"Did the French Guardsmen "Age"?" Topic

Could men taken into the Young Guard 'advance' to the Middle or Old Guard through acts of bravery or distinction? Or were they stuck in whatever regiment they first entered? Clearly the Middle and Old Guard regiments would need replacements from time to time. Did they come from the 'younger' regiments or from deserving veterans in the line regiments (or both)?

From what I understand, they had different requirements. Old Guard had to have 10 years plus minimum height but came from anywhere. Middle guard where from the pre 1809 campaigns, and young guard were the best of the newer recruits. I would assume once middle guard had passed the 10 year requirement they were eligible for the old guard. I would also assume after 1812, most of that was thrown out of the window anyway, along with the horse colors of cavalry regiments. Either way, not many spring chickens amongst the old guard I think.

Good guradsmen from the middle and young guard were promoted into NCO“s in lin eregiments, and NCO“s were sometime made offocers in line regiments. If I recall correctly this traffic were more frequent than advance from young to old guard. It is my impression that the late old gurad was though old sweats that was not material for command.

They had magic Shakos -- an Old Guard shako immediately added years of wisdom and age, while the Middle Gaurd's shako resulted in an overwhelming urge to get a mistress and a fast colorful horse, while the Young Gaurd shako sliced off years of age but resulted in a short attention span leaving them capable of only one form of attack, charge ą la baļonnette.

The only problem with the 'shako' logic is that the Old Guard didn't wear shakos, they wore bearskins-the only exception being in 1815 when shakos did appear in the 3d and 4th Grenadiers and the 3d and 4th Chasseurs.

B

Promotion to both the line and inside the Guard was done. The Young Guard regiments were formed from the pick of the conscripts. Young Guardsmen after two years service and if they had at least a rudimentary education could be 'promoted' into the Middle Guard.

The cadres of the Middle and Young Guard were from the Old Guard and the Middle Guard did provide the Old Guard regiments with replacements.

Old Guard NCOs could get promoted to sous-lieutenants in the line.

Qualified line troops could be taken into the Guard provided they met the qualifications of service and education. Coignet tells the story of how he became a Guardsman after distinguished service in a line unit. He was interviewed by Davout, which must have been a unique experience. Coignet was also a little short for a grenadier, so Davout, impressed with the young soldier, told him to put cards inside his shoes before he was measured for height. Coignet passed the test.

In 1811 the Guard expanded its education system by the formation of the Battalion of Instruction (sometimes called the Battalion of Fontainebleu) which was activated as an NCO school at Fontainebleu. There were actually three instruction battalions, one to train the fusiliers as sergeants and two to train selected Young Guardsmen as corporals.

The graduates of this school were assigned to new line units as cadremen. The instructors were picked Old Guardsmen as well as from St. Cyr, and the instruction was rigorous and included both infantry and artillery drill as well as grammar, writing, arithmetic, garrison and field duty as well as fortifications. And the discipline was described as 'severe.'

When the Guard was rebuilt after Russia, veterans from Spain and regiments that didn't go into Russia were taken into the Guard. The Guard's reputation was intact and the infantry were used more in combat in 1813-1815 than they had before and performed excellently. The Guard artillery definitely maintained its excellent reputation in 1813-1815, as did the French artillery as a whole.

B

The only problem with the 'shako' logic is that the Old Guard didn't wear shakos, they wore bearskins-the only exception being in 1815 when shakos did appear in the 3d and 4th Grenadiers and the 3d and 4th Chasseurs.

Technically not an exception at all, because the 3rd and 4th regiments of Grenadiers and Chasseurs were the Middle Guard, which had worn shakos throughout their existence.

You can go to the Old Guard not only from the Middle or Young one.

They were the best of the best of the "whole" French Army.

Next promotion from the Old Guard is like our friend Sparta has said.

And you can even return there.

Remember that the Old Guards has "nominally" more grade than the Regular Army.

So, they most simple soldier there was a Corporal for the rest of the French Army.

You also has some "grade" when you get a condecoration.
The soldiers has to "present arms" to you even if you were a simple soldier.

