"Atrocities in the Napoleonic Wars" Topic

Welcome back Flecktarn, hope you were gentle with the tanks :)

Reading between the lines re Whirlwind telling porkies on stiffling Gazzolla, I don't think W did say that he'd stiffed G, as far as I remember it was Fleck & meself. And a few hundred others ….

Moreau was controlled by his wife and mother in law both jealous of Bonaparte in reality a sad figure

Chouan and Peeler,

I have to say that I have always found the Challenger II to be a very good tank; the design philosophy is completely different from that of the Leopard and, of the two, I think that I would rather have the British one supporting my unit than the Leopard:(. I think that they are probably quite difficult to break but trying out a Milan on one would be…interesting.

Chouan,

For me, Marengo is one of the prime examples of deliberate Napoleonic falsification of history in the cause of creating the myth. Napoleon performed badly on the day and needed the story to be rewritten to make himself the hero. However, that, and other falsifications of history, should not blind us to the fact that there is some truth in the Napoleonic versions of many events.

Jurgen

Von Winterfeldt,

I have learned never to take any sources, even primary ones, at face value. Why should they lie is a question that often has many answers.

However, your evidence on Jaffa looks overwhelming so I will, as I said, investigate it further if I get time.

With regard to rewriting the history of Marengo, I was indeed referring to Napoleon's activities in that field.

Jurgen

Flecktarn
My approach is simple, when getting interested in a topic, I start researching, then I evaluate all my sources, very often, if not always – my findings are in stark contrast to the usual established views.
Now it is easy – with google books, gallica, Hathi Trust – to find and read good sources.

Imperiale
The very sad figure is Napoléon himself.

von Winterfeldt,

Not being a professional historian, or even really an amateur one, I am possibly a little underqualified to comment but, if I was developng findings that were very often, if not always, in stark contrast to the usual established views, I think that I might be inclined to question my methods.

Alas, my problem is time rather than access to sources; finding enough of it to complete a doctorate while serving was very hard and I now find that increased responsibility leads to less time to get involved with any form of historical research. Another new and rather fascinating interest is also happily absorbing the time that I used to spend reading and wargaming.

Jurgen

Hi Flecktarn,

Good to have you back. I hope you do find time to publish some of your research, I am increasingly of the opinion that good military history tends to be written by those who have served themselves. Perhaps because they instinctively understand the challenges of operational decision making.

Seriously, draw up a list of all the historians you trust, and then note down which have served, it will come as a revelation:

Young, Lawson, Weller, Elting, Rothenburg, Digby Smith, Edwards, Lipscombe, Chappell, Gill, Burnham…

So far as I am aware, neither Duffy nor Griffith served, but of course were on the staff at RMA Sandhurst for some time!

Hans we all have our opinions you say Napoleon I say Moreau lets leave it at that

Flecktarn
On the contrary – one has to question established views and why they are established (they suit a purpose, like news – one has to read between the lines).

von Winterfeldt, I think what Flecktarn meant, but I'm no mind reader, is that if you adopt the simple approach that you use and your findings are in stark contrast to the usual established views, chances are the fault lies with your research rather than the established view themselves. I would personally regard this as the more likely explanation for the stark contrast, unless you believe that you have an innate ability to seek out the historical truth where others miss it.

I do agree that reading between the lines can be important. I have said before on these boards that I like my history unbiased, and I am quite confident that you guard against possible bias at all times during your simple research.

The results of your research are always valued, in whatever language you decide to post them.

Sparker that is an interesting point you make about authors and not one which I had researched over the years, although I would still be minded that a good military historian need not necessarily have ever served.

Flecktarn, in my day I suspect we had a lot more tanks than we do now, but I trust you had fun in the field.

Peeler

I think many authors who have served could also be classed as academics. Did they all start writing while they were serving? Or did they become authors only when they changed over to an academic or civilian position? Or a bit of both?

And how will serving in the forces, just as an office clerk or a cook, for example, possibly make them better authors. It is not a definite. It could depend more on their interest militarily and their skills at research, possibly skills they've improved on when they became academics and civilians.

However, the list you present is impressive and I think I have titles by most of them.

‘I long ago learned that when dealing with you, I have to choose words and definitions very carefully, to prevent you from playing with semantics, diverting the topic from one that is uncomfortable to you, or obfuscating by deliberately arguing about words instead of meanings or facts.'

This could have been written to describe your actions on the forums especially when disagreed with or when Germans or Germany is mentioned or discussed. You really shouldn't accuse people of actions or intentions that you have no idea of and that you cannot prove. Your accusatory position here is both inaccurate and ludicrous. That is reprehensible.

And your ‘historical method' here on the forum is suspect. You apparently come to your conclusion and then attempt to find ‘facts' to support that conclusion. That methodology is both illogical and definitely fallacious, historically (see David Hackett Fishcer's Historians' Fallacies-a very useful book to have especially on the forums).

You formulated a question that was obfuscatory in nature and which fitted your conclusion first, and not any facts to be assembled first, and not one that others might come up with. Further, it was avoiding the main point that the War of Liberation for Prussia meant ‘liberating' as much German territory as possible and that is exactly what happened. That is not historical inquiry which is the process of researching and finding facts and then coming to a conclusion. And no amount of your ludicrous sermons can change that simple observation.

You play semantic games and if you are disagreed with you react with verbal abuse, condescension, and ridicule of the opposite opinion or material. And your historical games are at best either intellectual dishonesty, or merely just games-you have to decide which. I'm just tired of your verbal abuse and other nonsense and you're not impressing me at all, though I do think quite highly of your book on Germany. I was pleasantly surprised it was so good.

