"Prussian staffwork, 1813-15" Topic

Hi all,

Reading Peter Hofshroer's two Osprey volumes on Lutzen and Bautzen and Leipzig, I was struck by his claims that by 1813 the Prussians were developing a 'modern' concept of staffwork that put the French system well in the shade.

In particular, he characterises this French system as having simply been Napoleon's employment of scribes to wrote down his orders.

To be fair these claims are not a principal theme of either book (they are largely limited to illustration captions), but they struck me as very interesting. How far ahead were the Prussians by 1813?

Cheers all,
Redcoat

PDF link

Hmmm…maybe a bit more than even by 1813, fairly well ahead by 1815.

They saw their faults as far back as 1806 and tried to rectify them as quickly and professionally as possible during the interim, but that involved funding, education either "brought to" a group personnages (or vice versa) and what with duties and spies about, that was difficult, but achievable.

1812 was a good warm-up for them, leading into 1813 and they steadily improved from there on out, but, you would be hard pressed to call it the famed/professional Prussian/German General staff for at least 25 years and even then it took another 30 years to "prove it" to everyone else.

A lot of people forget that before this revolution/revelation, the French had a superb system. Adjutant Commandants with brains and leadership being able to take up to a brigade to go fix this problem or that and with a high success rate. Staff work itself had improved, it's just that the final light bulb never quite went off in the heads of the true "paper pushers", headed by Berthier, that things could be done differently.*

* Okay, Jomini, maybe Belliard and a few others, but Jomini only had limited influence near the end of the Napoleonic wars, so…

This was one of the "hot" topics that gave the Naps' boards their evil reputation.

I think the proto-efforts at reforming their staff to combat Napoleon's individual genius & to compensate for Sturm und Drang commanders such as Blucher (great battlefield leader, of course) are there to see.

I don't see the value in deprecating Prussian achievements in this area nor in minimising the French achievements in staff work as mentioned by Andrew (above).

Peter loves the Prussians as much as Bowden fawns over the "invincible" French.

We must remember that the French weren't the same after Russia by a long shot.

If the real test of staffwork is how quickly you get over a catastrophic defeat, then the ability of the Prussian army to get back into the fight on the 18th June 1815 to tip the balance at Waterloo after being hacked and slashed a mere 48 hours earlier speaks volumes…

It would be a miracle of J3 staffwork today, with all your computers, connectivity and real time data links!

And if von Gneisenau and von Grolman managed to get some kip in during that 48 hours, I'd be even more impressed!

Scharnhorst made the comment around 1801 when he was still a lieutenant colonel that is the Prussians didn't adopt French methods of organization, administration, and tactics they would not beat them.

The French staff system employed during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars was developed during the period 1763-1815, Bourcet (who had once been Broglie's chief of staff during the Seven Years' War), France's premier staff officer began the staff corps, school, and system and although theh school at Grenoble was later abolished, as well as the staff corps, the products of Bourcet's foresight, such as Alexandre Berthier, organized, established, and institutionalized the French staff system.

In 1790 a French staff corps was put into law by the French government and was composed of 30 staff officers, seventeen colonels and 13 lieutenant colonels. This group of officers would be chiefs of staff at the division and army level and would eventually be the adjutant commandants of the Consulate and Empire.

Paul Thiebault wrote the first French staff manual in 1800 which established the duties of a chief of staff as well as the organization of the staff into sections with definite responsibilities.

The French staff and staff system was the preeminent staff organization of the period.

The Prussians, thanks to Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and other staff officers, Clausewitz and Grolman among them, took the lessons of 1806 to heart and founded and organized the Prussian staff system on the model of the French, with certain differences peculiar to the Prussians. By 1815 this system was only in embryonic form and would not progress to where it was a major organization, based on Scharnhorst's example, until after the wars were over.

The greatest chief of staff of the period was definitely Berthier-despite the nonsense (including labeling him as merely a chief clerg) that Jomini wrote about him. There is plenty of primary source evidence to support this, including statements by Thiebault, Custine, Lauzan, Lejeunce, von Funck and others. Napoleon's comment that if Berthier had been at Waterloo he would have won, is indicative of the esteem and value Berthier was held by Napoleon.

Both French and Prussian staff work in 1815 was poor. Gneisenau leading a pursuit after Waterloo is one indicator that he was not doing his job properly. For the French, Soult was not a good replacement for Berthier, though Montholon was still on the staff. And the staff Soult assembled for Nord was not anything near as efficient as Berthier's staff.

The Prussians were definitely progressing in staff organization and functioning by 1815, but that was the first time since 1806 that a solely Prussian army was in the field. Gneisenau did well in 1813-1814 as Blucher's chief of staff, but they weren't planning allied operations, Radetzky and the Austrian staff were.

B

In what is a rare event, I find myself generally in agreement with Brechtel198. However, the following sentence made me laugh, somewhat startling the young lady who is currently working her way through my paper files in an attempt to digitise them:

"Gneisenau leading a pursuit after Waterloo is one indicator that he was not doing his job properly."

That is certainly one way of looking at it but the lack of logic in the sentence is wonderful. One might just as easily argue that his leading the pursuit is an indicator that:

a) He had done his job rather well.
b) He had enough confidence in his staff to be sure that they would do a good job without him for a while.

Sorry, chiefs of staff don't lead pursuits, especially at night.

That isn't his job, whether or not his staff can still function in his absence.

And as the pursuit which lasted for about four miles wasn't that effective, then Gneisenau failed in both 'pursuits' that evening.

B

Sorry, chiefs of staff don't lead pursuits, especially at night.

That isn't his job, whether or not his staff can still function in his absence.

And Gneisenau wasn't a cavalryman-he had been an infantryman.

