"The advantages of the column" Topic

Can anyone clear this one up for me? What was the advantage of attacking in column and how do you (or the rules you use) represent this? Was it a regular occurrence? Were troops trained to take up this formation when closing on the enemy lines? I've never quite understood how reducing a formation's frontage (as opposed to troops in line) provided an advantage to the attacker.

A column moves faster.

You might have a look at this site, it gives a rather clear explanation:

link

It didn't, of course. The advantage of a column of bayonets actually making contact with an enemy in line would seem clear, but as we know that was not the usual dynamic of an infantry attack. Most often by far, the closest contact between infantry units was a dynamic of weight and effect of fire, followed by one side or the other seizing advantage and taking the iniative to push the other. One side or the other would, sooner or later, give way to the push. Lines, of course, have the advantage in fire weight, so there was little or no advantage to combat in column, except in the pouring rain.
Movement is easier and faster in column than in line. Less experienced and trained troops found it hard to maintain cohesion moving in line, and were slow if they did. Controlling the direction of oblique marching, and speed of movement of units on a confused battlefield is easier in column, and the formation debatably provides some physical and psychological 'security'. This would make it the formation of choice for movement, until there was close proximity to the enemy.
The ideal attack would involve columns moving to engagement range and then deploying into line, but that was a tricky thing, especially for less experienced troops. Being caught mid deployment from colum to line by an oponent would be disasterous, so deployment had to be dispensed with, or timed well, a decision involving both the quality and cohesion of the troops in column, and a clear idea of where the enemy was.
In the rules I use, all the above considerations are modeled. The most difficult thing, from a gaming view, is representing the tactic of deployment on a back slope to foil the attacker's sense of when to deploy into line. With an umpire it works best, because the figures can be removed, the attacker told the enemy is there- but not exactly where (marking a map works too, but umpires tend to preclude any confusion issues). In terms of the game, it makes deployment too early or too late more common than getting it right. Our house modifiers to the rules we use only allow defensive deployment in line on a reverse slope to the nationality that practised it as a regular tactical methodology.

The reason columns moved faster than lines is often misunderstood.

All Napoleonic troops were taught to march in rhythm at a standard length of pace and a a number of standard paces per minute. These were practiced so much that they became completely instinctive (as they still are by soldiers in their basic training).

There were national variations but these were comparatively small. The British standard pace length was 30 inches (and still is) whilst the march rates were Ordinary 75 paces per minute, Quick 108 paces per minute and Quickest 120 paces per minute. In theory both lines and columns could be told to march at any of these rates. The problem occurred when minor obstacles were encountered. A British column, formed on a single company and with a frontage of some 20 yards could simply wheel around any obstacle. A British line, with a frontage of some 200 yards could not.

The anti-obstacle drill, which was virtually identical for all nations, was for the line to continue to advance, but any section of it faced by an obstacle fell back, formed a small column, wheeled around the obstacle, then marched at a faster pace to resume its position in the line. This worked if the line was advancing a a slow pace, but became very difficult, if not impossible if the line itself was advancing at a fast pace. Such a line would rapidly become fragmented, and to avoid this lines normally moved at a relatively slow pace, perhaps a maximum of the British 108 pace per minute Quick Step, allowing the 120 pace per minute quickest step to be used for any blocked sections to catch up. Incidentally the latter 120 pace per minute step is used as the standard parade pace of the modern British Army, so it is not really that fast.

Rod

Rod

As an aside: I think I am right in saying that the British army 'went metric' in its pace length a few years ago? This was some sort of standardisation to match our NATO allies, I believe.
Whether or not it happened, it would have occured after I left the army, so cannot catagorically state this as true.

To what, 76cm paces?

I know the US still used 30" paces in 2000, even though they use metric ranges for all ground movement.

I read the that Imperial Guard attack at Waterloo was not by column but was in fact a square. The French were afraid of British cavalry. The Guard were well trained that this maneuver was easy for them to do. Looking at the Guard advancing like this at ground level could be interpreted as attacking in column.

BullDog69 wrote

As an aside: I think I am right in saying that the British army 'went metric' in its pace length a few years ago? This was some sort of standardisation to match our NATO allies, I believe.
Whether or not it happened, it would have occured after I left the army, so cannot catagorically state this as true.

Well I left the British Army in 1992 (after 30 years service) and as far as I know the 30 inch pace is still used. I suspect any metrication would be a good story for 1 April.

We used metres for weapon ranges etc, but the normal British way is to be pragmatic about using a mixture of metric and imperial measurements as appropriate.

Rod

StanleySteve,

This is often a much confusing topic due to misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the often repeated British Line vs. French Column "myth" that was perpetuated by sir Charles Oman and other historians over the years, based upon the available research of the time and their interpretations of that information (Mostly English data from the peninsular war conflict). While most of the era conflicts ranged across Europe.

The French Regulations changed over the years and went from 9 Co's in a Bn to 6 in 1808, but also reverted back and forth to older regulations that were written out from newer regulations by differences in agreement between higher ranking officials throughout this time frame as to how to correctly employ (or even as to wether to allow the tactic, or not) a column of attack. The actual misinterpretation of what actually constituted a column of attack contributes further to this messy topic (column of div's, closed, open, etc…, etc…

In short a French column truly wasn't that much shorter in frontage than a British line. It was a stubbier line that allowed additional options & flexibility against French opponents. And yes it also changed from three ranks to two throughout the period, as well as throwing in integral skirmishers on top of all this as well. All adding to the mass of confusion as to it's correct implementation and employment.

So the French would use this tactic for numerous reasons (some which have already been mentioned in other posts as well as above) which is what it sounds like you're actually asking? Art Pendragon is without a doubt in my mind the most knowledgeable in this arena and most probably will see this thread and chime in (hopefully)! I've posted some information here that you're welcome to look at as well;

You have to work your way backwards

link

Still needs updating and is alway's being updated when I find the time (motivation). Cheers,

Chris

I would sum it up thus – the column is a first rate formation for second rate troops.

It gives them a cohesion and solidarity they might not otherwise have, at the cost of their firepower which might well be minimal anyway!

It actually takes centuries of tradition and ethos for a Regiment to stand stolidly on a battlefield in a two deep line!

