"Defending France in 1815" Topic

What if France (Napoleon) had chosen to remain on the defensive in 1815? Would they have been able to find a way to prevail militarily within their own borders? How do you think it would have looked from June 1815 on, into 1816…?

I thought he was on the defensive in 1815. He was trying to knock out the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies before they linked up (along with everyone else!) and did another 1814 job on him.

yes,I mean waiting for the Allies to move first, and cross French borders. And I wonder if the Allies would have had as much momentum and motivation as they did in 1814?

It seemed like there was still sufficient fear/political will to motivate the Allies to push into France, and Napoleon (rightfully, as it turns out) had plenty of reason to be concerned about the internal situation at home.

le Grande Quartier General,

I agree with darthfozzywig mostly.

In 1805 Napoleon put a big army on the French side of the channel in preparation to attack England. England responded by convincing the Austrians & Russians to go to war with France as part of the 3rd Coalition. This was, from the English point of view, a pre-emptive, defensive action.

Similarly, in 1815, there are large Allied armies gathering near the French boarders, I think it was equally known that their intent was to move in on Napoleon by attacking France, therefore from Napoleon's point of view the Waterloo campaign was a pre-emptive, defensive action.

Had Nappy waited I think the result would have been losing the initiative.

Cheers,

The Bandit

I suspect that sitting and waiting and allowing quite large parts of French territory to be entered by the Allies would have resulted in a rather quick overthrow of Napoleon. France had no appetite for war in 1815, particularly if that war was on its own territory.

The Allies seem to have had the will to invade and I suspect that Napoleon would have been either dead or in exile by 1816.

A schwerpunkt was his only option, but it was not one that either he or his army were capable of executing any more.

Jurgen

I think the best policy was the pre-emptive attack into Belgium, which almost worked.
But the OP is an interesting one. In 1814 Napoleon had a relatively tiny army with lots of green troops, and a increasingly disconsolate marshalate, an inadequate defense set up in Paris, and a crack British army under Wellington advancing from Southern France. And he still bested a much larger enemy coalition for a while.
In 1815 the situation is a lot better for Napoleon in my opinion (although he still has some internal problems); he has a much bigger army, with much better quality in it, and the available Marshals and Generals are well up for fighting, he is already in Paris so he can set up a mean defence (as well as other key French defences outside of Paris), and there is no British Army already deep in the French interior. It could work. Possibly.

But it doesn't suit Napoleon's rather impatient, aggressive and dynamic style of making war. All his great victories are won by going on the attack and bewildering his enemies.
So I think the option he chose was the correct one for him. Even though it didn't work in the end. I don't agree with Flecktarn at all that he or his army was not capable of executing that kind of campaign any more. The Allies had to hang on to the skin of their pants just to stay in the game. If D'erlon comes across on the 16th, its all over for the allies. Ditto with Grouchy on the 18th. And if the Prussians retreat towards Namur on the 16th, its all over too. A lot of things had to go their way just to stay in the game.

I think a waiting game would have been suicide as the Austrians after crushing Murat in Naples (which they did at Tolentino in early May)could have sent their Italian army into France, the French armee de alps under Suchet was facing 75000 Austrians, Schwarzenberg was mobilising 210,000 to advance on the Rhine and in fact the last battle of the campaign was the French victory over the Austrians at La Suffel.

Presumably the Prussians and British would have received reinforcements.

Not to mention by sitting still it would have given the Russians a chance to get an army into France. Tolly had 167,000 at Mannerheim on 25 June and in fact he got to Paris by July.

I think a major part of Napoleon's genius was his aggression and attacking inclination. He grasped that there are systemic benefits to attacking – dislocation of the enemy, causing confusion as a result of surprise & shock, compelling the enemy to use their forces in defensive ways that negates their numerical advantages – in a way few contemporaries or predecessors did. Given the situation in 1815, it is hard to see how any waiting strategy would have helped in any way.

I'd echo TW's:

In 1814 Napoleon had a relatively tiny army with lots of green troops, and a increasingly disconsolate marshalate, an inadequate defense set up in Paris, and a crack British army under Wellington advancing from Southern France. And he still bested a much larger enemy coalition for a while.

…but also add that if Napoleon had had the political greatness to give himself more achievable results (i.e. to get enough members of the Allies to agree to 1792 borders or natural frontiers + a few colonies or somesuch that they might genuinely have agreed to) he might have actually pulled this off.