And as the pursuit which lasted for about four miles wasn't that effective, then Gneisenau failed in both 'pursuits' that evening.

B

Brechtel198,

The pursuit wasn't that effective? Really? Napoleon and the French army had a very easy time that night, didn't they?

Gneisenau having been an infantryman is utterly irrelevant to the discussion and I cannot imagine why you brought it up.

Chiefs of staff do what they need to; it is not up to you to state what they should or should not do. Given Blucher's age and recent injuries suffered at Ligny, someone had to lead and organise the pursuit. Gneisenau apparently considered that he was the best man for the job.

Yes, I agree, its my understanding that in the reformed Prussian service, a COS was more than a COS in modern use but was also the Commander's alter ego, something of a deputy commander…so in the Commander's absence, leaving behind a well trained staff, he was entirely justified in leading the main effort at the time…Particulalry so since half hearted pursuits had so often left the fruits of victory ungarnered.

'The pursuit wasn't that effective? Really? Napoleon and the French army had a very easy time that night, didn't they?'

Gneisenau harried/harassed no formed units and took no eagles. How many guns did he overrun and take? Nearly every regiment's hardcore around its eagle got out. And the Prussian 'pursuit' only began after the French rear guard, composed of the Guard cavalry (see de Brack) left the field in excellent order. I would consider that 'pursuit' ineffective unless you were a straggler.

'Gneisenau having been an infantryman is utterly irrelevant to the discussion and I cannot imagine why you brought it up.'

I disagree. A good cavalry commander would be best, but you have to be careful at night, also. However, the Prussians didn't have an army cavalry reserve, so that couldn't be organized in any orderly way. Gneisenau probably scooped what Prussian units were in his immediate vicinity and took off, abandoning his actual duties as chief of staff.

'Chiefs of staff do what they need to; it is not up to you to state what they should or should not do. Given Blucher's age and recent injuries suffered at Ligny, someone had to lead and organise the pursuit. Gneisenau apparently considered that he was the best man for the job.'

I have no doubt that Gneisenau thought he was the best man for the job. However, he had never been a field commander with the responsibilities of a field commander. He also didn't get along with Bulow too well. Gneisenau wanted very much to be a field commander which is why he tried to command a pursuit and did a lousy job of it.

As to the other comment, it is up to anyone with a knowledge of staff operations and procedures to make a comment on Gneisenau's performance as a chief of staff. He had an army to look after, especially if Blucher was still having physical problems, not to be galavanting around the Belgian countryside at night like a light cavalry junior officer.

That comment that you made not only makes no sense but clearly demonstrates a lack of knowledge/appreciation for what a chief of staff is supposed to do and what his responsibilities to Blucher and the army as a whole were.

B

The manner in which theh Prussian staff system developed was a dual command system. If an army commander needed a very strong chief of staff who could and would assume higher-level responsibilities because of the limitation of the commander, then he was empowered to do so.

If the commander didn't need that level of supervision or assistance, then then he, the chief of staff, would function as a chief of staff normally would.

In the first instance, if failure in the field ensued, then the chief of staff might be relieved and the commander remain, being given a second chance.

It was an odd system, one which would probably not be efficient or even work in another army. It worked for the Prussians and later the German army. I am not convinced, however, that was the case in 1815-it was something that developed later through tradition, practice, and experience.

Again, the Prussian army from 1813-1814 did not operate independently with its own staff. Blucher's Army of Silesia was composed of both Prussian and Russian elements, although his chief of staff was first Scharnhorst, then Gneisenau after Scharnhorst's death. Commanding Russians and Prussians was undoubtedly a challenge. However, the staff that ran the allied armies was the Austrian general staff, not the Prussian equivalent which, again, was only in the embryonic stage in 1815. Its 'growth spurt' took place after the wars were over.

B

Brechtel198,

That high horse really does not suit you.

In response to your comments:

1. Guns: how many did the French remove from the field of Waterloo? It is rather hard to capture guns in a pursuit when they are still sitting on the battlefield behind you.

2. Eagles and "hardcore": no eagles were taken in the pursuit, but a pursuit is about rather more than capturing symbols. It is about pushing the enemy and preventing them putting up a defence. The French returns from a few days later show the effectiveness of the pursuit.

3. Ineffective pursuit: was Napoleon a straggler then? Have you read French accounts of the night after the battle?

4. Cavalry commander: any good commander can run a pursuit.

5. Role of a chief of staff: you were not commenting on his performance but on his choice of activity; I hope that the difference is obvious. Also, you might want to read about the role of the chief of staff in the Prussian system of 1815. As well as being responsible for staff functions, Gniesenau was also the second in command, a situation which was not replicated in other nations' systems. As such, with Blucher unable to take charge of the pursuit, Gniesenau was acting as commander in chief and had delegated staff responsibilities to von Grolman, who was more than capable of doing the job as he was already head of the staff at headquarters. Such flexibility was a positive point of the Prussian system, enabling a swift change of command when the C in C was incapacitated.

You may understand the role of a modern chief of staff, or that of Napoleon's chief of staff, but the role of a Prussian chief of staff was very different.

'You may understand the role of a modern chief of staff, or that of Napoleon's chief of staff, but the role of a Prussian chief of staff was very different.'

In the period after the Napoleonic Wars as the Prussian General Staff grew in importance and influence that is an accurate statement, but not during the period 1808-1815. As stated the Prussian general staff was in an embryonic development period during the latter Napoleonic Wars with functioning and procedures still developing, most of which was based on the current French model.

And Scharnhorst dying early in 1813 didn't help the speedy development of the general staff.

B

Gneisenau could lead, in sharp contrast to Berthier who failed when he should show responsability – like in the campaign of 1809.

