"Borodino: Davout's bad idea of a flank attack?" Topic

"Well into de afternoon of September 6th, while Napoleon reviewing the Russian position from near Borodino, Marshal Davout approached him with a proposal to abandon plans for a frontal assault on Bragration's Army and instead to authorize a flanking movement by 40.000 men of his and Poniatowski's corps down the Old Smolensk Road in order to envelop and roll up the Russian left flank. In principle this was a good idea. Napoleon needed a decisive victory, and there had to be doubts whether this could be archieved by a frontal assault. The toughness and stubornness of Russian troops were legendary. A flanking movement might bring on a battle of manoeuvre rather than attrition, which could onlhy work to Napoleon advantage.
Nevertheless the emperor was right to reject Davout's suggestion.
Given the quality of their light cavalry the Russians were unlikely to be surpirsed by a flanking movement but in any case a threat to his flank might simply inspire Kutuzov to decamp which after so long pursuit Napoleon dreaded. To redeploy Davout's Corps for such a movement would by now requiest a large-scale movements in the dark throught the forest on the French right, which was a recipe for chaos. Moreover, the Russian strategy of whittling down Napoleon army now bore fruit.
Earlier in the campaign the could easily have spared 40.000 men for such a movment but by now his margin for risk and error was much more tight"
From Dominic Lieven book.

I see some wargaming taking Davout idea and mostly of them failed.
How was your experience in this matter?
If Borodino was quit by Kutuzov, maybe the big battle would be in Moscow himself?

Amicalement
Armand

I disagree. The flanking manouver was exactly what should've happened. Kutuzov was always going to fight – he got the job because he had promised the Czar he would fight. Yes, the Cossack screen would've detected the move but getting the Russian Army re-deployed in time would've been another matter.

Of course the French should've manouvered.

I agree completely with nsolomon. Kustov got the job because he was expected to stand and give battle. Now if he retreated again the pressure would have been increased. Davout's plan was a good one.

The terrain at Borodino was scrubby and broken up by ravines, not least in the Southern sector. Napoleon feared that a long night march might have gone astray, resulting in a lack of cohesion and a disorganised flank….Not a godd thing with lots of Cossacks about…

With 20/20 hindsight, it might well have got a better result than the frontal attack that happened.

We know now that Kutusov was going to give battle before giving up Moscow (if necessary). But Napoleon didn't know. So while I agree that Davout had the right idea, I can understand Napoleon's desire for a decisive battle here and now.

About the Cossacks, they were massed at the other side of the battlefield in front of Eugene Beauharnais Corps (french left flank).

Amicalement
Armand

Cher Armand,

General-Major Karpov-2 commanded 8 cossack regiments covering the extreme left of the Russian position:
- Don Cossack regiment of Gen,-Maj. Karpov-2
- Don Cossack regiment of Col. Bykhalov-1
- Don Cossack regiment of Host Strashina (Major) Grekov-21
- Don Cossack regiment of Col. Ilovaysky-10
- Don Cossack regiment of Col. Ilovaysky-11
- Don Cossack regiment of Host Strashina (Major) Komissarov-1
- Don Cossack regiment of Lt. Col. Melnikov-4
- Don Cossack regiment of Col. Vasily Alekseyevich Sysoyev-3

Additionally positioned forward toward the French before Utitsa on the Russian left was the detached command of General-Major Prince Shakhovskoy. In the woods were the 4 "active" battalions of the 20th and 21st Jäger regiments, dispersed as skirmishers. These were immediatly suppported by the 2 "active" battalions of the Tavricheskiy Grenadier regiment and the 2 Combined Grenadier battalions of the 3rd division.

Bien fort amicalement.

Mon ami Seroga, much apreciated your data.

Amicalement
Armand

A flank march which was staged at night, but started at first light while the rest of the army kept the main Russian army engaged would have been a superior solution to crashing straight ahead. I believe that the Russians would have had a hard time disengaging without disaster.

The French had a large cavalry force, so it seems like the flank attack could have been supported with enough cavalry to deal with any Cossacks.

I think it was a good plan, characteristic of the younger Napoleon and the high level of French grand tactical practice. However, it would have demanded that Davout and his Corps lead the turning movement.

Maybe Napoleon didn't have the same confidence in his army's ability to manoeuvre as the ones he led before.

It's certainly an interesting way to wargame a big battle.

