"Defending France in 1815" Topic

Erwin,

That is rather profound and I like the idea of rulers having an expiration date.

I mentioned something in another thread today about Napoleon losing touch with reality and I think that is what you are refering to with regard to 1815; the former Emperor of the French failed to realise that he had become irrelevant to the future (and present?) of Europe and that, whatever problems the European powers had between themselves, they would put those aside for along enough to get rid of him.

It is easy to see why nobody believed, or wanted to believe, his messages of peace; the man just had too much baggage.

Jurgen

No strategist other than a totally mad one would regard a war where success is predicated on either killing the enemy commander or their own army being something other than what it actually is as anything other than a lost cause.

Are you (deliberately?) missing my point again Flecktarn? No one is suggesting that any commanders strategy has ever been based around the things you stated in this quote.

Flecktarn; I believe that the campaign of 1815 was probably unwinnable for the French army as it was in June 1815.

Von Wintervedlt; In 1815 there was no possible win for Napoléon there his operational art of war did not any longer cope with those of the Allies.

I am just stating that comments like yours and Von Whirlwinds display both a lack of awareness when it comes to understanding the nature of military conflicts and other complex things, as well as totally demeaning the commanders and soldiers who fought during the 100 days. It is to my mind the worst kind of armchair revisionism that stems from an agenda, and doesn't pay enough respects to the actual events at the time. When Von W says "no possible win", I smell his usual axe grinding. I can't think of one serious military historian that I have ever read that has argued that the Waterloo campaign was "un-winnable". And neither did the three respective commanders-in-chief at the time. To say that it was unwinnable for Napoleon is, if you actually think about what you are saying, the same thing as saying that Wellington and Blucher had a 100% certainty of beating Napoleon. Not only is this demeaning to the brilliant but dogged-backs-to-the-wall achievements of Wellington and Blucher, but also ignores the very fine lines that existed during the campaign (and has made it such a favourite amongst so many enthusiasts of military history). We know that Napoleon achieved the central position and the Prussians and were almost given the coup de gras (meaning Wellington would have been lost too). Just look at the quotes from Wellington from the outset of the campaign right up to, and indeed AFTER, the battle of Waterloo, and then tell us if Wellington thought the campaign was "un-winnable" for the French. I could be wrong, but no serious historian of Waterloo has put forward the same black-and-white deterministic analysis of the campaign as you have done. In fact, most of the ones that I have read have emphasized the near-run nature of the event.
Von Winterfedlt or Flecktarn, please tell me about a military historian who has argued that Waterloo was unwinnable for Napoleon, I would be very interested to read their work, their reasons given, and why they feel that they are confident enough to in this case ignore the vagaries of chance and chaos that plague every other event that occurs on planet Earth.

E Muilwijk, I am interested in your view on the French army in 1815. Your exchange with TelesticWarrior seems to have been overlooked, whereby he said:

"The 1815 French army was better than the one available in 1813-14 (and possibly earlier), so I don't agree that the army was not "capable of executing" the attacking option in 1815. If it was capable of achieving a series of brilliant attacking victories in 1814 for a few weeks against a numerically much bigger enemy, why not a year later against a numerically not quite so much bigger enemy for just the few days that were needed?"

To which you replied:

"So here's my question with regards to your argument how the French army in 1815 was at least much better, than the one in 1813-14 (or perhaps some years prior): can you please hand me some source material & studies that confirm this, as I really would like to read these?"

I have no particular sources for my opinion on the matter except quite a few books read quite some time ago, and as a result I have held the view that the 1815 army was of better quality than that fielded in 1813-14 which was comprised of a great deal of Marie Louises. I would be inclined to think that mine is the more traditional view. Are you saying that something in your research leads you to conclude differently?

I realise that I am reversing the question you posed to TelesticWarrior, but would be interested to hear from you.

I believe it is generally accepted that there were more 'veteran' soldiers in the 1815 French army than in 1813-14. However, there is also the organizational weakness of many units fighting under commanders they were not familiar with serving under, which perhaps made the army more 'brittle' under adversity. Never the less, Telestic Warrior is on very firm ground when he proposes that the Belgian campaign was considered at the time, and has been considered over the years by everyone I personally have read as very winable by the French- in fact it was really theirs to lose in many respects once the central position had been acheived on the 16th. The war as a whole after the campaign? Different kettle of fish there.

TW,

The boundaries of the campaign can be artifically drawn as 'The Waterloo Camapign' or, as I think Flecktarn and others are aluding to, 'The Napoleon wins and gets his way campaign'. The former he very nearly succeeded in winning. However, at the same time that he was endangering Britain and Prussia's armies in being there was a growing insurrection within France, half a million more enemies arriving and his coffers were empty. Without returning to a debate about what Napoleon would have settled form, I think most will agree that the latter is unwinnable and would only have been attempted if there were no other option.

Adam

Hello TelesticWarrior,

might it be possible for a war to be unwinnable in hindsight, that at the time all commanders were not so sure of?

My knowledge of military history is non-existent compared to others who post here, but I will go out on a limb and say that during certain conflicts we know after the fact that the war was unwinnable (as far as wars can be unwinnable) but that doesn't mean this was what the commanders thought at the time

I don't want to derail the OP by bringing this up I just thought that logically it is not inconceivable to look back at previous history, and because of the wider knowledge we have now we can make statements which no-one at the time might have claimed.

I am not claiming that Napoleon's 1815 *was* unwinnable, I am just saying that we might, now, be able to look at the forces arrayed against him and come to the conclusion/opinion that the war was unwinnable.

This doesn't seem to me to be demeaning to the soldiers who fought in the war nor displaying a lack of the nature of military conflicts and how they are/were fought.