Getting back to Prussia, it wasn't merely getting back territory that she had previously owned. Prussia even grabbed minor Swiss territory (Neufchatel). And as subsequent Prussian actions from 1815-1871 clearly demonstrated, that was the point of the exercise for Prussia.

And as I said before, take a look at maps of Prussia in 1790, 1806, 1810, and 1815. The Prussian growth in territory during the Congress of Vienna is impressive.

Maybe the next time you can actually engage in an adult conversation instead of being accusatory and rabidly defensive, but I doubt it. Your actions here are pathetic and in the end I just feel sorry for you.

As a footnote, I found the following just for you, especially as you know and understand little about armies, wars, and especially soldiers despite all of your bluster:

'Considering the late 18th Century Prussian Army, that mysterious, wandering Welsh soldier of fortune, Henry Lloyd, who had served both in and against it, described it as made up chiefly of foreigners of all nations, manners and religions. Frederick the Great had drilled and disciplined it into a 'vast and regular machine', but-were Frederick removed-it probably would fall to pieces.'

'The Prussian Army that went condifently against Napoleon in 1806 was Frederick's army still in most regards-a framework of foreigners, enticed into its harsh service, filled up with part-trained Prussian reservists. A few days of fighting shattered it.'

'Thereupon Prussian officers began rebuilding it, with vengeance and conquest very much in mind. It became a national force, the active army backed after 1813 by a landwehr of older men, and infused with a growing national spirit. Prussia however was a poor nation with a limited armament industry; only lavish English subsidies enabled it to keep a strong army in the field through 1813-1814. By 1815 it was worn thin, armed with a mixture of weapons from practically every European country. Its supply system never had been particularly efficient, and the artillery was definitely inferior to the French.'

'Prussia was a predatory nation, eager to seize territory on any pretext or opportunity. Its soldiers were tough fighters, capable-if well led-of great exertions, tautly drilled and disciplined. They also were arrogant in victory, remorseless looters and brutal in their plundering. In 1815 Belgians complained that the Prussians billeted on them were worse than the Cossacks.'

-Napoleonic Uniforms, Volume IV by John R. Elting, 488.

B

The following is an interesting and somewhat enlightening description of the Confederation of the Rhine:

'Caught between Prussia and Austria, both of which constantly seized every opportunity to ingest them, the smaller German states had increasing difficulty maintaining their independence. When the Austrians invaded Bavaria in 1805 without a declaration of war, ordering the Bavarian Army to submit to Austrian command, Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt at once joined Napoleon. this alliance was formalized on 12 July 1806 when sixteen south and central German states seceded from the ancient Holy Roman Empire (no longer Roman and certainly never holy) to form the Confederation of the Rhine, with Napoleon as its 'Protector.' Other states joined during 1806-1808, bringing the total to thirty-five.'

'Each state pledged a military contingent in case of war. (France, in turn, pledged 200,000 men to the common defense.) A few of the tiniest states were allowed to substitute cash contributions.'

'Originally, the armies of these states differed greatly in organization, armament, training, and efficiency, many being cumbersome 18th century-type formations. Service with the French, especially against Austria in 1809, led to the adoption of French organization, tactics, and insignia. Through Napoleon's demands after 1808 for men for his grueling war in Spain caused resentment, the Confederation troops were loyal and usually efficient allies through the disastrous 1812 campaign. During 1813 they fell away, readily or regretfully. In 1814, Prussia, Austria, Britain, and Russia combined to drive them, willingly or reluctantly, into battle against Napoleon. But something of an emotional tie-memories of hardships endured together, of battles lost and won-remained. After Waterloo, Napoleonic exiles often found safe haven in various German states.'

-Napoleonic Uniforms, Volume III by John Elting, 9.

B

ColonelToffeeApple,

That was indeed what I meant; thank you for clarifying:). Being in the field was a nice change from my current assignment; unfortunately, I have to do this job for a while as it is part of my career path. The next step will be much more fun as it should be a brigade command:).

Brechtel198,

Those are interesting quotes from a well known highly subjective source. Have you read anything in German about the attitudes towards France, Napoleon and the Rheinbund in the minor German states during the period?

Jurgen

@ColonelToffeeApple

Example :

(established view)
The 3000 killed POWs at Jaffa – were soldiers who had capitulated beforehand and had promised not to fight against France – also there was no food supply.
Though they were granted that their life was spared when capitulating at Jaffa – this was then ignored when the above mentioned facts were found out)

When researching the incident – I found out that amonst the victims were children and women as well, that the French Army captured quite a high amount of provisions.

Question : why is the established view that Bonaparte had good reason to butcher POWs?

Question : why is this view still accepted despite massive evidence against it?

Sources :

Schur, Nathan : Napoleon in the Holy Land, London 1999
(which is very pro Bonaparte)
Jonquière : L'Expédition D'Égypte, several volumes, available on google books
Doguereau : Journal de l'Expédition d'Égypte, re-print by La voivre 1997
Translation in English : Guns in the Desert
Bernoyer : Bonaparte en Egypte 1798 – 1800 & en Syrie
1981

to name the most important.

The best sources are those, where you can form your own opinion after having read them.

That, then, begs the question: What was the solution to the problem?

B

My dear von Winterfeldt, I haven't read enough works on Jaffa to be able to provide the "established" view, or comment on whether there is a "stark contrast" between that and the position you have advanced based on what seem like readily available sources.

I found the Dwyer article, linked twice on this thread interesting reading on Jaffa.

link

All sources of any kind are those where you can form your own opinion after reading them, it quite naturally follows that the more you read on a particular subject, the more informed your opinion becomes.

