"Yamato V US Battleships" Topic

The battleship Yamato was designed to be able to fight a number of US battleships to counter Japan's much lower shipbuilding capability. So could the idea have worked?

Let's forget about the Iowas which came along later. Suppose Japan had never thought of attacking Pearl Harbour, or had made a mess of it if they had, and the US battlefleet was intact at the start of 1942. Could Yamato have successfully engaged a number of those battleships, or was the Yamato concept flawed and the ship have been overwhelmed by superior numbers?

The Yamato would never have operated alone. At a minimum it would have been with its division. In a wargame setting the Yamato engaging two battleships of the Pacific fleet with the most modern available in late 1941 would have been the New Mexico and Colorado, each with eight 16 inch guns. Yamato would have been faster and would have had 9 18.1 inch guns. The US would have had a higher rate of fire from her main batteries than their opponent. If the US commanders successfully split the fire of the Yamato and one battleship is firing pretty much unmolested at the Japanese ship I believe it would have been a hard fight for the Yamato to prevail if she did indeed win. In any case I believe the damage she would have received would have laid her up for a long time.

If you look at her taking on the North Carolina and Washington I think it becomes even harder for the Yamato. Both of those ships were in commission in December 1941.

You preface this engagement with no attack on Pearl Harbor. So a major surface battle might really be a knock down drag out. The older US battleships were I feel more than a match for the Haruna, Ise, Kirishima, and Kongo. The Tennessee class matches well with anything but the Yamato class. There were only two of the Yamato class built; but you would have to double up on them or fight at a real disadvantage. Once the North Carolina, South Dakota or Iowa classes come onto the scene it is game over in surface combat.

A look at the battleship comparisons on the Nihon Kaigun site gives a good example of the strength of the Yamato and the North Carolina and Iowa class battleships.

The Japanese did hedge their bets though. They had a power force of cruisers and destroyers armed with Long Lance torpedoes. These nasty toys could be the game changer.

Didn't the US have radar controlled guns ? I seem to recall that is what was pivotal in the second battle of Savo Island

Don't fall into the typical wargamers' trap of comparing hardware.
the USN was simply NOT READY in December 1941.

Tgunner, that is what I meant by the Yamato would never have operated alone. The Long Lance lost much of its mojo once the allies figured out what a great range it had and began to use evasive maneuvers. T Hara in his book Destroyer Captain discusses that to some extent. Early in the war at Sundra Strait for example the Allies sailed in battle formation taking no defense against torpedoes as they felt they were out of range. In the later Guadalcanal battles however they began to make radical heading changes when they engaged the Japanese destroyers even when they were at ranges where there was no way they could have seen the launch of those torpedoes. Hara's book tracked torpedo effectiveness, at the battle of the Java Sea the Japanese fired 43 Long Lance at ranges averaging 10,000 yards getting no hits In all they fired 64 torpedoes to get one hit. The one hit was from a spread of 16 fired from 6,000 yards. The cruiser Naka and 7 destroyers fired 64 torpedoes and hit nothing later the Nachi, and Haguro fired 12 from 10,000 yards missing with all All in all at Java Sea the Japanese fired 199 torpedoes to get 3 hits. Not a real game changer at gunnery ranges. When they closed to the doctrinal range of 2,000 to 5,000 yards however the hit rate goes up dramatically. A spread of 8 torpedoes fired at USS Barton from 3,000 yards got two hits which sank her immediately. The same destroyer then reloaded in about 10 minutes and fired 4 torpedoes at USS Juneau and hit her from 3000 yards with one torpedo and Juneau was lost with the Sullivan brothers on board.

