"Who is still using written orders in games?" Topic

Written orders are an essential part of Horse and Musket games.

They do need to be used in the spirit intended which can be a problem with club games.

That having been said I will not be including same in an upcoming rule set so as not to put people off.

The up side is that written orders and their effects an be added into any game system with minimal effort by the players if they so choose.

@Bill,

My take on Polemos is marginally different from Glenn's, so here goes (I've written this in step form for my own sake):

1. The game is (generally a two-player) miniatures game which can be played face-to-face without an umpire in a couple of hours- all other aspects of the game are subordinate to this, so rules which in effect require an umpire or exploratory dialogue to make work, or require large amounts of work, are non-starters.

2. The series designer has adopted the basic architecture of the DBx series: in terms of effect, it makes little difference whether you (realistically) assume the commander can try and do everything with conceivably possible with his forces then put obstacles in the way of this, or you just limit what the commander can achieve. Each has a degree of control, in that the commander can choose what he wishes to get done most of all and will almost certainly be able to achieve that – but not always lower priorities.

3. The series designer has adopted the idea of 'Tempo' instead of PIPs and has more-or-less made time variable. So, whichever commander controls the tempo/seizes the initiative will get the stuff he wants to do done before his opponent, who is trying to get more stuff done.

4. The effect of losing that initiative is that the commander trying to do more stuff will probably not be able to achieve all of that, as the moves made by the commander with the initiative cause shock and/or surprise to the commander without it.

5. The 'mechanics' of using the tempo to move troops around the table are partly to reflect the physical nature of the game – i.e. those bases have to be moved around the board, but mostly a consequence of making time a variable. The troops who didn't receive a tempo point whilst marching down the road haven't stopped and waited around – they just haven't moved significantly during a brief focus of action elesewhere on the field. Naturally this isn't a perfect solution to the problems of representing time and motion on the Napoleonic battlefield…but it isn't any worse than anything else, and a deal better than many (obviously IMHO).

6. Apart from the games from the TFL stable, this mechanic reflects most closely some of the stuff I have read about current theories of how battles are won (and lost); this kind of stuff, say: link

(But I freely admit there are lots of games I haven't played – Piquet springs to mind). Anyway, it is all about the virtues of seizing the tempo and initiative and the effect of speed in causing shock and surprise at key moments. These are the key components of battlefield success regardless of period, which is why all Polemos rules use some variant of them.

7. I take on board your standing point that, as I am not the designer, just a player, I could have got this entirely the wrong way around! And perhaps there is a case for rules writers to really expand on their designer'snotes to explain their key assumptions better. That said, if Peter isn't too busy at Partizan tomorrow I may just ask him.

8. Napoleon at Austerlitz fought the perfect Polemos battle, by seizing the initiative at the key moment, disrupting the Allies complicated plans which required a lot of supervision and movement, throwing them off balance in such a a way that the Allies could not recover from. Technically brilliant, as eminent historian Corelli Barnett described it…;-)

Regards

M C LeSingeDew:

I totally agree that orders are essential to any horse and musket era wargame. If portraying command, how could it be otherwise? The question is how many different mechanics can be devised to immulate them successfully. It issues are:

1. The time it takes to write them out, particularly for multiply games, though two player games have problems with written orders too.

2. The second problem is how to write them. Without some 'form' to them, it will take an umpire to ajudicate all the possible variations to them.

3. Of course, if there is a 'form', it either has to be very detailed to cover a wide range of options, and thus loaded with rules and exceptions OR they have to be simple, where three or four types have to cover all contingencies with their own set of restrictions. There are real issues with each approach.

4. The 200 foot general also creates some problems, in conjunction with a typical game behavior: a tendency to micro-managing and attempting to eek out every possible little advantage from the rules. This means lots of orders are likely to be written, which creates problems for game flow.

Now we have all seen mechanics to address these issues, some more successful than others, but in general, a good portion of gamers and designers haven't been satisfied with the solutions.

Bill

Hello Whirlwind!

Can't say I see any difference. However, you have certainly embellished a number of points.

Best regards,

Glenn

Hello Bill!

It seems you only have two basic concerns, how does Tempo compare to historical military command and the constant update requirement of every turn. I'm actually surprised that these two points are causing you problems. On the other hand I think I can see that your extensive knowledge of the period and your skills in simulation and game design could do this to you. Anyway let me try and do this one more time.

Historically there is a military hierarchy that functions with orders that can be written, done verbally, with drums, bugles and various types of signals. Polemos requires you to have the same military structure in it's games. The entire historical order system has been converted to a simple "game mechanic" called "Tempo". The distribution of Tempo points represents all of these order types. The game does not require the use of any other type of order, but you can use them if you want.

The constant update or review every turn happens in just about every game system. So I'm really puzzled with why you feel that Tempo is so unusual. One of the things that is different in a Polemos game is every turn is not a set element of time, it's variable. Also keep in mind that some commanders did send follow up orders. Tempo covers this very nicely. I guess if you still feel this is some kind of handicap then so be it. I certainly don't see it as a problem.

In your quest for some historical evidence I think it's truly amazing that Whirlwind has actually called Austerlitz a Polemos battle. What better endorsement could there be then a player identifying an historical battle as such?

Bill, what Polemos does in a very simple format is truly amazing and just shouts milestone to me. Not sure what else I can say to show it to you.

Best regards,

Glenn

Hi Bill,

"So the question as far as order writing is concerned is how many would be written by a CinC and/or corps commanders in a well-controlled battle and how long would it take to actually implement them. Looking at the distances at Jena and Auerstadt for instance, it wouldn't have taken either napoleon, Davout or Hohenlohe or the Duke of Brunswick or any of the corps commanders more than ten to fifteen minutes to communicate with their subordinates and make things happen when looking at voice commands and the distances/times by horse.

Restricting a CinC to a few commands in a battle might imitate what Napoleon actually did, but he chose whether to issue lots of commands or not, and send out orders whenever and to whomever he wanted to. A lot of the question has to do with how the army communication system worked and what each level could or couldn't do based on the SOP established for that army.
This is just a brief review of some of the command issues, but it raises questions that I think get more to the heart of ‘how things worked' than simply writing orders or not, using Command Points, cards or restricting what the Head Honcho could do if he wanted to."

Yes agreed… and I think that I take it for granted… it is all down to the abilities of those issuing the orders and their armies` SOP`s re. order transmission.

As you`re aware, I have ADC`s in my game and they`re not just simple messengers either.
Also in my rules a Napoleon can send as many orders as he likes by adding couriers (probably light cavalry NCO; not so useful as a proper aide-de-camp) but if he does this the result would probably be as it should be – more likely it`d be utterly chaotic and so he wouldn`t do it.

all the best,

Mike.

Glenn and Whirlwind:

I appreciate the elaboration on what Polemos does. I think I understand what it is about, between your explanations and actually playing it. And I'll try and respond to each point. First of all:

The constant update or review every turn happens in just about every game system. So I'm really puzzled with why you feel that Tempo is so unusual.

Glenn, I agree that it is an element in many, many games, and the Tempo system isn't unique in that way. The only reason I might think the Tempo is so 'unusual' are your statements like this one:

Bill, what Polemos does in a very simple format is truly amazing and just shouts milestone to me.

Glenn wrote:
Historically there is a military hierarchy that functions with orders that can be written, done verbally, with drums, bugles and various types of signals. Polemos requires you to have the same military structure in it's games. The entire historical order system has been converted to a simple "game mechanic" called "Tempo". The distribution of Tempo points represents all of these order types. The game does not require the use of any other type of order, but you can use them if you want.

I have no problem with the order system being converted/reduced to a simple game mechanic. That is what ALL simulations and wargames do. You say the distribution of Tempo points represents all of these order types.

What I am saying is they don't represent them well at all. Not in how they are used by the CinC, why they are used, or the impact they have on the battle as orders compared to the historical dynamics of command. They also don't produce the kind of problem-solving that the historical command system demanded.

One of the things that is different in a Polemos game is every turn is not a set element of time, it's variable.

Several games include variable turn and game lengths…

Also keep in mind that some commanders did send follow up orders. Tempo covers this very nicely. I guess if you still feel this is some kind of handicap then so be it. I certainly don't see it as a problem.

Did they? And how do you know that? And why would they? If commanders didn't, would everything grind to a halt as a consequence as they do in Polemos? It's not a 'handicap', and I don't know that Tempo 'covers' this nicely with a constant need for such 'follow up.'

Whirlwind wrote:
The troops who didn't receive a tempo point whilst marching down the road haven't stopped and waited around – they just haven't moved significantly during a brief focus of action elesewhere on the field. Naturally this isn't a perfect solution to the problems of representing time and motion on the Napoleonic battlefield…but it isn't any worse than anything else, and a deal better than many (obviously IMHO).

The point here for me is that such 'focus' of action elsewhere and the subsequent lack of 'significant movement' is planned by the players, actually created by spending orders like money. In reality, [history, that is] those marching columns would continue regardless, attempting to complete the last order, and any lack of significant movement wouldn't be planned, but rather 1. unplanned, 2. leaving the CinC unaware of it for some time, and 3. Something the commander would have limited ability to 'correct', which wouldn't necessarily or usually solved by 'more orders'.

So, how much better is that dynamic than any other system when considering what it is supposed to represent?

But lets take a look at Whirlwind's endorsement:

Napoleon at Austerlitz fought the perfect Polemos battle, by seizing the initiative at the key moment, disrupting the Allies complicated plans which required a lot of supervision and movement, throwing them off balance in such a a way that the Allies could not recover from. Technically brilliant, as eminent historian Corelli Barnett described it…;-)

The first question is how Napoleon 'seized the initiative' and did that have anything to do with constantly issuing orders?

Whirlwind wrote:

So, whichever commander controls the tempo/seizes the initiative will get the stuff he wants to do done before his opponent, who is trying to get more stuff done.

What is this 'initiative' that is being seized and more importantly, how is it done? The military defines it a number of ways, but basically it is when one side is able to push forward their plans, forcing the enemy to react rather than expend energy on achieving their goals. Having initiative is something created by a commander which forces the enemy to react rather than act in accordance with their own plans.

So how did Napoleon 'sieze the initiative?'

Now a Polemos scenario of Austerlitz will probably run through eight to 10 turns, which is about 1 hour per turn. The battle started at 7:30am. At @9am, Napoleon was 'attached' to Soult's command [in game terms] and ordered him to advance. For the next two hours Napoleon wandered the center of the battle, but issued no orders.

So, in the time roughly represented by the first three turns of the game, Napoleon issued one order to one corps.

Yet he was able to not only seize the initiative, but keep it with that one order… and no follow up, even though he did receive a number of reports from the field, including requests for support. And this behavior isn't unique to Austerlitz, Napoleon or other CinCs of the period.