I am unable to enter into the discussion as to whether we can say this about the 1815 campaign as I know nothing about it (apart from this thread!), but I am going to say that in my opinion it's not "demeaning the commanders and soldiers" or the "worst kind of armchair revisionism" to say that a war was unwinnable after the facts.

I am unable to comment on whether the two posters you referred to as having an agenda do actually have an agenda or not as once again I know nothing about it, but if their agenda is to say that they think it was unwinnable I think it is not unreasonable to believe that they are entitled to that pov. Again I cannot (and in fact I don't want to) take sides but I do feel that saying a war was unwinnable in hindsight is not wrong per se

thanks
m

magnus

Napoleon had no choice but to leave Elba when he did. The Bourbons had cut his financial support and there were plots to assassinate him. Had he time he should have returned in late summer, giving him the winter reorganize France. But he didn't have time!

So leaving Elba when he did was his only option. An intriguing alternate to France would have been the US. And no the US would not have denied him residence.

The coalition that defeated France was not the strongest. While Austria made a point to destroy Murat it did so because it considered Italy to be in its sphere of influence.

By 1815 Austria had a bellyful of Russia meddling in the affairs of central Europe. Its lack of enthusiasm was reflected in the very-very slow advance of its armies against Metropolitan France. Also the fact that one of Frances' grand children was in line to eventually rule France had to be considered.

Indeed, had Austria chosen to recognize Napoleon and his son, Europe could well have been the better for it. A rapprochement between Austria and France would put paid to Britain's desire to destroy Napoleon while curbing Prussian militarism and making German unification under Prussia much more difficult. It would also lock Russia out of meddling in Central Europe based on the ridiculous pretext the she was the Big Brother of the Serbs.

One could argue Napoleon was too dangerous but by 1815 he was evincing the maladies of age, which made him less dangerous and which were to end his life six years later.

Which returns us to the topic could Napoleon have survived by remaining on the defensive? No one will ever know. But what is knowable is Austria was not enthusiastic, Russian armies were a thousand miles away and neither the British nor Prussian armies in Belgium were capable of successfully invading France on their own. The best units of the Prussian Army were withheld by Frederick. The army in Belgium had a corps consisting of mostly LW and another of impressed Saxons who were to say the least unenthusiastic.

With the Austrians dawdling on the boarders, Napoleon could have had till 16 to worry about an invasion. Then who knows?

Bob Coggins

"Napoleon had no choice but to leave Elba when he did. The Bourbons had cut his financial support and there were plots to assassinate him. Had he time he should have returned in late summer, giving him the winter reorganize France. But he didn't have time!"

He left Elba because he believed his supporters (because he wanted to) who told him that France was calling out for his return. It wasn't, of course.

"Which returns us to the topic could Napoleon have survived by remaining on the defensive? No one will ever know. But what is knowable is Austria was not enthusiastic, Russian armies were a thousand miles away and neither the British nor Prussian armies in Belgium were capable of successfully invading France on their own. The best units of the Prussian Army were withheld by Frederick. The army in Belgium had a corps consisting of mostly LW and another of impressed Saxons who were to say the least unenthusiastic."

Except that there was another Prussian army on the way, a Sardinian Army and a Spanish army also on the way. The South was not on his side and there was open rebellion in the West. Added to that there was significant resistance to conscription and general war-weariness throughout France. The only people in favour of Buonaparte's retention of power was the Army, and a few of Buonaparte's functionaries who saw a better future for themselves under the Empire. He had to be seen to be winning to hold on to power, so couldn't defend.

"Napoleon had no choice but to leave Elba when he did. The Bourbons had cut his financial support and there were plots to assassinate him. Had he time he should have returned in late summer, giving him the winter reorganize France. But he didn't have time!"

"He left Elba because he believed his supporters (because he wanted to) who told him that France was calling out for his return. It wasn't, of course."

-I think it was both reasons, you could argue which was more pressing- I'd go with lack of money and safety as a more personal motivation, given what I know of human nature.

-I doubt Napoleon was concrned with an invasion of France by Sardinians and Spanish. Prussians and Austrians, oh yea. One can speculate of what if's of course. That's sort of the idea of the post.

I'm in agreement with Flecktarn on various points. I don't think the campaign was unwinnable but I am not certain that a return to power was sustainable, I also agree with Bob C. as to the reasons Nappy left Elba when he did and with Le Grande Quartier General that sure there were multiple reasons and it is a question of weight but all applied to some degree.

I disagree with Chouan that the *only* people happy to see Nappy return were those in the army, similar to the claim that the *only* reason he left was because of claims of supporters in France. Events rarely happen because of only one reason.

I do agree that he had to win to hold power, that proved out in history, he lost and he lost power…

One might ask, could Napoleon have managed a diplomatic solution that would have him remain in power without fighting a war – I think this would have been more difficult than winning the war that occurred. As Flecktarn points out, the rest of Europe felt he had a lot of baggage.

Regarding the campaign being winnable or not, I think it was highly improbably not impossible.

Cheers,

The Bandit

@TW

I am just stating that comments like yours and Von Whirlwinds display both a lack of awareness when it comes to understanding the nature of military conflicts and other complex things, as well as totally demeaning the commanders and soldiers who fought during the 100 days.

Erm…what did I say?

TW,

It seems that you are overheating slightly; please take the emotion out of your response and I will consider replying to it. Throwing around some of the phrases that you are using, such as "armchair revisionism that stems from an agenda", "a lack of awareness when it comes to understanding the nature of military conflicts and other complex things" and "totally demeaning the commanders and soldiers" is neither helpful nor constructive.

I am happy to debate with you, but only if that debate is conducted in a rational and constructive manner.

