"Borodino: Davout's bad idea of a flank attack?" Topic

If the French had lost at the Berezina, then no one would have come out of Russia.

As it was, Napoleon defeated two Russian armies at the Berezina and the French retreat continued.

Which French general 'abandoned his corp(s)…and staggered into the French lines'? I don't recall any French corps commander doing this.

From where did Napoleon 'run in shame'?

Sincerely,
K

Who captured the supplies at Minsk?

Davout and his Ist Corps cutting Bagrations communications! But he was French. I don't see where your trying to go with this unless your refering to events during the retreat in November. That was two months after Borodino.

Remember the war ended with Cossacks camping in Paris…

I was going to ask what Berezina had to do with Borodino but you've already whisked us off to Paris.
I don't care if you have a different opinions about the campaigns, its one of the benefits of TMP. But pontificating about some off the top of your head idea then suggesting that others have read nothing, except perhaps "War and Peace" and could do with watching an informed video!
Actually I've begun laughing to myself while writing this. Ignore me please go ahead. :oP

Which French general 'abandoned his corp(s)…and staggered into the French lines'? I don't recall any French corps commander doing this.

Ha ha I'm guessing he's refering to Ney. You know the one that Napoleon referred to as the Bravest of the Brave. Think he is suggesting a name change. Perhaps Abandoner of the Abandoned. :o)

I share in general 1968billsfan's opinions.
Reading the series of memoires – edited by Mikaberidze and his book about Borodino and the Berezina – I realized how political a lot of the Russian generals were, political in the sense to gain victory for themselves – even in letting down other generals to accomplish this.
Barclay de Tolly executed just the Russian master plan, to which the Russian emperor agreed, but he could not do this in open public, there again the political mind demanded a battle to defend Russian cities and soil.
Also the constant retreats had a bad effect on the morale of the Russian Army.
In the end the Russians just did the right thing.
At the Berezina, along with a bit of good will from Wittgenstein and Kutusov – the Napoleonic Wars could have ended in 1812 and not in 1815.
It was a French and Allied success – but it was paid with the loss of the last fighting structers of the Grand Armée.

Yes Von Winterfeldt I don't think anyone is disagreeing how the campaign panned out or that it was a deliberate strategy adopted by the Russians. Its his assertions of 3-5 year plans etc and supporting these points by reverse engineering history eg Cossack Ponies in Paris= "I'm right a 3-5 year plan (that means 1815 to 1817)existed and suggesting anyone who disagrees is therefore unread". But again we looking at Borodino and if the Russians had won there then I'm guessing wouldn't have abandoned Moscow. Its not that different a strategy than the one adopted in 1813. Avoid Napoleon, avoid Napoleon, Leipzig, pursue, pursue.
I'm saying 1812 went.
Avoid Napoleon, Smolensk, avoid Napoleon, Kustov replaces Barclay, avoid Napoleon, Borodino, abandon Moscow, pursue, snow, pursue, Scary Cossacks, Ney wanders into tavern

Maxshadow
You can't seem to see that there was a continuation of strategy by the Russians for the entire period from the original invasion to the final fleeing of Napoleon from Russia. It was to avoid a battle of annihilation, keep the core of the army intact, attack the flanks, wear out the French and wait for the build up of Russian forces. Russia did not have the financial resources to build and maintain a super-sized army constantly, so the large scale troop raising had to await the invasion, followed by training, equipping and travel to the front. The strategy of not directly meeting Napoleon in an annihilation battle was continued by the allies into 1813 and 1814 if you would care to look. Any army faced directly by Napoleon would retreat, but faced by other marchalls, they would advance. The lack of a flank attack at Borindino is the result of a realization by Napoleon, that the Russians would scoot away at the hint of an annihilation battle. It happened before during that campaign, it happened thereafter (e.g.Battle of Malojaroslawez, the "Golden Escort" back to Poland).

The Russians started to analyse how Napoleon waged his campaings from 1807 onwards and came up with clever ideas how to deal with this, Fabry deals with this in his volume one
Fabry : Campagne de Russie 1812, Paris 1900 – volume 1, available on google for free.
One clearly sees how much the Russinas out thought Napoléon – and the whole campaign prooved the the French emperor was at his wits end how to deal with it.
Napoléon wanted a decisisve battle, the Russians presented seemingly this at Borodino, for that reason he went to it – even frontally.
As 1968billsfan rightly pointed out, the terrain was quite unknown to Napoléon – so he did not risk a flank attack but concentrated his forces.