Now, in Polemos, would such a lack of activity produce anything positive, let alone a technically brilliant battle? With the Tempo system, players are constantly having to vie for 'initiative' each 'hour', parceling orders like a limited cache of energy, trying as you say to 'stay on top' of all the battle events.

If there is any command that even slightly resembled the Tempo game activity, it was Kutuzov, who issued a large number of orders in an attempt to first unsnarl his many columns of march and then react to Napoleon's advance in the middle. In other words, the only time you migh see something like the persistant flurry of orders represented by the Polemos system would be when a poorly run command system attempted to deal with a crisis.

Certainly, a game where the players don't do anything for three turns or more isn't very entertaining. A constant need for orders, that is player decisions is what games are about as Sid Meiers says: "Games are a series of interesting decisions". That is understandable, and the Tempo system can certainly provide interesting decisions. However, a wargame or participatory simulation game is series of interesting decisions like those faced by historical commanders." The Tempo system is nothing like a historical representation of Napoleonic command.

The historical and design questions about command, even in the abstract are:

1. How Napoleon [or any CinC] commanded to 'seize' the initiative and carry out a technically brilliant battle.
2. How to provide players with a similar decision-making environment and opportunities with a game system.

That is not an easy task and there are a wide range of ways to approach the questions with game mechanics that are all equally workable. The end result isn't that variable. In the end, the game experience has to represent very specific history in some recognizable way or it doesn't represent history at all. That recognition is done by comparing the history to the game mechanics like I have done… in a very cursory way, of course.

We can always attach terms like 'initiative' to die rolls and game mechanics, orders and friction of war to others, but the bottom line still remains: If the game mechanics are supposed to represent something of history and the actual dynamics of battle, does it? Where and how?

Best Regards,

Bill H.

Mike wrote:

As you`re aware, I have ADC`s in my game and they`re not just simple messengers either. Also in my rules a Napoleon can send as many orders as he likes by adding couriers (probably light cavalry NCO; not so useful as a proper aide-de-camp) but if he does this the result would probably be as it should be – more likely it`d be utterly chaotic and so he wouldn`t do it.

Mike:
Yes, I know. I think that a constant stream of orders, [saying what? repeating past orders, giving new orders or slight corrections of existing orders?] would create some chaos, as well as tiring out both staff and recipients. One reason you see a limited number of orders from the CinC and corps commanders and a different basic system of control for Division and Brigade commanders.

Best Regards,
Bill

The point here for me is that such 'focus' of action elsewhere and the subsequent lack of 'significant movement' is planned by the players, actually created by spending orders like money. In reality, [history, that is] those marching columns would continue regardless, attempting to complete the last order, and any lack of significant movement wouldn't be planned, but rather 1. unplanned, 2. leaving the CinC unaware of it for some time, and 3. Something the commander would have limited ability to 'correct', which wouldn't necessarily or usually solved by 'more orders'.

So, how much better is that dynamic than any other system when considering what it is supposed to represent?

I think that you are mentally dragging it back to 'each turn represents x minutes and a column marching down a road wouldn't stop for x minutes'. The point is that the commander controlling the tempo gets to choose the focus of action for an inderteminate period and makes it happen faster than the enemy commander.

As for the point about 'correction', this I think is not taking in the DBx philosophy of reversing the command problem to achieve the same effect. Clearly Polemos isn't perfect as , but the need for command effort – in this case tempo points – to resolve it is not a bad solution; not quite as random as a straight PIP roll, but allowing more control than some card systems and not having the complexity of a supply sub-system, an order sub-system, a chance event sub-system within the rules. Now clearly if you want to make a 'staff' focussed game, rather than a command game, these would be heinous omissions. As it is, it is rather a neat solution (others are available…)

Now a Polemos scenario of Austerlitz will probably run through eight to 10 turns, which is about 1 hour per turn. The battle started at 7:30am. At @9am, Napoleon was 'attached' to Soult's command [in game terms] and ordered him to advance. For the next two hours Napoleon wandered the center of the battle, but issued no orders.

Well, yes and no. As referred to above, to say a turn = an hour isn't the best way of looking at the thing. However…

So, in the time roughly represented by the first three turns of the game, Napoleon issued one order to one corps.

Yet he was able to not only seize the initiative, but keep it with that one order… and no follow up, even though he did receive a number of reports from the field, including requests for support. And this behavior isn't unique to Austerlitz, Napoleon or other CinCs of the period.

Now, in Polemos, would such a lack of activity produce anything positive, let alone a technically brilliant battle? With the Tempo system, players are constantly having to vie for 'initiative' each 'hour', parceling orders like a limited cache of energy, trying as you say to 'stay on top' of all the battle events.

If there is any command that even slightly resembled the Tempo game activity, it was Kutuzov, who issued a large number of orders in an attempt to first unsnarl his many columns of march and then react to Napoleon's advance in the middle. In other words, the only time you migh see something like the persistant flurry of orders represented by the Polemos system would be when a poorly run command system attempted to deal with a crisis.

No, in Polemos terms what (I think) happens is this. Kutusov wins the initiative for most of the first few turns. As Napoleon doesn't do much, this encourages Kutusov to keep the initiative but bid lower (and do more stuff). Because Napoleon is playing MdE rather than GdD he has primed his units with prepatory TPs. At the key moment, Napoleon wins back the initiative with a high tempo bid to enable him to do the stuff that he needs to do and Kutusov can't react in time. From this point Kutusov is on to a loser as he can't issue TPs quickly enough to regain the initiative (he needs to do a lot of stuff), counter-attack and supervise the continuing movements in the North and South.

Are tempo points a perfect match on to Austerlitz – no, of course not. But they do seem to enable a reasonable recreation of it which is not possible in some other sets.

Regards

Whirlwind wrote:

I think that you are mentally dragging it back to 'each turn represents x minutes and a column marching down a road wouldn't stop for x minutes'. The point is that the commander controlling the tempo gets to choose the focus of action for an inderteminate period and makes it happen faster than the enemy commander.

Whirlwind, make the time mean anything you want. If I keep 'dragging in back' to actual time spent, it is simply an effort to compare Polemosplayer actions with CinC actions around command, orders and the Tempo mechanic. In this case Napoleon. [Just a note, "Tempo" has a great deal to do with time in the concrete, not the inderteminate.]

Napoleon didn't make things 'happen faster'. The speed at which the Allies moved is pretty much the same speed the French moved at Austerlitz for all forces. Bonaparte actually waited for the Allies to commit before moving… he slowed the pace at the start and certainly controlled the 'tempo' with the release of reserves around 11am and after. I to ask you what "makes 'it' happen faster than the enemy commander?" What exactly did Napoleon and the army do 'faster'?

I'm not looking for perfection. It is simply looking at what the game was designed to represent. It is asking whether the Tempo system actually represents in some way what the historical commanders were doing, deciding and dealing with. It doesn't from what I can see.

Kutusov wins the initiative for most of the first few turns. As Napoleon doesn't do much, this encourages Kutusov to keep the initiative but bid lower (and do more stuff). Because Napoleon is playing MdE rather than GdD he has primed his units with prepatory TPs. At the key moment, Napoleon wins back the initiative with a high tempo bid to enable him to do the stuff that he needs to do and Kutusov can't react in time. From this point Kutusov is on to a loser as he can't issue TPs quickly enough to regain the initiative (he needs to do a lot of stuff), counter-attack and supervise the continuing movements in the North and South.

I think this is a danger in comparing game mechanics to history. It be done by translating history to fit the game mechanics rather than the other way around.

Kutusov didn't 'win' the initiative. He took it, and Napoleon expected him to take it and didn't do a thing--and I mean didn't do a thing. That was Napoleon's genius. He figured out the Allies' plan of attack. This the right moment [not indeterminate moment] Soult was released. Napoleon actually had Soult wait for fifteen minutes more before moving. Fifteen minutes! But Napoleon saw such a small amount of time as significant.

The prepratory TPs could is an interesting mechanic, only the costs make the results odd. I haven't played it for this reason. When A CinC can only allocate 2TP to any formation on any turn, and IF the general of the formation is decisive, he also has 2TP, then the formation can't move without storing TPs because it costs five TPs. It also means it is harder to get a formation to move than keep it moving, which doesn't seem to match Austerlitz command events well at all. I don't know why it is portrayed this way. Then again, poor Kutuzov would never have been able to get his troops moving at 7:30am and shouldn't have planned to do it, because he couldn't possibly have enough TPs to move until two turns later. As Napoleon waited for the Allies to be well and truly committed on the French right wing, that means Napoleon, in a Polemos game would be waiting a long time in turns before 'springing his trap.' As a formation commander can only warehouse 4TPs, Tempo wise, there is no reason to wait that long. As Kutusov would have to wait a considerable time himself to bank enough TPs to move his many formations, we envisioned alot of waiting while we banked TPs. On one level, having a lot of small formations can be a handicap with the TP system. At Austerlitz, the number and size of the formations on both sides, corps and columns was generally similar.

While we could provide both sides with banked TPs at the beginning of the Austerlitz game, what does that do to the whole TP mechanic? It is interesting that Chris Grice in his Napoleonic Campanion book does do this for any of the the MdE scenarios.

Are tempo points a perfect match on to Austerlitz – no, of course not. But they do seem to enable a reasonable recreation of it which is not possible in some other sets.

Again, forgetting about perfection, and embracing 'reasonable', what exactly does the TP system do to provide players with similar command decisions faced by Napoleon and Kutuzov? Personally, I don't think the actions of either commander at Asterlitz match up in any reasonable fashion with the Tempo system.

Tempo is a 'money' game, where both sides husband limited amounts of orders and spend this *something* in getting their armies to move on a continual basis. Run out of TPs, your army stops. That is not the basic Napoleonic command dynamics, even at it's most abstract. There are a number of wargames that are based on this idea of limited orders, a vague something that runs out for an army. I think BJ's Die Fighting is one of the newer incarnations. Is that the way commanders experienced battle? Did that kind of thing even become a blip on their command radar--in any fashion? How do we know?

The game mechanics can be fun, challenging, multi-faceted and I say terrific. However, if the question is whether there is a 'reasonable' connection to the game mechanics and history, those entertaining traits have nothing to do with answer.

The system can be loaded with terms like initiative and orders and such, but it all comes down to the challenges actually faced by the commanders, the tools at their disposal and the decisions they could make. And how that compares to the game mechanics.

Best Regards,

Bill

Whirlwind, make the time mean anything you want. If I keep 'dragging in back' to actual time spent, it is simply an effort to compare Polemos player actions with CinC actions around command, orders and the Tempo mechanic. In this case Napoleon. [Just a note, "Tempo" has a great deal to do with time in the concrete, not the indeterminate.

No, this isn't me 'meaning anything I want", this is spelled out in the rules.

Tempo is a 'money' game, where both sides husband limited amounts of orders and spend this *something* in getting their armies to move on a continual basis. Run out of TPs, your army stops. That is not the basic Napoleonic command dynamics, even at it's most abstract.