One must avoid to see the Napoleon / Berthier relationship as model to the whole French Army, Berthier was nothing more than a pen pusher and didn't show a lot of initiative due to Napoleon's dominance and ignoring sound advice to his subordinates.

Otherwise chiefs of staffs could play a much more dominant role – closer to the modern staff system than general and clerk.

A good example is for example Belliard and Murat.

It is interesting how the French staff actually worked and one can learn this very well by the memoires of Thiebault.

Au mois de janvier 1807, Ney, ayant eu pouvoir se permettre des pointes en avant de ses cantonnements et de la région qu'il appelait son « cimetière » pour tâcher de procurer des vivres à ses soldats Napoléon le rappela vertement à l'ordre, comme un sous-lieutenant. « L'Empereur, M. le maréchal », écrit Berthier le 18 janvier, « n'a besoin de conseils, ni de plans de campagne, personne ne connaît sa pensée et notre devoir est d'obéir. »

P. 70 / 71

Donc, à la Grande Armée, un maréchal d'empire se borne à obéir strictement, ponctuellement, aux ordres que le major général lui transmet chaque jour : ainsi le vent l'Empereur.

P. 71

Titeux : Le Maréchal Bernadotte et la Manœuvre d'Jena.

Now, anyone knowing the details of Friedland (Jomini – though at Eylau – was no longer with the army and, thus, not present at Friedland), might point out that at Friedland, Ney wanted to attack earlier than Napolen. The marshal sent numerous couriers to the Emperor. The fifth courier, Étienne-Françoise Girard, was ordered to tell Ney to stop sending couriers and that the marshal would learn the Emperors plans when it was necessary.

« Tenez-vous-en strictement aux ordres que je vous donne ; exécutez ponctuellement vos instructions ; que tout le monde se tienne sur ses gardes et reste à son poste ; moi seule sais ce que je dois faire. »
Correspondance militaire de Napoléon Ier, Paris 1893, tome IV, no. 739, page 11

Caulaincourt :

« Une fois une idée qu'il croyait utile une fois casée dans sa tête, l'Empereur faisait illusion à lui-même. Il l'adoptait, la caressait, s'en imprégnait ; il la distillait, on peut dire, par tous les pores. »

This is of course totaly different to the new Prussian approach, where the general in chief would discuss with his chief of staff all important matters and would work in team.

Napoleon / Berthier – out of date obsolete system ignoring other French approaches to more modern staff work.

on napoleon-series.org is a very good article by

Eman V. Vovsi

Paul Thiébault and the Development of the French Staff system from Ancien Régime to the Revolution

Brechtel198,

Thank you for confirming that you do not know how the Prussian staff system operated in 1815. By that date, Blucher and Gneisenau were working in a way that was way beyond what you describe as the "French model". It was utterly different from the dysfunctional relationship that existed between your hero and his CoS. It was indeed still developing but it worked better than Napoleon's system which was constructed around the assumed omnipotence of the Emperor.

I do rather think that you need to learn to accept that the French were not the best at everything during the Napoleonic wars; at times, your fanboy inclinations become tiresome, if occasionally amusing.

This started out as a polite and revealing discussion, I can see that it has degenerated, as is the norm, once again.

Lots of words wasted on whether a garbage man had the capabilities of directing traffic in a pinch…my, word!

To try and get this back on course, I think vW hit it on the head with Belliard, he did a lot of work to make Murat look good (though that was not his intention) and as the Cavalry Reserve of the Grand Armee had become it's own army in later years, he did a damn fine job of sending and receiving inforamation and orders across fairly distant locations in a timely manner.

Bonnal in his "Manoevre de Jena" is critical of Berthier's performance or competence giving a detailed analysis in chapter 13.

As to the other comment, it is up to anyone with a knowledge of staff operations and procedures to make a comment on Gneisenau's performance as a chief of staff.

Will an operational tour as Battle Watch Captain to Commander UK Task Group Middle East with SO3 J3 watchkeeping responsibilities for the Central and Southern Arabian Gulf do?

But I stand by my original opinion – a modern COS probably shouldn't dash off out of the HQ – although of course they do spend time shuttling between as many as 6 different HQ sites; Forward, Rear, Main, Combat, etc – but in the Prussian set up, with a 'Deputy Commander' and Commander's best mate function, leading the main effort was probably the right thing to do…

I disagree. Below is some material on the Prussian 'general staff' in 1813-1815 which clearly demonstrates that the chief of staff at army, corps, and division was not a 'deputy commander' or the second in command of the formation.

The material does show the development and what would happen in the future, after 1821 and closer to mid-century, but as pointed out before the Prussian staff system in 1813-1815 was still in the development stage, embryonic if you prefer, and still had problems-one of them being the army chief of staff galloping off leading an ineffective pursuit after Waterloo.

The chief of staff's job is to run the staff for the commander-that is what his function is today in all US formations and by regulation (FM 101-5, which is available on line).

Shanahan was a serving naval officer who had access to the Prussian/German archives prior to War II. White had access to what was being held in archives in East Germany in the 1980s. Craig worked in Germany before War II, beginning in 1935.