Amicalement
Armand

Well, I was writting these at the same time of Kevin.(smile).

'Technically not an exception at all, because the 3rd and 4th regiments of Grenadiers and Chasseurs were the Middle Guard, which had worn shakos throughout their existence.'

That is incorrect. The Middle Guard was not reactivated in 1815. The mainstay of the Middle Guard infantry was the two regiments of fusiliers. The 3d and 4th Grenadiers and Chasseurs were rated as Old Guard and were officially made Old Guard by decree.

B

shakos for 3e and 4e grenadiers of the guard in 1815, this is obsolete research which was corrected recently by Juhel – in 2006, the author looked into the archives, what was available in the depots and stores of the regiments, and seemingly there were enough bearskin caps available to kit out all units.
so no shakos but fur caps for all 4 regiments, the cul de singe however of black leather not not any longer red.

technically I have to say the 2nd and 3rd grenadiers of the guard were middle guard in 1812 and only 1st grenadiers old guard, as to to heardress then – for this 3 regiments fur caps (also goatskin)

otherwise the observations of SBminisguy are well taken.

Napoleon classified the Guard as Old, Middle, and Young Guard in early 1812 before going into Russia.

The Old Guard was made of the 1st Regiments of Grenadiers and Chasseurs as well as the NCOs of the 2d regiments and the two fusilier regiments. The Grenadiers a Cheval, Dragoons, Polish Lancers, Mamelukes, Gendarmerie d'Elite, artillery, engineers, veterans and the NCOs of the Young Guard artillery were also Old Guard.

The Middle Guard was made up of the 3d (Dutch) Grenadiers, the corporals and privates of the 2d regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs, the fusiliers, the 2d Lancer regiment, the artillery train battalions, the Velites of Florence and Turin, the ouvriers, and the Dutch Veterans.

The Young Guard was made up of the tirailleurs, voltigeurs, the flanquers-chasseurs, the Regiment of the National Guard, the bataillon des equipages, and the corporals and privates of the Young Guard artillery. The Old and Middle Guard officers who were assigned to the Young Guard kept their original status and pay.

However, in 1815, all eight regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs were classed and officially decreed as Old Guard. The 3d Regiment of Grenadiers of 1815 was not the same as the 3d (Dutch) Regiment of Grenadiers of 1810-1813 as it lost heavily in Russia and was disbanded. The survivors went into the Old Guard.

B

I always thought of them as the NCO and OCS for the grand army.

At Waterloo the average enlistment time for those in the guard corp was only 4 years. As in the majority of men were drafted in 1811. To me this is interesting and a very good indication of the changing calibre of soldier from austerlitz to Waterloo. even at Jena and austerdat only 2/3 of the french engaged had seen action. And that was only less than a year since the austerlitz campaign.

The idea that the best of the best were in the guard is ludicrous as officers from battalions would put forth names and no man would give over his very best or may have used the draft as a means to get rid of his trouble makers. There is instances where men who do not even meet the physical requirements being promoted, which may indicate other requirements where not met as well, the number of campaigns served for example.

Pretty much after 1809 any claim that the guard were elite is just propaganda. They were probably better than the line battalions recruited just before the invasion of Spain and the Danube campaign but I would guess that they were no better than the stock standard unit in the 1805 army.

Just look at Davout and Soults Corp who performed better than most any other French unit during the Napoleonic wars them. Those troops would have tilted Waterloo and they were classified as fodder in 05-06.

Do you have any source material for your opinions on the quality of the Imperial Guard as well as 'classing' Davout's and Soult's troops as 'fodder'?

B

Hi Bretchel, To be honest I left my ability to back up wide sweeping statements and hyperbole on another tiny toy soldier board.

Napoleon's Immortals: The Imperial Guard and It's Battles, 1805-1815. Andrew Uffindell.

History is subjective and is made up of opinions. I suppose the arguments stem from who believes who is the most informed based on the sources they have consulted and the 'facts' they have drawn from those said sources.

Regards

Kurt.