Well, there we disagree. Basic command is all about managing resources by command activity in time. Commanders in the Napoleonic period on the battlefield either issue orders to troops, or provide logistical support, or supervise activity in person, or they wait to do these things at some future point.

Napoleon didn't make things 'happen faster'.

Yes, he did. He got his troops onto the Pratzen heights before the Allies could react strongly enough to stop him. As you well know, it doesn't mean 'making the troops march faster, or anything like that. Polemos-series rules make a reasonable stab at this.

Kutusov didn't 'win' the initiative. He took it…

Erm…

…That was Napoleon's genius. He figured out the Allies' plan of attack. This the right moment [not indeterminate moment] Soult was released. Napoleon actually had Soult wait for fifteen minutes more before moving. Fifteen minutes! But Napoleon saw such a small amount of time as significant.

Yes, that is what Polemos is good at (IMHO). Soult's Corps is ready (it has 4 TPs). At the right tactical moment, Napoleon seizes the initiative (gains the Tempo), gives a TP to Soult to get him moving and away he goes before Kutuzov can react.

Again, IMHO, not a bad representation.

Regards

I wish I would be able to play anything… Even with written orders!

@Basileus,

You can't play anything at the moment?

Regards

Nope! I have not the time… nor the strength, after 12 hours at work and then taking care of my kids… Geez, I am so tired that I have almost forgot how to game! Man! How I need some vacations!

Whirlwind:
The rules 'spell out' indeterminate time. When I said you could have it mean anything you want, that is what an 'undetermined time' is!

Well, there we disagree. Basic command is all about managing resources by command activity in time. Commanders in the Napoleonic period on the battlefield either issue orders to troops, or provide logistical support, or supervise activity in person, or they wait to do these things at some future point.

Fine. So how did Napoleon and Kutuzov 'manage' these resources--in an indeterminate time? If that is what basic command is during a Napoleonic battle, give me an example. Where does Napoleon 'manage limited resources' during Austerlitz?

Yes, that is what Polemos is good at (IMHO). Soult's Corps is ready (it has 4 TPs). At the right tactical moment, Napoleon seizes the initiative (gains the Tempo), gives a TP to Soult to get him moving and away he goes before Kutuzov can react.

Well, putting aside the surprise element [hidden] in Soult's movement, all Napoleon did is order Soult to advance. It could just as well have been AFTER the Allied move in Polemos He didn't spend any 'resources' to do it… neither did Soult. Napoleon wasn't sitting in the early morning with Soult as he waited for the Allies to commit on the right 'juggling' 'resources', however you want to define them… that simply isn't the way or what he was thinking about.

We are dancing on air here for the most part because we don't know what history the designer had in mind.

Tempo seems to attempt to represent:
1. Friction of war
2. The time it takes to deliver orders and get troops to move
3. The basic command decisions a CinC makes in a battle
4. The wide variety of concerns he has all under the heading of 'resources' or 'tempo.'
5. The way a commander 'seized' initiative on the battlefield.
6. The limits of the command system.

Have I got that right? I certainly see the logic behind the rules and why folks might find them entertaining. Now granted, these 6 elements of command are subsumed under one game subsystem called Tempo. And of course, it will by necessity be abstract, even very abstract, and it certainly won't be perfect and never will.

Is the Tempo subsystem reasonably representative of those historical factors in a battle and what a commander had to deal with on the way to victory?

When I read about what those commanders did, what they said and described as the demands of command, and just considering those elements listed, I have to say no. You certainly would understand why a player might win the game, but you won't understand how Napoleon orchestrated his victory at Austerlitz [even in the most general, abstract way] or what 'technical brilliance' he exercised.

For instance, it costs 5 TPs to get a formation to move, and only 1 to continue to move. Fine. So it required five times as many 'resources' to get a formation to move than to keep it continuing on the move. Then again, did it 'cost' the command system anything to have a formation continue on with its orders?

So granted that this is very abstract, but does it really 'cost' the command system that kind of energy to move a formation relative to the army or a formation already in motion? Did commanders think in those terms, considering the 'cost' of ordering a formation to move? What cost? How and when did a CinC calculate such things, in whatever terms you like?

Where in the heck do you see this kind of command thinking in Napoleonic history? Are there any similarities?

That is my continuing question. I don't need a tranlation of general history into game terms. I have as good an imagination as anyone. I can do, but that isn't what my quesion is about.

Describe the game mechanics visa vie history.

For instance, what 'resources' did Napoleon and his staff/command system 'spend' in the first three hours of
Austerlitz? What were the actual command costs of his decisions that Tempo would be abstractly illustrating? How do you know this kind of 'economy of resources' is what an army commander thought about? Particularly when the time in the game is 'indeterminate.'

Again, this isn't a question about playing the game as entertainment, it is a question about what history it is supposed to mimic.

And yeah, basileus66, I can relate. I wish I had more time to game. It seems to require a full free day or evening and that is hard to find for me, let alone one or more of my buddies for the same time… How I want to retire… though even then I'm not sure my time will be my own.

Best Regards,
Bill H.

Hello Bill!

"Tempo seems to attempt to represent:
1. Friction of war
2. The time it takes to deliver orders and get troops to move
3. The basic command decisions a CinC makes in a battle
4. The wide variety of concerns he has all under the heading of 'resources' or 'tempo.'
5. The way a commander 'seized' initiative on the battlefield.
6. The limits of the command system.

Have I got that right?"

Possibly more, but I'm good with that.

"Is the Tempo subsystem reasonably representative of those historical factors in a battle and what a commander had to deal with on the way to victory?"

Certainly reasonable, see your 6 points.

"When I read about what those commanders did, what they said and described as the demands of command, and just considering those elements listed, I have to say no."

Just considering those elements, oddly enough I agree with you.

"You certainly would understand why a player might win the game, but you won't understand how Napoleon orchestrated his victory at Austerlitz [even in the most general, abstract way] or what 'technical brilliance' he exercised."

I don't agree here at all. After all of our games most players are very much aware of the difference. In fact we always compare what the players did vs their historical counter parts. Most players seem to feel that the system allowed them to achieve the same or very similar results. Something that very well might have been impossible under other rules.

"So granted that this is very abstract, but does it really 'cost' the command system that kind of energy to move a formation relative to the army or a formation already in motion? Did commanders think in those terms, considering the 'cost' of ordering a formation to move? What cost? How and when did a CinC calculate such things, in whatever terms you like?"

Of course not, he thought in terms of your 6 points.

"Again, this isn't a question about playing the game as entertainment, it is a question about what history it is supposed to mimic."

Bill, it's suppose to mimic the history of the period covering the rules. It's only a game, it will never reach the lofty goal of being some kind of exact replication of real life. It was never intended to be that. I'm not aware of any set of wargame rules that matches your historical analyzes.

One really interesting thing, however, is the fact that other then you, no other player that I know of has expressed an opinion like yours. In fact the most common point of view is exactly the opposite of yours. Players overwhelmingly feel that Polemos gives them the best feeling of historical command and control that they have ever experienced. I guess that simply confirms all the others are way out in left field.

Best regards,

Glenn

Hi Bill,

At its simplest, we need a rate of time it takes a messenger to arrive, and either the possibility that he does not arrive or perhaps even better some mechanism that has the message get though, just perhaps very slowly. I say this last as then you don't have to worry about whether or not your subordinate thinks to send another messenger, or for that matter yourself. Again a simplification but it does ease work load.

Beyond that, and tying this into the VLB discussion, the arrival of a courier really triggers what VLB calls a decision point. This is just an opportunity for the player to alter his plans.

I've seen rules that codify what orders should include, and how they should be formatted, but I suggest that as 1; the players have to be interested in using orders for them to work at all, and 2; the player issuing the order knows what he wants to do, the added overhead is not useful.

In a two player game, there could be a simple chance that an order is misinterpereted. Roll a die or dice and if confusion occurs, either have some penalty like the unit moves in a random direction, or just does nothing, confused, or let the opponent say what the unit does !

In a multi player game the consequences of badly worded orders sort themselves out, as the recipient either asks for clarification, wasting time, or perhaps worse, does what he thinks you meant.

All of the above can happen without any limit on the number of orders that can be issued, or even accounting for the time it takes to write them, as all of these variables are included in the time it takes the message to get from sender to recipient.

I suppose you could include staff ratings so that say Mack isn't as quick in responding to a changing situation as Napoleon would be by adding an additional delay, preferably a random factor to courier movement.

Again this is, IMO of course, the minimum overhead for a written order component, stressing as always that it is only going to work if the players want it to. An added plus that such a system could be grafted onto any set of rules as it really relates to the timing of decisions rather than to move pips, or cards, or any core component of the battle rules used.

This is just a "written orders story" that really put the hook into me for this sort of thing.

As some of you may know I occasionally write for Two Hour Wargames. One of the things that attracted me to that company and that I try to improve with each title I am involved with is the concept of solo or same side play. I would rather have four player on one side vs. no one on the other than say 2 v 2 for example.

Now I have always been a fan of American western history, and as gamers do sometimes, have always scratched my head at Crooks seeming apathy during the Rosebud battle.

Here is the situation: Ten companies of cavalry and five of infantry with a sizable body of allied Indians were in march order and at rest when assaulted by an equal or slightly inferior body of enemy Indians. That battle "raged" rather desultorily for 12 hours and in the end, it seems that very little had really happened.

So out it goes on the table. Just me as Crook and the blue bellies strung out in order of march and the game system controlling both friendly and enemy Indians.

Sure enough whenever I managed to order my fellows to do something, the Indians had moved on to some other fun activity. I was, as they say, behind the information curve, throughout. The Indians ran rings around me and fired off all their ready ammo and then just left.

A very frustrating game that showed the difficulty of a "properly" organized force versus small bands of decentralized fighters.

They could not organize to wipe me out and my actions were too ponderous to corral them, at least when I was caught unprepared from the start.

I scoff at Crook no more : )

Jesus H Christ
It should be readly apparent to any 'napoleonic' commander why order writing has to be part of the game. Of course, one can always paint figures and play chequers.

To each his own but you'd be hard pressed to find very many more than a few written orders during a battle. On occasion written order may be issued before a battle to place formations. The time it takes to deliver an order on the battlefield is the time it takes an aide or orderly to gallop from A to B.

There were absolutely no written orders below division because below division officers had no choice but to do precisely what they were told. On the grand tactical battlefield orders fell into that murky realm of politics as many were nobles or in the case of the French friends or enemies of the army commander. Even Napoleon had instances when corps and wing commanders did not exactly obey his battlefield orders. So someone who thinks that written orders somehow reflect what occurred on the battlefield is kidding himself.

But as I wrote, if you just gotta have written orders by all means have written orders and enjoy yourself.

Bob Coggins

@ Bill,

Where in the heck do you see this kind of command thinking in Napoleonic history? Are there any similarities?