I most certainly don't have the retention of detail required to argue the toss on historical matters anymore hence this thread. It is much easier to glean from the collective knowledge of well read TMP members than to attempt to address the subject yourself (for me at least).

The one thing to be avoided is bias, because an opinion, no matter how well informed is, if based on a biased view, rendered relatively worthless.

"That, then, begs the question: What was the solution to the problem?

B"

Yes, there's a moral response and an immoral response. The moral response wouldn't result in the execution of women and children, at least.

"The 1800 campaign was of course won by a much better general than Bonaparte – Moreau. ;-))."

The usual biased and deliberately inflammatory nonsense from Von Winterfedlt. The war with the Austrians involved conflict on two principle fronts, Italy and 'Germany'. Both these conflicts had to be brought to a satisfactory conclusion before the war could be won. Napoleon did his bit in Italy, Moreau did his bit in Germany. Unless VonW is suggesting that Napoleon should have cloned himself & been in two theatres at once, I can't see that his point (which he has made before) has any merit whatsoever.

As for Moreau being a better General than Napoleon, i guess each person is entitled to their opinion, but when the person in question has made it apparent that he thinks pretty much EVERYONE in history was better than Napoleon, we can see through it quite quickly.

Chouan

How easy it is to say what should or should not be done when your views are based on hindsight and you are not actually faced with the problem yourself. And surely, one man's fact is another man's fiction. People tend to believe who they want to believe rather than who they should believe.

And I'm sure we would all like to think no one would kill anyone unnecessarily and especially women and children, in any war – but that is not reality or human nature. It has happened in recent conflicts and will probably continue to happen. Even Richard the Lion Heart, the king of England did it.

link

von Winterfeldt,

Looking at the case of Jaffa, as you use that as your example, nothing that you have presented denies that some at least of the men massacred were parole breakers.

That the defenders were promised their lives would not have covered those who broke parole, as would have been known to all involved.

Women and children were among the victims; that is certainly evidence that something bad happened to the women and children but again, does not deny that there is truth in the Napoleonic account of why the men were massacred. I can think of reasons why some women and children were killed which, while not reflecting particularly well on the French, could be explained.

The amount of provisions found is irrelevant unless you prove that the men massacred were not parole breakers; if they were, the French were entitled to kill them so logistics and supply become irrelevant.

I am not a fan of Napoleon but, unfortunately, bias exists on both sides.

Jurgen

I know memoirs should be considered with care, but here is the opinion of someone who was said to have been there, and from the memoir of which is not greatly favourable to Napoleon either.

Napoleon had ordered two aides-de-camp to try and appease the troops after the siege of Jaffa was completed. The two aides-de camp had been threatened to be shot by the defenders, if they did not allow some of those defending Jaffa to surrender. They duly lead the unexpected mass of prisoners back to the French camp.

'It was necessary to decide upon their fate. The two aides-de-camp observed, that they had found themselves alone in the midst of numerous enemies, and that he had directed them to restrain the carnage. "Yes, doubtless," replied the General-in-Chief, with great warmth, "as to women, children, and old men-all the peaceable inhabitants; but not with respect to armed soldiers. It is your duty to die, rather than bring these unfortunate creatures to me. What do you want me to do with them?" These words were pronounced in the most angry tone.
The prisoners were then ordered to sit down, and were placed, without any order, in front of the tents, their hands tied behind their backs. A sombre fury was depicted in their countenances. We gave them a little biscuit and bread, squeezed out of the already scanty supply for the army.
On the first day of their arrival, a council of war was held in the tent of the General-in-Chief, to determine what course should be pursued with respect to them. The council deliberated a long time without coming to any decision.
On the evening of the following day, the daily reports of the generals of division came in. They spoke of nothing but the insufficiency of the rations, the complaints of the soldiers-of their murmurs and discontent at seeing their bread given to enemies, who had been withdrawn from their vengeance, inasmuch as a decree of death, in conformity with the laws of war, had been passed on Jaffa. All these reports were alarming, and especially that of General Bon, in which no reserve was made. He spoke of nothing less than the fear of a revolt, which would be justified by the serious nature of the case.
The council assembled again. All the generals of division were summoned to attend, and for several hours together they discussed, under separate questions, what measures might be adopted, with the most sincere desire to discover and execute one which would save the lives of these unfortunate prisoners.
Should they be sent to Egypt? Could it be done?
To do so, it would be necessary to send with them a numerous escort, which would too much weaken our little army in the enemy's country. How, besides, could they and the escort be supported till they reached Cairo, having no provisions to give them on setting out, and their route being through a hostile territory, which we had exhausted, which presented no fresh resources, and through which we, perhaps, might have to return.
Should they be embarked?
Where were the ships? Where could they be found? All our optical instruments, directed over the sea, could not descry a single friendly sail. Bonaparte, I affirm, would have regarded such an event as a real favour of fortune. It was, and I am glad to have to say it, this sole idea, this sole hope, which made him brave, for three days, the murmurs of his army. But in vain was help looked for seaward. It did not come.
Should the prisoners be set at liberty?
They would then instantly proceed to St. Jean d'Acre to reinforce the Pacha, or else, throwing themselves into the mountains of Naplouse, would greatly annoy our rear and right flank, and deal out death to us, as a recompense for the life we had given them. There could be no doubt of this. What is a Christian dog to a Turk? It would even have been a religious and meritorious act in the eyes of the prophet.
Could they be incorporated, disarmed, with our soldiers in the ranks?
Here again the question of food presented itself in all its force. Next came to be considered the danger of having such comrades, while marching through an enemy's country. What might happen in the event of a battle before St.Jean d'Acre? Could we even tell what might occur during the march? and finally, what must be done with them when under the ramparts of that town, if we should be able to take them there? The same embarrassments with respect to the questions of provisions and security would then recur with increased force.
The third day arrived without its being possible, anxiously as it was desired, to come to any conclusion favourable to the preservation of these unfortunate men. The murmurs in the camp grew louder-the evil went on increasing-remedy appeared impossible-danger was real and imminent.
The order for shooting the prisoners was given and executed on the 10th of March. We did not, as has been stated, separate the Egyptians from the other prisoners. There were no Egyptians.
Many of the unfortunate creatures composing the smaller division, which was fired close to the sea coast, at some distance from the other column, succeeded in swimming to some reefs of rocks out of the reach of musket-shot. The soldiers rested their muskets on the sand, and, to induce the prisoners to return, employed the Egyptian signs of reconciliation in use in the country. They came back; but as they advanced, they were killed, and disappeared among the waves.
I confine myself to these details of this act of dreadful necessity, of which I was an eye witness. Others who, like myself, saw it, have fortunately spared me the recital of the sanguinary result. This atrocious scene still makes me shudder, when I think of it, as it did on the day I beheld it; and I would wish it were possible for me to forget it, rather than be compelled to describe it. All the horrors imagination can conceive, relative to this day of blood, would fall short of the reality.
I have related the truth, the whole truth. I was present at all the discussions, all the conferences, all the deliberations. It may be supposed that I had not a deliberative voice; but I am bound to declare that the situation of the army, the scarcity of food, our small numerical strength, in the midst of a country where every individual was an enemy, would have induced me to vote in the affirmative of the proposition which was carried into effect, if I had had a vote to give. It was necessary to be on the spot in order to understand the horrible necessity which existed.
War, unfortunately, presents too many occasions on which a law, immutable in all ages, and common to all nations, requires that private interests should be sacrificed to a great general interest, and that even humanity should be forgotten. It is for posterity to judge whether this terrible situation was that in which Bonaparte was placed. For my own part, I have a perfect conviction that he could not do otherwise than to yield to the dire necessity of the cause. It was the advice of the Council, whose opinion was unanimous in favour of the execution, that governed him. Indeed I ought, in truth, to say, that he yielded only in the last extremity, and was one of those, perhaps, who beheld the massacre with the deepest regret.'
(pages 308-331-Private Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte by Bourrienne, Volume 1, 1830)

