"Russian Artillery firing 'too high' at Borodino" Topic

"The approach of Stephen Summerfield – with his SOJ – is much superior and one is clearly able to access good sources – factual based and by that can form ones own opinion, thank you for that."

Agree completely!

'Engineering the Revolution – Arms and Enlightenment in France 1763-1815 by Ken Alder
The Development of Technical Education in France 1500-1850 by Frederick Artz
The Système Gribeauval – A Study of Technological Development and Institutional Change in Eighteenth Century France by Howard Rosen'

'Relying only on those works won't do to learn more about Prussian – Austrian or Russian artillery.
In fact they are useless for that.
Relying on those only, you are also missing a lot about French artillery and the problems French artillery officers had with it.'

You have taken what I said completely out of context and misrepresented it. Haven't you accused other posters of 'cherry-picking' in the past. You have actually done it here.

What was said was the following to correct the error(s) in your posting:

'There are three good starting points here for that subject: Engineering the Revolution by Ken Alder; The Development of Technical Education in France by Frederick Artz; and The Systeme Gribeauval by Howard Rosen. Archival research was conducted by the authors and the bibliographies are expecially valuable for further research.'

The point of the posting was that the three books were a 'good starting points' and that 'the bibliographies are especially valuable for further research.'

So, you not only misquoted or paraphrased incorrectly, you missed the point entirely. That being said, next time at least attempt to get it right, not what you did this time. Your posting changed the entire point and intent of what had been written.

B

Gee, I thought that the three sources were what "Brechtel" said when he posted them :
"The Prussians had no artillery school until 1791, which was quite late, and the Russians had problems with their education system, both in general and in particular the technical schools (artillery and engineer). References have been provided for both. There are three good starting points here for that subject:"
I am not misquoting or paraphrasing. I just copy/pasted what "Brechtel" wrote. I expected that "that subject" and "both" referred to the two comments about the Prussians and the Russians. Is my English so bad then?

But now I see we are told to use instead their bibliographies as a starting point (really? or is Brechtel just trying to change the subject?).

OK, to the bibiliographies….

There are roughly 900 citations in Adler's bibliography. Of these, I found 1 (one!) not in English or French and a total of 7 not originally written in English or French, and none of these about the Napoleonic era:
-- 3 works by Frederick II, in transaltion
-- 1 work by Galileo, in translation
-- 1 work by v. Goethe, in translation
-- 1 work by Tartaglia in Italian and 1 in translation (Adler could read 16th Century Italian? Wow!).
But this is not a problem with Adler ….. he was writing about the French of the 18th Century!

But how should we draw conclusions about Austria, Russia, or Prussia in the Napoleonic era from the works listed in this massive bibliography?

The other bibliographies are similar.

I am having a hard time not agreeing with "Relying only on those works won't do to learn more about Prussian – Austrian or Russian artillery [of the Napoleonic era]. In fact they are useless for that." It is a very strongly worded judgement, but it appears correct to me so far.

'All that is theoretical and matching to reality. Your comments…We may never agree or understand each other so talk in different levels.'

First, I framed no question. I stated what an artillery system is: it isn't merely the hardware, but also education, doctrine, tactics, command and control, and the people in general who populate the artillery arm.
We have much more than ‘the physical quantifiable part.' If that's what you actually believe, then you haven't studied artillery as much as I thought you may have. Or, perhaps you're uncomfortable with the unquantifiable part and cannot make a conclusion as to value, functioning, and overall effectiveness of an artillery arm. Your comment on Gassendi is an indicator of this lack.

I am impressed, though, with your ability to use a strawman argument, which you do very often.

And du Teil is an up-to-date manual, the only of its kind of the period. The Austrians, British, Russians, and Prussians had no overall doctrinal publication that discussed artillery matters above and beyond the battery level.

And, yes, some artillery arms were better and more competent than others, especially at the higher levels of command. That's not a ‘quantifiable' subject-it's about people and soldiers and how they are trained and react in combat.

And I do believe that you missed the point regarding the three books I referenced. Apparently it is pointless to continue that part of the discussion.

And Rosen's paper is right on the mark. While some French ordnance changed during the period to 1815, it was still the Gribeauval System and the changes he made that were in effect in the Grande Armee. The Systeme AN XI never came into fruition with the exception of two field pieces, so they did not replace Gribeauval's light artillery, they merely augmented it.

And you are wrong if you believe that ‘There is alas so little about how guns were used in the period.' That is absolute nonsense. If you want to begin to read about artillery employment, take a look at Grand Artilleurs by Girdo de l'Ain. The after action reports of Eble, Senarmont, and Drouot are very helpful.

It does seem to me that too many of your historical ‘judgments' are incorrect and that making up designations for artillery systems that didn't exist (your ‘M' series) is historically wrong. It is misleading and to my mind misrepresents what actually was in existence and what took place.

My comments on the Prussian artillery is based on research, as are those on the Russians. The Prussian artillery had myriad problems from employment, command and control, and basic tactics. Further, they had no artillery school until 1791 which is a definite problem, and their artillery organization in 1813-1815 was flawed. If you don't agree, then state your case. You haven't done that.