Jurgen

Bandit and AdamNameNotLongEnough,
I think we are talking about two different things. My conversation with Flecktarn was (I think!) whether Napoleon's June 1815 campaign against the Prussians and Anglo-Allies was "winnable". It is the assertion of Flecktarn and Von W that it was not winnable for the French, which I totally disagree with. In fact, I find that view quite silly.
We were not talking about (I hope!) the the wider issue of 1815 in general, i.e. what happens when the Austrians and Russians arrive. That is another kettle of fish entirely, and a very difficult task for the French indeed. But the first task, that of defeating the armies of Blucher and Wellington (that they had available at that time) quickly, was well within the realms of the achievable. A detailed analysis of the campaign shows this, because it was a very near run thing indeed.

Whirlwind,
So sorry, I meant to type Von Winterfedlt not Von Whirlwind! Accept my apologies!

Erwin,
Sorry I did not reply earlier as I got distracted with other things. Always good to hear from you. I echo the response that ColonelToffeeApple gave to you. I'm pretty sure from my general reading that the 1815 French army was in much better shape than it was in 1814, but I can't think of any sources quickly off the top of my head that could confirm that. There were many conscripts in the 1814 army. There were some conscripts in 1815 too, but the class of 1814 Marie Louises had had their baptism of fire by the time the Waterloo campaign rolled around. Then we have to add all the veterans that had been released from the prison camps and were with Napoleon again in 1815.
The cavalry was far, far better in 1815 than it was in 1815.
The Generals were perhaps better in 1815 too. By 1814 the Generals must have been totally exhausted from the Russian and German campaigns. By 1815 the likes of Grouchy, Gerard, Drouet and Vandamme had had a much needed rest. Its difficult to say how fresh Ney was, in terms of his state of mind.

Sungam,
You make some very valid points. It is true that we can look back on a War many years afterwards and conclude that the side that lost had little chance of winning, even though the commander/s of the losing side at the time could not see it.
But I don't think the Waterloo campaign was one of those times. It was a difficult campaign for Napoleon to try and win, sure, but hardly unwinnable. The French were actually in the driving seat for good portions of the campaign, if the Corps of D'Erlon arrives at Ligny on the 16th of June as intended, the Prussians would have suffered an even greater loss than they did. Meaning that they would have been unable to save Wellingtons army on the 18th. Even when this opportunity is lost, there are still other opportunities to win on the 18th.
Flecktarn will argue that it is precisely these lost opportunities that show that the French were not capable of winning. It is this that I dispute. The French high command was not as good in 1815 as it was in earlier times when Marshal Berthier was Chief-of-staff, but there are still highly competent men that have been conducting and winning wars for 20+ years on the staff. I suppose my whole point is that the command mix-ups on the 16th and 18th are preventable on any other given day, there is nothing totally INHERENT to the French situation in 1815 that would result in these mix-ups happening every time. If you read up on them, you can see that the wanderings of D'rlons Corps on the 16th really were odd.
Wellington and Blucher were saved by some big slices of luck in 1815, and this as much as anything should tell us that the campaign was winnable for the French. There is nothing at all to say that these mix-ups would have happened in a deterministic way every time we stage a re-run of our "what if" campaign.

Flecktarn,
It is armchair revisionism though. I am not sure what else to call it. No historian that I have ever read has stated that the Waterloo campaign was unwinnable for the French. Quite the opposite in fact. I see no reason at all why we should see it that way, considering the extremely near run nature of that conflict.

TW,

I think we are talking about two different things. My conversation with Flecktarn was (I think!) whether Napoleon's June 1815 campaign against the Prussians and Anglo-Allies was "winnable". It is the assertion of Flecktarn and Von W that it was not winnable for the French, which I totally disagree with. In fact, I find that view quite silly.

We're not talking about different things. I agree with Jurgen (Flecktarn) about the 8 points he listed as being against Nappy during the campaign. I don't agree with his conclusion that it was impossible to win the campaign but as I concur with the negatives he noted I believe it was improbable. Regarding Flecktarn's conclusion being silly, he listed out 8 general conditions that support his view. All of those points seem realistic and viable. None of them conflict with your list of things that could have happened differently. My thinking is that your statement that:

If D'Erlon comes across on the 16th, the campaign was as good as won already, and there are a number of points right up until late on the 18th where the campaign is winnable.

… sure. But Flecktarn's 8 points didn't dispute this, his 8 points to support his conclusion indicate that these were more unlikely than likely. His conclusion is that those points you content could have gone the other way were unlikely to break for Napoleon because of the 8 points he cited. That isn't unreasonable.

Regarding your statement that:

It is armchair revisionism though. I am not sure what else to call it.

Wouldn't armchair revisionism be claiming conditions that either weren't the case or weren't known to be the case? So far the stuff he's outlined seems reasonable, he just comes to a different conclusion than you and I do. His points #3, 4 5 & 6 are not agreed to by everyone but nor are they out of left field.

Cheers,

The Bandit

… sure. But Flecktarn's 8 points didn't dispute this, his 8 points to support his conclusion indicate that these were more unlikely than likely. His conclusion is that those points you content could have gone the other way were unlikely to break for Napoleon because of the 8 points he cited. That isn't unreasonable.

Wow, I clearly missed editing that couple sentences, sorry for the poor writing, hope my point was understood.

Cheers,

The Bandit

It was unwinable because the Allies were much better than Napoléon then.
Napoléon failed on all aspects in his strategy (which was so successfull from 1805 to 1809) -
he failed to destroy the center of gravity of Blücher and Wellington and there was no rupture of the position central – due to the shifting of the lines of communication of Blücher after his defeat of Ligny.
Then of course Blücher did a marvellous manoeuvre sur les arrieres of Napoléon while Wellington pinned his army.
Great Napoleonic strategy reversed.
The what if's – D'Erlon etc., I leave to the armchair revisionsm of TW or B
I agree with Flecktarn, Napoléon's time was over and out.

