"British Light Infantry Tactics in the AWI" Topic

How did the British converged light infantry battalions fight during the AWI? Did they fight as formed infantry on the battlefield, did they fight in some sort of loose or open order, or were they dispersed in smaller platoons for skirmish and outpost duty?

Given that there were usually 500 to 600 men in the battalions, this would seem to be a waste of valuable manpower to use them only for "light infantry" style of warfare. I'm guessing that they fought in close order on the battlefield when not engaged in a "light infantry" role such as the attack/raid of Wayne's camp at Paoli.

Someone asked me this question on my Fife & Drum blog and couldn't come up with an answer, so I figured that this was a good place to pose the question.

Have you got With Zeal and Bayonets Only? I don't have my copy to hand to check whether it addresses this topic directly but it is invaluable for British tactics in the AWI generally.

In the major battles, they were to be found in the Cornwalis Task Force™, a wargamer's dream command.
Somehow, Cornwalis managed to get ALL of the grenadiers, ALL of the Guards, ALL of the Light Infantry, and when he could get away with it, ALL of the cavalry and Highlanders.

As far as I can tell, they were "just" another elite battalion. Maybe they moved a little bit faster, but I can't recall reading anything like that.

When I started out in AWI gaming, I made a big effort to mount all of my British LI uniquely.
When I got around to rebasing, I just put them on "normal" stnds. They can always be spaced…

As for Paoli, "Errr, Sir Charles. Can we borrow the light infantry tonight?"

22ndfoot, I just got my copy today, and I'll look it up see if there is anything worth posting.

John,

Per Spring, see above, it is hard to imagine how the lights could have moved faster than the other British troops as they were all running hither and yon. You are probably right on the "just" another elite battalion point.

They were not normally used in the traditional Light Infantry role. I say normally because there are always exceptions.

IMHO they were used as shock troops. They moved fast and crushed all before them or that was the idea.

The British seemed to automatically form a composite light and a composite grenadier battalion whenever they could. At least Burgoyne and Cornwallis did.

In my games, I would probably use them as elite formed infantry with the ability to detach skirmishers in groups of single stands.

One tactic unique to the LI battalions was that they had a number of rifle-armed men in each company, and these were extracted and converged into a rifle platoon (under a subaltern) and this unit usually led the battalion on the march, supported by one or two musket-armed companies.

Otherwise, they tended to form sub-units of 2-5 companies, depending on mission and location; it was extremely rare for them to fight as entire battalions of 5-600 men.

It is certainly wrong to think of them as "light infantry" in the Napoleonic sense, which is what I imagine people mean by "traditional". When they shook out into more open orders, they were not screening the main assault by close order troops, they were the main assault and the close order units behind them were for back up, or to rally on if they were reulsed.

Spring is definitely the chap to read on this. By and large all of the British regular infantry fought in the same manner(s), but the lights and grenadiers (and a few of the more experienced line battalions) were better at it.

What I mean is traditional for 18th century North America. Scouting ahead of the main body to locate the enemy. They would guard the flanks which had more importance in North America, with few and poor roads and forest providing cover for ambush.

Super is correct they did not screen the main assault as in Napoleon's time, they were the main assault. Now that is not to say they did not preformed those other functions at times.

There were pitfalls in solely using your light infantry as the main assault. That is unless you have scouting Dragoons you could be entering a battle blind. Like at Cowpens. Given the terrain it was difficult for cavalry to maneuver so you had to rely on scouts and/or your light infantry.

I would like to know the difference in the role of light infantry in Europe compared to their role in North America in the AWI time period? While were at it, how did the French and Germans us their light infantry in North America as compared to how they used them in Europe?

General Gates did special training in Ireland and Nova Scotia in light tactics for North America (I think that's correct) so the roles must have been different to require special training. Every unit could function as light infantry?

The rules we use for AWI allows all infantry to skirmish but only actual light infantry (composite lights, Jaegers, Riflemen units etc) units can reform into a different formation. Other infantry stays in skirmish for the rest of the battle.

I am still a little bit confused.

Let us say that we are on a battlefield and a brigade of Pennsylvania Continentals are across the field, hunkered down behind a rail fence. Facing them are a converged light battalion of 500 men.