Your continued statements about being a scientist are fine, but are not in question here. I'm am both anengineer and historica by degree and education and was a professional soldier in a technical specialty. What's your point? What we're supposed to be doing here is talking history, not science, and historical inquiry is assembling facts and making an historical conclusion. You are making statements without backing them up with factual material, and most of your statements are quite sweeping, which can be a problem.

B

‘Command and control is essential on the modern battlefield BUT what was possible then. You could not see the next gun or target through smoke. Communication was done by signal, drum or trumpet. Your voice carries tens of yards. Orders transmitted at the speed and competance of the carrier.'

This posting of yours exemplifies the main differences between us regarding artillery. You state that you want to bring a ‘scientific' approach to artillery, which is fine regarding the gun tubes, ammunition, gun carriages, and ancillary vehicles-those things can be quantified.
What you neglect is the human element, which is the most important one. There was effective command and control in the French artillery arm, and that has been shown in many instances, quite a few of them to you, which apparently you ignore.

As to battlefield communications, drum, trumpet and mounted courier were all used quite effectively.

And the usual fall back position of 'too much smoke' is an over-reliance on an old excuse for effective artillery employment. Batteries/companies usually would fire by piece, and it is specifically stated in French manuals that fall of shot was observed and one over, one short, and then fire on target was an accepted method of observed fire.

The very fact that there was an artillery chain of command in the Grande Armee, and that it was also being developed in the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian armies, which has also been shown to you, clearly demonstrates that command and control was not only present, but used.

Without it, such actions as Senarmont at Friedland, Drouot at Lutzen and on other fields would not have been possible.
And leaving out the human element also demonstrates a lack of knowledge and perspective on just what an artillery system is-it isn't merely the hardware. And that is why you fail.

B

"I'm am both anengineer and historica by degree and education"

Where did you do your PhD in history? What was the subject? What are your qualifications to be an historian?

It is sad that what was an interesting and respectful discussion has turned into "I am right and everyone who disagrees with me is wrong" since Brechtel198 became involved.

I have a masters in military history from Norwich University. I don't believe, nor was I aware that you had to have a PHD in history to be an historian.

Some of the people that I know who do have PHDs in history are not historians.

Anything else you'd like to know, such as my shoe size?

Sincerely,
M

In most universities a PhD is regarded as a basic requirement for one to decribe onself as an historian as it is only through a PhD that one acquires, and can demonstrate, the research, synthesis, and analytical skills required of an historian.

If you did an MA in Military History at Norwich, was it by attendance or correspondence/online?

Your shoe size is irrelevant as it has no relationship to your claim to be an historian.

Sarcasm is lost on some, unfortunately.

I took my courses on line and I found it to be excellent as well as challenging.

Again, I see no requirement of having a PHD to become an historian.

And I make no claim to being an 'academic' historian and would never want to be one.

And I have no interest in getting a PHD. It isn't worth the money or travel, though I understand now that Oxford is offering PHDs on line.

Now, if you wish to get into a discussion (which obviously you do) on this subject, I don't because it will degenerate into your usual round of nonsense, condescenion and ad hominem comments.

And, like spending the time and money to get a degree I don't need, that is useless.

B

Thank you for the information; it answered the questions and gave me, and others I hope, an understanding of the veracity of your claim to be an historian.

"nonsense, condescenion and ad hominem comments"…pot, kettle?

Oxford does not offer any PhDs, let alone online ones.

Remember what is often said about sarcasm and wit;).

If we are all giving our educational credentials ….

I am not an historian.

My undergraduate work was in mathematics (computational approaches to number theorectic and cryptogrpahic problems) and economics (econometric input-output models of national economies).

My graduate work was in law (France – international law and diplomacy) and electronic engineering (USA – optimzed signal processors for electronic warfare).

I have been recently selected for a Russian Kandidat nauk degree (like Ph.D.) in international finance (social networking approaches for broad public capital formation in developing economies).

After some years in the Navy and working in defense and high tech, now for employment the people who pay me seem to be under the impression that I am an investment banker. Fools they are, I am sure!

I have no claim to knowing anything about history.

So please, do not think that I can write or say any kind of historical judgement worth your time or consideration. Just click on the links I post, read the original sources, in full (and hopefully in the original languages) and decide for yourself.

I try to avoid convincing anybody of anything here. If my poor writing skills make it seem like I am trying to convince you of something, please just ignore me and read the original sources.

This thread has been a very interesting read. My take has always been that the big 5 Nations of the era, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England all had well trained and highly motivated artillerists. I tend to give a slight edge to the French for a couple of reasons.

1) It is with artillery that one makes war. I don't think anyone else of the era was as adept as Napoleon and the French at utilizing a massed battery to make a decisive point along the line of battle.

2) The French were involved in more land battles and had more battlefield live fire experience.

With Borodino its important to remember the overall picture. Kutaisov was killed leading a charge leaving a great number of Russian guns out of action for the day. Sorry I don't recall the number of guns but I feel their is a direct correlation between the 35,000 French and 45,000 Russian casualties, compared with the number of guns that were out of action due to Kutaisov's death. And factor in a slight edge for the French.

Dear Ashenduke
About the myth of Borodino you should read Mikaberidze superb book on Borodino and the Russian sources. The Russian Artillery was rotated. Once they had exhausted their ammunition they were replaced. This was an advance over the older systems used by the French.