Bandit,

I am not really disputing Flecktarn's 8 points. Some of them are very good points, and I am not denying them. I am disputing his statement that they mean that the campaign was "un-winnable". It is this statement that I find very silly, considering how close the Waterloo campaign was. It is the near-run nature of the campaign that has made it so fascinating to historians and wargamers and military enthusiasts alike. So I see it as pure revisionism for him and Von Wintervedlt to come out and say what they have. That is probably why they cannot name a single military historian that would support the very determinsitic claim that the 100 days campaign was "unwinnable" for any of the combatants. Historians know that the real world doesn't work like that.

The 8 reasons Flecktarn gave are not good enough to support his final conclusion. They are good enough points to support the view that the French have an handicap, sure, but they are not good enough reasons to say it was "unwinnable". I could just as easily list a series of very valid criticisms of the Prussian and British situation and all the myriad of handicaps that they were labouring under, and then try to use them to claim that it was "un-winnable" for them, but that would be equally silly.
My point is that very few campaigns in history have been 100% totally "unwinnable". Please see the quotes of Napoleon himself I gave on page 1 that show that luck and chance is such a big part of warfare. Even Napoleon, one of the greatest commanders of all time, never ever felt 100% confident that he could win against even a weaker opponent every time he took to the saddle.
Waterloo is not even that unbalanced against the French. At the start the Brit/Prussians are the favourites because they outnumber the French, then Napoleon achieves the central position and catches the Allies with the pants around their ankles, and the French arguably become the favourite. The Prussians are smashed at Ligny and the pendulum swings even more to the french being favourites. From the 17th onwards the pendulum starts to swing back towards the Allies until they become the favourites. But at NO POINT during all this is the campaign "unwinnable" for EITHER side, until the French are actually streaming from the field on the 18th and Napoleon's morale is shattered.
Fleck and Von W are essentially arguing that the allies had a 100% chance of winning. This is silly, because it is also saying that under no scenario is it possible for D'Erlon to come across on the 16th, or the Imperial Guard to actually carry the British centre late on the 18th, and so on and on and on ad finitum. It displays an ignorance of the chaos inherent to real world military events.

Note that I am not necesarily saying that Flecktarns individual points are wrong, just the conclusion that he draws. His case has not been helped in my eyes by the fact that Von W is arguing the same point. Von W is a known Napoleon hater with a massive axe to grind, and I am very distrustful of ANYTHING he says. Just look at his latest comments;
"It was unwinable because the Allies were much better than Napoléon then". LOL. Really? Then why were the Prussians outclassed AGAIN at Ligny, despite having a clear superiority in numbers?
"Napoléon failed on all aspects in his strategy (which was so successfull from 1805 to 1809) -he failed to destroy the center of gravity of Blücher and Wellington and there was no rupture of the position central – due to the shifting of the lines of communication of Blücher after his defeat of Ligny." This is pure nonsense. Napoleon DID achieve the central position between Wellington and Blucher, which is clearly shown by the fact that the brits were not capable of reinforcing the Prussians on the 16th, and vice versa, whereas the French could sent reinforcements to either "Wing". Saying that the lines of communication were shifted is a disingenious masterpiece, because you can claim that "the lines of communication have shifted" after every defeat in history, even a catastrophic defeat such as Austerlitz. LOL.

I think that the Bandit has said everything that I would have said in reply, but probably said it better and more eloquently that I would have.

Jurgen

TW,

You are continuing with the approach of describing views with which you agree as "very silly"; you are now also condemning an argument because of your view of one of the people who holds it, which is rather weak.

You also say; "It displays an ignorance of the chaos inherent to real world military events." Now, that is fascinating; which of the two of us has commanded a battalion in a combat zone?

Please try to debate rationally and constructively.

Jurgen

Bandit, your "I disagree with Chouan that the *only* people happy to see Nappy return were those in the army, similar to the claim that the *only* reason he left was because of claims of supporters in France. Events rarely happen because of only one reason." is interesting. The final sentence is generally true. However, I would be interested if you could show that he had any other support. By 1814 refractraires were hiding from conscription in tens of thousands, thousands of young men were either marrying very early or were mutilating themselves to avoid conscription, and the economy was in ruins. Which people in France, apart from the army and the returning Pows would want Buonaparte's return?

I think one of Napoleon's big mistakes was returning in 1815. The Allies had large armies still under arms. 1816 or 17 may have been a better bet.

This comment seems to have gone largely unremarked upon, possibly as it is slightly away from (though far from completely off) the topic. Whilst another poster has pointed out that Louis XVIII was a lot more canny than he is given credit for, another year of Bourbon rule might have dimmed the memories of the worst aspects of Napoleonic government. The Allied armies would have dispersed: the Russians most likely all the way back home; large parts of the Prussian army returned to civilian life, and others quietly seething at their new overlords; and that of Great Britain – inevitably – reduced to a rump, with its veterans consigned to demobilisation. Only the Austrians, with a European empire to police, would still be around in any numbers. Politically, many European governments were being distracted from foreign activities by calls for change at home, especially from the working classes, with the rise of what later became trade unions in the UK, for example.

However, most significantly, 1816 was "the year without a summer" – one of the five worst harvests (I think maybe even THE worst) recorded since 1500, and which saw folk in the south of France huddled around fires wearing greatcoats in August. Hunger and poverty might well have boosted recruitment to a resurgent French army.

What effect – positive or negative – might all of this have had on Napoleon's propsects if he had come back a year later?

