"Who is still using written orders in games?" Topic

Now if you feel the need to have that level of detail with couriers and writing out orders to add to your suspension of belief, then go for it. But not for us. Too close to having role playing intrude on the game and we don't want to go to the dark side of the hobby.

Rallynow:

Interesting. Could you elaborate? Your connection between 'that suspension of belief,[disbelief?] and role playing intruding on the game [not sure about the dark side… Have I slipped in there already?] What aids your suspension of disbelief?

That would be an intriguing thread: "What supports that 'suspension of disbelief' in the game experience?"

Probably not wording it best. It's what you want to add that makes it more real to you. If order writing and couriers puts you into the moment then that's fine.

I know some folks like to interject a bit of role playing into their historical gaming. The way I have seen it done is a card is passed out to players and it describes the personality and tendencies of certain generals and you are expected to act that out during the game.

Just not my cup of tea. I want to focus on the battle and how I would conduct it rather than acting out what a fictitious or even historical personage would do. Using couriers and such is a step in that direction.

We usually refer to role playing or any non-historical minis as the dark side (as in Star Wars) or sometimes anything other than historical minis as playing space monkeys. All in jest. No harm is meant.

Bandit

We seem to think exactly alike a shame that we cannot play together :-)
I think that you nailed it spot on. The question is when to commit and then do it in a straight line. We have no order system above the "command" which can be from a brigade to a division. But new orders to command are delayed depending on the ability and proximity of higher commanders.
I also believe that once units were engaged orders stopped having effect, you just fought the enemy directly in front of you. In that respect the formations are much like arrows for the commander. Retain them in reserve or fire them straight at some point – but then you don not control them any more.

Sparta,

It is a shame, I've got some friends in Denmark but haven't ever been there myself and it is a bit of a ways to go for a game!

If you want to hack over stuff though I'd be delighted, seeing as you don't have PM ability, you can toss an e-mail to public@falcontechnologies.org and I'll reply. That way we won't dominate the thread talking about personal preferences in game theory :-p

Cheers,

The Bandit

Hello Bill!

"Yes they do represent orders, but also a lot of other things, like supplies, etc. as well.

Hi Glenn:
? How do you know that?"

It's certainly in some of the rules, see Crisis of Allegiance page 22.

"I haven't read that anywhere or seen it on the list. The designers certainly can claim to represent anything and everything. The question here is what decisions do they provide the player 'like' those of actual CinCs? Did they include 'supply' and other things? I'm going to go out on a limb here and say that the goal of such representation is a goal behind any wargame command and control rules."

I agree.

"Obviously C&Cs did not think in terms of points. The system simply translates their basic intentions.

Obviously, but in what terms did they think? They certainly didn't think about of divvying up orders or supplies or effort, or energy or anything else during every period of time represented by the rules."

Of course not, it's simply a game with turns like most games. What you choose to think about is optional.

"At Austerlitz, arguably one of Napoleon's finest performances, he issued no orders for the first two hours of the battle [6-9am], then personally released Soult a little after nine, and again for two hours sent no more orders until around 11am."

No problem you can simply issue no Tempo or defer it to the next active level. We do this a lot when the C&C is not on the battlefield.

"Jena? He kicked around a Prussian drum a good portion of the battle, and the orders he did issue were far and in between, at times to just one brigade… the same one more than once while not issuing orders to some divisions or corps at all… yet they continued to fight and advance. So how does that compare to the reoccurring command decisions prepresented by the Tempo mechanics?"

Obviously there were orders issued at some point in time. The tempo is simply sent to those who should remain active and not to those who shouldn't.

"At no time that I can tell, did Napoleon find himself constrained in issuing orders or 'getting things done.'"

A properly designed Polemos game should work like this.

"In contrast, at Austerlitz, Kutusov spent the first part of his morning, not issuing orders, but trying to untangle a logjam among his columns, and then sending orders later to only some commands in attempting to meet Napoleon's attack, though I can see no reason to believe he couldn't have sent orders to everyone. It wasn't something that required a lot of his time. He spent a good portion of his time moving around and finding out what was going on."

Again no problem what the C&C chooses to do is up to him.

"The actual number of orders and which commands were contacted once a battle is engaged is relatively small, and it could be argued that the successful command issues far less orders than the unsuccessful command."

That works in Polemos. Recurring tempo does not only mean new orders.

"It certainly is an issue of time. Archduke Charles wanted to change his orders to the army on the first Evening of Wagram. He decided he couldn't do it because he simply didn't have enough time to get new orders out to the entire army. He didn't send orders to two corps because he couldn't do five. Getting orders out to an army about the plan of battle was done before the battle began because it couldn't be done during the battle."

Again, not a problem, it's all in the hands of the scenario designer.

"For my money, if the system is meant to portray something of historical command, it is meant to simulate something. Therefore can't avoid technically being a simulation… It also means that the design challenges, methods and concepts of simulation design will be dealt with regardless of whether the designer thinks he is or is not designing a simulation. It's like trying to build a model airplane that flies when denying doing anything similar to or dealing with the same issues as a professional aircraft designer."

If you think it's a simulation that's fine. Regardless it was never intended to be one. It's the model airplane that does not fly.

"And having played Polemos a number of times, [and enjoyed it]"

You would never guess that.

"What I am saying is that the players are making command decisions based on 'allocation' of orders challenges, repeated every turn for the entire army or force. What the players are asked to think about and decide on each turn regarding 'orders' in no way represents the kind of challenges actual commanders faced, in either the command dynamics or the command decisions facing them. That is true, regardles of the seamless play or that all units can make their objectives."

I think that applies to all wargames.

"A game and any participatory simulation is an artifical construct. "It" doesn't do anything. The players make both happen through their game decisions. A simulation is when those decisions have some specific relationship to real decisions faced by real commanders. Not all, just some. I'm simply saying that the Tempo system doesn't offer that--at all, not that Polemos as a whole doesn't."

Remember your the one claiming it's a simulation, not me.

Bill, my only point in this thread is that if you want to use an order and or control system, then Polemos Tempo is an excellent one. That's it.

Best regards, and I hope you enjoy your next Polemos game even more.

Glenn

Glenn,

Word to the wise, you've both asked McLaddie for evidence *and* mentioned the word simulation. He will now talk until you become horse ;-)

I think we've moved quite a bit off base here from Written Orders to Command Points. These are two mechanics that have been commonly used together but have no necessary relationship.

On the notion of Command Points (I've never played a Tempo game so I can't speak to it), they generally are used to represent resources and influence. In this way they are little different from Command Radius in that many games that use Command Radius say the location of a given command stand doesn't represent the location of the commander but rather the area of the battlefield that he is attempting to influence. Similarly Command Points represent influence not necessary actual decisions. As I said earlier I am not a fan because it means that player deals with a construct that is seeking abstraction rather than dealing with the historical problem.

To all,

In trying to get back to the topic of the thread, i.e. Written Orders, one of the big trends with Written Orders was that they tended to be persistent, i.e. they didn't expire after a turn but persisted until they were accomplished, became unobtainable or were replaced with new orders.

I think one of the bad things about moving away from Written Orders is that this persistence is lost. Battle plans are reduced from being game long to being turn long. This moves us farther and farther from how the historical commanders acted, assuming we are talking about large scale and scope.

In a game where players command a brigade or less, they are going to be constantly shifting units this way and that way and all crises are local and all timelines are short. Therefore I believe that in such games having non-persistent orders is far less of a problem. For instance in the ACW game Johnny Reb you're issuing orders to regiments and the orders have to be issued after 15-20 minutes. Well that isn't very representative of a brigade commander's decision making in the ACW because the 15-20 minute period is strict, but due to the small scope & scale not much is lost.

However, in a game where players are commanding corps of 15-30,000 men and are primarily sending them off in groups of 5,000 or so to take care of a given task, non-persistent orders become very wonky in my opinion. An infantry division doesn't get told to charge into a gap the way a battalion might. While the division may be plugging a gap with the action it takes, its purview is far larger. "Hold the ground between those two hills." or "Cut that road between the town and the swamp." These differ greatly from "Quick charge that way!" which is more of what a battalion or regiment would get told.

Due to this I think that the loss of Written Orders is not so terrible but their replacement with a non-persistent order system for larger scope games so common in current rules sets for the last ten to fifteen years or more is a shame. This one a great criticism I have of the IGOUGO mechanic because it is defined by move-counter-move which drives short term planning and crisis control rather than large scope planning and grand-tactical decision making.

Is anyone able to inform me of rules that *don't* use Written Orders but do have persistent orders?