In short a French column truly wasn't that much shorter in frontage than a British line. It was a stubbier line that allowed additional options & flexibility against French opponents

Are you sure about this? A British battalion of 600 has a frontage of 300 men in its 2-deep line; a French battalion of 600 with a frontage of two companies has a frontage of 60-odd. Or a difference of four or five times, if you like.

Regards

Are you sure about this? A British battalion of 600 has a frontage of 300 men in its 2-deep line; a French battalion of 600 with a frontage of two companies has a frontage of 60-odd. Or a difference of four or five times, if you like.

There in lies one of the misperceptions (a 1 vs. 1 mindset). Waves of skirmishers and columns vs enemy lines forced most enemy lines to break/waiver way before any type of contact was ever made. Along with artillery and possible cavalry threats to your lines flanks. Watch the video I mentioned in the link above and you'll see things a little clearer I think (Part 3 or 6 depending upon which way you go)? Cheers,

Chris

There in lies one of the misperceptions (a 1 vs. 1 mindset). Waves of skirmishers and columns vs enemy lines forced most enemy lines to break/waiver way before any type of contact was ever made. Watch the video I mentioned in the link above and you'll see things a little clearer I think?

I can't watch the embedded video?? It is telling me the Youtube link has been pulled.

Anyway, regardless, I'm not saying anything about the relative merits of opposing tactical systems, I'm just saying that I don't think the statement "In short a French column truly wasn't that much shorter in frontage than a British line" can be quite right. It was much shorter in frontage.

Regards

I've often thought it a little odd that a 9 ranks deep formation is a Napoleonic column but a Renaissance line.

Going back to the original point of tactical advantages of columns, not only did they allow faster movement, but also were much safer if there was an enemy cavalry threat.

A line would take about one and a half minutes to form a square (the governing time being how long it took the flank companies to march to their position at the rear of the square).

Napoleonic battlefield columns were normally at quarter distance (troops in 2 ranks eg British) or half distance (troops in 3 ranks – eg French) and from those formations hollow squares could be formed in less than 20 seconds.

Sometimes all nations used close columns (ie only one pace between ranks) in which case solid squares could be formed by halting and facing outwards, again in less than 20 seconds.

This is what made columns good for movement, but their firepower could never be as good as a line, and that is why failing to deploy into line before the final attack was their undoing against well drilled and steady troops.

Rod

Whirlwhind,

I agree in the most simplistic of comparisons 1 vs 1, you're right, but it also depends on what exact type of attack column formation was being used, as there are numerous variations (I.E multiple companies, or column of attack variations)? Which represented mass. A never ending amount of troops approaching the enemy and mentally as well as visually somewhat overwhelming.

The hardest thing for wargamers to wrap their heads around as visually they just see the miniatures on the table due to basing and don't mentally visualize all that really was occuring. I don't think you can say logically that commanders would say O.K. there's one enemy Bn in line, so therefore I can only send one of my Bn's at it all over the battlefield! That just doesn't seem logical does it? For example L'ordre mixte column line, line, coulmn, etc… It was all about the mass getting ready to steamroll over your two/three rank line. Throw in cannons and skirmishers on top of that, and the pssibility of cavalry attacks.

The French soldier felt more secure in a columns protection as a line was much less secure mentally in a soldiers mind (fragile, easier to break). Of course British troops were known to be more stedfast than other nations in line due to training and tactics (reverse slope used when possible not always). This was of course unless the line was supported by fellow troops, but once again a lot of rules sets don't factor this type of support in, some due as die roll modifiers). Hope this helps a little more as it's a 30 – 40 yrs journey of study to help myself even try and wrap my head around it.

And why some rules sets I find rather to simplistic!

Rod, your last post is my understanding of this as well. BTW thanks for that explanation of the 'obstacle drill', I hadn't thought about exactly how that worked.

If the battalion has only three divisions (company of divisions), the first should be deployed (line) and the two others should place themselves in column by subdivisions behind its wings. Three cases may occur;

1) The enemy gives way.

2) The enemy stands without flinching, and awaits you boldly or marches unhesitatingly to encounter you.

3) Your troops stop or turn back, with more or less panic or confusion. If the enemy runs away before you reach him, he will run quicker than yourself, and you could not overtake him. (My note: Some wargames accurately portray this)

You must therefore send out one of your extreme companies as skirmishers against him, for the purpose of harassing him with a sharp fire, and follow closely with the remaining companies, watching carefully both of your flanks, lest they be turned or lose the "support of the adjoining battalions" less successful than yours. Let your advance be prudent, and always take precautions against any charge of your cavalry of the second line, or the reserves of your adversary. Before sending out your skirmishers, you may sometimes order the front of your column to fire a volley.

"Writings on the French Napoleonic Art of War, B Marshals Bugeaud & Ney, & the Baron De Jomini", Brent Nosworthy, Ad Signa Publishing, 2003, p.13.

Thanks Grognard, it's always nice to find out that my take on it (as babbled in my inital comment) is backed up by such esteemed company!

R

I think the wargames rules that represent the advantages of columns best are:
1. Superior speed and manoeuvrability – this is well attested by contemporaries, even if the actual pace of march was the same.
2. Easier to change formation to square, or change direction to face flank.
3. Morale rules that use percentage casualties; since the rear ranks aren't exposed and casualties are easier to absorb – simulating additional cohesion effect quite well.
4. Depending on the rule set some sort of morale bonus, especially for poorer quality troops.

That's all you really need – charge or close combat bonuses don't fit the historical evidence well.

You should also make sure that the firepower advantage of lines is not overdone – i.e. the overlap is limited to about 50% maximum, and maybe less. The casualty rates from long-lasting firefights, as at Albuera don't really support a higher ratio – some advantage, yes, but not massive. I think a lot of the flank fire was ineffective – a column being a much smaller target to the flank than it appears on the games table. And some of the disparity might be made up with skirmishers.

Grognard1789,

I believe that you will find that the quote that you give from Nosworthy's rather fine booklet is describing a theory rather than French practice during the Napoleonic era.

I have to say that I also agree with Whirlwind about your statement that "a French column truly wasn't that much shorter in frontage than a British line." A typical French column was inherently shorter in frontage than a typical British line. By introducing massing of columns and skirmishers, you have moved away from your original statement, which just does not stand up. While I agree that more than one French column could attack a British unit in line, that does not alter the fact that each column had a much smaller frontage than a similarly sized British unit.