Leigh

I have war gamed this scenario twice. The first time I was the Russian C-in-C. I learned of the French flanking attack very early on and shifted more Cossacks and Jagers to that flank. Unfortunately, for the French, "their" Davout advanced too far to the flank and became completely out of touch with the rest of the French army. The French "Napoleon" also over compensated by thinning his battle line trying to cover the area vacated by the now "absent" Davout. As the Russian commander, I issued orders for the Russian right to press home an attack on Eugene's wing. In the center I also vigorously attacked the French, thus pressuring their entire line. Davout made progress, but didn't succeed in making contact with the Russian left until after the French left and center had withdrawn in defeat.

The second time we played, I was on the French side. This time the battle ended in a bloody draw. The reason for French failure centered on 3 things: the terrain is just too difficult for rapid movement by the flanking attack, it is almost impossible to surprise the Russians, but more importantly there are just not enough French forces to execute a flanking attack and withstand Russian pressure along the rest of the battle line.

@isttexas: what set of rules did you use?

I can't envision Kutusov actually ordering his center to abandon their strong position and attack Napoleon's center. He would have been mauled by the French. In a wargame – yes, but in practise – not likely.

This map may be interesting:
link
(It shows the battle at a late stage)
The "woods" areas are shown in two levels of density: the very dense was almost impassable (like a forest), the less dense would be a problem for formed units in a few places (scattered stands of trees) but was generally passable.
Immedately to the Russian left of Utitsa were two hills and then another village. These dominated the clear area before Utitsa. The woods closed in around and behind this clear spot and became increasingly thick, anchoring the Russian extreme left. Immediately behind Utitsa were two more hills that could dominate the route from Utitsa into the Russian left flank and rear. The Russians ended up on these hills in the real battle, as seen on the map.
The area around Utitsa was intially defended by the Russian 3rd Corps – speciifically the 1st Grenadier division (14 battalions of grenadiers, including the Life-Grenadier regiment) and the 3rd Infantry division (8 battalions of infantry and 4 battalions of jäger) with 18 guns deployed. 3rd Corps was an excellent unit. There was also a horde of opolchenie militia and the 8 cossack regiments listed above.
The Russians had their main artillery reserve at a road junction to the right rear of Utitsa, with a little road leading over the hill behind the village and thence continuing to meet the Old Smolensk Road at Utitsa. In front of the the artillery reserve was the 2nd Cuirassier division with 5 regiments (20 Cuirassier squadrons) and the 2nd Grenadier division (12 Grenadier battalions).
In the real battle, the Russians shifted forces toward the center, including moving the 3rd Infantry division, 2nd Grenadier division and 2nd Cuirassier division in that direction. If attacked on the flank, they could have shifted instead to the left, and brought up as many guns as they thought fancy.
A problem for the French would be that immediately upon taking the woods in front of and the clearing near Utitsa, they would have to make a very sharp change, almost 90 degrees, in their axis of advance – the denser woods behind Utitsa would inhibit a deeper enveloping move toward the Russian left rear.
It makes a great game.

I don't think the Russians would ever have launched an attack beyond local counter attacks. I think it would have been too difficult if not impossible for them to change from a defensive plan to an offensive plan in the heat of battle. It can only happen in a wargame. Didn't Kutusov leave the field early saying there was nothing else he could do?

Davout was the master of the outflanking move. He would never have made the suggestion if he thought he would come up short. I think it was just an over confident Napoleon error, or he didn't want to share any glory by admitting that Davout had a better plan. Perhaps Napoleon just didn't see things as clearly as Davout did.

Yes the terrain and the defense were clearly obstacles but Davout would have known this. I think he never lost a battle during the Napoleonic wars. In my view Davout was the better general of the two any way.

For Napoleon not to agree with Davout was in my opinion a classical error. A number of battles were clearly won by outflanking. He knew this but didn't follow through. If anything I think it clearly shows he had lost his edge. The signs for losing the Waterloo campaign were starting to appear.

Ahhh! One of the great things about wargaming, is I don't have to be Kutusov and you probably can't find a "real" Davout amongst your opponents (friends). Was not the final question a wargaming one? I have also lost twice as the French at Austerlitz, won at Waterloo 3 times, drew the 1813 campaign, lost in ACW as the "Rebs" at Fredericksburg and yet won Gettysburg. And never, never suffered bodily harm. And now in my 60s I still campaign. I thought that is why we wargame? Because we can change history while enjoying the color and pageantry…and Oh Yeah…never get hurt!