It was not Napoléon's habit to let the strategical initiative to his foes. He should have shared his forces between all his borders against, including West, were a royalist uprising was growing, without talking about others royalist departments. He needed a fast and stunning victory for strenghtening his still weak power in 1815 France.

Defense wasn't an option, was it? I agree that taking the offensive was the best option. But it was only a matter of time before Napoleon would have succumbed even if he'd succeeded at Waterloo

TelesticWarrior,

I think that the wanderings of d'Erlon on the 16th, and the failure to launch a pursuit of the Prussians late on the same day or very early in the morning of the 17th are evidence that neither Napoleon nor his army was capable of the kind of quick and decisive action that was required.

Add to that the confusion and slowness of the French army on the 15th and the failure to move the rest of the Ligny army quickly towards Quatre Bras on the morning of the 17th to attack Wellington and one can clearly see a lethargic army and a lethargic commander.

One has to look at what actually happened; playing "what ifs" does not provide evidence.

Attacking was the only option, but it was handled very badly.

Jurgen

I think one of Napoleon's big mistakes was returning in 1815. The Allies had large armies still under arms. 1816 or 17 may have been a better bet.

I don't think remaining on the defensive was a realistic option and it is thus difficult to see it being any more sustainable from a hypothetical viewpoint. Therefore it would have been impossible to prevail militarily in any way other then that envisaged by Napoleon. There seems little point in conjecture on what would have been in 1815 through to 1816 for these reasons.

FWIW, and in no way trying to derail this thread, but I find the 1814 campaign fascinating, Napoleon dashing about, trying to keep those plates spinning, with a bit of a rag-tag army, yet still delivering check after check on larger armies.
I think it was Napoleon at his best, if I'm honest, just my opinion. Oh, and it makes for really good scenarios.

John

The OSG game on the 1814 campaign "Napoleon at Bay" is a classic.

I find the 1814 campaign fascinating, Napoleon dashing about, trying to keep those plates spinning, with a bit of a rag-tag army, yet still delivering check after check on larger armies.

+1

The OSG game on the 1814 campaign "Napoleon at Bay" is a classic.

+1

Attacking was the only option, but it was handled very badly.

Flecktarn has a point there. I think the Armee du Nord was certainly up to the task at hand, at least as far as defeating the immediate threat of the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies in Belgium goes, but Napoleon and senior commanders may not have been.

Certainly Napoleon of 1815 wasn't the same man of 1805 (who is!). And the dressing down of Ney after Ligny probably had an unfortunate effect on Grouchy.

Then again, I don't know that the Allied armies were any better led and prepared for the fight below army command level. That's not a "French were as good/better!" comment so much as "no, I really don't know enough about Allied division commanders." :)

I'm not sure that in fact the Army du Nord was more subject to mistakes and pratfalls than any other army of the period – or to put it another way, Clauswitzian friction. Lots of stuff went wrong in 1805 and 1806 too! Napoleon got more of his army into action on the 16th (as a percentage) than either of his rivals and created the conditions where success was at least possible, despite quite heavy campaign odds against him.

Certainly Napoleon of 1815 wasn't the same man of 1805…

I'm not easily convinced that one could be sure he was worse. It may just as well be that Wellington was no Mack, and that Wellington and Blucher were too canny to have go for a 'clever' (i.e. one likely to badly wrong in real life) plan, like that adopted by the Allies at Austerlitz.

Napoleon was doomed. If he had waited until 1816 then there might have been more of a chance as the various nations would have carved up Europe. No longer in Vienna. The national interests may well have stopped them signing the outlawing of Napoleon. However, Alexander was still hell bent on a crusade against Napoleon.

1. The Prussian Army would have been in a more efficient state.
2. The Saxon question would have been resolved.
3. The British would have had the veterans back from America but would have had another year to dismember the armed forces.
4. The Netherlands may well have started early the 1830 troubles.
5. Spain would have been in further troubles. Remember the French intervention in 1824.
6. Russian Army would have been even further from central Europe. Troubles in their new province of Poland and possibly war again in Turkey.

All interesting oonsequences. Napoleon was an opportunist. He threw the dice too often and lost.

If he had been a competant diplomat and been realistic, Napoleon should have made peace in 1813. By 1815, it was already over.
Stephen

If he had been a competant diplomat and been realistic, Napoleon should have made peace in 1813. By 1815, it was already over.