Bourrienne's account seems to suggest only men were killed and that there was a shortage of supplies and food. Women and children however, may well have been killed during the siege and final storming of Jaffa, as in all sieges.

Flecktarn

How did the French know they were parole breakers, took they finger prints, they certainly had no regimental clothes.

What happened was that some defenders (and again the number varies) were promised their lifes if they surrendered.

This they took in good faith and surrendered.

After that – Bonaparte did decide to get rid of them.

So far some good sources are given, among the victims – bayonetted to death on the beach, were women, children (who were along with their husbands and fathers) and some old men.

I cannot deny if there were some parole breakers, nor can any other source prove that there were.
What is most unlikley – at least for me – that children and women could have been those – so why kill them?

One of the reasons – as excuse – was that there was not enough food, Dogereau – an artillery officer and no enemy to Bonaparte just states otherwise and list the amount of food captured.

von Winterfeldt, "How did the French know they were parole breakers, took they finger prints".

Do you perhaps think that you might have, however unknowingly, developed a certain bias. A bias that occasionally comes to the fore in how you express yourself when posting?

I merely ask because, as I said earlier in the thread a biased opinion is of dubious value from the perspective of a serious military historian for example.

Regarding the following interesting passage from Elting's Napoleonic Uniforms provided by Brechtel:

"When the Austrians invaded Bavaria in 1805 without a declaration of war, ordering the Bavarian Army to submit to Austrian command, Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt at once joined Napoleon."

The following clarifies what occurred with dates and details mainly from French diplomatic correspondence. Bavaria and Baden allied with France prior to any Austrian movement into Bavaria; Württemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt delayed joining until a month or more after (whether this constitutes joining Napoleon "at once" is subject to interpretation.)

It would be interesting to see the corresponding Austrian correspondence. It seems likely that the Franz would be invoking his imperial powers and calling on the member states of the empire to fulfill their traditional obligations to provide troops in support of their emperor (which many of them would ignore in the customary fashion) – the Emperor would not negotiate treaties with them in the way an external power would. But it is important to note that Napoleon's demands for troops from the south German states formed a precondition of each alliance when eventually signed. Each of these small states was getting essentially the same treatment from both sides.

Bavaria

I already detailed the sequence of events earlier in the thread, including the following:

Napoleon to Talleyrand, 13 August 1805: "Also write to Mr. Otto need that it is necessary that Bavaria decide, and I will not allow it to remain neutral. You will write in the same way to my ministers to the arch-chancellor of the German Empire [Dalberg the Archbishop Elector of Mainz, later Grand Duke of Frankfurt under the Confederation of the Rhine] and the electors of Baden and Württemberg." [Correspondance]

Some additional information of interest:

24/25 August 1805: Treaty of Bogenhausen (Defensive-Offensive Alliance between France and Bavaria) – the sources I have vary on the official date of the treaty