Cheers,

The Bandit

Bandit wrote:

Word to the wise, you've both asked McLaddie for evidence *and* mentioned the word simulation. He will now talk until you become horse ;-)

Bandit:
I realize that simulation design and evidence are two things that bore you, I know, but I would think if I am so talkive, I'd be the one who'd become horse….

Of course not, it's simply a game with turns like most games. What you choose to think about is optional.

Hello Glenn:

For the player, to play the game, he is asked to think about particular decisions. That' a game, so while he has options, they are purposely limited by the game.

Obviously there were orders issued at some point in time. The tempo is simply sent to those who should remain active and not to those who shouldn't.

And here is the core issue. If in reality all the units were moving without repeated 'orders', that persistent order that Bandit speaks of, then what exactly does the Tempo represent?

"And having played Polemos a number of times, [and enjoyed it]"

You would never guess that.

Meaning I would only question the historical basis for a rule if I don't enjoy playing it as a game? I'm multi-faceted. I can enjoy the game experience and admire the game design elements while knowing that elements of the system historically represent bupkus. Lots of gamers do and I play with some good guys and I often [have to] play what they want to…

Bill, my only point in this thread is that if you want to use an order and or control system, then Polemos Tempo is an excellent one. That's it.

And Glenn, I realized that. And I've simply stated my opinion and why I held it concerning that one game design element and wanted to know why you thought the Tempo system excellent as an effort to prepresent command and control.

And enjoy your next Polemos game too!

Best Regards,

Bill

Rallynow:

Thanks for the clarification. And yes, I knew 'the dark side' was a jest, it's just there are so many temptations, I didn't know which you were referring to… ;-7

And I understand the aversion to role playing. I have enough trouble remembering what my objectives during the game, let a lone some other card-type personality.

Bill

Is anyone able to inform me of rules that *don't* use Written Orders but do have persistent orders?

Bandit, this is a short list, but here are some:

Valmy to Waterloo
Principles of War [chits and map drawn direction of attack]
Carnage & Glory II
Republique
Shako [chits and map drawn direction of attack]
The 1870 series of rules
Snappy Nappy [Which can be written down, but as they are one word orders, could just as easily be handled by chits.]

All the above games have persistent orders established with chits representing a limited variety of orders.

Bill

…it is very simple, the method of order transmission in the period was by courier/adc, has nothing to do with the nature of the orders sent, nor whether the player feels obliged to play the roles of historical generals – although its often a laugh when players do get into character.

"…it is very simple, the method of order transmission in the period was by courier/adc"

The method of artillery fire in this period was for a bouncing solid ball to roll along killing people. Should we therefore go back to H.G. Wells and resolve artillery fire by flinging marbles at each other's figures, trying to knock them down?

This will probably come out more harshly than it's intended, but I don't understand this selectivity when it comes to deciding which bits of the battle can be abstracted, and which can't.

Napoleon didn't have a "Sequence of Play." He didn't have soldiers glued to inflexible bases that couldn't compress or expand. He didn't have "Turns" or "Movement Allowances" or "Command Radii" or "Hit Markers" any of the things that are found in all war-game rules, and he certainly didn't roll dice, consult tables and charts, look up modifiers, and so on. He never said to Berthier: "Don't worry about that Russian attack on the Left… their movement allowance won't let them clear the woods before our Opportunity Fire Phase, and of course we'll get another Movement Phase before they get to Charge…."

He never knew in advance what the exact percentage chance of success would be for an attack, or how many more hits a unit could take before it breaks, or how long it would take a unit to march through a previously-unseen area of forest, or exactly how far a routing unit would move and in what direction, and he was never able to tell at a glance the identity and quality of enemy units that were still half a mile away.

Gamers are content to create all sorts of totally artificial mechanisms to represent 99% of what happened on a historical battlefield… but when it comes to the transmission of orders, then suddenly: Oh No, We Have to Do it The Way They Did It, Because this is Historical Wargaming!

Again, I'm sorry if that appears more harsh on the screen than it would have, coming out over a beer, but that selectivity just makes no sense to me.

Napoleon didn't have a "Sequence of Play." He didn't have soldiers glued to inflexible bases that couldn't compress or expand. He didn't have "Turns" or "Movement Allowances" or "Command Radii" or "Hit Markers" any of the things that are found in all war-game rules, and he certainly didn't roll dice, consult tables and charts, look up modifiers, and so on.

Gamers are content to create all sorts of totally artificial mechanisms to represent 99% of what happened on a historical battlefield… but when it comes to the transmission of orders, then suddenly: Oh No, We Have to Do it The Way They Did It, Because this is Historical Wargaming!

Sam, all you are doing is describing the conditions of ANY simulation or game. That's what Simulation designers do, create totally artifical ways to mimic 'the way it is.' You know the phrase.

"‘Simulation' is a broad term. But simulation is, by definition, pretending. All simulations are "tools that give you ersatz (as opposed to real) experience."

--Marc Prensky, Education and Training Simulator "Interactive Pretending: An Overview of Simulation" Digital Game-based Learning 2007

The military simulates Urban warfare with totally artifical laser tag equipment, with umpires for Pete's sakes.

Researchers simulate galaxies colliding mllions of light years away, particles colliding, chemical reactions, crowd behaviors, the weather, population migrations from thousands of years ago all on very artifical silicon chips, electricity and a monitor.

Training simulations offer totally fake experiences of driving a car, a tank, a plane, or how to manage an office.

So, simulations games are totally artificial. Always have been and always will be. And for ALL of them, pretending they're real is necessary for them to work as simulations.

The question is how they work to provide experiences and decision-making challanges so close to the real thing that a game can train a person in skills, provide pertinent and actually new information about the real world.

So, without meaning to be harsh either, the general response to your observations by simulation and game designers outside this small hobby would be: "Duh, so what else it new?"

Don`t worry about sounding harsh Sam, I understand the points that you`re making here.

I simply select the game methods which seem to me to be the easiest to administer and the ones which more closely follow the historical practices of the period.
The aims of a game designer should be simplicity and co-incidentally the means to control armies were really quite simple – one followed orders and one followed the leader; going in the same direction he did and doing the same things that he did.
Abstraction is still fine however, as long as it results in something useful that has been well-thought through.

I think the focus or perceived need for 'written orders' stems from:
1. The important battlefield dynamics surrounding that one aspect of command and control,
2. It has proved to be difficult to represent in a playable fashion, and,
3. It isn't clear what gamers are 'content with' or whether they simply 'put up with' mechanics because there isn't a perceived alternative and they want to play a game tonight.

I don't think is a matter of "We Have to Do it The Way They Did It, Because this is Historical Wargaming!" any more than the use of 'battalions' and brigades, fire combat, command figures or most other mechanics. It is that focus on how to get 'The Way It Was' on the table in a recognizable fashion.

Hello Bandit & Bill (McLaddie)!

Thanks Bandit for the heads up, but I've known Bill for a number of years. So I was truly seeking more input from him. As you know he is a bottomless pit of information and it's extremely rare that I find I have a different opinion.

It seems we now have only one unanswered question, what exactly is Tempo in the Polemos rules system. They were both created by Peter Berry of Baccus 6mm. They were designed for 6mm wargaming, but are now used by other scales as well.

As we all know in music tempo means the beat or rhythm of the composition. Some military writers have applied it to a number of periods, but I think the real use is a modern term by recent military commanders. To them it means controlling the dynamics of the confrontation with the enemy. This is exactly what Tempo is attempting to do within the Polemos rule system. So if I had to break Tempo down I would say it contains the following, orders, logistics, supplies, cohesion, morale, movement, fighting and just about any other factor that effects the battlefield that can be controlled by man. It's something that I don't think has ever been fully attempted by any other wargame system. Although it contains a bit of all of these factors in some cases the rules contain a separate mechanic to enhance their application. That's why I said earlier if you want you can piggyback a conventional order writing system on to it, but most will see after playing a game or two, that except for the odd scenario design it's a wasted effort.

Hopefully now you can see why it does not really compare to what historical commanders may or may not have written or said. This was only a part of the dynamic that was going on during a battle. Tempo in the Polemos system is trying to be more then that. It's also trying to do it as simply as possible.

I think Tempo is clearly a milestone in our hobby and has been overlooked and or not understood by many. So Bill, this is why I'm big on Tempo. Since we started using Polemos rules the dynamics of our games has changed significantly for the better. A lot of the tedious stuff like awkward and problem laced order writing has disappeared. Players now know that controlling the dynamics of a battlefield are one of the major keys in real life and on the table and so far nobody does it better then Baccus.

I'm presently writing a new Polemos rule set for North American Wars 1754-1815. One of the things I've tried to do is improve on the application of Tempo. Don't know yet if I can, but I'm trying.