B

From Prussian Military Reforms by William Shanahan:

‘An improved training for staff officers which bagan in 1803 was a reform of great promise. In this way staff officers took their first step, faltering and hesitant to be sure, toward that prominence which they were to enjoy in the Prussian army by mid-century. But in 1803 staff officers did not have any special prestige as they were still few in number and lacked an organization comparable to a modern General Staff. As a distinct organ of the army the General Staff did not begin to function until 1821. That date should make it evident that Scharnhorst was not, as many popular writers suppose, the founder of the General Staff. Although he was called after 1810 the Chief of the General Staff, the title was purely honorary since it did not refer either to an office or to a rank. And in the period of military reforms associated with Scharnhorst's name, 1807-1813, there were no important changes in the duties of staff officers as set forth in the orders of 1803.'-71

‘A definite order creating the Ministry of War came forth on December 25, 1808. It continued the organization first outlined in Stein's recommendation of the previous year, and confirmed Scharnhorst and Lottum as chiefs of their respective departments. Neither was made Minister of War. In this way the king escaped the responsibility of naming a single minister. Scharnhorst as Chief of the War Department also bore the title , Chief of the General Staff; although the army had staff officers it did not have a General Staff. The title was therefore honorary and did not carry the presige or authority that was to be associated with it much later.'

From The Politics of the Prussian Army by Gordon Craig:

‘Perhaps the most notable feature of the new army was the excellence of the staff work throughout the campaigns. For the first time in the history of the army responsible staff officers were assigned to all commanding generals and corps commanders-Gneisenau to Blucher, Boyen to General von Bulow, Grolman to Kleist, Rauch to Yorck, Clausewitz to Thielmann, Reiche to Zeiten, and Rothenberg to the Korps Tauentzien-and for the most part they were resulted well and consulted constantly. Yorck, it is true, greeted his chief of staff, Colonel von Rauch, with the words: ‘I need no chief of staff, although if I've got to have one, you are the one I would always prefer'; and Zieten's chef complained bitterly that he was given nothing to do. But these cases were overshadowed by the success of Grolman's and Boyen's work with their commanders, and by the inspired collaboration of Blucher and Gneisenau.'-62

‘ Like Scharnhorst [Gneisenau] never wavered in his belief that intelligence made as great a contribution to victory as bravery; and he insisted that staff officers must share the responsibility for operational decisions made by their commanding officers. This insistence, and Gneisenau's readiness to support his staff officers in disputes with the commanding generals, strengthened the position of the general staff and gave it an esprit…Gneisenau's other achievements in the French war are equally notable. To him is owed the development of the Prussian technique of command, characterized by clear and comprehensive formulation of objective but always leaving room for individual initiative and freedom of action.' -63.

From The Enlightened Soldier by Charles White:

‘Scharnhorst sought to circumvent aristocratic privilege by educating a new generation of officers who would imbue the army with a new spirit. This educational elite, the General Staff, would not be groomed for command, but for leadership. Its members would serve with royal headquarters and with the individual corps and divisions, guiding the commanding generals according to the intentions of the supreme command, and advising them on what actions were possible within the limitations imposed by the technical and tactical problems of communications and logistics.'-155

‘Without question, a great measure of Scharnhorst's success must go to Blucher. Immensely popular…His authority was unquestioned; the love and respect he had for his men extraordinary. A superb commander of great personal magnetism, Blucher had the good sense to recognize his own educational shortcomings while appreciating those of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Throughout the campaign he relied implicitly on their judgment, creating an atmosphere that allowed plenty of room for both to operate.'-155-156.
‘Blucher's satirical wit, enormous courage, and rapid and sure judgment under fire earned Gneisenau's warm admiration. Like Scharnhorst, Gneisenau would have preferred a field command, but bowed to a higher ideal. ‘I was glad…to sacrifice my small gesture of conceit to my sense of duty.'

‘That Blucher never felt any resentment toward his chief's intellectual superiority was characteristic of his leadership style. Blucher trusted Gneisenau completely, accepting his suggestions and expressing annoyance if others attempted in any way to influence or interfere with Gneisenau's prerogatives. In this manner there developed between the highly robust and shrewd Blucher, and the well-educated and gifted Gneisenau, the fundamental peculiarity of Prussia's general staff system.'-156

‘During the campaigns of 1813-1815, Gneisenau's position as Blucher's chief of staff became far more than a mere assistant. Gneisenau was the planner, the coordinator, the advisor, and the one to utter warnings. In reality he was an executive directly responsible to Blucher, though in no way impinging on the final authority of the commanding general.'-156-157

‘With Blucher's apparent approval, Gneisenau insisted that Prussian chiefs of staff share with their commanders the responsibility of command. This uniquely Prussian practice of ‘joint responsibility' was a response to problems in leadership Gneisenau saw during the apring campaign. Several commanding generals, particularly Yorck, were ignoring the counsel of their chiefs of staff. The resulting lack of effective coordination between Prussian units convinced Gneisenau that steps had to be taken to guarantee unity of command by enabling the General Staff to asset its collective will over stubborn commanders. Henceforth, whenever a commander refused to follow the guidance of his chief of staff, the latter could communicate directly with the Chief of the General Staff. Blucher's readiness to support Gneisenau in disputes with commanding generals not only strengthened the position of the chief of staff at headquarters, but also fulfilled Scharnhorst's original idea of utilizing the General Staff to obtain and maintain effective control of the field forces. At this crucial stage, when the coalition lacked a central direction, Gneisenau's concept of ‘dual command' proved decisive.'-165

'Gneisenau could lead, in sharp contrast to Berthier who failed when he should show responsability – like in the campaign of 1809.'

Gneisenau was never a field commander-Berthier was (he formed and commanded the Army of the Reserve in 1800 and moved it across the Alps. I haven't found anything similar in what Gneisenau did in his career.

Your 'interpretation' of 1809 is incorrect, though you are far from the first to make that egregious error. The staff mess at the beginning of the 1809 was Napoleon's error, not Berthier.

By the decree of 4 March 1809 Berthier was appointed as chief of staff of the Army of Germany-he was not the commander, as he had been in 1800 with the Army of the Reserve.