The time for screening and scouting has now passed. The battle begins.

The British decide to attack. OK, now how does the light battalion carry out that attack?

When you use the terms "formed infantry on the battlefield" remember Howe's reforms at the outset of the war where British regular infantry trained to fight at a farther space apart than on the continent. While this would seem like an excellent manner to tackle the particularly difficult terrain of the North American woodlands, it was also due to manpower constraints and getting the most bang for the buck when firing. The light infantry when on the battlefield fought in this manner as well if I'm not terribly mistaken.

I am drawing heavily on the Saratoga Campaign for references but reading about General Fraser's pursuit of the Americans retreating from Ticonderoga looks like the light infantry were used much like other battalions, just with better, more highly motivated and skilled troops.

In this regard I think the converged light battalions were used primarily for spearheading advances and patrolling operations.

Still I get the feeling that the light battalions were used like regular battalions, however were used as converged groupings (of more than 1 light battalion) in separate, more elite Corps? (Bunker Hill, Long Island, Saratoga, Brandywine battles all come to mind – Light units were used as converged groupings separate from the main body, but all with very important missions that were deemed "no fail" such as flanking the enemy's main body)

Ketchum is a good source for reference, as well as Mr Brendan Morrisey of the Osprey fame. Ward is also an excellent reference if you can get yourself a copy of his 2 volume works "The War of the Revolution" – just be careful as Ward is generous with his OOB assessments.

Alte Fritz,
Your example is a real-life vignette. Didn't the light infantry and grenadiers (elite, specialist troops) conduct an attack against Stark's troops behind a rail fence at Bunker Hill? This was an important mission to flank the enemy's main defenses so, in my humble opinion, was given to the converged battalions of grenadiers and lights to carry out.

Alte Fritz,

I presume the Light Infantry carried out the attack as any of the other battalions. However their officers want them to. They have all the standard formations available to them. More often than not they attacked in line or skirmish formations. Bayonets fixed and sloped.

They may stop and exchange fire but more often than not they charge right at the enemy. The bayonet being the weapon of choice. Don't want to stop and exchange fire with the Americans. Get into close quarters as soon as possible. At least that is how I see it.

They formed an elite battalion or two … and fought as such … as an elite battalion often brigaded with Grenadiers.

Mike B

After reading the book With Zeal and Bayonets Only and Brendan Morrisey's excellent titles, I came away with a different view on how the British operated during the AWI.

After Boston and prior to landing in New York, Howe used this time to train the British in Light Infantry tactics he found that worked during the F&IW. So the British went from a "Close Order" formation of troops shoulder to shoulder in 3 or more deep ranks. To an "open Order" formation of the soldiers having roughly 18 inches or more between them and two lines deep. They also used an "extended" line where there was more distance between each soldier and they were two lines deep.

So my understanding of the British during the AWI after Boston. The Light Infantry or Grenadiers (combined into their own battalion) would form into an "open order" formation and advance to the enemy. The "line" or "hat" companies of a battalion would be in a "close order" formation behind the advancing light infantry or grenadiers to provide support.

The british would fire one or two volleys and then try to close with bayonet. The reason being the Americans would use cover to exchange volleys with the British. Causing the British to take heavy losses like at Breeds Hill.

Also from my reading it seems Light Infantry and Grenadier companies operated on their own more than the line/hat companies did. It seems anyone that went to a battalion that was in good health, aggressive and smart went into either the light infantry or grenadier company. The rest were used as fillers in the line/hat companies of a battalion.

Hope I explained this correctly cause like I said this is how I viewed the British operating after reading the above.

Ironwolf,

I think you'll find that Spring concludes that all British battalions operated in two-rank open order, moving quickly and following up a volley with an aggressive charge. It was the evolution of the Continentals, who at first were completely unsettled by this, that led to gradual decline in the success of the tactic over the war.

Light Infantry were usually used as an elite advanced guard/ unit--they would fight formed but loose with about 18 inches or more between men--
Where they really came into their own was as detatchments for the many many petite guerre style combats during the long AWI--Acting as skirmishers or small groups of well motivated and skilled troops to fight in the backwoods or in outposts, during foraging or scouting missions.
However by the end of the war even the centre or hatmen companies would be as skilled as the lightbobs at skirmishing. The Grenadiers were the elite "big men" of the army and would have been used as an elite reserve or in an assault.

