""Losing small wars"" Topic

I have just finished this book by Frank Ledwidge, a critical assesment of the British army's campaigns in Basra and Helmand. It's a sobering read and a bit of an eye opener, "exploding the myth that the British army does this sort of warfare better than anyone else". Ledwidge has little criticism of the "boots on the ground" but is scathing about the top brass. Ledwidge is a former intelligence officer who suggests new ways of thinking are required in future. The ability of U.S. forces to learn quickly from it's mistakes and act swiftly to correct them is praised and contrasted with British inertia.
The book leaves the reputation of the British sqaddie untarnished but the "planners" of the senior ranks come in for a bit of a panning. Highly recommended.

Frank

Frank,

Thanks for sharing.

Pat

Was looking for new book for upcoming trip. Thanks!

Raises an interesting question that I've had when reading histories from the colonial period to today (eg the new book The Outpost.)

Time after time generals send troops off to some Godforsaken patch of ground where they and the locals kill one another for some period of time and then the western troops go home. I'm always left wondering, what was the point?

Always thought the problem was simply not enough resources.

Trying to control a third of Iraq with a brigade or two of infantry was asking for problems.

and those senior officers who are not willing to stand up to them. when there was obvious evidence that a Bde could not cope (And did not) such a huge AOR.

There were the ammo dumps that we could not secure, not forgetting the locals up in Al-Amarah who said thank you for getting rid of Saddam, now please leave us in peace.

Tally Ho!

Nick,

For the record it was Donald Rumsfeld and his allies such as Wolfowitz who decided to deploy fewer troops in Iraq.

In fact, General Shinseki was famously forced into early retirement when he broke with the talking point that Iraq would be a cakewalk. In testimony before congress he estimated that it would take several hundred thousand soldiers to properly occupy Iraq. For this he was pilloried by others in the Bush administration.

Shinseki was right, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were wrong.

Maybe it was the fact that Shinseki had combat experience and based his opinion on military history (such as the occupation of post-war Japan and Germany) while those who opposed him did not…

No,

we had plenty for the initial stage of the operation, after Basra was taken, the British Govt put pressure on the Army to drop from a Division to a single Bde. Yes the whole show was a US run thing, but the British Govt who pushed for quick troop withdrawl in the SE,

Tally Ho!

To be fair, Rumsfeld was correct about the initial battle, since the Iraqi army was quickly defeated with the forces at hand.

However, the insurgent campaign by both sides (Sunni and Shiite) was not dealt with very effectively, and people had been warned of the ancient tensions in advance.

Wartopia … Elected politians order Generals to deploy troops. The God forsaken location is usually of the enemies choosing. Korea, SE Asia, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. … If there was not a problem/threat … the troops wouldn't be there …

Man, some people just cannot keep their politics out of threads like this.

Oh, my stars and garters! Maybe that was true in Somerset, but it sure as hell wasn't

Not being political, just stating a fact.

Wartopia is completely right, two wars; one of them necessary and one of them not.

I have slowly and reluctantly come to the conclusion that we have lost the necessary war because we couldn't concentrate on one war at a time, but started the second (unnecessary) war, thereby taking the most valuable limited resources away from where they were needed.

Some interesting figures from the book;
In 2006 of the British force of 8,000 in Basra about 200 rifles were available to patrol outside their bases, that is in Basra itself and surrounding towns.
In the early days of the Helmand deployment a force of 3,500 could, with luck, have 168 rifles available for operations.
Britains three armed services have 500 general officers.
The Army has more generals than helicopters, or operational tanks,the Royal Navy more Admirals than ships and the Royal Air Force three times more "one star" officers than flying squadrons.
proportionately there are eight times as many generals in the British armed forces than the U.S. Marine Corps, four times as many as the U.S. Army and ten times as many as the similar sized I.D.F.!

Frank

You can build a helicopter much faster than training up a General. no arguement that often there are to many of the s, but while you can expand new privates rapidly, good generals take more time.

Unfortunetly good in peace does not mean good in war, so you seem to need more than you will want just to have enough to discard those who dont make the cut in a real war. HArd on those new privates.

And I should point out it is hard to talk about what made you go to war, and who did it without touching on politics. it is after all a political decision.

And as for yahoos who think they can make war on the cheap, what ever party or political leaning or what ever, they are always wrong. It always costs more than you want it to and takes longer than you think it should.

owen

Wow.

