"Russian Artillery firing 'too high' at Borodino" Topic

"'Napoléon's best game was to more or less surrender in 1810…'
That is one of the most incredibly naive and fantastic statements that I have ever read regarding the period ….
And at the end of the Russian campaign in late 1812, the war wasn't over, it was just beginning."

Don't you think Napoléon could have gotten a better deal for the French Empire in 1810 than in 1813, 1814 or 1815?
I suppose it is "naive and fantastic" to expect someone to realize that their negotiating position was only going to deteriorate when they are on top.
But the deal he got in the end was pretty bad, n'est-ce pas?

Seroga,

The problem is that Napoleon, like so many of us, was unable to realise when he was at his peak and that decline was coming. In addition, Napoleon was always a gambler, who believed that everything would change if he could just grab that one massive victory.

Napoleon may have been a brilliant commander for some of his career, but he lacked the insight and understanding to realise that all his victories would amount to nothing unless he could find a way of reaching an accomodation with his enemies that managed to meet at least the basic needs of all parties. Of course, it is more than possible that no such accomodation was possible, given that those needs were utterly contradictory and that Napoleon's grasp on the throne was relatively fragile.

pas de charge,

I agree. Hence my comment – his best deal woul dhave been obtained when he was (apparently) leading on all fronts. He did try to capitlaize on this success, but narrowed his aim to the dynastic marriage with the Austrian crown. In a sense, he might be accused of dealing for the Bonaparte dynasty instead of looking for a viable steady-state for his Empire. If he confused the one for the other, "l'état c'est moi", then he was really missing the point of the Revolution in France and the emergent concept of nationalism that was popping up all over Europe.

but he lacked the insight and understanding to realise that all his victories would amount to nothing unless he could find a way of reaching an accomodation with his enemies that managed to meet at least the basic needs of all parties.

Actually, I wonder sometimes whether or not the opposite was the problem -- that, for all his troops' pitilessness in occupation, especially in Germany, he was perhaps a little too accomodating to the old regimes.

Napoleon had so overwhelmingly defeated the Prussians in 1806/7 that he could probably have deposed the Hohenollerns altogether and established a puppet ruled by a relative. Had that been the case, 1813-14 may have ended differently.

Seroga,

I agree with your view that Napoleon might have been more interested in his dynasty than securing a viable future for France, although, of course, the latter was essential for the former.

However, Napoleon came from a culture where the clan and the family were everything. His worldview was as limited as one might expect from the son of a minor Corsican noble and he had no real understanding of how Europe and attitudes within Europe had changed in the aftermath of the revolution. In essence, he was still working with an 18th century mindset.

"Napoleon had so overwhelmingly defeated the Prussians in 1806/7 that he could probably have deposed the Hohenollerns altogether and established a puppet ruled by a relative."

Why not. It worked great in Spain.

He chose not to remove the Hohenzollerns of Prussia due to pressure from the Tsar and the need to have buffer states between him and Russia.
Stephen

porfirio,

The problem is that by the early 19th century it was very difficult to build a lasting European empire based on deposing other rulers and taking over their subjects. The spirit of nationalism that was spreading through Europe threatened all empires founded on domination of other nations or cultural groups and this would have included a Prussia ruled by a member of the Bonaparte family.

Anyway, German states ruled by Napoleon's relatives hardly made a positive contribution to his war effort, generally seeking any opportunity to rebel and performing poorly in the field.

If Napoleon had deposed the Hohenzollerns, it is unlikely that Alexander would have made peace at Tilsit; Napoleon could probably have carried on beating Russian armies in 1807-8 but would eventually have ended up running out of veteran troops rather more quickly than he actually did. Imagine the early part of the 1809 campaign against Austria with Russia active against Napoleon and no veteran 3rd Corps available.

Alexander could not have done anything about the Hohenzollerns being deposed, any more than he was able to affect the creation of all the Confederation of the Rhine states. The Hohenzollerns were on the brink in 1807 anyway -- it would not have been hard to just push them over.

German nationalism was flamed more by the bad behavior of French troops in Germany than anything else. It was still in its infancy in this period, and took decades to really get rolling. Even then, there's no way that nationalists were going to rise up to defend the Hohenzollerns, who showed nothing but contempt for the common people.

And the confederation made valuable contributions to Napoleon's campaigns, including in 1813, the campaign in which they supposedly betrayed him. They were variable, but some of them, such as the Saxon cavalry, were every bit as good as the French.

Why not. It worked great in Spain.

Had Napoleon been able to campaign for an extended period in Spain, the British would have been defeated there. Napoleon was consistently campaigning in Central Europe -- the analogy to Spain just doesn't work. The Russians in 1807 were not comparable to the British.

there's no way that nationalists were going to rise up to defend the Hohenzollerns, who showed nothing but contempt for the common people.

