"Buttoned/Unbuttoned Tank Commanders" Topic

This should mostly pertain to former & real life tank crewman. I've read many accounts and historical references of WWII tank commanders in battle but I'm not sure how they handled sticking their head out and observing or the amount of time they would spend exposed. Was there a standard way of doing this? did they pop in and out? Would they expose their entire upper body to get a good look?

Thanks,
Wolfhag

There are many more experienced tank commanders here then me,but as I recall we were taught at Ft Knox in the late 80s, open hatch in attack, buttoned up in the defense.

It depended totally on the situation.

A lot of British tank commanders' personal accounts discuss keeping their heads out as much as possible, for better situational awareness, but at the same time keeping their head as low as possible – often with the hatches partially closed over their head. One even described being seriously concussed when a mortar-bomb detonated against the hatch that he had partially closed over his head.

Modern….

US is to be open hatch as much as possible, until the shooting starts, Thus the half closed hatch that the M1 has…
Person standing in TC hatch, should be at "name tag height"…

Although guys like me liked to get up a little higher for better visibility.

I'm thinking that the TC's probably did the same thing…tried to stay open hatch until things got a little hot, and then closed…

I stayed at somewhat above nametag defilade most of the time. But as I stated in your other thread, I'm an old 'Cold Warrior'.
As to WW2, that's not so easy to answer. Different Armies had varying doctrine as to the practice of tank commanding.
Let's just say it's a very dangerous job…

Now I want to change our bands name to "Nametag Defilade"

Prior to the M-1, with the M-60/48 series of tanks, head out of the hatch was prefered, usually in nametag defilade. Once shooting started, you dropped down to just above eyeball defilade. The commander coupola had it's sight assembly that could provide small arms cover from the front as you opened or closed the hatch. The hatch had to be locked in either the full open or closed position. If not, you ran the risk of getting your bell rung or (if you put your hand on the hatch rim) broken bones and/or amputated fingers while the tank moved.
There were attempts to increase the commanders visibility by adding a layer of 360 degree vision blocks between the turret and coupola, but, I always hated it, looked ungainly, increased vehicle heigth and it didn't really help that much.

What an interesting thread, thanks Chaps! I for one am going to rethink my model TC's positioning, moving the majority down a tad to 'nametag defilade' as I'm sure that would have applied in WW2….

Would they expose their entire upper body to get a good look?

…… the dead ones did!
The German tank commanders were well known for fighting with unbuttoned as this gave them a much better tactical awareness but they suffered corerespondingly high casualty rates too.

Whew! I thought you meant their trousers!

Well that always worked for me spontoon, but I was in an M113 !

IIRC, the Soviet training was "always buttoned up."

Now, I model company commanders, 2iCs, and occasionally platoon leaders unbuttoned. Helps me keep track of where the bosses are. I'm aware that's not particularly historically correct, but I need that for game reasons.

Good work snowman !!!

Yes good point Tim et al. Troopies could be designated by being well low, Squadron Cdrs a little higher…Like it!

Someone should have told this to Whitman!

Good thread this. I wrote my own WWII platoon scale rules and had vehicles with the option of having the commander unbutton, and therefore become a target for small arms fire, but with the benefits of being able to see better. The rules worked OK but I was never sure if they really worked well…

In game terms, I believe there's a couple of systems that represent the commander buttoning or unbuttoning, aren't there?

We considered this aspect as critical and is a key parameter in Maneouver Group.

This thread is faceinating. In writing MG we talked to a TC who said we were unduely generous on our buttoned up vis. But we still kept being generous and it is still key. He said they used a wooden block to chock the hatch open so you could knock it out and close very quick if push came to shove.

In tactical games we also differentiate between buttoned & unbuttoned.

In game terms, I believe there's a couple of systems that represent the commander buttoning or unbuttoning, aren't there?

Ambush Alley games do, Flames of War does not. Gearkrieg does, though I don't play GK (I stuck a couple GK models into my FoW German army as armored cars).

