"OoB Battle of Mogilev/Saltanovka" Topic

Anyone know where I can find the OoB for this? I am building Davout's 1st corps and my Cousin is building Raievski's 7th Corps in 15mm at a 1:20 scale – but I want to know what all was engaged at this battle. I have scoured google and not been able to find anything definitive.

Any help would be appreciated.

I have this mostly in scattered notes (in 3 languages), as I never finished looking into this engagement. Let me give you an overview, which might be off a battalion here or there due to detachments, and lacking confirmation of the presence of most of the named commanders.
If you want more, let me know and I will see if I can do better over the weekend.

For the French ….
Davout commanding in person – really actively running the battle
All ligne infanterie regiments of 5 battalions each plus 4x 3-lber ex-Austrian cannons, with stregnths shown as of 15 June état (probably 10-15% lower for the battle).

First line
Elements of the 4e division with general Dessaix in presence (and being pushed aside by Davout, it appears) :
- 85e (brigadier Friederichs, colonel Piat)(109/3930)
- 108e (brigaidier Leguay, colonel Perdiset)(103/3647)
From the 5e division
- 61e (brigadier Guyardet, colonel Bouge)(101/3570)

Second line
From the 5e division with general Compans in presence :
- 111e (brigadier Lonchamp, colonel Juillet)(101/3570)
From the corps cavalry
- equivalent 3 squadrons of the 3e chasseurs à chevel …. this regiment had benn really trashed by Cossacks just before the battle, effectively losing a squadron+ and their colonel, Davout was really steamed and denied the usual sending of money and clothes to the captured colonel, moral was likely a bit raw and I don't think they were much engaged)(chef d'escadron Velaine, acting – and doing alot of messsages to/from Davout)(~600 all ranks)

Reserve, not engaged, guarding just before Mogliev
From the 5e division
-- 57e (brigadier Teste, colonel Charriere)(97/3575)

Artillery
- 1 compagnie d'artillerie a cheval (chef d'escadron Polimey) (4x 6-lber cannon, 2x 24-lber howitzer)
Comment : This is the only artillery formation that I am sure was there. Between them, the 4e and 5e divisions has 2 compagies of foot artillery and two of horse artilllery. Davout intentionally left some (how much?) of the divisional artillery of 4e and 5e divisions in Mogliev. Some may not have even reached Mogliev yet. The coprs atillery was elsewhere, in the rear.
Gun "counts" are confused becasue of the many 3-lbers present.
But, it remains to confirm if the 1 compagnie of horse artillery was really all that was brought forward to the battle.

Russians next ….

First, who was not there ….

The Cossacks under colonel Sysoev-3 who had trashed the 3e chasseurs had moved along into the French rear, scouting Mogliev and trying thier usual "tricks" on the approaching French coming up to Mogliev. They were then ordered to scout east toward Smolensk, covering (at long distance) Bagration's march there.

The Cossacks had been backed on their approach to Mogliev by a regulaar cavalry detachment under Graf Sivers : 8 squadrons of dragoons and a horse artillery company of 12 pieces. These had been called back to Saltanovka, They were present early in the morning of the day of the battle, as apparently was Prince Bagration. The terrain being unfavorable, the dragoons seem to have been dismissed to go south and east. The Prince Bagration (although reports and narratives differ) seems also to have departed, leaving the action to Count Raevskiy.

There is an issue here :
Some see the move through Saltanovka as a real attempt by Prince Bagration to advance on Mogliev. In this version, he does not see how much of the French 1er Corps is coming up, and decides to complete his original idea to meet 1st Western Army in Mogliev. The battle is more or less a (rather bloody) tactical draw, but the French stop the intended Russian advance, and the Prince Bagration then is forced to move on to Smolensk. Operational French victory.

The other version is the Cossacks accurately report the advance of Ier Corps, Prince Bagration understands Mogliev is lost, and desires Count Raevsky to merely mount a spoiling attack to insure that the French do not move south toward Bagration's main force. Same bloody tacticla draw. But Davout never again tries to move south, to catch Bagration in the flank on the march, but instead soon starts driving his people hard on to Smolensk. Operational Russian victory.

Be sure that French like the 1st version and Russians like the 2nd story, right ?
:-)

Eseentially ALL of 2nd Western Army was in the vivinity of Saltanovka. Only elements of 7th corps (12th and 26th infantry divisions) were engaged, and not all of even these.

There is a great "what-if" here for gaming – alternate instructions or goals for the Russian player.

OK …. back to the Russian OOB. The infantry were in good shape – 2 battalions/regiment, 600 men/battalion. Each division had 2 light foot companies (each 8x 6-lber gun and 4x 12-lber unicorn) and 1 position battery (8x 12-lber gun and 4x 24-lber unicorn). I think (subject to looking more carefully) all of the two divisions were there very near, bt certainly not all engaged. The place was restricted in lateral movement, and (as noted above) Raevskiy may not have been trying to really break through Davout anyway.

12th division
1st brigade (gen-maj. Kolyubakin)
- Smolenskiy Infantry Reg. (col. Ryleev)
- Narvskiy IR (lt.col. Bogdanovskiy)
2nd brigade (col. Pantserbiter)
- Aleksopol'skiy IR (lt.col. Petrigin)
- Novoingermanlyandskiy IR (lt.col. Zhukov-1)
3rd brigade (gen.-maj. Palitsyn)
- 6th Jâger Reg. (col. Grebov)
- 41st JR (maj. Petrovskiy-2)

26th division (gen.maj. Laskevich)
1st brigade (col. Litgart)
- Ladozhskiy IR (col. Savoini)
- Poltavskiy IR (lt.col. Koshin)
2nd brigade (col. Ladyzhenskiy)
- Nizhegorodskiy IR (lt.col. Kadyshev)
- Orlovskiy IR (maj. Bernikov)
3rd brigade (col. Gogel')
- 5th JR (maj. Kavregin)
- 42nd JR (lt.col. Sinenkov)

Summary :

French : 20 battalions "up" and 5 in reserve, 3 shaken squadrons of light horse, 6 artillery pieces (or more?) plus 20 "regimental" 3-lbers …. defending with good terrain advantages

Russians : 24 battalions and as much as 36 artillery pieces "up" and the rest of 2nd Western Army in reserve …. with a real question as to what their goals ("victory conditions") were

A neat engagement to game, I think.

If greater detail/accuracy is needed, let me know.