Politics aside (the author is ex-military not some activist), the book is an excellent read on how an institution (in this case the British army) can become ossified by resting on its laurels.

The irrelevance of merely stating that the British invented COIN in Malaya and did well in Northern Ireland is cruelly highlighted. As is the cop out of declaring that stabilization has been achieved, handing the town to the care of the local "elders" and withdrawing only to have the opposing militia take over. And then having the Yanks come and sort things out. Happened in Basra, happened in Helmand…

Well, the Brits can do as the French armed forces then: shed the troops and equipment but keep so many star carriers!
Ours have grown a bit like African armies.

Sgt Troy's figures of 8000 'mouths' yet only 200 'boots' say it all,the task for a brigade was too much and the politicos heard only the '8000'…..they imagined all those troops out patrolling when they were tied to the base camp and depot organisations……that with the dismissal of the
Iraqi army and police forces created the power vacuum and ensuing chaos.

I had the pleasure of meeting the author during a book promotion, in our local bookstore. Excellent chap, and was quite willing to sit and chat after the usual Q&A. He actually put the 'blame' on us, the electorate, for voting in totally unqualified professional politicians, no party was exempt.

So, in the UK, it could be argued Thatcher was partially responsible, as her war on the old-shire Tories ('are you one of us') and her transformation of a party free of an embracing ideologically to an 'ism', based on her charismatic leadership, sowed the seeds for the professional politician.

In the US a similar process was happening , but the effect of the media, entertainment and education industry, following a particular political line is far greater.

If you read the book, the military, not the politicians, are blamed for the 'face-saving- Helmand debacle. Some of his anecdotes that do not appear in the book, border on the farcical.

As for Afghanistan good, Iraq bad analysis, understandable, but just think of this. If Saddam had been allowed to stay what would the result have been, Syria II? A nuclear arms race between Iraq and Iran? That would have done wonders for the price of oil!

Ordered a copy!

Thank-you for your replies.
TMP is a great place to voice your thoughts about warfare and wargames.
We read about the reality of war, we admire the courage of the people involved but leaving aside the rights or wrongs of any conflict, I think we are left saddened by the tragedy and waste of war.
Most wargamers are intelligent, free thinking individuals,qualities that go hand in glove with our hobby.
No wargamer seriously beleives that we simulate war,seeing a greiving parent crying over the body of their dead child would mean that, I for one,would never roll the dice again.
Our fantasy of war is I think based on films we see as children, heroic blood and guts, this is how we start playing with toy soldiers. I have been "playing toy soldiers" for almost forty years.
I don't want to get too deep with this, I suppose I'm trying to say that it's ironic that because we turn war into a game we possibly understand the terrible nature of war more than the "man in the street".

Frank

Still on the pile of 'to read' but I had dabbled in and around British Officers (serving and retired) quite sometime now and also did my research in COIN and related gibberish… (COIN is a catch all word that has lost meaning sadly).

The professional advisers are a much more interesting bunch. One of my colleagues claims (no way to independently verify but ) to be one of them and I can say how the process flow. Considering that 80% of these advisers have just a very superficial background (a lot of military experts are just IR chaps with a a very shallow grasp on reality sadly) and tend to be easily taken by manufacturers claims and technology the results are predictable. got involved in producing brief for the carrier controversy in UK and saw some of this first hand.

The other problem is not so much 'resting on laurels' but 'distorting history'. The military history that the military receive is simplified, mythologized, and often not very accurate. Case study on that was Andrew Lambert teaching tank warfare at Sandhurst. While I like him and he is a brilliant naval historian his understanding of armour is a bit limited. Armies create myths. The British Army created the Myth of Malaya and The Troubles. While they are successful operations as Commodore Jermy pointed out every case is different. What the British Army (and others) did was to raise these two successful campaigns to the status of perfect model without dwelling deeply. In that process they removed two other sucesses (Mau Mau Revolt and the Konfrontasi) and deleted the Aden disaster. They als ignored the NWF. They also distorted Malaya (removed artillery, airpower, NGF, initial large scale operations, the geography and the background). Once I listened to some Guard officers (got the idea they never been under fire) boasting how good the BA was in deploying mechanized battalions in light role in NI and that this alone was a recipe for success for counterinsurgency. Meet line officers (Anglian and Green Jackets if I recall correctly) and in the end I got the impression that they were fighting a conventional war just to survive.