Supercilius Maximus,

Given the discussions that were happening in Vienna, I suspect that, by the spring/summer of 1816, Napoleon might have been on his way to St Helena. If that year had been one of peace and Napoleon was still on Elba, then I suspect that his chances of a successful return would have been reduced as France became more used to not losing tens of thousands of yong men every year in war. Bourbon rule under Louis XVIII was not bad.

Alternatively, it is possible that the European powers might have fallen out enough to be fighting each other by then, which would have had an effect on his ability to return, but I am not sure if that effect would have been positive or negative.

Jurgen

Sometimes I wonder if the interuption of funds to Elba was just a second step towards a greater isolation planned by the Austrians & British. What I mean is, there must have been a tendancy in Austria (certainly in Britian)to want to progressivly isolate Napoleon over time, as the Hapsbourg heir grew up- whatever that might have looked like, from assination to exile. I speculate that Napoleon saw the writing on the wall, beginning with the refusal of the powers to allow the Queen and Prince to join him in exile, despite the Queen's expressed desire to do so, if only because she was a loyal person and a dutiful Catholic. Napoleon must have suspected his progressive isolation was beginning from the moment of this refusal, which we know caused him great anxiety,and must have built over time and been exacerbated by evey circumstace that followed. To expect a man with his personality to be patient under the circumstances when every day (to him)meant a waining of his influence would be asking too much, and 1816 would have looked like an impossibe wait to him. If he had been capable of such patience, he might not have been there in the first place! Having said that, the speculation that 1816 would have been a more fortunate time for him is delightfully interesting to contemplate- a great subject for an alternative history, and…a wargames campaign, perhaps?

TelesticWarrior,

While I agree with your opinion of the campaign I can't agree with your criticism. Let me contrast two things that you're painting with the same brush:

Flecktarn – Outlines 8 points you agree are reasonable assessments though you give them different weight than he does.

von Winterfeldt – Says it couldn't have happened because it didn't happen:

It was unwinable because the Allies were much better than Napoléon then.
Napoléon failed on all aspects in his strategy (which was so successfull from 1805 to 1809) -
he failed to destroy the center of gravity of Blücher and Wellington and there was no rupture of the position central – due to the shifting of the lines of communication of Blücher after his defeat of Ligny.
Then of course Blücher did a marvellous manoeuvre sur les arrieres of Napoléon while Wellington pinned his army.
Great Napoleonic strategy reversed.

Here's the thing:

Flecktarn says that to his mind the outcome that occurred was the most likely of all possible outcomes not just because it came to pass (improbable things sometimes happen…) but because of XYZ reasons (his 8 points) that combined to make the outcome more likely than any other. To his mind, it is so unlikely it could not have occurred otherwise. That isn't irrational no matter if I disagree with it or not.

von Winterfeldt says that since Napoleon's actions failed they could never have succeeded. That makes no sense unless one adopts fatalism.

You say that since it can be envisioned that events broke a different way it is impossible for success to have been impossible. That is rational depending on the acceptable ranges of probability granted presuming the envisioned events can be determined to carry enough weight to move the thing.

My take on all this? You and von Winterfeldt are applying the same reasoning, which I think lacks depth (yours simply because the weight of your examples is presumed but not innately evident, sure the claim is possibly true but not known to be true – I mean logically not factually), to opposite arguments. Flecktarn, whose conclusion I disagree with, makes a reasonable conclusion all the same, i.e. here are 8 points that contribute to the probability of the events as they happened, their weight is clearly evident, blah blah blah.

The reasonability isn't a factor of "do all the kids in the class agree" it is a question of logical conclusion based on the agreed on premises. The actual fact is that we do not know if the campaign was winnable or unwinnable. We know that in the event it was lost and we know that XYZ contributed to it. We can say reasonably that, "had X occurred differently then I believe it carried enough weight to change the result" and we can debate the amount of weight X carried – that is a useful discussion. Yet that argument you're making to Flecktarn, and strangely enough that von Winterfeldt is making back in your direction – is that any conclusion that does not match with the speaker's desired one is "armchair revisionism". Of all the things said in this thread – that is the silly one. Just because it is disagreed upon doesn't make it silly. Perhaps if it was unfounded… but the foundation for the conclusion has already been granted.

So Flecktarn might be right or wrong but it isn't silly whereas von Winterfeldt's statements could be right or wrong but are silly because they assume their conclusion and yours could be right or wrong and are not silly pending debate over the weight of examples… Then there is me, whose position could right or wrong but who offered no evidence for consideration, rather chose to rely on the examples given by each you and Flecktarn which I suppose makes me lazy but not likely silly.

Cheers,

The Bandit

le Grande Quartier General,

Sometimes I wonder if the interuption of funds to Elba was just a second step towards a greater isolation…

I've always felt this way though it is based on opinion more than anything.

…planned by the Austrians & British

While I am more than happy to blame the English for a lot of things, I actually thing they are (and were) a very pragmatic people and thus were all about keeping him happy on Elbe (at least while he was on Elbe) in order to make an attempt at return less likely.

…the speculation that 1816 would have been a more fortunate time for him is delightfully interesting to contemplate- a great subject for an alternative history, and…a wargames campaign, perhaps?

Trouble is someone would make a strong argument that the uniforms would have changed again, at least yet different hats and then we'd have debates about what figures could be legitimately used to represent it… oh man I don't know, big can of worms there ;-)

Cheers,

The Bandit

Not to throw the thread off on another tangent … but from a purely wargaming perspective, I think the only really viable solution to a long-term French victory in 1815 is if the Austrians decide that they are getting the short end of the post-war diplomatic stick (which they were) and either remain neutral or (better yet, from a wargaming perspective) actually enter into the war on France's side. Yes, I know it was highly unlikely, by several orders of magnitude. However, it would create a fascinating campaign!

