"Submarine vs Submarine." Topic

"For submarines in the North Sea and off the Norwegian coast, many factors influenced their operations. Certainly the most prevalent was the hours of daylight. In the spring and summer, the horizon was lit for up to 20 hours a day. This made it very difficult to operate on the surface to use their main diesel engines and resulting high speed to gain favourable firing position on a potential target or charge their batteries for submerged operations. Submarines were not designed to be used on the surface under good visibility conditions, but rather under cover of either darkness or bad weather- they are essentially an ambush weapon. In addition to the limited cover of darkness during the summer months, the North Sea was restricted in its opportunity for evasion as the bottom was often shallow and very flat. This feature also made for excellent mining conditions to lay protective anti-submarine barrages. On the other hand, the conditions in the North Sea provided benefits for submarines. The dark murky waters made aerial observation difficult- submarines at periscope depth could not, under normal circumstances, be detected from the air, plus frequent changes in the waters temperature and salinity layers made underwater detection difficult.

With the opening of hostilities off Norway in April 1940, the Allies deployed a sizable force of submarines south of Bergen and in the Skagerrak and Kattegat to interdict the German supply traffic. For their part, the Germans had deployed many submarines in these areas to screen their transport forces from interception by British surface forces. The concentration of submarines inevitably led to numerous encounters.

HM THISTLE attacked a German submarine off Stavanger and missed- her intended target U.4 in turn sank her the next morning by torpedo. HM PORPOISE and U.3 each missed one another off Lindesnes while the French submarine ORPHEE missed U.51. Several other failed attacks and encounters took place over the next few months. Except for the success of U.4, it became apparent that submarines were not ideal weapons to hunt enemy submarines. However, the British Admiralty felt a strong conviction that their own submarines could effectively intercept German submarines using the North Sea and Norwegian waters to access the Atlantic. So the practice of deploying Allied submarines in an anti-submarine role was encouraged and maintained.

By the summer of 1940, Britain was preoccupied with the threat of invasion from Germany. To give forewarning of any sea borne forces approaching, the Royal Navy stationed submarines off the approaches of the main Norwegian ports believed to be points of embarkation- Bergen and Stavanger. In addition, they patrolled the entrance to the Skagerrak and maintained offensive sorties in the sea-lanes between Stavanger and Kristiansand where enemy traffic had to travel in open waters. As always, a patrol line of several submarines were also held in the central and northern North Sea to intercept German submarines on their way to and from the Atlantic shipping lanes. The Germans had laid 2 large minefields off SW Norway to protect the approaches in mid-summer that greatly affected the British deployment of their submarines. Following several unexplained submarine losses attributed to the minefields, VAS adjusted his submarines transit routes that caused a concentration at several points. This inevitably led to confusion and on July 22 HM CLYDE fired a salvo of 6 torpedoes in error at HM TRUANT west of Bergen. They missed astern due to a bad estimation of speed and course. Following this event, orders were issued that emphasized obtaining positive identification of enemy submarines prior to attack, hopefully not conflicting with the need for rapid action necessary in fleeting submarine-to-submarine encounters.

As uncommon as submarine versus submarine encounters were, for a period of just 6 days in the North Sea in late July early August 1940, there were no less than 5 separate attacks- 2 including the very rare event of a submarine engaging another in a surface gun action. The first was on July 29 when at 2033 SW of Egersund, Norway, the 250-ton coastal submarine U.62 (Kapitänleutnant Hans-Bernhard Michalowski) surfaced. U.62 was headed for home, on her final operational tour- she was to be de-commissioned and used in a training flotilla upon arrival. Her batteries were nearly exhausted and she was out of torpedoes, her only weapons being her 20-mm C/30 antiaircraft gun mounted on the fore deck and a pair of 7.92-mm MG34s on the bridge. U.62 had been spotted and reported by the submarine HM TRITON the day before when leaving Bergen and the Admiralty had advised submarines stationed south to be on the lookout. The 750-ton British HM SEALION (Lt. Commander Ben Bryant) was submerged nearby and detected the German boat. Bryant attacked with 3 torpedoes but U.62 had seen her periscope and avoided the salvo on the surface. HM SEALION then surfaced and engaged with her 76-mm 50-cal deck gun. Three shots later U.62 dived, having been able to charge her batteries enough while surfaced (27 minutes). HM SEALION quickly followed her down, but neither maintained contact.

August 1, 1940. A new development was evolving in the area; 2 new Dutch submarines, O.21 and O.22, augmented the British submarines. They had just finished their trials and working up periods and were being deployed by the Royal Navy's 9th Submarine Flotilla. They were both assigned an area in the central North Sea for the purpose of anti-submarine duties on their first war patrols.