You are simply not getting what the DBx philosophy is. The point is specifically *not* to mimic the mechanisms of command, it is to reverse them to give the player equivalent problems to deal with. If you don't like it, fine, you know?

At Austerlitz the tempo/command resource problem wasn't Napoleon's: it was Kutuzov's. When Napoleon seized the initiative and ordered Soult's advance, he couldn't move all his troops the way he wanted too *in the time available* to stop the French and supervise his Northern and Southern attacks. But even with Napoleon, at the moment he was ordering Soult to attack, he wasn't simultaneously re-arranging Lannes corps or anything, or supervising Davout. Polemos has a go at restricting his ability to do that, but since you think that Napoleon could easily have moved pretty much any sub-unit any way he wished *at any time*, then we just disagree on how battles of any period are fought.

But I think we are getting pretty much nowhere here, I'm out.

Regards

Bob,
We`re not entirely just "kidding ourselves" as we know that written orders were issued by CinC`s. Also we must all realize that what we do is to represent real actions, not reflect or imitate. Some representations (rules) are not life-like than others, and yet some others may be a little more impressionistic or analytically cubist in nature and yet still work in a similar manner to the real object or process being played out.

Now then, are you the first person in this discussion to state that written orders weren`t dished out below divisional level? I think you maybe (sorry if i missed anyone else doing this).
Anyhow, I was waiting for this to be said, and it boils down to being a practical matter of managing the game. Orders WERE verbally transmitted, but writing things down (making a brief record of your very concise orders) saves a whole lot of confusion later on and helps to keep generals honest.

MichaelCollinsHimself,

Every so often we go through this written vs verbal order kabuki dance because some gamers enjoy playing rules which require written orders. Certainly I have no problem with gamers who enjoy those rules. To each his own. What I do have a problem with are those who try to justify their rules by convincing others that written orders existed on the historical battlefield when they very rarely did.

When on campaign, did divisions often receive written orders? Absolutely, but we don't play campaigns on the table top; we play battles. I'm not claiming written orders did not exist, but I do claim they were rare. Show me the written orders Davout issued during the battle of Auerstadt. Show me Ney's written order to Kellermann to capture Quatre Bras.

At Bautzen Ney had written orders from Napoleon which he did not follow. At the Katzbach, MacDonald had written orders from Napoleon which he did not follow. So what are written orders supposed to do? Artificially place governors on gamers which their historical counterparts did not have?

Bob Coggins

Surely verbal orders were passed by couriers during battles. Those orders took time to arrive, the further the recipient from the issuer, the more time that would take.

Without extra players to act as couriers the easy solution is to right these instructions down and only act on them when they arrive.

Again it gets back to decision points, not micromanaging.

Unless we are talking about writing down orders for each unit for every move in which case I agree we can do without that : )

Glenn wrote:

I don't agree here at all. After all of our games most players are very much aware of the difference. In fact we always compare what the players did vs their historical counter parts. Most players seem to feel that the system allowed them to achieve the same or very similar results. Something that very well might have been impossible under other rules.

Glenn:
I can appreciate that and you have stated that before. The problem I have with this is that I have no idea what they base those conclusions on, and 'same or very similar results' can mean anything.

The problem is this: Gamers rationalize after the fact. They have to because they have so little information up front. They can become very good at it. For instance, if a game has units moving only 300 yards in 15 minutes, gamers can come up with loads of logical, quite sound reasons why that is, from command failures to unexpected ground and 'hurry up and wait'. Yet, when you look at actual historical evidence, Napoleonic units moved far faster than that under fire as an average. And historical evidence is what is supposed to be the basis for the rules.

Bill, it's suppose to mimic the history of the period covering the rules. It's only a game, it will never reach the lofty goal of being some kind of exact replication of real life. It was never intended to be that. I'm not aware of any set of wargame rules that matches your historical analyzes.

Glenn, who is talking about 'lofty goals'? Of course it's a game, with game mechanics. The question is what those mechanics do to mimic historical command. The only kind of 'replication' I am thinking of is that which you feel makes Polemos a milestone, those aspects you feel are so well represented in the Tempo system. [And it seems my six points don't cover all you see it doing.] The only goals we are considering are those you feel the Tempo system succeeds in achieving. No more, no less. And no, there is no reason you should know of any set of wargame rules that matches my historical analysis.

One really interesting thing, however, is the fact that other then you, no other player that I know of has expressed an opinion like yours. In fact the most common point of view is exactly the opposite of yours. Players overwhelmingly feel that Polemos gives them the best feeling of historical command and control that they have ever experienced. I guess that simply confirms all the others are way out in left field.

Well, that wouldn't be the first time. . Then again, how often do you play with folks that have already decided they don't like Polemos? Other than you, I have don't know any other player that believes Polemos and the Tempo system is all that unique, let alone a 'milestone' in wargame rules. Who do we put out in left field then? Is this the way it's done?: add up all the people we know on each side of the question and declare a winner?

It's face book time again, counting friends. That is hardly the way to determine what history the system is based on, or not based on. However, that does seem to be the way it's too often done.

What I find interesting is while you believe that the Tempo system does a superior job of representing history and military command, you didn't offer any as evidence of this--at all.

In the end, a wargame or simulation game works when the players are thinking about the command aspects offered in the game in ways similar to the contemporary commanders, facing similar decisions with similar controls, however abstract the rules may be. Not perfection, but simply those few things the game is designed to provide.

Best Regards,
Bill H.

Whirlwind wrote:
You are simply not getting what the DBx philosophy is. The point is specifically *not* to mimic the mechanisms of command, it is to reverse them to give the player equivalent problems to deal with. If you don't like it, fine, you know?

Whirlwind:
Oh, I get the philosophy. I simply haven't seen any evidence of 'equivalent problems.' It's the equivalency that is missing. Historical problems/game problesm.

At Austerlitz the tempo/command resource problem wasn't Napoleon's: it was Kutuzov's. When Napoleon seized the initiative and ordered Soult's advance, he couldn't move all his troops the way he wanted too *in the time available* to stop the French and supervise his Northern and Southern attacks.

What makes you think that? Who said he couldn't move all his troops What troops didn't he move 'in time?' The problem was not that he couldn't move troops *in the time available*. He moved the ones that weren't already committed, which is all he could do anyway. At every point, the Allies had troops to challenge Napoleon's moves.

But even with Napoleon, at the moment he was ordering Soult to attack, he wasn't simultaneously re-arranging Lannes corps or anything, or supervising Davout. Polemos has a go at restricting his ability to do that, but since you think that Napoleon could easily have moved pretty much any sub-unit any way he wished *at any time*, then we just disagree on how battles of any period are fought.

Again, statements are being made about what Napoleon could and could do *in time*, etc., and again, I ask: How do you know that? Where do you get that idea?

But I think we are getting pretty much nowhere here, I'm out.

You're right. All we are doing is stating what we believe. Unless we start dealing with the historical evidence, once we have stated our conclusions about that history visa vie Polemos,, there isn't any place to go. As Voltaire once said, "I don't care what you believe, I want to know why." What actual historical evidence leads you to your conclusions?

Regards
Bill H.

I use order chits in my rules set… they are are very specific as to what action is being performed, but leave the means of the action up to the CO recieving the orders.

Basically I have 7 orders… and rather than say what you can do, I have a short list of what you cannot do when each of those orders are activated.

The key here is actually getting your orders and that depends completely on the command rating of the COs in the command chain… this adds a wonderful element of "oh crap" and plays out beautifully….

There are some reactionary items any commander can make, but his command rating affects the die roll to do so.

This can lead to many real world situations and lots of Fog of War situations where as a player you see what is happening, but if you don't anticipate what your opponent is going to do.. you could be left out in the lerch… this can lead to shppting at your own troops (which often did), missing oppertunities to shoot, again… mistaking foe for friend…

A good command chain can issue and recieve orders quickly, while poorer commander cause delays, etc… also, I might add that a superior commander can reduce the time orders get acted upon, but never more than 1 turn… what this represents is the commander is so good, he anticipates the exploit and can act on instinct.. (mechanically, they get the orders really quick).

It works great and really brings to the forefront the quality of command.

It all comes down to staying a step ahead of your oponent.

So yes, I do use orders, but they have some wiggle room for interpretation…

Dear Bob,

I think you know what written orders were supposed to do.

You know, I guess that it is a form of artifice. Making up rules that represent real-life processes. But you make us sound and feel like tyrants!

Written orders were issued and carried out too – perhaps not always to the letter, but to a point…. that is what subordinates did; it was the function of divisional generals etc. to act according to circumstances and if necessary determine the specific form that general/corps orders were to take in practice – like maybe Durutte`s adoption of a battle array that did not conform to the rest of d`erlon`s corps at Waterloo.

I would only argue against the practice of not having orders represented at all in a game.
And I would object to playing in a game which allowed players to change their plans and their orders as opportunities present themselves from each turn to another.

This is not a debate about the existence of verbal and written orders on the battlefield, it is a simple case of the practical management of orders in a wargame.

Would you be happier if we "writtenrulers" used sound recording devices in our games instead?

MichaelCollinsHimself

MichaelCollinsHimself,

As I wrote, I have no problem with gamers who enjoy games with written orders. I just don't play them because I have found written order rules are mostly designed based on the unsupported prejudices and beliefs of the designer. Also written order rules tend to interfere with and slow the play of the game. My God, there are rules where two senior officers are within a few hundred scale yards of each other and it takes over an hour to deliver an order according to the rules.

In the end, by all means play rules with written order if you enjoy them, but historically they rarely occurred.

Bob Coggins

This discussion keeps referring to how the player (corps commander or C-in-C) has to be limited by some mechanism and yet providing a limitation via command points or number of orders or time delay appears to be commonly arbitrary and from a methodology standpoint perhaps ahistorical.

Yet, while I see constant references to how many orders Napoleon issued and how much spare time he had in which to issue them, there hasn't been any talk of the constraints that made it impractical for battlefield commanders to micro-manage every aspect of the fight.

If we want to find the answer to why the player shouldn't micro-manage all his units we need to figure out why Napoleon didn't micro-manage every one of the hundreds of battalions in his army.

My belief is that Napoleonic rules don't provide the real-world constraints of the Napoleonic battlefield, largely because they can't or it is impractical to do so using obvious methods:

1. Visibility – Players can see it all. Generals couldn't, generals were dependent on reports, limited visibility and had a lot of distractions.

2. Time – Players have infinite time to make decisions. Generals had to believe every moment was precious. Waiting or rushing were both important, the player never faces this choice.

3. Control – Players have explicit control over where each battalion halts, the pace of its movement, the number of degrees it wheels. Generals were dependent on others to execute their commands and precision varied.

4. Influence & Awareness – Players are everywhere all the time, they can exhort their influence at two opposite ends of the battlefield simultaneously (in game time). Generals suffered from a reduced awareness of other parts of the battlefield when they sought to influence a specific location through personal intervention and generals couldn't be in two places at once.