Best regards,

Glenn

Just a quick interlude into a great thread if I may.

When I read accounts from WW2, the Brits would type up the next day's orders for the subordinate commanders to follow (several pages worth from what I can tell). The subs would then filter that down, until a sub unit would try and achieve an objective (ie start line 05:00, farm on ridge 11:00, woodland by 15:00, then stand down and be relieved by supporting unit).

So that would give us an "objective" type of written order (the arrow in Shako perhaps), that we, as "players" then action on the table. So at what level of "order" would be a good choice for written orders?

An example from my thoughts. GHQ Micro Armour rules; each turn requires the command base(s) to "issue orders" (effectively a PIP mechanism. So the player can adjust his table top reaction to what is happening (surely the key reason for written orders, to try and minimise that – the helicopter general effect). But I want some sort of mechanism that sets out a general task for my units, which they will try to achieve (ie capture the farm), and not be diverted by my efforts to respond to an enemy action elsewhere on the table. So I would be looking for some sort of delay – after all, how quickly could a WW2 Brit unit have its orders changed mid-attack? And that is WW2, radios, runners etc. How long for a Napoleonic command to be changed?

So, great thread, and nice to see it is so polite and well thought out.

Glenn wrote:

As we all know in music tempo means the beat or rhythm of the composition. Some military writers have applied it to a number of periods, but I think the real use is a modern term by recent military commanders. To them it means controlling the dynamics of the confrontation with the enemy. This is exactly what Tempo is attempting to do within the Polemos rule system. So if I had to break Tempo down I would say it contains the following, orders, logistics, supplies, cohesion, morale, movement, fighting and just about any other factor that effects the battlefield that can be controlled by man. It's something that I don't think has ever been fully attempted by any other wargame system. Although it contains a bit of all of these factors in some cases the rules contain a separate mechanic to enhance their application.

Glenn:
Thanks for the greater explanation. And I appreciate your response to Bandit. He doesn't like the way I answer his questions. We have discussed wargame design on a number of lists. ;-7 I too am in this to hear and see other views.

Your explanation does round out the the rather large territory that the Polemos system is targeting.

I certainly think that the 'Tempo' of the battle, with all the modern implications attached to that word including initiative and decision-cycle is a worthy target for a wargame design.

I also have no problem with a game system designed to incorporate a large number of factors under one abstract game subsystem. In truth, all wargames and simulations do that with every rule created.

And simplicity is always important, where it can be constructed to meaningfully represent very complex events. I agree that the Tempo process is far simpler and more fun to play than most all written order systems.

And as you say, modern military men do talk about Tempo:

'Tempo': This is the speed of operations relative to the enemy. OODA loops, command and control, etc.

Initiative: a condition where one side in a military contest is able to perform more tactical or operational actions than their opponent over a given amount of time.

Commander's 'Intent' Understanding your role in the higher commander's plan and what he/she wants to achieve overall is fundamental to Mission Command (mission-oriented orders). Subordinates having the freedom to act within their higher commander's intent (and with the necessary resources) but still within certain constraints (e.g. boundaries) is one of the greatest factors that enables seizing initiative.

From March 25, 2013 publication [my Birthday!]: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

While these are useful concepts in understanding Black Powder era conflict, obviously, period military men didn't use the above terms, except 'initiative' and even then in a different context.

And of course, this It's something that I don't think has ever been fully attempted by any other wargame system. Although it contains a bit of all of these factors in some cases the rules contain a separate mechanic to enhance their application.

I think Tempo is clearly a milestone in our hobby and has been overlooked and or not understood by many.

I am not sure about those conclusions, obviously. A wargame that didn't provide the players with the ability to control the tempo of combat wouldn't be much of a game, let alone a representation of actual war. The idea of combining all those factors under the umbrella of "Tempo" may be a new approach, depending on what other designers saw themselves representing with their CP and Activation mechanics.

Hopefully now you can see why it does not really compare to what historical commanders may or may not have written or said. This was only a part of the dynamic that was going on during a battle. Tempo in the Polemos system is trying to be more then that. It's also trying to do it as simply as possible.

Well, I can see why you would feel that way, but you've lost me to some extent. Obviously, 19th Century men didn't speak of 'tempo' or combining all those factors you list into one 'thing' or concept to be discussed, let alone represented. Or did they? Maybe in different terms. There is no reason they should nor any reason you can't have an abstract construction like 'tempo' represent something real in pre-20th centry warfare. The question is: Does it?

The idea is that the Tempo system represents something of the challenges and opportunities faced by actual commanders managing an army in battle. Correct?

So, how would you know that, or even suspect that there is some connection between history and the Tempo system if it isn't based on what those military men wrote and said??

There has to be some identifiable connection between written history, the experiences of the commanders and your Tempo system, regardless of how abstract and/or the number of things the system attempts to represent.

Otherwise, its a nice, simple system to play and may represent some basic principles of war conceived of by the modern military, but there isn't any history involved. My impression is that the reason you feel that the Tempo mechanics is a mile stone is because you feel it meaningfully represents something in the military historical experience.

My question is simply where and how? I don't see it, but that doesn't mean I couldn't be convinced otherwise.

Best Regards,
Bill

Hello Bill!

Sorry, that was my fault. I was referring to your previous comments. It is clearly the intention of Tempo to relate to it's historical counter parts. This is to some extent where it is configured or applied slightly differently within each separate rule set. Have a look at your Napoleonic rule set. You will notice that the Tempo is structured differently for each of the two different rule sets in the book. Similar but different.

No I think it's more of a milestone in wargame design. Although as I have stated it's a cousin of CP, it's intended to capture and do more, if anything raising the bar on CP. It plays very differently from any CP game that I can recall. Although my memory is very rusty on that type of game. Probably haven't played one in 30 years.

A very common comment from players that I have spoken with who have played the Napoleonic Polemos rules are something like "this is the most Napoleonic feeling type of game that I have ever played". I feel the same way and have played most of the popular ones over the years. Along with a number of lessor know ones, not to forget all the ones I've read and said, "no way". Now when you clear away all the common elements with other rules one of the few things left standing is Tempo, so it must be working and working well.

Best regards,

Glenn

It plays very differently from any CP game that I can recall. Although my memory is very rusty on that type of game. Probably haven't played one in 30 years.

Glenn:
No fault, no loss. I have played Napoleonic "Genral de Division" and "Marcehal" versions, but have the 1870 rules with the 1859 additions, though we haven't gotten any armies together for those yet.

The bidding of command points for turn initiative has been around for awhile under different guises, for both board and tabletop games. What is different is that Tempo points for a commander are translated into greater amounts of "orders" for lower commands. I am still divided about the advantages of this complication, though I think I see why it was done in game terms. The ability of different quality officers to use those orders to move is also something seen before in rules.

Some things are different for the Napoleonic and 1870 versions, one of which I don't understand the inclusion of: In the Napoleonic version, the non-tempo player pays more for the same order results than the tempo/initiative-winning player. This is absent from the 1870 version.

I am still not clear exactly what extra stuff is included in "Tempo" besides the issue of orders. For instance, in the Napoleonic rule book this is given as an illustration for 'stealing' tempo by the no-tempo player:

(Battle of Waterloo 2.00pm. D'Erlon's Coprs is approaching the allied line. The Duke of Wellington realises something must be done quickly; he turns to his cavalry commander: "Uxbridge, there's not a moment to lose. That these 5 TPs and see what you can do.)

Granted this is an analogy, but it strikes me as implying the transmittion of orders [as Tempo] and nothing else. Everything I see in the two [four] sets of rules say that Tempo is simply higher level issuing of orders.

If that is true, Wellington's order to Uxbridge wouldn't have been [and wasn't] constrained by when or how many cavalry brigades could have been ordered to move, nor would Uxbridge's orders. Certainly, apart from actual troops, Wellington wouldn't have been 'husbanding' anything, not orders or whatever 'Tempo' represents that I can see.

A very common comment from players that I have spoken with who have played the Napoleonic Polemos rules are something like "this is the most Napoleonic feeling type of game that I have ever played". I feel the same way and have played most of the popular ones over the years. Along with a number of lessor know ones, not to forget all the ones I've read and said, "no way".

Glenn, that is a comment that wargame desigers like to hear, obviously. And I know any number of wargames that have some number of players saying the same thing about other rules.

As a game designer, as someone disussion wargame design, "this is the most Napoleonic feeling type of game that I have ever played" doesn't mean a whole lot other than "I like it." You don't know what gave them that 'feeling' in play or what kind of 'feeling.' Do you even know what parts of play brought them to that conclusion? You don't know what Naploleonic history they know, have read and remember. What exactly are they are mentally using for comparison? It might just be that George gave a wonderful game commentary during play or someone had martial music playing in the background. Who knows?