That's likely a true conclusion. I think in order to have made peace successfully in 1813 he would have had to brought Austria in as an ally. There had to be some external support to take the pressure off and give the Russians & Prussians a reason to come to the table.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Think inviting an invasion of your home territory is very bad, (unless your country is huge or very rugged terrain…. USA, Canada, Russia, China). Especially as if Napoleon just waits, the British and Prussians will wait til united… Possibly even for the Russians, Austrians and whoever else fancied a crack.

So it would short and very messy for the French. His plan was best I think, strike first, defeat each contingent seperately. His execution was poor though.

I think the 1816-17 scenario offers more interesting possibilities.

Flecktarn & Whirlwind & darthfozzywig,

I have discussed these aspects of the Waterloo campaign a million times with my old nemesis ColinJallen and others (Whirlwind will remember!), so I don't want to go there again and de-rail an interesting OP.

I'll just say that I largely disagree with Flecktarn. The 1815 French army was better than the one available in 1813-14 (and possibly earlier), so I don't agree that the army was not "capable of executing" the attacking option in 1815. If it was capable of achieving a series of brilliant attacking victories in 1814 for a few weeks against a numerically much bigger enemy, why not a year later against a numerically not quite so much bigger enemy for just the few days that were needed?
And if Napoleon's 1814 campaign is regarded by many skilled analysts (including Wellington) as one of his greatest, I can't see why he would have changed so much in just a year. Like Whirlwind said, I am not sure he was worse (unless of course you are meaning the flu or whatever it is that he had, which is a temporary thing).
The upper command tier below Napoleon (Soult, Ney, Grouchy) was worse, and ill suited to enact the Waterloo strategy, I definitely agree with that.

Returning in 1816 or 1817 would have been too late and he would have few, maybe no support. Louis XVIII was a fat and unglorious king, but he was smarter than often said. He understood more than the Ultras and his brother (future Charles X) that the Revolution couldn't be swept away and he had to rule with that. After his second restauration, he wrote the Charte, a kind of Constitution, deeply looking like the 1791 constitution. It confirmed the new upper class in its proprieties and privilege. Napoleon's return, and failure, is more a political problem, than a military one.
The Armée du Nord was a very efficient machine at least on a tactical level, it was well equipped, although some French novellists (not historians) said (Victor Hugo…) But Lannes, Bessieres were dead, Davout in Paris, No great cavalry leaders, Soult couldn't fulfill his task as ably as Berthier, suspicion against many senior officers and their royalist feelings, real or not, plagued the army morale: the Armée du Nord wasn't the 1805 Grande Armée.

TelesticWarrior,

I see that we will not agree on this; however, again I will make the point that my views are based on the performances of the army and of Napoleon in 1815, not those in 1814 or what "should" have been the case in 1815. On an operational level, both were poor in 1815.

In answer to this question:

"If it was capable of achieving a series of brilliant attacking victories in 1814 for a few weeks against a numerically much bigger enemy, why not a year later against a numerically not quite so much bigger enemy for just the few days that were needed?"

I can only answer that I do not know why not, although I have a few ideas. However, it quite clearly was not as it was totally defeated 4 days after the start of the campaign.

As for Napoleon, he was the person responsible for the delays on the morning of the 17th.

Jurgen

I can only answer that I do not know why not, although I have a few ideas

Don't be shy Jurgen – it would be very interesting to read your ideas on this.

Regards

I think defending France would have been a military option in 1815 – look at the problems the Germans had in 1870/71 even after completely defeating the Field Armies. So Napoleon retreating into the interior, may be even giving up Paris, striking at the Allied lines of operation and forcing their armies to do battle piece-meal is a feasible scenario.

Politically however – Napoleon's hold on power was quite brittle, and he would not have lasted long in such a scenario. He needed a quick, decisive victory, and he needed to keep the Allies away from France. Striking against the allied armies in Belgium was basically his only option – striking against Schwarzenberg would have meant that the Allied's most capable (Wellington) and most aggressive (Bluecher) commander would have had open road to Paris before them.

Regarding the quality of armies – I think the main point here is that the quality of the leadership and the determination of officers and men in the Allied troops had changed, and I am not sure that Napoleon ever fully acknowledged that to himself. In certain ways the Prussian Army of 1815 was inferior to the army of 1806 (cavalry, training, problems with the integration of the less-than-enthusiastic recruits for the newly gained territories), but this was an army that re-organized itself and fought again after a bitter defeat, something the Army of 1806 never could have done.