Cheers,

Christopher

You could play the back story as France getting rid of the Bourbons again in disgust and accepting the Prince to the throne in favour of Napoleon's abdication- France, Poland Italy & Austria fight England, Spain/Portugal, Russia and Prussia, but without Napoleon, who is too ill to campaign, but not to meddle somehow…

I don't think you would have to change any uniforms, would you really? :)

PS: Bandit, define 'silly'? LOL (no, please don't!)

Bandit, you are probably right about the British- Really it would be the Bourbons and the Austrians who had the most to gain/lose, and in fact the stopping of funds began with the Bourbons and was argued against by a British representatve, as I recall…

Flecktarn,
Shall I assume from the fact that you continue to avoid all the key points that you have conceded this issue?

I'll give you one last opportunity before I lose interest. Could you please answer or address the following points;

1. Can you please link me to any military historian at all that agrees with the blanket assertion that the Waterloo campaign was "unwinnable" for the French?

2. Do you agree with me when I say that the claim that the Waterloo campaign was "unwinnable" for Napoleon is the exact same claim, from a logical point of view, that it was 100% certain that his opponents would not to lose the Waterloo campaign?
If the two statements are not the same, why not? And if they are the same, please explain how either statement could be true, given point 3…

3. How is possible that the Waterloo campaign can avoid all the twists of chance, chaos, damn bad luck and just plain odd and unexplained events that have plagued every other complex historical event that has occurred on planet earth?

I have also noticed that you often like to accuse people that disagree with you as irrational. Let me define the word rational for you;
-using reason or logic in thinking out a problem
-in accordance with the principles of logic or reason; reasonable
-of sound mind; sane – the patient seemed quite rational
-endowed with the capacity to reason; capable of logical thought man is a rational being.
Now that we have learned the definition of your favourite word, perhaps you can use it to explain to me why you think that the fact that you have "commanded a battalion in a combat zone", means that you are more qualified to state that Waterloo was "unwinnable" for the French. Please also use the definitions whilst trying to avoid the contradictions that are inherent to your position, given point 2, above, and also whilst you are explaining why it is ok to ignore all the factors outlined in point 3, above.

TW,

You called his argument silly, what would be an appropriate response from him, "no it isn't!"?

Chouan,

I'm painting the kitchen today, I did see you question, not ignoring it, just not taking the time (yet) to address it.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit,

Flecktarn says that to his mind the outcome that occurred was the most likely of all possible outcomes not just because it came to pass (improbable things sometimes happen…) but because of XYZ reasons (his 8 points) that combined to make the outcome more likely than any other. To his mind, it is so unlikely it could not have occurred otherwise. That isn't irrational no matter if I disagree with it or not.

If Flecktarn stated that what happened historically was the most likely of all possible outcomes, then I would not be arguing with him. But that was not what he has written. To state the obvious, this is an internet forum, and we are dependant on the written word. We can only respond to what people write. He stated that the campaign was "unwinnable" for the French. It is this bit that makes little sense, whatever way you look at it. I'm pretty much OK with the first bit of his argument, and have been from the beginning. His opinion is a subjective thing that he is entitled to, so if he says something like "it was the most likely possible outcome", then I am cool with that. But it is the other part that is an un-knowable thing, and makes no sense.

von Winterfeldt says that since Napoleon's actions failed they could never have succeeded. That makes no sense unless one adopts fatalism.

Exactly.

So Flecktarn might be right or wrong but it isn't silly whereas von Winterfeldt's statements could be right or wrong but are silly because they assume their conclusion and yours could be right or wrong and are not silly pending debate over the weight of examples… Then there is me, whose position could right or wrong but who offered no evidence for consideration, rather chose to rely on the examples given by each you and Flecktarn which I suppose makes me lazy but not likely silly.

LOL! That's an interesting summary. Confusing situation, isn't it?

TW,

He believes Napoleon winning was impossible, impossible is the least likely of all circumstances. If you think it is impossible for something to be impossible, then I guess uhm sure… but that still doesn't make his statement silly. Your argument with his statement thus far consists of, "but I don't agree!" Thing is, you don't have to.

The reason I'm jumping in is that while I concur with your conclusion about the campaign your argument isn't very strong while you seem to be picking a fight with the guy who recently said, "I'm gonna try to stay outa fights, ma," worst of all is that he made a strong(er) argument to support his position than the one you've made objecting to it which appears to me — the guy whose view agrees with yours — can only be understood to be, "but you're wrong / silly / whatever, cause I say so."

Cheers,

The Bandit

No problem Bandit, we all haves lives beyond this forum.
I'm just home from work and have marking to do.

TW,

"Shall I assume from the fact that you continue to avoid all the key points that you have conceded this issue?"

You can assume whatever you choose to. As I stated in a thread that I started, I am going to try to avoid being drawn into fights and what I believe are known as "slanging matches", one of which is what you seem to be trying to start.

However, I note with amusement your attempts to argue against things that I have neither said nor claimed.

I have never claimed that any published historians agree with my view, neither have I claimed that having commanded a battalion in a war zone makes me more qualified to claim that Waterloo was unwinnable for the French; what I questioned was your assertion that my view "displays an ignorance of the chaos inherent to real world military events", when I have experienced "real world military events" at command level.