So I'm off to a tropical paradise for the next week. So in summation here of mypoints for you to disparage while I'm photographing coloured fish or being eaten by sharks.
1. i still think Davout was right and that it would have saved many casualties on the day.
2. Davouts plan would have improved the effectiveness of following up the Russian retreat because the French Cavalry would have been fresher and have had more day light because the retreat would have started earlier.
3.1968billsfan assertion that the Russians were following a 3-5 year plan has never appeared in any history book.
4.1968billsfan suggested (please, Russia, die to the last man, destroy Napoleon and your country and leave us to pick up the pieces cheaply and for no expenses on our part) That sounds pretty bitter are there any references for that or just your opinion
5.1968billsfan assertion that "HINT: they had been fighting the Swedes and the Turks and crushed Napoleons line of communication and his northern and southern lines of attack)." Just didn't happen. During the advance it was the French that kept performing pincer attacks against the Russian lines of communication. No crushing. There were plenty of Russian attacks on his communications during the retreat.
6.1968billsfan reference to A French general abandoned his corp, sneaked through the woods and staggered into the French lines, is a clumsy reference to Ney, and is unfair.
7.1968billsfan said strategy by the Russians for the entire period from the original invasion to
No the Russians retreated because they were out numbered and their armies split. Alexander planed to meet and defeat Napoleon at Drissa. He didn't want to give up his western provinces Bennigsen saw the defences and said they were the "most disadvantageous position I have ever seen" The position was abandoned. The plan was put up by Von Pfuel and i believe was to originally have included a flank attack by Bagration.
8.1968billsfan your constant reference to "battles of annihilation" that the Russians would scoot away at the hint of an annihilation battle ignores the very sensible tactic under taken by most defeated armies, to retreat. The Russian lost at Borodino and retreated. Not exactly a new tactic. Same as Smolensk.
9.1968billsfan The strategy of not directly meeting Napoleon in an annihilation battle was continued by the allies into 1813 No the tactic was to avoid Napoleon all together and it was proposed by Bernadotte. I've never read a history book that suggested it was a Russian idea. In fact if I hadn't mentioned it myself I doubt you would have even thought of it.
10.

As 1968billsfan rightly pointed out, the terrain was quite unknown to Napoléon

It was Sparker that pointed out the broken terrian and is the only point made that makes me suspect that Napoleon might have been right and not Davout. BTW they had eyes and telescopes

Mr.1968bilsfan took my atention when you wrote:

"Remember the war ended with Cossacks camping in Paris and Napoleon running in shame to throw himself at the mercy of the British, (who had just traversed the Pyrenees against minor resistance)."

"Minor resistance" at the Battle of the Pyrenees by the french?
In that battle, by memory, Wellington Army lost more than 7 thousand men.
Then at San Marcial and Vera Wellington Army lost another 1500/2000 or so.
Not counting the site of San Sebartian with another 3000 casualties from Wellington Army.

Wellington had to managed against Soult Army with any "minor resistance" imho to traverse the Pyrenees.

Amicalement
Armand

Maxshadow:

Bon appétit ! Sharks!!!

:)

Yeah, sharks will eat anything!

I have found very intersting and informative

link

and the book.

Russia Against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace [Hardcover]
Dominic Lieven (Author)

link

You can buy a used copy for $2.19 USD US. It is a great buy and if you read it with an open mind, a lot of the "unfantomable Russian actions" become pretty self-evident. At $2.19 USD a copy, I hope the Board Nazi's don't think I'm shilling a commercial enterprise.

"Remember the war ended with Cossacks camping in Paris"

Also, Kalmyks, Bashkirs and all sorts of folks, even some Russians.

I have a young friend, an attorney for a Moscow-based investment bank, and a devout Buddhist. He is of Buryat and Mongol heritage. No one can really pronouce his Mongol name, so we all call him "Sasha".

One of his ancestors is said to have brought back a French heavy cavalry sabre, supposedly from Paris. It is at the shrine with the ancestor's name tablet at their temple in Buryatia. It is marked to Klingenthal for 1810. Looked real to me.

@1968billsfan
I don't think you can make or change people's opinions. If we are lucky we can share sources and information. But if someone believes "such and such" – they likely always will continue to do so.

Cool old prints link
(Not sugggested for buying – I have no commercial relation – but the "click to see larger" are views with pretty good resolution and the descriptions are in English.)

This concept that the Russians were following some kind of master plan from 1812-1814, or even 1815, has not been evidenced, and, I suspect, stems from a misreading of Lieven's excellent book 'Russia against Napoleon'.

In this book, which I heartily recommend, BTW, Lieven makes the point that his work is the first to look holistically at the way the Russian army grew and developed in its operational art from 1812-1814, seamlessley tracking progress from 1812 through 1813 to 1814.

However, whilst, with hindsight, he skillfully traces a convincing path of improvement and development over that time, this is a million miles from suggesting that they had a blueprint for victory right from 1812!