Morale rules that use percentage casualties; since the rear ranks aren't exposed and casualties are easier to absorb – simulating additional cohesion effect quite well.

Actually, this was a disadvantage for the column. Given the same number of casualties in a given time, the column is losing a greater proportion of its foremost ranks. The men will "feel" the losses sooner in a column, and the men in the rear will not press on.

Matthew,

Actually, in a column the rear ranks are more exposed to the casualties as they have to step over them. With a line, there are just gaps where people used to be; as the unit moves forwards, it closes up and the dead and wounded are left behind out of sight.

Apart from that, I completely agree with you.

All my Napoleonic data are stored away, (hoping to sell my house here in Texas, and move back to Pennsylvania. May never happen, as the US Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] has now put my home squarely in the middle of a flood plain that did not exist 3-4 months ago!)

But I recall reading about General St Cyr commanding early in the Peninsular War against the Spanish in eastern Spain. His "corp" was running low in ammunition, and facing a Spanish army in line. He ordered his brigades to form column, and simply push through with little or no firing.

Despite one of his general insisting in engaging in a fire fight with the Spanish, he broke through the Spanish line successfully.

Later in the war the column was used because of the larger number of conscripts in French units, as way of moving across the field in better order. They usually wanted to get closer to the enemy, and then form line.

GdeP

All,

There are so many variables to this issue it's crazy! I realize as Wargamers we have to develop a realistic model in order to visually display and represent this on the table, but there are so many other mitigating factors such as, nation being represented, the make up/ composition of their units, (not a cookie cutter every unit the exact same size) which is what we've gotten used to. There were fallouts, stragglers, defectors, replacements enroute, sickness, battle casualties, foragers, etc…. So units come in all shapes and sizes. Not one size fits all!

What I refer to and is commonly referred to in the U.S. military today as overall unit cohesiveness & readiness. So to say every unit was this exact size is rather proposterous. So if a unit of French companies lets say have an 80 man frontage due to being large size was in column (gives it 160 men wide frontage, depending on type of column it's in once again) vs an enemy unit suffering from the above variables ( originally 600 in double line, with a 300 man frontage) but now minus 15% so now with a 260 Man front, it doesn't really give it that much more frontage. Thus the stubby line comment in previous post. We have to remember volleys were not precision aimed fire such as modern day wpns. So this also depends on a units size due to it's historical timeline from 1792 – 1815 composition and makeup which historically changed.

The other thing we do as Wargamers is say that everything occurs exactly center mass! I don't believe commanders at that time had exact laser precision, but a line would be a heck of a lot easier to discern and maneuver towards, than multiple columns logically. So in my opinion and you know what they say about those. These are the types of things we need to better familiarize ourselves with as rules designers and gamers! There's also the variables of Green, conscripts, militia, veteran, elite, etc… All which need to factored in as well as weather, morale, fatigue, commander, unit experences, etc… But bottom line a rules set needs to be something the gamer enjoys and that is not overly mind numbing with all these factors. So choose a set that overall you like/ are comfortable with and enjoy!

GdP- wellll….they were Spanish…lol

Grognard-A company frontage of 80 men would mean a 240 man company. To my knowledge the largest French coy size fully complimented would have maxed out(unlikely)at around 160, or a 50+ man front, in column of divisions 100ish. A 300 man bn in line is not much bigger, true. Of course if one was lucky enough to be in that formation isolated against an understrength bn of 300 ln, it would be fortunate.
You are very correct about the other variables, which is why I like C&G, which accounts for attrition and calculates frontage for combat purposes by man, not figure.

Agreed, more an illustrative example to get people to see units were all different sizes, not one size fits all, rather than a historical one. And why I like C&GII as well. As the user can tell the system unit size and forget about it as well as carry any factors incurred from prior battles into the next battle if one wishes!

Grognard,
Can you please give me an historical example of a Napoleonic French line or light battalion with 240 man companies.

Given that a full strength pre-1808 battalion consisted of 8 companies of 120 men and one of 90 men and a post 1808 one of 6 companies of 140 men, I am frankly baffled where you get the idea of a 240 man company from. Putting forward historically inaccurate models to try to prove your point is rather absurd.

Taking your 520 man battalion in 2 deep line as a comparison with a full strength post 1808 French battalion, the battalion in line would have a 260 man frontage while the column would have a frontage of 93 men (I have not allowed for officers and others who would not actually be the ranks); the line is nearly 3 times wider than the column, which rather destroys your argument.

O.K. This will be my last comment on this topic as I do not want to get into a he said/she said debate here. For those that get it congratulations! For those that don't I'm sorry.

Battalions were meant to deploy in fixed widths. (Co's & Peloton's) all French battalions used the peloton as the tactical unit, whereas the Company was an organizational unit. However, peloton's were distinctly ad-hoc and soldiers were quite frequently and regularly transferred from one peloton to another, whereas they weren't transferred from one company to another. The idea was to keep the number of men in each peloton as equal as possible. The reason for that was so that, for example, when forming column of companies (i.e. a frontage two peloton's wide) the column would have a roughly equal number of files in each rank.

French Co's 1791-1808 3 ranks, 1808 –1815 2 ranks (Especially after 1813 due to losses in manpower)

Frontage widths were always maintained no matter how many ranks. (I.E. Plugging the gap, later ranks would merely walk forward to plug any holes occurring in the line.)

(Ex. If units were under strength;
I-----200-----I
I-----200-----I
I--50--I The 3rd Rank were the skirmishers in may countries.

Within the battalion, men were organized into companies: nine per battalion in the French army until 1808, when a reorganization reduced it to six (one grenadier, one light, four line). In the Austrian army battalions had six companies; in the Prussian, four; and in the British, ten.

Confusingly a pair of companies were often referred to as a division, so that a battalion in a "column of divisions" had a front of two companies (= to four peleton's). This had nothing to do with the higher formation of a division (which usually contained several brigades; ten or a dozen battalions), though it has been suggested –not very plausibly –that confusion over the terms was responsible for d'Erlon's monstrous formation at Waterloo.