The confusion and counter-orders were caused by Napoleon's use of both the telegraph and couriers when sending his instructions, and they did not arrive in sequence. Berthier was attempting to sort out the mess when he finally, and quite bluntly, told Napoleon that he needed to get in theater.

Berthier to Napoleon 11 April 1809:

‘Sire, I very much desire Your Majesty's arrival, to obviate the orders and counter-orders which circumstances, together with Your Majesty's commands, have made necessary.'

Berthier to Napoleon 14 April 1809:

‘I should have been relieved of considerable embarrassment, Sire, if your telegraphic dispatch of the 10th, which arrived at Strasbourg on the 13th and was sent on here on the 16th, had reached me earlier. I would have fulfilled your wishes. But, after carefully rereading your instruction, you seemed determined to hold on to Ratisbon: this is the position which we occupy. I would have preferred to have concentrated on the Lech.'

Napoleon later blamed Berthier. The last message also hints at Berthier's strategic planning ability, which was considerable. In fact, many observers, including Scharnhorst thought Berthier responsible for the Marengo campaing in 1800.

B

'One must avoid to see the Napoleon / Berthier relationship as model to the whole French Army…'

Why? You ought to explain such sweeping statements or avoid them altogether unless you are willing to explain them. All you are doing here is being a contrarian, and an inaccurate one at that.

'…Berthier was nothing more than a pen pusher and didn't show a lot of initiative due to Napoleon's dominance and ignoring sound advice to his subordinates.'

This is classic Jomini and is incorrect.

'Otherwise chiefs of staffs could play a much more dominant role – closer to the modern staff system than general and clerk.'

This is an incorrect statement. See FM 101-5 (available on line) for how the modern US Army and Marine Corps organize their staffs at division, corps, and army level, and what the duties of a modern chief of staff actually are.

'A good example is for example Belliard and Murat.'

Would you mind explaining what you mean by this or by showing examples? The staff of the Cavalry Reserve was a smaller version of the Imperial General Staff, as were all corps and division commands. This comment actually makes no sense without an explanation.

The following are comments about Berthier from various contemporariew that knew and served with him, along with comments by two modern authors who had an understanding of staffwork, then and now:

‘Quite apart from his specialist training as a topographical engineer, he had knowledge and experience of staff work and furthermore a remarkable grasp of everything to do with war. He had also, above all else, the gift of writing a complete order and transmitting it with the utmost speed and clarity…No one could have better suited General Bonaparte, who wanted a man capable of relieving him of all detailed work, to understand him instantly and to foresee what he would need.'-Thiebault

‘All the problems connected with the needs of the army and their transport…were thrown on him…The armies were scattered from Bayonne to the Bug, from Calabria to the Helder, and as far as Stralsund; they were shifting their positions incessantly, had to be supplied and directed, and the whole of it passed through [Berthier's] hands…He always was the clearing house through which all business was transacted…the infallible day book to which Napoleon was referring every minute of the day to make sure how his balance stood. For this reason he had to be in attendance on him on every battlefield, on reconnaissance, at every review…without fail on every study of terrain.'-Ferdinand von Funck

'If Berthier had been there, I would not have met this misfortune.'-Napoleon after Waterloo

‘I can speak of him with more knowledge than anyone else, for it was I who formed him in America…I know of no one who has more skill or a better eye for reconnoitering a locality, who accomplishes this more correctly, and to whom all details are more familiar. I shall perhaps find someone who can replace Berthier, but I have not yet discovered him…'-General Custine

[Berthier] ‘has all the necessary qualifications for making an excellent chief of staff.' –Duc de Lauzan

Napoleon, with whom Berthier served for 18 years through victory and defeat stated in 1796 that Berthier had ‘talents, activity, character…everything in his favor.' After the action at Lodi in 1796, Napoleon also stated that 'the intrepid Berthier, who was on that day a cannoneer, cavalier, and grenadier.'

''Berthier was also the most indefatigable person I knew, and when I one day congratulated Count Daru on his wonderful power of sustaining fatigue and doing without sleep, he said to me, 'The Prince of Neufchatel is even stronger than I am; I never spent more than nine days and nights without going to bed, but Berthier has been in the saddle for thirteen days and nights at a stretch…' –Baron Lejeune

From By Command of the Emperor by SJ Watson:
‘…Frequently one hears that the successful commander is born and not made. Even more is this true of the ideal staff officer; for, to be content to work for another and to see fame and honor always falling to another, demands qualities of loyalty, self-effacement and strength of character which are very rare in human nature.' 8-9.
‘These are the very qualities that Berthier displayed throughout his long and adventurous career. Joining the army when he was scarcely twelve years old, he served in the infantry, in the cavalry, as a topographical engineer and a general staff officer. He fought on four continents. Yet his career was by no means an unbroken sequence of successes; for, during the French Revolution, he was in his fortieth year summarily demoted from general to private, and shortly afterwards dismissed from the army altogether. But within nine years of his reinstatement he became the first of Napoleon's marshals.'-9.

'The Emperor employed Berthier not only as his trusted chief of staff, but also as a commander-in-chief, as minister of war, and as an ambassador extraordinary; and in every assignment he invariably demonstrated meticulous efficiency and prodigious capacity for work that made him indispensable and irreplaceable…Amid the sunlit vineyards of Italy, the burning sands of Egypt, the bleak plateaus of the Guadarrama and the icy wastes of Russia, he was always ready at any hour of the day or night to appear properly dressed in uniform to give advice to, or to take orders from, his master.'-9.

