Ram Kangaroo | 30 Jan 2013 11:11 a.m. PST |
Dunkirk is naturally celebrated as one of the few British bright spots in the early war years. I have not had the opportunity to read any "what if" articles postulating on the consequences if the Germans had prevented the Dunkirk operations. So, I pose it here :). |
Brian Smaller | 30 Jan 2013 11:16 a.m. PST |
It would have been bad for Britain. Britain would have lost any ability to conduct land operations for several years while a new army was built. I think the Germans would have doubled down in attempting to destroy the RAF in preparation for Sea Lion. The knowledge that the enemy had no army left would have been a big incentive to keep at it. |
Mooseworks8 | 30 Jan 2013 11:19 a.m. PST |
From here: link The rapid advance of the German army through Belgium and France in May 1940 stranded hundreds of thousands of British, French, and Belgian troops at the port of Dunkirk on the coast of northern France. On May 24, with his enemies encircled, Hitler ordered a halt to the attack. This provided the British with enough time to organize a massive evacuation, using every available civilian craft alongside naval vessels to evacuate 198,000 British and 140,000 French and Belgian troops. The operation's success gave a significant boost to the morale of the British population and helped harden the resolve to fight on.But what if Hitler had ordered his tanks to destroy the Allied forces at Dunkirk on May 24? How might his decision have affected the course and outcome of the war? Adolf Hitler was in fine spirits and good humor on the morning of May 24, 1940. His Panzer divisions were within fifteen miles of what was left of the defeated British Army trapped near the French port of Dunkirk. He believed that decisive victory was at hand. But at Charleville, in the headquarters of Army Group A, which had carried out the advance, he was astonished to learn that his commander in chief, Colonel-General Gerd von Rundstedt, wasn't planning to continue the attack. The general assumed that the British had nowhere to go and that bombardment by the Luftwaffe would soon compel its surrender. He wanted his tanks in good repair for their deployment south against the French.
Hitler momentarily wavered. He decided to speak with the commander in chief of the army, Walther von Brauchitsch, and the chief of the Army General Staff, Franz Halder, both of whom disagreed with Rundstedt. They advised Hitler to destroy the British Army without hesitation. Hermann Göring, head of the Luftwaffe and Hitler's designated successor, agreed. His mind made up, Hitler overruled Rundstedt and ordered the tanks into Dunkirk. It was a one-sided contest. The British and their Allies had left most of their heavy armor behind in the headlong retreat. They had few munitions, little food, and no hope of relief or of holding out. On May 28, Lord Gort, commander in chief of the British Expeditionary Force, sought permission to surrender from the small war cabinet summoned by Winston Churchill, the new prime minister. Churchill reluctantly gave his permission. That same day, Belgium capitulated to Germany and soon afterward, devoid of allies and its own forces disintegrating, so did France. At midnight on May 28, the guns fell silent as a temporary armistice took effect on the Western Front. The Allied troops not killed or seriously wounded in the last, fruitless defense of Dunkirk were herded into long, miserable columns and marched into German captivity. It was a defeat unparalleled in British history. Back in London, the war cabinet, in session almost continuously in recent days, held tense debates about Britain's next move. Despite the odds, Churchill remained defiant, arguing that it was better to go down fighting than to capitulate cravenly. This made little sense to the other politicians present—Neville Chamberlain, the former prime minister and current leader of the Conservative Party; Lord Halifax, the foreign secretary; and Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood, leader and deputy leader, respectively, of the Labour Party. Dismissing Churchill as overly emotional, the war cabinet seized on an opening that had arisen three days earlier, on May 25, when Lord Halifax had been approached by Signor Bastianini, the Italian ambassador in London. Well aware of the hopeless British plight on the channel coast, Bastianini had raised the possibility of a negotiated end to the war brokered by Benito Mussolini. Although Churchill remained reluctant, Lord Halifax's argument convinced the other members of the war cabinet. The army was lost, the air force still weak. No help