The effectiveness of Grand Batteries was born out of the writers from the WWI generation who remembered the effect of barrages. Gun powder artillery was not like that. The Grand Battery denied the enemy a portion of ground and would suffer severely if he stood in front of it.

The inventive use of French artillery was something seen before 1809. After this date the use of the Grand Battery was an attempt to compensate for the deterioration of the Infantry. Frederick the Great had to resort to this in the later 7YW.

Stephen

1) I believe (this is a hunch, so shoot me down if you can) that the term "massed batteries" arose in the theoretical pre-war reform discussions and meant more than 2 guns – i.e. independent rather than batallion guns.
Grand batteries did not show up until later. The Russians used one effectively at Eylau, and the Austrians at Aspern. It wasn't until Wagram that Napoleon got around to it, and subsequent battles became particularly bloody.

2) I think experience was key for all branches. The Russians and Prussians won the second go round, and the Austrians certainly did much better.

Nearly every Russian gun got into action at Borodino. The disparity in casualties leads me to beleive they are probably understated for the French and that the Russian's preference for 12lbers substantially hurt their ROF and therefore their effectiveness.

'About the myth of Borodino you should read Mikaberidze superb book on Borodino and the Russian sources. The Russian Artillery was rotated. Once they had exhausted their ammunition they were replaced. This was an advance over the older systems used by the French.'

What was 'the older systems used by the French'? Do you know how the French operated their artillery and infantry ammunition resupply system?

In short, as the Austrians and the British finally did, they pushed the ammunition forward to the gun companies so that the artillery did not have to pull out of position to be resupplied. That is a much more efficient system than pulling firing batteries out of line to be resupplied.

B

'The effectiveness of Grand Batteries was born out of the writers from the WWI generation who remembered the effect of barrages. Gun powder artillery was not like that. The Grand Battery denied the enemy a portion of ground and would suffer severely if he stood in front of it.'

Where did you come up with this idea? The French used massed artillery offensively, especially after Senarmont's artillery attack at Friedland in 1807. What the French did was maneuver large batteries of artillery close to that portion of the enemy line selected for the main effort. Then the artillery would open fire quite literally at point-blank range and blow a section of the enemy line to pieces and then the French infantry would attack to follow up the success.

I would like to see a source, or sources, for what you have written here.

B

'The inventive use of French artillery was something seen before 1809. After this date the use of the Grand Battery was an attempt to compensate for the deterioration of the Infantry. Frederick the Great had to resort to this in the later 7YW.'

Frederick's employment of artillery and the French employment of artillery were not the same at all.

Competent generals had massed their artillery before the French Revolutionary Wars. What the French did was to mass their artillery at the decisive point on the battlefield to seize the tactical initiative and using the artillery in an attack on that portion of the enemy line by fire and maneuver. For the French, their artillery from 1807 on was utilized as a maneuver element on a par with the cavalry and infantry and could now be employed as a supported, vice a supporting, unit.

B

@ Summerfield

"The Russian Artillery was rotated. Once they had exhausted their ammunition they were replaced. This was an advance over the older systems used by the French."

This is the exact system that Clauzewitz – a prussian artillery officer of the period – blaims for the ineffectiveness of prussian artillery. He directly states that the artillery fired of their ammo quickly, because they knew that they would be pulled out of the line when depleted. I do not think you get much better evidence than that of an atilleryman descriping the deficiencies of his own states arm.

When it come to wargame terms I think it is evident that artillery should be rated on at least four qualities.

1) Offensive doctrine, meaning the willingness to advance aggressively to inflict maximum damage on the enemy. A wargamer is always willing to do that, if he plays a general he should be restricted by the doctrine of his army.

2) Defensive doctrine, the willingness to stand before and advance and risk loosing the guns compared to limbering and going before the enemy got close (which in my view happened more often than the first)

3) Quality of fire, meaning the ability to place your self in a position to throw the metal where you want it and actually hitting.

4) Ammo supply. This should represent the on hands supply and the ability to bring up new ammo. In wargames terms this is how long you can stay in a position firing and still be able to keep up an effective fire as compared to having to fall back with the battery and be replenished.

In our houserules we have abstracted all of the above, which makes for a very vried gaming experience with different types of artillery.

Dear Sparta
1. Clausewitz was not an artilleryman.
2. He was complaining of the practice of firing off their ammunition as quickly as possible.
3. That was the disadvantage of the system but it put fresh units into the line.
4. He referred to Prussian Artillery and not Russian.

Again there are plenty of slurs against the technical arms especially by Wellington who accused the RHA & RA of cowardice at Waterloo.

Now restricting to doctrine of the army is always a problem as these are rarely written down in the manuals etc… Can I ask where these are written for the French. Certainly in the Prussian 1812, it is evident. As I have stated that there is often very little in the manuals talking about tactics above a pair of guns let alone a battery.

Ammunition supply is rarely instigated in games and too much long range fire is used. Co-ordination of batteries was very difficult. Artillery at this time was area effect and being able to co-ordinate against a particular battalion was improbable from two batteries.

Again we are talking two levels here. Reality and the wargame which is a simulation or should be.
Stephen

Von Clauswitz is not "on point" for the Russians of 1812-1815. The critique is given for using battery rotation as the main means of ammunition resupply. The Russian system was different.