In my club and amongst my friends there is a long running debate on The Imperial Guard post 1812, that if you strip out so many veterans out of your army to form an elite corp it must effect the fighting quality of the rest of the Army.

A sort of consensus amongst us is yes it dose, but it is made up for by having a large and effective Corp in you army.

It certainly is not a lot of laughs trying to deal with it on a wargame table.

Kurt,

I have found that using methodology based on historical inquiry to be the procedure to collect facts on a subject and from those facts a conclusion can be drawn on an historical event, person, or military unit.

I also found Uffindel's book on the Guard to be OK, but that's about it. It was short in a lot of areas and I don't agree with the author's conclusions.

B

Hey Bretchel,

That is your opinion and that is fine. I'd argue that the that line of historical inquiry you mention is not objective. For example Uffindell wrote a book that he thought would address areas he believed he could see in guard history, therefore the history he wrote is subjective.

Interpretation of primary sources itself leaves any one open to accusations of opinion based writing let alone the interpretation of secondary sources. Even here I have provided a source for the basis of my 'informed' opinion and the source is question and somewhat derided.

That is fine, however it does not make good discussion.

I admit, I failed to properly explain that I believed that the line battalions of Davout and Soults Corps in 05-06 were better than the guard units at Waterloo. I believe this is because of the ability battalions in these units had in deploying from column into line or square and then into skirmishing bands under fire. These units could then deliver return fire and break already deployed enemy battalions and fend off cavalry charges, see Davout at Austerdat and Soult's assault on the Pratzen heights.

As the Osprey on Napoleonic infatry tactics states and I am paraphrasing, it takes amateurs to get into a firefight and lose. Now I have never been in combat but I can assume that fresh battalions of the guard deploying from column into line should not have been defeated by tired and heavily mauled units in that final assault. This then leads me to believe that these guard units were in fact poor and inferior to the above mentioned units and one could argue that they performed worse than some of the second string battalions Welligton faced in Spain.

I have gone on too long for a forum and I do apologise.

Regards,

Kurt.

Kurt,

On most occasions, one side in a firefight loses; that does not mean that they are amateurs.

With regard to the Old Guard, logic tells us that they were probably not at their previous standard after 1812. Given the losses in Russia and the tendency to use the Guard as a pool of replacement officers and NCOs, the rebuilt Guard would almost certainly have largely consisted of men with less experience. It is also hard to see regimental commanders in Spain or elsewhere sending their best men off to join the Guard.

Given the deterioration of virtually all European armies by 1813, the Guard were probably still a level above the vast majority of units but I agree that they were almost certainly inferior to the best French units of 1805-1806.

Jurgen

It is also hard to see regimental commanders in Spain or elsewhere sending their best men off to join the Guard.

The idea that the best of the best were in the guard is ludicrous as officers from battalions would put forth names and no man would give over his very best or may have used the draft as a means to get rid of his trouble makers. There is instances where men who do not even meet the physical requirements being promoted, which may indicate other requirements where not met as well, the number of campaigns served for example.

There have been a couple of comments on this thread in this vein – that the Imperial Guard was likely to be comprised mainly of qualified throw-outs rather than the cream of the French Army. I don't think I've ever read anywhere else that this was likely to be true, is there any primary source or analytical evidence for it?

Regards

Whirlwind,

No solid evidence for it whatever, just as there is no solid evidence that the post 1812 Guard was the super-elite force of unstoppable fighting machines that it is often made out to be. I suspect that it was just a bit better than everything else at the time.

However, as someone who has been a unit commander in a war zone, I know that if I was ordered to select a number of men to be sent back home for reassignment, I would not be selecting my best men, as those are the ones that I rely on to keep my unit working effectively. I would be sending those that meet whatever criteria are set but who I can lose with the least negative impact or, if I thought that I could get away with it, I would send soldiers who did not meet the criteria that I wanted to get rid of. I see no reason to believe that French battalion/regimental officers of the time would have behaved any differently.

Jurgen

Who and where has the Imperial Guard been portrayed as 'the super-elite force of unstoppable fighting machines that it is often made out to be.'