8 September 1805: Austrians cross the Bavarian frontier two weeks after the Treaty of Bogenhausen was signed.

Between 23 September and 9 October: "Otto [French Minister to Bavaria], acting on the authorization of Talleyrand, altered the date of the treaty from August 24 to September 23. ‘From this most important change of date it becomes evident,' remarks Otto, ‘that the Elector has only concluded an alliance after having been driven from his capital, and that his majesty the Emperor only commences war in order to restore his ally, and to avenge the injury which has been done to him." The footnote relates to the full paragraph and includes references to multiple letters from Otto to Talleyrand, Oct 9 1805 being the most likely date for this passage in context. These are located in Affaires étrangères, Corr. Pol. : Bavière, 180 according to the footnote. [source: Fischer, Herbert A.L. Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship Germany. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903. 97]

Baden

Napoleon to Talleyrand, 25 August 1805: "M. Talleyrand, Thiard must be at this hour arriving in Baden. My intention is that you give him instructions and powers to negotiate an offensive and defensive alliance with Baden. I will guarantee to the elector the "recès de l'Empire", an increase in his dominions with peace, and he will provide 3,000 men for my army." [Correspondance]

2 September 1805: Treaty of Ettlingen – (Defensive-Offensive Alliance between France and Baden)

8 September 1805: Austrians cross the Bavarian frontier one week after treaty was signed.

Württemberg

"On August 30, 1805 the Electoral Cabinet, assured that neutrality was out of the question, consented to the defensive and offensive alliance with France. ‘I must,' wrote the Elector, August 29, ‘take part either against France or for her'" … [Fischer, p. 100]

‘If I had resisted the Emperor,' said Frederick a few days later, ‘my states would have been divided up, and my house would have had to live on the pity of foreign courts.' [Fischer, p. 101]

Although Frederick could only guess at Napoleon's intentions, his fears were entirely justified based on this:

[Napoleon] to the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Talleyrand], 18 August 1805: "Concerning Wurtemberg, if the father [Frederick, Elector of Württemberg] takes a wrong turn against us, it seems that the simplest course would be to dismiss him and replace him with his son. You should sound him out to see whether he would take sides with us, we could give him a regiment. We need to know whether he would act against his father to dethrone him, this would be safer, because there is no doubt that upon our entering Stuttgart, all troops will desert." [Alombert & Colin, Campagne de 1805 en Allemagne, I, 66.]

8 September 1805: Austrians cross the Bavarian frontier.

24 September: The Franco-Bavarian alliance is publicly announced

October 8: Treaty of alliance with France is signed. Württemberg was in no hurry to conclude the alliance with France. The treaty was not signed until one month after Austrian forces crossed the Bavarian border and nearly 6 weeks since the cabinet had authorized an alliance.

Hesse-Darmstadt

L'Empereur a Talleyrand. 29 August 1805: Monsieur Talleyrand, the prince of Hesse-Darmstadt should provide us 4,000 men, do not let him remain neutral. Send a letter to my chargé d'affaires near him, to negotiate a treaty of alliance, and he will be required to give us a small division according to his strength. [Alombert & Colin, I, 266-7]

I don't have a treaty date for Hesse-Darmstadt, but on 2 October 1805 Napoleon was still trying to persuade the Landgrave to supply 3000 men. It appears any formal treaty of alliance occurred later in October.

von Winterfeldt,

I do feel that your bias is showing somewhat; you seem as determined to see everything that Napoleon and the French did in a bad light as Brechtel198 is to see it in a good light.

There are a range of reasons why some women and children might have been killed; war is brutal and sometimes things are done which look different from the safety of our homes than they did in the field.

As to the food, yes, food was captured; however, Napoleon had an army to feed. I suspect that the bigger logistical issue would have been what to do with the prisoners: guarding them would have been difficult and absorbed resources and the question of what to do with them on the march or in battle would have been almost impossible to answer. If that was the reason that they were killed it was a brutal and terrible one but, let me ask you this: what would you have done? Letting them go (again?) was certainly not sensible.

War leads people to make hard, and sometimes brutal, choices; commanders make them every time they order their men into combat as that order will often lead to soldiers being killed and maimed. What we later call "atrocities" are occasionally the result of necessity and a lack of other options.

Jurgen

Flecktarn,
Please do not use a Milan on one of our Challengers – we don't have as many as we used to & such an action could start a right old ruccus :)

Peeler,

I will try not to:). It was a very good two weeks; I always enjoy spending time with the British army as it is, in some ways, very similar to the Bundeswehr yet, in others, very different.

Jurgen

I'd be interested to know how similar & how different …. Perhaps in a different thread though eh … :)

Peeler,

One big difference: the food, ach du lieber Gott, the food!

Jurgen

'Each of these small states was getting essentially the same treatment from both sides.'

There was one very large difference-Napoleon wasn't attempting to ingest the Confederation as Prussia and Austria were and Prussia eventually accomplished.

Napoleon consolidated the mass of smaller states, enlarged and promoted the rulers of the larger ones, and only annexed two of them (Salm and Oldenberg). He also created two new ones, Berg and Westphalia.

So, I see a great difference between the ways that Napoleon treated the German states and how Prussia and Austria did. Both Austria and Prussia wished to be dominant in Germany and both failed until 1814.

Prussia's attempt ended in late 1806; Austria attempted twice-1805 and 1809 and the German states either chose the French or fought with them in those campaigns.

B

'Moreau was controlled by his wife and mother in law both jealous of Bonaparte in reality a sad figure'

Agree. Moreau was not as strong a commander as portrayed by his admirers. He was popular with the rank and file and some of the generals that worked for him, but he was not the best general in the Rhine armies (Desaix was both a better commander and soldier) and his weak character allowed him to be swallowed up in plots against the First Consul. He was the author of his own misfortune.