Granted there was some skilful clearing of the decks prior to the invasion with the Treaty of Bucharest, etc, but the 1812 campaign was fought entirely in reaction to French Initiatives, right up to and including the Berezina.

Indeed, formally planned moves and fortifications were repeatedly abandoned. The operational strategy referred to above whereby an army threatened directly by Napoleon would retreat, and others continue to advance, was not thrashed out with the Coaltion partners until the Spring 1813 armistice.

As 1968billsfan rightly pointed out, the terrain was quite unknown to Napoléon

It was Sparker that pointed out the broken terrian and is the only point made that makes me suspect that Napoleon might have been right and not Davout.

Aw shucks! However, I stand on the shoulders of giants! Mikerabdze writes a detailed and convincing argument of why N was right to not take up Davout on his flank idea.

In reference to a comment above that Napoleon should have been able to pick up his telescope and see that there was little (sic) on the Russian left flank……

That section of the world is gently rolling, but cut up with a lot of ravines, streams, depressions and small forest on a lot of the slightly higher ground. There are no "general's hills".

panoramio.com/photo/4601935

link

Be advised that the "realistic" paintings of the time were usually done by artist who never saw the battlefield. They wanted to show a grand sweeping view of large groups of noble troops. Often they showed in one painting, scenes which were miles apart and several grand assults that took place many hours apart. If they had to put a mountain on the battle field, in it went.

Also, note that most of the photographs are taken from the highest possible vantage point- many times artificaully constracted after the battle in order to place a monument where it can be seen from the largest possible area.

In actuality, there were beacoup Cossack regiments present to keep French light horse from poking around. The initial attacks also found a lot of Russian jaegers to wade through. Not a good or certain start for a war-winning sweeping right hook!

Sparker, I am inclined to agree with you about there not being a hidden "master plan", which was followed. I think what happened, just happened because there was no alternative to the "retreat and wear out" policy. Earlier, Austerlitz indicated that Napoleon would be difficult to beat in a pitched battle (even on the Austrian national army training ground!). The Russian attempts at Eylau and Friedland showed who the master was there. There was no sense in fighting a pitched battle at the frontier, nor was there an ability to concentrate, nor was there much to fight for in that poor provence. Some thoughts about fighting from an entrenched camp at Drissia were discovered to be senseless (there was no real stopper defensive position against such a big French army). Mobilizing the manpower from distant areas of the Russain empire required a lot of time, for drafting, organization, supplying, and marching to the theater. Disentangling from the Swedish and Turkish wars happened fairly quickly, but it still required time to get these forces into play- giving more reason for a delay. All these things were obvious to most of the Russian leaders… I think that it was an organic evolution more than a clever, hidden, secret plan.

A further point for people to thing about is that there was a prior history and template for an invasion of Russian from the west and how to defeat it. About a century before (also in the era of gunpowder but with hand-cannon muskets just starting to replace the push of pike)

One brief simple summary is at:
link

Basically, Charles got his army lost and eventually defeated in the vastness of Russia. Napoleon is said to have a copy of Voltaire's History of Charles XII on his night stand for the entire campaign. I hope people would give the Russians credit for also remembering their history and "what worked last time". It is unreasonable to think that this information and the concept would be well grounded amoung the Russian leaders and not need explicit explaination? I think so.

'This concept that the Russians were following some kind of master plan from 1812-1814, or even 1815, has not been evidenced, and, I suspect, stems1 from a misreading of Lieven's excellent book 'Russia against Napoleon'.'

"This concept"? "This concept"!? – the only thing that's been said is that the Russians were preparing for a 3-5 year war and that there was a "continuation of strategy". Both well supported by Lieven. Well, at least you read his book. And didn't claim anything as egregiously stupid as it "never appeared in any history book".

There was a general outlay of strategy to deal with Napoléon's art of war, this was not invented by Lieven, but already well known over a 100 years ago, as pointed out, just read the introduction of Fabry (a French officer) who is discussion those plans (and how they changed) well.
After 1807 the Russians prepeared themselves for the next campaign against Napoléon, which they knew that it would come, sooner or later.

Fabry book can be found at:

link

does anyone know of an English translation?

You can't seem to see that there was a continuation of strategy by the Russians for the entire period from the original invasion to the final fleeing of Napoleon from Russia.

'This concept that the Russians were following some kind of master plan from 1812-1814, or even 1815, has not been evidenced, and, I suspect, stems1 from a misreading of Lieven's excellent book 'Russia against Napoleon'.'

"This concept"? "This concept"!? – the only thing that's been said is that the Russians were preparing for a 3-5 year war and that there was a "continuation of strategy". Both well supported by Lieven. Well, at least you read his book. And didn't claim anything as egregiously stupid as it "never appeared in any history book".