5. Math – Players can do the math and know the percentage chances of their potential choices. Generals had to guess and go by their gut.

The question at hand is how to mimic not only the outcome but also the constraint through game mechanics.

I venture that some of these constraints can be controlled through mechanics of the rules (2, 3 & 4). While others can not be (1 & 3) without impractical handicaps in the rules.

1. Visibility – Without implementing double-blind systems or hidden units we can't address visibility directly. We can do it indirectly by placing somewhat arbitrary delays on the player's ability to react, this is imperfect.

2. Time – We can directly impact this by limiting the amount of time players can take to make their moves as well as indirectly impact this again through placing delays on the player's reactions, thus forcing the player to think several moves ahead. While the time delay may be somewhat arbitrary, the mechanic can directly reflect the battlefield general's experience. The battlefield general can't always wait until the last minute to decide, he has to plan ahead most of the time with a limited ability to respond to crisis. Imperfect but better.

3. Control – When dealing with grand tactical formations we can dictate SOP / doctrine for deployment of large formations. We can require that units always move at their full rate. We can require that the destination for a movement must be set before the movement starts. We can require that orders persist turn after turn. These things don't perfectly recreate the constraints of battlefield execution but they help. Again, imperfect but better.

4. Influence & Awareness – We can allow players to have the sort of radio control that they are often used to and that battlefield commanders sometimes exhorted over specific subordinate formations. We can balance this by limiting control over their other units if they choose to exact complete control over one. Close to perfect.

5. Math – We can't stop players from knowing the odds, the best we can do is balance the odds so that players rarely have a guarantied result. In my opinion this can be best managed by choosing dice that give us a high level of precision. This is where my bias against 1D10 comes from, a 1D10 means the least chance of an occurrence is 0% or 10%. With a 1D20 we can move this to 5%. With 2D6 we can make increments variable. So we do have decent options.

Keeping these in mind, an order chit or written order or even a declaration becomes a method for keeping the honest player honest. The player is prevented from infinite adaptation of their battle plan as events unfold but can be allowed some flexibility combined with a limited ability to respond to crisis if he planned ahead for it.

If we only allow players to issue a command every X turns (where X is largely arbitrary and determined by playability) we will create circumstances where players must plan ahead but since all players can issue orders with the same frequency the mechanic would be arbitrary by turns but historical in practicality. Players would need to plan ahead, worrying about lining up the timing of events. Precision of execution would be necessary for success.

Now this is where we introduce a delay of activation for commands. The delay is for playability but the amount of delay should be as close to historical as possible. This delay needs to throw enough randomness in that players can't depend on their plan going off as designed. This provides the challenge of coordination that battlefield commanders faced and it is a real one.

Cheers,

The Bandit

Obviously, when we play games with fixed little metal pieces on wooden bases, and we have to pick each one up and put it down, before picking up the next one and putting it down, then there's no way we can recreate one of the most important fundamentals of battle; simultaneity. More than one thing is going on at the same time, but that's virtually impossible to represent. Yet it's the basic problem hanging over the decision process of any commander: if I set the following things in motion, how long will it take before that motion is complete, and what will the enemy do in the meantime?

So I've always liked the idea of getting rid of the predictable "game turn" and its predictable sequence, as a way of representing time delay. If the player doesn't know how much longer he can keep acting, before the enemy gets to act, then it forces him to concentrate on the things that are most important, and he doesn't get to do everything all at once, predictably, in the same sequence, every single turn, always with the perfect foreknowledge of what the enemy can and can't do, prior to him making his next set of decisions.

I think that's a nice way of injecting some sense of urgency (which makes the game fun and challenging and unpredictable), and also of dramatically simplifying the sequence of play, since you can plausibly do just about anything, in whatever sequence you want, but you have no way of knowing in advance how long it will take to complete, or how and when the enemy might react to it, before you have your next opportunity to do something.

-

Tactical adjustments are one thing. But at the grand-tactical level, I'd venture that wargame units "move" about 20 times more, and more often, than their historical counterparts did. When you think about how long a major battle could last, and how infrequent it was for major formations to make large movements… it's really striking to see how most units end the battle quite close to where they started it. Or at least within a kilometer.

Ironically, it's most obvious when you do get some large grand-tactical movement, like Longstreet on the 2nd day of Gettysburg, or L'estocq coming to the rescue at Eylau, etc. When those forces make those big, large movements, they look dramatic on the map precisely because the rest of both armies seems so immobile by contrast. It takes hours for that corps to make that move… what is everybody else doing?

But obviously that's not much fun. Nobody likes games in which units creep along in tiny increments, or in which most units get stuck in, and then just sit there for hours, even if the "just sitting there" represents hours of prolonged combat exposure. So we tend to make our game movements much more dramatic, in order to have some psychological reward for having made this or that decision.

Rather than trying to calibrate the movement rates of the units, I'd suggest it's better to make an unpredictable sequence, and number of opportunities, in which those units can move at all, so that when they do so, it's dramatic enough to be a good game action, yet infrequent enough that making a move indicates a real decision and a real commitment.

Bob,

We do differ on this.

But… Yes I did read what you said about you`re having "no problem", and yet you continue and say that it`s all down to our prejudices – well actually I`ve explained that it`s not because of prejudice that I use written orders.
Orders were not written below corps levels, but it is a way of managing a game.
Alternatively, one could use cards, or counters, or points on a die – none of these were used historically either, perhaps we should dispense with these too?

As for time wasted… a wargame for me should be centred on the actions and reactions of generals – this should be the "play" of the game.

MichaelCollinsHimself

Hello Bill!

"Glenn, who is talking about 'lofty goals'?"

Me, as it seems what you are seeking does not exist.

"Of course it's a game, with game mechanics. The question is what those mechanics do to mimic historical command."

They don't ask the players to make all of the same decisions that faced historical commanders. I think that's impossible. They do force players to think in an abstract way (the use of tempo points, etc.) to achieve similar results.

"The only kind of 'replication' I am thinking of is that which you feel makes Polemos a milestone, those aspects you feel are so well represented in the Tempo system. [And it seems my six points don't cover all you see it doing.] The only goals we are considering are those you feel the Tempo system succeeds in achieving. No more, no less."

Tempo also includes logistics, morale and cohesion. Although they may have been included in your six points, I'm not sure as they were brief. I've never seen anything like this in one mechanic before. I also include the standardization of 6mm basing that was all over the place before Polemos. A single multi-purpose mechanic and a single simple basing system. Not only a milestone, but a breakthrough as well.

"And no, there is no reason you should know of any set of wargame rules that matches my historical analysis."

Well then why have you singled out Polemos?

"Well, that wouldn't be the first time. grin. Then again, how often do you play with folks that have already decided they don't like Polemos?"

That would be never.

"Other than you, I have don't know any other player that believes Polemos and the Tempo system is all that unique, let alone a 'milestone' in wargame rules. Who do we put out in left field then? Is this the way it's done?: add up all the people we know on each side of the question and declare a winner?"

Bill, I can only relay my experience. It's a slam dunk in my group of 25 gamers. We have played at least a dozen different rule sets over the years. Never has there been such a positive response.

"What I find interesting is while you believe that the Tempo system does a superior job of representing history and military command, you didn't offer any as evidence of this--at all."

Are we not talking lofty goals again?

"In the end, a wargame or simulation game works when the players are thinking about the command aspects offered in the game in ways similar to the contemporary commanders, facing similar decisions with similar controls, however abstract the rules may be. Not perfection, but simply those few things the game is designed to provide."

I think Polemos comes very close to this, but since you say no rule set does. It becomes a non-issue.

I think Warfare on the battlefield is in it's simplified form an exercise in time and motion. Did Napoleon not say something to the effect if I could conquer time……….
Polemos is clearly designed as a game that will reward the player who can master time and motion better then his opponent. So the actual problems facing the players and their historical counter parts will always be different, but the results can be the same. At least as close as possible for a game. Milestone/Breakthrough!

Best regards,

Glenn

Players should absoloutly have to write general battle orders, much the same way and in the same detail as was historical. See Napoleons orders for Waterloo as an example of the level of detail. Once those are written ,and deployment is commenced, rules should reflect the necessity for regulation, and for a mechanic that allows things to go awry- See Grand Manoeuvre for an excellent example of this. Local action and reaction below the corps level does not require writing- again, just a mechanic for limiting the flexibility of formations as they were in fact limited by real factors. Reserves must be maintained if a player wishes to retain any flexibility, as was the actual case,for committed troops had none. The point is there MUST be inital written orders to frame the armies inital deployment, intent and objectives- preferably monitored by an umpire- after which the main moves are attempted against the opponents plan and friction and local tactics decide their successes.

So I've always liked the idea of getting rid of the predictable "game turn" and its predictable sequence, as a way of representing time delay. If the player doesn't know how much longer he can keep acting, before the enemy gets to act, then it forces him to concentrate on the things that are most important, and he doesn't get to do everything all at once, predictably, in the same sequence, every single turn, always with the perfect foreknowledge of what the enemy can and can't do, prior to him making his next set of decisions.

Turk:
I like unpredicability in game rules. However, I do find it annoying when it is either over the top in frequency, or layered so evenly and thinly across the battlefield that it belies any attempt to realistically hamper the 'perfect foreknowledge' of the players, let alone all the things that real generals did to reduce such friction. Writers like Clauswitz went into great detail discussing where that unpredicability occurred and why.

I think that's a nice way of injecting some sense of urgency (which makes the game fun and challenging and unpredictable), and also of dramatically simplifying the sequence of play, since you can plausibly do just about anything, in whatever sequence you want, but you have no way of knowing in advance how long it will take to complete, or how and when the enemy might react to it, before you have your next opportunity to do something.

Are you thinking of the Piquet family of games or BJs Die Fighting or Zouave II? There are some clever ideas in them, but are also good examples of over-the-top, excessive 'chance' injected into everything. And yes, I do enjoy the challenges that can provide, regardless.

Tactical adjustments are one thing. But at the grand-tactical level, I'd venture that wargame units "move" about 20 times more, and more often, than their historical counterparts did. When you think about how long a major battle could last, and how infrequent it was for major formations to make large movements… it's really striking to see how most units end the battle quite close to where they started it. Or at least within a kilometer.

Ironically, it's most obvious when you do get some large grand-tactical movement, like Longstreet on the 2nd day of Gettysburg, or L'estocq coming to the rescue at Eylau, etc. When those forces make those big, large movements, they look dramatic on the map precisely because the rest of both armies seems so immobile by contrast. It takes hours for that corps to make that move… what is everybody else doing?

Waiting, because the Generals want them too. No one seems to answer the question you ask: "What are they doing if they aren't moving?" And why? Most often, the assumption seems to be that it is 'friction' or some such that keeps them from moving, instead of other, more intentional reasons. Clauswitz speaks to this too, but so do any number of other contemporary military men.