So if they could close the range before launch the Long Lance might be a game changer.

ming31

Yes the Iowas and the more modern battleships had the Mk13 radar fire control which was excellent and would allow them to maintain firing solutions even when maneuvering in the extreme. Yamato's fire control was very much at a disadvantage in this area. Yamato could fire or maneuver; if she fired while maneuvering her fire would be much less effective while South Dakota, and Washington both of which were available in early 1942 could fire with accuracy over the visible horizon using radar fire control. In a night battle between the battleships Yamato had better optics but optical fire control at night is much less effective than Radar control, so I would expect the US battleships to pummel the Yamato. Even the Tennessee class had radar control but it was not as good as later classes.

To me the most important thing is the Yamato and later the Musashi could not be replaced. Tennessee and Maryland would have been almost immediately replaced if lost by South Dakota and Washington both of which were more capable than they were. Even in victory Yamato would probably have taken severe damage and would have been laid up for a long time. By the time it came back into operation it would have faced not only the South Dakota and North Carolina classes which were probably a pretty fair match to her, but also the Iowa class which was faster and had the best fire control ever put on a battleship. Against an Iowa I believe the Yamato would have been shot to pieces without being able to close to effective range.

John,

You're correct of course. In a 1941 battle the Japanese have a distinct advantage they were trained to peak efficiency. We were not complete slouches however and with what was available in the Pacific Fleet at the time of Pearl Harbor could have put up a good surface fight even in a losing cause.

I believe the deciding factor here is that the US could make up the losses in any opening surface battle by the transfer of ships from the Atlantic fleet and within 6 months would have had more capable ships on line in the Pacific than they started with. The Japanese would add the Musashi, but no other battleships. All the Iowa class came on line after the start of the war Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Massachussetts, Alabama, North Carolina, Washington, South Dakota; all would have gone to the Pacific. The Japanese industrial capacity would not have been able to keep the pace. Add to that Alaska and Guam, which would probably have been a match for any Kongo and more than a match for any other Japanese capital ship other than the Yamato class and I don't see any route to anything but defeat for the Nihon Kaigun.

There are a lot of "what-ifs" in this scenario, and some of them might be significant enough to determine the victor.

US radar controlled gunnery was impressive, but US radar technology borrowed a great deal from the British. If this scenario assumes the US has the technology then that gives the US a great advantage, but what if the British hadn't provide the technology? The Yamatos were intended to use spotting planes for beyond visual range firing. Without radar the Japanese may have the advantage.

What if the US carriers were present at Pearl on December 7, but not he battleships? That could provide the Japanese with the ability to attrit the US fleet with aircraft AND provide a decisive advantage in reconnaissance.

What if the engagement takes place at night? The Japanese trained for night engagements, hoping superior Japanese training would compensate for superior US numbers. If the engagement is at night the US is at a disadvantage, especially if the US lacks radar.

There are too many variables for a single easy answer.

I have to agree with The OFM and Brad.
The USN was not ready.
Oh sure, they had men, ships and designs on the slips and on the boards, but they were suffering incredibly from the strains of expansion.

The only navy suffering in a worse way was the RCN, going from six ships to three hundred. It takes time for sailors to learn and get experience and then to work up and gain experience as a crew. By 1943 the USN was unstoppable.
1941 was when the apprenticeship of the majority of the USNs expansion was just beginning.

Despite the apparent buildup, I can see Allied help to the USN as well. Few people know that for three or four months the only carrier available in the South Pacific was the Victorious. A couple of King George V class BBs supporting the USN would have galled many in the anglophobe USN leadership but would have probably been inevitable for a temporary period.

I am sure that ships can be pared off and compared, but I only see a number of the earlier fights like the Battles of Savo Island merely as being refought by larger units with subsequently larger catastrophic losses.

Yes, the US did benefit from British experience with RADAR. Britain however brought the magnatron to the US for help in manufacturing it more efficiently. Without US help the British Radar development would have also been delayed. The Mark 13 was developed by the US for the US Battleships. The KG V class had radars as well but they were not as good at holding targets in the vertical axis or the ranging axis as those on the US Battleships.