First one should note the size and organic assets of a Russian artillery company. This was 12 guns (plus perhaps 2 spares – about double the size of a French artillerie company), plus the equivalent of two French artillery train companies, plus a substantial organic capability for technical services (about the size of 1/2 of a French artillery armorers company plus 1/2 a French artillery workers company) and included a local supply of spare and repair tools. The artillery company was a Russian artillery lieutenant colonel's command (seniority, pay and nobiliary rank of a Army infantry colonel). The personnel total was near to 400 men, roughly 4 times the size of a French atillery company.
The main orgainizing regulation was ПСЗ № 20.672 19.iii.1803 O.S. (as amended) available here : link

The reporting structure for the battery commander was to an artillery general or senior colonel (commanding an artillery brigade) on the staff of an infantry division – typically three artillery companies per division, 2 light and one battery (heavy) company with 36 or more pieces, rather a "Grand Battery" all on is own. The line of command led thence to the chief of artillery at the Army headquarters. The supply channel was similar : after exhausting the organic load-out of ammunition, the artillery company commander could get immediate re-supply from other companies in his brigade. If not, the re-supply would be handled through the Army headquarters and be sourced from the Army train. This could be either by caisson rotation or by company rotation.
The main organizing regulation was ПСЗ № 20.672 27.i.1812 O.S.

The choice of company rotation vs. caisson rotation was based on (i) the availibility of reserve artillery brigades to provide for the rotation and (ii) the depth of the Russian tactical position, and (iii) the degree of damage and exhaustion of the artillery company. In a comparatively narrow and deep position (such as Borodino) there would be little tactical benefit to lining up all the artillery wheel to wheel, and so there would be reserve companies available. Equally, in a very intense battle (such as Borodino) the crews would have begun to tire and the artillery equipment might sustain some damage. By moving to the resrve, the artillery company could rest the gunners and immediately use their organnic repair capability to effect repairs while getting re-supplied. Some elements of the Russian equipment design were chosen with this capability in mind (for examples,the French-type screw elevating mechanism and iron axle shafts were tested and determined to be hard to repair and less reliable especially in extreme cold conditions).

In general, learning from Austerlitz perhaps, the Russians increasing fought in comparatively narrow and deep positions. So, the opportunity for company rotation was more often available.

Similar to the case of the Russian artillery sights, the Russians used both a method similar to the French (caisson rotatation) and somehting of their own design (company rotation). To suggest that Russian artillerists tried to quickly expend their ammuntion in order to get relieved is (i) unsupported by any contemporary source, (ii) reflective of a mis-understanding of Russian arttilery re-supply systems, and (iii) a tad insulting to the artillerists who had indeed a great reputation for standing under enemy fire for long periods, a common Russian "national characteristic" of the era.

The Russian "double" re-supply system was indeed pretty expensive, and was applied to an artillery arm of serivce of rather heroic size. However, in an essentially feudal economy, the notion of "budget" or "expense" had a different application than in western Europe or Britain.

The organic ammunition available in the Russian artillery company was substantial. Taking the 6-lber gun as an example :
- 4 rounds on the carriage
- 20 rounds on the limber
- 51 rounds in the caisson
The number of caissions per gun would be 2 or 3 (3 being typial fo rthe first line at Borodino), depending on the tactical situation, giving a total of 126 or 177 rounds organic to the artillery company per gun.
For comparison, the French provided 1 cassion with the gun and used a shuttle system otherwise. Ideally, between the French artillery companies and the division artillery parks 170 rounds of ammunition would be alloted by the French per piece. The Russian method at Borodino pushed 177 rounds up to the gun, and then cycled either the caission or the company to an Army park.

Of course, if you don't know Russian, I have little idea where you would read this. But, the following may be OK for machine translation, and gives more description:
link
link
link
link
lib.rus.ec/b/187233/read
link
link
link

=======================================

The question of losses and loss reporting is filled with many many issues. I do not think that taking only one (side's) report of the losses – and that at a summary level and as found in a modern secondary source – is likely to be very instructive.

Competent generals had massed their artillery before the French Revolutionary Wars. What the French did was to mass their artillery at the decisive point on the battlefield to seize the tactical initiative and using the artillery in an attack on that portion of the enemy line by fire and maneuver. For the French, their artillery from 1807 on was utilized as a maneuver element on a par with the cavalry and infantry and could now be employed as a supported, vice a supporting, unit.

Indeed. I read another chapter of Britten-Austin's book last night; it seems aggressive & brilliant offensive artillery manouvres were used again by the French at the battle of Maloroslavets (please excuse the spelling). Seruzier carried out a great outflanking manouvre with his guns and then blasted the Russian lines from the rear as they were engaged with Eugene's Infantry. This allowed Eugene to achieve a victory against a numerically far superior Russian army.

Sparta said

1) Offensive doctrine, meaning the willingness to advance aggressively to inflict maximum damage on the enemy. A wargamer is always willing to do that, if he plays a general he should be restricted by the doctrine of his army.

Funnily enough I was thinking about this same issue myself. I think your correct and it is important to restrict the offensive usage of artillery by Nations that did not use this kind of doctrine.. Sparta, how do you abstract your rules to represent this issue?

Telestic
Agreed – an an excellent example, often overlooked.

The place is "Малоярославец" or "Maloyaroslavets".