In game terms, I believe there's a couple of systems that represent the commander buttoning or unbuttoning, aren't there?

I think I'd prefer a zip – you don't want to be fiddling with buttons in the heat of battle! :-)
Seriously SOP for German tank commanders was head out – or more accurately eyes over the edge of the cupola. Pet peeve of mine all those TC figures waist up out of the hatch. Thats for Nuremberg rallies and on the march – not combat.

If you are doing 80's British, don't forget the bright golfing umbrella (though the picture caption did say it is assumed they wouldn't use them in time of actual war!)

In game terms, I believe there's a couple of systems that represent the commander buttoning or unbuttoning, aren't there?

Some handle it in an abstract fashion by allowing AFV's to be "pinned" when under fire – represnting crew buttoning up and generally being more cautious.

From some experience, stating the obvious visibility is really limited out of a buttoned up tank, making it harder to spot the enemy, tank moves slower and more chance of colliding with something which can throw a track (or just slow you down more).

If the tank commander is hit, the tank often becomes combat ineffective for a while. e.g. the tank reverses into cover and stays put.

So in wargaming turns + 1 to spot the enemy, but + 1 for the enemy to damage you if they hit and small arms fire may suppress an unbuttoned tank. Actually, heavy small arms can suppress a buttoned up tank as well.

When I think of a TC unbuttoned I visualize the German Tiger TC in Saving Private Ryan. He's barely peering over the top of the cupola and seems the be ducking up and down a little. This would most likely be how someone would react when rounds are going off all around you. But being Hollywood you can't be sure.

I can understand why the Russians would remain buttoned up. Rather than attempting to fire at the frontal armor of a German tank you most likely could not penetrate better to button up and haul ass to get behind and outflank them. Firing on the move with HE, coax mg and hull mg on the move may force them to button up / duck down too and there would be not need to be unbuttoned for that. While not effective firing back always helps morale.

We're thinking of having a rule that when arty, MG's and Rifle Squads fire at an unbuttoned vehicle to get the TC if the fire is "effective/hits" the defending player gets a "Saving Throw" for his TC to simulate his random ducking down and saves himself. Some had the 6th Sense to know when to duck, zig or zag but zigging when you should be zagging can add another page to your health record or terminate it.

We're trying to get ways to involve the defender in decisions and variable DRM die rolls rather than having the firing player going through the charts and DRM's while the non-phasing player sits idle. Saving Throws are not realistic and I've never really been a fan but I kind of like the way it can make a turn interactive and involve the non-phasing player more. He gets a "hand" in saving himself.

Wolfhag

We're thinking of having a rule that when arty, MG's and Rifle Squads fire at an unbuttoned vehicle to get the TC if the fire is "effective/hits" the defending player gets a "Saving Throw" for his TC to simulate his random ducking down and saves himself. Some had the 6th Sense to know when to duck, zig or zag but zigging when you should be zagging can add another page to your health record or terminate it.

Otto Carius had a lucky escape when a Russian AT round took the cupola off his Tiger I while he was bending down to attend to something in the tank. Had he still been head up it would have taken his head with it.

The question was focused on WW2. I think many of our answers here are very interesting, but I would suggest we use care not to apply modern tactics and SOP to WW2 armies.

The Germans usually went into action un-buttoned. Most other armies did not. Not so much strictly enforces, but just as typical behaviors.

With the Soviets it was rather strictly enforced. And no, it had nothing to do with "Rather than attempting to fire at the frontal armor of a German tank you most likely could not penetrate better to button up and haul ass to get behind and outflank them". For that you would WANT to be unbuttoned, as it would give you a far better ability to find the cover you seek.

Rather, most Soviet tanks (until the mid-war years) could not fight if the TC was out of the hatch. In the T-34 the TC was the gunner (early versions had him as the loader). In the T-60 and T-70 he was both the gunner and the loader. In the KV-1 the hatch was placed in the recoil path of the gun, so it could not fire if anyone was looking out of the hatch. All of this reflected a very strict doctrine of always buttoning up for combat.