With 20/20 hindsight, I am sure at that point Napoleon would have done better to listen to Davout, as Lee would have done better to listen to Longstreet. In retrospect they both misjudged the position, the defense, and failed to imagine alternatives and exibit the flexibility and energy that worked so well for both of them prior to, and also again after each of these battles.

What battle did Napoleon ever win with a flank attack? Bautzen? – He had very superior numbers, but his main force got pretty chewed up and the Allies withdrew successfully. Remember, the Russians _did_ shift much of their force during the battle and their forces were very dense. So long as they stayed in front of the French it was going to be a bloodbath, and the rear of the Russian position – converging main roads through woods across a river made for a very defensible withdrawal.

Hew, quite a few actually – Montenotte, Borghetto, Castiglione, Bassano, Arcola, Rivoli, Aboukir, Austerlitz (I'd argue the Allies were outflanked from the central position on the Pratzen), Eylau (he salvaged a draw with Davouts flank attack), Friedland, Abensberg, 2nd day at Wagram, Lutzen, Bautzen, Champaubert and Vauchamps. Thats what I can think of, I'd need my books for more but I think that list establishes that Napoleon favoured the flank attack for much of the period.

As to the terrain behind the Russian left, given the French superiority in open order fighting and in difficult terrain I would've thought that favoured a flanking manouvre even more.

Napoleon was after a battle since the start of the campaign, in case the outflanking might have been a possible thread to the Russians, Kutusov might have withdrawn for another battle field.
Also a second battle in front of Moscow was planned, for career resaons, read the memoirs of Yermolov about this, but Barclay advised not to engage and Kutusov was happy with this there he could blame Barclay for avoiding a second battle.
Napoleon's idea for the campaign was an early decisive battle and draw the Russian emperor to the negotiation table.
For that reason – my opinion – Napoleon opted against an outfanking, he had the Russian Army in front of him, accepting a battle – and he wanted to beat and destroy it.
A flanking movement would have cost too much time, the Russian Jäger were almost as good if not at par with the French and Allies in skirmishing in 1812.

N, it really is just a question rather than an assertion. Sure Napoleon sometimes attacked a flank. What is there to write home about? Not much in your list, which is so broad you could toss Borodino in there on the grounds that Napoleon did throw his weight against what was the Russian left wing.

Wagram is the best example, and a portentous harbinger of Borodino. Given the near parity of forces, Davout's flank attack was mirrored by Klenau and Kolowrat's attack on the other flank. The relative stasis resulted in an artillery bloodbath from which the Austrians withdrew fairly easily. It was only when they ran out of real estate at Znaim that the war was won.

We are talking about attempting to envelop the Russian left with a 1/3 of Napoleon's army. Even if it did not go off track, I don't see much reason to expect anything other than the results of Wagram or the actual Borodino.

The point of a Napoleonic flannk march was to draw out the opponent's reserves in order to allow the mass de rupture to crack the enemy center at the hinge. At Borodino, the hinge still would have been at the Grand Redoubt and if Davout had drawn off the Russian reserve, the Russian center was not going to be cracked, even if the Guard went marching up the hill.

I don't think a French flank march would have created a decisive result.

I agree with Malcolm. Effectively much of the Russian reserves were committed early by Kutuzov anyway, much to Barclay's disgust. Some of the rest of it was forgotten about.

Perhaps the only effect of a flank attack would have been to delay or prevent the Uvarov's Cavalry raid (later inflated into a flank attack) which had the effect of delaying the final French push.

This would have meant the French central breakthrough might have gained the redoubt and fleches 2 hrs earlier, but then what? We still have a what-if concerning N's reluctance to commit the Guard…

Umm, since when did the French lose or draw Borodino using Nap's plan? My recollection is that the French used their artillery far more effectively than the Russian and decimated the Russian army. Problem is that the Russians had more real estate to retreat through and didn't give up when the French took Moscow.

Borodino was a French win.

No need for the Guard. If Davout was rolling up the flank. Kustov wasn't going to be responding effectively to it, he spent the battle sitting around unsighted. If the Russians had attempted their retreat with two hours extra daylight and two hours less fatigue on the French army then i predict it would have ended in a huge rout.
If only we had a nice big table set up so we could game this debate out! There's enough of us in the thread to fill out the commands!

Now everyone has a map showing the roads, bogs, streams and forests off the Russian left flank. Napoleon did not have these.

Battles fought in central and western Europe were fought over terrain that both sides were familiar with. Both sides had traveled over it for generations, the locals were knowledgable as well, maps were available, military maps were available and scouting calvary did their business fairly evenly between the two sides.