The Spanish Bourbons had nothing but contempt for the common people, either. (Arguably, nor did any dynasty, including Napoleon's).

Just saying that abolishing Prussia wouldn't necessarily extinguish German nationalism or anti-French sentiment. Indeed, it might have just re-oriented or re-focused it. Anti-French sentiment was alive and well in Westphalia, which was ruled by a Bonaparte.

"Alexander could not have done anything about the Hohenzollerns being deposed, any more than he was able to affect the creation of all the Confederation of the Rhine states. The Hohenzollerns were on the brink in 1807 anyway -- it would not have been hard to just push them over."

I agree that Alexander could not have prevented Napoleon deposing the Hohenzollerns; what I stated was that if he had done so, Alexander would have been unlikely to make peace. Russia could afford to lose battles in East Prussia and Poland; Napoleon could not, hence his desire to make peace with Alexander.

"German nationalism was flamed more by the bad behavior of French troops in Germany than anything else. It was still in its infancy in this period, and took decades to really get rolling. Even then, there's no way that nationalists were going to rise up to defend the Hohenzollerns, who showed nothing but contempt for the common people."

A French ruled and garrisoned Prussia would, therefore, only have further inflamed that nationalism. Nationalism was not about defending the Hohenzollerns, but about the nation and being anti-French.

"And the confederation made valuable contributions to Napoleon's campaigns, including in 1813, the campaign in which they supposedly betrayed him. They were variable, but some of them, such as the Saxon cavalry, were every bit as good as the French."

I am not quite sure how the Confederation and the Saxons crept into your reply as I was commenting on German states ruled by Bonapartes, the only significant one of which was Westphalia, a state that was riven with nationalism and anti-French sentiment, had an army that its own king (justifiably) did not trust and which escaped from French rule as quickly as it could.

"Had Napoleon been able to campaign for an extended period in Spain, the British would have been defeated there."

Absolutely no way of knowing he would have won. Napoleons only track record against Wellington and allied troops is a defeat. Also here he was fighting amongst a partially sympathetic population. Spain he would have been facing a Wellington with a far superior army, battle hardened allies, a mostly hostile population and Guerillas. I don't think victory was guaranteed at all. More than likely he would have fared just as badly as his generals.

Funny how people see things very differently. My own view is that any return by Napoleon to Spain would have been very bad news for Wellington. The Emperor would have took the Imperial Guard with him, plus his best Marshals and Cavalry. With the Emperor as Commander-in-chief the various French Armies would have to co-operate in a way they chose not to do when left to their own devices, thereby achieving a numerical superiority the British could not hope to match. I can only see the British experiencing the same fate as John Moore's army in 1808 when faced by Napoleon in person, a quick retreat to the sea. Of course, Wellington would have his Lines at Torres Vedras or the ships of the Royal Navy, but if the Waterloo campaign is anything to go by, Wellington would have done well to avoid being completely out-manouvred by Napoleon.
Wellington's only real option would be a retreat behind the Lines. With these available to him, maybe a final victory for the French in Spain was an impossible thing. Who know's? like Edwulf said, there's absolutely no way of knowing who would have won a 'what if?' campaign.

As for the larger European picture, it seems crazy to me to suggest that Napoleon was in a losing position in 1810. You are all making the mistake of looking at things with hind-sight that was not available to the major players at the time. There was no way to know that Napoleon would lose half a million men in Russia. Before that, Napoleon was viewed as being almost invincible, and he held many of the cards that the British did not.

I can envision a number of theoretical ways France could have defeated Britain;
- Instead of putting the effort into the Russian campaign, a new invasion of Britain is planned, utilising all the resources the French Empire now has available.
- A closer alliance with Austria and/or Russia is forged, constituting a real shift in global geo-politics. (Napoleon already had this in mind with his marraige to a Hapsburg and his continuous attempt to woo the Tsar).
- A popular revolt in Britain by a population desiring the same meritocracy as the French.
- The destruction of Wellington's field army and the possible conclusion of a new peace deal.

"it seems crazy to me to suggest that Napoleon was in a losing position in 1810"
I tried to say more that he was on top in 1810, and that further gains would come only at greater investment and risk – and so it was time to try to make a deal, as his position was more likely to deteriorate than improve. It is like when you are counting cards in 21 …. when the deck is unfavorable, you step away. Didn't the admiral Yamamoto propose the same thing after the Japanese successes early on in the war against the USA and the British?

"There was no way to know that Napoleon would lose half a million men in Russia."
Actually, he was warned exactly along such lines, most famously by the général de division duc de Caulaincourt.

I love this board!

I never heard of this can you tell me when this happen and where you read about it?