could be expected from the United States. Continuing hostilities would probably result in pointless destruction, quite possibly in a German invasion of Britain. A negotiated end could prevent the relentless bombing of British cities and a potential German occupation. Not least in Lord Halifax's considerations was the thought that the empire might still be salvaged. Chamberlain's voice was decisive in support of Lord Halifax. Attlee and Greenwood, new to the government, fell into line. Isolated, Churchill considered resigning but, unwilling to reveal the split in the government, agreed to Halifax's proposal with the heaviest of hearts. He knew it meant the end of everything he had stood for, his own political demise, and, most likely, disaster for his country. |
Timbo W | 30 Jan 2013 12:18 p.m. PST |
Why should Britain surrender or sue for peace? By this stage defence of the UK was down to the RAF and the Navy. The loss of 198,000 men would have been a heavy heavy blow for Britain, but the British army of World War II grew to 3,900,000 let alone all the Imperial and Dominion forces. So disastrous but not fatal. The other side of the coin, or so I've heard, was that the Germans had run out of supplies so had to stop to wait for more fuel and ammo. |
toofatlardies | 30 Jan 2013 12:37 p.m. PST |
"The few British bright spots of the war" Without wishing to be rude, which planet are you on? |
21eRegt | 30 Jan 2013 1:03 p.m. PST |
The OP didn't say "of the war" but "of the early war years." A big difference in words. The successes in North Africa were months away, Norway was a strategic disaster, the Battle for France obviously was a failure. Yes, I'd call saving an army a definite bright spot. |
Sparker | 30 Jan 2013 1:50 p.m. PST |
Well there were a couple of idiots on here who have maintained the Britain was so strong, militarily, in 1940, and Germany so weak, that it would have made no difference! But they haven't chimed in yet so perhaps they've done a bit of research
So my 2 cents is that of course it would have been a disaster – trained soldiers, and establishing effective cadres for combat effective units, doesn't happen over night, and so Hitler might have taken more of an interest in SEALION
.scary! |
basileus66 | 30 Jan 2013 2:29 p.m. PST |
and so Hitler might have taken more of an interest in SEALION
.scary! I don't believe that would have been an issue, even if Dunkirk would have been a disaster for the UK. It doesn't matter that the balance of power would have benefited Germany even more than it actually did. What is important is that: first, the Royal Navy would have still had the upper hand; and second, and more importantly, the strategic thinking of Hitler would have been still firmly set on the East. For him, the war in the West was a distraction, not the main goal. He wanted to conquest the Western lands of the Soviet Union. That he could do it without worrying about France was good enough for him. UK in 1940-1941 was, in Hitler's mind, a minor annoyance, not a strategic threat. He believed that once he would have defeated the USSR, Great Britain would either sue for peace or could be safely ignored by Germany. The real question is if a great disaster at Dunkirk would have move forward the schedule on the USSR invasion, and how that would have affected the events. But even if Hitler would have pushed forward the timeline to attack the USSR, would have been German logistic effort enough to advance the time for the invasion in any significant way? I am not so sure, but I don't know enough about the topic to be adamant in a way or another. Best |
Unlucky General | 30 Jan 2013 2:29 p.m. PST |
Not sure why people enjoy this sort of speculation so much. We might as well discuss "What if the Germans were beaten by the Anglo-French forces in 1940?". This is in no way having a crack Ram
I enjoy them too (confession). I recall reading the plans for the defence of Britain which, as it transpired, included my Grandpa digging in around Salisbury with his Vickers section (2nd AIF). I think is was Allanbrook (?) who even planned shelling any German forces who made if as far as the beach with mustard gas. I don't believe the Germans had the capability of a seabourne invasion on that scale against the sort of resistence they would meet in England – even an England short of their BEF. Timbo W makes the point about dominion forces and he's quite right. The only aggressive campaign the British were capable of mounting after Dunkirk was in North Africa and with the assistance of large numbers of Australian, New Zealand, Canadians, Indians and South African forces – and others besides. I