Michael

Whirlwind,

I did not want to move the thread any further away from the original post but since you ask, I will respond.

1. The area of operations was far more congested than in 1814. In 1814, Napoleon had room to manoeuvre his army and evade contact with the Allies when he needed to. Creating operational space is a key element of military activity, then and now. In 1815, the area being fought over was so small that there was very little room for manoeuvre.

2. In 1814, the Allied armies were very spread out and only really managed to converge occasionally; Napoleon was able to use the operational space that he had to attack elements of the armies and beat them before they could be reinforced. When the Allies did converge significant forces on the battlefield, Napoleon lost battles. In 1815, the Allied armies were close together and had a plan of what to do when attacked.

3. The French staff system failed in 1815.

4. Some (many) of the senior French commanders were not up to the job. In this, I would include Ney, Soult, Grouchy, d'Erlon, Reille and Jerome Bonaparte. They did not compare with the likes of Lannes, St Cyr, Davout and Murat.

5. Napoleon himself was not at his best, possibly due to illness, possibly due to feeling his age, possibly due to the effects of a "year off". At critical points he was slow; for example, he failed to send Grouchy off in pursuit until too late on the 17th and failed to march to attack Wellington's flank before he could withdraw from Quatre Bras.

6. The army was something of a "throw together"; units had not worked together before and officers were unfamiliar with those above and below them. Ney's appointment to command the left wing is a classic example of this.

7. Ney; he should have been left at home.

8. The combined Allied armies had an easier task than the Allies of 1814; all they had to do was work together and not lose. The Allies of 1814 had to avoid losing to Napoleon, take Paris, guard their lines of supply and try to deal with too many crowned heads at headquarters.

As I said, these are just my thoughts. I believe that the campaign of 1815 was probably unwinnable for the French army as it was in June 1815.

Jurgen

I'm with Flecktarn on this one as I concur with all of his reasons though I am not certain of his conclusion that it was un-winnable. The morale of the rank and file was high but the officer corps was hurting especially among the senior command. And frankly Nappy was worn out, I don't think that means he couldn't have done it but it had to have been harder for him. A president ages a ridiculous amount over his 4-8 years in office, Napoleon had drastically more stress both physical and mental for a longer period of time so I conclude he had reduced energy to put into execution of events in June 1815. Maybe he could have pulled it off, I believe it was a die roll, but it was a harder (physically and mentally) die roll than it was ten years earlier.

Anyways, circling back to the OP:

1. The area of operations was far more congested than in 1814. In 1814, Napoleon had room to manoeuvre his army and evade contact with the Allies when he needed to. Creating operational space is a key element of military activity, then and now. In 1815, the area being fought over was so small that there was very little room for manoeuvre.

2. In 1814, the Allied armies were very spread out and only really managed to converge occasionally; Napoleon was able to use the operational space that he had to attack elements of the armies and beat them before they could be reinforced. When the Allies did converge significant forces on the battlefield, Napoleon lost battles. In 1815, the Allied armies were close together and had a plan of what to do when attacked.

8. The combined Allied armies had an easier task than the Allies of 1814; all they had to do was work together and not lose. The Allies of 1814 had to avoid losing to Napoleon, take Paris, guard their lines of supply and try to deal with too many crowned heads at headquarters.

I think these three points directly address why a defensive campaign in 1815 would have been yet more difficult than what he attempted. His 1815 plan was essentially, "I need to show them Napoleonic France is still a military force, when that is demonstrated they will give us some space." I believe had he setup for defense the Allies would have just continued to gather until they felt they could overwhelm him.

I also concur with the notion that fighting on your own soil is not sustainable for most nations. If Napoleon had barbed wire maybe…

Cheers,

The Bandit

When I go back to the original question of this topic, it is quite clear that in 1815 Napoleon already explained his reasons for not taking the defensive option, as he quite clearly demonstrated & explained in his "Mémoires pour servir a l'histoire de France en 1815", published in Paris in 1820.

Just check what he wrote… the book is available on Google books.

For any 'what-if' scenario in either 1816 or 1817, just consult: Thierry Lentz' "Les Cent-Jours, 1815. (Vol. IV. Nouvelle histoire du Permier Empire)". Paris, 2010.

