I just finished Hans Delbruck's 1920 "Dawn of Modern Warfare" which covers the period from the Swiss pikes through Napoleon and thought I'd share odd snippets.
From the Renaissance: a mercenary cavalry contract with the Huguenots in 1568 specified one wagon for every 4 or 6 horses. Lansquenets were to have a wagon for every 10 men.
The renowned Maurice of Orange fought one battle during his career, Nieuport in 1600. The rest of his actions were sieges and the small fights on the way to and from them.
Mercenary bands had a person described as leader who was the ombudsman for the rank and file, a sort of union representative. Officers of the time complained that leaders often were at the head of mutinies. This position disappeared when units became disciplined servants of the state instead of contractors.
Later on:
Delbruck writes extensively about Frederick the Great, including his less successful campaigns. Browning's "War of the Austrian Succession" introduced me to Frederick's disaster in Bohemia in 1744, unknown to most wargamers since there was no battle. Browning stated that the Austrians led by Charles of Lorraine and his brilliant chief of staff Traun outmaneuvered Frederick sent him away in a near rout, losing 30,000 of his 70,000 troops. Delbruck says the Austrians cut Frederick's line of supply and that most of Frederick's losses were desertions. Frederick, aware that since many had been forced to enlist, wrote much about how to avoid desertion. These techniques failed when hungry troops were retreating in disorder.
We usually see Frederick as badly outnumbered, which he was at times. Of the King's 12 campaigns, in 4 he had more troops, in 3 1/2 he had equal numbers and in 4 1/2 he was outnumbered.
One error: Delbruck says the French developed divisional formations to expedite skirmishing. According to Nosworthy, Broglie broke his battle line into 4 divisions during the Seven Years War to speed up the deployment of the army. He knew that French officers and enlisted men would not drill up the standards of the Prussian automatons. Knowing they couldn't deploy as quickly he opted for 4 smaller deployments instead of one large one. Broglie also experimented with battalion columns to move on the battlefield but I'm not aware of his being a pioneer of light infantry tactics.
I found Delbruck bending facts into place to agree with his theories. He apparently took heat for saying Frederick was not Napoleon's precursor in seeking the annihilation of the enemy. I tend to agree but think he goes overboard at times.
He calls Napoleon the first to see only the enemy's army as the target of a campaign. That seems right to me, as does praise of Bonaparte's operational skill. He then goes on praise Napoleon's political acumen. While there certainly was plenty of that, I think the major misstep in Spain in 1808, the absolute disaster invading Russia in 1812 and to a lesser degree, spurning peace offers after 1813 bring some doubt about the perfection of his political skills.
Delbruck seems to duck and weave a bit to get facts to fit his theory.
He pinpoints Wellington's strategic missteps in 1815 but does it with a will and a way that suggests he was still smarting over the armistice of 1918.
Last, he seems to go overboard insisting that the main advantage of the French armies during the Revolutionary wars and after was skirmishing. I think it was one of their tools but one among many.
Still and all, it was an interesting read, save for one place where he lambasted another military pundit who he disagreed with. You've seen one academic cat-fight, you've seen them all.
a previous thread on this book: TMP link