may be mistaken but I think the majority of the numbers but certainly infantry divisons were those not from the British Isles. Policy at the time was understandably survival but for Britain and India – as Britains most prized posession. Beyond saving India, I'm afraid to say the Brits left the Aussies and the Kiwis for dead. Even after the Japanese attacks, the British government tried to keep Australasian forces engaged in North Africa to fight Britain's war, something that generation of Australians at least remained in some denial about. Churchill even attempted to divert the 6th and 7th divisional withdrawal to Burma – such was their determination to hold their Indian possession at the cost of the 'colonials'. Lucky for the Empire that in those times, feelings of being a part of the Commonwealth ran very strong and an almost completely Anglo population of Australian and New Zealanders regarded themselves as British – sometimes British first. Perhaps the seeds of republican or independent self awareness were planted because of the WWII experience – who can say? I may have strayed a little of topic. |
piper909 | 30 Jan 2013 3:09 p.m. PST |
Mustard gas, yow! That could have led to all sorts of nastiness. Would British military leaders really have used gas against invading German troops if they thought it might provoke German retaliation gassing of civilian centers in London, etc.? I would think that the reaction from Germany would outweigh any short-term tactical benefit. |
WarpSpeed | 30 Jan 2013 3:35 p.m. PST |
With no rescue of the terrified and broken allied forces at DunkirkMr.Churchill would have read the other prepared speach on BBC. |
Unlucky General | 30 Jan 2013 4:27 p.m. PST |
Well I don't imagine it's that far a step removed from bombing with high explosives and incendiaries. I'm not sure what they imagined the casualty rate might have been fighting the Wermacht from the beaches to the Highlands either. I remember touring Normandie and the Netherlands last year and taking on board for the first time the civilian costs in lives from fighting across urban centres in the 20th century. Invading or liberating seems a bloody business. As far as it being a short term tactical benefit, I suspect if it's to prevent your country from being invaded, the short term is all you need. Everyone appears to have had their gas mask in preparation for the worst so perhaps they felt the people wer ready for it? I'm not sure how effective it would have been anyway as a weapon of mass destruction. The Luftwaffe only had so many aircraft and would have needed them in a front line combat support role I imagine. |
PiersBrand | 30 Jan 2013 5:59 p.m. PST |
Well one result would have been that my Grandfather wouldnt have got back from France
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Etranger | 30 Jan 2013 6:32 p.m. PST |
Mustard gas, yow! That could have led to all sorts of nastiness. Would British military leaders really have used gas against invading German troops if they thought it might provoke German retaliation gassing of civilian centers in London, etc.? I would think that the reaction from Germany would outweigh any short-term tactical benefit. All the major European combatants considered it likely that the other side would use gas indiscrimately against their civilian population and prepared accordingly. It's one of the few mercies of WWII that no such deliberate attacks occurred. As to the loss of the BEF at Dunkirk: provided that Churchill remained as PM then it's unlikely that there would have been any immediate surrender or negotiation. Churchill would never have let such a setback stop his resistance. Remember that The Empire lost 80,000 men in Singapore 18 months later,(most of the effective strength in the Far East), soon after losing 40,00 in Greeece & Crete & there was no talk of negotiations then. If he had been supplanted by Lord Halifax then there is some possibility of such a decision. There were still enough troops left in the UK to send divisions back to France after Dunkirk fell. Presumably those units wouldn't have been sent or would be recalled if there had been heavier personnel losses in the North. If anything the RAF & RN will be stronger as they won't have spent so much time and effort in defending & evacuating the BEF, so more destroyers and fighters are available for defence. OKW still doesn't have a coherent invasion plan & the German Navy is still mostly at the bottom of a Norwegian fjord