For the French it was also important to always button up. But for a very different reason -- their tanks did not have hatches on the roof. The commander had an all-round vision cupola, but there was no hatch on top for the R35, H35, S35 or Char-B. Rather, the hatch was a back panel of the turret, which hinged at the bottom to open downward and lay horizontal over the engine deck, forming a seat for the commander to sit upon during road marches, with only his legs actually inside the turret.

The British developed a few cruisers with hatches that slid backwards to open rather than hinging upward. These had the very nasty possibility of slamming shut if the tank stopped suddenly, with grave risk to the poor TC who had some portion of his body outside the hatch.

All of these tanks were expected to enter action buttoned up. Period. No one outside. After all, the whole reason for building the tank was to put armor around the crew so they could continue to fight in a hostile environment -- why would you want to put one of your crewmen outside???

This was very much the thinking in the inter-war period. Even during WW2 it was far from clear that unbuttoned was the way to go. In part this is because 9 out of 10 tank actions did not involved enemy tanks, but rather enemy infantry. Those guys with the small arms. That could not really hurt the tank, but could very much hurt the guy sticking his head out of the tank.

In the US Army one of the big reasons that the tank destroyers were open-topped was to prevent the turret crews from "buttoning up". This was because these vehicles were supposed to specialize in anti-tank fighting, and were not supposed to fight enemy infantry. Having eyes outside of the armor was considered critical to situational awareness in tank-vs-tank action, and getting in the first shots was everything to the TD doctrine. Even when roof-armor kits were made for the M10 and M36 TDs, the armor sat more than two inches above the turret armor, leaving all-round visibility for the whole turret crew even when the hatches were closed.

It was really only with the proliferation of potent hand-held anti-tank launchers, such as bazookas and (most importantly) panzerfausts, that unbuttoning became critical to the crews themselves. Exposing 6 or 8 inches of TC to small arms fire, in order to better protect 100% of the tank and its crew from faustniks that wanted to sneak up on you, was obviously a worthy trade off.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Interesting thread, but if the Soviets were supposed to be buttoned up all the time, why the signal flags? How could they read flags or send flag signals?

I vaguely recall a British tank commander explaining he had to have his head fully out or in. If sort of mid way he was deafened when the gun fired.

Remember also that ww2 tanks had to rely on extractor fans to remove fumes from firing the guns. If you at least propped a hatch open with a piece of wood then the fumes cleared much faster.
Those gun tube gadgets are post war.

It's my understanding that flag signalling was rarely in combat. A common scenario would be to explain a fixed plan. The signal would be "go now". Everyone buttons up and off they go. Or "follow me" and the company follows it's co.
Completely different thing from the constant chat you might expect on a radio net and one of the "hidden" advantages Jerry had.

The rules we play the tanks are unbuttoned unless the player specifically states that he's buttoned up. It's usually a scary moment when some guy with infantry says "Can I do anything to that tank if I machine gun it?" then players announce they're buttoning up their tanks.

<<Exposing 6 or 8 inches of TC to small arms fire, in order to better protect 100% of the tank and its crew from faustniks that wanted to sneak up on you, was obviously a worthy trade off.>>

Depends which 6-8 inches you're exposing…..

Especially with the British sliding 'slicer' hatch mentioned earlier too…

Interesting thread, but if the Soviets were supposed to be buttoned up all the time, why the signal flags? How could they read flags or send flag signals?

Many of the earlier (inter-war and early war) Soviet tanks had provisions for signaling.

If you look at the early T-34s you can see the flag hatch:

This was a sub-hatch on the main hatch, which unit commanders could open to display signal flags without exposing themselves to small arms fire.

Still, as mentioned by others, signal flags were a very basic form of intra-unit communications. They were most often used in approach rather than in combat. The Soviets expected their tanks to attack in one of a very vew possible formations (ie: column, line, arrow), on a pre-set axis of advance to a pre-determined objective. Once engaged in combat, flag signals were rare.