"There was no way to know that Napoleon would lose half a million men in Russia."
Actually, he was warned exactly along such lines, most famously by the général de division duc de Caulaincour"

Thanks Seroga!

Oh and how do you pronounce Seroga?

Lord Ghee

Just read

Coppens, Bernard : L'Aveuglement de Napoléon, Russie 1812

It is also interesting what he did tell Caulaincourt about his plans about the Poles.

Culaincourt is a great read, but I always take all of those post-1812 French memoirs with a grain of salt. Everybody wanted to be on record as having warned the Boss that this was a terrible idea…. once it became clear that it had been a terrible idea.

The duc de Caulaincourt …. in English!
link

"Oh and how do you pronounce Seroga?"

Серёга
Ser-yo-ga or Ser-o-ga

The stress in on the first syllable. The "y" in the "yo" is really little voiced, but the "o" sound is long English "o" (even in Moscow, where the regular "o" sound is often prononced "ah").
It is a short or friendly form of Sergey.

It is like the rapper ….
YouTube link
YouTube link

thanks Seroga

Lord Ghee

one will find the warnings in many memoires, also those who did not warn but observed others doing so, officers falling onto their knees to be the allmighty emperor not to invade, read the book by Coppens, he cites only eye witness accounts and by that the reader can form his own opinion, great read.

"There was no way to know that Napoleon would lose half a million men in Russia."
What I meant by this is that in 1810, which is the context of the discussion, Napoleon had won all the campaigns he had undertaken in Europe. For very good reason he was feared militarily by all the other European Nations. Very few would have fancied their chances against an army commanded by the Emperor. From Ulm to Wagram his track record was one of success. In 1810 it was not certain that there would even be another War with Russia, let alone that the War would be a disaster and half a million French & Allied troops would be lost.
You are correct that Caulaincourt and others warned Napoleon before the invasion in 1812, but that is not really what we were talking about. The invasion was a great mistake, few would argue otherwise, but in 1810 Napoleon was in a strong position.

I can see the angle. 1810 WOULD have been a good time to ground arms and run his empire.

But when you've gone so far, I think very few men would still be humble enough to stop there. You don't extend the limits of glory by folding. He'd tasted constant success and would be feel pretty confident. It's easy for us to say he should have done this at this point when really he current form would suggest he can keep pushing.

And in 1810 he had little cause to think that this was "it"

Dear Edwulf
The French state had run out of money so had to conquer more land to survive. In 1810 France annexed Holland, Oldenburg and further parts of Italy & Illyria.

France was failing in the economic warfare upon Britain. The foolish continental blockade was a failure. Spain was starting to make the French Army bleed.
Stephen

Of course, if Junot had not behaved like the worst drummer boy in the army in the early stages of the campaign it is very possible that the main Russian army would have been annihilated in 1812.
Failing that, Napoleon could have left Moscow soon after its capture and fiery destruction, thereby avoiding the disaster that was to befall him.
These are the two main ways that the 1812 campaign could have ended in success for Napoleon. But these are if and buts, and the invasion will always be seen as Napoleons biggest mistake. And rightly so.

‘France did not have a modern financial system and could not borrow or lend as the British could.'

The French economic system created and put in place by Napoleon lasted until the at least World War I, when the income tax was introduced. It was put to use intact by the Bourbons. See France Under Napoleon by Louis Bergeron, Chapter II.

B

‘France was forever going bankrupt and still suffered that. The only way to balance the books was to conquer more lands. Asset strip those lands and produce a protected trade system. That is what the continental system was. It ruined the ecconies that were constrained to abide by it.'

France was not bankrupt during the period after Napoleon became head of state. Again, see Bergeron. Further, according the Owen Connelly in The French Revolution and Napoleonic Era, the French franc was the most stable currency in Europe, more stable than the British pound sterling.

B

‘Please supply me with sources about Napoleon puting France on a firm financial footing. I have seen no evidence upon this.'

-France Under Napoleon by Louis Bergeron.
-The French Revolution and Napoleonic Era by Owen Connelly'
-Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms by Owen Connelly.

‘On the other statements, I refer you to my books on the subjects.'

Citations and titles, please? It would actually be much better if you could actually cite source material other than your own.

B

‘The Kingdom of Holland had to be absorbed. It forced France into Portugal and then Spain.'

Economics may have been one of the reasons for the annexation of Holland (the main one being Louis not doing what he was told), but it wasn't for the invasions of Spain and Portugal.

B

‘Napoleon could not understand the new way of war. He was always in debt. France could not maintain conquests as it had done with ease up to 1809.'

Again, what ‘new way of war', and what exactly did Napoleon not understand?

If you're going to make sweeping statements such as these they need to be supported.