. The Germans were wary of losing their panzers, which they wanted to preserve for what they still felt was going to be the second, decisive phase of the French campaign. Those divisons that had been involved in fighting around Calais & Boulogne had suffered enough casualties & delays from the rearguard garrisons in those ports to tread warily when approaching Dunkirk. Longer term the losses of trained personnel & perhaps more imprtantly in leaders (Montgomery, Allanbrooke, Alexander to name three of the more prominent.) would have had a serious effect upon future land operations. It's worth noting though that in the actual evacuation many of these were ordered to depart well before the end of Dynamo so it's possible that a priority would have also been given to getting such men off if there was a more rapid collapse. |
ScottWashburn | 30 Jan 2013 7:22 p.m. PST |
One consequence of a British surrender on the Continent that I've never seen mentioned is the psychological impact of a quarter million young English lads heading into POW camps with no prospect that they'd ever be released unless peace was made. Losing men as prisoners in dribs and drabs is one thing, but losing that many all at once would be something else. There might have been strong public pressure to make peace with the Germans and get the boys back home. |
Etranger | 30 Jan 2013 7:35 p.m. PST |
I doubt it would have changed Churchill's mind. If he wasn't in charge, see above. For a bit of perspective remember that the Britsh Empire lost roughly twice that number in casualties (420,000 including 96,000 dead) during the 4 months of the 1916 Somme battles, including 60,000 in a single day. link No-one suggested calling WWI off though. |
WarpSpeed | 30 Jan 2013 8:12 p.m. PST |
Losing 80,000 men around the world is not like losing 200,000 40 miles from home..btw the surrender speach was already written but was never needed. |
Agesilaus | 30 Jan 2013 8:30 p.m. PST |
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BullDog69 | 30 Jan 2013 11:01 p.m. PST |
No way of knowing, of course, but I feel the loss of the army would have had more of a psychological impact than a military one: but would it have stiffened British resolve or seen those political forces who were anti-war gain the upper hand? It is hard to look objectively at the period and for ones thinking not to be clouded by Churchillian bulldog spirit and backs to the wall etc etc
but perhaps a disaster might have seen him squeezed out as easily as Chamberlain was after Norway and for a new government to put feelers out for peace? Lots of other nations on the Continent showed no inclination to fight on and on – is it so hard to believe that there were those in Great Britain who thought similarly and who were ready to accept a peace settlement in 1940 and make the best of things? Might not a disastrous failure at Dunkirk have been enough for them to gain prominance? It was a bizarre (and really not very admirable) period of history, and public opinion was very fragmented: for example, as well as the marginal threat of the fringe nutters of Mosley's Fascists, British trade unionists and communists were actively sabotaging the war effort in the early years because Britain was at war with Stalin's ally, Hitler. Not something you hear much about now. |
Martin Rapier | 31 Jan 2013 4:24 a.m. PST |
'We might as well discuss "What if the Germans were beaten by the Anglo-French forces in 1940?"' That happened when we played Third Reich once (a botched 1939 double impulse attack on Paris). We laughed like drains then set the game up and started again:) |
donlowry | 31 Jan 2013 10:33 a.m. PST |
What about the affect of having all those extra British POWs in German hands? |
Sparker | 31 Jan 2013 2:56 p.m. PST |
Well there were a couple of idiots on here who have maintained the Britain was so strong, militarily, in 1940, and Germany so weak, that it would have made no difference! But they haven't chimed in yet so perhaps they've done a bit of research
Clearly not
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Bill N | 31 Jan 2013 4:39 p.m. PST |
Just a wild guess. If no Dunkirk then the Second Armored Division does not get sent to North Africa. Without the prospect of armored reinforcements Wavell halts at the Libyan border. Without a major victory in NA, the British do not reinforce the Greeks and the coup in Yugoslavia does not take place. |
4th Cuirassier | 01 Feb 2013 5:17 a.m. PST |