B

it always seems strange to me Hans detests Napoleon with venom yet he dresses as a soldier in the Grand Armee with the 9e legere and shouts Vive l'Emperuer when required to do so smacks of hypocrosy

Concerning Jaffa, Herold (Bonaparte in Egypt), who uses Jonquiere as a source, suggests (page 302) that Napoleon should have let the prisoners go, that they would be no use to Djezzar at Acre. That shows a lack of military insight – letting 3000 men swell the force at Acre. And extra three thousand men firing at the attacking French would certainly cause a lot of French casualties. Who would you put first?

Herold also suggests around one hundred men could have remained and guarded them. Armed with machine guns, yes, you could agree with at. But not one hundred, armed with muskets, to control 3,000.

There is also the question of would the French willingly kill their prisoners, knowing full well that such an act may affect French prisoners?

It looks like, as in many cases, your viewpoint will depend on which sources you prefer to believe. And again, it is so easy to say what to do or not to do with the luxury of hindsight.

Imperiale

Perhaps, like a lot of people, then and now, he is really a secret admirer of the great man.

"von Winterfeldt, "How did the French know they were parole breakers, took they finger prints".

Do you perhaps think that you might have, however unknowingly, developed a certain bias. A bias that occasionally comes to the fore in how you express yourself when posting?

I merely ask because, as I said earlier in the thread a biased opinion is of dubious value from the perspective of a serious military historian for example."

Colonel, you do seem to have a problem with what you refer to as "bias". You questioned me extensively about my viewpoint in a previous thread, such that eventually I ceased responding, then I went for my usual couple of weeks in France.
A couple of definitions of bias might be useful. " Biased means one-sided, lacking a neutral viewpoint, not having an open mind." and "Bias is an inclination of temperament or outlook to present or hold a partial perspective and a refusal to even consider the possible merits of alternative points of view.".
I'm inclined to think that Von Winterfeld has a viewpoint that he has developed through reading and learning over a period of time. He seems to have formed a view of Buonaparte based on his learning and understanding. That is not bias, it is a viewpoint. If he, or I, had started with a viewpoint, an uninformed viewpoint, then ignored any other view of Buonaparte, that would be a biased viewpoint, whether ir be favourable or unfavourable. However, a viewpoint that has been formed by reading and research that tends towards a particular idea, in my case unfavourable towards Buonaparte, is not necessarily a biased view. I, for example, can find good things about Buonaparte. That he was able to motivate the Army of Italy, for example. That he was able to articulate Jacobin views quite well in his political pamphlets. That he was very good indeed at self-publicity. I'm sure that Von Winterfelt can do the same. However, that my overall view is negative doesn't mean that I, or anybody else with a negative view, can't read about him objectively, as you seem to suggest.
As Jurgen argues, some things in war are indeed brutal, but the mass execution, in cold blood, of women, children, the elderly, disarmed prisoners who hadn't given their parole earlier, as well as those who had, is, to my mind an atrocity. One could, possibly, argue military necessity for the soldiers, but not for the non-combatants. If British, Prussian, Austrian, or indeed Bavarian troops had carried out such an action it would be universally condemned as such.

The answer is simple, isn't it – let them go. Just say to your men, listen lads, we have to let them go it is the right thing to do. Now I know about 2,000 of them will join our enemies and fire on you but when you have been hit by one of their shots and are lying on the ground dying, or have a leg or arm blown off, remember that we did the right thing. Yes, I'm sure the troops of any army would accept that!

Chouan, I am reasonably long in the tooth, and while I find your guidance on definitions of bias helpful, I am content with my own understanding of the word which I see no need to rehearse.

I don't question anyone's ability to post, I find some of it quite magnificent stuff that keeps me highly entertained, which is after all the point of the forum.

I like to think that I am relatively neutral which might give me a different perspective.

I recall our previous exchange which you broke off, for reasons known only to yourself. The "endgame" of that had been my desire to ascertain if Airfix box art had subliminally affected me compared to your university days, where you really learned how to read a book, and your subsequent extensive reading, in and effort to understand how two individuals, staring out on the same book(s), (namely Chandler) could have reached such differing views. But of course we didn't get the chance to explore that, and I am also aware that we seem to read military history books differently.

It is my opinion that your extensive work in this area has led you to have a somewhat one sided view on the subject, and I base this entirely, as I have nothing else, on how you express yourself in some of your posts. If one sided equates to bias, so be it. I don't call into question your ability to post well, or the validity of your posts, far from it, long may they continue.

As it stands I think Von Winterfelt comment on finger printing the prisoners smacked of over eagerness.

Quite often I post nonsensical rubbish myself, so there you go.

Chouan,

While agreeing somewhat with your sentiment, I would ask you this:

Was there a mass execution of women, children, the elderly and disarmed prisoners who hadn't given their parole earlier?

I can think of several reasons why some women, children and the elderly ended up being killed but I see no evidence for a mass execution of them.

Values were different at that time and military chivalry did not really apply between Christians and Muslims so killing prisoners that you could not guard properly was probably not an unreasonable action.

Jurgen

Flecktarn raises a good point. There is an extract in Memoirs of Napoleon's Egyptian Expedition 1798-1801 by Captain Joseph-Marie Moiret of the 75th Demi-Brigade, page 21.

'For twenty-four hours the town was given over to the horrors of war. It is impossible to describe a more horrible scene, the roads were heaped with corpses; children were to be seen, murdered in their mother's arms, and everywhere the shrieks of women whose husbands had been slain.'