@Seroga – your information is staggeringly detailed – thank you for sharing with us all. I always learn something new when you reply with information. When I revisit my Russian Corps on the Ottoman borders, I will probably have a question or three to ask if I may?

Until then, where do you get your information from? Is it available online? If so is it in English or Russian?

Marcus,

Thanks! for the kind words.

NO English – all Russian and French and maybe a little German, Polish, etc. here and there – sorry.

I said it was preliminary work, so my bibliography was just getting started ….

Le général Compans (1769-1845): d'après ses notes de campagnes et sa correspondance de 1812 à 1813
Jean-Dominique Compans, réd Nicolas-Dominique-Maurice Ternaux-Compans, son petit-fils
Paris : Plon-Nourrit, 1912 780p
OCLC: 10919857
vers page 138 : la bataille de Saltanovka, près de Molihev, le 23 juillet 1812
=
Memoires du major Claude-François-Madeleine Le Roy (1767-1851) – manuscrit de ses mémoires vers 1841, publiés par Gabriel Dumay
[Tulard no. 901]
Title variously reported as ….
Souvenirs de C.-F.-M. Le Roy, vétéran des armées de la République et de l'Empire
Souvenirs de Leroy, major d'infanterie, vétéran des armées de la République et de l'Empire
Souvenirs du major Le Roy, vétéran des armées de la République et de l'Empire
Seemingly published at least three times ….
Mémoires de la Société Bourguignonne de geographie et d'histoire. Dijon: 1894, T.29
Dijon: P. Berthier, 1908, en deux feuilles In-8 : ~322p. (memoires) & ~190p. (notice biographique, états de service, etc.)
Dijon: P. Berthier, 1914, 326p.
=
colonel Frédéric-Ernest-Gustave Robert
Historique du 85ème régiment d'Infanterie.
La petit bibliothèque de l'armée française.
Paris & Limoges : H. Charles-Lavauzelle, 1888 (in-32, 64 pages).
OCLC: 83415517 / HOLLIS : 003645142
Harvard University, Widener Harvard College Depository – code Fr 348.85
=
E. Sage, capitaine adjudant-major au régiment
Historique du 85ème régiment d'infanterie de ligne et du 10ème régiment d'infanterie légère, 1690-1876.
Manuscrit des archives historiques de la guerre, 1877, in-4 1337 pp.
=
Paul-Henri Charvet de Léoni
Monographie des régiments de l'armée française – 85e régiment d'Infanterie.
"L'Illustration militaire", nos. des 11 & 16 mars 1868.
=
P.A.Zhilin "The Patriotic War Of 1812", Moscow,1988;
=
E.V.Tarle, Complete Works, Volume VII, "Napoleon's Invasion to Russia", Moscow 1959,
=
The collection of materials of the museum-panorama "The Borodino Battle" by I.A.Nickolaeva, N.A.Kolosov, P.M.Volodina, the 3-rd edition, Moscow,1985
=
General Bagration: Collection of documents and materials. Moscow, 1945, p.209

Also the standard works : Davout Correspondence, 1812 Dokumenti (23 vols), Buturlin, Mikailovkiy-Danilevskiy, Six, Quintins, Fabry, etc.

Also useful and I think all on-line : Fastes de la Légion d'honneur, les Annuaires Impériales, les registres de l'Order de Saint-Louis, database of Saint-Geroge Order, S-Pb Vedomosti, the Adress-Kalendar, Podmazo's Shef & Commanders, his Russian campaign OOB, etc.

Fantastic Seroga,

Copy/Paste!!!

Disclaiming personal connection ….

Although Yegeniy Tarle, listed above, was related to my wife's family (distantly, by marraige – or some such), he was black-listed by rest of the family for becoming a government historian after the revolution …. "sock-puppet for the bolshevik propagandists, no true academician, we are NOT to think of such a red-sympathizer as part of our family, this is what happens when someone marries a Ukrainian, blah, blah, blah,", quoth my dear Lady, when she saw me reading his work.

:-)

Timbo, dear Colleague, unless y'all want this in mixed Рус-çaise, I have to manually re-type it into Latin alphabet in English.
Then copy/paste!

:-)

Don't worry Seroga, we cross-posted. I was referring to me copying the OB itself in your first and second posts, not your sources :-)

No, no … the OOB was ALSO in Рус-çaise …. I more or less think in Рус-çaise plus English. My wife claims I am poorly-spoken and illiterate in three languages at the same time.
:-)

Seroga, Where would the gaming community be without people like you! I greatly appreciate the info.

Thank you for the clear cut Russian OoB, quite excellent work. I am very much in love with the 1812 campaign and am trying to get as much info as I can to put together a full OoB guide for the war…I would eventually love to run a scenario and this puts me one step closer to being able to do that!

Thanks!

I would guess MG Vorontsov was commanding the 1st brigade of the 12th?

@Seroga, many thanks once again for sharing with us "amateur historians". Your grasp of the fundamental details puts a lot of us to shame. Very humbling, but equally very exciting when we have such learned friends on this forum. A big thank you to you and all of your contributions to date and for the future

I'm afraid, when I ever learn foreign languages they are always end up being on the fun side of life. My good friend who can speak many foregin langauges, who has a gift for languages (he can speak, read and write Hungarian) gave me this book

It has helped me no end across the world as you can imagine…..

Otherwise it is very pigeon as they say!

I hadn't realised you were writing a book, may I ask what the title will be and it's subject? (I will glady put my pre-order in now!)

Seroga, I think we all know you could benefit financially from your expertise, so your free sharing here on TMP is without a doubt exteremly admirable.

So here is my scenario – Please let me know if there is anything lacking – this will be played with either General de Brigade – or my current personal favorite – Imperial Lances.

FRENCH OoB
CinC: Davout
MJ: Dessaix
4th Infantry Division: GdD Dessaix
Infantry Brigade: GdB Friederichs
-85th Line [5 btns. + 4 light guns]

Infantry Brigade: GdB Leguay
-108th Line [5 btns. + 4 light guns]

Artillery: ChdB Thevenot
-II Horse Battery/5th Horse Art. Reg. [6 guns]

5th Infantry Division: Compans(Not Pysically Present)
Infantry Brigade: GdB Guyrdet
-61st Line [5 btns. + 4 light guns]

Immediate Reserve
5th Infantry Division: Compans (physically present)
Infantry Brigade: GdB Loncham
-111th Line [3 btns. + 0 light guns]

Cavalry Brigade: Bordessoulle
-3rd Chasseurs [3 sq.]