22ndFoot,
I agree with you, many of the British "line" battalions were just as aggressive and full of fight as the lights or grenadier battalions. I was just meaning to streamline my answer to fit Der Alte Fritz's question about Light Infantry battalion attacking troops behind a fence. Could have just as easily be a line battalion in open order, two ranks deep attacking the americans behind the fence. With another battalion behind them in support.

I think it was in the book on the 23rd where they talked about the light infantry company at Germantown was by itself during the battle. At one point they had two ranks firing forward and another rank firing to the rear until they were able to link back up with their battalion. If I remember correctly the company had about 30 – 40 men in it.

---I agree with you, many of the British "line" battalions were just as aggressive and full of fight as the lights or grenadier battalions.----

If all the best men were siphoned off into converged light and grenadier battalions, why would the line units be just as aggressive and full of fight as the lights or grenadiers?
That doesn't sound right to me.

in 'Zeal and Bayonets', Spring argues that in the northern campaigns the lights and grenadiers were generally used as the hammer to the rest of the army's anvil. They form the core of what could be called the army's elite division, which tries to outflank the Americans and beat them by achieving local mass on that flank. Meanwhile, the rest of the army does little more than hold the Americans' attention. This is how things work out at Long Island and Brandywine, but its also the aim at Bunker Hill. (White Plains turned out different as the elite division was on the ight and Howe decided to atack on the left, so he had to use Germans and British line brigades.)

Long outflanking marches + swift bayonet attacks require fit, aggressive and confident men, so the best guys tend to be siphoned off into the flank battalions.

In the southern campaigns, there are few flank battalions as Clinton kept them with him at New York, the selfish ! There was less scope for outflanking in the southern theatre(not least because the Americans were getting wiser to this trick, and picking their ground better), but it did happen – as in Archibald Campbell's brilliant little victory outside Savannah in 1778, when he sent the lights that he had to penentrate through swamps onto the Americans' right flank. Most of the battles tend to be frontal attacks, and most of this fighting was done by the better line battalions, like the 23rd and 33rd, not forgetting provincial units like the Vols of Ireland.

As for how the light anbd grenadier battalions operated tactically, Spring shows they do what all the British infantry did: a swift advance at the trot, maybe a volley or two, maybe not, followed by a succession of (three?) cheers and a furious rush with charged bayonets – with the aim of panicking the Americans into a quick rout. No point getting into firefights with the Americans, after all, as there were often more of them, they were easier to replace, they often hid behind breastworks or fences, and they were generally panicky – ie, wasting time by engaging in a firefight with the Americans that produced roughly a equal exchange of casualties was not only pointles but counterproductive for the Brits.

Spring does say that the flank coys did operate more loosely than the line battalions in combat, in that although they went forward together in line as part of composite battalions, the company commanders controlled their companies more or less autonomously. He analyses the sequence at Brandywine to prove this, for example, by showing that certain companies peeled off to perform certain tasks. Remember, up to 600 guys in two ranks with at least 18 inches between each file would cover over 300 yards. There aint no way one man could have controlled that line effectively from the centre, even without reckoning in the cluttered terrain – woods, etc.

Forget the complicated drill book manoeuvres, toy-soldier-like mechanical movements and the spit and polish so beloved of many reenactors! In one of the most revealing bits of Spring's book he shows that the new-raised 71st Regt (which went to AMerica in 1776 and was very heavily engaged) did not even learn the manual exercise till mid-way through the war. I think he says the same about the Queen's RAngers, another tough and succesful unit.

Fast, furious and impromptu. 'Loose Files and American Scramble' was how Gen Harcourt (a veteran) later described British tactics in America – it sums them up well!

If all the best men were siphoned off into converged light and grenadier battalions, why would the line units be just as aggressive and full of fight as the lights or grenadiers? That doesn't sound right to me.