I have seen no credible secondary work that has done that at all. Seems to me you're overstating your 'case.'

B

Brechtel198,

I rather knew that you would pop up with a pompous, pedantic, humourless comment. Yes, I overstated my case; I do not regard discussing Napoleonic units on a wargames forum as an entirely serious activity, and I have a sense of humour.

"No credible secondary work"; that is a wonderful qualification as it allows you to limit which works you will accept.

Jurgen

I didn't believe that you could support your 'argument' on this subject, so thanks for confirming my suspicions.

If you don't understand what a credible secondary work is I'll be more than happy to explain it to you. All you have to do is ask.

B

Brechtel198,

The lack of logic in the first paragraph of your post is amusing. The poor attempt at an insult in the second is pathetic, especially coming from a pseudo-historian.

Have a nice weekend, you are dismissed.

Jurgen

There was no insult intended. That you took it for one says more about you than anything else.

You really shouldn't judge others by your own low standards.

Here endeth the lesson.

B

Kurt,

Here's a description of the senior Old Guard infantry regiments of Grenadiers in 1815 by Captain Mauduit, who was present. He is quoted in Napoleon: ses dernieres armees by Henri Couderc de Saint-Chamant, 410-412:

'The average height of the grenadiers was 5'6" [French measurement]…the average age of the grenadiers was 35 years old…The average service of the grenadiers was 15 yhears and as many campaigns…Long-tested by marches, fatigues, deprivations, bivouacs, by the sun as by the front, the grenadier of the Guard was lean and thin. Obesity was unknown in our ranks. Everything about these men of iron was proven…'

Additionally, one-third of the 1st Grenadiers had fought in between 20 and 25 campaigns and four out of five had the Legion of Honor.

To sell the Imperial Guard of 1813-1815 short would be a great mistake.

I would still like to know why you considered the III and IV Corps of 1805-1807 as 'fodder.'

B

Kurt,

Here is some interesting information on the experience level in Napoleon's Grande Armee of 1805:

-One-third of the soldiers were veterans of at least six years' service and this included almost all of the officers and NCOs.

-More than half of the cavalry and 43 percent of the infantry had seen combat.

-About 3 percent were veterans of the old Royal Army.

-A somewhat larger percentage were veterans of the volunteers of the volunteers of 1792-1794, but I don't have a number for those.

-The most numerous group of veterans were from conscripts of 1799-1800, but again I don't have a number.

-And a large group, again no numbers, were new soldiers without combat experience.

Interestingly, the Grande Armee of 1806 had one-third of its soldiers with only about a year of service.

B

Who and where has the Imperial Guard been portrayed as 'the super-elite force of unstoppable fighting machines that it is often made out to be.'

I have seen no credible secondary work that has done that at all. Seems to me you're overstating your 'case.'

Might I suggest you take a look at the works of Scotty Bowden, like these:

link

link

Although I admit that citing Bowden as "credible" may be pushing things a bit.

Good info Kevin!
Thanks for share!

Amicalement
Armand

'Might I suggest you take a look at the works of Scotty Bowden, like these:…Although I admit that citing Bowden as "credible" may be pushing things a bit.'

Do you have a page or at least a chapter citation to back up your assertion?

And you pejorative comment about Scott Bowden is both inaccurate and uncalled for. It should be withdrawn.

B

You're very welcome, Armand.

B

And you pejorative comment about Scott Bowden is both inaccurate and uncalled for. It should be withdrawn.

No, it shouldn't. While I admire Mr. Bowden's pursuit of useful information about the French Army, I find it's value is undermined by his determination to make the facts fit his pre-conceived notions rather than allowing the facts to drive his conclusions.

His books on the Napoleonic Wars (at least the ones I've read) seem to start with the premise that the French were better at everything than other nations, then he presents information that supports that claim. He relies too much on French sources and takes them at face value without consideration of the authors' motivations or biases. His book on 1813, IIRC, includes exactly one non-French source, the Austrian Army staff history of the campaign. This hardly strikes me as an attempt at an even-handed analysis.