Reserve
5th Infantry Division: Compans (NPP)
Infantry Brigade: GdB Teste
-57th Line[5 btns. + 4 light guns] "The Terrible"

Reserve Artillery
4th Division Artillery
-IX Foot Battery/7th Foot Art. Reg. [8 guns]

5th Division Artillery
-XVI Foot Battery/7th Foot Art. Reg. [8 guns]

RUSSIAN OoB

12th division
1st brigade (gen-maj. Kolyubakin)
-Smolenskiy [2 Btns]
-Narvskiy [2 Btns]

2nd brigade (col. Pantserbiter)
-Aleksopol'skiy [2 Btns]
-Novoingermanlyandskiy [2 Btns]

3rd brigade (gen.-maj. Palitsyn)
-6th Jâgers [2 Btns]
-41st Jâgers [2 Btns]

Artillery
XII Heavy Battery [8) 12lb guns 4) 24lb Licornes]
XXII Light Battery [8) 6lb guns 4) 12lb Licornes]
XXIII Light Battery [8) 6lb guns 4) 12lb Licornes]

26th division (gen.maj. Laskevich)
1st brigade (col. Litgart)
-Ladozhskiy [2 Btns]
-Poltavskiy [2 Btns]

2nd brigade (col. Ladyzhenskiy)
-Nizhegorodskiy [2 Btns]
-Orlovskiy [2 Btns]

3rd brigade (col. Gogel')
-5th Jâgers [2 Btns]
-42nd Jâgers [2 Btns]

Artillery
XXVI Heavy Battery [8) 12lb guns 4) 24lb licornes]
LVII Light Battery [8) 6lb guns 4) 12lb Licornes]
LVIII Light Battery [8) 6lb guns 4) 12lb Licornes]

The scenario is this
The French player deploys. Everything listed as immediate reserves are available to start coming on turn 1. Everything listed as Reserve may start rolling on turn 3.

The Russian player deploys everything from 12th division. 26th division is held as immediate reserve, player may start rolling for these troops on turn 1. 26th div artillery is held as Reserves and may start rolling on turn 3.

The French player may keep the 3lb guns with the battalions or may organize them as provisional light batteries of 8 guns each at the beginning of the game. Once deployed to provisional battery the guns may not re-join the battalion. Light guns if left in the battalions would effectively increase the battalions's fire strength – not represented by a model on the table.

Any comments or tweeks I should make?

@Hew Johns
Thank you! You called my attention my transcirption errors. I did warn (several times) that this was from preliminary notes.
"Non sumus angeli"

12th division (gen-maj. Kolyubakin)
1st brigade ( )
- Smolenskiy Infantry Reg. (col. Ryleev, from the Koporskiy IR)
- Narvskiy IR (lt.col. Bogdanovskiy)
2nd brigade (col. Pantserbiter)
- Aleksopol'skiy IR (lt.col. Petrigin)
- Novoingermanlyandskiy IR (lt.col. Zhukov-1)
3rd brigade (gen.-maj. Palitsyn-2)
- 6th Jâger Reg. (col. Glebov)
- 41st JR (lt.col. Shein-1)

26th division (gen.maj. Paskevich)
1st brigade (col. Litgart)
- Ladozhskiy IR (col. Savoini)
- Poltavskiy IR (lt.col. Koshin)
2nd brigade (col. Ladyzhenskiy)
- Nizhegorodskiy IR (lt.col. Kadyshev)
- Orlovskiy IR (maj. Bernikov-1)
3rd brigade (col. Gogel')
- 5th JR (maj. Kovrigin)
- 42nd JR (lt.col. Sinenkov)

The general Vorotsov, although the shef of the Narskiy IP, was assigned to command the 2nd Combined Grenadier division, and specifically the rear guard of the 2nd Western Army. His rear guard did cover the movement of the army east from Dashkova (south of Saltanovka) and there were some limited skirmishes with the French – but not much, and after what I would think of as "the engagement at Saltanova".

See:
Захарова О.Ю.
Генерал-фельдмаршал светлейший князь М.С. Воронцов
M: Центрполиграф, 2001

В. Харкевич
1812 год в дневниках, записках и воспоминаниях современников.
Вып. 1., С. 200-204 : "Из воспоминаний графа Воронцова."
Вильна: 1900
Note : the general Vorontsov's memoirs have been recently re-printed in Russian, but in the Kharkevich they given in their original French. Also, the general Paskevich's notes are in the same volume.

So, who did command the 1st brigade of the 12th division? Colonel Ryleev was the senior officer, but I do not read the accounts as giving him the rôle of a brigade commander, but he was wounded early in the day. In my notes, I would call it "vacant". If a specific ruleset has a "problem" with vacant brigade command, you could put up colonel Ryleev and have the Smolenskiy IR under the command of major Shevelev (who was killed) or major Shengelidzev (who was wounded). These were the battalion commanders at the start of the day, but I am not sure who was senior. Command at the end of the day was with major Matskevich.

Of possible interest ….

Raevskiy's simple epithet (inscription on his gravestone) :
«Он был в Смоленске — щит // В Париже – меч России»
"Was at Smolensk a shield // To Paris, a Russian sword"

Raevskiy and his young sons leading the attack at Saltanovka (perhaps mythical – several said they saw it, but Raevskiy denied it and said it would have too cruel for the younger boy, while the elder just a serving ensign in 5th Jägers and not taken onto the corps staff):

Maps:

@Marcus
I am not writing a book. I was just seeing what people were thinking was needed. I was really surprised at what the answers were.
But if I ever had enough attention span to finish a book, you would not have to order it.
It would be free, open-source, no copyright, etc., etc. and on-line.

@Alyxander100

For the French ….

"MJ: Dessaix" – I don't know what is the "MJ". I am sorry.