Jurgen

Bandit

He believes Napoleon winning was impossible

Yes, this is the laughable bit. There have been hundreds of books written on the Waterloo campaign and none of the authors have concluded that it was impossible for Napoleon to win. If you really stop to think about it (and I know you are a very smart chap so I can't see you won't concede this), it is the same comment as saying that the Prussians and British had a 100% chance of "not losing", which is equally silly. It is also why I said much earlier in the thread that their view is demeaning of the achievements of Wellington and Blucher, because if they had a 100% chance of winning, there was no achievement. Its like asking someone to roll a 1-6 on a D6, there's no achievement to it.
Blanket statements like theirs is a slippery slope. In fact, that is why there is not a trained historian in the world that would ever state that a campaign like Waterloo was un-winnable for either side, for reasons that should be obvious by now. The real world doesn't work like that.
This is why I don't have to make a detailed argument about the specifics of the campaign to deconstruct his determinism, and asking for one misses the point. I just need to show why the determinism doesn't work in the real world. The Waterloo campaign was not like asking Napoleon to throw a 7 on a D6. In the real world there is always a chance of throwing a successful result, there is never "un-winnable".
Flecktarn can make as many detailed arguments as he wants describing how the French command structure was poor, but he could NEVER prove his specific point. He can only hope to support his claim that a French win was unlikely, but he cannot hope to support the laughable logical non-starter that a French win was impossible. He knows that now, which is why he continues to avoid the points I listed in my previous post, particularly points 2 & 3.

If it was said by anyone else I would let it slide on the account of it just being poor terminology, but when Fleck and Von W say it I chose to call them out, because we all know by now the context in which they make their comments. It is always the same guys that try to say that Napoleon couldn't win, so he was the bad guy for even trying, he should have surrendered to the British after 1811, he alone should have jumped through flaming hoops to make a peace blah blah blah. It is a double-standard, because I rarely see these same guys make the same argument about any other Nation during this period.

Well if my memory serves me right, Flecktarn gave his 8 points and then said:

" As I said, these are just my thoughts. I believe that the campaign of 1815 was probably unwinnable for the French army as it was in June 1815."

So taken at it's height he was merely talking about a probability not an absolute.

There has been a fair amount of possible subtle baiting in this thread namely when TelesticWarrior wrote:

"a lack of awareness when it comes to understanding the nature of military conflicts and other complex things"

"totally demeaning the commanders and soldiers" (of the 100 Days)

and

"It displays an ignorance of the chaos inherent to real world military events."

It would appear that Flecktarn, given his background, has perceived these comments as an attempt at baiting, and is refusing to proceed with the discussion on the basis of this, not wishing to be drawn into a "slanging match".

TelesticWarrior on the other hand may have framed these comments with sole reference to the complexities that would have prevailed during the Waterloo campaign, and be of the view that an assertion that it was probably unwinnable for the French shows a distinct lack of the qualities encapsulated in his comments. He can perhaps explain this.

It would seem that until these side issues are put to bed the substantive discussion on the unwinnable issue might not move forward.

on a second thought – a very successfull scenario defending France would be – arrest Napoléon – Ney brings him back to Paris in an iron cage.

TW,

It appears that you are quite happy to set up strawmen and then argue against them in the hope of starting an argument.

Please read and understand my original comment:

"I believe that the campaign of 1815 was probably unwinnable for the French army as it was in June 1815."

The word "probably" is quite important there and makes what I said different from what you are trying to claim that I said.

I will not behave in your insulting manner by defining it for you as if you were an ignorant child.

Your rudeness and your twisting of what people say are the reasons why I refuse to continue to debate with you.

If you feel the need to believe that refusal means that you have "won" something, please feel free to believe that.

Jurgen

Flecktarn,
Although you used the word probably I thought your position was quite clear from other things you said before that, such as;

A schwerpunkt was his only option, but it was not one that either he or his army were capable of executing any more.

Seems pretty clear to me. I didn't twist your words and there is no strawman. You said that attacking was the only option, yet neither Napoleon or his army were capable of it. Quite a declarative statement. You then said;

I believe that the campaign of 1815 was probably unwinnable for the French army as it was in June 1815

Von W then entrenched this position, and you subsequently did nothing to clarify that you do actually think the campaign WAS winnable for the French.
Are you now stating that it was possible for the French to win the Waterloo campaign, but you think it unlikely? If so, we don't have a major difference of opinion.

TW,

You've never had a major difference of opinion with him. He has with you! He disagreed with your approach:

"TW,

It seems that you are overheating slightly; please take the emotion out of your response and I will consider replying to it. Throwing around some of the phrases that you are using, such as "armchair revisionism that stems from an agenda", "a lack of awareness when it comes to understanding the nature of military conflicts and other complex things" and "totally demeaning the commanders and soldiers" is neither helpful nor constructive.

I am happy to debate with you, but only if that debate is conducted in a rational and constructive manner.

Jurgen"

He disagreed with your comments about not understanding the chaos of war. He disagreed with your misquoting him.

To be honest, I think the majority of us have disagreed with you on these.

I note that you refer to von W as a Napoleon hater, is it fair to then say you are a Napoleon lover? The former is probably true and is your opinion, the later is probaly true and is my opinion, both equally valid. Does that undermine your objectivity? Should it have undermined your objectivity to the point where you wish to type in excess of 4000 words that totaly ignore Flectarn's use of the word "probably" just because it was anti-Napoleon?

As to belittling commanders or troops because something was a certainty – I think not, and they rarely percieve that something is unwinnable. Were the Boers at Spion Kop any less brave because the British couldn't, at that point, act in a different way? The personalities involved, the training received and the sterotypes they embraced rendered them incapable of acting in the decisive but responsive manner required. We can see that with the help of hindsight and analysis of the psychological make up of command, we can see it through the lens of modern warfare and operating with dispersed command and an 'empty battlefield', we can also see where they went wrong because of historical perspective and Godlike view wargaming and Osprey books give us. I doubt a Victorian soldier could have seen it!