Best Regards,
Bill

Tactical adjustments are one thing. But at the grand-tactical level, I'd venture that wargame units "move" about 20 times more, and more often, than their historical counterparts did. When you think about how long a major battle could last, and how infrequent it was for major formations to make large movements… it's really striking to see how most units end the battle quite close to where they started it. Or at least within a kilometer.

Ironically, it's most obvious when you do get some large grand-tactical movement, like Longstreet on the 2nd day of Gettysburg, or L'estocq coming to the rescue at Eylau, etc. When those forces make those big, large movements, they look dramatic on the map precisely because the rest of both armies seems so immobile by contrast. It takes hours for that corps to make that move… what is everybody else doing?

I think this is a fair problem to consider and your two examples are good for discussion:

When those forces make those big, large movements, they look dramatic on the map precisely because the rest of both armies seems so immobile by contrast. It takes hours for that corps to make that move… what is everybody else doing?

#1 "Longstreet on the 2nd day of Gettysburg"

#2 "L'estocq coming to the rescue at Eylau"

I'd like to examine each of these because the circumstances are very different.

Starting with #1 "Longstreet on the 2nd day of Gettysburg". Lee had ordered the rest of his army to largely sit in place and wait while Longstreet moved to his assault launch point so in this case the answer of "…what is everybody else doing?" is waiting because their commander-in-chief wanted them to. As you said, this move took hours.

Now consider #2 "L'estocq coming to the rescue at Eylau". L'estocq arrived at the Russian right flank, exchanged couriers with the Russian commander-in-chief, Bennigsen, perhaps rested his division a short bit and then marched over 6,000 yards (at least 3.5 miles), deployed and attacked Davout. The counterattack launched against Davout's corps is believed to have come to contact at about 4pm. That means L'estocq rested, marched, deployed and attacked in three hours.

I don't have hard data on the amount of time it takes a Prussian division to deploy into waves for combat in 1807. My guess based on impressions formed during my reading is not less than 40 minutes. Assuming 40 minutes for deployment that means that L'estocq marched the 3.5-4 miles in a little over an hour including whatever time his troops may have been briefly rested in Althof and if there was any pause during the communication with Bennigsen (though it appears this communication occurred while the Prussians continued to march). Figure 20-40 minutes for a brief pause in Althof and 10-20 minutes to close with Davout once the attack is launched.

3.5-4 miles per hour isn't a crazy fast walking pace for a march. Quick March for the US army infantryman is 120 30" paces per minute, I'm using that just because it is a handy figure for comparison. At the US army Quick March movement rate it would take troops 70 minutes to march 4 miles. This verifies the movement rate suspected of L'estocq's Prussian division as determined by the accounts of when he passed through Althof to when Davout's lead elements report they came under attack as plausibly accurate.

So, "…what is everybody else doing?" Well, the Russian left was collapsing and the Russian right was exchanging artillery fire with the French left while the Russian center was counterattacking, retiring, reorganizing and curling back on itself as troops were shuffled between the center and the left as the line yielded to Davout's pressure.

In short, I believe in the case of #1, the Confederate Army was waiting for Longstreet to move into position and in #2, the general action was going on with a heck of a lot of action. For the two to three hours that the Prussians were marching the Russians were fighting against 2-4 French divisions.

Cheers,

The Bandit

"Glenn, who is talking about 'lofty goals'?"

Me, as it seems what you are seeking does not exist.

Hey Glenn:
The only goals I have been seeking are the achievements you subscribe to Polemos and the Tempo system, nothing more. Too lofty? And those are quite a list of goals you say it achieves.

Tempo also includes logistics, morale and cohesion. Although they may have been included in your six points, I'm not sure as they were brief. I've never seen anything like this in one mechanic before. I also include the standardization of 6mm basing that was all over the place before Polemos. A single multi-purpose mechanic and a single simple basing system. Not only a milestone, but a breakthrough as well.

I would say that is certainly as lofty as anything you suppose I have inquired about. But yes, I am coming to the conclusion that any connection between the Tempo system and Napoleonic history doesn't exist, at any level of abstraction. You haven't been any help in finding such connections, emulations, similarities etc..

"Of course it's a game, with game mechanics. The question is what those mechanics do to mimic historical command."

They don't ask the players to make all of the same decisions that faced historical commanders. I think that's impossible. They do force players to think in an abstract way (the use of tempo points, etc.) to achieve similar results.

I wasn't suggesting that they should or could make ‘all the same decisions.' We are talking just about what decisions the Tempo system does force them to make as a multi-purpose mechanic. They do force players to think in specific abstract ways… which is something all wargames do. But the term abstract is the qualifier in your observation. In wargame design terms, what does that mean if the abstract mechanics are supposed to ‘emulate' [to use Whirlwind's term] military historyto achieve similar results?…to history, I assume.

I do want to address what it means to ‘achieve similar results' with a wargame design, but one thing at a time. However, I'll to the Abstract and ‘similar results in another post.

Well, then why have you singled out Polemos?

I didn't. 1. You brought it up, saying the Tempo system was singular, and an answer to writing orders, to boot. 2. I've played it, 3. I asked you how it modeled history and you gave me how many people like it, that is a terrific milestone, and that it's abstract…but no military history it portrays. I'm still on #3.

"Well, that wouldn't be the first time. Then again, how often do you play with folks that have already decided they don't like Polemos?"

That would be never.

That was my point. So how many is that?

Bill, I can only relay my experience. It's a slam dunk in my group of 25 gamers. We have played at least a dozen different rule sets over the years. Never has there been such a positive response.

Terrific. That is all to the good. That doesn't address the history supposedly ‘emulated' by Polemos I can only rely on my experience too, and what I see visa vie my experience with history. That is why evidence is so important, it crosses such disparities in experience.

"What I find interesting is while you believe that the Tempo system does a superior job of representing history and military command, you didn't offer any as evidence of this--at all."

Are we not talking lofty goals again?

I have read this one sentence several times, and still am not sure what to make of it. Are you saying that any expectation of there being any historical evidence to support the idea that Polemos and the Tempo system emulates history at all is ‘lofty', some unreal, pie-in-the-sky expectation? Or is it that it is unrealistic to even link history to the game system? Or that any request for evidence that the Tempo system does all that you say it does is expecting too much? If that is the case, I find it an astonishing position to take…

"In the end, a wargame or simulation game works when the players are thinking about the command aspects offered in the game in ways similar to the contemporary commanders, facing similar decisions with similar controls, however abstract the rules may be. Not perfection, but simply those few things the game is designed to provide."

I think Polemos comes very close to this, but since you say no rule set does. It becomes a non-issue.

Actually, I didn't quite say that. You wrote that you didn't know of any rules set that does all that you say Polemos does, and I agreed with you. Of course, I included Polemos in that assessment. However, that doesn't make it a non-issue if you do claim the Tempo system succeeds where others have failed--which you do. That is what we are talking about, regardless if other rules have or have not succeeded in doing the same.

I think Warfare on the battlefield is in it's simplified form an exercise in time and motion. Did Napoleon not say something to the effect if I could conquer time………. Polemos is clearly designed as a game that will reward the player who can master time and motion better then his opponent. So the actual problems facing the players and their historical counter parts will always be different, but the results can be the same. At least as close as possible for a game. Milestone/Breakthrough!

Certainly time and motion is a significant element on the battlefield and a game focused on that could provide a viable, historically supported, simple game system doing just that. The question is what kinds of motion in what kinds of time, and we only know the answer to that from what the military men of the time wrote. My best guess at this point, and it is a guess, of where the idea for "Tempo" came from is based on the things you say the Tempo system covers, including ‘logistics', which isn't something that Napoleonic generals worried about on the day of battle, [from period writers and after] and the term ‘Tempo'. My guess is the idea is based on modern military thinking at the operational level and higher, not grand tactical Napoleonic warfare.

So, I'll tackle what I understand of ‘abstract' and ‘similar results' with game mechanics and what that could possibly mean for a wargame system like Polemos.

Best Regards,

Bill

Hi Glenn:

Abstract Game Mechanics:

All game mechanics are abstract, but how and how much is the question. At inception, Chess, both Chinese and European, was an abstract wargame designed to capture some of the challenges of war. The only way you can determine ‘how abstract' it is, requires knowing what specifically is being abstracted.

The battlefield was divided up into squares, an abstraction. The pawns were first conceived as attacking only to the right, to mimic the right arm attack of a sword or spear-wielding footman. It also modeled how a hand-weapon battle line would shuffle off to the right because of this. Only later did the pawn get to attack both left and right, but not forward over the shield. Such abstractions were built around another abstraction, the use of squares. The knight, representing a cavalryman, could move three times as fast as a footman/pawn and is the only piece that can jump over [or though like cavalry] enemy pieces. The attack left and right in the ‘L' shaped move for the same reason as the pawn, the horseman's attack from the side of the horse.

The rooks? They represented the castles that defined the boundaries of a kingdom. Move the rook up and new boundaries are created, like building new castles. The Bishops represented different boundaries, those of the church territories, which is why abstracted, they create angled ‘boundaries' different from rooks.

This all can all be found in any book on the history of Chess. However, we can see how abstracted the rules are only by knowing what they specifically attempted to represent. The mechanics are only an abstraction IF they are an abstraction of *something.* Without that connection, there is no abstraction. They are just game mechanics.

So what specific history, what military elements does Polemos abstract? How? How abstract are they? I can tell you with Chess. I can't with Polemos. To say the mechanics are so abstract that you can't make those historical connections, is to say they aren't abstractions of anything.

When simulation/game abstractions aren't grounded in this way, players can and do try and fill in the connections themselves… or don't try at all. Any number of Chess masters don't know or care about the original purposes behind Chess rules and enjoy the game. However, anyone attempting to ‘reverse engineer' what the chess rules ‘represent' without knowing the original basis, is going to naturally see things that aren't there, based on their own biases.

Here are Whirlwind's connections between what Napoleon and Kutuzov did to win and the abstract rules of Polemos

Napoleon at Austerlitz fought the perfect Polemos battle, by seizing the initiative at the key moment, disrupting the Allies complicated plans which required a lot of supervision and movement, throwing them off balance in such a way that the Allies could not recover from. Technically brilliant, as eminent historian Corelli Barnett described it…;-)

At Austerlitz the tempo/command resource problem wasn't Napoleon's: it was Kutuzov's. When Napoleon seized the initiative and ordered Soult's advance, he couldn't move all his troops the way he wanted too *in the time available* to stop the French and supervise his Northern and Southern attacks. But even with Napoleon, at the moment he was ordering Soult to attack, he wasn't simultaneously re-arranging Lannes corps or anything, or supervising Davout. Polemos has a go at restricting his ability to do that, but since you think that Napoleon could easily have moved pretty much any sub-unit any way he wished *at any time*, then we just disagree on how battles of any period are fought.