A battalion would form column on a front of one, or more commonly two, companies, (giving it a front of around fifty to eighty men), and a depth of nine to twelve men, depending on the number and strength of the companies in the battalion.

It would thus be thirty to sixty yards wide and between twelve and fifteen yards deep, when the companies were closed up for an attack, making it more a stubby line than a ‘column'.

Sometimes, however, a number of battalions –perhaps a whole regiment, or even more –were deployed behind the other, greatly increasing the depth of the column while its front remained limited to two companies. Such a formation had little to recommend it, except in a defile or when the terrain otherwise compelled the advancing troops to attack on a very narrow front.

Open columns, with large gaps between successive companies enabling them to swing out and deploy into line or square, were widely used for maneuvering at a distance from the enemy, even by the British; but they were not suitable for close combat, having none of the compactness and cohesion of a closed column, nor the firepower of a line.

In general the column –particularly smaller battalion columns –had many advantages. With their narrow front and without the need to maintain perfect alignment with their neighbors, they could advance far more rapidly and over much rougher ground than infantry in line. Their officers and NCO's were concentrated so that they could more easily set their men a prominent example or maintain pressure from behind as circumstances required, while the press of comrades to front and rear must have encouraged the men, far fewer of whom were in the exposed front ranks immediately facing the enemy. The flanks of the column were far less vulnerable, for by filling the gaps between companies with officers and NCO's, while men on the outer edge of each company faced outwards, it could quickly convert into a solid block, less secure than a properly formed square but still capable of resisting all but the most determined cavalry.

Alternatively a proper square could be formed more quickly and easily from a column than from line. For all these reasons columns were ideally suited for use by poorly trained troops making an attack.

("Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon", Rory Muir, p. 68., 71)

(I.E) Not a 1bn line to a 1 bn column (bn actually in multiple columns deployments followed by and paralleled by other bn's) stand as depicted on the miniatures table!

Bn ---------------------------------------- Line (300 men front)

<..> <..> <..> <..> <..> <..> <..> <..> Skirmishers 3rd rank)

1Bn -- ofc's -- nco's, drummers, etc column/s
-- --

or – -- -
– -

See pictures here; (show how wide a column front of two companies actually was

link

unfortunately TMP's format wont allow correct alignment

Followed by and paralleled by additional bn's in similar deployment thus presenting an overwhelming and never ending mass appearance of troops to the enemy!

"French Co's 1791-1808 3 ranks, 1808 –1815 2 ranks (Especially after 1813 due to losses in manpower"

So, are you now claiming that the French routinely adopted 2 rank formations from 1808-15? If so, please provide evidence for that other than for very weak units.

Dear distinguish colleagues of the forum,

If I may add my two cents on various postings on this thread.

From my reading of French instructional documents on their military science, without a doubt I concur with Rod's posting on how all Napoleonic troops were taught to march in rhythm at a standard length of pace and at a number of standard paces per minute. But it just took the French longer to standardize their own pace per minute.

In l'ordonnance de 1791 the pas ordinaire was 76 paces per minute, which was replaced in 1793 to 90 paces per minute, but in the end, their standardized pace was 100 paces per minute.

"…sa Majeste a ordonne qu'on ne manoeuvrerait qu'au pas accelere (100 paces per minute with caught up speeds of 120 or 160 per minute), et qu'elle fait toujours qu'elle fait toujours defiler ainsi au rest, des differentes marches decrites ci-dessus, et calculees dans le tableau comparatif, it ne faut s'attacher qu'a ce qui faite partie du reglement de 91 ou de l'instruction de l'an 12, les autre principes n''etant relates que comme des documents qui n'ont nullement force de loi"…

This can be validated in various decrets, usages, Ou Reseigements Propres Aux Sous-Officiers Des Cette Arme", various publications from the Commission, the General Committee, Inspector Generals, or l'Ordre de Jour par Divisions…

Just as Rod mentioned, in theory both lines and columns were able to march at any rate in their ordonnance. Rod has already mentioned the difficulties experienced when minor obstacles were encounter, or embarrassing terrain. But on the flip side of this, and to a lesser degree, we also see that this same problem occurred when minor obstacles were encountered for a column on the field of battle as well, especially when troops were not trained to march en colonne serree/close column.

But first we have to have a better understanding of the three types of marches for columns that were used on and off the field of battle; the colonne de route, the colonne de manoeuvre, and the colonne serree or also known as a colonne d'action ("action column").

A colonne de route was used to march up to the field of battle. A colonne at full distance was considered a colonne de route, when applied to common marches, where the attention of men and officers are not so much kept on the stretch, the colonne de route, could be formed by divisions of the battalion, or no less than 3 to 4 files depending on which country was marching by files.

When a colonne de route is named a colonne de manoeuvre, it is when it is within reach of the enemy, the greatest exactness is required, in order to execute a speedy change of formation at any instant into line, during its transition from one position to another. The colonne de manoeuvre was a formation that could be used in standing in open or other distances according to circumstances on the field of battle. The colonne par pelotons with a distance of platoons at half distance is an example of a colonne de manoeuvre, as was the colonne par divisons at half or quarter distance.

The column serree or close column, or what the French and Americans also referred to as an "action column", was used as a formation to assault a breach or other fortified strong-points, to pass immediately through or into a defile, close or interested ground, woods, night marches, entrenchments, a passage of lines, or other restrictions in order to attack an enemy unit. A colonne serree could also be found standing on the field of battle in reserve, however most importantly the colonne serree, such as a colonne d'attaque/column of attack relied on shock tactics not musketry, and the colonne serre was the only column that all countries used to assault the enemy with.

The reason that an open column or in other distances were not used in an assault is because they did not present enough mass to be regarded as a viable means in forcing a breach in the enemy line of battle, hence only a colonne serree had enough mass to be used to assault the enemy.

Of courses this closed mass also had its disadvantages; it was a massed object for artillery, and whereas an open column or other distances according to circumstances, were able to easily execute a change of direction on a halted or movable pivot, a colonne serre required training to perform both a change of position and of direction in the march of a colonne serree.

As an example the instructions for such an execution in the Rules and Regulations are quite inadequate to supply the necessary information, and which, by leaving those evolutions partially explained, thus create disorder for untrained troops, of course nothing more satisfactory is offered in the French Reglement.