@ Hew – I really can't see why you are so distressed at my equating 'master plan' with 'continuation of strategy', and frankly I don't care.

But I would rather you kept your patronising comments about not being 'egregiously stupid' to yourself…

Armand,

To get back to the original posting, I don't agree with Lieven's assessment of Davout's proposal for a flank attack.

First, it wasn't a turning movement to get into the Russian rear, but a flank attack to roll up the Russian left.

There would have been a frontal attack also to pin the Russians in position. Davout's proposal reminds me of his attack at Eylau and Ney's abortive first attack at Friedland, in February and June 1807, respectively.

I also don't agree with Lieven's assessment that Napoleon didn't have the troops to spare for Davout's proposal. To my mind, it would have undoubtedly would have worked.

I don't agree with the assessment that the Russian jagers would have fought as well as the French in broken terrain. Lieven's information on the quality of the Russian jagers in 1812 backs this up, as does the information in the Zhmodikovs' books on Russian tactics.

Too much credit is given the Russians by Lieven, though I believe his work to be excellent overall. Much of his information on Russian intelligence, who knew what when, the Russian decision to go to war with France as early as 1810, and the initial Russian plan that revolved around the Drissa camp is not new to Lieven's work. Clausewitz talks about it in his work on the campaign, and it was discussed in English language texts as early as 1964.

Sincerely,
Kevin

As for the idea that Ney abandoned his corps on the retreat, that is nonsense. He was cut off, was rescued by Eugene and both Ney and his survivors were brought back by Eugene to the main army.

Sincerely,
K

Dear Kevin, many thanks for your guidance.
I agree that Lieven book is excelent, but with a cleary pro-russian point of view.
Specially in the years 1813/14.
I would post in the near future more quotes of him to debate here.

About Ney… well I think it was a mistake to said he abandoned his troops.
Anybody who had read about the Russian campaing knows why he deserves there the tittle of the "Brave of the Bravest" accepted even by the own Tzar.

Amicalement
Armand

Hi,
I have to agree with Glenn's assessment on page 1 and Kevin's above. If Davout suggested it, it would likely have been both possible and sucessful. In hindsight, there is little if anything to second-guess in any of Davout's decisions and actions during the whole of his career. No commander at his level or above in any army was so perfect in execution troughout his career, Napoleon included.
It seems to me less likely that this battle would have been the one exception, more likely by far that the maneuver would have been more effective to some degree than what actually occured.

GQG
napoleoniccampaigns.com

I am not convinced that the "Davout suggested it so it must have been a good idea" approach really holds up in any sort of analytical framework.

Having walked the Borodino battlefield, I am aware that the terrain in that area is rather difficult and would probably both disorganise any flank attack and assist resistance to such an attack. Examination of contemporary maps shows that it was even more difficult then than now.

Kevin, on what basis do you assume that "it undoubtedly would have worked"? Given the performance of the two armies on the day, I can see little to support such a confident and sweeping statement.

@colinjallen

If I may suggest, without offense I beg of you?

Statements of faith, belief, judgement or opinion (canonically delivered as confident "sweeping statements") often fail to hold up under close analysis, and often lack support except from others who will share the same faith, belief, judgement or opinion.

To apply close analysis or to seek unbiased support in such cases …. well, this can often be a wasted effort. When you ask for "support", you just get more of the same.

And indeed, are we not all entitled to our faiths, beliefs, judgements and opinions? Especially with regard to a hypothetical question?

Seroga,

Indeed we are all entitled to them but such statements need to be supported if they are to have any validity beyond that of mere faith, belief and opinion.

If someone states that a particular strategy would, to their mind, have worked, they should be able to provide some basis of support for it.

I agree with Collinjallen – the Davout suggested it and therefore it must have been a good idea – is a very weak argument.
All that is based on speculation, one seemingly always and always and always ignores the reaction on the other side – here the Russians.
They would have been aware of any out flanking in grand style and would do counter measures.
Napoléon, according to Mikaberidze, despite having a map and a telescope even misread the distance of the Rusian field fortifications and a lot of his artillery was placed initially too far to the rear and the shots fell short.
There is no basis that an outflanking would have worked – how could it be – all of that is pure speculation.

10th Marines

28 May 2012 8:06 a.m. PST

Armand,

To get back to the original posting, I don't agree with Lieven's assessment of Davout's proposal for a flank attack.

First, it wasn't a turning movement to get into the Russian rear, but a flank attack to roll up the Russian left.

There would have been a frontal attack also to pin the Russians in position. Davout's proposal reminds me of his attack at Eylau and Ney's abortive first attack at Friedland, in February and June 1807, respectively.