To a certain extent the error of the COIN mafia in the US (and abroad) and the BA had been assuming that they had a perfect model (one using also a reduced footprint for doctrinal reason, do not blame Rumsfeld for something that was largely preached by his critics, namely that COIN required small intervention footprint until they changed idea later on). We are quite prisoner of a model based society were the perfect and universal model is sought after. A lot of academics in security studies just follow this approach as a matter of faith and to be quite honest their are much more appreciated by policy maker and the world than people like me that work on case studies and caution against easy solution. Tried to make one of them reasoning, she is barely speaking with me now (ok she has a sort of idiotic but apparently good looking Italian follower that happens to be just one of those awful IR guys, but maybe I overrated her brain after all).

As a sidenote I have still to read the book properly, but some of the author comments also looks to me a bit as 'perfect solutions'. The big problem is that small wars are based on trial and error rather than by the book solutions.

Arrigo

Some good posts here guys … yes we are to blame for It is a world wide war with supremacist islam and . And COIN has lost it's meaning … Good insights !

Thw 1derdull Wiznard wrote:

The Bush administration knew they had to fight the Jihadis somewhere. Iraq was the obvious choice.

Presumably on MacArthur's great strategic principle, "hit 'em where they ain't".

I'll add my recommendation for the book.

All the best,

John.

I think it mutated into the fly paper strategy, or was that mutated into the fly, can never remember.

Arrigo, you have to read the book to understand opertions like Helmand were doomed from the start. If the SAS are saying don't go in, you really should listen to them. Trouble was the Army needed to protect their reputation as COIN specialists. I do agree about the mindset, too much believing in the mythical, don't also forget the Falklands fueling this self-belief. Which was why the US overseeing British operations, in Southern Iraq, was such a humiliation for them, as Ledwidge says, they could not be trusted to do the job themselves.

JDS, bang on. I'm not sure what the Wiz was trying to say. The most effective control on jihadis in Iraq was Saddam Hussain.
Just ask yourselves who forced the last synagogue to close or drove out the last bishop of Baghdad. It wasn't Saddam.

As far as Afghanistan goes, the traditional way of dealing with them seems to be the best.
Ignore them. Deplore their internal conflicts if you must, but leave them alone.
Should they venture out of their tribal country to spread mischief externally, go and kill those you suspect of fostering such mischief. Oh, heck. Burn the Balla Hissar.
Then leave. You can't "civilize" them. The Greeks tried, the Turks tried, the Persians tried, the Mongols tried, the British tried, the Russians tried… All failed.
What makes anyone think that we can, we who are so easily distracted by shiny things?
What have we accomplished in 10 or more years? Girls can go to school now? How long will that last when, if ever, we leave? About a week, if that.

Go in, kill the people you want to blame for the trouble, warn them that you can do it again, and then leave. If you do not have the stomach for that, don't bother.
"Nation Building"? Don't make me laugh.

This non-political history lesson is brought to you by OFM Enterprises.

Yup, he'd control them just the way Assad did, oops! I guess one failing state with WMD's is not enough! He'd also have engaged in a nuclear arms race with Iran, which would give the Mullahs a perfect excuse to continue to develop their programme. As someone clever once said, to understand what Iraq is doing, one must first understand Iran's actions, and vice-versa.

I think the Wiz was perfectly clear. The Jihadis made Iraq their battleground against the West, flocked there and died there. Whole echelons of specialsts were taken out of the terrorist infrastructure, leading AQI to declare that Iraq was blacker than night for them. Whether you agree or disagree with the strategy it was perfectly clear.

John, the Persians and Macedonians succeeded, they just were as brutal as the Afghans, something we would never aquiesce to.

The day we entered Basra, I was chatting to an ex Engr Colonel who had been trained at Sandhurst. He was a very interesting chap, one question he asked was now that we had "won" what was this democracy we were bringing.

He then said that to keep the people in check we had to be very firm, to give them no lee way. Not long after one mate put it "they need a good slap"! One of the problems stems from using our experience in NI and trying to transpose it directly into SE Iraq and Afg. One thing so many people just don't seem to understand is the mindset of these people and how different it is to ours!

Tally Ho!

Some people in the West understood "their" mindset perfectly well before the war began.

And some people didn't.

And some people still don't.

