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"Executive Fuller!’ - The RAF and the Channel Dash" Topic


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Kaoschallenged08 Jan 2013 12:29 a.m. PST

"In February 1942, the Wehrmacht executed a well-planned and highly effective joint air-sea operation to transfer a powerful battle squadron from Brest to Wilhelmshaven in what become known as the ‘Channel Dash'. Although this was a relatively minor action, it resonated strongly across the levels of warfare: for the Germans, it was a tactical success, but ultimately a strategic failure, while for the British, it was a minor tactical embarrassment that was inflated by the context of other events into a direct threat to the survival of Churchill's government at the grand strategic level. This paper provides an analysis of the RAF's participation in the Channel Dash and identifies the key points of failure: these include structure, in terms of the poor organisation of the system of command, and agency, particularly in the characters of the most important personalities involved. Other important themes emerge: at a time of intense focus on air-land integration, the Channel Dash illustrates that empathy and understanding is also required to make air-maritime operations work, while the need to balance operational security against the requirement for absolute clarity of communication in high-tempo military actions is also prominent"

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marcus arilius08 Jan 2013 6:48 a.m. PST
Mako1108 Jan 2013 3:41 p.m. PST

I am experiencing de ja vu……

Kaoschallenged08 Jan 2013 6:57 p.m. PST

LOL I was going to post here originally Mako. But I posted to the Naval Gallery by mistake. So I just posted a brand new thread here too grin. Robert

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