The monanastery or convent tha figured so much in the battle has been restored since the end of the Soviet era by the lady monks of St. Elizabeth Otrada monastery. The lady monks (is there English for "lady monk"?) run an wonderful girls' orphange and school there. The historical museum is not so bad. But if you ever go there, do also go and make a donation for the orhpans at the convent.

Lady monk = nun

Seroga,
Do you feel that my statement that the French were up against a "numerically far superior Russian army is correct"? After writing my post I went on Wikipedia (mainly to check the spelling of the "Maloyaroslavets") and I was slightly surprised to see Wiki has the numbers on each side as being very close. My understanding is that the Russians had far more soldiers available than the French, even if they were not all utilised. The Russian position also seemed to have been a very strong one. Why did Kutuzov not win this battle?

P.S. if I ever visit the area I will be sure to make a donation to the orphans and their "lady monks"!

@Sparta

You should read Malinovsky and Bonin, where they battles and clashes are reported and how the artillery fought.

I cannot see a lot of ineffective Prussian artillery, instead aggressive handling such as Gross Beeren, or Dennewitz

Telestic
Maloyaroslavets was rather a meeting engagement, with forces arriving from both sides. And both sides had more troops that "could have gotten there in time" to fight, but for various reasons didn't.

The battle space was actually quite limited : the river crossing, the monastery and then the town. So practically, the question of "superior numbers" really never applied.

The French never go out of the town, but they forced the crossing by clever movement and (as you noted) great utactical use of artilery in the offensive and then fought a bloody and eventually successful battle to hold what became the burning ashes of the town, giving them a good "strategic" bridgehead to the south, albeit with a difficult river to the immediate rear. But the Russians held them there, literally sitting in the ashes of the town among the dead.

The Russians had thus gained space/time and were concentrating and Napoléon decided (for reasons that are variously reported) that he would not give another battle like Borodino in order to force the move south, but instead resolved to retreat over the same route as the advance in the summer.

The Russians did not either like the idea of going across the river to have a big battle with the the river behind them, and displaced west also.

The prince Eugène and his 4e corps, more than 1/2 Italians, had fought brilliantly, the artillery included. But their skill and great sacrfices had conferred on the French no real advantage, while continuing the process of irreplacable personnnel and material losses.

The battle makes a great wargame, I think.

The battle makes a great wargame, I think.

Agreed! I'm definitely going to war-game it one day.

The Russians had thus gained space/time and were concentrating and Napoléon decided (for reasons that are variously reported) that he would not give another battle like Borodino in order to force the move south, but instead resolved to retreat over the same route as the advance in the summer.

This was the momentous decision that would eventually cost Napoleon his Empire! If he had continued on to Kaluga I think he could have captured it without another Borodino. There are some good indications that the Russians did not want to get involved in another huge battle either. Napoleon did not have the benefit of hindsight of course, but if he had carried along the Kaluga road it is probable that the Grande Armee would not have been destroyed in the subsequent retreat. There may not even have been a retreat, he could have wintered in the Ukraine, with it's milder climate.

"in the Ukraine, with it's milder climate"

Not so milder, really. And less sparsely settled, fewer roads. Farther from the Gand Armée's bases in East Prussia and northeast Poland. The Pripet marshes. Fewer ethnic Lithuanians in the population. And another Russian Army.

I think Kutuzov would have given at least a decent sized battle before Kaluga (compare Ostovno in the summer), but might have let the French go somewhat easily, just to see them fully separate from the factories, depots and road junctions at Tula.

And where "south" do the French go? Bryasnk? Orël'? Hack a way west through marshes and forests to …? Roslavl'? Have you ever been to Roslavl? There is (and was) no "there" there.

And how do you get supplies/replacements through from the Brest – Lublin area when there are partizans, Cossack/Native cavalry and a brigade sized "long range" force floating around, not to mention the un-surrendered fortresses at Bobruysk at Mozyr'? (Not that Napoléon ever even noticed these in the summer, once the prince Bagration had moved north).

But …. you never know what "might have been".
:-)

Not so milder, really. And less sparsely settled, fewer roads. Farther from the Gand Armée's bases in East Prussia and northeast Poland.

But settling in over the winter in and around Kaluga could surely not have turned out worse than what actually happened? Would it have been possible to winter there then re-open the campaign in early spring? I.e. leave the french armies in the West to their own devices, and attempt to rejoin with them the following year.

And where "south" do the French go?

India!

I am joking of course, but I don't doubt that Napoleon had an obsession with following in the footsteps of Alexander the Great and conquering Asia. He certainly took enough maps with him when he left Paris.
One thing about Napoleon, he always thought BIG!!!…..

The major problem that Napoleon would have faced wherever he ended up, including Kaluga or Roslavl (which I have been to!), was the lack of availability of supply. Getting supplies through would have been impossible and it is hard to see how the army could have survived the winter in any meaningful way, wherever it was holed up. A Napoleonic army with no horses was not an effective army and I cannot see how the remaining horses could have been kept alive for the spring.

A retreat along the Kaluga road would probably not have been very different from the retreat that did happen; the French lacked the resources to obtain adequate supplies and would still have been harried by the cossacks etc.