I think it is unlikely that any living Frenchman or ally had ever traversed the old Smolensk Road. Any Russian peasants were not talkative and the French calvary was almost completely stymied from scouting by the worn out condition of their horseflesh and the dominance of the Cossack horse. I have not seen any history that the French had scouted (it would have to have been in at least a regimental force level) in the direction that our armchair generals are saying was a clear-cut, easy flank march for several French corps.

Would you, as Napoleon have sent a large part of your army into the unknown brush? A good chance to have them wander away from the battle. A good chance to leave themselves and the main army up to some surprises. A good chance that if successful, to have the Russian army melt away into the distance again. Napoleon had been frustrated several DOZEN times by the Russians refusing battle or retreating once a less than favorable battle was joined. He was far from home, running out of motive force (e.g. his calvary and horse drawn supplies were crippled by wastage, poor fodder, overwork, disease and overwork), and the army itself was being racked by disease and exhaustion. To some extent, he could have many of his soldiers die in battle or die from poor conditions in a week or so anyway.

Forcing the Russians out of their battle positions was the last thing Napoleon wanted to do. A flank attack is effective if the enemy is pinned to their position by strategic imperatives. Not the case here.

Very interesting point of view 1968billsfan.
Agree with you.

Amicalement
Armand

A flank attack is effective if the enemy is pinned to their position by strategic imperatives. Not the case here.

Can you think of one Napoleonic example where anyone had a "stradgic imperative" in that case?

Waterloo. The French might have fallen back when the Prussians were sighted had they not had a strategic imperative to fight

Fine so what was the Stradgic imperative at Waterloo and how was it greater than Kustov's who was in front of Moscow and whos predesesor was sacked for not standing and fighting?

What matters is not Kutusov's strategic imperative but what Napoleon believed was the situation. The Russians had been evading a fight at every opportunity and he had no overwhelming reason to believe that it was going to be otherwise.

Indeed, in his mind, Napoleon had the greater strategic imperative to fight and the Russians knew that. He had to fight in such a manner that they would be willing to stay and fight. Hence the frontal assault into prepared positions. He felt that he had to give them a hefty handicap.

What does the term 'strategic imperative' actually mean? Do you have a definition for it?

Sincerely,
K

Good point Malcolm. Your estimation of Napoleons thinking makes sense to me. However I believe Davout looked at the preperations of the Russian army and decided they were there to fight. His solution was to avoid that frontal assault.

Smolensk as an earlier example of a place that the French were sure that there would be set-piece battle of decision?

By "strategic imperative", I mean a course of action on a strategic level (having to do with the actions of major armies over large (ca. 1000km)distances, that MUST be followed due to the lack of any alternatives.

The Russians were defending relatively low productivity agricultural land, whereas the Austrians or Prussians would be defending the core of their country, with many vultures wanting to carve off pieces. The Austrians or Prussians would be giving up population centers, armament centers and the means to continue to make war. The Russian armament centers were no closer than Tula and the Urals. The Russians were planning a 3-5 year war and the reserve armies that were being gathered, equiped and were even marching during training towards the theatherwere at least 500-1000km and 6 months from the battlefield. The Russians could afford to fight a battle for show and melt away into the mists and lure the French further away from their supply bases. If the Prussians did that….. well, look at the position of the Frederick William at tha time. Scurrying around like a wanta-be court page. Francis's daughter was being bedded by Napoleon. In the west, they had to fight and lost. The Russians didn't have to have a victory, they just needed to preserve enough of the main army to serve as a cadre for new recruits and waste time so that they could grow the main army and allow the armies that had been fighting the Swedes and the Turks to close in on Napoleon's line of communication.

I've never heard of the term 'strategic imperative' used for military operations before. It is used, however, in business planning.

Sincerely,
K

link

"A Strategic Imperative is an initiative, key project, or major objective that is high leverage and systemic (strategic) and a must-do (imperative) over the next 6 – 12 months to significantly move a team/organization toward its vision and desired culture.

Our process for implementing Strategic Imperatives is to form teams for each imperative using this template:
•Executive sponsor/owner
•Team leader
•Possible Team members
•Team mandate/charter
•Timelines/stages

Once the teams are set and their mandate/charter agreed to by the larger executive or steering team overseeing this work, each Strategic Imperative Team then develops and manages:
•Development of a detailed implementation plan
•Execution……"

cf:
link

Sorry. Too much management training. I was the one saying: "…for C.F.S. stop talking gobblygook and throwing nonsense terms around and just decide where we need to get to and how to get there Talking nonsense around in circles is a bunch of F.B.S.!!!!"