Spring deals with that in 'Zeal and BAyonets'. He quotes Pat Ferguson of King's Mountain fame, who complained to Clinton that line battalions were being reduced to being 'nurseries' for the flank banttalions and that consequently they were incapable of pursuing beaten rebels after a swift bayonet rush because they quickly got 'knocked up' (by which he meant knackerered, I imagine, rather than pregnant). If I remember right, Ferguson wanted Clinton to raise more light units and use the Highlanders as such too, giving them back their broadswords.

<<Remember, up to 600 guys in two ranks with at least 18 inches between each file would cover over 300 yards. There aint no way one man could have controlled that line effectively from the centre, even without reckoning in the cluttered terrain – woods, etc. >>

This is a vital point to bear in mind, and appears to have been appreciated by Howe, as the 1777-1778 flank battalions – which had more than the "standard" 10 companies (typically 12-14, occasionally more) – had two field officers (Lt Col + Major for the Grenadiers, two Majors for the Lights). Since it was unusual for flank companies to be commanded by Majors or Lt Cols within the parent regimental structure, this suggests some prior intent that they were to operate other than as a complete battalion.

"If all the best men were siphoned off into converged light and grenadier battalions, why would the line units be just as aggressive and full of fight as the lights or grenadiers? That doesn't sound right to me."

I'm sure others that are better read on the subject can answer this with more fact than opinion. But some regiments like the 23rd and the 33rd fought just as good if not better than the Grenadier & Light battalions. I'm not sure if this was because they were better trained? Better quality of soldiers/Officers? Or could have been a combination of these and more reasons. It seems some Regiments were better taken care of by their Colonel than others. So it might be just as simple as the men felt appreciated so put forth more effort??

It seems some Regiments were better taken care of by their Colonel than others. So it might be just as simple as the men felt appreciated so put forth more effort??

Deffo. Cornwallis was famously proud of the 33rd and looked after it very well, spending his own money on it rather than abusing his colonelcy to make money by shortchanging it (which is what Urban says Howe did to the 23rd, IIRC). Percy likewise lavished care on the 5th. Both were considered very good corps.

IIRC, Cornwallis's 33rd was popularly known as 'The Pattern' because it was so good – although I don't ever recall seeing that in an original source, I must add. LAmb, however, waxed lyrical about both the 23rd and 33rd in one of his wo books (forget which), putting each regt's superiority down to the care of the commanding officers (IIRC, in the case of the 23rd I think he meant Nisbet Balfour, who led the 23rd on the ground in the southern campaigns, in Howe's absence).

Spring's 'Zeal and Bayonets' also touches on this – he writes about how the common soldiers seem to have put themselves out for officers who they fely looked after them.

Simon Fraser's 24th Foot was another such unit.

Yes the old thought that all the British soldiers were flogged into obedience and fled to the american cause was just not true. But I do recall reading a few accounts of British soldiers deserting to stay with women they met in America. lol

…the new-raised 71st Regt … did not even learn the manual exercise till mid-way through the war. I think he says the same about the Queen's Rangers,…

I don't have the book so can you explain the basis for these statements? I'm having troubling believing that a regular infantry regiment can be recruited and sent to war a year later without learning the drill and manual exercise, especially since they were reviewed by the Inspector General before embarkation.

To apply this to the Queen's Rangers is also misleading as Simcoe himself writes "a few motions of the manual exercise were thought sufficient ; they were carefully instructed in those of firing, but above all attention was paid to inculcate the use of the bayonet and a total reliance on that weapon."

Printed in the Eighteenth Century Notes

British Light Infantry At Brandywine.
by Mark Nichipor, U.S.A

Narratives of many battles tend to be dull, dry things. Few seem to convey the terror and confusion that any battlefield holds no matter the time period. They also tend to have a sameness about them, with all manoeuvres and troop formations by the book. So it is of great interest when you come across a different type of narrative that is out of the ordinary.

Enclosed is an account of the battle of Brandywine from an anonymous British Light Infantryman, possible from the 17th Regiment's Light Company. As such it gives a worm's eye view of the action, and holds a number of interesting details that normally get left out of such narratives. In keeping with the spirit of the writing, I have not changed spelling, grammar or punctuation.