Simply put a colonne serree needed to manoeuvre from point A to point B in a straight line, but everyone realized that it was not possible to march in a straight line all the time, so each country developed their own mechanics for performing a change of direction of a colonne serree. This means that when minor obstacles were encountered, the colonne serree was forced to halt, and to execute a change of direction on a halted or movable pivot.

I do not know what is meant by "second rate troops" for wargamers, so I shall not comment on the validity of whether or not they should only be formed en colonne serre, while on the field of battle.

I can say that a body of troops needed to be trained in the regulations for formations and movements prior to being proficient enough to manoeuvre in both line and colonne serree on the field of battle. Otherwise they would be forced to be employed on the field of battle en la debandade just as the National Volunteers were from 1791 to 1793. In all accounts while in "Simple March" the National Volunteers manoeuvred in colonne when advancing to the field of battle, retreating, or following up on the retreating enemy.

When entering the region that is called to us the "War March", the National Volunteers were unable to manoeuvre in this region while formed. Quite often the National volunteers were pushed up to the field of battle en colonne par bataillon, then deployed en a la debandade.

We then come to the category of such colonnes that were formed as a counter measure against cavalry, such as a colonne vuide, which were slow to manoeuvre in embarrassing terrain, or the colonne de retraite if used unwisely, since musketry from of a retreating battalion was no more practical than the fire executed from a battalion advancing.

I would like to thank Mr. Groenland for the excellent link he has provided everyone with. I myself have visited it on several occasions, but in my opinion when the author points out the advantages and disadvantages of a column, the author is only totally correct on one point…a "column was an excellent device for bringing men more rapidly into action".

Nevertheless it is an extremely useful website, and I recommend to everyone.

Very Respectfully
Art

Dear distinguish colleagues of the forum ,

It is quite common for contemporary Napoleonic authors to use extremely poor analog models, or simply put; a model to understand a large scale problem, by using a single battalion in line versus a single battalion in column, to represent a large scale application of two great bodies of troops engaged. This type of analog model of a single battle in line versus a single column attacking, to theoretically demonstration why columns were bound to fail, is quite faulty and has no bearing on the actual military science that was used, and should be considered anything but the reality.

-It only provides us with food for thought, wondering if the author who uses such an analog model actually understands any military science at all…

Here is a perfect example of an analog model:

A British battalion of 600 has a frontage of 300 men in its 2-deep line; a French battalion of 600 with a frontage of two pelotons has a frontage of 60-odd. Or a difference of four or five times when engaged.

Here is another analog model as well:

A British battalion of 600 has a frontage of 300 men in its 2-deep line; a French demi-bataillon en colonne of 300 men has at least 12 times the frontage, or 24 times the frontage if the entire bataillon is engaged.

Nevertheless both are bad analog models and in no way are demonstrative models of military science and why a close column failed or succeeded.

Very Respectfully
Art

Very bad models for drawing tactical conclusions from. Very good representations for demonstrating why the frontage of a line was indeed far greater than that of a column.

Regards

"It actually takes centuries of tradition and ethos for a Regiment to stand stolidly on a battlefield in a two deep line!"
Really ???????????????

In 1815 some of Wellingtons most prized units were his KGL, germans plus spanish, austrians, and poles included.
Not exactly a centuries worth there of tradition and ethos.

In 1815 Wellington was trying to have the Portuguese regiments shipped over.
The general order for them to be in 2 ranks for combat was issued in 1808 not long after their creation.
Almost if not exactly 7 years of tradition and ethos.

In 1815 Wellington had a General order issued for the Dutch and Belgian units to form for battle in 2 ranks.
Barely a 100 days of tradition and ethos.

Perhaps some prefer to believe Wellington didnt know his rrrs from his elbow, and was an aristocratic twit of the 1st order who just lucked out. Personally I suspect he had somewhat of a military talent

To understand why nations units perform differently under combat stress first it is needed to ponder if officers and NCOs have any purpose whatever, and if accepted that they do, then go on to look at where they were posted and how large a section they were each tasked to actually control on the battlefield by their regulations.
It will amongst other things explain why the US rangers were more elite than any other of their infantry in the 1990s.
And also why the Portuguese, Germans, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, and a few English, Spanish, and Polish of British organisation were potentially and generally more capable than Austrian, Rhine confederation, Russian, and Turkish organised during the Napoleonic wars.

Art,

Thanks! Figured you'd chime in based on your schedule.

JeffsaysHi,

RLTW, I was one of those guy's during that time frame. Cheers,

Chris

Dear distinguish colleagues of the forum,

For years now, there has been a misconceived notion that has escalated to monstrous proportions, from lack of understanding the military science or even the system (doctrine of various countries that used the colonne serree as an offensive tool.

It would seem that it originally started shortly after the Napoleonic era, and grew.

Nowhere in the repertoire of the Austrian, French, Russian, Prussian 1812, and America system is it found in both l'ordonnance d'exercice and l'ordonnance de tactique, that a body of troops shall deploy en bataille near the enemy battle line in la region des balles, with the intent of delivering musket fire upon the enemy.

Displaying/deploying in la region des balles was the only course of action when the colonne serree was staggered or found to be checked.

-There is one exception to this, but that one particular circumstance will be discussed at a later time.

When a body of troops en colonne serree are advancing toward the enemy battle line…and their resolution to advance fails and then stalls…the only remaining course of action for the Supernumeraries…were to attempt to deploy the body of troops. For it is imperative at this stage…to keep some resemblance of a resolution of forward motion.

Then characteristically…once the French were stalled…the British as an example, would make swift their attack with the bayonet…and with their ascendancy in moral due to their resolution to advance…the "material action" was decided…it is here that we see contemporary authors making the mistake that the French were attempting to deploy in la region des balles, because they had misjudged the exact location of the British line of battle.