‘Transcending all his other qualities were Berthier's self-effacement and his loyalty. While in private he was Napoleon's confidant and often his outspoken advisor, he was always careful to appear as his deferential servant in public…So it is hardly surprising that Berthier has been eclipsed by the legend of Napoleon's infallibility; and in general military commentators have either scorned him as a pen-pushing nonentity, or have criticized him for not making decisions which in fact were the prerogative of his commander-in-chief, or have even reviled him for not countermanding, on one occasion in 1809, the explicit order of his Emperor.'-9

‘…if the study of Napoleon and Berthier does nothing else, it convincingly demonstrates theat the strength of a successful partnership between a commander and his chief of staff is ever greater than the sum of their strengths as individuals.'-11.

From Swords Around A Throne by John Elting, 128-130
‘…Napoleon took Berthier as his chief of staff only after his first choice…refused the assignment. Their relationship quickly became one of mutual dependence…Because he worked in his Emperor's shadow, Berthier's accomplishments seemed matters of routine. In 1800 he organized the Army of the Reserve and moved it across the St. Bernard Pass into Italy; in 1805 he planned the Grande Armee's march from the English Channel into Austria; in 1809 set up the assault crossing of the Danube before Wagram; and in 1812 handled the unprecedented concentration for the invasion of Russia.'

‘To the army and the world at large, Berthier was a mixture of brusqueness and courtesy, never suffering fools gladly, but never insulting, and careful of his subordinates self-respect. Always ready, properly uniformed, orderly in all things, he was a quiet example to a new, restless army of thoroughgoing individualists. His courage was beyond doubt, whether in rallying a broken column and ramming it home through keening Austrian musketry across Lodi bridge or, in 1812-just turned sixty, exhausted, and very sick-pulling the command of the retreating Grande Armee together after Murat had deserted it. His position made him the handy butt of both Napoleon's temper and the other marshals' anger, but neither of those affected the even tenor of his work. His health finally failed toward the end of the 1812 campaign; he was ill during much of 1813 and 1814, but his work still was well done, his orders clearly written, his insistence on proper staff procedure unrelenting.

B

'It is interesting how the French staff actually worked and one can learn this very well by the memoires of Thiebault.'

Thiebault's memoirs have been demonstrated, at least from the late 1980s, as being unreliable. What is reliable by Thiebault, however, are his two editions of the French staff manual (1800 and 1813).

Ralph Adye stated this about the first staff manual by Thiebault in 1800:

‘The great advantages which must manifestly result from a well-conducted Etat-major or staff, are acknowledged in every military country. France, however, seems alone to have entered fully into the system, and to have added experiment of practice to the suggestions of theory.'

Further, the manual was translated into at the very least English and German. These two manuals are the only two which deal directly and solely on the formation, function, and operations of a general and subordinate staffs of the period.

Here is a comment by Vincent Cronin on the reliablility of Thiebault's memoirs:

‘Baron Thiebault is another who rallied to the Bourbons and paid for a good job by circulating a MS in which he abused not only Napoleon but all the men of the Revolution and Empire. From Thiebault's notes a journalist ghost-writer named Calmettes worked up Memoirs which appeared in 1893-94, half a century after Thiebault's death. Their partiality has long been recognized by historians.'

B

Brechtel198,

The final paragraph that you quote tends to disprove your view of the role of a Prussian chief of staff in 1813-15. It was not the same as that of a modern US chief of staff as it consisted of far more than "running the staff". They shared responsibility for command, had joint responsibility and there was dual command; your own quote says all of that.

'This is of course totaly different to the new Prussian approach, where the general in chief would discuss with his chief of staff all important matters and would work in team.'

Actually, that is an incorrect assessment. The Prussians, guided by Scharnhorst, borrowed from the French staff system, such as definite staff sections, chiefs of staffs communicating between and among themselves without their commanders' approval or knowledge, etc.

Berthier to General Piston, chief of staff of the Army of the Alps, 9 May 1795:

‘You will find attached…a copy of the decree of the People's Commissioners for the organization of your staff. You will see that you are detailed to continue to perform the tasks of chief of staff to the Army of the Alps; and it is a real pleasure for me to correspond with you.'

‘I am most grateful for the care you take in informing me of the various movements and details of your army. But your time is precious, so I would ask you to save paper-wrok by giving me just a summary of these details. For the same reasons you should send me the general situation report of your army only once each month.'

‘Continue…to let me know as quickly as possible the things it is important for me to know, especially when there will be any move on the part of the enemy…'

Scherer to the Directory, 6 January 1796:

‘General Berthier, now employed as Chief of Staff with the Army of the Alps, seems to me by his knowledge of the country and by his military qualifications very suitable to meet this requirement [army command]. I would make him commander of the reserve. He would be incomparably more useful to this army than to the Army of the Alps.'

‘Be so kind, citizen directors, as to accede to my request. It is entirely based on the benefits that will accrue to this army by transferring this general officer whose military talents I have come to know since the war.'

Berthier to Carnot 19 January 1797:

‘It is in Italy that you will dictate terms of peace to the Emperor of Austria as well as the other powers. I consider therefore that no time should be lost in accelerating and even augmenting all the reinforcements that you can make available to the Army of Italy. It is in the Tyrol, it is in Trieste, perhaps even in Vienna that we shall have to fight the Archduke Charles and his Army of the Rhine. According to all calculations, Mantua ought to be ours in fifteen days' time…'

Berthier to Victor 5 February 1797:

‘No officer of the army can appropriate any object unless authorized by the general-in-chief. The general-in-chief directs me to point out to you that it is an army corps that is on the march, not a horde of pillagers. Establish order and maintain discipline.'

Berthier to Soult, 3 December 1805:

‘In warfare nothing is done, so long as anything remains to be done. No victory is complete so long as there is an enemy in the field…In our present situation there is but one order to be issued-to inflict as great losses as possible upon the enemy and exploit our victory in every way.'