Napoleon's invasion of Russia, and probably his empire, were doomed once the Russians refused to follow his plan and fight a major battle somewhere near the border. The retreat may have been unpopular with many Russians, especially once it reached the Russian heartland, but it was a well thought-out plan and possibly the only one that could have succeeded.

"winter in and around Kaluga"
Nothing there to eat. Few people. Few buildings. Lots of Russians. Not a happy place at all.

Only place in Russia that the French might have wintered successfullly was Smolensk (this could be supported from Poland …. further east and the draft animals eat more in transit than their loads).

Actually, Moscow was not impossible, if you could keep the place from geting burnt whiling looking very very carefully for food resources and putting the whole (victorious) Grand Armée on siege rations. But then …. what do you do in the Spring? Surrender? Cannibalism?

The idea of India seems to have actually surfaced after Tilsit. The idea was to take care of the Turks, Persians and British possessions in India in combination with the Russians. There were similar arrangements to get the British out of the Baltic and Denmark and "pacify" Scandanavia for Russia.

The most interesting thing about the India concept for the Russians was getting at the Turks. And the French really did not stab their quasi-ally in the back the way the Russians had hoped for. The rest of that "Great Project" never got started.

The whole thing sounds like a game of Risk, no?

But there was an asymmetry in the expectations of the parties at Tilsit. The French thought they had just beaten the Russians, that they had done something like 1805 in Austria or 1806 with Prussia.

The Russians had just lost a battle with an expeditionary force on foreign territory. They could make a deal or raise another expeditionary force. It mattered nothing to them either way.

If the deal looked good for them, especially as pertained to their northern and southern borders, then why not try taking the deal? If the deal feel apart, they could fight the French some more later.

The French thought they had won, that they had defeated the Russian Empire. The Russians did not at all think that they had lost more than some rather modest battle in the suburbs of Königsberg ….. "Hey Sergey! They lost another 25,000 guys somewhere in Germany – remember to conscript an extra 40,000 this summer." End of "problem". The Emperor essentially "owns" 60 million people, and all their labor value or productive ouput, not even counting the Native populations. The Russian Emperor could reallly ignore casualites, costs, expenses, time, etc. in pursuing his policies.

If a Russian Emperor ever said "A man like me troubles himself little about a million men" no one would have been surprised enough to even note it as a quote.

And as was seen again in 1812, the French (well, Napoléon really …. lots of folks were warning him about the error he was making) persistently thought that winning or losing battles would have some impact on the Russians. Such battles really did not matter that much to them, in the broader context of their geopolitics.

And (under Kutuzov, Bagration, Platov and company) even the Russian military came to see that breaking the Grand Armée, creating hundreds of thousands of dead French and Allied corpses, is what really mattered, not winning battles.

Overall, very asymmetrical. Hard to analyze. And hard to game above the level of single battles.

pas de charge,

Next time you are in Roslavl', remember …. don't call me!
:-)

And the supply problem starts just east of Smolensk (even without Cossack/Native cavalry, partizans, and flying columns causing trouble). You can just calculate it : how much does the ox or horse eat per day, how much can it carry, how many km per day can it go? Where does the load-carrying capability end?

Oooooops! We have a major problem less than 100 km east of Smolensk. And it would take years (plural) to develop the resources and transit infrastructure to enable movement to Moscow to be adequately supplied. The Russians had just spent the better part of 5 years just to ensure that their own armies, on friendly territory, could be supplied from Moscow to their own borders!

Ever try to get something by truck from, say, eastern Germany delivered to Moscow? It is still not so easy even today!
:-)

"Napoleon's invasion of Russia, and probably his empire, were doomed once the Russians refused to follow his plan"
Yeah …. asymmentry is sure a b***h, isn't she ?

Even when Napoleon took Cairo in 1798, his real plan was to go on to India and start a new Empire in the East, like his hero Alexander the Great. After the failure to take Acre he exclaimed about Sidney Smith that "That man made me lose my destiny!". It's almost as if the young Bonaparte said to himself after Acre, "my dream is lost, Asia is not to be!…..Oh well maybe I should take over France (and Europe instead!).
So yes, the whole thing is much like a giant real life game of Risk!

The dream re-surfaced again after Tilsit, and again in 1812. But by then Napoleon had a mistress called France that he was chained to, so his fanciful dreams were never a real possibility.

After Moscow, I guess the only real possibility was a retreat on Smolensk then. But he left it far too late!

Telestic,

Napoléon is really exciting and interesting. Great dreams, great ideas, great plans. Maybe a little hard on the commmon folks, but really for the era possibly quite visionary.

The winners, esepcially the Russians and British, are less attractive characters in the drama. The Russians – feudal, religious, unyeilding, devoted to an authoritarian form of government, almost "asiatic" or "barbaric". The British – perfidious, commercial, calculating, buying victory with gold and other nations' lives whenever possible, creating a future world under their economic domination.

But really, could the French Empire have ever hoped to defeat either of these powers, let alone the idea of surviving while fighting both of them?

Napoléon's best game was to more or less surrender in 1810, getting as many nation-states as possible created (Catalonia, Walloonia, Flemingland, Poland, Hungary and a host of statelets among German-speakers). Get the best terms possible and hope for the French Empire or "Union" to survive long enough to develop industrially and commercially.