And therein lies the problem.

Milites,

I think we agree on a lot of counts (I said I have the book need to find the time to read it, and only got some impressions from the quick surfing, probably they will change). One thing I disagree is the idea that you always have to head to Special Forces. Often SF and regular forces have competing doctrine that tend to clash. Even worse there is a sort of insurmountable barrier between the two communities and it is very difficult to get them operating together in an effective way. Special forces resist to be employed in support of conventional ops (and often don't understand them) and vice-versa. Combined arms is not very widespread outside tank+mech…

In the end someone has to go to Helmand, but both the SAS and the Regulars failed to really prepare for the challenge as a single entity.

Falklands in another interesting point. A lot of people in uniform talk about it, not many understand it anymore, just vague concepts. One year ago we had a student doing a simulation on the topic. He was arguing there was no chance the Navy could have landed the 3rd Commando Brigade in Stanley. Now I have a little trump card… I know Mike Clapp and Julian Thompson, and I had arranged to come and give a talk to another class on the subject… Julian would have been fine in landing closer to Stanley, much closer but Mike, considering 1982 radar tech did not want a land mass between his ships and the source of the probable air attacks. In the end he persuaded General Thompson to do something different. but the myth is that the RM did not want to land at Stanley (of course the student did not turn out at the talk… typical behavior…). Sad thing is that General Thompson is now a recognized and competent military historian and provided several good accounts of the war, but still the mythical version is more common.

Milites wrote:

I think the Wiz was perfectly clear. The Jihadis made Iraq their battleground against the West, flocked there and died there. Whole echelons of specialsts were taken out of the terrorist infrastructure, leading AQI to declare that Iraq was blacker than night for them. Whether you agree or disagree with the strategy it was perfectly clear.

Evidently your ability to discern clarity far exceeds mine.

Perhaps if you were to provide any statement at all from any official source that this was the strategy on which the invasion of Iraq was predicated, the idea that the strategy was in any sense "clear" would be less incredible.

Likewise, a reasoned account of how Bush's "mission accomplished" speech can be viewed as in any way compatible with such a strategy would be interesting to see.

I look forward to your providing one or other of these.

All the best,

John.

I do recall reading i think 'Losing Small Wars' and I'd have to say I don't recall thinking that it left he book leaves the reputation of the British squaddie untarnished at least in parts – there were a few comments I thought about aggression in Ulster etc and that being carried over to Iraq etc that i thought perhaps came more from the attitude of someone who was a lawyer in his real job and a part-time naval officer (lawyers of course are past masters of pointing out in the court room what you should have done in your job – hindsight is always 20/20). I don't disagree that it has a lot of valid points.

I think as well of course it also goes down well with certain countries that have for a long time been rather tired of the British Army's view of itself as the best in the world.

Some also of the overall views of the book re the British supposed defeat in Afghanistan 'Afghans clearly consider the British as occupiers', 'the body count keeps on rising' could in all honesty be as much applied to US forces as well – if its a defeat then it is not solely for the BA but for the whole of ISAF/NATO etc

And just to prove that as ever the UK has a fair share of self-hating gonks – how about this for a comment from Amazon on the book (the reviewer loved it of course as it fitted in with all his prejudices)
'the British are not a military nation and its' officers are normally amateurs…. and its' land forces performance consistently dismal (Crimea, Boer War, Somme and the obscenity of Passchendaele and most of World War I, World War II).

Obviously his history books didn't cover the Napoleonic Wars and most of WW1 and WW2 – the old Black Adder school of military history again!

Arrigo, do read the book, the SF reference was to their awareness that any British troops deployed to Helmand would be counter-productive, due to history. If you are interested in Falklands myth this is an excellent read

link

John, I assume that there is some misunderstanding, as I doubt you would use such an obvious strawman arguement. I never said the original strategy, in fact in an earlier post I used the term mutated, which tends to imply change, I was commenting on the supposed lack of comprehension of the strategy by a poster, who was advancing the, 'better the devil we know' arguement.

I'm sure the idea of choosing the battleground was uppermost in some minds, though I doubt they would ever admit it publically. I seem to remember it being advocated by some, post 9/11, so I guess dying for 'freedom' is ok, dying as bait is unacceptable.

GNREP8, scary thing is these people are allowed to vote!