I have seen no evidence of this and you have repeatedly made mistakes as to Napoleon's economic understanding and the financial system France was using. If Napoleon was actually always in debt, the wars he fought could not have been.

If you actually wish to discuss what European powers were bankrupt and always in debt, then Russia, Prussia, and Austria need to be the examples used. They were so broke that without British subsidies in 1812-1814 they could have not kept armies in the field at all. See John Sherwig's Guineas and Gunpowder for the amount of subsidies.

And Great Britain wasn't exactly swimming in cash either, and there were doubts that she would go bankrupt because of the subsidies because they were so high in 1813-1814 financing the armies of Spain, Portugal, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, as well as the Royal Navy and Wellington in Spain. And Great Britain's failed military expeditions didn't help with the overall bill either. Great Britain did not come out ahead until the wars were over and the benefits of winning the war as well as a larger colonial empire could be felt.

B

‘The Continental System was forced upon Napoleon probably by the same supporters who re-instated slavery to French dominions. The old slaving families supported his 1799 coup. This did nothing to reform the rotten state of French finances. This is clearly shown by the skimping upon the expensive business of artillery.'

Sources for this statement?

The Continental System was Napoleon's creation and I have seen no evidence of ‘the old slaving families' supporting Napoleon's coup in 1799 (it wasn't his to begin with, as a matter of fact, he was brought into it because he was available and he was the third co-conspirator, not the first or second).

Where did Napoleon ‘skimp' on ‘the business of artillery?'

If that were so, then the rearming of the artillery in early 1813, which was done rapidly and efficiently, would not have been possible.

B

‘Napoleon thought he could overawe the Tsar but underestimated a religious fanatic who lead a crusade against Napoleon. The bankrupting of the supporters of the Tsar and the absorbing of the German state was a foolish political gamble.'

Again, what German state? Oldenburg and the Hanseatic cities were not ‘a German state' and Holland isn't a German state at all.

And the Confederation of the Rhine was not 'absorbed' by Napoleon if that is whay you're referring to, and it wasn't a single state, but an alliance of German states with France.

B

Regarding Prussia, I don't see any problem internally with the state being dismembered by the French or the Hohenzollerns being displaced as a ruling house.

The average Prussian submitted quite meekly to the French in 1806 and the collapse of the Prussian state was nearly complete in three weeks with the destruction of the Prussian army.

Even when Prussia was resurgent in 1813, the average Prussian was not very enthused with being shot at and conscription in some areas of Prussia had to be done by force.

Prussian 'nationalism' and German 'nationalism' were not the same thing, and the nationalists in Germany were not in the majority, even in Prussia in 1813. And it should be remembered that the Prussian reformers and what they wanted to do with Prussia and Germany were shunted aside by Frederick William and the conservatives after the shooting was over and the need for reform passed, Fichte and others of his ilk notwithstanding.

B

Interesting posts Kevin. Clearly you have gone away and done some research then come back with some great responses. I just hope the relevant people will not simply cry foul and start the usual round of insults without constructive criticism. I think you will stir up a hornets nests with the latter posts about 'Germany', and I'm not sure we should go there again so soon after the last argument! But your other posts about the finances of Napoleonic France and the 'new way of war' are excellent ones.
I was pretty sure that Summerfield and others were on the wrong track in regards to the financial situation, but I was too lazy to hit the books and address it myself. So I am glad you have done so.

Thanks.

Germany was brought up by others in this thread, and the information was 'interesting' to say the least, so I believed something should be said.

The thread has strayed far afield from Russian artillery, but we'll see how it goes.

B

France was neither bankrupt nor particularly in debt during the Napoleonic wars, mainly because France had a poor reputation for reliability with regard to servicing and repaying debt and was generally unable to obtain credit from anyone other than the Banque de France (established in 1800) and, to a very limited extend indeed, its own population through the issue of bonds, so actually found it very difficult to get itself into debt.

This reputation for fiscal incapability was gained under the Bourbons (particularly after France was unable to service or repay the loans it had taken out to cover the costs of assisting the rebellion in some of Britain's North American colonies) and became worse during the French revolution.

Through sound fiscal policy, Napoleon manageed to restore some of this reputation; he increased taxation in France (and conquered/allied territories) in order to fund the state and help fund bond and loan repayments. Within France, this increase was largely through indirect taxes rather than direct taxation. Unfortunately for France, his fall resulted in massive reparations having to be paid to the states that he had taxed (or robbed depending on one's point of view), destabilising French fiscal policy for decades to come.

A very readable, although very basic, paper on this is available at:

link

When discussing economics, it is very important to understand the difference between "fiscal" and "financial"; some of the posts in this thread have demonstrated a level of confusion around this.