Optional Field, I limited my comments to the fact statement laid out in the original question. In that question there was no attack on Pearl Harbor the question was on the results of surface action between battleships. Carriers were not a factor on either side.

In the end the superior manufacturing and ship-building capacity of the USA would simply have overwhelmed the Japanese. Yammamoto knew this to be true and again the Combined Fleet lays the economics out quite clearly.

Ta know, what I find interesting is that there is a constant litany of "The US was not ready." Through this whole post. Yet a mere three years and 8 months later the Japanese Navy was virtually anhihilated, and the United States dictated peace on the deck of a battleship in Tokyo Bay. A mere six months after Pearl Harbor the United States won "the Decisive Battle" the Japanese were always hankering after at Midway. A month before that the Japanese effort to take Port Moresdy was thwarted at the Coral Sea, a mere month before that and there was the Doolittle Raid. And just a few weeks after Pearly Harbor there was a serious plan to save Wake Island. After Midway the war is one of increasing slaughter of the Japanese land and naval forces and the strangling of Japan by American's submarines.

Not bad for "Not ready."

I'd hate to see what would have happened if America ha dbeen "ready!"

Otto- What you're saying is correct and what has been said about the USN's lack of prepareness is also correct. For every success you mentioned there were also monumental disasters (remember Savo Island?). Example: The USN was well prepared for a daylight ship-to-ship action (they had trained for that). What they were not prepared for is what they got; night time surface action with an enemy that excelled at the art. Example: The sub force at the start of the war was a wreck with many old, obsolete boats still in service. It wasn't until the Gato/Balao class came into service that that service could begin to stretch its muscles. And I won't even touch the torpedo fiasco. The USN had to develop the tools needed and doctrine needed to fight this new war; even if it had been "ready" in 1941, it would have been ready for the WRONG kind of war.

Yeah yeah yeah…

We got beat, we learned, the Japs never did.

They kept working with these "sand-castles" of "the decisive battle." They never realized they had their decisive battle- it was Pearl Harbor. They lost. They needed to destroy the American Fleet, the Base, the Airfields, the repair faciliites and they didn't. They sank four battleships. All but two of them I believe were repaired. Even if they had lost all four, that still left the Japanese several battleships down. Then Midway- The Japs got their decisive battle, only… what they mean't by "Decisive Battle" was really "Decisive battle that we win."

The simple fact is that After Midway it was all over for those who opened their eyes to see.

Ticking off individual "disasters" along the way and quibbling about this and that does not in the least mitigate the record I briefly delineated.

Like I said before, quibbling about these things is like a guy I'll call McGill at the Sales Meeting I once attended. Sales had a banner year, they oversold their forecast by $10,000,000 USD, or something like that. McGill had it in for sales and was nickle-and-diming the sales manager at the meeting as to how his sales dropped $600 USD at theis mom and pop store in east Hoggslobber Tennessee, and it didn't get the $6,000 USD order from Walmart in West Deadduck New Mexico.

We won BIG and they lost BIG! Whatever would have happened had we been ready! Poor Japs!

So how can it be the WRONG kind of war. We won. If anyone went into WWII and would fight the WRONG kind of war it was the Japanese. They assumed that everyone else in the world was like the Chinese- that all the Army and Navy had to do was say BOO! and they'd run away.

Of course the real truth was that the Chinese armies DIDN'T run away when the Japs said BOO! They fought, retreated and fought again. Oh the Japanese deluded themselves into thinking they had, but they really hadn't. But each time the Japanese came up against the US and Britain in the Pacific they marvelled at the opposition.