GNREP8, I agree some units, the Queens Lancashire Regiment in particular, do come in for a bit of stick.Ledwidge saying they came close to losing military discipline.
We train our soldiers to fight wars, once they
aren't "warfighting" and are asked to undertake the "security" role anger and frustration must take it's toll, perhaps instead of wondering why certain men or units "lose it" we should be surprised at how many do not.
I know an Iraqi Chritian family, lovely people, the Father is an Engineer. One of his daughters is blood specialist another lectured in engineering. Something tells me they may be some of the last Iraqi women in their fields. I hope not.

Frank

Ledwidge's main focus for criticism is the senior ranks, whose actions seem to sometimes be closer to a Python stereotype. During his talk, he kept on coming back to the the talented commanders who have left, or are leaving the Army due to the incompetence of the higher levels of command. He did though talk about the junior ranks acceptance of the doctrine of ad-hoc improvisation which was touted as a flexible approach but served poorly in Southern Iraq.

Sgt Troy, you probably are right, which is a tragedy, one day perhaps the social cost of conservative Islam will be recognised by those it purports to support and protect.

Milites wrote:

If you are interested in Falklands myth this is an excellent read

link

Another book recommendation I second wholeheartedly. Not only is the book interesting in itself, but it was a key influence in the British Army's development of its understanding of what is clumsily called "Mission Command" in English (it means Auftragstaktik).

John, I assume that there is some misunderstanding, as I doubt you would use such an obvious strawman arguement. I never said the original strategy, in fact in an earlier post I used the term mutated, which tends to imply change, I was commenting on the supposed lack of comprehension of the strategy by a poster, who was advancing the, 'better the devil we know' arguement.

I certainly don't understand the strategy as expressed by you and Wiznard. Assuming that we can have a clear strategy that nevertheless mutates by changing its main aim (thus violating the master principle of war), it seems reasonable to ask that some statement of it should be presented, no? If you think this mysterious mutation of strategy is in any sense clear, then please point me to a statement of it at any time. The only such statement about the "flypaper strategy" I can find is due to a Canadian journalist, whose ideas seem to have been taken up by some of the right-of-sensible canaille, but are rather clearly a failed attempt at post-hoc justification of disastrously muddled thinking.

I'm sure the idea of choosing the battleground was uppermost in some minds, though I doubt they would ever admit it publically. I seem to remember it being advocated by some, post 9/11

I find it hard to see how refusal to admit things publicly is consistent with clarity. One might argue (and as we're already pretty far into the realms of fantasy, why not) that this brilliant idea of starting a second land war in Asia to kill insurgents there instead of, say, Croydon, is "original", "ingenious", "sophisticated", or perhaps "cunning", but if nobody is going to say what it is. then "clear" seems a bit of a stretch.

Perhaps the Wiznard would like to clarify his position, once he is let out of the doghouse. Perhaps he will even attempt it. I rather doubt it, though. It's so much easier to maintain clarity if one ignores any evidence that might muddle things.

All the best,

John.

I would recommend a book called The Utility of Force – link – which is a very thought-provoking book about the disconnect between political objectives and military capability.

Along similar lines is the, for some, controversial thesis by Biddle, that suggests force deployment is the key to victory, not technology, per se.

link

I perused this book, but did not purchase it, have any TMP'ers read it?

link

I bought this collection of essays, which offer quite a though provoking array of opinions on different aspects of future warfare.

link

I also attended a lecture, by the the director of the MOD's future wars department, fascinating, though I wish I could find my notes on it!

John, I guess the statement in 2003, by the senior US ground commander in Iraq, Ricardo Sanchez that

'This is what I would call a terrorist magnet, where America, being present here in Iraq, creates a target of opportunity, if you will. But this is exactly where we want to fight them. We want to fight them here. We prepared for them, and this will prevent the American people from having to go through their attacks back in the United States'

Was just a post-invasion justification of the event, by a right wing oddball, and not elucidatory enough for you?

Along similar lines is the, for some, controversial thesis by Biddle, that suggests force deployment is the key to victory, not technology, per se.

Biddle's good, and I think right, but the book is slightly chewy reading, probably because he is first and foremost a student of econometrics rather than military history. Hence his use of rather awkward phrases like "troop employment" instead of "tactics". But if anything the outsiderish flavour this gives to his views is a good thing, as it gives independent confirmation to the observation made by lots of military historians and theorists that technophilia isn't that helpful.