The overwhelming superiority of controlling tank formations in combat via radio vs. flags is one of the key reasons that Pz III's and Pz 38t's, and even Pz II's, had so many resounding successes against their early opponents. Few 1-to-1 unit scale wargames demonstrate this critical component of mechanized warfare.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Hey Mark, how would you suggest, or how is it on some games, that these differing methods are represented? When writing my own WWII vehicle rules I really wanted to capture this sort of difference in C&C ability between the nations. I never felt I successfully enough achieved sadly, and had a rather clunky 'GW' style to it. Whet would you suggest?

Ark

Thanks for the explanation, very interesting.

Mark 1,
As always source seem to diasagree. Our reading of at least Late war Normandy talked a lot about losing commnders who were head out which anecdotaly implies it was common. It may be of course that in the close terrain of Europe it was far harder to get out of rane of weapons and there were many more places to be shot at from.

We as usual, went for a none dice rolling solution. In our rules the commnder is hamperd by a viweing angle restriction which is tighter in a buttoned up situation. This has the advantage of forceing formations so that nobody gets shot without the possibility of it being seen.

Plus it meets our most prime requirement, The only good time in a wargame is when you are moving the toys. Chanting rules and dice roleing are a neccessary evil and to be avoided wherever posible.

Hi Ark3nubis,

a very simple method I used was to force the Soviet tanks to act as a unit, ie all fire at the same target (or target unit) and all stay within 6 inches or a foot (can't remember which) of the troop leader. For additional grief have some penalty if the troop leader's tank is lost eg carry on doing the same thing regardless or mill around or no advance etc. Whereas Germans etc could do as they wished and act independently if needed.

IIRC as the war went on more of the Soviet tanks got radios so you could remove these restrictions later on.

As always source seem to diasagree. Our reading of at least Late war Normandy talked a lot about losing commnders who were head out which anecdotaly implies it was common.

I don't think this is much of a disagreement.

By mid-1944 most nations were getting to the point of heads-out tank combat, except the Soviets, who were by this time putting cupolas on their tanks, but still had a doctrine of buttoning up before action.

Also, in tight terrain the TC had to be head-out as much to guide the driver as to improve combat awareness. Tank drivers have vision tools to see a narrow arc directly in front of the tank. They are unable to see to the sides or rear. In tight close country, with tree-lined lanes, embankments, towns, and hedgerows it was particularly important for someone to guide the driver. Otherwise the tank could not maneuver without a high risk of overrunning or colliding with some obstacle.

IIRC as the war went on more of the Soviet tanks got radios…

This topic is much discussed in tank historical forums.

Documentation seems to indicate that radios were common in Soviet tanks from 1943 onward. SU vehicles and heavy tanks were spec'd to have radios from the start of the war.

But it appears that this was not always so. And even when it was, a radio is not always a radio.

Often platoon vehicles (non command) had radios which were receive-only. This may sound odd today, but if we think to even the 1950s it was common for police cars in the US to have receive-only radios (and of course until the 1990s most civilian cars managed with receive-only commo gear!). If you were not expected to have anything to say, receive-only made sense.

Even if the spec called for a radio, in 1942/43 it was a dubious proposition whether it had been installed or not. Soviet tank production proceeded even if difficult-to-manufacture (or source) materials were missing. But even more importantly than the radio type or availability was the apparent unreliability of Soviet-made radio gear. I have seen first-hand accounts, of tankers, commanders, artillery spotters, and even pilots, which indicate that the Soviet-made commo gear was not to be relied-upon.

This is one reason that Lend-Lease equipment was reasonably popular. Not that the commo gear always overshadowed other deficiencies in LL kit (the US M3 Medium was considered a curse regardless of the radio). But many pieces of LL equipment were well liked in part because the commo gear allowed more sophisticated combat tactics (Valentine tanks, Sherman tanks, P-39 fighters).