For the artillery …..
From a person who was there, then a young lieutenant commanding the 4x 3-lbers of the 85e de ligne:
link
He is really clear that only one compagnie à cheval was at the battle, the commander of which he gives as "capitaine Poligny". The attribution above of command of this company to "chef d'escadron Polimey" came orginally from an early printed version of the relevant bulletin. I find both names in various sources.
Here we see capitaine Poligny (having replaced chef de bataillon Thevenot) on his death bed after losing a leg, in the memoirs of Girod de l'Ain:
link
So, I think we can conclude that the 2e compagnie du 5e régiment d'artillerie à cheval (capitaine Paulinier, who himself was also killed later in the campaign) was the one surely at the battle.
That would be all, except the only French artillery officer who was wounded at Saltanovka was one lieutenant Roy of the 7e régiment d'artillerie à pied.
And I don't know to which compagnie of the 7e régiment he belonged. I really think he was just there on detached service, and that the 3 other compagnies of the 4e and 5e divisions were in Mogliev or still on the road there.
If you want to look some more, here (in French) the formations and commanders as best as I know them:

état-major d'artillerie de la 4e division : capitaine Poligny (replacing chef de bataillon Claude-François Thevenot), capitaine Gronnier
-- 9e compagnie du 7e régiment d'artillerie à pied : capitaine Mosson
-- 2e compagnie du 5e régiment d'artillerie à cheval : capitaine Paulinier

état-major d'artillerie de la 5e division : chef de bataillon François-Nicolas-Joseph Klié, capitaine Étienne-Joseph Barreau
-- 16e compagnie du 7e régiment d'artillerie à pied : capitaine Mercier
-- 2e compagnie du 6e régiment d'artillerie à cheval : capitaine Grosjean

"-111th Line [3 btns. + 0 light guns]"
As far as I can tell, they had all 5 battalions and their 4x 3-lbers.

"Cavalry Brigade: Bordessoulle"
General Bordessoulle was not present.

"-57th Line[5 btns. + 4 light guns] "The Terrible""
Well, maybe more "Le Terrible". In any case, I would not list them for the game. If the French neeed them, given the terrain, the French are in big trouble already. In any case, they were 10+ km away, guarding Mogliev, and would take a good while to join. And if they left, I think colonel Sysoev's Cossack would burn Mogliev to the ground, and capture the guns and gunners there. Just saying ….

The 85e de ligne had advanced to Mogliev with a demi-compagnie or so from the 3e compagnie du 2e bataillon de sapeurs (capitaine Mittiliot). They were still "up", or a detachment of them, and helped improve Davout's position.

For the Russians ….
See above for some corrections.
Since we were looking at French génie, there were quite a few pioneer companies nearby with 2nd Western Army. If your Russian commander wants one, I am sure he could have one for the battle.

For the scenario ….
"Everything listed as Reserve may start rolling on turn 3."
Allow time for Davout's messenger to go 10-12 km, then the reserves to get organized, and then march to join. Remember, Mogliev may be an ash-heap when they get back. Maybe roll to see if Claparède, who was next nearest to Mogliev, can get there in time to protect it. Otherwise, French lose.

"26th division is held as immediate reserve,"
Both came on at the same time.
The "reserves" for Raevskiy was the entire 2nd Western Army!
If you get the terrain right, you will see the problem is not one of available men, but sufficient space and roads/trails to move them (see topo maps above).

"may organize them as provisional light batteries of 8 guns"
Sounds good (though way not 4 gun units?), but I think Davout can, personally, grab the guns away anytime from the regiments, since he did do this in the real battle.

Alyxander100,
Great start with your oob, I too have put some effort into this scenario for GdB. Please contact me at aol. Use the name wmevms and add the numbers 96 to the letters. There are some good sources for "color" that I have put down somewhere but can't find them tonight. This information Seroga has provided is certainly a bit more then I have (many thanks to you sir), but the other sources do make pronouncements on how, where, and why the different battalions were brought into the battle. As Seroga has inferred/stated, the 2nd Combined Grenadiers were deployed "to the South", but certainly the other division of the 8th Army may be with in plausable distance to "reinforce" the battle if hypotheticals are introduced. As a further aside….Was not the 2nd Combined Grenadiers in the 8th Army newly formed and distinctly untested? Certainly they did well later, but their mettle was unknown at the time.
If my memory serves correctly, Davout also spent a fair bit of time preparing his position as he was aware of Bagrations march in his direction.

Additional points for me to ponder. I have no academic standing in this talk and will defer to anyone with even "claims" of source material. In other words I am guessing.

Those 3lb guns in Davouts chain of command have been pulled a long time. I wonder if they are all there. (cross posted with Seroga…I will defer ;) )
Both commands, but the Russians specifically, have pulled off some magnificant marching in the days leading up to this conflict. I had discounted battalion strengths a bit as I guessed about the oob, but then again I doubt that I was using "verifiable" secondary source material….just "older surveys" of the battle. I had dropped the strengths 15 to 25%.
Also, I am uncertain what is the map scale as described above (Macuima…..). Can I get some help with this unit of measure.
Seroga, thanks again for the time you share with us.
Jeff

@Jeff

Russian cursive is a bit much for foreigners (my wife's handwriting is more secure than 128-bit encryption) …. it says Масштаб / Masshtab / Scale …. looks like meters to me.

Bagration re-supplied himself with men while marching, taking the reserve troops sent to garrison Bobruisk fortress and leaving his weaker men there. Still Bobruisk held out and was not surrendered.
That said, my 600-men/battalion estimate reflects some weakening from starting stregth.

For the French 85e de ligne was really pushed hard. Maybe some of the others. I said above to drop 10%-15% from the 15 June état. 20% was also possible. You might find more detail in the regimental histories, but the SHD-Terre indices (indexes?) do not show a later état before the battle.

The Russian 2nd Combined Grenadier division was the Grenadier companies of the 2nd Replacement (depot) battalions of the 7th, 12th, 24th, 26th and 2nd Grenadier divisions. 30 companies organized into 10x 3-company battalions. Picked troops, but a smaller number than a regular division.

If you like "what if's" ….
All of 2nd Western Army was nearby, but getting any more troops down those little trails/roads to the battle, I don't think there was room to move them in time.

@Lerry

"I think we all know you could benefit financially from your expertise"

I would be dishonored to try such a thing with colleagues who had welcomed a stranger to their group so warmly …. and who tolerated my mangling the English language so politely.

:-)

Links for the volumes of the Kharkevich, noted above.
Courtesy of Steven H. Smith, who has forgotten more of this "stuff" than I will ever know – and also teaches the "way" of free, open-source, help others.

link

Thank you, "Sensei".

@Seroga

But if I ever had enough attention span to finish a book, you would not have to order it.
It would be free, open-source, no copyright, etc., etc. and on-line.

Thanks for that, you have answered my next question. I wanted to ask you about "licensing" this research info for inclusion in an open source software tool that I am currently working on.

It is good to find others out there that get it with regards open source .. that information and systems are only truly worthwhile when they are free (as in free-speech).