I also don't agree with Lieven's assessment that Napoleon didn't have the troops to spare for Davout's proposal. To my mind, it would have undoubtedly would have worked.

I don't agree with the assessment that the Russian jagers would have fought as well as the French in broken terrain. Lieven's information on the quality of the Russian jagers in 1812 backs this up, as does the information in the Zhmodikovs' books on Russian tactics.

Too much credit is given the Russians by Lieven, though I believe his work to be excellent overall. Much of his information on Russian intelligence, who knew what when, the Russian decision to go to war with France as early as 1810, and the initial Russian plan that revolved around the Drissa camp is not new to Lieven's work. Clausewitz talks about it in his work on the campaign, and it was discussed in English language texts as early as 1964.

Sincerely,
Kevin,

Kevin,
there is another thread which discusses the quality of the Russian jagers, their organization, their prior service and their training.

TMP link

I don't agree that the French were far superior, but rather that all the advantages in the "little war" were with the Russians.

Well, "Davout suggested it, and therefore it must be a good idea" is not a argument, and of course it would be weak if classified as such. It is an opinion, and should not be measured as an argument. Nothing in war is certain, no hindsight can possibly be definative. No-one can say, for example, that the Russians would have a 100% chance of interpreting and being able to react efectivly to a flanking maneuver, or that anything would undoubtedly work either way. No such statements could be considered measured arguments backed by evidence- there is none.

As I suggested prior, I think it comes down to who's plan you would bet on that day to produce better results- Napoleon or Davout. You could make an argument, based on past and future performance, that Davout was a better bet, his plan more likely to produce a better outcome. If I was to bet, I would bet the Davout horse, as there is some evidence the Napoleon horse wasn't in top physical or mental form.

The position of Davout at Eylau cannot be compared at all with that at Borodino – or with Ney at Friedland.

Napoleon did concentrate his forces in the center before the battle of Borodino.

How long would it take to re – arrange his whole army?

Military units are no counters on a map which can be pushed around easily – and again – he wanted to have a main battle – at all costs.

There is also some evidence (I will get the citations later as I am not near the sources at the moment) that the French were not sure of the location of the Russian left flank as there were too many cossacks lurking around. It is quite difficult to be reasonably sure of rolling up a flank when you know neither where that flank is nor what it consists of.

I myself do not think it is at all likely that Davout would have suggested a plan to Napoleon that he did not believe:

A) Was worth the risk given the alternatives
B) Was a maneuver that his officers and men were capble of carrying out with an acceptable risk of succes in execution.
C) Would compromise the goal of defeating the Russians in place.

It is probably important to remember that Davout's staff/commanders and intelligence/scouting aparatus were the best of the best. This is a commander who, in his time, did not need a satellite to know what was ahead of him or around the corner in such close proximity to the enemy. I would bet he knew the ground before he made the suggestion.
Given examination of the Marshall's track record of situational awareness, judgement, timing, and execution, and absent of any real evidence to base an argument on that would contradict Davout's judgement, assuming he, not I, was the more expert, informed and qualified man on the spot, I would think it highly likely that (again, given analysis of the alternatives facing him, and the hindsight of quantifiable results of the actual battle)his plan was a viable and potentially more succesful one than Napoleon actually executed himself. I think it's a good bet!
However- I think its worth mentioning that it may never have been a serious suggestion in the first place- how do we really know if it was?

The river ran from the french left-center to the Russian right flank. By attacking in the center Napoleon drove the Russians away from the river, giving them room to manuever. By attacking from the right flank he would have been driving them toward the river, funneling their retreating troops and increasing congestion and confusion behind their lines.

Grand Quartier General

"In hindsight, there is little if anything to second-guess in any of Davout's decisions and actions during the whole of his career.

Please provide information about the recon that French Superman Davout performed around the Russian left flank.

You will be the first person in history to supply this information.

Sorry, he was blind about what was and could be there. Please reference the confusion of the Polish forces that moved in that direction. That was an exploratory attack.

In my opinion, your format of writing is an indication that you are banking on a French admiration, rather than any knowledge or facts.

But we have fun arguing all this don't we!!!