IIRC the Luftwaffe didn't have any significant anti-ship capability in 1940, i.e. they had the bombers but they didn't have the doctrine nor an adequate stash of suitable munitions (torpedoes, armour-piercing bombs) given the scale of the task of holding off the Royal Navy. Sinking a destroyer with HE is feasible, but sinking a capital ship is much, much harder. I've never come across any serious claims that Britain was militarily more powerful than Germany in 1939, but she certainly had more economic muscle/potential, even if you only compare the UK with Germany. Of course the majority of the defence spend was on the navy and a lot of the army was dispersed throughout the Empire. Hence you end up with a weak army and air force relative to Germany's, but an essentially invincible navy. I think defeat at Dunkirk would have resulted in an armistice for the non-military reasons others have given. Until quite late in the war, though, Britain kept needlessly large numbers of troops at home; so at a pinch, some of the same overseas campaigns could have been attempted, provided Germany was fully engaged against Russia. |
Sparker | 01 Feb 2013 3:10 p.m. PST |
Sinking a destroyer with HE is feasible, but sinking a capital ship is much, much harder. Thats facsinating! – were you one of the US Admirals present at Doolittle's US Fleet Bombing trials in the 1930's? What was it you ascribed all those sunken battleships to – improperly latched hatches, wasn't it? Until quite late in the war, though, Britain kept needlessly large numbers of troops at home; As I keep trying to explain, theres a great deal of difference between raw troop numbers and effective combat formations – even by 1942, at the Battle of Alamein, the reason Monty kept the 9th Australian Div rushing around was that he considered it the only combat effective division he had! He wasn't entirely convinced that the majority of his Infantry Divisions were properly effective even by 1944 – and that was WITH the Dunkirk cadres to build on
But don't feel alone if you can't understand this – none of our politicians can either
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Lion in the Stars | 01 Feb 2013 4:45 p.m. PST |
Note that those capital ships were sunk by 1000lb bombs. I don't remember too many Luftwaffe birds capable of handling bombs that big. |
4th Cuirassier | 01 Feb 2013 5:58 p.m. PST |
I'm not aware of any bombing trials by Doolittle in the 1930s Sparker. If you are referring to tests by Mitchell in the 1920s, the trouble with those is that they weren't realistic. The target was stationary, was not shooting back, had no damage control parties aboard, was still hard to hit and took several days to sink from the progressive flooding. Which is my point really. In 1940 the Luftwaffe would have run likely have run out of torpedoes and bombs before they had got near to sinking the number of warships the RN could have chucked at an invasion fleet. |
Timbo W | 01 Feb 2013 7:11 p.m. PST |
Not to mention they might have been a little busy acting as 'flying artillery', escorting paratrooper transports, flying cover over Rhine barges, defending landing beaches from RAF bombers and dueling with RAF fighters. |
Sparker | 01 Feb 2013 10:26 p.m. PST |
Yes Mitchell, of course, sorry. Well its good to know there was nothing to worry about in Britain in 1940. Have you read FM Allanbrooke's diary of the time, when he was Commander Imperial General Staff – poor worried deluded fool, eh? Still, what would he have known of Britain' defences at the time
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Old Contemptibles | 01 Feb 2013 10:58 p.m. PST |
Wargamer 1972, I was with you until you got to the part of Winston being ousted. That wasn't about to happen nor would Britain surrender. Why would they surrender? The Royal Navy and the RAF had to be dealt with. Sealion could not succeed unless The RN and RAF was destroyed. Hitler did not want to fight Britain on the contrary he admired the British and their Empire. He was focused on the USSR. The question is what effect would this have on American popular opinion. My guess is not that much. But FDR and the War Department would be scrambling to find some way to help Britain even more than they already were. Would FDR have risked going before a divided Congress with a declaration of war against Germany? If he didn't get a sizable majority of the votes you would have a divided country going to war. But as we all know the Japanese had other plans. The Japs may have moved up their timetable. As far as the British is concern, even if invaded I think WC and what was left of the army would have been fighting from Scotland if they had to. Then off to Canada. |
Andy ONeill | 02 Feb 2013 4:02 a.m. PST |