"….Upon the Troops getting again in motion the advanced guard was composed of the 17th and 42nd Light companies and Capt. Evalts troop of mounted yagers. having advanced less than a mile Capt. Evalt proposed charging a party of dragoons on the road, provided we secured his left flank. -this was assented to, and the two companies quitted the road for this purpose to gain an orchard on the left flank; received a fire from about 200 men in the orchard, which did no execution; companies ran up to the fence and halted, as it was evident tho' the enemy fell back they were well supported. -Lord Cornwalis Aid de camp came to order the advanced guard to halt. -looked back and saw the line nearly formed and presently advancing. –

"Right of the road Guards – 2nd batts. B. Grens. left of the road Batts. of yagers. 2 Batts. of light infantry. 2nd line – Hessian Grens. on the right. -brigade of British on the left. -reserve Brigade of British.-

"As soon as the line approached the advanced guard Lt. Col. Abercromby ordered the 17th light company to form on the right of the battalion, the 42nd, on the left. -As soon as the line came up to Dilworth Church the enemy opened fire from five field pieces; the church yard wall being opposite the 17th light company, the captain determained to get over the fence into the road, and calling to the men to follow ran down the road and lodged the men without loss at the foot of the hill on which the guns were firing. the hedge on the left side of the road much cut with the grape shot.

-by a bend of the hill had a view of part of the enemys line opposite the grenadiers and opened a fire from about half the company on it; no more being able to form on the space; presently joined by the 38th company some of their gallant soldiers wanted to ascend the hill immediately; objected as too imprudent; the 33rd company joined immediately afterwards, and the men of the three companies calling out up the hill; at their cannon, ascended the hill and had a glimpse of the enemys line as far as the eye could reach to the right and left. -some firing might have taken place on the left, but as yet the heavy fire of the musketry was not begun.

-enemys guns too far back on the heights to annoy us, their line advancing on us we were compelled to throw ourselves on our knees and bellies, and keep up a fire from the slope of the hill. -enemy repeatedly attempted to come on, but were always drove back by our fire altho' their General (Lincoln) very much exerted himself At this time a most tremendous fire of musketry opened from both lines.

-Looking back to see how far the grenadier line was off from which alone we could receive immediate support, to my surprize I saw close to me major Stuart of the 43rd whose regt. being at Rhode Island attended the army as a spectaor; recollecting the 43rd grenadier company was the left of their line, we persuaded Major Stuart to run down the hill and prevail on that company to hasten to our support; he did go, but before he could return, to my inexpressible joy, saw Captain Cochrane of the 4th company on my left throw up his cap and cry Victory. -and looking round saw the 43rd company hastening to our relief;

-we dashed forwards passed the five pieces of cannon which the enemy had adbandoned and made some few prisoners, enemy running away from us, with too much speed to be overtaken.-

The men being blown we halted and formed to a fence, and were immediately joined by the 2nd grenadiers to our right His own battalion left away to the left; as soon as the men were fit to go on, out of gratitude to Major Stuart we desired to elect him our chief and ment to have gone on under his command, but before we could move Col. Abercromby galloped to us, and we joined the battalion. –

A british brigade got into action with the enemys reserve, which terminated the battle on the left. -the column on the right as soon as our fire was heard, crossed the river and drove the enemy from their works.-"

Throughout the piece there are a great number of unusual and curious bits of information. Please take note at how often fences are used as stopping points or rallying places, rather than cover. They are a convenient object to direct the men to. The Light Infantry battalion appears to be used in detachments, and reformed when needed. I am fascinated at the unattached officers being around, like Stuart of the 43rd. Also note the confusion within the ranks with the men calling out and the great latitude in orders a Light Infantry captain has.

*******

Note that the light infantry and cavalry were thrown out as an 'advanced guard' which moved ahead more than half a mile from the main line--and this is during a major battle. The company captain seems to have had a great deal of latitude in operations. It is also interesting that other individual companies are called to support the author's light company.

I think it would be a mistake to think that light infantry simply acted as another composite battalion of grenadiers during the AWI. It should also be noted that the FIW instructions for the 60th included how to control a line of skirmishers in wooded areas from both the center and the flanks… with a regulating file.

While the Lights may have operated as "shock infantry" in the major battles they still had outpost, picket, and advance guard duties. At Harlem Heights and Germantown it was the Lights picket posts that the Americans first encountered. Also, prior to Brandywine (not sure what the battle/skirmish is called) the lights and jagers formed the advance guard and deployed and skirmished against Maxwell's American lights.