But that is not all. Putting it into terms that Flecktarn will relate to. There may be a near certainty of prevailing – few ISAF patrols are in danger of being overrun and destroyed – but that does not remove the personal jeopardy of being on those patrols. Every patrol I have undertaken in numerous countries around the World could have ended badly for me. Would you say that my certainty that we could defeat any insurgent threat we faced (through AH, fires, deployment of QRFs…) "belittle" what we went through on the ground?

Personally, I don't feel that historical understanding of something as a certainty in either direction belittles what soldiers do.

TW,

I am not responsible for what you think or what you assume; neither am I required to state what you wish me to state or to clarify anything for your benefit. In addition, I am not von Winterfeldt and his statements should not be regarded as part of my argument or point of view.

I clearly stated my position early on in this thread:

"I believe that the campaign of 1815 was probably unwinnable for the French army as it was in June 1815".

You have continued to argue against something that I did not say and have created strawman arguments by doing so and twisting my words to suit your need to start an argument.

I am not now stating anything other than what I originally stated. What you assume from that is entirely up to you and is nothing to do with me.

Jurgen

Adam,

You've never had a major difference of opinion with him. He has with you! He disagreed with your approach:

Sigh. All I have pointed out is that to say Waterloo was unwinnable for the French is a silly comment.

He disagreed with your misquoting him.

Please tell me where I have misquoted Flectarn? You all seem fixated on this word "probably", but I have already pointed out that Fleck made a declarative statement even before this; "A schwerpunkt was his only option, but it was not one that either he or his army were capable of executing any more." There you go, its clear for you to read in black and white. Flecktarn thinks that the French were categorically not capable of executing the one strategy that he believes could have brought success.
All Flecktarn has to say is that Waterloo was in fact winnable for the French, and prove that he he is not holding to his logical non-starter.

To be honest, I think the majority of us have disagreed with you on these.

Fine. But your latest comments still show that you don't understand the point that I have tried to make.

I note that you refer to von W as a Napoleon hater, is it fair to then say you are a Napoleon lover?

Another logical non-starter. The former is not necessarily related to the latter.
If you think I am a Napoleon lover, support your claim.
The claim that Von W is a Napoleon hater is quite clear from all his posts, just look at his latest; he thinks "France" should have brought Napoleon back to Paris in an Iron cage.

As to belittling commanders or troops because something was a certainty

But I am not saying that Flecktarns comments belittle the courage of the commanders and troops am I? Standing in the firing line always requires courage. I am saying that his comments belittle the achievement of the commanders. If a campaign was unwinnable for one side, it must be a 100% certainty for the other. So it can't be an achievement.

Should it have undermined your objectivity to the point where you wish to type in excess of 4000 words

So now you are counting my words, how fun! No-one is forcing you to read what I write, or reply to it. If people didn't keep missing the point and skewing the issues, I wouldn't have to keep correcting them would I?

Flectarn,

You continue to play games. A simple question for you; Do you think that the Waterloo campaign was unwinnable for the French, or not?

TW,

I have repeated my statement; I am not playing games. If you choose not to understand, that is up to you.

Jurgen

"The claim that Von W is a Napoleon hater is quite clear from all his posts, just look at his latest; he thinks "France" should have brought Napoleon back to Paris in an Iron cage."

I think he said that Ney should have brought Buonaparte back in an iron cage in order to defend France, which isn't the same thing at all.
I'm inclined to agree with von Winterfeld, afterall, the Allies were at war with Buonaparte, not France, which is one of the reasons why the French people offered little if any resistance to the invasion of France in 1814, and again in 1815.

Flecktarn,

Adam; As to belittling commanders or troops because something was a certainty – I think not, and they rarely perceive that something is unwinnable. Were the Boers at Spion Kop any less brave because the British couldn't, at that point, act in a different way?

I read that as Adam talking about the courage of the troops. How do you read it?
I suggest you read the thread more thoroughly and stop pretending that I am misquoting people.

You can squirm and play your games as much as you want Flecktarn, it will not hide the fact that you are wrong. You have stated that you think the French were not capable of executing an attacking campaign and that Waterloo was unwinnable for the French. This means that you think it was impossible for the British and Prussians to lose. So if we follow your silly conclusions through to the end, it means that you think Wellington and Blucher did not achieve anything of note, because they were already 100% certain to win.

I'll ask you again and hope that your habit of wriggling ceases; Do you think that the Waterloo campaign was unwinnable for the French?

TW,

You are an extremely rude and deeply unpleasant and arrogant person who seems to think that anyone who dares to disagree with him is both "silly" and "playing games" and has to answer your questions.

I am sorry that you cannot understand a very straightforward statement; however, that is not my problem, but yours. However, I will state my position for you one final time and hope that this time you can understand it:

"I believe that the campaign of 1815 was probably unwinnable for the French army as it was in June 1815."

As far as I am concerned, you have shown yourself to be dishonest and a determined troublemaker. I think there is another name for you but I understand that it is forbidden to use it on TMP.

Jurgen

All,

It seems that I failed somewhat in my attempt not to get drawn into arguments; apologies for that.

However, there will be no further arguments with TelesticWarrior.

Jurgen

Oh dear, it's all suddenly got a bit serious

F

Flecktarn,

I don't believe that everyone who disagrees with me is silly, just the folks who are ignorant enough to believe that Waterloo was unwinnable for the French. I'll quote you again so we can see that was your position from the very start;
""A schwerpunkt was his only option, but it was not one that either he or his army were capable of executing any more."

Trouble seems to follow you everywhere you go on TMP, and your weak attempts to carry favour by apologising to everyone every time you get exposed for playing games won't wash. 327 stifles since June this year is quite some record, so don't play the innocent and blame me for your inability to behave on this forum.