To paraphrase The British military author Fonseca in 1825; 'to deploy under a heavy fire of artillery was seldom attempted, and to venture under the range of musketry is difficult to ascertain if the comment was meant in earnest, and which is bolder, the platoon which must stand alone while the battalion deploys under fire, or the boldness on behalf of the officer who ventures to adduce such a position in behalf of his theory', when contemplating such an absurd thought as deploying under fire next to an enemy battle line…

As a matter of fact, the colonne d'attaque was harder to deploy when staggered than a colonne par divisions. It was hard enough to deploy all pelotons on one side of a colonne with all cadre assisting in its deployment, but when the cadre were forced to divide and assist two wings deploying, and one wing may even refuse to deploy…

Another fact that most contemporary authors today fail to understand is that when the French officially accepted "l'Ordre Francaise" or also known at times as "l'Ordre Perpendiculaire in 1803, the detached peloton en tirailleur was an extension of the bataillon.

Authors today continual to erringly see the detached tirailleurs as a separate entity from the parent bataillon, while in the French military science they were a moving extension, just as an arm is attached to the body.

l'Ordonnance de 1791 or l'ordonnance d'exercice laid stress on the march in line of battle; but paid no particular thought to skirmishers, because deployed battalions were intended to provide the firepower of the grand formation and columns were only intended for; assembling, the passage of lines, or for rallying troops before and during action.

It is of major importance to recognize that in l'Ordonnance de 1791, musketry was prescribed from deployed battalions only. Nevertheless a major transition occurred where it became the exception, while musketry from tirailleurs became the customary means of firepower for the battalions.

In regards to using the third rank as skirmishers, when en colonne serree; the Austrians, Russians, French, Prussians 1812, and Americans would detach tirailleurs and have them deploy at the head of the colonne serre, or on both flanks of the colonne serre, hense giving the formed body an extension in frontage.

Up until 1808 it was alright to detach the third rank for the French, but after 1808 it was not permitted…but old habits were hard to kill even up to 1811, and some of the battalion commanders were doing it anyway…and Davout had issue with this, because when a bataillon formed en colonne serree and the third rank was detached, it did not have the mass required for a bataillon en colonne serree with six pelotons.

Very Respectfully
Art

Dear Colleagues,

"officers and NCOs …. where they were posted and how large a section they were each tasked to actually control on the battlefield by their regulations."
I can provide the answer for the Russians ….

The basic maneuver and combat formation was a Platoon – typically 8 of these to a Battalion, 2 Elite and 6 Center.
The non-elite Platoons would be equalized in size separately from the Elite Platoons.

A Platoon was maximally (senior platoon, full wartime complement, no one absent, smaller Jäger Banner Group, even the artelshiks grabbing a musket somewhere, etc.) 27 files, each of three ranks. More typical would be ~22 to ~24 files.
The platoon had two officers, who would usually (not always) be posted 1 on each flank.
The platoon had one senior NCO (normally posted to the right rear) and one officer aspirant senior NCO (posted the right flank).
The platoon had three junior NCO's (two posted to the rear, 1 that posted to the left flank or the left rear depending on the formation)
The platoon had 2 "vice" junior NCO's posted to the rear. These were senior soldiers, something like lance coporals, or perhaps like NCO aspirants.
So, the span of control was typically ~4 files (12 men – a "Detachment") per NCO/vice-NCO and ~12 files (36 men – a "Half-Platoon") per officer+senior NCO.
A Detachment could not be fewer than 4 files. It might be as many as 6 files if there was a shortage of NCO's and vice-NCO's, but plenty of men.
The smallest size of Platoon that should be formed would be 4 files per Detachment, 2 Detachments per Half-Platoon – that is 16 files (48 men) per Platoon. A 8-Platoon Battalion reduced thusly (384 rank and file) would be considered potentially unfit for combat and in acute need of replacements, or consolidation. Substantial consolidations occurred after Borodino and in Spring 1813.
It was usual for 1 junior NCO per Company (two Platoons) to act as the the quartermaster corporal (similar to fourrier in the French service). He was also often the junior NCO designated for the battalion Banner Group. If so absent, he was replaced in formation of the Platoon by the third vice-NCO.
It was not uncommon to post reliable men who were good marksmen in the last two files on each flank. Similarly, it appears that in 1812-1814 some units did not strictly follow the instruction to range the men according to height, but instead placed the oldest soldiers in the third rank and the newest soldiers in the second rank.
If the number of men, after equalization, did not make full 3-man files, the empty spot (called "deaf") would be placed toward the left flank in the second rank.

====================================================

From my admittedly less well-read undertanding, I would like to add to and corroborate Mr. Pendragon's comments about this idea of deploying from column in range of the enemy's muskets. For the Russians 1811 and later, I have never known of such being the intended evolution. I recall even as early as Survarov's complaints about Emperor's Paul's "School" of 1796/1798 that such notions as performing various evolutions in the face of the enemy's fires were among the "scatterbrained ideas written by drunken monkeys who were unfit to command a Platoon on Guard Duty at the Okhotsk Powder Works" (I don't rememebr the exact Suvarov wording, but it was somthing like that, and in mangled Russian and French mixed together).

Indeed, I am hard-pressed to cite an example of later Russians atttempting deployment even when staggered. I have more the impression of standing still and dying for a while until the NCO's give up urging them forward and the officers tell them it's OK to go back.

There were also similar complaints among the Russians about sending out the third rank to skirmish, leading to the practice (regularized after the war) of sending out the two flank files (or perhaps 4 files for a double skirmish line) of the Platoons. Oddly, this seems to have grown out of cavalry skirmish doctrine and the 1805-1808 Jäger practice of posting their riflemen here. More commonly, however, the whole skirmishing task was left to the Jäger or a Grenadier Battalion. In any case the same "major transition occurred where [musketry from deployed battalions] became the exception, while musketry from tirailleurs became the customary means of [infantry] firepower" as Mr. Pendragon has noted for the French.

"Nevertheless a major transition occurred where it became the exception, while musketry from tirailleurs became the customary means of firepower for the battalions."

It would be interesting to know when this transition did occur – or is this restricted to the column only?

At Austerlitz to the campaign in Poland – the feu à volonté – from a battalion deployed in line – was the customary means of firepower – in my view.

My old Friend Hans – Karl

Yes it is for the column I am referring to in this thread. I hope I have not given the impression that the French did not use a bataillon en ligne, and only the bataillon en colonne…that was never my intent.

Yet as you well know, in l'Ordonnance de 1791 the colonne was not an offensive tool, it laid stress on the bataillon en ligne.