Let's look at the Island Campaigns in WWII. In each of them we comment on the "massive casualties" of the Americans. But in each of these, from Guadalcanal, to Tarawa, to Saipan, Iwo-Jima, and Okinawa the same story is repeated. American casualties in dead amount to less than 10% of the Japanese casualties total, most of whom are killed, either by enemy fire, or their own hand. Okinawa is a good indications. 14,000 American dead, 52,000 casualties, Japanese military dead 74,796 (virtually all dead) and 148,136 civilian and other casualties virtually all dead. Total Casualties over all were 138,000 for America (military and civilian, and for Japan 2,620,000. military and civilian (note! the total US casualties were 415,000 but much of that was in Europe. So how RIGHT can the war be that you are fighting when you are allegedly "winning" but losing 10 to 1 and you start off with LESS people!

In each of these it's the same. These were supposed to be "delaying actions" to cause Americans unacceptable casualties to get them to give up. The central tenet behind any such action is to cause the enemy more casualties than you take. In each of these the casualties reflects an abject failure of the Japanese to even recognize reality. we occupied them and changed their whole society.

When you start off with 71,000,000 versus 131,000,000 this sort of "delaying action" is not something you want to be associated with. But hey! HEKKO ICHI! BANZAI! All you need is spirit!

1941? Good day for the Japanese. Anytime before mid-1942, still a good day for the Japanese.

After mid-1942? bad day to be the Japanese.

I've gamed it a few times with Seapower. The higher rate of fire of the US 16" guns completely overwhelms the much greater throw weight of the IJN 18".

This discussion has expanded somewhat but starting at the beginning.

Firstly, the initial premise is incorrect, the Yamato was not designed to fight and beat a number of Battleships, the doctrinaire philosophy behind Japanese ship design in the 30s was that their ships should be better than any foreign ship of the same class (itself a flawed concept, as it completely ignored the concept of efficiency in design and a ship being effective in its given role). The Japanese strategic plan that the Yamato was designed for was that after an initial attack on Guam, the Philippines ect the US fleet would advance across the Pacific. On this journey it would be attacked and suffer attrition from Japanese carrier and lighter forces (this is the reason why they were so effectively trained in night attacks and where the Japanese submarine forces doctrine was focused on attacking warships rather than merchants) so at the point of the ‘decisive battle' the Japanese and US battle fleets were to be of comparative size, with the power of the ‘Super Battleships' being decisive. As a concept it was dodgy in 1930, this became increasingly clear to any one that had eyes to see the potential of carriers – as Yamamoto for instance repeatedly pointed out and was ignored by the Japanese Navies high command, who were still in thrall to the concept of the battleline being decisive. Mind you, we can't judge them too harshly as it is not like the US navies thinking was more advanced.

As to how good would the Yamato have been compared to existing US BBs? It is all a guessing game but it does strike me that we have proof that the Yamato was incredibly difficult to sink, as we know what it took to sink her. Then again, US BBs were not exactly made of paper. So my guess is she would have taken any older US BB in a straight fight and it would have been an evenish match against the Iowa. The thing is, I don't think that it is purely mechanical, comparing armour, weight of broadside ect An actual combat would be decided by factors that you can not account for, the quality of the crew or even individual crew members in vital roles do count. It was stated that radar was better than superior optics in a nightfight, well yes, in theory, in practise however Savo is a real example of this not being true in every case. So an actual fight between these ships could have gone either way. As to the question could the Yamato have beaten two US BBs, I doubt it, she was not twice as powerful as other Battleships, but she may have gotten lucky I suppose.

Judging these Battleships on their actual role of ‘carrier escorts' would have to say that the Yamato was a worse ship as she was bigger and therefore wasted a greater amount of resources.

As to if the US fleet was ‘ready', define ready I suppose. The Japanese navy was more advanced in its thinking in some respects in 1941 – the use of carrier fleets, as shown by the attack on Pearl, no other navy in the world could have done it, or would have even considered doing it. Also, they were obviously more advanced in their development of night time engagements – as evidenced by Savo. However, the US fleet was the most powerful fleet in the world in 1941 and the US navy was very confident of its ability to win a naval conflict against Japan. On top of this, the building programmes that had already been put in place meant that the US navy, from a position of being the most powerful in the world had well advanced plans to be even more powerful. The Japanese navy was as powerful as it was going to get in 41 and it is also regularly ignored that it contained large weaknesses and flaws, at least as many as the US fleet, if not more so. The difference was the US fleet was willing to identify weakness and correct them (although this process sometimes took far longer than it should have ref. The torpedo debacle that has already been mentioned.) The Japanese Navy did very little to rectify problems and therefore continually suffered for them – look at the criminally poor damage control systems on their carriers for example.