RAF would probably have more fighters and pilots for BoB. We lost quite a few over Dunkirk. Britain takes quite a morale hit. There is the potential that Churchill takes a hit. There were several votes of no confidence which went for him historically. So there's some sort of a chance there'd be one went against him. Churchill wasn't as secure as some seem to think and his opponents were for coming to terms. I would think that's Jerry's best bet. At one time I used to think Sealion was viable. Then I did some research. It just wasn't going to work. The LW couldn't stop the RN from sinking the barges. Even if they somehow get here, resupplying would have been nigh on impossible. |
Sparker | 02 Feb 2013 3:21 p.m. PST |
The LW couldn't stop the RN from sinking the barges I was once serving on a modern (well modern by WW2 standards) Type 42 Destroyer and we were tasked with sinking a escapee Rhine Barge which was posing a danger to shipping. An ideal gunnery evolution – once we got range clearance – so we banged away with 4.5 inch shells, 20mm cannon, and GPMGs
.all of which bounced off. The only way to sink the damn thing was to go aboard and set a charge
Not saying I'd liked to have been aboard while we were brassing it up mind you, but I'm suggesting some, perhaps half, might have gotten through on a dark stormy night
Enough to capture an airhead, anyway
Resupply, now thats a different story! |
4th Cuirassier | 02 Feb 2013 3:34 p.m. PST |
AIUI the defence plan if the Germans did get ashore was essentially the same as the one the Germans used in 1944: hold the main strength back from the beaches and counterattack once you've figured out where the main landing area is. Anyone know if this was indeed the idea? It sounds like it would have failed for the same reasons. |
charon | 03 Feb 2013 3:07 a.m. PST |
"It (the defence plan)sounds like it would have failed for the same reasons." The British defence of the south coast may have very well succeeded whilst the German defence of Normandy failed. In 1944 the KM could do little to interfere with the landings and follow up, whereas in 1940 the RN could occuply the channel at will (and take losses). In 1944 the Allies had air supremacy, whereas in 1940 the RAF was strong with lots of fighters and bombers to attack the invaders. In 1944 the Allied logistic effort to support the landings was massive, whereas in 1940 the German logistics were minimal. All the available troops in the UK had to do was delay and contain the Germans until the lack of logistics forced the Germans to surrender. The question then, is whether German confidence is dented sufficiently to cause a rethink about Barbarossa. The losses in men, vehicles and aircraft would not be easily replaced. |
4th Cuirassier | 04 Feb 2013 7:27 a.m. PST |
@ charon Interesting differences. I am assuming the LW achieves air superiority, which in 1940 could easily have come about; by putting Park and Leigh Mallory into each other's jobs, for example, or by adopting some of Dizzy Allen's lonnier suggestions such as attacking the Luftwaffe on the ground with the whole of Fighter Command. Thereafter, yes, it gets challenging, but I wonder what happens if the British Army loses a battle or two? |
pas de charge | 04 Feb 2013 7:44 a.m. PST |
If the Germans could get sufficient forces ashore and maintain supply to them, which would entail achieving air superiority and chasing the Royal Navy out of the channel before they could cripple the invasion and support fleets, then the Germans would probably have won. However, that is a huge "if", especially given the combined strategic military abilities of Hitler and Goering. |
4th Cuirassier | 04 Feb 2013 11:35 a.m. PST |
It might actually depend on something as banal as the level of munitions. PoW and Repulse dodged over 40 of 50 torpedoes aimed at them, and their attackers were practiced experts. Not dodging 10 looks bad until you consider that the damage done by the initial hits made the later ones easier. The LW of 1940 wasn't such a practiced force as the IJNAF and it didn't have massive inventories of aerial torpedoes either. Unless one handwaves more into being, or postulates perhaps an anti-shipping air fleet being trained in 1939, it's hard to feel sure that they could have stopped a really determined surface attack using air power alone. |
pas de charge | 04 Feb 2013 1:21 p.m. PST |
In 1940, the Luftwaffe also had hardly any planes equipped to deliver torpedoes, which would have somewhat put the kibosh on any plans to launch mass torpedo attacks. I strongly suspect that it would have been extremely difficult for the Germans to force the Royal Navy out of the channel during an attempted invasion. Almost any level of Royal Navy losses would have been acceptable in order to defeat such an attempt. Basically, the Germans were not equipped to launch a cross-channel offensive with any real chance of success. |