When the 2 Dutch submarines came to the U.K. in May 1940, they were nearly complete, minus some armament outfittings. Their designs were typical in the Netherlands naval tradition- strong, efficient, well constructed, and innovatively designed. The British, who favoured traditional well-proven designs for their submarines, did not fully appreciate or utilize the Dutch planners progressive features. Two in particular. The first was a ventilation tube with a head valve that was designed for the Dutch submarines to operate their main diesel engines while submerged at periscope depth (although at a reduced speed of approximately 8.5 knots). This allowed it to remain submerged indefinitely and make detection considerably more difficult. Second was the fitting of a specially designed Vickers 40-mm antiaircraft mounting that retracted into a watertight storage well in the aft platform of the conning tower. The 40-mm shell could break up an aircraft in the air and be used effectively against surface targets while the protection from seawater improved the weapons operation/reliability and allowed the use of advanced optical sights as compared with the fixed open sights normally fitted on exposed guns.

As for the ventilation system, the British believed it to not be entirely reliable or safe. It did initiate interest in the concept, but the Royal Navy decided not to pursue its development and removed the system at the dockyards in May 1940 before the boats became operational. The Germans developed the Dutch design into the highly successful snorkel. As for the 40-mm gun, British theory on air attack relied upon rapid diving times- evasion rather than defence. Apparently there were no modified 40-mm weapons available for the original design, so the 2 Dutch submarines were fitted out with single 20-mm Oerlikons in British yards. Both of these features would have been invaluable for operations off the restrictive Norwegian coastal waters where air attack could be expected.

By 1602 on August 1, O.21 (Lt1. Commander J.F. van Dulm) had reached 55.34N 02.18E and spotted a 250-ton German submarine surfaced with a northerly course- U.60 (Oberleutnant zür See Adalbert Schnee). U.60 was headed to Bergen, Norway to re-fuel and provision before heading on patrol. Van Dulm commenced attack and thirteen minutes later, fired 2 torpedoes at the range of 2,000 meters, both of which missed. U.60 was unaware of the attack and the ever smiling and upbeat Schnee continued on course. As lucky as he was with O.21, Schnee again unknowingly escaped just hours later when at 1800 the other Dutch submarine O.22 (Ltz. I Commander J.W. Ort) patrolling to the north of her sister ship spotted U.60. This time the range was too great and no attack was executed. While closing Bergen off Haugesund next evening, U.60 was attacked in error by German Ju88 bombers from K.G.30 flying an anti-shipping strike out of Stavanger to the Orkneys and emerged unscathed. Schnee, a 26-year old Berliner, would continue to enjoy considerable favour throughout his career, eventually receiving the Knights Cross and surviving the conflict.

Destiny had a different ending for HM SPEARFISH. She had left Rosyth to relieve HM SNAPPER off Skudesnesfjorden (Stavanger) on August 2. She would never arrive. Less than an hour after O.22 spotted U.60 the evening of August 1, HM SPEARFISH was headed east off Aberdeen. At 1848 the 740-ton German submarine U.34 (Kapitänleutnant Wilhem Rollmann) spotted the conning tower of HM SPEARFISH, a sister ship of HM SEALION and HM SNAPPER. Rollmann, 4 days away from his 33rd birthday was completing an unbelievably successful tour. Since leaving Germany June 22, U.34 had sunk 11 enemy merchant ships and the British destroyer HM WHIRLWIND (50,000-tons + shipping) and was returning to a heroes welcome… with 1 torpedo remaining. In excellent visibility Rollmann fired his final shot at 1904 and saw 20 fragments blown into the air as the torpedo hit the targets bow. Five minutes later U.34 surfaced and rescued the only survivor. Rollmann too would receive the Knights Cross, but also a grave at the oceans bottom in 1943…"
Full article here (Clik on the left of the page at "WW2", it's the third article).
dutchsubmarines.com

Anybody wargame submarine vs submarine at WW2?