While hardly conclusive of everything, when a fellow player says a game 'feels' like some period's warfare, and I asked them what they mean, or what it is that led them to feel that and most won't have an answer, while the rest identify one particular thing about the game play as being 'realistic', another design-vague conclusion.

Now when you clear away all the common elements with other rules one of the few things left standing is Tempo, so it must be working and working well.

No doubt that it works well as a game system--and that you like it. As I said, I have enjoyed playing it too… or was that just the fun guys I play with?

Enjoyable, 'feeling', and fun are all subjective and can be based on a huge among of subjective input. It is very difficult to design for such things directly. It is a fascinating question and lots of designers have thought about it.

I have no problem with Polemos as an enjoyable game design. I just don't know what exactly the Tempo represents across the historical landscape of command, particularly as more than just a system representing the issuing of orders. Any historical examples illustrating the factors you say Tempo represents?

Best Regards,
Bill

Forgive the typos in the last post. I was in a hurry, of course…

I think the issue of command and control and ordes carried over to the next turn is summed up pretty good in the introduction to one of the empire rulesets. Where it asks the question: After unleashing 80 squadrons at the enemy at Eylau, did Murat stop halfway and rethink whether he wanted to attack?

C&C should delay implemenation of decisions relative to the effectiveness of the hisotrical staff and make players stick to a decision to commit troops once it is made. Even though i do not play Empire, I liked the division of the game into grand tactical and tactical. You make the decisions and move far enough to be comitted almost immediately.

For me the decision flow of Napoleonic battles are:

1) Place troops in position beyond artillery range (hard to move again)
2) Decide when to commit a formation – once done there is no time to rethink it before they go in.
3) Let them fight it out.
4) Perhaps commit reserves.

Most wargems let the players crrep towards the enemy reconsidering ten times across the valley.

"Most wargems let the players crrep towards the enemy reconsidering ten times across the valley."

Sure, but that's because players want to do everything. They want a small movement allowance and small turn because they want to react to everything and adjust everything… because the rules allow them a +1 if they hit such-and-such unit just behind its flank.

…and if the rules don't give them the +1 for hitting that unit behind its flank, then they'll damn those rules as "unhistorical."

…or if the rules allow the enemy to move across the table and hit his unit in the flank, the player will be outraged and say that surely his unit could have reacted in time to prevent that, so these rules are rubbish.

And of course they want their artillery to be able to shoot at the incoming enemy; they don't want that abstracted. They want to play-through all the steps of the process, or it's not "historical."

To use your example, Empire had a billion charts and tables precisely because it allowed player control over all those things, at the micro-detail level. Sure, it accelerated the initial move to contact, but once that was done (usually the first turn), then the game was an endless series of tiny incremental adjustments. Why did it have all those bells and whistles? Because it was trying to be the apotheosis of "realism" and historical accuracy.

After years of worrying about this stuff, eventually it dawned upon me that gamers get exactly the games they want. Whether they admit it or not.

---

The irony of this is that large movement allowances would actually be more historically accurate, since most games use a time scale that would allow the average unit to walk halfway across the board in a single turn, if its movement allowance were done historically. So then the games have to chop down those allowances to some arbitrary and fictional number, because nobody wants the Old Guard artillery overrun from the flank by some Russian grenadiers on the first turn.

It's a great example of how "doing it historically" will result in an ahistorical outcome.

Sure, but that's because players want to do everything. They want a small movement allowance and small turn because they want to react to everything and adjust everything… because the rules allow them a +1 if they hit such-and-such unit just behind its flank.

…and if the rules don't give them the +1 for hitting that unit behind its flank, then they'll damn those rules as "unhistorical."

The player's desire to squeeze out every possible small advantage they can from a set of rules is pretty much human nature. It is a recognized behavior, noted by most all game designers. Military men do it too. It's called micro-managing. It is the belief that "for the want of a nail…", so you want every nail represented and accounted for. Don't want to lose a game because if it, don't you know.

The irony of this is that large movement allowances would actually be more historically accurate, since most games use a time scale that would allow the average unit to walk halfway across the board in a single turn, if its movement allowance were done historically…

It's a great example of how "doing it historically" will result in an ahistorical outcome.

Uh, you mean the rationale for chopping up moves into little pieces is called "doing it historically", when in actualuty, it isn't and done for other reasons. [to avoid 'bad' things happening on the table.]

Hello Bill!

"Some things are different for the Napoleonic and 1870 versions, one of which I don't understand the inclusion of: In the Napoleonic version, the non-tempo player pays more for the same order results than the tempo/initiative-winning player. This is absent from the 1870 version."

I think they were written by two different authors. Every author has some latitude to put their own spin on tempo. As mentioned before tempo is basically an attempt to control the battle. So it seems the one author thought that the non-tempo player should pay more for his failure to control the battle. It's just another example of how tempo can be used in so many ways.

"Granted this is an analogy, but it strikes me as implying the transmittion of orders [as Tempo] and nothing else. Everything I see in the two [four] sets of rules say that Tempo is simply higher level issuing of orders."

No question orders is the main ingredient of Tempo. Also keep in mine it's a double edged sword, you obtain an order to do something and you also obtain the ability to execute it. In some cases you will not receive an order, but you might have the ability to act on your own to some degree. In some of the rules it's also used to rally troops who are disordered for a number of reasons, lack of ammunition, low morale, casualties, loss of cohesion, etc. For a while I experimented with using it at a lower level of command for ordering fire and tracking ammunition consumption.

"If that is true, Wellington's order to Uxbridge wouldn't have been [and wasn't] constrained by when or how many cavalry brigades could have been ordered to move, nor would Uxbridge's orders. Certainly, apart from actual troops, Wellington wouldn't have been 'husbanding' anything, not orders or whatever 'Tempo' represents that I can see."

Again this gets back to scenario design and deployment. If Uxbridge can't move all of his cavalry then something has not been set up right.

I certainly realize that feeling etc., is subjective. Here's the difference, in the past players have pretty much just said they liked it or not because of such and such. So far out of the roughly 100 players that I have exposed the game to only 3 clearly did not like it. Those that did were pretty clear on why. Some of the more common ones were:

- Tempo puts a new twist on issuing orders. There is a sense of urgency and pressure that's missing from most other rule sets.

- Tempo gives you a feeling of control that you don't get from other rule sets. The chain of command has a purpose and effect.

- You have to decide in advance what your plans are for the battle as changing orders mid-battle is not easy and generally guarantees you a loss.

- Your forced to think about how you plan to use your artillery in the game, long range fire, close support, grand battery, etc. Most rules you just fire them.

- Your forced to keep most of your commands together, which supports the historical use of regulating battalions. Unlike shotgun type games where every unit is on it's own.

- At the end of a game most commands are still together.

These were the top six reasons that I recall why players thought the game was the best representation of Napoleonic gaming. Along with the obvious, great looking 6mm figures, terrain, etc. While some were new to the experience many were seasoned Napoleonic gamers.

Best regards,

Glenn

Hi Glenn:
Just am now getting back to my computer. Thanks for the explanations, and your experience with Polemos. I can imagine it is gratifying to have that kind of response from folks you have introduced to the rules.

I think they were written by two different authors. Every author has some latitude to put their own spin on tempo. As mentioned before tempo is basically an attempt to control the battle. So it seems the one author thought that the non-tempo player should pay more for his failure to control the battle. It's just another example of how tempo can be used in so many ways.

Yes, I understand that the Polemos series of rules have several authors. So the explanation given in the Civil War edition for the Tempo mechanics may or may not apply to the rest. As there are no designers notes for the most part, the historical connections are left for us to guess at.

And yes, tempo is used by players in an attempt to control the game progress. Most wargame mechanics fit into that goal.

The question is whether tempo provides something resembling how historical commanders managed control through orders etc.—not whether the abstract mechanic can be used by players to control the progress of the game. It's a representational question. Having the mechanic used by designers in ‘so many ways' only confuses the issue here.

Again this gets back to scenario design and deployment. If Uxbridge can't move all of his cavalry then something has not been set up right.

Not sure what that means. If something hasn't ‘been set up right', what does that have to do with issuing the orders? Wouldn't that ‘setting up' be another command activity entirely? Again, what historical circumstances are we discussing here?

I certainly realize that feeling etc., is subjective. Here's the difference, in the past players have pretty much just said they liked it or not because of such and such. So far out of the roughly 100 players that I have exposed the game to only 3 clearly did not like it. Those that did were pretty clear on why.

Okay, I've asked for some historical evidence to illustrate what Tempo represents and I feel what you've given me 100 more "I like the system" responses instead. I think that's great and all, but it isn't what I thought we were talking about. The question is what historical evidence was the template for the Tempo mechanics?