This is by Doguereau, one of the accounts the 'unbiased' von Winterfeldt said should be read. It suggests that the main atrocities committed occurred during the storming of Jaffa, in the same way that atrocities were committed during the storming of Badajoz.

We must also remember that the commander at Jaffa beheaded the emissary sent by Napoleon requesting they surrender.
As Robert Asprey puts it (The Rise and Fall of Napoleon, Volume 1, page 303)

'Or he could execute the lot in compliance with the (Western) rules of war, the commandant having chosen to fight after the wall was breached.'

"Was there a mass execution of women, children, the elderly and disarmed prisoners who hadn't given their parole earlier?"

By Buonaparte or in general?

"I can think of several reasons why some women, children and the elderly ended up being killed but I see no evidence for a mass execution of them."

The source given earlier describes their execution, by their being bayonetted on the beach. Possibly a problem in idiom, but if a significant number of civilians are killed at, or nearly at the same time, in the same operation, it would be reasonable to describe it as a mass execution. They were prisoners being executed "on mass".

"This is by Doguereau, one of the accounts the 'unbiased' von Winterfeldt said should be read. It suggests that the main atrocities committed occurred during the storming of Jaffa, in the same way that atrocities were committed during the storming of Badajoz."

Except that the source cited states that those who had surrendered, having been promised "safe conduct", were subsequently executed, having been tied up beforehand. The mass execution of helpless civilians, females, children and the elderly, who had been promised their lives, some time subsequent to the storm and some time subsequent to the surrender is an atrocity by anybody's standards.

"Chouan, I am reasonably long in the tooth, and while I find your guidance on definitions of bias helpful, I am content with my own understanding of the word which I see no need to rehearse."

As am I, but an agreed definition helps in establishing the parameters of discussion. If your "bias" has a different meaning to my "bias", then discussing bias becomes pointless.

"I like to think that I am relatively neutral which might give me a different perspective."

But maintaining neutrality is virtually, if not completely, impossible. One can view Stalin's qualities of organisation and cunning, whilst still viewing him in a negative light. Already thinking him a villain whilst reading about him doesn't mean that one can't read about him rationally.

"I recall our previous exchange which you broke off, for reasons known only to yourself."

I try to spend a couple of weeks or more, if I can, in France in the summer, during which I am banned by my wife from using my laptop for anything but route planning, restaurant finding, and other tourist stuff. I was aware that you were seeking to show that a reader/researcher can't view the subject "fairly" if they have a preconception, negative or positive, about the subject. It isn't easy to read dispassionately about Carrier, for example. However, I would suggest that it is still possible to read of an historical figure and change one's view, if the evidence is strong enough. Most popular histories, films, etc. portray Robespierre as a fanatical monster, for example, whereas the reality isn't as simple. An essentially honest man whose morality becomes distorted by circumstances, would seem to cover it nicely. My view changed as I read more. I initially thought Danton and Desmoulins romantic heroes, the victims of Robespierre, but subsequently found them to have their own serious flaws. Again, an initial view that has changed over time, with knowledge. I wouldn't like to think myself biased about Robespierre, Danton, Desmoulins or Carrier, but I have views on them, that are the product of research. Those views may change, of course.

"The "endgame" of that had been my desire to ascertain if Airfix box art had subliminally affected me compared to your university days, where you really learned how to read a book, and your subsequent extensive reading, in and effort to understand how two individuals, staring out on the same book(s), (namely Chandler) could have reached such differing views. But of course we didn't get the chance to explore that, and I am also aware that we seem to read military history books differently."

Having read Chandler, and others on Buonaparte, I continued to read about him as part of my studies. Agreed, most military histories tend to show him in a positive light as a military leader of note, or even a military genius. However, reading far more political history than military, the picture of him as ruthless, autocratic and egocentric dictator became dominant. The flaws in his character became far more noticeable than they are in purely military history texts. The only obvious hatchet job is that of Barnett, but even so, Barnett does have some valid points about the limits on Buonaparte's "genius", for want of a better expression. Having been an amateur reader of History until I went to University, after 17 years at sea, I did find that the concept of reading about a subject different to that of an amateur. I realised that there are no definitive works on any topic, that each subject has many texts, from many viewpoints and that one has to create one's own synthesis. Yours and mine, based on widespread but often different books are not the same. Even if we'd both read all the same books, we'd probably end up with a different viewpoint.

"It is my opinion that your extensive work in this area has led you to have a somewhat one sided view on the subject, and I base this entirely, as I have nothing else, on how you express yourself in some of your posts. If one sided equates to bias, so be it."

I can see your point. My view of Buonaparte is indeed negative, but, as I have pointed out before, it is a viewpoint that is the product of learning and reading. To take an extreme example, if one had no knowledge of Lenin and, through reading reached a viewpoint that he was a very unpleasant man who seems to have avoided a dreadful and bloody reputation because Stalin was so much worse, would this mean that one was biased against him?

Thank you for your final comment, it was very kind.

Chouan.

Chouan I don't think that anyone ever questions your depth of knowledge on the topic in hand, particularly if it is focused more on the revolutionary period of the wars, nor do I call into question Von Winterfelt's breadth of knowledge which is undoubtedly superior to my own, as I genuinely cannot recall half of what I have read most of the time.

In my opinion you both have a negative view of Bonaparte. Equally there are some who have a positive view on the man, so it is not one way traffic. That your views were arrived at through learning is not in dispute, in fact quite the reverse.

It follows however, as night follows day, that if you have a prior negative view before you come to post on the boards, that this will be reflected in the opinions you express and in turn could be viewed by the impartial observer as exhibiting a bias. As it promotes lively exchanges on threads I wouldn't want to be without it.