I have seen several approaches to these kinds of things in rulesets over the years.

I am not fond of wargame rules that simply tell you your army, your side, your kit is rated low or can't do some things. Most 1-to-many unit scale rules do this. They either give a lower combat rating to some nations' formations (for poor tactical capabilities), or they have a "cohesion" value or some such.

I suppose this approach is reasonable, but I find it totally unsatisfying. I think back to my first wargame, Panzerblitz (a board game by Avalon Hill that I got in the early 1970s). A platoon of German Pz IVGs was given an attack factor of 14, while a company of T-34s had an attack factor of only 12. I hated that. It seemed like an error to me … like maybe it would have been fair if it had been the same number of tanks in both cases, but a 14 for 5x Pz IV versus a 12 for 10x T-34 just seemed SO wrong.

The problem is that the rules did not let me see how or why 5 Pz IVs could fight as well or better than 10 T-34s. It just told me they did.

I guess that's just a by-product of 1-to-many unit scales. Which is one reason I don't like playing those types of rules.

I've seen multiple approaches used in 1-to-1 unit scales. Some approaches I do not like. Others I find quite intriguing.

Armor and Infantry rules by WRG, for example, have a set of "modes" that allow different behaviors. So there is "hold", "advance" or "skirmish" mode, etc. Different types of units can use different modes. So for example German panzer troops can use "skirmish", where the platoon splits into a holding/overwatch section and a maneuver section, or as a whole advances to fire position, shoots, and withdraws to cover. But Russian tanks can not use "skirmish" mode.

I dislike that kind of approach. I don't like the rules telling me what I can or can't do, without telling me why it does or doesn't work for me. I also think this approach is WAY too prone to national prejudices. For example the WRG rules (being British in origin) describe the differences between almost a dozen different British and commonwealth unit types (Yeomanry vs. Highlanders vs. Indians [with a separate listing for Gurhkas of course!] vs. South Africans vs. Anzacs [with a separate listing for Maoris!]). Each has different capabilities. But ALL regular US Army units are "green". Period. What non-sense…

I am more fond of the model used in the Mein Panzer rules by ODGW. Even though the rules are 1-to-1 unit scale (one model = one tank), you activate your troops by unit. Usually a unit is a platoon, but with early war Soviets the rules suggest activating by company instead. At first this seems like an advantage (ooh, I get to shoot with 10 of my tanks while you only get to shoot with 5 of yours!), but it quickly becomes apparent that more activations = more tactical flexibility. So a German tank company gets 4 activations per turn, while the Russian company gets only 1. And so they maneuver around you and shoot you to pieces.

Each time you activate a unit in Mein Panzer you get an "action" and a "bonus move". The "bonus move" can only be a movement. You can split up the bonus move any way you like, moving before, after, or around your action. The "action" can be almost anything your unit might want to do: shooting, spotting, engineering work, whatever. It can even be moving, so that if you do nothing else you move twice as fast.

BUT -- if you are out of command control (which is defined by distance, depending on radio or buttoned up or etc.), then you don't get your bonus move.

When you have tanks that are outside of command control you ultimately do one of two things … you either sit still and shoot (but you can't spot and shoot in the same turn, so only at pre-identified targets), or you move towards your CO (and do nothing combat-wise until you reach him). But the rules don't tell you what you have to do. You get to decide what does or doesn't work, given that you are outside of command control.

This kind of structure in the rules does not take the decision-making away from the player. It places some reasonable restrictions and conditions on him based on his equipment, but he must decide what to do and how to do it.

That's how I like to approach these kinds of things.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

mark 1
Documentation seems to indicate that radios were common in Soviet tanks from 1943 onward. were they retrofitted to earlier t34s

Radio physically present != functional radio.

