"Battle of Kursk Nearly a German Victory?" Topic

This dates back to 1998. In the article, the author debates the perception that three SS divisions attacked in a manner usually reserved for a FoW game – ie; side-by-side. He also notes that German tank losses weren't nearly as catastrophic as claimed and furthermore, Russian losses were far greater. Lastly,the fighting continued on past the July 12 end of combat with the III Panzer Corps linking up with SS Das Reich on July 14.

link

Given the publication date, has this been confirmed or disproved?

Wyatt

I assume the article is a plug for his book: link
Soviet losses were far greater but they had a lot of reserves behind 5th Tank Army.

I read something similar. According to the author, had the Germans pushed on, it would have been a victory. But Hitler was rattled with the landings on Sicily and Italy's shaky loyalty, so he stopped operations on Kursk.

There are losses and there are losses.
Whilst the fanboise would like to concentrate on German total losses the real story is the huge drop in the 'in service' German totals. It is all very well boasting your tanks aren't really destroyed and can be repaired but if you are operating at 50% of your start numbers then you are in trouble.

Sample numbers

7/7/43
9th Pz D. 49 tanks in repair, 2 total losses 37 operational
20th Pz D. 21 in repair, 1 total loss and 60 in service.

sPzAbt 505 20 Tigers in repair and 11 operational.

sPzJgd Abt 656 51 Ferdinands in repair, 39 operational.

14th July.

Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Grossdeutschland'' had 132 tanks
at its disposal on 5 July 1943 at the beginning of the operation on July 14 it reported it had 40 tanks operational (1 Panzer II, 10 Panzer III's, 21 Panzer VI's and 8 flamethrower versions of the Panzer III. The maintenance elements were working on 59 tanks in short-term repair (less than 14 days): 3 Panzer II's,
12 Panzer III's, 36 Panzer IV's and 8 Panzer VI's. There were an additional 14 tanks in long-term repair (more than 14 days): 1 Panzer II, 3 Panzer Ill's, 8 Panzer IV's, and 2 Panzer VI's. The total losses for the division from 5-14 July were listed as 13 tanks

SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division "'Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler":
60 operational tanks compared to 120 on 5 July (4 Panzer II's, 5 Panzer Ills, 42- Panzer IVs, 9 Panzer VI's).
SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division " Das Reich": 92 operational
tanks compared to 147 on 5 July (36 Panzer Ill's, 24 panzer IV's, 9 Panzer Vis, 17T 34s and 6 command tanks).

SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Tofenkopf": 68 operational
tanks compared to 141 on 5 July (31 panzer Ill's, 5 short-barreled Panzer IV's, 25 long-barreled Panzer IV's, 7 Panzer VI's and 7 command tanks.

I would think losses as a percentage of force has to be taken into account. Weren't the Germans surprised at some of the latest Soviet tank designs encountered? Anyway, a land war in Asia against an indigenous foe isn't a very good idea.

Midway was nearly a Japanese victory too.
Except for the fact that they lost.

Midway was nearly a Japanese victory too.
Except for the fact that they lost.

And winning Midway would have made little difference to the eventual result.

Nor would "winning" Kursk. Some victories are Pyrhhic.

Anyway, a land war in Asia against an indigenous foe isn't a very good idea.

Yet it had worked for Germany only 25 years earlier. How is it that Russia's loss in WWI gets ignored?

In fact if the French had folded in 1918 like the Russians did in 1917, there would have been no need for Hitler, as Germany had already got all the lebensraum it needed at Brest-Litovsk.

(And yes, losing by revolution does count. Otherwise Germany didn't lose WWI either, since it was never so much as invaded. Also Hitler didn't necessarily set out to conquer the Soviet Union -- just destroy it as a power. Another internal revolution would have suited him fine.)

Given the publication date, has this been confirmed or disproved?