But, how visionary would Napoléon have to have been to decide to surrender when he was the great winner, master of most of Europe? So he decided to keep going …. against Britain and Russia.

It's like a Greek tragedy!

Great summary Seroga. I think that is exactly why I have always been fascinated by the Napoleonic era, and always will be. The Uniforms, the tactics and Battles, the personalities, the variety of Armies……and towering over these 20 odd years of almost constant war and drama; the fascinating figure of the self-made Emperor.

As there ever been a period in history to match it?
The Second World War?
The few decades either side of the AD-BC change-over?
Star Wars Episodes I-VI?
Lol.

I guess our own times are pretty interesting too, come to think of it!

Could never get into the Second World War gaming. Just lacks the personalities, dash and flair of Napoleonics. Has some potential for skirmishes but nothing competes with Napoleonics.

This has been a very interesting thread to read, as a layman with no particular interest in artillery. It's always good to hear from Russian and German sources and those that can read them.

Dear Matt
This is another example of the problems of relying upon English and French sources only. Also we must consider the national characteristics of the writers, the date it was written and what the audience was. This is a severe problem for French sources as in 1815, the monarchy came on the throne so any invention etc… made in the previous 25 years was suspect. Then post 1848-1870 we have the Second Empire dominated by Napoleon III who championed his own artillery system and the mythe of Napoleon etc…
Stephen

There is a very strong argument, for which I am indebted to a good friend, that Napoleon was forced to try to build a continental European empire, which is difficult as it can only be done by overcoming other major powers, in order to attempt to compete with the growing overseas British empire, which was created more easily by stealing the lands of less advanced peoples.

In this view, the Napoleonic wars are really the last gasp of the centuries long conflict between France and Britain, a conflict which France was doomed to lose once Britain had obtained its empire, the economic power that went with it, and a navy that was capable of denying France access to an overseas empire of its own.

France did not have a modern financial system and could not borrow or lend as the British could. The British had adopted the Dutch system when William III came to power.

France was forever going bankrupt and still suffered that. The only way to balance the books was to conquer more lands. Asset strip those lands and produce a protected trade system. That is what the continental system was. It ruined the ecconies that were constrained to abide by it. The Kingdom of Holland had to be absorbed. It forced France into Portugal and then Spain. The final straw was that of Russia who from 1810 could not afford to shut its doors to British trade. The Prussian economy was ruined by this time with no outlets for its cereals, linen and wool.

Napoleon could not understand the new way of war. He was always in debt. France could not maintain conquests as it had done with ease up to 1809.
Stephen

Yet the fascinating thing is that the capitol Cities of these two opposing Empires were only a few hundred miles away from each other. If Napoleon could have gained control of the English Channel for a few hours then London could have been seized by the French armies & their Allies. Much easier to say than to do, which is probably why Napoleon instead tried to strangle Britain with the continental system (which brings us full circle to the main cause of the 1812 invasion of Russia, and the destruction of Napoleon's Grande Armee).

It is easy with hindsight to assume the British were always going to win the epic strugle, but I'm not at all sure the British themselves saw it that way at the time. Neither did the French!

'Napoléon's best game was to more or less surrender in 1810…'

That is one of the most incredibly naive and fantastic statements that I have ever read regarding the period.

And the French had beaten the Russians in 1799, 1805, and 1807, the latter ending in a treaty of alliance.

What Napoleon should not have done was invade Portugal and Spain, employ the Continental System, and invade Russia.

And at the end of the Russian campaign in late 1812, the war wasn't over, it was just beginning.

B

In 1810 Napoleonic France was at the absolute peak of it's powers. It was thinking of many more glorious victories, not surrender!!!

Napoleon could not understand the new way of war.

Napoleon WAS the new way of War! Just ask his enemies….

Like protectionism used in the last century. It fails in a free market. It could be said that USA used a similar strategy to bring down USSR in the 1990s. USA had bigger pockets.

The Continental System was forced upon Napoleon probably by the same supporters who re-instated slavery to French dominions. The old slaving families supported his 1799 coup. This did nothing to reform the rotten state of French finances. This is clearly shown by the skimping upon the expensive business of artillery.

Napoleon thought he could overawe the Tsar but underestimated a religious fanatic who lead a crusade against Napoleon. The bankrupting of the supporters of the Tsar and the absorbing of the German state was a foolish political gamble. Amongst many that Napoleon performed.
Stephen

Dear Telestic
Alas Napoleon was the peak of the old manner of war. He was not of the war by other means. Economic warfare.
Stephen

And what 'old manner of war' was that? Shooting and getting shot at? We still do that.

So, again, to what 'old manner of war' are you referring?

B

'The Continental System was forced upon Napoleon probably by the same supporters who re-instated slavery to French dominions. The old slaving families supported his 1799 coup. This did nothing to reform the rotten state of French finances. This is clearly shown by the skimping upon the expensive business of artillery.'

'Napoleon thought he could overawe the Tsar but underestimated a religious fanatic who lead a crusade against Napoleon. The bankrupting of the supporters of the Tsar and the absorbing of the German state was a foolish political gamble. Amongst many that Napoleon performed.'

What are your source(s) for 'skimping upon the expensive business of artillery' and that the Continental System was probably 'forced upon him…by the same supporters who re-instated slavery to French dominions.'