Not popular. Wild Goose.

Bad flashbacks. Deprogram. Deprogram…

So, it is a modern management term from the business world that is now been adapted to a quasi-military definition?

I don't think that is applicable to Borodino in particular, or the Russian campaign in general.

Napoleon's objective in every campaign was the enemy's army, so if there is any 'strategic imperative' in the campaign, it is the destruction of the Russian field army.

Sincerely,
K

"The Russians were planning a 3-5 year war"
No they weren't

Maxshadow.

I think you are just expressning an opinion and maybe could not back it up.

Read Lievnes book or listen to a video that contains a lot of the concepts and facts from it.

link

Russia, because of its size and differences from western Europe, had a different approach to achieveing its national objectives than those exercized by the western nations of that time. (still probabably true). Most of the current "knowledge" about their motivation is based upon English reports (please, Russia, die to the last man, destroy Napoleon and your country and leave us to pick up the pieces cheaply and for no expenses on our part), and a relatively narrow segment of Russian soceity that was Frenchified, based on Petersburg, fluent in western langages and supplied tracts that were accessible to westerners.

Think about the following. Where were the best Russian troops, commanders and veteran soliders at the time of Napoleon's invasion? (HINT: they had been fighting the Swedes and the Turks and crushed Napoleons line of communication and his northern and southern lines of attack).

Also, consider that the novel "War & Peace" has shaped the western viewpoint of that war. Actually, that novel (a fictional account, maybe you might admit) was written from a mystic Russian perspective to further the view that "man" had no influence of the working out of fate and destiny. If that is your world view, than go with it but I don't think it explains the military realities. The Russians had large armies being built to reinforce the central armies, and two crack armies moving to crush the northern and southern wings of Napoleon's invasion. Those other two armies did that and destroyed Napoleon's line of communication and supplies. (Please read up on the amount of supplies Mr. Bonapart lost at Minsk and get back to me). Please consider the armies that trapped and destroyed 90% of Napoleon's main army at Studienka. Sorry, but losing most of your remaining people is not a victory.

the maps in link might be usefull.

Ninety percent of Napoleon's main army was not destroyed at Studenka, by which you mean the crossing of the Berezina. The French fought their way across a river in the face of one Russian army commanded by Tshitshagov while defeating all the attacks against the rear of the army by Wittgenstein.

And General Eble's pontonniers built two trestle bridges while the army was engaged which allowed the army to get across and continue their march out of Russia.

You might want to reread Lieven as well as other accounts of the Russian campaign. The Russians were not preparing for a 3-5 year war and were as near exhaustion at the end of the Russian campaign as the French were with losses just as heavy. And Kutusov did not want to prosecute the war into eastern Europe once the French left Russia.

Clausewitz had this to say about the Berezina:

'There was never a better opportunity to force the surrender of an army in the open field. Napleon had to rely for the most part upon the reputation of his arms; and he made use here of an asset he had been accumulating for a long time…Because the enemy was afraid of him and his Guard, no one dared face him. Napoleon capitalized on this psychological effect, and with its assistance worked his way out of one of the worst situations in which a general was ever caught. Of course this psychological force was not all he had. He was still supported by his own brilliant strength of character and the peerless military virtues of his army, not yet destroyed by the greatest of trials. Once out of the trap, Napoleon said to his staff; 'You see how one cna slip away under the very nose of the enemy.' Napoleon not only preserved his military honor, he enhanced it.'

The Berezina was one of Napoleon's greatest victories, and one of the best-fought actions of the Grande Armee. Kutusov's army was approaching the area but stayed out of the fight, no doubt because Kutusov did not want to face Napoleon and the French again-he had lost to them too many times.

Lieven's book is good, but there are errors in it and an over-emphasis on the Russian contribution in 1813-1814. It was the Austrian army that tipped the scales in 1813, not the Russians.

Sincerely,
K

There goes the neighborhood…

Uh, what good would it have done the Russians to ruin their armies, destroy Mr. Napoleon and leave the British, Austrian and maybe Prussian armies to pick up all the pieces of the defeated French????