I think it is generally accepted that the traditional view of Kursk, in particular the events around Prochorovka are largely a myth. The massed tank battle with hordes of T34's and German tanks engaged at point blank range, just didn't happen. 5th Guards Tank Army ceased to be an effective formation. As for the question it is not a simple as a yes no answer. Did the Germans win at Prochorovka? Yes. Could they have continued the offensive? Yes. But to what end? With the stalling of the offensive in the north continuing the offensive in the south, even without the invasion of Sicily would achieve very little. The Germans wouldn't be able to close off the salient before the Soviets could have evacuated much of the forces they had left there. There was no prospect of "bagging" large numbers of Soviets in an encirclement. Given that, the whole enterprise was a waste of time and scarce resources. Best to call it of as Hitler finally did. Better still for the Germans if they had never started it.

Although no Allied troops invaded Germany in W.W.I, they were still defeated on the Western Front by the Allies. The battles of Sept. 1918 and after show that the German Army was on its last legs, while the Allies had put together a plan to break any German defensive line made.

German High Command realized it was over except for the marching and threw in the towel. Was there major civil unrest in Germany at the time that contributed to the problems faced by the German Army, yes. That considered, the German Army was defeated in the field by French, British and American forces.

As for Kursk, I don't know enough to say if the Germans snatched defeat from the jaws of victory, but if they had one, I don't know if it would have mattered much more than extending the war another year or so. It would have changed how the war played out, but I don't know if it would have preveted the ultimate German defeat. Point for and against can both be made.

I agree with mkenny. There is a lot of revisionist History lately based on the notion that German tanks that weren't destroyed, don't count in the totals. I've heard the same arguments for the Normandy campaign.
If you read Guderian's book Panzer Leader he talks about the state of German armor production, repair and supply. There were many issues that made German losses more dire than they should have been. German industry was not producing enough tanks. Even Porsche Elefants are not tanks. They had a great deal of trouble getting them to the front. Forward repair facilities were inadequate, and spare parts were few and far between. Even tank engines that were only rated for so many hours of service were patched up far beyond there life expectancy, because few replacements were produced. A damaged German tank often meant one that was not operational for a long time, or one that couldn't be fully repaired.

A couple of points:

1. The Germans came nowhere near "winning" at Kursk; a possible local success is not the same as a strategic victory. Overall German AFV losses, to all causes including breakdowns, were crippling and resulted in them being unable to continue. In addition, the rest of the offensive had failed dismally.

2. Germany did not lose WW1 because of a revolution; they lost it militarily. The fact that Germany was not invaded in 1918 is irrelevant; their army had been beaten and had lost the will to continue the fight. The "losing by revolution" or "stab in the back" myth was a cornerstone of early National Socialist and right wing philosophy and belief. Many countries have lost wars without being invaded; the Argentinians in the Falklands being one example.

It doesn't matter how many tanks the German did lose. The fact is that Kursk was the last major offensive the Germans could pull out in the Eastern Front, and it failed in its purported goals. It didn't break the Soviet front, nor gave back the initiative of the war to Germany. That, in my book, makes of Kursk a German defeat.

The article is specifically about Prochorovoka and the three SS Panzer Divison which took part, not about the whole Battle of Kursk.

I don't think anyone disputes that the traditional view of Prochorovoka as masses of T34s ramming Tigers is bunk, and even that tactically the Germans came out on top (see e.g. Glantz).

Winning one tactical battle in the depth of the Soviet position wasn't going to win the campaign though. The Soviet forces deployed to attack the flanks of the bulge were very large, and the Germans beating their own formations to pieces just aided the Soviets.

I hope that this is not another attempt to glorify Naziism and the SS. Germany lost – end of story. They had some excellent kit, but they lost. The SS were well trained and highly effective – but they lost. Why they lost, where did it all go wrong – they are matters for discussion, but the reality is that they lost.

I am with ashill4. His articulated historical views and deep knowledge preserve us from shifty attempts to reverse history. I think he is a good sentry of our freedom.

Also Hitler didn't necessarily set out to conquer the Soviet Union -- just destroy it as a power.

How can you say this, after discussing "Lebensraum" in your previous paragraph? Hitler's entire idea was to conquer European Russia in order to provide room for German settlement. That he might have left a rump Russian state in Siberia only shows how little he thought Siberia was worth, compared to the western part of Russia.