Berthier to Belliard 24 September 1806:

Organize spies to find out about the Prussians concentrating at Erfurt, Gottingen, and Magdeburg. I am sending Monsieur Raibell to remit to you 3,000 francs which you will spend exclusively on espionage.'

Berthier to Savary, February 1807:

‘Nothing should be concealed from the Emperor, either bad or good; to deceive him, even about things that are likely to be disagreeable to him, is a crime.'

These two comments by Watson in By Command of the Emperor, also highlight Berthier's actions and service. These are not the actions of a 'pen pusher.'

‘Throughout 14 January there was a fierce ‘dog fight' on the plateau of Rivoli, where Berthier once more played the part of an assistant commander as well as a staff officer. He first of all took over the 14th demi-brigade of Joubert's division with its supporting arms, and later directed a cavalry charge supported by artillery against an Austrian counterattack: as Bonaparte wrote to the Directory four days later, ‘he displayed on this occasion the bravery that he has so often shown in this campaign.'-59

‘In this campaign, too, Berthier proved that he was a great chief of staff as Bonaparte was a great commander. In particular, during the final advance into Austria he successfully performed the most difficult task of maintaining communication with the three widely separated columns, and so coordinating their movements that, unlike Alvintzi's forces the previous year, they could not be defeated in detail. As in normal military practice, Bonaparte made the commander's decision and decide the concept of his operations; while Berthier unfailingly provided the information on which the decisions were based, and he then compiled, transmitted, and supervised the execution of the detailed orders for their implementation.'-63

B

'Napoleon / Berthier – out of date obsolete system ignoring other French approaches to more modern staff work.'

How? Again, another sweeping statement that is not supported in any way, and is quite inaccurate.

To what 'other French approaches' are you referring?

B

'Now, anyone knowing the details of Friedland (Jomini – though at Eylau – was no longer with the army and, thus, not present at Friedland), might point out that at Friedland, Ney wanted to attack earlier than Napolen. The marshal sent numerous couriers to the Emperor. The fifth courier, Étienne-Françoise Girard, was ordered to tell Ney to stop sending couriers and that the marshal would learn the Emperors plans when it was necessary.'

And this is important why?

What are you trying to demonstrate?

Seems to me Ney was a little too anxious and it should be noted that he was the planned main attack (and knew it) and that his first attack failed badly. That repulse is what prompted Senarmont to attack the Russian center with his artillery, becoming the de facto main effort. Ney rallied his defeated corps and attacked a second time, now becoming the supporting attack on Bagration.

Berthier to Cambaceres, June 1807:

‘You can form no idea of the brilliant apparition of Marshal Ney; the telling of it appears fabulous, and resembles only the age of chivalry. It is to him chiefly that we owe the success of this memorable day [Friedland, 14 June 1807].

The reference to Jomini is puzzling, as he failed as a chief of staff to Ney in 1813, and was actually replaced in Spain as Ney's chief of staff by Ney himself.

Jomini also continually attempted to blacken Berthier's reputation because Bertheir had given young Jomini, when the latter was merely a civilain ADC to Ney in 1805, a definite and blunt lesson in proper staff procedures, a dressing down from which Jomini apparently never recovered.

B

'The final paragraph that you quote tends to disprove your view of the role of a Prussian chief of staff in 1813-15. It was not the same as that of a modern US chief of staff as it consisted of far more than "running the staff". They shared responsibility for command, had joint responsibility and there was dual command; your own quote says all of that.'

You should take the different quotes as a whole. The point is, the Prussians were still in the development stage in 1813-1815 and the staff and their procedures, including the preference for (lack of a better term) dual command was not developed by 1813-1815.

If you don't agree, then demonstrate differently by research and not by opinion or prejudice (and hopefully not by condescension which you tend to resort too more often than not when you disagree-that tendency makes it both awkward and difficult to discuss historic situations with you).

B

Brechtel198,
I am not quite sure what else you need from me when the one quote that you have provided which discusses the role of a Prussian chief of staff in 1813-15 clearly demonstrates the falsity of your claim for the nature of that role. Nobody is denying that the role was a work in progress however.

My 'claim' isn't false-it's the result of study and analysis of the Prussian staff system. You have to take into consideration of all the material and actually read the books in question.

Apparently, you haven't done that, or have you (along with Gorlitz' study)?

B

Ah, so now you claim infallibility! Unfortunately, you cannot get round the fact, evidenced by the quote that you provided, that a Prussian CoS in 1813-15 acted in a dual or deputy command role and not just as a modern CoS running the staff for his general.

It is always wise not to make assumptions;).

Anyway, enough of pointing out your errors to you for now.I have to take some visitors out for dinner. A Russian translator would be useful as our Russian speaking member of staff is ill.

I am not a man of the cloth, and so cannot claim infallibility.

However, the error(s) are yours and you didn't answer my query about the books.

B

What query would that be? I see that you asked an apparently rhetorical question.

For your information, and because it seems to matter to you, I have a copy of a book by Goerlitz about the General Staff, but have never heard of one by anyone called Gorlitz. The Goerlitz book is well researched and invaluable.

My comment about you claiming infallibility was due to your dismissal, usually without any evidence, of any views that differ from yours, which you have done throughout this thread. I think most of the people who post on here are aware that you are prone to make posts based on opinion and prejudice, as well as having a tendency to use quotes utterly out of context, as you have in the thread on Austrian artillery.

I don't know an author named Goerlitz, nor Gorlitz, but there is Walter Görlitz (o mit Umlaut, ö):

Geschichte des deutschen Generalstabes von 1650-1945
Bechtermünz Verlag (1997)
ISBN-10: 3860479180
ISBN-13: 978-3860479186

I haven't read it though. The author seems to write mainly about the 20th century.