As to the problems of having 600+ men deployed in open or extended order, battalions often operated as "wings" or only a few companies deployed to skirmish while the rest of the battalion remained behind in support.

Hope this helps.

V/R

Joe

@number4

See this:
link

The link should take you to the 'Look inside!' webpage for 'zeal and bayonets'. Go to pp. 119-20 (or do a search for 'manual exercise').

Hope this helps,
Redcoat

"It should also be noted that the FIW instructions for the 60th included how to control a line of skirmishers in wooded areas from both the center and the flanks… with a regulating file."

Bouquet exercised his troops at Raystown in these tactics, but there is no evidence they ever used them. If they did at Grant's Hill, it was a disaster.

@redcoat: Thanks for the link; I found the reference by searching for "71st" and it says they received training aboard the transports from NCO's….this is attributed to an unnamed 'early historian of the highland corps' and not a primary source. When was this written, by whom, and was the author present or even a soldier in the 71st during the time period? What sort of training could be done aboard an 18th century transport ship? It certainly wasn't field craft lectures, First Aid, calisthenics or gruesome slide shows warning about exotic diseases and ladies of ill virtue :)

The Manual Exercise is the basic instruction on how to handle, load and fire your musket without blinding or burning your comrades in the ranks. It's nothing to do with parade drill or fancy maneuvers, and everyone learns it. Simcoes's Queens Rangers used a cut down version and even von Steuben's tactics were just a simplified variant.

To say that the 71st did not learn the manual exercise until midway through the war is misleading. It is probably the only training they got for the first couple of years!

@number4

Of course, you are almost certainly right – I overstated the case. The 71st were probably taught the basics of the manual exercise, presumably on the ships that carried them to America.

Here's the source for the 71st Regt evidence:

(Vol 1)
link

(Vol 2)
link

The reference to the 71st's limited training is in volume 2, pp. 50-51.

Also, on p.46 Stewart claims the unit embarked at Greenock "without any acquired knowledge of the use of arms."

On p. 49 he says of the unit at sea that "all the serjeants and soldiers, were totally undisciplined." [ie untrained]

Stewart is commonly cited by historians writing about the FIW and AWI – essentially his work was a regimental history, unit by unit. I'd call it a primary source, assuming Stewart had intimate knowledge of the campaigns via connections in the army and access to docs.

Here's a biog of the man:
link

Not quite a primary source because he wasn't there at the time, didn't witness any of the events first hand and is writing in 1822 using information presumably taken from interviewing veterans.

I can see how a hurriedly raised draft can be rushed overseas and expected to learn the basics in transit or on arrival though, but still there had to be someone to train the trainers, in the same way von Steuben trained his select company at Valley Forge before returning them to their respective units as serjeants to pass on the drill.

On p. 49 he says (of the death of Major Menzies) "where so many of the officers and all the serjeants and soldiers, were totally undisciplined." implies that there were at least a couple of officers who knew what they were doing.

Volume 2 makes interesting reading, thanks for the link!

>After reading the book With Zeal and Bayonets Only and >Brendan Morrisey's excellent titles, I came away with a >different view on how the British operated during the AWI.

Spring is pretty much the "go to" source. It was long overdue!

SM also makes an excellent point about "battalions" in the LI--Spring discusses (and Howe's orders stressed) the dividing of battalions into "wings" with one wing supporting the other, so there would be no 300 yard frontage, but a more manageable and likely 150 yard frontage.

Virginia Tory,
Very true, I always took for granted that the Battalions worked in companies. So finding out the platoons were combined into wings and divisions with in the Battalion. Then those wings and divisions were the combat element of the battalion. Plus you add in how the terrian effected all this. Gives you a totally different view on how they operated then.

The 18th century company was more an administrative unit; battalions normally operated as two 'wings', left and right, each having two 'grand divisions'. The men were told off into firing platoons within those sub-units. A firing platoon may be as strong as a company (platoons were not the permanent formations of the modern era, but tactical sub-units formed for combat)

This makes more sense when you look at it under the framework of the converged light and grenadier battalions, who were drawn from different strength companies across the army.