The article is OK and reflects current thinking. I am with Mr Kenny however in that total write off figures do not tell the whole story. The thing that annoys me about all the " the Germans won at Prokhorovkha stuff" is:

1. They may have defeated 5th Guard Tank but they did not capture the village.
2.Who do they link up with, the Northern pincer got nowhere and get's nowhere near as much discussion because it had ground to a halt in days with heavy losses.

Weird. Nowhere do I see any attempts to reverse history. Germany lost, WWII and Kursk. The point discussed is whether it was a closer run than what we think. Russian historians were prone to bend the truth, and with authentic russian records being declassified each year, historians have the rare opportunity to reevaluate facts. I, for one, would like to learn the truth, instead of the "generally accepted version".
As it was said before, even if Germany had won at Kursk it wouldn't have made a difference to the war's outcome. We are not even discussing a what if, just the real reasons why the germans lost that battle.

Russian historians were prone to bend the truth
And German sources bend them even more.
The German 'ace/kill confirmation' system was completely bogus and yet 70 years later it still has its defenders.

The German generals were very clear that they felt that hadn't won and were nowhere near winning. Their common refrain was that they didn't have half the infantry that they needed.

I'm not sure that re-evaluations glorify anything – I find it interesting to re-assess all military campaigns. I remember reading that the Falklands was a much more closely won victory than we had believed at the time – surely by stating that it does not glorify the Argentine invasion?

The irrelevance of the German "victory" at Prokhorovka is demonstrated by the situation on the ground a mere 3 weeks later-with Heeresgruppe Sud in full retreat towards the Dnieper and beyond. While the Germans may have had the better of it tactically the losses they sustained made it impossible for them to hold the line afterwards. Continuation of Zitadel would only have hastened German defeat in the East- strategically, the operation never came close to sucess, and continuation would only have improved the Soviet situation by further degrading the effectiveness of German mechanised forces at a price the Soviets had no trouble affording.

First the scope of the German advance in the 2 small dark 'humps'

Next the Soviet advances up to August 23rd (the striped bits)

Then the limit of the Soviet advance on September 22nd.

Map taken from Mark Healy's book 'Zitadell'

A picture is worth a 1000 words.

mkenny

Pretty conclusive.

Wehrmacht mobile units had to hold the shoulders of the southern penetration. Problem…not enough reliable infantry. Loss at Stalingrad had much to do with problems at Kursk…more infantry needed and not available. The Russ always planned to go over to the offensive once the kraits shot their bolt. Nothing like launching your attack into 60km of minefields too.duh. Term in boxing is "rope a dope."

Lets put this into perspective.

If you lose the war (espcially to the extent that Germany
"lost" WWII) then every battle you fought along the way, no matter how gloriously successfull, is a lost battle.

Battles follow upon battles and if you lose in the end, all the successfull battles are only easy steps that you bounded up on your way to the scaffold.

It's the historical equivalent of Aesculus' quote "Call no man happy till he be dead."

Interesting to speculate what would have happened had the Germans just abandoned the whole idea. Certainly once the Germans realised they were preparing their defences if it had been quietly dropped without any indication that it had been abandoned how long would the Russians have waited before launching an offensive of their own? Would the backhand counter offensive which had proved so successful for Manstein previously have worked again?

Certainly once the Germans realised they were preparing their defences if it had been quietly dropped without any indication that it had been abandoned how long would the Russians have waited before launching an offensive of their own?

Were they in any particular hurry to launch one?

Red Army had done pretty decently in winter offensives during the previous two winters, and they probably could do it again. So they might not be in any particular hurry to attack during the summer months, though the muddy autum months before the ground froze might have been problematic also for them.

Then again, the invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy might have provided a bit of distraction for the Germans, Red Army launching their own offensive at the same could provide something more to think for the German high command.

Were they in any particular hurry to launch one?

As I understand it they were planning an offensive of their own when they realized the Germans were planning to attack decided to let the Germans go first. IIRC the Russians had a spy in the German high command. Obviously they had an offensive planned and ready to go as the speed with which they attacked after Kursk was called off demonstrates. So if the Germans hadn't attacked how long would they have waited to start their own? As you say the Germans pulling reserves from the eastern front to send to Italy may have prompted an attack. Maybe in coordination with the western allies?