Hello Billsfan,
Well, again, simply, my suggestion is that I don't know what Davout knew or didn't know for certain, and neither does anyone else- would we know of Marbot's recon across the Danube if he had not survived the wars to write about it? Do we even know the truth about that? Was the Polish confusion due to a lack of understanding by Davout, or any one of a dozen possible communication issues? We don't know what any of a dozen officers who could have done recon could have told him about the area. We weren't there, we don't know what he knew, we can only guess. I did not say, if you will refer to what I wrote above, that I KNEW a recon had taken place. I said that I would bet he knew enough to propose the plan with some confidence of success, based on the man and the men he commanded. That is obviously an opinion, a bet, not a factual statement. He had a very reliable track record. THAT we do know. Would I bet on his instincts? Yes. Would I have faith in his ability to assess the viability of his proposed attack? Again Yes.
Again, I am saying I feel is simply a question of who would you have bet on given a choice of the two plans? I should think that my intent would be easy to see, without my having to delineate my previous posts.
By the way, my "format of writing" does not include an agenda,or pandering or solicitation of others agreement to make an argument, nor am I biased in any way towards the French, per say. I am not sure how one "banks on admiration" to make an argument otherwise, but I am not arguing facts, at any rate, just making a judgement based on my sense of those two generals on that day.
I wonder if I need less for Davout to be a "Superman" than you seem to wish him not to be!
I am disappointed that you feel the need to disparage my lack of knowledge and facts in argument, having not been able to glean as yet that I am not making a referenced, factual argument. My musings about which plan I would have bet on myself are simple enough. I would have bet on Davout's plan to work out better to some degree than the one that Napoleon used. I might have lost the hypothetical bet.
Perhaps you want to argue that I would have lost that bet? If so, please refrain from being unnecessarily contentious or provocative, and just stick to your personal interpretations of the "facts", as it is your right and privilege to do here.

Okay, sorry for leaning in the direction of an attack mode. I still think that Davout was proposing something without having any data about the terrain's viability or the enemy's location around that flank. I think you are clearly were saying that(cf:

I have to agree with Glenn's assessment on page 1 and Kevin's above. If Davout suggested it, it would likely have been both possible and sucessful. In hindsight, there is little if anthing…..

) [1 thesis]he suggested it, and [2 antithesis] implied fact #2 is he was a great French general and would not have suggested it if he didn't have the recon work done therefore [3 synthesis], they had good knowledge of the condition of the Russian left flank.

It would have taken a minor battle to get that information. The Poles and their right flank attack ran into a minor buzzsaw when they did advance, so its unlikely that they had recon out for a look-see. I think at that if there was a hold-on-the-center pinning attack with a strong right hook attack, then at that point the Russians would been turned out of the Borondino position but would have fought in front of Moscow and in Moscow. The French & Russians would be bloodied and the campaign would have ended in much the same manner as it did. My opinion is that Napoleon preferred a battle of attack in the countryside rather than in a built up area with houses, monistaries, fortresses for defensive use.

Many westernized Russians would have liked a classic battle for victory. They wrote and spoke a lot in western languages and I imagine are given more weight in the histories than they actually had in shaping Russian policy. Most Russians realized that they would not be defeated if they did not lose the veteran core of their army; whereas,the French could not afford a multi-year campaign with their restless conquered "allies", the British/Spanish/Portuguese in the field as well as intrigue in Paris.

I disagree with your second sentence, as I don't think that was his stye or proclivity. I stand by my previous opinion as posted.

"Napoleon has frequently been criticized for turning down Davout's suggestion. It certainly promised a much more decicive outcome that a direct attack against fortified positions. So what made him reject it? Davout's idea called for detaching two entire corps (I and V)- some 40,000 men – and Napoleon was naturally reluctant to commit half his infantry to this manoeuvre, since it would have weakened his position. In addition, the manoeuvre would have been performed during the night and, as Gourgaud observed, it is well known how hazardous such marches are amde through a wooded and unknown tract of country and alomst without a guide. (…) Russian historian Bogdanovich sharded this sentiment.
p. 69
to learn much more read :

Mikaberidze, Alwxander : The Battle of Borodino, Barnsley 2007.

in my view it would be suicidal to rearrange during the night the whole ordre de bataille of the Grande Armée, and then lead 40,000 men into the woods.

Also – again – the Russians would not have idly watched.

As an afterthought, I am not sure that inferring Davouts understanding of the situation based on the what we think we know of the Polish experience is necessarily a good framework for analysis, and projecting the likelyhood of success or failure of the proposed flanking maneuver from their experience, at one extreme, could never be a better a bet than predicting the victor at Marengo would have been, based on the situation in the middle of the afternoon. Might have beens are opinions, and adding up "facts" as we think we know them during a battle does not mean we will arrive at a correct summation. The number of roundshot in the coffers of the park, counted, written in the hand of the officer there, and preserved as an original document is a fact. Even with the certainty of knowing it is twice the number the enemy has, we should be unwise to predict a victory for the artillery -Particulary if we know the other commander has never been beaten.

Hi von Winterfeltd,
I think your observations are very good, and make a lot of sense when you think about why Napoleon rejected the idea. I think it is fair to say it could have been disasterous, as much as it is fair to say so many battles of the time could have been, based on general understandings of what armies could or could not do. Some turned out that way, some didn't!