Neutrality is not particularly difficult, it simply requires a lack of strong feeling either way, and an impartiality on contentious subject matter when it arises. Then again I spend my time on the forum gaining knowledge from others and not imparting it, so it makes life easier for me. This thread from it's outset has proved how much information the forum can produce on a subject that genuinely interested me.

So all that remains is who is joking, was von Winterfelt joking about the finger printing or was I joking about the dangers of exhibiting a bias as regards the weight to be placed on opinions on TMP?

Chouan,

The problem for me around the mass execution of women, children and old people seems to be that there is a lot of assumption and extrapolation going on. We know that some women, children and old people were killed; inevitably, some of these were killed when the French entered the city and it is likely that some were killed along with the captured soldiers. Again, I can think of reasons why this might be so, none of which point to a massacre of them. Those who feel that there was a massacre of women, children and the elderly really need to prove the case.

Jurgen

I have a question:

Napoleon invades a neutral state (Hessen-Kassel), erases it from the map, places the territory under martial law, and then when some Hessian ex-soldiers rise in revolt and must be suppressed with force, he punishes two towns in the area for their alleged complicity, by ordering both burned to the ground, ordering a selection of their civilians to be shot, and ordering more civilians to be arrested and transported to France.

Does any of that count as "atrocity" ?

(Or is that another example of the Germans being grateful to be liberated by Friendly Napoleon and protected from being annexed by Prussia or Austria?)

- –

Napoleon to Berthier, 19 Jan, 1807:

Write to Gen. Lagrange that I read his letter of 8 January, and that I am far from satisfied. My intention is that the two towns of Eschwege and Hersfeld should be burned, that sixty or more of the guilty of these two towns and their environs should be shot, and three times that number should be arrested and transported to France….

I have three questions:

There was one very large difference-Napoleon wasn't attempting to ingest the Confederation as Prussia and Austria were and Prussia eventually accomplished.

When was Austria trying to ingest the states of the Confederation of the Rhine? Were the Austrians trying to annex those countries? I thought Austria's consistent war aims against France were to roll-back previous French gains at their expense?

…I see a great difference between the ways that Napoleon treated the German states and how Prussia and Austria did. Both Austria and Prussia wished to be dominant in Germany and both failed until 1814.

But France was dominant in Germany from 1806 – 1813: how is this different? And Napoleon had more control over more of Germany than either of those powers before or after.

…the German states either chose the French or fought with them in those campaigns.

Couldn't this statement be re-written with 'French' replaced by 'Prussians' or 'Austrians' and be equally true?

Regards

"…I see a great difference between the ways that Napoleon treated the German states and how Prussia and Austria did."

I do, too. Neither Prussia nor Austria ever exercised anything like the control over the German states in the period 1790-1815 that France did.

- The Prussians and Austrians didn't have their police and customs officers controlling law enforcement or commerce in those states.

- Neither Prussia nor Austria confiscated personal property and estates to give as rewards to their military and civil officers, on anything like the massive scale that Napoleon did.

- I can't think of any example of a German ruling house that was overthrown by either Prussia or Austria in the period 1790-1815. I can think of several that were overthrown by the French Republic and Empire.

- Neither Prussia nor Austria would ever have dared to abolish the Holy Roman Empire.

- The only example that springs to my mind of the Prussians or Austrians annexing a German state in the period 1790-1815 is Hannover… which of course was Napoleon's idea and proposal, since he already controlled it. (One could make the argument that Prussia collected a handful of tiny religious properties in 1803*, but that was done with a vote at the Reichsdeputationshauptschluß, and was part of the attempt to reorder the Reich due to the French conquests in the Rhineland. It wasn't Prussian conquest, nor was it unilateral.)

- In the period 1790-1815 I certainly can't think of any example of the Prussians or Austrians conquering German states, abolishing them, and placing their family members on the throne of new vassals in their place, such as Napoleon did in Berg and Westphalia.

And we've already gone over the math about which nation annexed more Germans in this period. By a long, long margin, it was France.

---

But here's a simple, methodically sound, and completely unbiased approach:

If somebody really believes that German rulers gladly and voluntarily allied themselves with France, in order to protect themselves from Prussian or Austrian annexation: simply provide the documentation that supports that argument.

Show us the correspondence of the German rulers, in which they explain their happy and voluntary decision to ally with Napoleon, specifically because they fear Prussia or Austria.

If that's the argument, then support it with the primary documentation. Not just repeated opinions. Not just a vague list of English secondary sources. But rather: the primary documentation that supports the argument.

----

* Grubenhagen, for example, Corvey, Quedlinburg, and about 8 other former bishoprics. Some of these were @5 square miles.

And I neglected the three most obvious ones:

- In the period 1790-1815 Prussia and Austria didn't conscript anywhere near as many Germans from these small states as France did, nor eave them dead from Madrid to Moscow. The French blood tax on the Germans was massively higher than anything they'd experienced since the 30 Years War. (In Westphalia, one out of every 15 males died in Napoleon's service.)

- Neither Prussia nor Austria had anything on the scale of the French "contributions" from the people of the small German states, in the form of special war taxes, community taxes, forced French war bonds, and all the other ways that Napoleon squeezed them for money to be sent back to France.

- Neither Prussia nor Austria dictated religious policy to the Germans the way that France did, with the state control of churches, the closing down or amalgamating of religious organizations, the impositions of taxes on them, the imposition of rules on everything down to the precise words a Rabbi or priest or preacher was to say in the weekly service.

That level of control was achieved only by France.