And if the Germans decide not to attack at Kursk they may have decided to attack elsewhere which may have required the Russians to shift their forces preparing to attack at Kursk to elsewhere.

As you say the Germans pulling reserves from the eastern front to send to Italy may have prompted an attack.

To exploit this, the Soviets should have probably waited some time allow the reserves to be drawn sufficiently far. So maybe waiting three weeks after getting the news about the Sicily landings? Thus the reserves would be somewhere in transit towards Italy when the offensive comes, and the German high command would need to decide whether to send them back or not.

mkenny's maps tell the story that is so often missed.

The Germans were so far away from winning at Kursk that it is like asking if Canada almost beat the US in 1812. (The Canadians, being the ever-practical sort that they are, did not bother trying to conquor the US. Does that mean we should open the question as a what-if, and say "well maybe they could have?")

No, the Germans did not almost win at Kursk.

Now, did they out-fight the Soviets at Prokhorovka? That is a fair question.

I believe that the research done since the opening of the (ex-Soviet) archives rather fully de-bunks the image of 900 Russian tanks rushing down to mix it up with 700 German tanks at point-blank range on a narrow plain between the railroad tracks and the river, as Martin Caiden's "The Tigers are Burning" so breathlessly described. Nope. Pure bunk. Didn't happen.

It seems that Rotminstrov's 5th Guards Tank Army took a pasting during 2 days of fighting. And that the SS Panzer Korps had less than half as many tanks as the popular histories made out (maybe a little more than 300, but nothing like 650-700). And that only about 1/3rd of the SS Panzer Korps was ever deeply involved with 5GTA at Prokhorovka. So it was closer to 800-900 Soviet tanks dodging in and out of ravines and small woods dualing with about 80 to 100 panzers. And the Soviets took a pasting.

Does that mean the Germans nearly won at Kursk? No. Doesn't even mean they won at Prokhorovka. Because their mission was to advance, and they did not.

And if they had advanced? Nothing good would have come of it. Model's northern attack had already been called off. In fact the Soviet counter-attack had begun, and if Model had not re-oriented his forces his entire 9th Army might have been "put in the bag".

Rotminstrov's losses at Prokhorovka were made good within 2 weeks, while Hausser's II SS Panzer Korps would never make good it's losses. And the southern Soviet counter-attack followed. If Hauser had continued advancing as his strength ebbed, the entire II SS Panzer Korps, and perhaps much more of Army Detatchment Kempf or even Hoth's 4th Panzer Army would have been bagged.

Take a look at the maps again. It shows the battle of Kursk. It does not show what happened AFTER Kursk (the Soviets advanced all the way to the Dneiper).

The Germans were so far away from winning it begs the question of whether they even understood the war they were fighting. And the truth is, by that time, it is pretty clear they did not.

If the Germans had had an extra half a million men and 2,000 tanks to throw in, it might be an interesting what-if to examine. As it was, they were so badly out-gunned and out-maneuvered that they did not even understand the shattering defeat that their pathetic advance represented, until they had finished retreating 300 miles westward.

Even if the Germans had accomplished their goal, pocketing and capturing the Kursk Sailent, they were still screwed. The Soviets had a fresh Front ready to plug the hole. It was that fresh Front that started the offensives shown in the map above. It was classic von Clauswitz stratagy. It did not matter what the Germans accomplished with Kursk, the Soviets gained something.

What if Zeitzler had followed Manstein's original plan to attack in a south-easterly direction across the Mius and towards Rostov in order to pin the Soviet force against the sea?

A more limited offensive and one which would have been a purely Army Group South operation.

I have always felt that the handling of 9th Army's attack in the north did little to enhance Model's reputation – panzer divisions fed in piecemeal and defeated in detail……

If the Germans had opted for the "small solution", it would likely have gone better for them in the July/August timeframe. But what difference would that make?

The Soviets were outproducing them.

There are many myths about "Russian hordes", but in truth their numerical advantage on the front was seldom even 2:1 in 1943 (except maybe in gun/mortar tubes).