The Austrians hedged their bets and played it both ways at the same time untill it was clear the French were gone. They would have been happy with a weakened Napoleon to help couterbalance the Russians in Galican, Poland and the Balkans. It is true that the Russians could not have defeated the French alone, several thousand of miles away from their areas of military supplies and manpower. It is nice that they were willing to attack the husband of their emporer's daughter, as much as they did.

10 Marines…. have you read Leithem yoursself?

Please compare the size of the Russian and French armies at the time when the French were expelled from Russia.

Count the number of troops actively engaged in campaign. Count the number of troops in training and in motion toward the front, and then get back to me.

Yes, the Russian lead elements were also in strained shape due to campaigning in a severe winter climate. Reinforcements, supplies and horses were on the way. The Austrians were still sitting on the French side of the fence and had not even appropiated the money to rebuild their armies. Oh, and what they had in the field was running for home. Look it up.

On Briitsh support to Russia, it was not zero. But, much likely never left London and/or Saint Petersburg, disappearing in various corruption schemes. The aid, mostly in kind, had cost the British as follows :

British Subsidies and % of Russian military expenditures (1 year lag)
1804 – £300,000.00 GBP – nil
1805 – £50,000.00 GBP – nil
1806 – £610,000.00 GBP – 9%
////
1812 – £660,000.00 GBP – 9%
1813 – £2,170,000.00 GBP – 19%
1814 – £3,240,000.00 GBP – 27%
1815 – £1,100,000.00 GBP – 13%

See link

For example, the ~20,000 British muskets received as aid in 1812 were all worn out, broken or otherwise defective. Many were condemned on receipt and the metal scapped. Some were sent for rebuilding at Russian arsenals and were not issued until 1814. One wonders what weapons were actually stricken from the British crown's inventory, and who may have profitted from this "aid", which amounted to a substantial share of the supposed 1812 British subsidy.

Much, much better were the 60,000 British muskets purchased on commercial terms some years earlier. These were new, perfect, with all accessories and even nicely boxed. Between these "Brown Bess" muskets and the new M1808 Russian musket, many Russian frontline units were very well equipped in 1812.

See link

----------------------------------------

On the Berezina crossing, v. Clauswitz continues, from the part quoted above ….
"Buonaparte had here entirely saved his old honour and acquired new, but the result was still a stride towards the utter destruction of his army. We know how much of it reached Kowno, and the Beresina contributed the last blow towards that result. Besides himself, his principal generals, and a couple thousand officers, he brought away nothing of the whole army worth mentioning. …. Nominallly the Russians had failed in cutting off their enemy …. but, nevertheless, they had cut off considerable masses. This holds still more true of the campaign as a whole. …. The French are everywhere victorious; but look to the end of the account, the French army has ceased to exist, and with the exception of the capture of Buonoparte and his principal lieutenants, the campaign has the most complete result conceivable." [emphasis added]
English translation link
German original link

Yes, I have read Lieven which is excellent, but as the author is very pro-Russian in outlook I have used other volumes on the campaign in taking a look at it.

Sincerely,
K

And with those shattered remnants, Eugene was able to build an effective Army of the Elbe, of about 60,000 troops, with which he held the Empire's eastern marches until Napoleon returned with a rebuilt army which defeated the Prussian/Russian armies at Lutzen and Bautzen.

Sincerely,
M

I think you are just expressning an opinion and maybe could not back it up.

No it was just a bit of a fantasy on your part. Barcley had been undermined to Alexandra because he had not showed a willingness to fight. There were a couple of other reasons too but this point addresses your post. Kustov replaced him but basically continued Barcleys strategy but eventually had to be seen to show some fight and at least try to beat Napoleon before giving up Moscow. He certainly didn't go to Alexandra and say "Oh I've got a 3-5 year plan" they would called him a loon.
But thanks for the suggestion to read the same book that you have or watch an informative video!

they had been fighting the Swedes and the Turks and crushed Napoleons line of communication and his northern and southern lines of attack

No they didn't. The Finnish garrison was only 30,000 strong and would have been in front of the French if it ever left its post and I don't think it did. Chichagov's corps was below the Pripet marshes and wasn't crushing anybody. GTG

Who captured the supplies at Minsk?

The French army of the east, did not exist anymore, but this was a great victory?

A French general abandonded his corp, sneaked through the woods and staggered into the French lines,,,,, this is a great victory?? A scant hundred out of tens of thousands, staggering back is a French victory.

Geesh!!!

Remember the war ended with Cossacks camping in Paris and Napoleon running in shame to throw himself at the mercy of the British, (who had just traversed the Pyrenees against minor resistance).