Here it becomes obvious Napoleon could not wait another opportunity after 1815, as he was well aware the politicians at the Congress of Vienna were already discussing the emperor's close where-abouts on Elba to Europe and planning to relocate him to St. Helena. Furthermore, Napoleon was almost bankrupt in 1815 as the island's economy of Elba did not provide enough revenue. The only option left: a flight forward to mainland France and next a similar adventure in the Southern provinces of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Perhaps intersting as well is the fact, how Napoleon left France after 1815 with an enormous financial debt, as described by Lentz, much much higher than in 1814. The nation was completely bankrupt up into the 1830's and 1840's, just for the private reasons of one single individual who could not understand he was no longer part of the game in 1815.

My conclusion wargame-wise to the original question of this topic: an interseting 'what-if' scenario for a boardgame. Nothing else.

Of course wargame-wise there are such interesting battles by Rapp at La Souffel, or recreate the defence of France at the Alps when you consult Ronald Zins' "L'Armée des Alpes et les Cent-Jours à Lyon" (Éditions Horace Cardon, 2003)!

You fight Austrians and Sardinians ;-)

Just a final remark on this day.

7 December 1815… Marshall Ney is executed.

Now, whether or not people argue he should have been left home in 1815, was war-weary or even suffered from modern post traumatic stress since either 1812 or 1813, I would instead argue Ney did not suffer from any of these in June 1815. What he did suffer from was an emperor who called for him on campaign in 1815 without the necessary means, information and an adequate corps staff.

The morale of the rank and file was high but the officer corps was hurting especially among the senior command. And frankly Nappy was worn out, I don't think that means he couldn't have done it but it had to have been harder for him. A president ages a ridiculous amount over his 4-8 years in office, Napoleon had drastically more stress both physical and mental for a longer period of time so I conclude he had reduced energy to put into execution of events in June 1815. Maybe he could have pulled it off, I believe it was a die roll, but it was a harder (physically and mentally) die roll than it was ten years earlier.

I'm not necessarily convinced that Napoleon was bound to be more war-weary than Wellington or Blucher. I mean it is possible, but seems unknowable.

1. The area of operations was far more congested than in 1814. In 1814, Napoleon had room to manoeuvre his army and evade contact with the Allies when he needed to. Creating operational space is a key element of military activity, then and now. In 1815, the area being fought over was so small that there was very little room for manoeuvre.

The area of operations was no more congested than in 1814. Or in 1813 for that matter. The only reason that it looks like that is that the campaign was over so quickly. But there were no particular geographical constraints on Napoleon's operational activities, only temporal ones – and even these were not so tight as to demand that he triumph in Belgium by 19 June. Napoleon chose to attack when and where he did.

2. In 1814, the Allied armies were very spread out and only really managed to converge occasionally; Napoleon was able to use the operational space that he had to attack elements of the armies and beat them before they could be reinforced. When the Allies did converge significant forces on the battlefield, Napoleon lost battles. In 1815, the Allied armies were close together and had a plan of what to do when attacked.

I think this just argues that the Allies fought the 1815 campaign rather better than they did much of the 1814 campaign – lessons well learned by the Germans, perhaps. Napoleon of course had no way of knowing this before the campaign.

8. The combined Allied armies had an easier task than the Allies of 1814; all they had to do was work together and not lose. The Allies of 1814 had to avoid losing to Napoleon, take Paris, guard their lines of supply and try to deal with too many crowned heads at headquarters.

Well in theory the campaign objectives of the Allies were the same in 1815 as they had been in 1814, again I think 1815 just 'looks' different because the campaign ended up being so short after the precipitate French collapse. So, in 1814, if any of the individual Allied armies had been able to just 'not lose', then Napoleon would have lost the campaign (as the other armies converged on him, as you note). The problem was simply in 1814 that Napoleon was able to beat them more often and the Allies struggled to 'not lose'.

Regards

Whirlwind,

I think we are talking about different concepts when discussing operational space. What I mean by it is the area available to manoeuvre during the particular campaign or action once it is launched. In the case of 1815, as you say, Napoleon chose the time and location of his attack, thus limiting his operational space due to the short distance between the France/Netherlands border and the Allied deployment areas and the short lateral distance between the two allied armies. In 1814, the operational space was much larger as Napoleon could act between and around enemy forces which were quite widely distanced from each other. In 1813, most of Germany formed the operational space until Napoleon was finally trapped around around Leipzig.