number4 | 04 Feb 2013 5:46 p.m. PST |
Well there were a couple of idiots on here who have maintained the Britain was so strong, militarily, in 1940, and Germany so weak, that it would have made no difference! But they haven't chimed in yet so perhaps they've done a bit of research
So, you still believe the Britain didn't have the most powerful navy afloat in 1940 then? OK Whatever
. actually your comment about the loss of trained and experienced soldiers is correct. It would have been bad, but not a complete game changer; there were others at home in the UK (including my grandfather, a sgt. in the Gloster regiment and already a 20 year veteran) Your destroyer may have failed to sink a Rhine barge (you must have been rolling the same kind of "to hit" dice that I do), but to say these and the glorified rafts that made up Hitler's laughable 'invasion fleet' could make it through the channel on a 'dark & stormy night' is like suggesting coconuts migrate ;) |
Sparker | 04 Feb 2013 11:57 p.m. PST |
Well clearly you and I are not going to agree on Britain's relative strength to Germany in 1940 and its prospects of easily fending off invasion. I shall console myself that my view seems to chime in with the Commander of those defences at the time, Lord Alanbrooke, whose most optimistic assessment was: "We should certainly have a desperate struggle and the future might well have hung in the balance, but I certainly felt that given a fair share of the fortunes of war we should certainly succeed in finally defending these shores" Not exactly a cakewalk then
.and his assessment was made AFTER the BEF was successfully evacuated from Dunkirk
Of course you are entitled to a response, but if you don't mind, please have the last word. It depresses me trying to engage with smart alec revisionists, who by implication if not intent, reduce the heroic and epic achievements of our great heroes. |
4th Cuirassier | 05 Feb 2013 2:53 a.m. PST |
Rhine barges today are a lot bigger than in 1940. The typical size of a Rhine oil barge is now about 3,500 tonnes. Some go up to 8,000. Those displacements would have been found only among ocean-going vessels in 1940. A wooden barge in the 300 to 500 ton range would be less of a problem for someone trying to sink it. |
number4 | 05 Feb 2013 6:40 p.m. PST |
The relative naval strengths in 1940 are a matter of historical record, as is the fact that the Luftwaffe *never* at any point gained air superiority (let alone supremacy) over the British Isles. Alanbrooke's statement sounds a lot more confident than Eisenhower's prepared note accepting full responsibility for possible failure in Normandy four years later. All it proves is that Alanbrooke (unless you are calling him a defeatist?) was no Weygand or Petain. Back to the original post here (now there's a novelty!) No Dunkirk operation would have hurt the army, as even lightly armed soldiers are still capable of putting up a fight (look at what the Soviet Partisans were able to achieve), but the flip side of that is RN and RAF losses would have been much lighter – and it was they who were in the Front Line of Britain's defense from then on. Sparker my friend, I'll leave the personal attacks and insults to you, but I do find it strange that an ex-matelot has such a poor opinion of the RN in WWII! |
Andy ONeill | 06 Feb 2013 7:42 a.m. PST |
It was quite a shock to see Jerry take France so quickly. Morale took quite a hit. Whilst things looked fairly bleak in 1940 from the British side of the channel, the perspective from the German side wasn't so great neither. I don't think Jerry had any capability to deliver torpedoes from aircraft and IIRC their subs in Norway had problems because German torpedo pistols were rather dodgy. ( That's the thing makes the torp go bang ). I recommend reading up a bit on the naval side of Norway. The KM had fewer light craft than the RN and a massive inferiority in Destroyers. The RN just totally outclassed them. The LW never achieved air superiority. Here's the clincher though. One stormy night greatly underestimates the task the barges faced. Sealion involved 10 days to deliver the first wave. The barges were designed for rivers and had heavier motors bolted on – AFAIK they needed good weather. TEN days and nights to hold off the RN destroyers. This was General Halder's opinion on realising this: 'all previous statements of the navy were so much rubbish and we can throw away the whole plan of an invasion'. Not enough? The panzers were considered the major German advantage. How many panzers in that first wave? It just wasn't going to work.