Brilliant post Mark, the insight into these other rule systems that I personally haven't seen or played is really great, more comparisons as and when you please, if you please :D

Because of the way MG works, we sort of have radios built into the system. The ultimate is Battle Management Systems but that is out of period. Therfore intrinsic to the system is verbal ( complex by mouth), Group(terse simple orders that could be done by flag, and radio, and verbal by radio. The limitations mean that the felexibility is progressively reduced as the means of communications reduces. However the Russians did get round some of the issues by rehersing battles but this is not the final solution.

I agree with Mark 1 on the 'being told what to do' thing.

I always feel it is a 'cop out' of the top down approach to decide – well the Soviets lost despite numbers and having better tanks – therefore we'll give them lower ratings.

I too want to know why certain tactics won't work for them.

If you have solid evidence something wasn't possible – and for example I gather Soviets couldn't request impromtu artillery fire in the way Germans did and the Western Allies excelled at – then I'm happy not to have that option. But I don't like being told my units cannot go out of 'command radius' or some such when it just seems arbitrary.

I'm starting to look at how to work with orders and communications in my own games. Lots to think about.

It's not just a command radius, it's out of sight.
A common sort of set up would be a company co send receive radio, platoon co receive and the rest nothing.
All radios of the era were dodgy compared to modern ones.
Radio operating was a bit of a black art.
Market Garden they landed and had terrible problems. Nobody is sure why and there are various theories ranging from bad terrain to bad batteries.

Nowadays you turn a mobile phone on and the thing just works.
ww2 radios needed an operator to mess with em.
They needed to fettle the things and re-tune at the start of an op.
The sov components were not good and the radios of underlings had a low priority as Mark has mentioned. Sov training was kind of patchy and this probably didn't help.
Heat vibration and the like could mess up a radio and especially if they were not a great spec in the first place.
You could expect a certain proportion of British or US sets to go off net during a day.
I would expect a sov unit to have a higher proportion.
Quite how much higher I dunno, but they had a bad rep for reliability.

AONeil,

The Royal Signals did a radio exercise in the Arnhem area following the route of 1st Airborne and tehy ahd the same issues. Modern VHF radio eqpt still struggles in dense terrain, your lucky to get 1Km, only way to get long distance is to use HF "Skywave" and bounce your signals. But as the Bn's had VHF sets they had trouble with Comms through out.

Mark 1, I think WRG saw themselves as addressing the problem of generic rules, and some of the ideas fit doctrine (Russian units skirmish as platoons not sections). It allows you to differentiate the Western model of platoon based, versus the Russians of company based. A fact few rules had previously represented.

As for the US being green, you could quite easily change their rating, but Rangers and Airborne being stubborn, i.e. the equivalent of Soviet conscripts, was insulting, and revealed the rules inherent biases. Far worse though, was the fact that the rules precluded an attack option if closer than 100m, but assault (within 100m) precluded firing main guns. Russian tanks therefore could only use their machine guns at close range, dumb. Having said this, the rules did make fighting a German force a different experience to a Russian one, not the feeling of the same army using different equipment (a fault of many rule sets before).

I think the problem with any rule set is that the author's biases will inevitably emerge, both in the research method, and execution of that research. Take radios, often, from late 43, the Panthers and Tigers (much beloved by gamers) had detrained and deployed so quickly, a proper radio net had not been set up. So they might theoretically be able to call in support, but in practice not have the capability. Anyway, I though the Russians requisitioned radios for tanks, for recce and HQ units.

The fascinating TMP thread on officers and men, has shown how the much beloved, 'all battalion A are veteran', ratings are comforting, but bogus. Ideally, rules should allow virtually anything, but heavily penalise units who do not have the proficiency to do everything, especially showing variances of ability within units.

Take Goose Green, the British unit, Paras, would be rated very highly by rules, and the Argentinian conscripts poorly. Yet an in-depth examination shows a rigid British command, and a more Soviet approach, with subordinate commands expected to follow a rigid, inflexible, phased advance and a desire for the BHQ to get forward and get involved. The Argentinian conscripts, equally, did not display a stereotyped ineptness, though all failed to develop any significant attacks, or show much initiative.