So no B, I stand by what I wrote.

In contrast to Mauduit's comments about the Grenadiers, an analysis of the 220 men discharged from the 1st Regiment at its disbandment in September 1815 reveals an average age of 26 for a grenadier.

In addition, most (80%) had only been in the regiment since 1813 and they had an average overall service of 6 years.

According to a contemporary French officer quoted in Le Carnet de la Sabretache "L'infanterie de la garde a waterloo", 1905, volume 13 Page 51, the only similarity between the Old Guard of 1815 and that of previous years was the name, the men on the whole having nothing in common with Guardsmen of earlier years, lacking devotion to both Napoleon and the Guard and the esprit de corps this had previously given the regiments.

Mauduit noted the friction between the troops who had accompanied Napoleon to Elba and the rest of his regiment.

By the way, Bowden faked some of his references and bibliography in his book "Napoleon and Austerlitz", including his use of that famous German author Derselbe and his equally famous book "Die Schlacht bei Austerlitz", which is noted in the bibliography. For those of you who do not speak or read German, derselbe is translated as "the same" or "ditto", so it is hard not to be pejorative about Bowden.

Jurgen

Was not the regiment somewhat smaller at disbandment than when it went into Belgium in June?

And whose 'analysis' are you talking about?

Who was the French officer to whom you are referring?

Are you suggesting that Mauduit was wrong?

If you are you certainly have not demonstrated it.

B

'I stand by what I wrote.'

That is too bad.

B

Brechtel198,

I very much doubt that anyone could "demonstrate" anything to you that disagreed with your views.

It is late; I will reply to you properly tomorrow (actually later today).

Jurgen

All I did was ask a few questions prompted by your posting.

Maybe you need to 'be at ease in the harness.'

B

Brechtel,

I don't think we can judge historical characters through the moral lenses of our own age, but I do believe that military culture changes less than the rest of society. If you read the articles written about my Squadron, when I was in command, for base and Corps magazines they read similarly to Maudit's comments. If you read the operational record book you would get a different, more honest view. But that wouldn't be all, if you read the Station's disciplinary and administrative files you'd get information on a host of other issues that undermine the quality…yet they recieved plaudits from everyone they served with on their last operational tour. If you asked my wife she'd tell you a different story.

We can do a simple mind experiment:

- if Maudit was correct;
- and being an almost herculean veteran helps you to stay alive on the battlefield whilst achieving your aim;
- and the discharge paper referred to by Flecktarn was correct…

Wibble!

They cannot all be correct. Which means:

- Maudit lied!
- or being an almost herculean veteran doesn't keep you alive on the battlefield (and as they failed it also doesn't help them achieve their aim)!
- or the discharge documentation was wrong.

This is where history becomes opinion. Taking them in reverse order. The discharge documentation is least likely to be wrong, I doubt the bureaucrats thought 'lets mess with Brechtel's bonuses for the Guard when they invent war gaming in a couple of hundred years'. The success of the Guard is too well documented by all who served with them or faced them for it to be ignored. And as I have demonstrated that people 'puff up' their own units, I think we have to accept that Maudit lied.

I hope you can live with the horror of using an unreliable source on TMP.

For my next trick, I'll cheat and using a reducing argukment (using as evidence something I've only partially proved). Having shown that military culture changes little, I think we need to be careful of assuming that every commander gave up his best. At least one of my SNCOs was deliberately kept from courses that would have seen him removed from the Squadron when we were doing pre-deployment training and the subsequent likelihood of a posting. He was the best performing in his role. Either both Flecktarn and I are weird or we can deduce that this was likely to have taken place during the Napoleonic period.

Without one primary source!

All,

Hope you didn't mind me matching Brechtel's tone. There is a difference between challengin and assertion, pointing out faulty logic in an argument or a source and being rude. If I had any interest in supporting the notion that the Imperial Guard at Waterloo were anything more than adequate I'd have been equally disparaging of Flecktarn.

Brechtel198,

I think it is about the way that you ask questions, but never mind.