Oliver,

Unfortunately, I cannot persuade my iPad to do umlauts. In English, it is usual to write the umlauted o as oe, which is what is done in the English language editions that I have seen.

Ah, I see, I didn't know there was an English translation of his book.

I have never read the English version so have no idea how good the translation is.

Oliver,

That "oe" for "ö" (and "ue" for "ü") is really common in works published in English-speaking countries. It really annoys the heck out of me, but it is (alas) very common.

But then again, Russian transliterations for German-speakers often feature "w" instead of "v" for Cyrillic "в" … which drives me nuts also, even if it is correct for German speakers. Similarly we see "j" instead of "ya" for Russian "я".

Then we have the Russian usage of "г" (a hard "g" sound) for words in English or German that start with "h" …. so we have Russians saying "Garvard" for the American university, or "Gamburg" for the city in North Germany. This is despite the fact that Cyrillic Russian has another letter "х" which has a sound like "h" or "kh".

:-)

It is always fun with transcriptions from foreign languages, especially if we only have the transcription and must figure out ourselves how the original is spelled.

It could be worse. Prussian troops under Macdonald in 1812 always received French countersign and parole, and an officer inspecting his sentinels, brave sons of simple peasants, "had to contend himself to hear something only vaguely similar to the original French words" …

My favorites are when the Germans imported French words wholesale, to conform with the Napoleonic usages, but then had to convert the genders to conform with German grammar, or put German adjectival endings on them. Thus you get things like:

westfälischer Moniteur

or:

blessierte Truppen

Such verbs as "blessiren" were imported into German already in the 17th century.

But in the Napoleonic period, there were people who tried to redeem and repair the pure German language. On was Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, another one wrote this:

link

(German is my mother tongue, I love Wagner's operas, but I cannot understand this book without the help of the glossary at the end.)

Sorry for deviating from the topic.

Oliver,

I have a friend and colleague who is professor of German Romantic Literature; I have seen him in total despair when dealing with texts that I ask him to look at for me:).

Smile, tough luck with all these unromantic military terms …

But basically, texts of the period are quite easy to understand for a modern German, and even to read the "gothic" letters can be learned quicky with a little bit of concentration.

History of the German General Staff was first published in the United States in English in 1953 and had at least fifteen printings.

It was written by Walter Gorlitz, his last name printed in English as 'Goerlitz' because of the German umlaut over the 'o'. I don't have an umlaut on my keyboard, but I dispense with the added 'e' because I believe that to be less accurate than merely not using the umlaut, for example I always use 'jager' instead of 'jaeger.' I find the addition of the 'e' superfluous.

B

'What query would that be? I see that you asked an apparently rhetorical question. For your information, and because it seems to matter to you, I have a copy of a book by Goerlitz about the General Staff, but have never heard of one by anyone called Gorlitz. The Goerlitz book is well researched and invaluable. My comment about you claiming infallibility was due to your dismissal, usually without any evidence, of any views that differ from yours, which you have done throughout this thread. I think most of the people who post on here are aware that you are prone to make posts based on opinion and prejudice, as well as having a tendency to use quotes utterly out of context, as you have in the thread on Austrian artillery.'

My question on your reading the referenced books was not rhetorical.

And, I have not taken any quotes out of context. I have found over the years that using that 'term' is usually meant as either a dodge of the material quoted so the accuser does not have to answer the material, or, nothing but what is usually called a 'cheap shot' as an ad hominem attack-both of which I am realizing you are very adept at.

I would suggest that if you don't agree, you submit evidence that contradicts what is posted. If not, then stay away from pejorative comments and accusations.

B

I've only taken a few basic lessons in German, but here is what I learned:

Correct spelling: Blücher, schön, jäger

Not preferred, but technically correct: Bluecher, schoen, jaeger

Incorrect spelling: Blucher, schon, jager

Ignoring the umlaut changes the pronounciation of the words, and in some cases changes the meaning of the word. In fact schon and schön are two different words altogether. On-line translators will not work with the incorrect spellings of umlauted words.

The reason the 'e' substitution works is because there are no German words with the letter combinations of ae, oe or ue so there is no mistaking that the 'e' represents an umlaut.

I don't have an umlaut on my keyboard either. I cut and pasted from microsoft word. All of the umlaut letters can be found in the 'symbols' area.

Hope this helps.

Stephen

Brechtel198,

As I have repeatedly pointed out to you, your own quote clearly demonstrates the falsity of your claim:

‘With Blucher's apparent approval, Gneisenau insisted that Prussian chiefs of staff share with their commanders the responsibility of command. This uniquely Prussian practice of ‘joint responsibility' was a response to problems in leadership Gneisenau saw during the apring campaign. Several commanding generals, particularly Yorck, were ignoring the counsel of their chiefs of staff. The resulting lack of effective coordination between Prussian units convinced Gneisenau that steps had to be taken to guarantee unity of command by enabling the General Staff to asset its collective will over stubborn commanders. Henceforth, whenever a commander refused to follow the guidance of his chief of staff, the latter could communicate directly with the Chief of the General Staff. Blucher's readiness to support Gneisenau in disputes with commanding generals not only strengthened the position of the chief of staff at headquarters, but also fulfilled Scharnhorst's original idea of utilizing the General Staff to obtain and maintain effective control of the field forces. At this crucial stage, when the coalition lacked a central direction, Gneisenau's concept of ‘dual command' proved decisive.'-165

If you are convinced that is a description of someone who merely runs the staff for his general, then your understanding is even more limited than I suspected.

As to pejorative comments and accusations, you may describe them as that; I would describe them as a critique of your partial, biased and poorly informed approach to history. I do wonder where you studied.