BUT … IF there was no major campaign going on … no significant wastage of equipment … the Soviet advantage grew every week.

BUT … IF there WAS a major campaign, and a large quantity of Soviet kit was destroyed for a lesser cost in German kit, within a few weeks the Soviet numerical advantage would again be 2:1 or even more, because the flow of materiel and men allowed the Soviets to replace their losses, while the Germans did not.

Take the example of Rotminstrov's 5th GTA. At Prokhorovka Rotminstrov basically wasted an entire re-inforced tank army (a tank corps by any other nations' terminology). In two days he pretty much threw away 3 whole tank corps and a mechanized corps (3 tank divisions and a mech division) in swirling mobile meeting engagements that resulted in about a 9 or 10-to-1 kill rate advantage for the Germans. Despite this overwhelming disadvantage in the kill ratio, though, he stopped the German advance. He bought time.

Two weeks later his force was back up to strength, and he was ready to participate in a front-wide attack that pushed the Germans back hundreds of kms, over-running German depots and capturing a substantial number of the tanks that Soviet records showed as already having been destroyed, but German records showed as not being lost, in the Kursk battles.

The whole of the Soviet Union was essentially organized as a production line raising and equipping combat units for the front. Until 1945 the Soviets never really had an overwhelming numerical advantage at any one time, but they had an overwhelming advantage in the flow over time.

Time was not the Germans' friend. After the major factories in the Urals came online in mid/late 1942, any time the Germans delayed operations on the Eastern Front to re-build the strength of their forces, they wound up weaker (comparitively) as a result.

So Rotminstrov traded his army for time. To a Soviet general, this was perhaps a reasonable trade. His army was re-built within weeks. The Germans never again got close to Prokhorovka station, or Oboyan beyond, or Kursk.

The best that the "small solution" would have done for the Germans, was to buy some time. That was the last thing they needed to spend their resources on.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

"The whole of the Soviet Union was essentially organized as a production line raising and equipping combat units for the front. Until 1945 the Soviets never really had an overwhelming numerical advantage at any one time, but they had an overwhelming advantage in the flow over time."

Interestingly I was just looking at the production statistics in Richard Overys 'Russias War'. The USSR outproduced Germany in tanks, SP guns, artillery pieces, aircraft etc by a wide margin in 1943, despite having an industrial base (steel, coal etc) only 25% the size of Germany, let alone the whole of occupied Europe. Their only material advanatge was in oil production, but you can't make tanks out of oil.

Which really just demonstrates how appallingly ineffecient the Nazi war economy was.

Martin

Does the book split out the types of industrial base as particular parts are important for weapons production [e.g. heavy for tanks, automotive for vehicles, chemical for explosives etc].

Also as the bomber operations over German Industry were still rising in 1943 it shows how much Germany still had to mobilize when compared with the achieved increase in 1944 production.

Umm, steel, coal, oil, some other stuff… 'Why the Allies Won' had a more detailed breakdown as I recall.

I don't think anyone would deny that Germany latent capacity was vast (as the production increases in 1944 showed), just that they did a pretty poor job if using what they had until it was too late. The USSR still outproduced them in 1944 though.

And dont forget the effects of lend-lease. The US alone shipped over 430,000 motor transport vehicles of all types freeing up production capability and nearly 5,500 medium tanks. And this is the tip of the iceberg as it were.

Hi Martin

The problem with these types of figures is that they look at raw resource production [steel could be considered as a processed resource] and not at the actual ability to make things from these resources.

It would be interesting to compare Soviet production of Tanks, Arty and planes etc in 1940 to the German production.

I think the Soviet base was much better established for these items.

The remarkable relocation of so much of this in 41/42 is one of the wonders of WW2

link

link

Do not forget strategic and tactical initiative too. Bot the Germans and the Soviets were quite adept at recovering their vehicles, in case of soviets it was easy to recondition and send them back in service in mobile shops right behind the front lines.

Since Kursk and on the Soviets were recovering their tanks and SPG's in very large numbers.
After that German's couldn't exactly roll up to a Soviet division in their recovery vehicles and say "comrade mover over please we need to tow our Panthers"