To answer your questions:

1. Yes, the regiment was smaller, but that is the only date in 1815 for which there is useful data as the discharge records exist. Given that the data correlates nicely with that of that of men joining the 1st Grenadiers in September 1813 (average age 23, average service 6 years), it is probably as good a guide as anything, and needs to be considered alongside Mauduit's statement.

2. The analysis is here: link

3. The officer in question was Colonel de Pontecoulant. However, on rereading and retranslating (French >German>English) the article in Le Carnet de la Sabretache, I notice that I mistook what he said as being about the Old Guard, when it was about the Young. Therefore, I withdraw that part of my earlier post as being incorrect.

4. I am suggesting that there is a difference between the only actual data that is available and what Mauduit said.

5. I am not trying to demonstrate that Mauduit was wrong; what I am trying to demonstrate is that there is data which does not correlate with his statement.

Jurgen

Is the long and the short of it, that Bretchel198's source isn't unreliable and Mauduit's description can be trusted?

I don't think so Col TA. I'm not sure how you reached that summary?

Hi Bretchel and other,

Great debate.

I meant that compared to the veterans of the consular guard, now newly named Imperial guard at Jena and Austerlitz, these line battalions could be used more harshly to bare the brunt of the worst fighting. See Davout's forced march from Vienna and subsequent defence of the french right.

I never disputed that the guard of 1805 were veterans and were in actual fact some of the last remaining revolutionary infantry in the bolougne camp. What I was putting forth was that that the Guard infantry after Russia did not "Age" and that the unit, both young, middle and old had little if any combat value over the line battalions newly constructed other than "propaganda" value.

We haven't even discussed how effective 35+ men would be over 20-25+ men! The scarcity in which the guard was used must have dulled their fighting ability?

Thoughts?

Kurt.

Kurt,

Given that the men who joined the 1st Grenadiers in September 1813 had an average of 6 years experience, I think one has to assume that they would at least be more experienced than most of the men in the line battalions.

However,you raise a very interesting point by questioning how or if the infrequency with which the old Guard, at least, saw combat before the retreat from Moscow dulled their fighting ability. It is possible that the relative inactivity softened them. However, when deployed in 1813 and 1814, the Old Guard seem to have been very effective so I think it is safe to infer that they were better than the bulk of every army in central Europe (except, of course, for the Saxons). Of course, some of their success may have been due to their legendary reputation and the fear that Napoleon was accompanying them.

I do suspect that the higher numbered Young Guard units in 1813-14 were no better than the average line unit and Colonel de Pontecoulant's comments about the Young Guard of 1815 are indicative that they were only average for the army.

Jurgen

Adam with the very strange name makes a good point in relation to Mauduit. Every unit that I have known in the Bundeswehr is, in its own estimation, the best; it has the toughest soldiers, the best officers, is smarter, quicker, more accurate etc than any other unit.

The esprit de corps that binds soldiers together in a unit leads to such pride and bombast; it does not mean that it is true.

Jurgen

Point well made Flecktarn. Back to the books for me.

Regards,

Kurt.

In 1806 the Prussians believed they were the best on the field.

The Grande Armee quite literally destroyed the Prussian Army in three weeks of marching and fighting and relentless pursuit.

B

Whirlwind, My thinking, such as it was, is that Bretchel198 quotes Mauduit on the senior regiments of the Old Guard, Flecktarn counters with material which subsequently proves to be about the Young Guard, and Adam Name Not Long Enough makes a post predicated on Flecktarn's discharge documentation being about the Old Guard. Which seemed to me to take things in a circle.

There can be no doubt that the quality of the guard would have deteriorated with the passage of time and the losses suffered, I just found Mauduit's quote, even allowing for an old soldier's bias, to be rather nice and quite evocative.

"I never disputed that the guard of 1805 were veterans and were in actual fact some of the last remaining revolutionary infantry in the bolougne camp."

They weren't – 25 % of the soldiers took part in the Revolutionary Wars, anohter 25 per cent in the 1800 campaign the rest were conscripts.