Dear GQH,

Indeed the maréchal Davout was of the highest operational skill, and indeed he made every effort during the Russian campaign to have good tactical recon.

But there were real problems in Russia that are revealed in his correspndence and the various events of the advance to Borodino.

Some quick examples :
- His right flank was initially to be scouted by Latour-Marburg, but after the defeats at Mir and Romanov (where the Cossacks played havoc with the Polish lancers), Davout lost touch with his screen. He had to take one of two chasseurs-à-cheval regiments to go back and try to find either his cavalry screen or the Russians. Actually they found neither – but did mis-report (based on spies and traders) where the Russians were.
- His left flank had no contact and no screen. He was rather hoping for the best, and the Russians did not know he was effectively blind on that side. He eventually pleaded with the état-major-géneral to give him some pickets of Dutch "Red" Lancers of the Guard to at least permit some of the mail to get though. Davout later sent infantry to scout, and finally more or less blundered into some of the prince-viceroy's cavalry and re-established contact.
- To his front, he had effectively only one regiment of chasseurs-à-cheval. These were mauled by Cossacks south of Mogliev, destoying one of three squadrons and capturing their colonel alive. Davout was really angry – he forbade anyone to send him his mail, effects or money, and the colonel was saved only by being "bought" from the Cossacks by a Russian officer.
- Infantry and supplies were forbidden to move in less than battalion strength, preferably with some artillery. Smaller goups invited a Cossack raid.

Only a few examples. The whole correspondence reads mostly like a litany of "I am blind …. I know I should have better tactical recon …. but these damned Cossacks!".

I have no reason to think that there had been better scouting of the Russian left before Borodino. Maybe there was. Davout would have wanted to do such. But I don't think we can assume it was possible for him.

Again, of course, we can neither assume it was possible, nor assume it was not possible. It happened or it didn't. He would have done his best, which was considerable. Whatever his situation, he was the man on the ground, and we simply do not know what he knew with any certainty.
Again, I would have bet on his instincts and his plan that day over Napoleons. Again, whatever his situation, simply for him to advocate the maneuver, given his track record, makes it worth betting on over the frontal attack in my book. That is of course an opinion, made after considering that he may have even been blind. Instincts and execution count. At various times, the coach is right to trust the star players near the goal, despite the unknowns.

‘I don't agree that the French were far superior, but rather that all the advantages in the "little war" were with the Russians.'

I do believe, and it has been shown often and on more than one forum, that the French fighting in open order as skirmishers was superior to what the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians tried to do.

The ‘little war' was not fought on the battlefield with the main armies who deployed their light infantry, and in the case of the French many times their line infantry, in skirmish and/or open order. The ‘little war' was a war of raids, ambuscades, and other ‘light' operations that were performed away from the main armies generally or in an advance guard fight or other such operations.

The employment of skirmishers in large numbers on the battlefield took place in different ways depending on the army, the tactical situation, and other factors. What the French did with troops in open order that other armies did not was employ them in large numbers as a main force on the battlefield and not always as a supporting force. Further, many times French commanders would form their first line as a heavy skirmish line instead of the usual, or regulation, three-deep line.

I do believe that there is much confusion on the employment of skirmishers by the different armies and that tends to ‘muddy the waters' so to speak on what is actually meant. A ‘skirmisher is a skirmisher is a skirmisher' is not necessarily so. And the ‘little war' and major operations on the battlefield are not the same thing.

The Russians never caught up, to my mind, with the different methods that the French employed troops en tirailleur (open or as skirmishers). I have seen no evidence that the Russians used them as a maneuver element as the French did. Further, Austrian General Radetzky remarked in 1813 that neither the Austrians nor the Russians matched the French as skirmishers.

Sincerely,
K

"Austrian General Radetzky remarked in 1813"

No, he didn't "remark" anything.

This is a quote taken out of context by several modern English-language sources:
-- Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon,‎ by Rory Muir (1988)
-- Napoleon's Greatest Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army by Gunther E. Rothenberg (1982)
-- The British Light Infantry Arm 1790-1815, by David Gates (1987)
-- Once There Were Titans: Napoleon's Generals and Their Battles 1800-1815‎ by Kevin Kiley (2007)

This supposed "remark", quoted in various forms, actually is from a draft of an order that Radetzky wrote as Chief of Staff for the Army of Bohemia just before Leipzig.

It is found in Österreichisches Staatsarchiv – Kriegsarchiv Wien [the Austrian military archives] / Feldakten 1813 [Army orders for 1813] / Faszikel X [September] – 463b [463rd item, "b" = means that it was added to the date sequence subsequent to the initial archiving].

The supposed "remark" has no general application, and was not even a summary judgement by its author. It was part of a draft for an instruction for one Army at one battle.