As for a debate of radar was British, no it was the Americans made it happen blah blah, does not matter. These two nations formed possibly the closet and most effective alliance that history has seen and it is lucky that they did. Quibbling about magnetron manufacture seems to miss the point somewhat. I would also point out that the Alliance between the British and Americans was in some respect more effective than the alliance between the US Army and Navy. British and American forces were willing to serve under a unified command in Europe, something that the US army and Navy were never willing to agree in the Pacific.

As to the comment ‘it was all over after Midway for those with eyes to see', I would have to disagree. Personally I feel that it was all over when the aircraft took off from the carriers to strike at Pearl. A war against the US is one that Japan could not win – again as Yamamoto pointed out during the 30s and was at risk of assassination for saying so. The grand strategy of the nationalist / asianist / militarist / mentalist groupings that took over the Japanese government was at best ‘seriously flawed' or more accurately it was a work of complete fantasy. It led them to launch a war against the US (which alone is a mouthful too big for them to chew) whilst being in the middle of a war against China with the bulk of their army tied down there. My favourite fact to highlight just how bizarre Japanese national politics in the 30s were is that General Tojo, the man who authorised the attack on Pearl Harbour was considered to be a moderate…………..

I would also caution against when looking at attrition just comparing absolute numbers. It is certainly true that the Japanese took far more casualties than the US in the battles for the Pacific Islands but this is not the reason why those battles, (or the war) was won. If you compare this to Vietnam for instance, the US always won the numbers game of the bodycount but it did not stop them losing the war.

Well, that is a slow day at work…….

double post

"If you compare this to Vietnam for instance, the US always won the numbers game of the bodycount but it did not stop them losing the war."

The difference between WWII and Vietnam is that (for better or worse) the US press changed sides.

Well, that's another debate entirely. I think it is about a nations willingness to take casualties to achieve the declared aims of the war.

And in some instances one nation would be willing to pay a far higher butchers bill for victory than another.

I'm afraid I have to take issue with the whole "The USN was not ready" crowd. As I recollect, the Japanese Navy hadn't fired a shot in anger against any real opponent since 1905. The USN at least got some practical experience in WWI.

Basically both sides were beginners as of December 7th. Both sides had to learn a lot.

Everyone talks about how much more experienced the Japanese were at Midway. Really? I don't think a single one of the Japanese ships in that fleet had ever come under air attack, shot at a real target, or had to repair real battle damage. As opposed to the Yorktown task force who had done all of those things.

And of course the bottom line is that the USN had defeated the Japanese in fair battle long before American numerical superiority came into play. The first of the new US carriers didn't enter service until 1943 and the war in the Pacific was already won at that point by those same outnumbered and 'not ready' swabbies who were around on December 7th.

Scott, hate to say it, but you're dead wrong. Just one example: The IJN trained and trained hard at the kind of night surface combat that became the norm. And they had not only a superior doctrine, but superior equipment to go with it. The USN was NOT ready for that kind of battle (the USN didn't even have sufficient flashless powder and was saddled with an abysmal torpedo). Any casual examination of the Solomons battles bears this out. It would take several bruising losses before the USN started to learn how to fight at night. That they learned how to fight (and how to PROPERLY use their one great advantage, radar) is a great credit to the men involved. But to say the IJN were 'beginners' is grossly incorrect.