I agree that the Allies fought the 1815 campaign better than the 1814 version of the Allies had fought their campaign; that was my point and it was a response to TW's question as to why the French Army of 1815 was incapable of recreating the operational successes of 1814. One of the reesons for that failure was that their enemies did not give them the same opportunities.

With regard to your third response to one of my points, I am considering the Waterloo campaign in isolation from the rest of the activity of 1815. Once Napoleon attacked, the objectives of Wellington and the Mad Mecklenburger were not to invade France but to firstly avoid losing to Napoleon and secondly to defeat him. They had none of the same worries and issues that had existed in 1814.

As to your response to the Bandit, Napoleon had not only been commanding an army but also ruling France and trying to keep his Empire and alliances intact; I suspect that he was not so much war-weary as just worn out from the burden of doing all those things.

Regards,

Jurgen

Politically he had to fight. The country wasn't united behind him, the West was in open revolt, the South was "unresponsive" to say the least, and the bulk of the population was sick of war. To have remained on the defensive was political, and probably military, suicide. He had to attack and win a victory to have even the first chance of survival. His army had been boosted in numbers by the returned veteran POWs, so was, as far as the rank and file were concerned, a sound force of well trained troops, although, as has been suggested above, his higher command was limited in ability. It had to be the gambler's throw, as defence was doomed, and it had to be the closest army to attack, so Belgium it had to be.

Whirlwind,

As to your response to the Bandit, Napoleon had not only been commanding an army but also ruling France and trying to keep his Empire and alliances intact; I suspect that he was not so much war-weary as just worn out from the burden of doing all those things.

Jurgen beat me to it so I'll start with 'yep'.

Napoleon's travels were certainly more posh than that of his men but that didn't mean they were easy. From something like 1800 to 1814 he was sleeping what… 3-5 hours a night or something just stupid. I am saying that Napoleon was exhausted. Now I believe Nappy was a man of will and that such men can still sometimes pull off the impossible against all odds, as I said, harder die roll than previously.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Very well summed up by Chouan IMO. For internal political reasons Napoleon has to go on the attack, once the Allies have declared war on him. But from a purely military point of view as regards the OP, he would probably have had a better chance in 1815 of fighting a defensive campaign in France than he did the year before. But the offensive campaign is the better option, for him.

I'm still not convinced by Flecktarn's view of the 100 days though.

I believe that the campaign of 1815 was probably unwinnable for the French army as it was in June 1815.

This is armchair revisionism that would have made no sense at the time. Neither the British or the Prussians or the French themselves believed that the 1815 campaign was "unwinnable" for the French. Certainly Wellington and Napoleon never thought in those sort of deterministic ways, especially after the French had achieved the centre position between the two Allied armies. The historian has the great benefit of hindsight, but he can't forget that some of the events he is looking at could have spun off in very different directions, especially in a complex campaign with so many variables, such as Waterloo. Of course it was winnable. If D'Erlon comes across on the 16th, the campaign was as good as won already, and there are a number of points right up until late on the 18th where the campaign is winnable.
It is a tiny bit demeaning to not only the French who fought so hard and came within a whisker of victory on a number of occasions, but also the Anglo-Allied and Prussian armies that had to fight so well just to avoid being wiped out during those 3 days, to suggest that there was only one fixed outcome.

TelesticWarrior,

Of course it would have made no sense at the time; that is the difference between being "on the ground" at the time with limited information and our position now with vast amounts of information about the situation and the armies.

It is not demeaning in any way at all as it does nothing to decry the gallantry and bravery of those who fought.

As to d'Erlon's wanderings, I believe that they are a symptom of one of the reasons why the French could not win; the command system of the army was chaotic. With a different set of factors, the French could have won but, with the factors that were in place at the time, I believe that they were doomed to failure.

Jurgen

Of course it would have made no sense at the time

It doesn't make much sense to me now either, for the reasons given. Its too deterministic, and ignores the chaos of war and chance, as well as ignoring the fact that the French DID come very close to winning, on a number of occasions.
In fact, I can't really think of ANY major campaign during the Napoleonic wars that we can say was "unwinnable" for either of the protagonists. Even the Prussians in 1806 had a chance of winning, because that was the nature of warfare during those times.

"There are times when a battle decides everything, and there are times when the most insignificant thing can decide the outcome of a battle"

"In war, luck is half in everything."

"War is a lottery in which nations ought to risk nothing but small amounts."