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Etranger | 06 Feb 2013 9:38 p.m. PST |
To add to that marvellous (IMHO)summary. And how many horses? And tonnes of fodder required to feed them? |
4th Cuirassier | 07 Feb 2013 6:17 a.m. PST |
I would think you could find horses in southern England. But does this discussion suggest to us no better way? If you were thinking from say mid-1938 that you might have to defeat Britain and France to free your back to turn on the Soviet Union, what should you do starting then? There is always the easy rejoinder "If Adolf had been that rational there'd have been no war", but just supposing. I think you'd want to make enough mines to create a chokepoint of the Channel, holding the RN off long enough to invade rather further west with a view to grabbing airfields and, crucially, a port – ASAP. To do that you'd need gliders capable of landing a half track, some decent anti-tank, and more FJs than Germany had I think. It might also make sense to plan from the outside on trapping the British army on the wrong side of the Channel. You'd then need better intel on where the key fighter bases were, so you could concentrate on those. You'd perhaps want to go either sooner than 1940 (before Spitfires) or maybe later (so you could draw off some of the RN with your new battleships, and so you have FW190s). It sounds tricky any way you look at it, especially when you look at the effort involved in 1944. |
PHGamer | 07 Feb 2013 7:52 a.m. PST |
Sealion was a pipe dream for one main reason. Assuming the Germans could land 10 + divisions of whatever types are considered optimal. Now the problem starts. Each division will require between 800 (infantry) and 1,200 (panzer) tons of supplies, per day. Try delivering 10,000 tons per day, without the benefit of local steveadores. That is assuming you can get your barges passed the raiding ships of the Royal Navy. "I would think you could find horses in southern England." Possibly. Each German Infantry Division required 8,000 for normal operations. (that is 80 tons of fodder per day) |
thomalley | 07 Feb 2013 3:57 p.m. PST |
We wouldn't be talking about Montgomery, or Alexander or Brooke. |
Etranger | 07 Feb 2013 7:26 p.m. PST |
The Germans were taking their own horse transport with them, 80,000 in the first wave. The fodder was to be supplied from the continent. |
Andy ONeill | 08 Feb 2013 6:42 a.m. PST |
OK 4th here goes. Yes. When you look at what the allies had in 1944 and compare that to what Jerry had in 1940 it makes it pretty clear. That's what people should really be considering. 1944 allies. Vast fleet of ships with purpose built craft, total air supremacy and specialist training. Huge amount of planning and materiel available for resupply. Against an enemy was never realistically going to be able to intervene with naval assets. Compared to
1940 Jerries
Almost no ships, rather dodgy conversions of old barges, no air superiority and no prior training or inclination. Almost no planning for resupply and little materiel available. Against an enemy could trounce them with naval assets and would turn this into a suicide mission. Dieppe is a demonstration of just how easy Jerry would have found taking a port. And they'd have way less naval resources. Glossing over that. Historically, there were several steps in Hitler's career where he relied on British opinion. At that time (and for many years previous) Britain was very sensitive to other countries' naval strength. Building the destroyers ( or whatever) to deploy mines would have been a big red flag and the end of Adolf whenever he started laying down keels. Essentially, Germany cannot have more naval assets themselves in 1940. They could possibly have made more use of allies. Get Spain on side ( Highly unlikely but
.) and take Gib. Have Italy demonstrate with it's navy in the Med to distract and supply ships to cover an invasion. (That's why Gib is important). Make more effort to take French ships intact and use them. ( That didn't go so well for the British historically though ). You still find Jerry + allies outmatched by the RN but that gives the many British destroyers a bit of opposition at least. Then you have the craft those infantry and stuff are crossing in. They'd need maybe a year developing proper landing craft. They're relatively small and maybe Jerry could have hidden making these somehow. The first phase of Sealion was to gain air supremacy. Jerry actually started on this so we can see how that went. For the LW to have stood a chance they'd need to bomb radar more effectively and add drop tanks to their me109. Oh and bombing the RAF airfields and aircraft production – right thing to do but not enough big bombs. They probably also need bigger 4 engine bombers. In this what if Goerring therefore needs replacing with someone else. Oh and Udet as well probably. They were Hitler's choices of course. There again his focus was on the East so maybe he has to go before you can have all your toys built. He deliberately played off the different military arms in the belief that made them stronger in some sort of Darwinian manner. This was another part of the problem. The combined arms between Navy Army and Air wasn't going to happen. Not with Adolf in charge anyhow. Really the best person to change in order to make it possible would be Adolf. |
Timbo W | 08 Feb 2013 12:45 p.m. PST |
A really way-out fantastical scenario but one that would be very difficult for Britain: The Germans persuade the Japanese to send their fleet to cover the invasion. |