In contrast, here is how Napoleon described his strategy to his own staff two days before Austerlitz:

November 30, 1805 Napoleon:

"I could certainly stop the Russians here [the Pratzen Heights], If I held on to this fine position; but that would be just an ordinary battle. I prefer to abandon this ground to them and draw back my right. If they then dare to descend from the heights to take me in my flank, they will surely be beaten without hope of recovery."
From the Memoirs of Segur, French staff officer at Austerlitz, pp. 235-236

"Once the enemy were fully committed in the Goldbach valley, [Napoleon] intended to fall on the flanks and rear of their salient. Approaching from the southwest, Davout and the 3rd Corps would take the host in the left flank; more important still, the mass of the main army was to debouch from the Stanton area to the north, and sweep over the Pratzen plateau."
--Duffy paraphrasing Segur, Austerlitz p. 80

Proclamation to the Soldiers before the Battle of Austerlitz: December 1, 1805

"Soldiers: The Russian army has presented itself before you to revenge the disasters of the Austrians at Ulm. They are the same men that you conquered at Hollabrunn, and on whose flying trails you have followed. The positions which they occupy are formidable. While they are marching to turn my right, they must present their flank to your blows.

This was Napoleon's thinking on winning at Austerlitz. This is how most historians describe the 'technically brilliant plan conceived of by Napoleon: [And eminent historian Corelli Barnett describes the same plan.]

Excerpt from How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War—From Ancient Greece to the War on Terror, by Bevin Alexander, page 265

The reason Napoleon had left the Pratzen unoccupied was that he wanted the Allies to climb onto it, see a seemingly weak French army ahead, and strike hard for its weakest position, Legrand's men on the southern flank. The brilliance of Napoleon's foresight was to appreciate that once the Allied force departed the Pratzen in pursuit of the French southern flank, the Pratzen would of course be vacated. He could move troops onto it and from there mount a masterful counteroffensive.

While the main body of the Allies pressed around the French southern flank, Napoleon knew the remainder of the Allied force would move forward along an east-west running highway about two and a half miles north of the Pratzen. These movements would create a hole in the Allied center. Napoleon knew that he could win by striking directly into this hole with Soult's two divisions on the north, seizing the Pratzen, and then driving on what would now be the rear of the Allied force on the southern flank.

Napoleon didn't think in Polemos terms, even in the abstract. It wasn't the Allied command system he was planning to defeat. He was getting them to commit a large portion of their force to the French right, taking them out of the fight and leaving the Pratzen empty. He inserted himself in the center of the Allied center and attacked north and south on their now exposed flanks.

The Tempo system has re-imagined history. The methods used by Napoleonic generals to communicate with their army are ‘abstracted' into different methods: how army generals planned to defeat the enemy and what they targeted in those plans for the battlefield. In playing the game, such thinking is understandable. In representing Napoleonic military history and command, it isn't. The idea that the enemy communication system is not only a major determiner of battle 'tempo', but also a serious target of strategy for winning is a very modern view.

Best Regards,

Bill

Similar Results and Tempo

They don't ask the players to make all of the same decisions that faced historical commanders. I think that's impossible. They do force players to think in an abstract way (the use of tempo points, etc.) to achieve similar results.

Hi Glenn:

Obviously, that ‘similar results' could mean a huge number of things, from individual combats to the total end game results, all compared to / similar to the historical events, i.e. evidence.

The problem with ‘similar results' is a game design problem. A game can be designed to provide ‘similar results' on a wide variety of criteria, particularly the end results, and in play have nothing ‘similar' to the history that created the results. For instance, I can design a game of three turns and three die rolls and get consistently similar results for Austerlitz. The process would have nothing to do with historical command. Wargame designers produce such games all the time, and wargamers see ‘similar results', reasonable results etc. and believe that establishes the validity of the game process.

Simulation designers see ‘similar results' as important an outcome in creating a viable simulation, but not as a particularly significant ‘test' by itself for this very reason. In other words, there lots of ways to get an equation to equal ‘4', but only a one of them will involve 2+2. A wargame system is simply a set of mechanics which can be manipulated in a great many ways to come to that ‘similar results.' The question is whether the process for getting there, the play, is similar to military command.

And that brings us to "Tempo". From what I understand, the issues of time and motion for Napoleonic commanders are represented by the system. And both you and Whirlwind have been at pains to articulate what that means in the game. Are those descriptions ‘similar' to the historical descriptions of battle from the command standpoint?

Here is what Clauswitz, an experienced staff officer, says about the ‘tempo' and character of a Napoleonic battle: On War, Book Two, Chapter two "The Character of the Modern Battle"

What do we do now usually in a great battle? We place ourselves quietly in great masses arranged contiguous to and behind one another. We deploy relatively only a small portion of the whole, and let it wring itself out in a fire-combat which lasts for several hours, only interrupted now and again, and removed hither and thither by separate small shocks from charges with the bayonet and cavalry attacks. When this line has gradually exhausted part of its warlike fire in this manner, and there remains nothing more than the cinders, it is withdrawn and replaced by another.
In this manner the battle on a modified principle burns slowly away like wet powder, and if the veil of night commands it to stop, because neither party can any longer see, and neither chooses to run the risk of blind chance, then an account is taken by each side respectively of the masses remaining, which can be called still effective, that is, which have not yet quite collapsed like extinct volcanoes; account is taken of the ground gained or lost, and of how stands the security of the rear; these results with the special impressions as to bravery and cowardice, ability and stupidity, which are thought to have been observed in ourselves and in the enemy are collected into one single total impression, out of which there springs the resolution to quit the field or to renew the combat on the morrow.
This description, which is not intended as a finished picture of a modern battle, but only to give its tone, suits for the offensive and defensive, and the special traits which are given by the object proposed, the country, etc., etc., may be introduced into it without materially altering this tone.
But modern battles are not so by accident; they are so because the parties find themselves nearly on a level as regards military organization and the knowledge of the art of war, and because the warlike element inflamed by great national interests has broken through artificial limits and now flows in its natural channel. Under these two conditions, battles will always preserve this character.

While this alone doesn't prove anything conclusively, I think it is fair to suggest that any Napoleonic wargame would bear some ‘similarity' to General Clauswitz's description, or have counter historical evidence that is followed instead.

That is all I am asking for, that evidence. Far from being a ‘lofty', pie-in-the-sky request, such evidence is:

1. Vital to any wargame design ‘emulating' Napoleonic war: what is being emulated, however abstractly portrayed.
2. A reasonable expectation of anyone who states that a wargame design is a milestone in that effort to ‘emulate' military history and command.

Again, if there is no evidence, I am not sure how Polemos is a milestone, regardless of how many people like to play it, or have a feeling that it is. A milestone in what? Not history, not command or their portrayal as far as I can see.

And I would and do apply that criteria to any wargame, based on what the designer [and company] says the game system is created to do. That means when Richard Borg says Battle Cry is ‘stylized history', I have very different expectations of that game compared to one that is a milestone in historical wargame design. If Polemos is ‘just a game', even an excellent one, then history and actual Napoleonic command isn't an issue at all, and any expectation would indeed by ‘lofty,' to say the least.

If you want to change the subject and discuss the nature of order transmition in other Napoleonic games, we can.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

McLaddie

At the risk of going off on a tangent, you prompted me to google the origins of chess moves, and I found some very different explanations from those you offered:

"infantry, cavalry, elephantry, and chariotry, represented by the pieces that would evolve into the modern pawn, knight, bishop, and rook, respectively"

"In the medieval shatranj, the rook symbolized a chariot. The Persian word rukh means chariot (Davidson 1949:10), and the corresponding pieces in Oriental chess games such as xiangqi and shogi have names also meaning chariot"

"The Bishop was originally the elephant and could two squares diagonally (no more or less), but could jump over a piece between. Another version let elephants move two squares sideways or front-and-back (no more or less), but could jump over a piece between. Yet another version, from southeast and east Asia, let the elephant move one square diagonally, or one square forwards, like 4 legs & trunk of elephant"
"The bishop's predecessor in shatranj (medieval chess) was the alfil, meaning elephant, which could leap two squares along any diagonal, and could jump over an intervening piece. As a consequence, each alfil was restricted to eight squares, and no alfil could attack another"

"The Foot-soldier (now called the Pawn) could move one square forwards (not two), capturing one square diagonally forward promoted to queen only"
"The pawn has its origins in the oldest version of chess, chaturanga, and it is present in all other significant versions of the game as well. In chaturanga, this piece moved directly forward, capturing to the sides (one square diagonally forward to the left or right)"
[You'll notice that there is no mention that at one time a pawn was only allowed to move to the right, or any reference to shields etc]

So – while your preferred reference book offers one person's version of how the pieces and moves evolved – it would seem there is no definitive answer to what the chess pieces represent, or how their various movements came about… and therefore your claim that:

"However, we can see how abstracted the rules are only by knowing what they specifically attempted to represent. The mechanics are only an abstraction IF they are an abstraction of *something.* Without that connection, there is no abstraction. They are just game mechanics"

might need some re-thinking?

BullDog69:

I can understand your reservations. What you are describing are indeed 'the oldest versions of chess' and there are a lot of differences between them and European Chess. And there are still a number of versions. For instance, Chinese Chess, played today in most Asian countries has a river dividing the board, a castle area that the king can not leave, cannon, which fire over pieces, chariots and retainers/pawns that attack straight ahead. And the pieces travel along the lines separating the squares, and cutting diagonally through them. A friend brought back a set from his tour in Viet Nam in the 70s and we played it a number of years.

What I was describing is the European version of Chess created during the Medieval period [developed 900-1100 AD] to reflect Medieval warfare, and not the oldest versions originating in Asia.

Here are some of the books that discuss this:

HJR Murray, A History of Chess, (Oxford University Press)

David Shenk, The Immortal Game: A History of Chess Random House Digital, Inc.

Yuri Averbakh A History of Chess: From Chaturanga to the Present Day, Russell Enterprises, Inc [short, only 88 pages]

Best Regards,
Bill

McLaddie

Many thanks – I found it fascinating to read into it, and shall indeed get hold of those books.

BullDog59:

Here is a picture of Chinese Chess.

Hello Bill!

"If you want to change the subject and discuss the nature of order transmition in other Napoleonic games, we can."

Since it seems that neither side has moved, we can just move on, or get into your suggestion. Your suggestion is perhaps closer to the original topic at hand and may encourage others to join in. So either way is fine with me.

Best regards,

Glenn

Glenn:
Well, I found it telling that TelesticWarrior [excuse the play on words] as who was still using written orders rather than which rules sets were still using them.

A good fraction of different Napoleonic sets still use them in one form or another, and there are plenty of other rules that attempt to have the planning and committment of written orders with simplified orders with a limited range on chits and the like.

While I do value the limits such orders impose on players and decsion-making visa vie historical command, I hate written orders. They are too involved, and either they are too simple, or they are too open in form, so wide open to interpretation, requiring an umpire to work.

I think in some ways, what orders were supposed to do, and how they were used hasn't been really captured by wargames to the extent they could. Again, I don't think the right questions have been asked.