Because in l'Ordonnance d'exercice deployed bataillons were intended to provide the firepower of the grand formation and columns were only intended for; assembling, the passage of lines, or for rallying troops before and during action…

If the French would have made the l'Ordonnance de 1791 their l'Ordonnance de tactique, and followed it to the letter, then they would have fought strictly in the same manner as the British and Prussians prior to 1812.

Best Regards as always.

Very Respectfully
Art

Dear M. Seroga et Hans – Karl,

I am certain you both are very knowledgeable on the campaign of Poland. Therefore I should like to know what you have both learned of the Battle of Pultusk.

I do not need to know about the battle, for that I have plenty of sources on it, which was a brilliant engagement for the Russians.

But what information do any of you both have on the French en colonne and their tactical use in the battle itself.

I know that Davout's leading bataillons were formed en demi-bataillon with 50 meters separation en echelon which is in accordance to their military system…

Very Respectfully
Art

Was there anything particularly noteworthy about being formed in half-battalions? I mean, more to it than the Brits doing it at Waterloo?

Regards

All,

In the early Napoleonic years the French swarms of skirmishers, taking full advantage of the ground to avoid losses, warmly engaged the defender's infantry at effective ranges. Small columns, usually battalions in columns of companies, followed the skirmishers just beyond the effective range of the enemy's rifles. When the defender's lines had been sufficiently shaken by the skirmisher's fire, these columns of attack marched through their skirmishers and assaulted with the bayonet. Not only did the steady advance of such columns have a depressing moral effect on the defenders, but like a massed formation at football, the column was prepared to break down the enemy's resistance and penetrate his formations, by the sheer shock and weight of the deep mass.

In the column, too, once started, the whole tendency was to go on; the more timid were carried ahead by the close contact and example of their braver companions, and the officers had their men close at hand and under easy control. For the weapon of this period, these dispositions of the French constituted an excellent compromise in the constant conflict between requirements for fire effect and for shock action. (Figure 1.) shows the formation of St. Hilaire's division at Austerlitz in 1805, when the French Army, in training, skill, and discipline reached its high mark.

After 1806, the quality of the French troops rather steadily deteriorated as a consequence of shorter periods of training, and the inclusion in the ranks of half-hearted recruits from the conquered countries. With this decrease in quality, came a diminished ability to skirmish, which depends so much upon the training, skill, and character of the individual soldier. Accordingly, battles were more and more decided by the shock action of great columns of attack, in which the unwilling recruit could be herded forward by his officers and comrades.

The use of heavy columns by the French culminated in the remarkable formation of Macdonalds corps at Wagram, which is, perhaps, the most famous column of attack mentioned in military history. Eight battalions were deployed in line, one behind another at close distance, while on the right flank six, and on the left flank seven, battalions were formed in heavy column, each battalion in close column by division. The rear of the square was closed with cavalry. This column broke the Austrian line, though at the cost of enormous losses on its own part. (Wagner 0. & T., p. 89.) See
fig.2.)

v/r,

Chris

From another TMP post on the effectiveness of Firepower!

von Winterfeldt 13 Jun 2012 3:25 a.m. PST

Demian : Anleitung zum Selbst-Studium der militärischen Wissenschaft. Für Offiziere der k.k. österreichischen Armee, Erster Theil : Wafenlehre, Wien 1807

„ If one is looking into the usual instruction of the firing and its true purpose, which should be to hit an hostile item, one finds that these instructions are teaching precisely the non hitting, because :

1. Up to now the line infantry was not trained to fire at an aim. And still aiming is an art, which like others has to be learned and practised; if this is not the case then hitting would be at random. The line infantry man therefore must be taught and must practise when his shots should hit.
2. One is aiming (technically joue, schlagt an, in English maybe arm) always at the half man, without taking into account the different distances and terrain, despite according to the closer or farer distances, also the difference in terrain, demands a higher or lower aiming.
3. The man is pushed for quickness. One has tried to increase with the number of shots also the effect of the fire, and one was giving a lot effort to make the soldier fire seven to ten times per minute. However the experience teaches us that the soldier is shooting worse the quicker he loads, and that all speed and skill in loading is useless without proper aiming. Because not the skill [in loading] but the hitting makes the firing effective. The push for speed at aiming means to train them and use them to shot in the air. And to that already wrong instruction for firing one has to add the natural fear of the man, by which aiming in the heat of battle is almost impossible. Who was in a fire fight without noticing that in this moment the soldier is acting as a machine, that means he loads his gun, shots in the air, loads again and thinks less to damage the enemy than more to distract himself by the work to ban all thought of fear which are surrounding him in this moment. As soon as the soldier is seeing the enemy he wants to start to shoot being afraid that the other will overtake him in that and only few officers have the power to restrain their soldiers, or when they are able to do this they have not the knowledge about the shooting distance of the gun or to judge the distances. In case however the soldier is not lacking in cold blood and deliberation in a serious fire fight, and he is not acting as a machine, so alone because of the disorder and pushing for quickness, which is usual in a fire fight, is preventing to let him think about aiming. The experience teaches that the soldier is hardly listening at the commands of his officer in this critical moment and that every body as soon as he finished loading wants to shot. When one is closing the pan, the other is working with the ramrod, the third is making ready, the forth is arming and the fifth pulls the trigger. Is one taking into account the disorder which is caused by the falling of the dead, and the retreat of the wounded, as the quite dense smoke of powder which is enveloping the men, so it is impossible to expect that a sure shot can happen. Yes, even the best Jäger (marksmen, sharp shooters expert to hit with a shot, so to speak Hessian, Austrian, Prussian Jäger units) as soon as they would have to fire in rank and file, they would not hit better by the ruling constriction and disorder than the usual line infantry man."

Demian page 34 to 37

So – in the end it would depend on the tactical formation.

Dear Chris

Quite often when you translate the name of a military formation into another language, they frequently may need to have them explained when translated.

As an example what are the following formations:

"small columns"
"battalions in columns of companies"
"heavy columns"

Also I do not know where to find (Figure 1.) that shows the formation of St. Hilaire's division at Austerlitz in 1805.