John, I guess the statement in 2003, by the senior US ground commander in Iraq, Ricardo Sanchez that

'This is what I would call a terrorist magnet, where America, being present here in Iraq, creates a target of opportunity, if you will. But this is exactly where we want to fight them. We want to fight them here. We prepared for them, and this will prevent the American people from having to go through their attacks back in the United States'

Was just a post-invasion justification of the event, by a right wing oddball, and not elucidatory enough for you?

Perhaps when it is restored to its original context of the interview with Wolf Blitzer (available at link ) it will be obvious why this is not a statement of the so-called "flypaper strategy" at all. At the time the General was speaking, he was (as he says inthe interview) still going after Ba'athists as his main target, not Mujahideen, and the search for the imaginary WMD was still in progress. No "mutation" of the strategy had yet occurred, as people were still maintaining in public that they were sticking to Plan A, zapping Saddam and nicking his nerve gas, nukes, or other nasties.

As for the question of clarity -- do remember that this is the very same General Sanchez who told the New York Times that "After more than fours years of fighting, America continues its desperate struggle in Iraq without any concerted effort to devise a strategy that will achieve victory in that war-torn country or in the greater conflict against extremism." If he's the best bloke you can cite to demonstrate the clarity of the strategy, then you really do have a much greater ability to perceive clarity than I do.

All the best,

John.

A BBC interviewee, Jeremy Binnie of Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, put it thusly:

'The war in Iraq has minimized the threat to Europe because everyone who's Jihad-inclined wants to go fight over there. So even though some of these… the guys suspected of involvement in the train bombings have reportedly gone over to lodge themselves in Iraq. So there are these radicals sort of coming out of Europe and actually going to a different theater altogether.'

And the Presidents reply of 'bring em on', was just bravado I take it?

That is a valid tactic … but I don't know if the general public would understand … I know I liked it …

And the Presidents reply of 'bring em on', was just bravado I take it?

Events in the 60s would indicate that it was just bravado.

:)

I didn't take you for a Ratherite.

Milites wrote:

A BBC interviewee, Jeremy Binnie of Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, put it thusly:

'The war in Iraq has minimized the threat to Europe because everyone who's Jihad-inclined wants to go fight over there. So even though some of these… the guys suspected of involvement in the train bombings have reportedly gone over to lodge themselves in Iraq. So there are these radicals sort of coming out of Europe and actually going to a different theater altogether.'

A fairly astonishing claim for him to make, given that the Iraq invasion provoked the perpetrators of the London and Madrid bombings into action.

If, indeed, he did say such an absurd thing -- I can find no trace of it on the BBC site. The quote you have given, with exactly the same ellipsis, appears on a number of sites by political pundits whose views appear to be more than a touch Limbaugh. Of course, just because someone is a frothing loon does not necessarily make him prone to misreport or misrepresent things to conform to his own world-view, but it's painfully noticeable that none of these sites that I've found includes a link to the purported original.

And the Presidents reply of 'bring em on', was just bravado I take it?

You take it, I take it, I think everyone with more than a slack handful of firing neurons took it that way. Or did you somehow not get that?

All the best,

John.

I'd have thought Binnie would have taken action, if he felt he had been misquoted, though I do agree I'd have liked to have read the original myself. The frothing loon comment, to describe those you disagree with philosophically, (the blogs) really does mean this is a pointless debate to continue. If I do dig up anymore evidence it will be similarly dismissed out of hand, I think there was a 'flypaper' strategy, you don't, end.

So your 'flypaper' created thousands of AQ nutters, blooded in Iraq and Helmand who the West and Israel is now employing in Libya, Syria and Russia to kill more Christians and secular Muslims.

Complex strategies, islamic supremists, countries and factions changing alliances, intrigue, deception, collateral damage, etc., etc. … sounds like another day on 21st Century Earth …

Hey, if it's my strategy I never got invited to all the free junkets and lucrative speaking engagements. Damn, knew I should have set up that policy forum and then the think tank.

Legion, don't bother, if the real world does not play out like an episode of 24 or Battlestar Galactica some people will moan. Bottom line, the US and its Allies were able to get into the heart of AQ's command structure, crucially understand its disperate structure and then severly damage it. Was it all worth it? Ask the question in 40 years, so that some sort of historical perspective is available to make a more nuanced judgement.