"The moment of greatest peril is the moment of victory."

Napoleon

TelesticWarrior,

Perhaps it would help if you could point out those points right up until late on the 18th when the campaign was winnable for the French. That would enable me to understand your position better.

As for 1806, I think that the Prussians had no hope of winning, despite how people at the time saw it. The only question was as to how complete their defeat would be.

Jurgen

Perhaps it would help if you could point out those points right up until late on the 18th when the campaign was winnable for the French. That would enable me to understand your position better.

I suppose my position is that in War (and even in Wargaming!), nothing is certain. Even if you outnumber your enemy as the allies did, you are not certain of success, especially if that enemy happens to be Napoleon and the French.
Specific points are all "what ifs", of course, but that is what we are talking about when it comes to whether a campaign or battle was winnable.

- If D'Erlon comes across as intended to Ligny on the 16th
- If Blucher is killed or captured at Ligny when he is trapped under his horse and the French cavalry thunder past.
- If Gneisenau decides to retreat via Namur instead of Wavre, whilst Blucher is incapacitated
- There are a whole series of events concerning Grouchy's command on the 17th and 18th that would have spelt serious trouble for the allies
- If La Haye Saint is captured earlier, Wellingtons centre is in danger of crumbling earlier.
- If the Guard are sent in half hour earlier on the evening of the 18th
- If Wellington is killed at any point during the battle, which was a very real possibility considering the fate of many of his staff.
- And so on and on and on.

All these things are what ifs, and same will be more tenuous than others, but that was the nature of war, especially in those times. It is not as deterministic as saying that any of the campaigns were unwinnable, for any of the protagonists. I could probably make a list of all the ways the Prussians could win in 1806. If Napoleon is mortally wounded rather than the Duke of Brunswick for example, the whole game is over.
We are not talking about how "likely" someone is to win, but whether it is possible to win. Even if we say the chance of a Prussian win is approx 10-90 against in 1806, its still a chance. And the chance of the French winning the Waterloo campaign was at certain points was much higher than that. I think Napoleon himself gauged it at 80-20, on the morning of the 18th. When he learned of Grouchy's failure he revised it to 60-40 in favour of the French, as he still had a decent chance.

TW,

I am far from convinced that Napoleon's comments about the probability of victory are in any way reliable as evidence of anything other than what Napoleon said.

I agree that the points you raise could have had an effect and now see what you are getting at. From that perspective, there was a possibility of a French victory but, apart from the Wellington and Blucher related ones, all of them were dependent on the French, and in particular their commanders, being different from what they were, which renders them pretty much invalid.

No strategist other than a totally mad one would regard a war where success is predicated on either killing the enemy commander or their own army being something other than what it actually is as anything other than a lost cause.

Jurgen

As to 1806 I agree basically with Flecktarn, as the Prussian leadership was completly helpless, but there would exist some hypotetical scenarios, Hohenlohe attacks Lannes, when he is still isolated and crushed his corps, then withdraws in direction Magdeburg and units with Rüchel.
Braunschweig shows initiatice occupies the pass of Kösen before Davout and then crushes Davout's isolated corps.
After that piecemeal success the Prussian Army withdraws into East Prussia (and destroys all provisions which couldn't be carried along) and units with the Russians, or even better form two different operational armies, one using the system of Napoleon of the manouevre des arrieres, very big trouble for Napoleon then.
I know – too much asked for the leadership – would be an interesting wargaming scenario – though.
In 1815 there was no possible win for Napoléon there his operational art of war did not any longer cope with those of the Allies.

Hmmmm, it seems my arguments here are neglected. Well, so be it. I thought these were at least interesting to consult as the topic is about defending France, rather than getting into a discussion of why choosing the offensive.

Hi Tellestic W,

Thanks for your profound and interesting posts here. You are probably well aware I write about 1815.

So here's my question with regards to your argument how the French army in 1815 was at least much better, than the one in 1813-14 (or perhaps some years prior): can you please hand me some source material & studies that confirm this, as I really would like to read these?