Speaking as someone who designed training programs and simulation games as a job, I have had to spend a good deal of time and money field testing them rigorously, refining them before using them. And you have to generate meaningful responses from participants to know what the program or game is doing. Subjective 'l likes' aren't particularly useful by themselves.

What you have given me in the way of player reasons for liking the game are still very subjective, just more particular, but still ‘I like' responses about 'this'.

What program/game development research [and my experience supports] is that even when participants were ‘pretty clear' on why they liked or disliked a game, unless there were efforts to clarify the responses and their particular sources in game experience, they could often be saying that they liked the game system because of things actually unrelated to the actual game processes--like the scale or terrain… Perhaps they simply liked you for providing a game and didn't want to disappoint you. Maybe they liked something about the experience totally unrelated to "Tempo", the topic under discussion, which only two of the seven reasons you gave ‘seem' to address.

I can't say as I wasn't there, other than to know it is a common occurrence and unless ferreted out, you can't really know which were which with any certainty.

You remember some of those reasons these folks gave as antidotes, and they are great ones. While antidotes can be powerful indicators, they are not particularly reliable as quality indicators without some rigorous controls in recording and reporting because each person will identify different things for different reasons--as your examples show.

I could list all those reasons for that unreliability, but I'll give just two. It may be that the players are simply repeating what they heard you explain before or during game play, and so were expecting to see just that. They may not even remember you speaking about it. A major problem with antidotes demonstrated by extensive research [and your comments about why you remembered them] is that the person remembering them tends to recall only those comments that they were looking for and agree with, rather than those they don't, whether positive or not. And they will also normally, if unconsciously exaggerate the number of such comments from memory, if not recorded. I don't know whether you did or not.

But, there are other issues. I'll take just one of your examples of player reasons as an example:

"- Your forced to keep most of your commands together, which supports the historical use of regulating battalions. Unlike shotgun type games where every unit is on it's own."

The comment is only viable as quality indicator if:

1. The game was designed to do just what was approved of [supporting the use of regulating battalions]. If you design the game to mimic 'A' from history and the player appreciates 'B' unrelated to the designer's goals and mechanics, That's nice, a bit of serendipity , but it's not indicative of a successful design based on the designer's objectives, and

2. the person making the judgment has a firm grasp of the history they say they see in how the rules function. For instance, keeping commands together doesn't 'support' or mimic the use of regulating battalions. The reasons for, and the dynamics involved in using regulating battalions on the battlefield wasn't to force commands to stay together, nor did the simple fact that they did or didn't stay together indicate that regulating battalions [or units] were being used. So how useful is that approval if it mistaken and doesn't identify something substantial or actually historical?

These were the top six reasons that I recall why players thought the game was the best representation of Napoleonic gaming. Along with the obvious, great looking 6mm figures, terrain, etc. While some were new to the experience many were seasoned Napoleonic gamers.

And those are all attractive reasons, most of which I personally would want to see in any Napoleonic games I played or designed.

However, the question is not what players said about the game, whether ‘seasoned Napoleonic gamers' or not, but rather what actual historical evidence is being used as the template for Tempo mechanics, or at least illustrates and supports it's processes. That can be very hard to do when the designers themselves haven't really done that for the players either.

I can understand why those gamers' approval of the Napoleonic game would be gratifying to you and increase your support of Polemos as would their specific comments. They simply don't address the question I asked. Not the connection between the game system and gamer reactions, but the connection between historical evidence and the Tempo mechanics.

Best Regards,
Bill

Hello Bill!

"The question is whether tempo provides something resembling how historical commanders managed control through orders etc.—not whether the abstract mechanic can be used by players to control the progress of the game. It's a representational question. Having the mechanic used by designers in ‘so many ways' only confuses the issue here."

Most players and I think they do. I've not encountered a situation in a game where I was not under the impression that the commanders were not managing control through the use of tempo. It's always seemed to me to resemble historical control very well, and much better then any other system I've ever used.

"The question is what historical evidence was the template for the Tempo mechanics?"

I really can't answer that one as I didn't design it. I can only say that it was designed as a game to be enjoyed by people who want to play historical wargames. As such I don't see any need for any historical evidence. You either like it or you don't. I do and so do you.

Yes, I clearly know that peoples statements and reactions are not reliable. I just know that the vast majority who are exposed to it in the proper setting really like it, and if possible come back to play it again and again. Sort of like yourself.

Best regards,

Glenn

I really can't answer that one as I didn't design it. I can only say that it was designed as a game to be enjoyed by people who want to play historical wargames. As such I don't see any need for any historical evidence. You either like it or you don't. I do and so do you.

Glenn:
That seems to be the bottom line, or at least the wall we hit when we don't know what the designer did with history. [See my article in this month's Miniature Wargames.]

I find your comment "to be enjoyed by people who want to play historical wargames. As such I don't see any need for any historical evidence" both a common view and understandable when we don't know what history the designers are portraying.

However, to play historical games supposedly mimicking historical dynamics, but find no need for historical evidence that there is any connection between the two a sad commentary.

I play wargames because I enjoy both the games and the history… Guess which one gets short shrift for the reasons you give. I also enjoy game design as a craft in-and-of itself. However, if I return to Polemos is will be because my friends want to play it, and like lots of gamers, because there aren't any alternatives to it with a better historical foundation at the moment we want to play.

I hope there is a time that the quality of the history in historical games is more than the number of folks that 'like it' [as important as that is] and can be related to actual historical evidence, what the game mechanics are supposed to be modeling… particularly when the game is seen to be a new milestone in those connections.

Thanks for your explanations, and I have no doubt that I will play Polemos again.

Best Regards,
Bill

Dear All,

While working on my 1813 book I came across the following written by a Saxon staff officer. This may help inform how to write a game length order, which is what my friends and I do in our games:

"He issued his orders only on a grand scale, communicating them personally, or through his orderly officers, to the commanders of corps or divisions, by whom, in their turn, they were transmitted to the officers commanding battalions. All his orders were short and precise".[Odeleben, Ernst von. A Circumstantial Narrative of the Campaign in Saxony in the Year 1813 ( London: John Murray, 1820), 1:118-119.]

Oops, the "He issued" refers to Napoleon.

James:
Was that pre-battle, or during battle, or on campaign?

I agree with Sam.

Command and control are important factors in our games, but a change of orders at every turn is not always necessary or advisable.

A general has a battle plan and a number of alternative moves if the initial attack is not decisive & maybe a contingency fall-back plan if all goes belly-up.
The action takes place; it succeeds or it fails and then the general gets involved.
But at the larger scale, as James demonstrates, all this takes time. And it certainly takes more time than was possible in those traditional brigade-sized games of the late 1970`s to 1980`s.
The way that it worked should indicate the ways that we can make it work in our games too.

Mike.

But at the larger scale, as James demonstrates, all this takes time.

Mike:
Well, actually, the quote doesn't demonstrate how much time it took, only what was done. I do agree that orders every turn, whether Command Points or placing chits, has little to do with 'how it was done' and is really impossibly through micro-managing besides being a backwards representation of how the command dynamics worked orders of desired actions, then results of who did or didn't do what, then some orders in response.

Bill

Bill,
Not in the same "go"… I thought it was implied in the phrase "in their turn":

"He issued his orders…communicating them personally, or through his orderly officers, to the commanders of corps or divisions, by whom, in their turn, they were transmitted to the officers commanding battalions."

Mike.

An interesting thread. I pick up on the comments by Sparta and I tend to agree that there important decisions (with orders ) applied to the high level then cascaded down within the chain of command. This also builds on the Saxon reference from James Arnold.

Perhaps the best approach to this comes from the Change of Situation mechanism underpinning the Variable Length Bound. When the commander is aware that something has happened then he may issus new orders. The "initiative chit" mechanism is one method of generating friction and disruption but I am not in favour of this or the command span.

Where I am with this now is that formations (corps) will either be deployed, massed in reserve, making grand tactical moves or making strategic movement (road march). Orders need to define to intended place a formation should move to and what to do when they get there, allowing a doctrinal approach to the unexpected (ie the enemy).

Mike:
Yes, there certainly was a 'cascade' effect to orders, as Mike says. But 'in their turn' doesn't suggest any amount of time for this all to take place. It describes how orders were communicated. I would imagine from the description it is generic, the usual way it was done. But I am still not clear if they are speaking of before battle, "He issued his orders only on a grand scale" and the fact that every battalion received orders, which would not necessarily be the case during battle…in general. As he communicated them 'personally' or through orderlies, I am assuming that's the case, but from this one example, without context, I don't know.