There were no Russian Army Jäger even included in this force. The Russian infantry under Radetzky was entirely in the reserve (a Grenadier division and the Guards division). As such, Radetzky's supposed remark's relevance to Russian skirmishing is not only isolated to one day and one battle, it is about the heavy Russian infantry held in reserve and neither designed nor intended to skirmish.

This kind of quoting without context is easy to do if few readers have the German language, or can't check the original source. Hence four modern English-language authors quote and re-quote each other, until we have an established "truth".

But it is all without context, and really means little to nothing, especially with regard to Russians, once the context is understood.

"The Russians never caught up, to my mind"

Thank you for noting your personal opinion as just that, your opinion.
You are completely entitled to your own personal opinion, of couse. And it would be impolite, indeed churlish, to try to change your opinion.
Again, many thanks for your frankness.

it has been shown often and on more than one forum, that the French fighting in open order as skirmishers was superior to what the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians tried to do.

Well, no. It has often been the subject of much (heated) debate. I don't know if anything has been 'shown'.

Regards

‘The supposed "remark" has no general application, and was not even a summary judgement by its author. It was part of a draft for an instruction for one Army at one battle. There were no Russian Army Jäger even included in this force. The Russian infantry under Radetzky was entirely in the reserve (a Grenadier division and the Guards division). As such, Radetzky's supposed remark's relevance to Russian skirmishing is not only isolated to one day and one battle, it is about the heavy Russian infantry held in reserve and neither designed nor intended to skirmish.'

‘This kind of quoting without context is easy to do if few readers have the German language, or can't check the original source. Hence four modern English-language authors quote and re-quote each other, until we have an established "truth". But it is all without context, and really means little to nothing, especially with regard to Russians, once the context is understood.'

‘Thank you for noting your personal opinion as just that, your opinion. You are completely entitled to your own personal opinion, of couse. And it would be impolite, indeed churlish, to try to change your opinion.
Again, many thanks for your frankness.'

My conclusions were not merely ‘opinion' but a historical and logical conclusion based on research into the subject. Radetzky's statement is the basis, but on reading both the Zhmodikov's books on Russian tactics of the period as well as Lieven's study of the Russian army from 1812-1814, it is apparent that the Russian infantry's ability to fight in open order or as tirailleurs/skirmishers, depending on the mission, was less skillful than the French system.

One of the weaknesses of the Russian system was that they had to write and/or publish regulations for skirmishers and that the development of the Russian infantry's ability to contest the French superiority in this type of fighting on the battlefield took a long time to develop.

Some, not all, of the Russian jager regiments became skilled in open order fighting after 1807, but the regular Russian infantry, although they had to provide troops as skirmishers because there were not enough jager units to go round, never caught up. And they did skirmish when the thought they had to. That is the same problem the Prussians had in 1806-specialist infantry for open order fighting and not enough to go round.

In the French system, the ability to fight in open order became institutionalized for both line and light infantry and it was not based on a written regulation but on field experiments with troops in the mid-1770s in Normandy. The French army of the period never had a written regulation for army-wide use.

Basically, the training and ability to fight in open order for whatever mission assigned either on the battlefield or in the usual missions assigned to light troops (advance and rear guard missions, flank protection, the ‘war of posts' and the ‘little war') were all handled by French infantrymen during the period, even in 1813-1814 with the huge influx of new conscripts.

The Russians chose to go with ‘specialized' units of light troops, the jagers, and apparently neglected training their line units in fighting in open or skirmisher order which put them at a distinct disadvantage when fighting the French.

And if you believe that Radetzky's statement is taken out of context, perhaps you can put it in context for us? That would be very helpful. It doesn't seem to be that way to me, and I don't believe that Rothenberg would take something out of context. It appears as a stand-alone statement assessing the relative ability of the Austrian and Russian regular infantry in 1813.

Here is the statement from the text:

‘Skirmishing was not given much weight in the new instructions. The Austrian high command remained convinced that poorly trained troops could not execute it properly. As Radetzky observed in September [1813], ‘fighting en tirailleur should be done only in very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the maniere de tirailleur.''-Gunther Rothenberg, Napoleon's Great Adversary, pages 234-235.

It seems to be pretty clear to me. And Rothenberg cites the original documents in the Krieg Archive.

As to establishing ‘truth' I would have to say that ‘truth' in history is very difficult to establish. Facts can be assembled and conclusions made form them, but ‘truth' is an ‘iffy' proposition. Historian Henry Adams made a very wise statement in that regard for historians to follow:

‘The historian must not try to know what is truth, if he values his honesty; for, if he cares for his truths, he is certain to falsify his facts.'

Sincerely,
K

Previous discussion of this stuff – including contextual points about Radetzky – in this thread TMP link this one TMP link

Regards