I really liked SPI's Kharkov, approach to unit proficiency, the Russians combat factors were only revealed when they attacked, the Germans were known already.

It's ironic that rule sets which laudably try to introduce more 'realism' often suffer from a dogmatic approach. WRG tried to introduce tactical and exigency modes based on nationality, but created a restrictive array of national stereotypes. The latest, dice activated move, rules do not acknowledge that not all orders in war are chaotic, making C&C when in combat the defacto model. This results in a headlong charge by T-34's, desperate to close the range, grinding to a halt because they failed an activation. Extreme has become the normal, due to a desire to get away from the 800 ft commander syndrome. Trouble is, that approach penalises some armies who rely on a gathering momentum for success. Similarly, not all German panzers were used with initiative and panache, sometimes their performance was sluggish and inept, lacking in initiative or ability.

We MG have taken the approach that you can do what you want. You can , mix up platoons, head out or in. However there are benerfits for all of the platoon being on one net so that they can share awarenes of what is going on. Spotting an enemy that nobody in else in the platoon can see has little gain. Spotting something on your immediate net allows you some gains. This is far better than a wholy unrealistic command radius. basicaly you are crudely modeling why platoons are on the same net. You get better command, more intuative rules and less of them. Imposing racial/ethnic stero types is always fraught as there origins are difficut to fathom. All head in or all head out. Neither may be particularly logical and so is that a rule or a style of play. MG accounts for both but not who should do what. Like generals, MG cannot make a Bad general good and certaily we cannot make a bad general good. Faced with the high flexibility in a tank battle afforded by MG, you and use it or get out thougfht. We cannot make rules to replace a players ability to cope with complex evolveing patterns of deployement in a constantly evolving situation. The best you can do is make the units faster or slower to respond, and that is about it.

Good point, in fact looking at Soviet small tank engagements, they could use terrain masking effectively, showed high degrees of initiative and were risk averse, not speeding to their destruction, as happens in so many German accounts. Equally importantly, they worked around the limitations of the machines and coaxed combat performances out of them that might seem incredible, to an uninitiated observer or chronicler.

Ditto, is that why WWII tank radios were sometimes receive only?

I know from one of my Sherman books that there were some issues of compatibility between tank and infantry radios, for the US at least.

There were no "issues of compatibility". There was no compatibility at all between tank radios and infantry radios.

So also tank and infantry radios were incompatible with artillery radios, and all three were incompatible with aircraft radios. Then, when you operated with an NGO … well, yet another incompatible system!

The same was true in most armies of WW2.

Mortars were very popular with the infantry not only because they were close geographically, but also because they were on the infantry commo network! An 81mm mortar battery you could talk to was far more powerful than a medium gun battery you could not reach.

One of the big reasons you had FOs (or FAOs, or NGOs) assigned to HQ units was that the FO team came with their own commo gear. The HQ could not talk to the artillery without someone present who had an artillery branch radio.

This was also one of the big reasons that both the British (first) and the US (later) mounted field telephones on the backs of their tanks, that tied in to the tank's intercom system. This provided at least some way for the PBI to talk to the tankers in combat.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

I don't know about tank regiments, but as an Artillery observer in the French Army during my military service in 1980, nobody never cared about me being in or out the AMX 10 observation tank, I could have unbuttoned everything if I wished :-) but I only experienced training in a peaceful countryside.

Thanks for all of the response and feedback. From a few sources I've read it seems that during heavy fighting tanks kept their hatches open because fumes from the tanks rounds could suffocate them. I wonder if this included the TC's hatch too? I guess that would give a new meaning to buttoned and unbuttoned. Maybe Squad Leaders "CE" (crew exposed) definition is better defining a TC sticking his head out and observing. I tried to find reference on how TC's used flag for communicating but was unsuccessful. I can't imagine a commander waving flags at other tanks with the TC having his head inside his tank. It seems that observing from inside was about 50% as effective and you could not use your binoculars.

Wolfhag