And I agree. An 'initiative chit' doesn't capture this process well, and as for generating friction, in the limits of those orders, it generates friction before orders are issued rather than the way it was…you issued orders to everyone and friction then had some of them go arye, but the commander couldn't know before hand which ones.

Re McLaddie's query: The quote refers to Napoleon's conduct during a battle. Re Mike the Mug's observation: (and here I pass from "historian" to gamer (the former being infallible of course…I wish): our games do employ the "Change of Situation" mechanism, but we limit the number of new orders each cic can issue. The number is based on our assessment of a commander's ability, and, in a bow to eliminate micro-managing, is capped at no more than three per day(which is Napoleon's quota). Most of our games give the opposing cics one or two. Then, the "change" order is "timed" along the chain of command. Applying "history" to gaming, I am confident that the Saxon is describing how Napoleon reacted to a "change of situation."

All best,

James

James:
Thanks. A change of situation <l>during a battle? I am surprised… as the suggestion is that the orders are being given to ALL portions of the army. But if not, it seems that such board 'grand scale' orders means that his army could translate 'short and precise' orders on a 'grand scale' down to each battalion… There is sooo much organizational operations implied in that.

I think limiting the number of orders to eliminate 'micro-managing' is limiting what a commander could and did do during a battle, rather than providing the benefits and down-sides for doing so… Not particuarly 'historical'.

For example, during the battle of Aspern-Essling, Napoleon saw the Austrians moving against Essling, and sent an aide to Massena to let him know, as he couldn't see if Massena was aware of the advancing Austrians, [trees in the way] and ordered him form a reserve column and drive the Austrians out of Essling.

Micro-managing. The question is why commanders didn't do it more often, or why they waited around for quite awhile before issuing more 'change of situation' orders, like Napoleon at Jena, Austerlitz, Wagram etc. etc. and many other competent CinC like Suvurov, Wellington, and Davout. The benefits and down-sides of giving orders, particularly lots of orders I think should be portrayed rather than simply limiting the CinCs ability altogether.

Certainly, the 'timed' nature of orders is important. What the time is involved is another question altogether.

Best Regards,
Bill

"…another question altogether."

1. The time to write/dictate order itself to ADC/courier.

+ 2. The time taken for a man on horse to arrive at the command post.

+ 3. The time taken to issue the order (to that directing or regulating unit).

+ 4. Additional time taken to relay order down the chain of command to subordinate generals (from corps to division, or division to brigade). Points 1-3 are repeated in this.

+ 5. Cautionary order given.

+ 6. Executive order given. then the units start to move.

Most of the time taken in all of this would be taken in points 2 and 4. and the time is dependent upon the distances involved.

Other delays may be possible of course; how good each army is at processing the orders, the abilities, readiness and the responsiveness of generals receiving these orders.

Michael:
Yes, that's it, but also translating the "Grand Scale" orders of the CinC into specific orders for division to brigades to battalions.

The question is how long that would take from CinC to move. I have seen general estimates of times, but nothing based on any particular evidence except on campaign, not on the battlefield.

I think an interesting question is how well the system would work…and how much of the 'tin can' syndrome would apply. That is, the passing of information down a line of people, each one 'modifying' what they've heard of the original message until it could be totally changed at the end of the line. [The first experiments with this used people talking with tin cans attached to string.]

It does give a good presentation of where and how communication might break down or need skill in process, even before meeting the enemy. There is a lot of research, both in orgainzations, but simulation design too, that such friction occurs almost entirely in particular 'weak points' of a communication/ system, not spread equally over the entire system.

Best Regards,
Bill

<quote>James Arnold:
"our games do employ the "Change of Situation" mechanism, but we limit the number of new orders each cic can issue. The number is based on our assessment of a commander's ability, and, in a bow to eliminate micro-managing, is capped at no more than three per day(which is Napoleon's quota). Most of our games give the opposing cics one or two. Then, the "change" order is "timed" along the chain of command. Applying "history" to gaming, I am confident that the Saxon is describing how Napoleon reacted to a "change of situation."
</quote>

That's how my home rules work as well, almost to the letter it sounds.

All formations begin the game with orders, and making changes is very limited for most army commanders (new orders allowed once or twice per game), Napoleon being a major exception.

Local attacks that fit with previously given orders might step off almost immediately (definitely within 30 minutes) but large mass attacks can take up to 2 hours game time just in passing down orders and forming up the troops, before they even move.

I feel they capture the narratives of battle I read in the history books.

Bill…

"…translating the "Grand Scale" orders of the CinC into specific orders for division to brigades to battalions."

This is where the SOP`s (or systems, or doctrine – call it what you like) of the armies come into play; or at least, they should do.
Therefore, specific, detailed orders per division/brigade/battalion are not necessary given the situation that may present itself.
And so, I return to the point I made earlier about detailed orders not being necessary for every unit, at every turn in a game, because it simply did not work in that way!

The systems generally worked quite well, otherwise they would have thrown everything away, given it up as a bad job and waited for 200 years until radios were invented!

If there is little evidence, then one must explore the possible and probable times for order transmission that the communications technology of the period can provide.
What can you do but estimate a reasonable speed, over minor obstacles of battlefield terrain of various types that are generally not represented on the games table.

Yes there are weak points in processes, but in very practical terms, one needs to average these things out – to generalize – in order to come up with a rule mechanism that is not too complex, yet manages, in effect to represent the whole process.

Mike:
I think sometimes we fail to see the evidence that is there. I have just finished reading the Pole Chlapowski's memoirs as an aide to Napoleon. He gives great descriptions of both campaign communication as well as several major battles. And for example, there is Colonel Vachee's book on Napoleon's command for the 1806 Campaign.

I have seen the command process for campaign being confused with the communication process for a battle. That is one reason I asked about the context of James' Saxon quote. That is when the SOPs would really kick in with more action that just marching and scouting.

Yes there are weak points in processes, but in very practical terms, one needs to average these things out – to generalize – in order to come up with a rule mechanism that is not too complex, yet manages, in effect to represent the whole process.

I agree that we have to 'generalize' and that whatever rule mechanism used can't be too complex. The question is again, the 'whole process' and what breaks down where. That gives you the nature of the outcomes to be 'generalized.' The Napoleonic military men were into the KISS principle too. Like the regulating battalion, it is just a matter of discovering what that simplicity involves.

What too often happens is simplicity is translated into restrictions that have little to do with actual command. Why restrict CinCs to two or three 'new orders' a battle? Of course, what constitutes 'new orders?' Is that for the whole army or does that restrict the CinC with new orders, to an individual corps or command? What constitutes a 'change of situation' for a commander?

Chlapowski gives several examples of Napoleon giving out orders to Corps commanders during Aspern-Essling, for instance, in response to 'changes of situation.'

What can you do but estimate a reasonable speed, over minor obstacles of battlefield terrain of various types that are generally not represented on the games table.

There are a number of ways to estimate that speed based on accounts: The number of orders/messages sent over a set period of time by distance. For instance, Oudinot sends three messages to Napoleon during the second day of Bautzen over a three mile distance in a four hour period. That is six messages back and forth, with time actually managing the battle inbetween, and for Oudinot's situation to worsen and his activity. That is @ 40 minutes between communications. At a walk, a horse can traverse three miles in ten minutes at a trot.

Reading different battle accounts of Corps and division commanders, the time spent relaying messages etc. certainly wasn't any longer than ten or fifteen minutes. With the SOPs in place, every single battalion chief didn't have to get the word before a change in the action.

I just don't think anyone has really asked and researched the questions that are raised when we talk about how a CinC or corps commander actually controlled his command. We assume and create rules that 'sound good' or match our 'impressions' from some historical work.

I just think we can do better by asking different questions.

Mike and James:

I think we have to ask what a commander-in-chief did and didn't do during a battle. What their basic job consisted of, and what corps commanders expected. Here is a description:

"In modern battles the commander-in-chief has only two lines of action available¯the direction in which to introduce fresh troops, and the moment at which he may do so. One in action, the troops march straight forward, they man, indeed, leave the field again, but cannot be withdrawn at will. thus [at Austerlitz] Napoleon could here introduce Douet on Soult's left wing, but he could not have withdrawn him again and employed him on Bernadotte's right wing. Drouet had to move on in the direction once given, via Pratzen.

The more the battles of modern times confirm this experience, the more it must be the endeavour of the commander-in-chief on a battlefield to secure to himself the mastery of these two points by which he alone can exert any influence upon the course of a battle, so as to be able to bring them up where and when his plan demands it. If he has no fresh troops to send forward at the decisive moment or to the decisive point, he can no longer turn a doubtful battle into a victory."