Especially with regards to Napoleon being able to mobilise enough troops (he was not), the financial problems Napoleon caused with his return for the French state (by May 1815 France could hardly stand firm to repay the financial loans now made), the logistical problems to acquire enough muskets, guns & horses, etc. (causing no more troops to be fielded all over France than there were), or the even biggest problem: numerous & often not retold riots (in history) all over France of the peoples who detasted his return (let alone the popular risings we know of) because his return to France but a blatant 'coup d'état' (something he had previous experience with as a consul), or the fact Napoleon already realised during his march upon Paris after his escape from Elba: at Lyon he already encountered lots of civilians and authorities who were entirerly devoid of entusiasm for his return, while we might at last state the allegiance of the army: if in case it was such a good army, this was entirely to the benefit of it having been preserved in 1814 as a royal Bourbon force! (and yes the old 'grognards' sided upon the return of 'their emperor', but were similarly part of the coup d'état or more likely were afraid to speak against him…. only Cubières on behalf of his regiment defied allegiance to the emperor on behalf of his regiment at the Champ de Mai).

(Always keeping an open mind!)

Erwin,

I think your earlier posts clearly indicated why Napoleon felt he had to go on the offensive in 1815 and why he could not have waited until 1816 or 1817 before returning.

Your latest post is interesting as it effectively contradicts the commonly held view that Napoleon was welcomed back by the French in 1815; any reading of anything more that superficial or utterly pro-Bonapartist texts soon reveals that, although people were not particularly happy with the Bourbons, what they really did not want was a return to endless war, which is what Napoleon's return meant.

Jurgen

No doubt Jurgen, the Bourbon's were not particularly well received in 1814 and similarly with the 2nd restauration in 1815, but that is an entirely different history for France and its memorable years of 1830 and 1848.

Once you really get down and dig deep, the ultimate question is not whether Napoleon upon his return to power in late March 1815 had to choose between taking the offensive or the defensive option. As the sole reason for him to have ever asked to make a choice between either, was merely made obvious and obligatory once he understood for real the united European powers present at the Congress of Vienna had him as a person (not the state of France!) to be outlawed. To be taken prisoner and sent somewhere far far away to rot and be forgotten. Of course Napeleon made his so-called peace offerings to all European rulers & sovereigns, but his pleas by his messengers and ambassies were left unopened and unanswered. No one believed the 'Corsican ogre' to suddenly plea for negociations, which he had defied in 1813 and even in 1814, or now in 1815 to think he would have changed character. Napoleon rolling the dice of international law, abidance & mediation….?…. well, had he ever done before!

No, the simple fact is, offence or defence, is that by the time of his dearing escape from Elba the emperor had lost political contact with the reality of Europe in 1815. And perhaps this is what the French historian Lentz, as mentioned above in a post by me yesterday, already mentioned: the emperor was bankrupt and knew one was already speaking in Vienna to get rid of him to some isolated island in the South-Atlantic. Yep…. St. Helena.

Politicaly wise Napoleon was finished in 1815. The unanymous European resolve against him was firm, probably much firmer than if he would have upset things in his Belgian campaign in 1815… had he won. He was hated, detested by all of sovereign Europe as a wannabee emperor, a self proclaimed noble without the proper birth rights, who was nothing more than some mediocre fool from an island just recently conquered by France.

Militarily he could never have won in 1815 as from all cornes in Europe more than half a million troops descended upon the French borders. Hindsight? As is suggested in some posts in this topic. Hmmm, … perhaps with a lucky roll of the dice he could have won his campaign in Belgium, but I sinicerely doubt this would have shocked Europe…. which was the ultimate goal of his campaign there in Belgium, or to be more precise… the Southern provinces of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. Nope, Tsar Alexander was hell bent on crushing Napoleon, the Austrians and Württembergers joinded in on the lower Rhine, while south of the Alps the Sardinians were assisted by the Austrians to fall upon the French borders as well. Let alone Wellington and Blücher had expected to turn to the offensive much sooner then what actually happened, and what was to become history.

In the end Napoleon was neither forced offensively or defensively by the powers outside France, but merely by the political and social reality in France he had direly underestimated upon his return. Something most political (and in his case absolute) rulers often forget…. they don't understand when their day of expiraton is due, before it's too late for themselves.
In that respect is is entirely beyond the point to discuss the reliability of the French staff system, blame Ney, Soult, or the ordinary 'grognard' or 'fantassin' for the downfall of what I do acclaim to be a very wonderful and interesting period in history, named after one man. Surching for the blame, etc., etc., would be as for looking for the dagger that stabbed the German army in 1918.

… and again I say: wargame-wise there would be some really interesting games to be played on the table or the board!
(I like my wargame armies of the Kingdom of Holland and my French troops!)

(Up to you, my respondants!)