Free – libéré information allows others to apply it in new ways to benefit everyone. That is the real value of information, which always goes way beyond dollars.

спасибо !

Looking at the ground scale as well – if that is in metres, its a fairly close engagement.

It looks like the Russian Divisions maintain something like column of battalions (?) whilst advancing to well inside engagement range.

Would be very interested to know what orders were issued as this battle progressed on each side, with timings, objectives, delays for activation, etc.

Wondering how long (how many 'turns') did they spend deploying out of those columns as the battle developed.

Its very interesting to study what orders at what level of detail did the CinC's actually issue during the battle, and compare this to how game systems model that level of command.

There is a general perception with wargamers (and many rulesets), that commanders (and therefore players) above Division level never get involved in "micro managing" events at the Battalion level. You mention the example of Davout personally ordering about the sections of guns from the regiments during the actual engagement as one example.

I am wondering how many more examples are there to be found in the primary sources.

Thanks again.

@Seroga – very humbling to know that you would make such information freely available and access to all via the interwebz – bravo for your courage. We need more like you!

@Steve64 – I whole heartedly agree with the making of education / information free to all and I get it. However, unsure of the term "licensing" the research info. into your open source software tool – what is this?

@MM – re licensing.

What Im working on is a computer moderated system that manages tabletop battles, in a nutshell. Its not a C&G clone, its more of a professional grade C3 simulator with a gamey touchscreen interface.

In order for it to be easily usable for the wargaming public, it needs a large database of unit definitions and scenario details, so users can simply select a year, a region, and a set of Corps/Divisions to create a scenario and get playing.

Seroga's detailed primary source account of a real battle, shown here, is exactly the level of detail I need for these sorts of scenarios, including all the period maps and what not.

The intention in this case is to take Serogas' excellent translation work, and add that verbatim to the database. It would be cool to be able to add narrative to the scenrio database that includes details of what the real CinC's did during the real battle as well, to given even more background to the actual fight.

The more sharable data in there, the better.

@Steve
I did nothing here that could be "licensed", I think.
The sources are listed, only some of the modern Russian ones would likely be in copyright, such as from Podmazo.
Given the amount of information taken from any 1 source, and that you plan a not-for-profit, open-source use, I think you are likely OK with the Russian definition of "Fair Use". But I do not know what country you are in, and how (assuming it is a signatory) your country treats its obligations under the Berne Convention. YMMV, as they say.

@Steve

"It looks like the Russian Divisions maintain something like column of battalions (?) whilst advancing to well inside engagement range."
It was typical for the Russians in 1812 to have Jäger shooting in skirmish order, and to have Heavy infantry advance with the bayonet formed in somthing about the same as a French-style column of attack. The difference from French is that a Russian battalion operated in 8 platoons (like the French Guard). The frontage was still 2 platoons/pelotons, formed on the center, just like the French.
I said "typical", not required or always or something similar.

"Davout personally ordering about "
Chapuis reports Dessaix and Frederichs being rather chuffed (chuffed off ? I am not sure of the British expression, and I think the American equivalent will be filtered, as it recalls urination) at being bypassed and having their units micro-managed. It was such a small space, and rather few units, Davout could act the part of a division or brigade general very easily in the area of the French center and left.

" fairly close engagement."
Very! That is why I said above that the limit on the Russians was not the number of units at hand, but the time/space to get them in contact. With the river on the right flank, a broader tactical turning movement to the far left (where the terrain was not much better) would take the whole day, and be esseintially retograde to 2nd Western Army's line of march. As it was, Pashkevich's more shallow turning movement took quite a long time and lost touch/coordination with 12th division on the Russian right.
Davout picked his ground very very well, especially given his lack of cavalry and artillery.
However, the Russians were no fools (Bagration, Sivers who had ridden over the whole area, Raevskiy, Pashkevich – these were among the best Russian generals and they had complete information from the Cossacks roaming all the way to the walls of Mogliev). I think the concept of Raevskiy making a spoiling/covering attack was the real intention. But, that is purely my personal opinion. Davout reported that he stopped 2nd Western Army from making a determined drive on Mogliev and had won a huge out-numbered battle something akin to Auerstadt. I think Napoléon responded along the lines of "so where is Bagration then?" As it turned out, Bagration was not caught, and got to Smolensk and 1st Western Army (just) ahead of the French, though travelling a less direct route and over worse roads.

" how long …. did they spend deploying"
Or, if not even deploying, just getting them to contact.

@Steve64 – Well that is admirable and an excellent worthwhile "gaming" tool for young and oldies like me! Don't always rely on primary sources either as they often have ulterior motives, some of the most modern works will contain a more (sould do) picture and are accurate if not more so that the primary source – see Gill's latest trilogy on the 1809 Danube campaign. If I can help at all please do not hesitate to contact me at trajanic AT gmail DOT com.

Seroga--wonderful scenario--thank you very much! Quick question about the first brigada, 12th division--when do you show A.V. Bogdanovskii taking over?

As I wrote above, I really would treat the brigade command as "vacant". There was no problem for the Russians (especially in such a small space) to have the regiments report directly to the division level. So if your rules really require a brigade commander, go with Colonel Ryleev at the start of the battle and hope he does not get wounded so fast as he did in real life.
I suppose the nominal command of the brigade would have technically fallen to lieutenant-colonel Bogdanovskiy, but I am pretty sure that he didn't act in such capacity, as he was already "up-stepped" to command of his regiment, the shef of the Smolenskiy Infantry being the general-major graf Vorontsov, who was discussed above.
By the battle of Smolensk, the graf Vorontsov was called back to lead the brigade, lieutenant-colonel Bogdanovskiy still had the Narvskiy Infantry and the Smolenskiy Infantry had been given to major Renenkampf of 33rd Jäger. One assumes that the Smolenskiy Infantry's own majors (if any were left standing) were all deemed too junior.

In addtion to the memoirs noted above, see also PDF link

Ok, this is a comment, my opinion.

Rules, when applied to Russians, tend to overstate the importance of the brigade level of command.

First, some Russian division/corps commanders just didn't use them. Instead, they made advance- and rear-guards, 1st- and 2nd lines of battle, reserves, detachments, wings and so on.

Second, the main tactical unit was the battalion. The regiment, typically of 2 active battalions, was tactically a convenient way of saying "2 similar regiments". Just as easily, one could take 2 battalions of different regiments for the same job.