1. When were orders sent?
2. How were they expressed, particularly if usually verbal
3. How were orders different during battle compared to the pre-battle set of orders or briefings held for the general staff? [For instance, at Austerlitz, both the Allies and Napoleon had 'staff meetings' to outline the plan of battle.]
4. What kind of 'objectives' were given? Are we talking about a wide range of goals given by a CinC to his subordinates, or did they fall into easily recognizable types.

While many games have 'attack', 'defend', 'maneuver', and 'withdraw' orders of some type, my question is how such kinds of orders were described to the recipients… I have yet to find any orders using the words 'attack', 'defend' etc., even when that is what the generals would do to carry out their orders. I mean, orders gave the goals for an engagement, rarely the 'how' it would be carried out [e.g. attack, defend, hold, maneuver etc.] Apart from "hold out at all costs" or "to the last man" dramatics, most often the how was left to the generals.

Just thinking/writing out loud here.

Best Regards,
Bill

Bandit….. VERY, VERY well said!!!!

On 31 May 2013 I posted this:

In my recently published sets of "Old School" rules (available at Amazon) written orders are an option. When I first began wargaming in 1958 (I was 17,) using Scruby 30mm ACW minis, my opponent (Cousin Charles)and I used written orders all the time up until 1967.

I raised a 30mm Scruby Napoleonic Army in 1961, and also used written orders until 1967. Since then, the use of written orders has been infrequent in Nap and ACW games, using my rules called: "Classic Napoleonics" and "Some Wore Blue and Some Wore Gray." I find that written orders work best when there is a non-playing umpire who is "fair and balanced" in his interpretations.(Like FOX News???)

************************************************************

Now I have decided to post the actual Written Orders rules:

OPTIONAL RULES

These rules may be added at the Umpire's discretion.

WRITTEN ORDERS – SIMULTANEOUS MOVE

1. Mark units' positions on a map before the game begins. Once the game is in progress, each unit's last position on the board will be used as a reference point.

2. Written orders must precede each move and may be short, but must be specific and give the direction of the move, for example: go forward/advance to the nearest enemy; go north-west; stand, charge, oblique right, oblique left, wheel to the right, wheel to the left, limber or unlimber, prolong, change formation from column to line, etc.

3. Orders to fire are unnecessary unless they are part of a specific fire-tactic, for example: when firing from a hidden location, do not fire unless charged; engage in a fire-fight, etc. Otherwise, all units capable of firing will do so, according to fire priority rules.

4. Contingent orders:
a. Each unit may have a contingent order, for example: Stand, counter-charge if charged.
b. When infantry have a contingent order to form square if attacked by cavalry, each side rolls one 6-sided die. If the cavalry rolls a number greater than, or equal to the number rolled by the infantry, the cavalry close with the infantry before they form square. The infantry fight disordered. If the infantry rolls a number greater than the cavalry, the infantry successfully formed the square.

5. All units must obey orders.

6. If orders have not been written for a particular unit, that unit will continue to follow its last written order.

7. If allied generals put their troops on a collision course so that their respective units would intermingle, the units halt at the point of contact, disordered until new orders are written.

8. At the Umpire's discretion, allied generals of different nationalities may not communicate with each other except by written communiqués which are transmitted one full game turn after writing – to reflect difficulties in translating.

9. At the Umpire's discretion, written orders may be seized by the opposing side, on a roll of 0 on a 10-sided die. If this is part of the scenario, players may also designate decoy orders, which may be seized on a roll of 1-4 on a ten-sided die. The Umpire makes these die rolls out of sight of either side, and transmits orders accordingly.

10. Skirmishers do not need orders.

11. Execute orders, skirmishers moving first.

Certainly this thread has opened up some interesting thoughts about orders and their place within the game. I have been a bit wary of plunging in here as I do not have a lot of time at the moment to take forward any points of discussion.

My experience of wargaming in the old days is that there was a great deal of low level decision making. Cavalry attacking infantry could become a "paper, stone, scissors" exercise and written orders helped confirm the intentions of one player vs another. Here we are talking game written orders rather than historical written orders. I think today I take the view that the low level tactical decisions are taken by the unit commanders and decisions to change formation or attack should be factored into the "combat" phase. It is for the player to deal with the outcome rather than intervene in each step.

Again in the early days (for me) 12 battalions on each side at 25mm would be a "battle". In reality this is an action within a battle so the notion of Napoleon or Alexander issuing orders is not so relevant. A game of this scale maybe needs an instruction to the player – his governing Order , written by the game designer as if it were from his commander. Everything below this uses game mechanisms to deliver the order. This may mean giving verbal instructions to lower formation commanders to achieve the objective of the governing order.

I also want to raise the issue of the notion of issuing orders to battalion commanders etc as a cascade. It would not be normal that each battalion in a division would be given specific orders. A division would be expected to move or deploy as a whole in the same way that a battalion moves and deploys as a whole. No separate written orders are issued at company level for battalion activities. The drill manuals of the period include descriptions of forming the "line of battle" for brigades and higher. Ney's instructions give plenty of examples of 8 battalions moving in concert (often follow the lead battalion). The regulating battalion gives us one clear mechanism as to how a division can be controlled without written orders to each brigade or regiment.

As to timing and coordination, this is one area where the "initiative" chit mechanism does not work for me. If you have a corps deployed and ready to attack then this can be expected to start moving all at the same time. This may well be governed by the firing of a signal gun or a battery firing three salvoes etc. Once started the advance may well be uneven and friction may delay some units but I would argue that a prepared advance should start in a coordinated manner as long as the preparation has been ordered and completed first. A mechanism for unexpected delay or even an early start to execution could be included but this should apply to the whole formation where it is obviously deployed together.

So where should we design orders within the game. I still hold to the "two-down" notion. The player issues orders one level down and can specify actions one level below this. If the game is 6mm and portrays the full battle then orders should be from commander to corps with detachment orders available to divisions. For set piece battles (typical for 15 -28mm scale) then formations will be already deployed so it is about orders to attack or defend a location. For reserves it will be a case of ordering out of reserves to a location to deploy and take some action.

For a full Napoleonic battle with the movement and approach to battle then with small scale figures (6mm etc.) you can represent the full battle. Formations (corps) will march to the battlefield, deploy (taking a lot of time when closing up from "road-mode"), attack (or defend), be compacted into reserve, deploy from reserve, and ploy back into road-mode either to retreat or follow up from the battle. Orders should be needed for these changes of activity with the orders referring to specific locations or relative to other corps within the army.

Deciding on timings and the need to complete a change before starting a new order are significant issues in managing a battle. Once a deployment or ployment order has been issued and started then there is little to do but wait for execution to finish before issuing any new order. At any level a unit changing formation is at risk until this is completed and we accept that a battalion counts as disordered when changing formation. The same applies to a corps or the whole army.

So my view is that formations (Corps and Divisions) should take one of four deployment modes:-

Deployed (ie ready for combat – able to defend or attack direct to front – if necessary make a change of front before attacking or defending)

Grand Tactical column – (marche de guerre), battalions in columns and columns closed up (half or quarter distance etc.) Used to march to where ordered to deploy (or react to discovering enemy , this I describe as reactive deployment)

Reserve – battalions in close column, division closed up (small intervals between battalions / squadrons). Ready to open out and move to a deployment location using grand tactical column

Road march mode. – Spread out along the road or on the roadside. Some intervals between battalions to allow for minor delays.

Orders are issued to change from one deployment mode to another, to move to a location, to deploy and to launch an attack.

Orders may be preparatory (go to a location and deploy ready to attack), executive – launch an attack or march to a location) or both. In the true essence of the operational Napoleonic battle most orders will be to march to a location in the expectation of fighting the enemy found there.

Deployment mode can also change as a response to a change of situation where the immediate commander reacts to enemy action (reactive deployment). Orders may be needed to override these reactive changes in deployment mode. Example a corps may run into an enemy force and deploy in defensive mode. The army commander may send an order to attack and pin the enemy as reinforcements are to be brought up.

Mike:
I guess it would depend on what you wanted to recreate with orders. If the player is an army or corps commander, would he be writing orders for a division commander so brigades could deploy from road march? Or a army commander for a corps? I think we could make a distinction beteen orders concerning military objectives and coordination as opposed to simple changes in formation or mode. The latter can be tedious and in someways simply SOP for the command in question rather than needing a separate order. In some respectives, this might include 'reactive deployment' to new situations.

This goes along with your ideas about 'no more than two levels down'. It could be only one level in most cases for a game.

Three of the biggest issues I see are:
1. How to limit the scope of the representation. In other words, how do you either incorporate all the things that can impinge on the communication system, such as Bandit outlined. Lots of verbal and written orders were given at all levels. Which are important to the game?

2. There are game considerations. No matter how the game is designed, the players will still be moving all the units represented in the game, whether they are in direct command or several levels down. Physically, the player IS involved in positioning them, so there is game manipulation 'bleeding' in the actual control exerted by the players.

3.Players want that control and like being involved in the nitty-gritty at the small unit, tactical level, particularly when Napoleonic narratives often have commanders dealing with battalions and batteries. Of the several large-scale Napoleonic rules sets out there, including Polemos, Grande Armee, Snappy Nappy, versions of Napoleonic DBM, and the like, the most successful, Volley & Bayonet, is also the one with the most tactical and least operational focus. 95% of the rules deal with brigade tactics and movement, 5% with command and control… This gamer preference is something to consider when the physical manipulation of all tactical processes are invariably handled by the gamer anyway.

Bill

Hello Bill!

Okay I think were back on the same track.

My general thoughts to all, not just to you.

Those that support writing orders seem to think that gives them control. Perhaps to some degree, but it's really not worth the effort. Yes some orders were written, but not to the extent advocated, at least not on the actual battlefield. Once the battle starts the vast majority of orders are verbal. So to have an elaborate phase in your game for order writing is just a waste of time and never really gives you the control that is sought. Individual units responded to their immediate commanders which all issued verbal commands. Most Brigadiers, Divisional and Corps commanders did this as well. So to consistently have them responding to written orders is probably out of step with actual practice. If the game design has a written order phase, then it probably happens every turn. If so then it distorts reality to some extent. It forces the players to use it as there are no other options. It clearly becomes an awkward game mechanic.

The vast majority of wargames that I have ever played or even seen have the troops lined up either on the table edge or within striking distance. The scale of most of these games leaves very little wiggle room. You mainly fight the enemy that is to your front. The only real decisions that most of the players have is when to attack or when to withdraw. As you have pointed out these were generally not written orders. So if the critical decisions were rarely written down what is the point of written orders?

As I said before I think written orders belong in the pre-game show, rarely on the table. Written orders were used mainly for placement. Once the battle started it seems orders became the domain of voice commands.

So if anybody is using written orders to control troops on the table top, I think they might want to re-think that mechanic.

Best regards,

Glenn