--Count Yorck von Wartenburg, Napoleon as a general.

The CinC was the one who held the army's reserves and could partial them out. this was the way a CinC controlled the tempo of battle, but once committed, he couldn't simply pull them out again. Also, this description gives an idea of what it was like for the committed troops in linear warfare—straight in.

"Battles are only won by reinforcing a line at the critical moment."

--Napoleon to Murat, 13th, October, 1813

and of course, he husbanded those reserves:

"When the first corps had become engaged, napoleon allowed them to calmly to fight on, without troubling himself about their good or bad positions, and only took good care not to yield too lightly to any requests on the part of their leaders.

--Gouvion Saint-Cyr

More than once, you see Napoleon and other CinCs ignoring requests from corps commanders for reinforcements, keeping a hand on those battle-winning reserves. At Bautzen when Oudinot repeatedly requests to be reinforced, Napoleon tells him no.

So how does this work in a battle. at Jena, Napoleon is reported doing the following during the nine hours of battle:
1. Issued general orders for the day of battle to his corps commanders in the early morning of Oct. 14th
2. Orders the jump-off advance of Lannes' corps in the early morning that gets the entire army moving.
3. Orders the formation of a gun line between Suchet and Gazan's divisions.
4. Orders Lanne's reserve brigade to drive out a pocket of Prussian light infantry on the right flank and returned them when they were successful.
5. Orders help to be rendered to Ney's elite formations that Ney stuck in without orders.
6. He orders a general advance and releases Soult's flank attack and Murat's cavalry.

Most of the time, Napoleon did nothing but kick a Prussian drum around the Dornberg hill. this wasn't because he was restricted from doing more, and what he did do more than once directed individual brigades and batteries.
Now, he might have done more that isn't recorded, but with what he did do, it does support the above observations. I think it was Longstreet that said that without reserves, a corps command has nothing to do.

It appears that on a smaller scale, the corps commanders operated in the same way and the army CinC. They made a plan and sent it out, and with reserved supported the plan and took care of the unexpected. Napoleon's order to Massena to form a reserve column at Aspern-Essling is a good example of this keeping a reserve and the freedom Napoleon had in directing his Corps commanders.

Of course, runners were used to deliver the messages and they didn't take long to get to the intended destination from all appearances. when Napoleon ordered the general advance at Jena, he didn't order it at 12pm and have to wait an hour for it to actually occur. There are a number of reasons for this.

It also appears that corps commanders followed this same process: order the attack or defense and with reserves support success and take care of the unexpected. Division and brigade commanders handled control differently, which is why division commanders in most armies had one [British] or two ADCs [French] and brigade commanders none.

For a wargame, this kind of CinC decision-making would require a lot of decision-less administration of 'the plan' with only a few actual decision points concerning reserves during the game for a player in the CinC role…. That is, if the player is acting in an effective manner like Napoleon and not attempting to micro-managing everything—which should have consequences. Not what gamers want.

There is also the desire to have a closer connection to the small unit combat which would have players making decisions as brigade and division commanders too. you see that multi-level control of the battle in most all pre-20th Century wargame designs, from Empire to Volley and Bayonet.

So the question as far as order writing is concerned is how many would be written by a CinC and/or corps commanders in a well-controlled battle and how long would it take to actually implement them. Looking at the distances at Jena and Auerstadt for instance, it wouldn't have taken either napoleon, Davout or Hohenlohe or the Duke of Brunswick or any of the corps commanders more than ten to fifteen minutes to communicate with their subordinates and make things happen when looking at voice commands and the distances/times by horse.

Restricting a CinC to a few commands in a battle might imitate what Napoleon actually did, but he chose whether to issue lots of commands or not, and send out orders whenever and to whomever he wanted to. A lot of the question has to do with how the army communication system worked and what each level could or couldn't do based on the SOP established for that army. T

his is just a brief review of some of the command issues, but it raises questions that I think get more to the heart of ‘how things worked' than simply writing orders or not, using Command Points, cards or restricting what the Head Honcho could do if he wanted to.

Bill

Is not the written order more within the domain of the pre-game show? For us table top titans don't your Corp and perhaps even your Divisional commanders already have their written orders and have complied by their position on the table top when the game begins? That's how our games work.

We mainly play historical games so most of the troops are already on the table just waiting to be ordered forward or will simply hold their position in defense. Why they are where they are and their basic objectives are all covered off in the pre-game briefing. Both sides then form a plan and go from there.

I think once a battle begins most of the orders would be communicated verbally, unless a subordinate was separated by some distance. Even then I think courier's or ADC's also delivered verbal messages. The other exception might be the formation of a grand battery, etc., where numerous commands have to be contacted simultaneously and would need confirmation that they are no longer under the command of so and so.

In our games the players are trying to play the role of the senior commanders, which are generally the C&C's, Corp and Divisional commanders. At the point of time when the game starts their communication with most of their subordinates would be verbally. The use of Tempo points in our games is an abstract way to establish those communications. It gives the green light to the junior commanders, who are non-players, but player controlled to do something.

So the use of Tempo points is intended to cover both written and verbal orders, which is another reason why I think it beats game systems that are simply locked into one or the other. Not to mention all the previous posts about the pitfalls that are inherent with those systems.

So I think the use of written orders during a table top game are not required, and in some cases actually can create a certain unhistorical feel to a game. Such as writing orders to a level of command that was clearly done verbally in most cases. If, however, a player wants to do something that perhaps is not obvious, or outside of the norm, then go for it.

We have been playing without any written orders for at least 20 years now and have not had one problem. Tempo has been used for over 7 years and it's rare to find a player in our games that didn't like it. In fact I don't think anyone has ever had a problem with Tempo. It's more just not their level of gaming, etc.

In my recently published sets of "Old School" rules (available at Amazon) written orders are an option. When I first began wargaming in 1958 (I was 17,) using Scruby 30mm ACW minis, my opponent (Cousin Charles)and I used written orders all the time up until 1967.

I raised a 30mm Scruby Napoleonic Army in 1961, and also used written orders until 1967. Since then, the use of written orders has been infrequent in Nap and ACW games, using my rules called: "Classic Napoleonics" and "Some Wore Blue and Some Wore Gray." I find that written orders work best when there is a non-playing umpire who is "fair and balanced" in his interpretations.(Like FOX News???)

Glenn:
I agree that written orders are found most often and the most detailed with pre-battle orders such as Napoleon's before Jena, though pre-battle meetings between corps commanders like Austerlitz served that function too.

And yes, I do believe that most orders were delivered by voice, whether the CinC or by courier. Even so, they were more often recorded by his staff, in Napoleon's command.

In our games the players are trying to play the role of the senior commanders, which are generally the C&C's, Corp and Divisional commanders. At the point of time when the game starts their communication with most of their subordinates would be verbally. The use of Tempo points in our games is an abstract way to establish those communications. It gives the green light to the junior commanders, who are non-players, but player controlled to do something.

I understand what they are supposed to represent. I simply don't see any historical support for it. The image of command that Tempo points give of command is this constant pressure of orders to ALL commands all the time, often changing every X amount of time, orders by voice or not. It also suggests that the CinC is somehow juggling a limited amount of *something* which constrains his ability to issue orders to all his troops. On top of that, if these orders aren't continually issued through Tempo points, the chances that a command will continue to function effectively goes down.

From what I have read [and provided as quotes and descriptions above], that simply isn't the way the Napoleonic command system worked for any nation unless really damaged or backward--not 'modern' in von Wartenburg's judgment. It isn't what the CinC spent his time doing during battle--or the fundamental challenges he faced in commanding and controlling his army. Even the most abstract and simplified version of the actual command system couldn't look like the Tempo mechanics.

And as far as I can tell from the evidence I have found, with no counter-evidence offered by you, that is the case regardless of how many gamers 'like the game' or 'haven't had a problem' with the rules. I haven't had any problems with playing the rules either. The Tempo subsystem can be a fun game challenge. Certainly any number of folks enjoy it.

That doesn't change the facts concerning what even the most basic historical evidence describes. The Tempo mechanics don't represent--in any fashion that I can see--the military history and army command regarding the Napoleonic wars. What players are doing and the decisions they are asked to make with the Tempo mechanics bears no relationship to the historical activities of a CinC other than telling sub-units what to do. Tempo points are like gas the commander has to constantly divvy out, or the 'gas-less' subordinates slow down and stop.

That makes Napoleon at Austerlitz one of the worst commanders of the period, and Kutuzov one of the best, for his constant efforts to issue orders in an attempt to deal with the French attacks, while Napoleon issued less than a dozen to his subordinates for the six hour battle. Jena and other battles are no different. Suvurov acted far more like Napoleon during his 1799 battles than Kutuzov at Austerlitz. In fact, I think I might be able to make an argument for the defending CinC having to do more in the way of issuing orders than the CinC on the offensive.