The tactical place of the regimental senior officer, the shef (usually a general), was actually with the 1st battalion of his regiment. The commander, typically a colonel, was with the third battalion. (The 2nd Replacement batttalion, typically commanded by the lieutenant colonel, was typically elsewhere).

Also there were typically 2 (sometimes 1 or 3) majors per battalion. If the shef or commadner was called away to command something, or was wounded, or was just at home, there was this "crew" of majors to take over battalion and regiment command (and in the midst of battles even higer formations occasionally).

Below the battalion, every company had a captain or staff-captain to command it. Every tactical platoon a captain/staff-captain or lieutenant.

Administratiely, the senior officer from the 2 included regiments would be the brigade commander. If you wanted someone to command a brigade as tactical unit (or a detachment, wing, line, etc.), it would be from among the senior officers present.

On the other hand, the Russian system did not require this. The divisional commander might easily send out his 4 jäger battalions to broken terrain or skirmishing in open order, and hold the remaining 8 battalions under essentially direct control, giving orders to either battalion officers to order them 1-at-a-time, or regimental officers to order them 2-at-a-time or senior of 2 regiments' officer to move them 4-at-a-time.

By the way, this is easier to describe in Russian. A unit coul dhave two types of "commander", two different nouns. One was the officially-listed officer, the other was the actual person commanding the operation of a formation at a given time.
The first : командир / komandir
The latter : командующий / komanduyushchiy

Bragration, Raevskiy, etc. kept the administrative brigades as tactical units in 2nd Western Army with few exceptions. 1st Western Army mostly also, but less religiously.
In the north, brigades were not used at all, but the divisions were still pretty much the basis for the "task-based" "boutique" "custom" formations.
In the south, the divisions themselves pretty much were not used as tactical units.

This is getting long and abstract …
So to summarize :

key administrative elements :
company / regiment / division

key logistics elements :
artel' (maybe "mess" in English – it was a kind of club or even co-op canteen service, serving about 1/4 to 1/3 of a company) / regiment (12 companies) / army or separate corps (various number of regiments)

key tactical elements :
platoon (1/2 company) / battalion (4 companies) / division (8 heavy infantry battalions + 4 jäger battalions) or "boutique"

As you can see, "brigade" is not on any of the three critical lists or paths. And a set of rules that puts the focus on the tactcial managment of brigades just kinda misses the mark, in my opinion.

<< Rules, when applied to Russians, tend to overstate the importance of the brigade level of command.

:-) Yep… I'll have to "Yermolovize" (his purported doings about the Raevskii redoubt have been getting a lot of play lately in English) "General de Brigade." That said, shouldn't be hard to do, and having an async command setup for the Russians would be fun…

jeff

Seroga,

One quick question about the map – are the "_-_-_-_-_" areas around the river and stream supposed to be marshland? Just setting up the map and want to make it correctly.

Dear Aleksandr,
Yes, exactly, swamp or marsh. Note also, as shown by the little hash marks on each side, that the roads/trails in the way of these wetlands were raised.
The maréchal Davout picked his location very well, as one might expect from his reputation.

I prefer to go by Sasha :) thank you for the clarification. One other small thing, what is the sun shaped figure next to the bridge to saltanovka?

By strict translation, assuming the cartographer used the right symbol and color, that should be a "mud geyser – type not heated". There is an identical mark next to the bridge to Fatova (further to Russian left).
To try to interpret a little, I have two ideas.
1. The cartographer, or the printers of the version were are looking at, was a little off in symbology, and these are instead "water powered wheel – type for grinding grain", about what you would expect for each village to have on the downstream side of their bridge – and there is a little (mill- ?) pond upsteam from the bridge at Saltanovka.
~or~
2. They were places where there was an up-welling from under the stream bed of silted or muddy water, and the cartographer (and printer) picked the correct or closest symbol.

The symbols for these two features are really similar.
I really don't know how to easuly decide the case. The resolution on Google maps and even Russian Yandex maps is compromised over modern Belarus by their esteemed and (honest, really, 100% legal, would we kid you about this?) democratically elected-for-ever President. Maybe the Soviet era military topo's will show the feature better. The are on-line somewhere for Russia, but I don't know about Belarus.

You might notice the zig-zig lines nearby in front of 1er battalion du 85e régiment de ligne and in front of 42-y yegerskiy polk. These should be "field fortification – type light, improvised". You will note that I mentioned above that there were engineers present with both forces.

Soviet military mapping, and even previous Russian Imperial mapping, was really quite good, by the way.
The Soviet system used a large library of a bewildering (at first) variety of symbols and notations. Once you had the system learned, you could see the really great detail added into the maps.

Also, I don't know for sure the heights of relief features. It looks like the datum marks and set-off for the contour lines were not included in the as-printed version of the map. I am sure they were there in the cartographer's orginal. If the orignal was 1:25,000 they would be typically 5m. And if the original was 1:10,000 or less they would dhave been 1 meter. I would guess 1:25,000, but you could likely confirm it from some other topo of the area.

Топографическая карта – Могилев

link
Inside the .zip there is :
1:200,000 topo : 200k--n36-19.gif
1:100,000 topo : 100k–-n36-073.gif

The next sizes would be ….
1:50,000 topo : N36-019-А // N36-019-Б // N36-019-В // N36-019-Г
1:25,000 topo : N36-073-А // N36-073-Б // N36-073-В // N36-073-Г
The middle of the series is sometimes given in Roman numerals with "XIX" instead of 019.
The leading "0" as in "019" is often omitted.
The terminal letters are sometimes given as the Arabic numbers 1, 2, 3, 4.

It looks like the -Г or -4 version will be correct for 1:25,000 .
But I can't find them except in torrent sites that even I would not want to try.
How's your "google-fu" ?
(These are public domain, as far as I know, products of governemnt printing, owned by the collective of socialist peoples of the Soviet Union, blah, blah, blah).

Photos (including the memorial), modern Google map views panoramio.com/photo/56898328

May the fallen heros of both armies rest in peace!

Thank you very much once again! I think I am going to go off the assumption that the "suns" are water wheels, I know that Fatova had a mill – so that would make sense that they would be wheels and wheel houses. That should look pretty good on a table.

Using a 4ftx8ft table Any ideas on how the table should be oriented? I am thinking that the table should be just like the map, with the Russians advancing from the 4ft side up the length of the table with the Dniepr on the Russian right flank.