As for Macdonalds colonne vuide, it was used by both Russians and British as well, and M. Seroga did an excellent job explaining about the Russians en colonne vuide commanded by General Neverovskiy which successfully fought off 30 to 40 French cavalry charges, at the Battle of at Krasne (Krasnoie, Krasnoye) in August 1812.

You will find M. Seroga's posting on the colonne vuide in the "Russian Battalion Columns 1811-1814" Topic.

Very Respectfully
Art

Art,

That portion of text with the figures can be found in Google books "NOTES ON INFANTRY, CAVALRY and FIELD ARTILLERY".

LECTURES DELIVERED TO CLASS OF PROVISIONAL SECOND LIEUTENANTS

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANS

PART I

NOTES ON INFANTRY LECTURE DELIVERED JANUARY 29, 1917
By MAJ. H. B. FISKE

Pg's 8, 9.

I tried to find it again but Google Books says the link is broken. I'll send the PDF copy I downloaded to your e-mail address! I attempted to post the figures here, but they did not work thus the deleted link.

PS: My numbers above were based on a double company column width being 40 men x 2 = 80 man frontage (but possible to 50 men which would = 100) x 3 = 240 men if companies were placed parallel to one another, instead of ducks in a row. Thus a 240 man wide frontage with NCO's and Ofc's placed between companies. This of course also goes into all the variables mentioned above and time frame (1792 -1815) being most prominent. Did a bad job explaining I believe, but if one draws it out on paper they'll see.

I also have a thesis on the Polish campaign that I'll send to you as well!

Cheers,

Chris

My numbers above were based on a double company column width being 40 men x 2 = 80 man frontage (but possible to 50 men which would = 100) x 3 = 240 men if companies were placed parallel to one another, instead of ducks in a row. Thus a 240 man wide frontage with NCO's and Ofc's placed between companies.

If you place three double-companies next to each other, isn't that a line?

All,

Yes! The preferred attack deployment!

(Once again dependent upon the type of deployment of the co formation? As Art show's their were numerous variations) What about "l'order mixte" column, line, column. Weren't a Bn's companies to form off of the center co? So I have two companies on each side (r/l) one behind the other and the center in line. Which Napoleon preferred. Or six companies in parallel, or 2 , 2, 2 (240, 240, 240) strong each, 6 ranks total would have a frontage of 120 – 150, or if eight companies 160 – 200 wide front, or a stubbier line. Once again behind skirmishers with Ofc's and Nco's between them to appear as a solid line/wall.

So 8 – 9 companies total, which based on numbers above would come to 1050 w/ ofc's/nco's in earlier revolutionary period 1790's (research states avg 1100 wartime, 700 peacetime).

Which as Art and posts above also mention, the column was not the desired attack formation. So with six companies in parallel (3/4 double co columns, not necessarily closed up tight, nut to butt) with ofc's and nco's spaced between them, or the center companies in line (3rd rank deployed as skirmishers), or extra 2 co's deployed as skirmishers, plus the grenadier co there's more than enough in a French Bn to try and match a 600 man (300 man line frontage). That's merely what I was/and am trying to convey here, (An alternative).

Think about it for a second. As a commander would you line up 1100 men (with an 80 man front) in a row of ducks and then try and assault a line? (Note: Probably what Davout and Menuier professed as to why there was not enough mass later with 6 company Bn's). Skirmishers however were trained to shoot for the enemies Ofc's and Nco's, cmd structure.

Small columns, usually battalions in columns of companies, followed the skirmishers just beyond the effective range of the enemy's rifles. When the defender's lines had been sufficiently shaken by the skirmishers fire, these columns of attack marched through their skirmishers and assaulted with the bayonet.

Not only did the steady advance of such columns have a depressing moral effect on the defenders, but like a massed formation at football, the column was prepared to break down the enemy's resistance and penetrate his formations, by the sheer shock and weight of the deep mass.

Can you show me it's not possible? It's often stated by historians that the regulations were a guideline only (column designed mostly for maneuver), not necessarily what was commonly practice on the battlefield as this was common knowledge/practice (not written down for posterity by those who were in the know).

I'm not trying to be obtuse here, or argumentative/ devils advocate, but if I put my Bn behind yours in the same parallel columns, (or besides yours which is what everyone is saying and understands here and agrees upon) there would be no reason as to why you could not deploy your columns in such a manor. I was both an enlisted man and Ofc in the U.S. Army RANGER's and Special Forces which teach to think out of the box.

And so thinking about it in a 1Bn vs. 1Bn wargaming perspective (which I always see portrayed with the often repeated British line, always defeated French column myth that's represented). There's no way in Hell I'd line my Bn in a column (ducks in a row) 80 man wide frontage and attempt to assault a 300 man line (600 men firing just not good logical sense). I'd try to match the enemy's frontage, or exceed it. In three lines I would feel stronger and the men would feal more secure as well.

From my admittedly less well-read understanding, I would like to add to and corroborate Mr. Pendragon's comments about this idea of deploying from column in range of the enemy's muskets. For the Russians 1811 and later, I have never known of such being the intended evolution. I recall even as early as Survarov's complaints about Emperor's Paul's "School" of 1796/1798 that such notions as performing various evolutions in the face of the enemy's fires were among the "scatterbrained ideas written by drunken monkeys who were unfit to command a Platoon on Guard Duty at the Okhotsk Powder Works" (I don't remember the exact Suvarov wording, but it was somthing like that, and in mangled Russian and French mixed together).

And no historically I haven't proven this possible theory (I haven't dove in that deep to read French contemporary/primary sources, not English interpretations, and historians misinterpretations that have been perpetuated over the centuries as Art mentions), but from some of readings I've seen/read in English it does sound possible! And it hasn't been 100% disproven/not plausible either!

Small columns, usually battalions in columns of companies, followed the skirmishers just beyond the effective range of the enemy's rifles. When the defender's lines had been sufficiently shaken by the skirmishers fire, these columns of attack marched through their skirmishers and assaulted with the bayonet.

Hope this is an even clearer explanation! Cheers,

Chris

Grognard1789,
If you can find an example of a French battalion formed in order mixte or with 3/4 double company columns en bataille, please post it.

As to not assaulting a 300 man frontage battalion in line with an 80 man wide column, that is what many French commanders did. If you have evidence that the French tried one of your fantasy formations, please post it.