As I said, I'm open to any evidence you feel supports the Tempo mechanics representation of history and army command.

mahdi1ray;

Umpires certainly take up a lot of slack in such things. I think that is one reason a number of wargamers still play with umpires.

Hello Bill!

"I understand what they are supposed to represent. I simply don't see any historical support for it."

That's okay, it's clearly an abstraction.

"The image of command that Tempo points give of command is this constant pressure of orders to ALL commands all the time, often changing every X amount of time, orders by voice or not."

Yes that's certainly part of it, the "constant pressure". That's missing in most games. As well as the pressure to be on top of things.

"It also suggests that the CinC is somehow juggling a limited amount of *something* which constrains his ability to issue orders to all his troops."

Yes it does that as well, but it allows the scenario designer to tailor the Tempo to fit each army. Those that have fluid armies should have few constraints. While others who were static will have more problems. Another feature missing from a lot of rule sets.

"On top of that, if these orders aren't continually issued through Tempo points, the chances that a command will continue to function effectively goes down."

Yes another fact that adds to the pressure of command. It forces the senior commanders to try and be on top of every situation. Artificial, of course, but it certainly adds to the dynamics of the game.

"It isn't what the CinC spent his time doing during battle"

I don't think any rule system reflects this.

"or the fundamental challenges he faced in commanding and controlling his army. Even the most abstract and simplified version of the actual command system couldn't look like the Tempo mechanics."

I disagree, his basic requirements are to issue orders and control his army. Tempo does both.

"And as far as I can tell from the evidence I have found, with no counter-evidence offered by you, that is the case"

I'm not exactly sure what evidence your looking for. This is not a case of law, it's simply a game that works the way the designer intended and as a wargame it blows the doors off a number of more conventional designs. The designer might be able to offer up something to satisfy your desire for some sort of evidence, but as I said before I don't even see a need for it.

"I haven't had any problems with playing the rules either. The Tempo subsystem can be a fun game challenge. Certainly any number of folks enjoy it."

That's it, that's all it's intended to do.

"That doesn't change the facts concerning what even the most basic historical evidence describes. The Tempo mechanics don't represent--in any fashion that I can see--the military history and army command regarding the Napoleonic wars. What players are doing and the decisions they are asked to make with the Tempo mechanics bears no relationship to the historical activities of a CinC other than telling sub-units what to do."

I'm not aware of any rule set that completely embraces the historical activities of a C&C beyond telling sub-units what to do. However, as you said Tempo does this and in this regard that's all it's really intended to do.

"Tempo points are like gas the commander has to constantly divvy out, or the 'gas-less' subordinates slow down and stop."

Yes, that's certainly one of the effects of the abstraction. I think of it more like logistics which is missing from most other wargame designs.

"That makes Napoleon at Austerlitz one of the worst commanders of the period, and Kutuzov one of the best, for his constant efforts to issue orders in an attempt to deal with the French attacks, while Napoleon issued less than a dozen to his subordinates for the six hour battle. Jena and other battles are no different. Suvurov acted far more like Napoleon during his 1799 battles than Kutuzov at Austerlitz."

Your drawing conclusions without any facts. We have played a few hundred Napoleonic Tempo games. Napoleon and Suvurov have not gotten any worse and certainly Kutuzov has not gotten any better in any of our games. The only interesting thing is players can now see that success or failure is very often directly under their control. A fact that often is more elusive under other rule systems.

Best regards,

Glenn

"I understand what they are supposed to represent. I simply don't see any historical support for it."

That's okay, it's clearly an abstraction.

Howdy Glenn:

Thanks for your response. Any simulation or wargame is one big abstraction. We're recreating battles on a tabletop, for Pete's sakes. The question is whether that abstraction has any relationship to the history it proports to mimic. I get the impression you believe the Tempo system does mimic military command during the Napoleonic wars 'in some fashion', regardless of how abstracted it is. I may well be wrong about that impression.

"On top of that, if these orders aren't continually issued through Tempo points, the chances that a command will continue to function effectively goes down."

Yes another fact that adds to the pressure of command. It forces the senior commanders to try and be on top of every situation. Artificial, of course, but it certainly adds to the dynamics of the game.

Glenn. Wargames/simulations are artifical. And I'm glad it adds to the game. Howeve, we [or at least I am] are talking about the historical challenges it may or may not add to the game. The question is if that 'pressure' in the game has any relation to the pressures faced by the actual commanders. Napoleon hardly is the picture of a senior commander trying "to be on top of every situation" in all the historical accounts I have read…my major source of what it was like to command in the Napoleonic period.

"or the fundamental challenges he faced in commanding and controlling his army. Even the most abstract and simplified version of the actual command system couldn't look like the Tempo mechanics."

I disagree, his basic requirements are to issue orders and control his army. Tempo does both.

No, that aren't his basic 'requirements'. The question is how he controlled his army and how much…through orders… not as his basic requirement.

"Tempo points are like gas the commander has to constantly divvy out, or the 'gas-less' subordinates slow down and stop."

Yes, that's certainly one of the effects of the abstraction. I think of it more like logistics which is missing from most other wargame designs.

? You are free to think of it anyway you want. The question is whether the CinC was thinking about *something* 'more like logistics'. There may be a very good reason it is missing from other wargame designs.

"I haven't had any problems with playing the rules either. The Tempo subsystem can be a fun game challenge. Certainly any number of folks enjoy it."

That's it, that's all it's intended to do.

That's fine, but if that's all, then history and military command aren't issues--at all. Is that what you are saying?

I'm not aware of any rule set that completely embraces the historical activities of a C&C beyond telling sub-units what to do. However, as you said Tempo does this and in this regard that's all it's really intended to do.

Glenn, we aren't talking about 'completely embracing' the historical activities of anything. We are talking about only those things the Tempo system is supposed to embrace, what you believe they embrace so effectively.

If the Tempo system is only designed to 'embrace' the CinC telling sub-units what to do, then the Tempo system has the CinC issuing orders far, far too often, divvying them from some limited packet of *something*, where units grind to a halt if not constantly fed this infusion of 'orders.'

That bears no relationship to the historical command process--in just issuing orders--at all.

"That makes Napoleon at Austerlitz one of the worst commanders of the period, and Kutuzov one of the best, for his constant efforts to issue orders in an attempt to deal with the French attacks, while Napoleon issued less than a dozen to his subordinates for the six hour battle. Jena and other battles are no different. Suvurov acted far more like Napoleon during his 1799 battles than Kutuzov at Austerlitz."

Your drawing conclusions without any facts. We have played a few hundred Napoleonic Tempo games. Napoleon and Suvurov have not gotten any worse and certainly Kutuzov has not gotten any better in any of our games.

I think you missed my point entirely. Neither Napoleon or Suvurov spent their time constantly issuing orders in fear that if they didn't, their armies would grind to a halt. In fact, I have provided evidence of that and will be glad to provide references. If a Polemos player issued as few orders as Napoleon and Suvurov, and showed as little interest in 'staying on top of every situation' in the game as they did in real battle situations, they would lose every time.

The only interesting thing is players can now see that success or failure is very often directly under their control. A fact that often is more elusive under other rule systems.

Well, I am not sure about that, but regardless, that is simply a statement about a game, not something that 'embraces' military history or the historical evidence.

I'm not exactly sure what evidence your looking for. This is not a case of law, it's simply a game that works the way the designer intended and as a wargame it blows the doors off a number of more conventional designs. The designer might be able to offer up something to satisfy your desire for some sort of evidence, but as I said before I don't even see a need for it.

When I asked for some historical evidence, Glenn, I am assuming you see the Tempo system 'resembling' something in the history you have read, otherwise why would you think there is some connection between the two? I am asking for that connection between actual history and the Tempo system.

The question of historical evidence is far closer to case law than it is to a Face book page, where it is simply a question of how many people click 'I like' or friend you.

If Polemos is simply a game, I am assuming you mean like Monopoly or chess. I certainly can accept it on that level, and that is certainly how I play it. In that case, history really doesn't apply to whatever the game offers. In that case, I can understand when you say The designer might be able to offer up something to satisfy your desire for some sort of evidence, but as I said before I don't even see a need for it.

Well, the designer hasn't offered anything. Having played it, it does make me wonder about by what criteria you say Polemos is a 'milestone' or heads above other games in the hobby. Either it's a fun game or it isn't. If you have other criteria for your judgment, what is it based on if it has nothing to do with history or military command? If it does have something to do with it, What? …and Where?

Best Regards,

Bill