"And of course the bottom line is that the USN had defeated the Japanese in fair battle long before American numerical superiority came into play"

Really? Let's see: Coral Sea- We trade a large carrier for one of their small carriers. And our damage control was roundly criticized. Savo Island- A US force gets slaughtered for no good return. Second Guadalcanal- We send in 2 BBs and a handful of DDs and get a victory. But why send 2 BBs contradicting every tenet of US surface battle doctrine (BBs were never, ever to be risked at night in tight waters)? Because we had NO CAs left in the area. In fact, by the end of 1942, the USN commander's were doubting that they could keep up the battle at that pace, given the horrific losses in cruisers.

And about Midway: Great victory for the US; that's obvious. But look at the handling of the Hornet. Her lackluster performance almost scuttled Mitscher's career. And the IJN was still way ahead of the USN in organizing massive, coordinated strikes from several carriers.

That we learned how to do all the things that needed to be learned is one of the great stories of WWII. But don't be so misguided as to think that we were on par with the IJN across the board on the morning of Dec 7, 1941. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Coastal 2

Your points do not show that the US navy was not ready, just that its doctrine and training was not as good as the Japanese in those specific areas. Yes, the Japanese were more advanced in Carrier Ops and Night fighting in 1941 than the US navy. However, there were other areas that the US Navy was also undoubtedly better. ASW being a crucial and clear advantage to the US navy. The Japanese fleet went to war to capture the oil fields in the Dutch East Indies, but did not have a plan or clue how to transport the oil to where it was needed. This shows the IJN almost moronically unprepared for a Pacific war in 1941.

In other areas both navies were evenly matched – usually because they both rated as 'not very good'. Both fleets had a doctrine of the primacy of the battle line in navy combat for instance.

Or the best example being that both had fairly ineffective submarine forces (you would think they would look at what had been happening in the Atlantic for the past two years and try and draw some lessons). This illustrates the vital difference however of the two fleets. The US submarine fleet, learnt, changed and become a decisive weapon of war. The Japanese submarine force, although always large, was always an irrelevance. In December 41 the German submarine force wrecked havoc on the East coast of the US, why was the Japanese fleet not doing the same on the West?….. In 1944 every drop of fuel, bullet and ration that the US used had to be carried across the Pacific, where was the Japanese submarine fleet?

The US navy in 41 had strengths and weaknesses but was (largely) willing to identify weaknesses, accept the reality of the situation and try and improve. The Japanese fleet in 41 had strengths and weaknesses and spent the next 4 years thinking that reality should confirm to their wishes. It never did.

Thank you Durrati, you said it better than I could have!

And I love how the USN detractors always try to minimize Midway by chalking the victory up to the codebreaking. The codebreaking allowed the US to have its forces on the scene, but that was all. Once there, the USN still had to win the battle and the codebreakers couldn't help them at all in that. Hugely outnumbered and up against the 'more experienced' Japanese, they had to win the battle at the tactical level--and they did.

"The US navy in 41 had strengths and weaknesses but was (largely) willing to identify weaknesses, accept the reality of the situation and try and improve. The Japanese fleet in 41 had strengths and weaknesses and spent the next 4 years thinking that reality should confirm to their wishes. It never did."

Exactly (and I think I pointed that out, at least for the US). The Japanese were indeed clueless and remain so in many critical areas (logistics, proper use of submarines, training to wartime requirements, etc). We adapted and adapted again; they didn't.

"Hugely outnumbered and up against the 'more experienced' Japanese, they had to win the battle at the tactical level--and they did."

Amazing how victory covers up the gaffes and errors of the winning side… Fact: The Hornet's performance was so sub-par that her captain, Marc Mitscher, came within a hairs breath of getting sacked. Fact: The USN NEVER put together a coordinated strike between the three carriers because they were incapable of it. Yes, they won. In spite of many major self inflicted errors. Sometimes victory goes the one who makes the fewest errors (or whose errors are not fatal). And that, BTW, is borne out in the USN's own post action reports.

This is the only Yamato that could have made a difference.