My other thought is to turn the map diagonally and have the stream running through the middle of the table, giving me the ability to put all three towns on the table, Saltanovka, Fatova Selest. The other idea is to shorten the table and cut Selest off completely, just have the cavalry and the two battalions off the table in reserve.

As to the "improvised light" defenses, would these be along the lines of felled trees and stone type defenses, Cheval de frise and other anti-cavalry spike types, our would this be more quickly thrown up earthwork trenches? Would the french artillery have had time to erect gabion defenses or would they have been deployed in the open fields?

I like the water-wheels idea (whether there or not in real life)! Actually, I think I see the remains of a mill-dam just downstrean of the Saltanokva bridge looking at the Google map. Definition (thanks Mr. Belarus-President-for-Ever) is too low to be sure.

I would make the table like the maps. If you need to cut some length (or turn diagonally), cut the Russian deployment zone south of the stream to a minimum and have them march in out of the hills/woods and be immediately confronted with the marsh and stream and Davout. In real life I envision some congestion just getting the Russians sorted out for the fight. Davout is not going to need room south of the stream to advance into the Russian rear (there is a whole Army there, remember).

By the way, Davout could know nothing of exactly where and when and with what forces Raevskiy would be coming. Conversely, Raevskiy could see Davout well and had extensive reports form Colonel Sysoev and General Sivers. If you have any rules to limit "helicopter / god-view" command and control, apply them to Davout and not Raevskiy. However, note that lateral communication with his own left for Raevskiy was difficult (no line of sight, difficlt terrian, no lateral roads/trails and the roads/trials toward the Russsian rear filled with Russians).

The field improvements would be very hasty : likely wolf-pits (fox-holes) for the Russian jäger on the Russian right and felled trees and parts of huts and houses for French to provide a cover for skirmishers and inhibit the Russians from wading through the marsh. Davout aslo was taking apart the Fatova bridge. The artillery seems to have been posted on the hill crests, and (interestingly) it looks like both sides intended to fire over their own guys.

The were in long cannister range. Maybe, just maybe, the French would try something fancy to get their men out of the blast zone and still use cannister (battalion splits into two half-battalions, they run to the side, unmasking the artillery, it fires, the infantry runs back). More likely, they were firing round shot over the heads of their guys. The Russians also would be firing roundshot and grenades (exploding shell) and not try any delicate co-ordination.

The Russians guns on the right would have been slightly dug-in by standard practice, for their first positions. The firing area is quickly levelled and any trees in the way are felled. The debris would make a little rampart to the front (the fleches at Borodino were not too much more than this standard preparation). The firing position in the exceptionally convenient clearing shown to the right of the road opposite Saltanovka could easily have been made the night before by Raevskiy's pioneers, the last line of trees being felled and rolled downhill a little just as the action begins. Surprise! 18 large calibre guns and unicorns! (Well, not too surprising for Davout – but the guys in 85e de ligne might have had a moment's concern.)

French artillery, per habit, did less of this preparation. They were more concerned that they could displace forward if needed, I think. This advancing the guns during the action was a French tactic seldom copied by the Russians, who had a tendency to place (especially foot) artillery and leave it there. They would advance another (preferably horse) company if this option seemed useful during the battle. They had, of course, many many more guns, so there was less need to "double-task" the artillery companies.

A little more about Russian wolf-pits, maybe ….

When you read about Russians manning the chain of skirmishers, it is often the case that this means manning a chain of wolf-pits. These would be two-man fox-holes, dug by the unit themselves and/or nearby pioneers and militia (or even local civilians dragooned into service if there was not an active battle going on). Each Russian infantry regiment had a large selection of shovels, axes and picks distributed to the rankers.

They feature here at Saltanovka and at Borodino (especially in 2nd Western Army's zone). At Maloyaroslavets, they were used in combination with loop-holed buildings and shelters hastily made from debris. This explains why the Russian Jäger were literally not all killed at Borodino.

They were effective, just like modern fox-holes:
- they made a cavalry barrier, even if empty
- cavalry could not attack the guys in the holes except by pistols and lances (which makes me think that the French attachment of small lancer companies to cuirassier formations was not only for scouting and defense against Cossacks)
- French artillery had no explosive/concussive round like Russian granate or British shrapnel, so the wolf-pits really help proteting the Russians from artillery
- French formed infantry would have to move around them if advancing, disruptig the formation
- they were warm, with two bodies and maybe even a little sheltered fire to heat tea (well, for officers at least), out of the wind in winter
- they could be harder to see, depending on the overall terrain
- if needed, you could even have your guys stay in the pits and let the enemy pass them, then resume shooting (happened at Borodino)
- it was much easier to shoot over your guys with your very very large number of artillery pieces if they were dug in.

The drawback was getting the guys out of the holes, especially to advance. I think, with a doctrine based more on advancing the skirmishers and formed lines of deployed infantry, that this is the reason the French were less interested in using wolf-pits.

For the Russians, who increasingly separated the infantry into shooting Jäger in open order (and if possibe in holes) PLUS advancing with formed heavy infantry in (attack) columns, the wolf-pits were just a great idea. Since Jäger were considered a little "élite" and had many good regiments, getting them to advance out of the holes when needed seems to have been no problem. At Saltanovka, 42-y yegerski polk did exactly this.

I probably will get more stifles for explaining this. But it is interesting, since immediate digging-in became commmon for infantry as weapons became more lethal in the years following the Napoleonic ers.

Off topic, but a question for Seroga…

English language texts emphasize that the Russian infantry had poor quality muskets in comparison with the British or French.

Do Russian texts draw the same conclusions? If so, were better quality firearms given to the yeger than to the line infantry?

Well, are Brown Bess good enogh?

By 1812, 110,000 Brown Bess equipped front line Russian forces and another 40,000 were being distributed during the early part of the campaign.

150,000-200,000 of the latest Russian M1808 musket were also issued, with more being produced. This was an excellent musket, trying to combine the best of the Brown Bess and French "Charleville".

In general, for front-line units, the muskets were common/identical per regiment by 1812.

Yes, Jäger in a division would get the new ones first. Also, the lower-numbered Jäger units might not have really turned in their almost new M1805 Russian Jäger rifles. But really, even the new units like 27th Division got great muskets.

Russians liked the Brown Bess and M1808 so much that they typically would issue captured French muskets only to rear-area or militia units. I have shot the good replica's of both the Brown Bess and M18108 -- they seem essentially very similar and quite workmanlike.