And what are your source(s) for the following: 'The old slaving families supported his 1799 coup. This did nothing to reform the rotten state of French finances.'?

And Napoleon did reform French finances and put the Empire on a firm financial footing.

Which 'German State' did Napoleon absord? If you're referring to the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine, that was an organization of many German states, not one, and how was it foolish?

Again, you're making broad, sweeping statements based only on opinion (apparently) and not on source material, unless you can demonstrate it.

B

Dear Kevin
As you should know well in 1810, Napoleon annexed Holland, the Hanseatic towns and Oldenburg into Metropolitan France. The latter was closely related to the Tsar.

Please supply me with sources about Napoleon puting France on a firm financial footing. I have seen no evidence upon this.

On the other statements, I refer you to my books on the subjects.
Stephen

Ah, the "firm financial footing." Another one from the Greatest Hits album. This is an annual topic:

TMP link

* *

For those who don't want to wade through the last iteration, here is the précis:

Napoleon set himself up for a vicious cycle that could only end in economic collapse eventually. It was just a matter of when.

In order to wage war, he needs armies on a scale hitherto-undreamed-of, which are massively expensive. France itself is tapped-out; taxes are as high as they've ever been and can't go any higher. By 1807 the continental bond markets are similarly exhausted. France can't secure loans below 8.5% anymore, which in those days was considered borderline Junk status. (Britain borrowed at rates between 3.5% and 5.5%).

So there is only one remaining way to get the funds: exploitation of conquered territories. Across Spain, Italy, Germany, Poland, and elsewhere, French authorities and their satellite regimes were forced to contribute huge sums to pay for the maintenance of French forces. (In Westphalia, for example, the French "contributions" were equal to 50% of the national budget! Plus additional funds for the maintenance of the large French garrison in Magdeburg.) There were huge transfers of land and wealth, which inevitably led to cronyism and corrupt patronage. Pauline Bonaparte, for example, was the recipient of hundreds of thousands of acres of confiscated estates that she never visited, and in some cases never even asked for, as Napoleon stashed away much of the wealth among family members.

Obviously, this is not only a short-term expedient at best, since the confiscated wealth won't last forever, but also becomes a cause for resentment, even hatred, of the French overlordship. People blamed Napoleon for the economic collapse, rather than blaming the British blockade, because it was Napoleon's guys on he scene, arresting people for black-marketeering, or taking people's land, livestock, cash, etc. By 1810 the Continental economy was in free-fall. I've looked at statistics for places like Holland, the German states, and northern Italy, and you see the same pattern everywhere: businesses shutting down, unemployment spiking, a huge increase in crime and migrating homeless people.

In coastal areas (Holland, the German ports, Croatia), Napoleon attempted to clamp down on it by just annexing those lands to France and hoping to improve the degree to which they could be policed. Needless to say, that did nothing to improve revenues from those areas, since now France is responsible for paying for their bureaucracy as well.

By 1813 the imperial finances resemble a giant ponzi scheme, with debt being moved around off-budget in various creative ways. In a sort of reverse "quantitative easing," there were forced buy-backs of debt, resold at higher rates to postpone the inevitable collapse. There were "forced bond" issues, in which people were required to "buy" government debt at horizons of 15+ years. By that point, there was significant resistance against Bonaparte authority in northern Italy, Holland, and Germany. (One anti-draft riot in Holland involved upwards of 13,000 people.)

The bottom-line is a cruel irony: as long as he is at war with Britain, Napoleon can't possibly raise the revenues needed to fight a war against people who are funded by Britain. Each time he tangles with the Coalition, he finds himself ruling over yet more territories that have to be garrisoned, at ever-greater expense, and leading to ever-greater conflicts. (Can you imagine a Russian war in 1812, had there not been a war in 1806-07? What were French troops doing in Poland, anyway? How did the frontier of French power end up there in the first place, except by trying to control the ever-growing list of enemies?)

Make peace with Britain, and the blockade ends, commerce and shipping return, employment picks back up, and the bond markets revive.

Or take the gamble that somehow, somewhere, you can win enough victories on the Continent to convince the British to make peace with you?

The new way of war was one that meant that dramatic battlefield victories, grand manouvres and even sometimes technological superiority were secondary to economics, the ability to deny your enemy resources, and to outspend him. This was the same lesson that Germany failed to learn resulting in them twice taking on the world's strongest economies in the twentieth century.

Napoleon's best outcome might well have been to make peace in about 1810 and hope that France could become a modern, industrial nation with a reformed financial system that could support itself. However, that was not Napoleon's way and it is also difficult to see how he could have done so; his power base was the army and peace would have meant either demobilising much of it, with consequent high unemployment and unrest, or maintaining it at near full strength, which France could not support economically without plundering other nations.

Regardless of how people felt at the time, Napoleon's empire was pretty much doomed after Trafalgar; once any real threat of an invasion had vanished, the British could concentrate on building and maintaining their empire, developing their economy and commerce, and spending money so that other people could die fighting Napoleon. With Britain's economic and maritime strength, there was never really any hope of Napoleon winning in the long run.

As to the idea of Napoleon wintering in Russia, even if he had been able to, when spring came would he still have been emperor? Napoleon knew that the Russian campaign had to be relatively quick as there were powerful forces in France that would happily have taken advantage of any prolonged absence to dethrone him.