The idea of "bad Russian muskets" or "bad Russian powder" have specific historical sources : Sir Robert Wilson reporting what he saw in 1806 and a specific report of ~1808. These documents are then (i) over-emphasized even as to the situation of 1805-1807 (usually because the "historians" in the west think that Russian manufacturing and logistics worked like the French, which it didn't) and (ii) magically extended to apply to 1812-1814.

Actually, the review of small arms (for which the report of 1808 was created) led to fundamental changes by 1812.
But (allow snarky comment, please), when you're an "expert" but don't have any Russian, what are you going to be able to say about them?

There is an issue here :
Some see the move through Saltanovka as a real attempt by Prince Bagration to advance on Mogliev. In this version, he does not see how much of the French 1er Corps is coming up, and decides to complete his original idea to meet 1st Western Army in Mogliev. The battle is more or less a (rather bloody) tactical draw, but the French stop the intended Russian advance, and the Prince Bagration then is forced to move on to Smolensk. Operational French victory.

The other version is the Cossacks accurately report the advance of Ier Corps, Prince Bagration understands Mogliev is lost, and desires Count Raevsky to merely mount a spoiling attack to insure that the French do not move south toward Bagration's main force. Same bloody tacticla draw. But Davout never again tries to move south, to catch Bagration in the flank on the march, but instead soon starts driving his people hard on to Smolensk. Operational Russian victory.

Be sure that French like the 1st version and Russians like the 2nd story, right ?
:-)

What makes those mutually exclusive? The French want Bagration to move to Smolensk, don't they?

Usually, I think the French goal at this stage of the campaign is to prevent Bagration from linking up with the 1st Western Army, and to defeat his smaller force (only two corps) in isolation.
At Smolensk, the Russians arrived there in strength just ahead of the French, and united the 1st and 2nd Western Armies, leaving only 1st Separate Corps to cover the north flank and Riga and even the way to Saint Petersburg – and a similarly small force in the north west Ukraine ("Volhynia") to shield the way to Kiev, and await reinforcements freed by the recent peace with the Turks.
In the way of the French drive on Smolensk and Moscow, the Russians could thus oppose with a roughly equal number of men in a unified field force.

" …(usually because the "historians" in the west think that Russian manufacturing and logistics worked like the French, which it didn't)… "

Can you please explain this a little more? Thanks.

It's a very big topic, but to hit some high-notes ….

1. The Russian governemnt owned all the relvant resources : factories, horse studs, foundries, powder works, shipyards, etc. Actually, since the "Russian government" was really quite feudal, these things coul dbe thought of as the personal property of the Emperor. In any case, they were operated by varios departments in the War Ministry. These operations had minimal cost (serf labor, no entrpeneurs' profit, natural resources all owed by the Emperor already). Essentially, if the Emperor ordred it, then anything was "affordable". Internal payment could be made in paper rubles or promissory notes or just confiscated for the good of the nation – for things like transport, buying extra horses, etc.
2. If requirements demanded it, there was no hesitation to buy from foreign countries or hire foregin experts These you paid in gold. But Russia mined gold in government-owned mines and so there was agian no effective limit. Muskets and clothe from Britain, naval stores from the Baltic countries, grain delvered by Americans, etc., etc.
3. There were created depots, arsenals, horse herds, etc. for all this stuff, laid up in heroic quantities. There were issues moving the stuff around the great Russian distances and into Europe proper – this was the limiting factor. After 1807, there were great reforms in this area, and various lines of depots, the forward ones mobile, were created by 1811.
4. from these depots, the movement of supplies, in bulk, often in semi-finished condition or as raw materials, went to the Army level of command. To co-ordinate this there was a separate arm of service charged with all forms of logistics (including personnel), His Imperial Majesty's Suite for Quartermaster Affairs. This was not unike the French intendence, but had a more specific zone of operations : from Depots to the Army commands.
5. From the Army command, the next level for logistics was the regiment. Here there were substantial transport and repair/matinence (even manufacturing assets), listed among the regiment's "non-combattants". It was here that powder was purpose ground and blended, where rounds were made form lead (suitable to local calibres), etc.
6. The medical system followed the same pattern, by the way. And essentialy the same for personnel (except that the recruit depots were tagged to a Division, not an Army)
7. From the regiment, the next level was the artel, of which typically three per company or 36 per regiment. These were a kind of supply collective that combined the army provided stuff with what could be bought, requisitioned, made-up or foraged locally. Leading this was a soldier artel'shchik who made a kind of commisiion for his work. Think of the French example of the cantinières, but integrated with the official supply system.
8. This system was pretty good for lateral or border campaigns, but after 1807 it was seen that in fighting the French the need to keep moving with strategic depth required more and more-mobile depots (noted above) and provided less time for the regimental non-combatants to do much more than repair work. This led to an increasing reliance on putting finished goods into the sytem (as opposed to semi-finished or raw materials) . This led to a need to standardize the firearms, to have the depots bake bread in a kind of hard-tack or distribute rice in place of flour, and so on.
9. Lastly, it may be noted that Cossacks and Native horse were not part of the Army, and served on separate terms. Part of their compensation was to come from war prizes or looting the enemy's lands. They provided their own uniforms, horses and remounts, arms, etc. Think something like British or American naval privateers. Although in case of need, the Army might provide support, they were basically "free" to the government both in terms of cost and resources.

So, you can see that when an historain saw many local calibres of guns, he thought that this was a real big problem. But, since Russians could and did make the rounds locally in the regiment, it was usually not too big a deal for the them, unless they were thinking they would be moving rapidly and over long distances.
Also, the substantial changes noted above after 1807/1808 are generally ignored by Western historians, as there are few sources in languages that they can read or that were even available (unitl now) outside the Soviet Union.
There was also the whole Cold War thing, which did cause some bias I am sure on both sides. If you could be black-listed as a "communist sympathizer" or "lackey of the capitalists" for saying somthing good about the "other" side, even historically, it migh have effcted your objectivity (especially when you had no information to the contrary). Happily this time of Cold War is now the "bad old days".

Seroga,

Can you share the book below?

E. Sage, capitaine adjudant-major au régiment
Historique du 85ème régiment d'infanterie de ligne et du 10ème régiment d'infanterie légère, 1690-1876.
Manuscrit des archives historiques de la guerre, 1877, in-4 1337 pp

Researching both regiments for the 1809 campaign.

Thank you,
Michael

Good luck, Michael. I think you'll find Seroga's most recent visit to the forum was in March 2013.