Amicalement
Armand

USS Batfish War Patrol Attack Summary

2-10-1945 I Class Submarine
2-11-1945 I Class Submarine
2-13-1945 I Class Submarine

10 February
0001 With range to target 1020 yards a Japanese I class submarine was clearly visible from bridge. We were in a beautiful position – 90 track zero gyros so at
0002 Commenced firing tubes forward. #1 was a hot run in the tube, #2 hit, and number three passed over spot where submarine sank. The hit was accompanied by a brilliant red explosion that lit up the whole sky and the target sank almost immediately Radar indications on the APR ceased abruptly. This radar signal was apparently non-directional type, and probably anti-aircraft since we closed to 900 yards without his giving any indication that he was aware of our presence. Target disappeared from visual sight and on radar screen almost immediately, screws stopped and loud breaking up noises were heard on sound gear.
0010 Heard one end of run explosion.
0015 Commenced reload forward, sent results of attack to pack commander and rigged searchlight preparatory to returning to scene and search for survivors.
0120 Very strong oil smell, heavy slick on water. A cut shows we are two miles east of the point of attack. Turned on searchlight and after a short experiment decided we were advertising ourselves needlessly and accomplishing little except ruining the night vision of the bridge personnel and probably drawing airplanes.
0150 After running through the "spot" several times decided to wait until daylight and come back to investigate. It was too dark to have been able to see any debris or survivors and while oil slick was indication that submarine had sunk, would still like to salvage some Nip submariners and see what makes them tick.
0510 Plane contact on SJ 9,000 yards. Verified on SD.
0512 Three planes seven miles. These lads are going to make our daylight search a little difficult.
0540 SJ plane contact 12,000 yards. Verified on SD.
0541 Another plane at 5 miles.
0543 One plane coming in fast on port quarter, range 7,000 yards. Since dawn is breaking and it is fairly light in spite of being overcast, decided it was time to hide, so dove. Plane was at 3 miles when SD went under. APR had saturation signal at 179 mgcs.
0947 Sighted five planes bearing 180° True, distance about 4 miles, heading west. One, identified as a Black Cat was flying low, separately investigating the same oil slick we were; ie. the remains of our last nights target. The other four were fighters acting as escorts. Unfortunately BATFISH failed to go to deep submergence.
1008 While taking another look, sound heard a torpedo running on port beam. nothing in sight except four of the planes which are close aboard on port bow. (One fighter was not seen on this sweep). Went deep. Torpedo passed overhead and went away on bearing 150° relative. A tender moment and if these actually prove to be blue planes a very unfriendly act. My theory on the attack is that the patrol plane launched the torpedo and the one fighter we could not see was spotting us overhead flying down our track.
1812 Surfaced.
1930 PLAICE, SCABBARDFISH, and SEAPOACHER, received orders to patrol elsewhere. PACK consisting o fARCHERFISH, BLACKFISH and BATFISH to revert to former designation of Joe's Jugheads and continue patrol in LUZON STRAITS.
2000 Radar signals on APR at 178 mgcs.
2038 SJ radar plane contact, bearing 280° True, 15,000 yards, crossing astern.
2042 Another plane on port bow. Then commenced the now familiar tactics employed by the Jap's anti-submarine planes and when range had closed to 9,000 yards, with plane coming in on a steady baring at 330°, and with APR at saturation 178 mgcs, at
2044 Dove to 200 feet.
2128 Surfaced. Weak APR signal but no contacts.
2150 SJ plane contact 15,000 yards on port bow. Crossed ahead and out to 18,000 yards; then turned and came in on a steady bearing of 030°. With range 10,000 yards at
2157 Dove to 200 feet.
2254 Surfaced. All clear. I guess the planes have found somebody else to annoy.
11 February
0100 Received orders from pack commander to patrol west of CALAYAN. Cannot make it tonight so will stay where we are until tomorrow.
0510 SJ plane contact 14,000 yards, crossing ahead from port to starboard, closed to 9,000 yards and disappeared at 24,000 yards. No APR signals.
0548 Dove.
1820 Surfaced.
1837 Two plane contacts on SJ at 21,500 yards. Indications of 178 mgcs radar. Plane disappeared at 12 miles.
1915 Radar signals on APR at 158 mgcs, 500 PRF. Since this is the same radar as we found on our submarine target last night, started searching very carefully on SJ and swung ship in order to find null in the signal, thereby determining the approximate true bearing of the source.
1951 Radar contact on SJ at 8,000 yards, bearing 310° True. Manned battle stations and commenced tracking. Since, if anything, it is darker than last night; and since we had found how ineffective the Jap radar was, decided to make a surface attack if possible and close target sufficiently to identify him by class.
2037 Sighted target from bridge at range 1,300 yards, identified as submarine with no shears, very low in water, and perhaps slightly smaller than our last target.
2043 With range to target 1,200 yards, on a course for a 90° starboard track, had made up my mind to shoot when the gyro angles decreased 10 more degrees to 10° left when at
2043-30 Signal on APR went off and target dove. Changed course to left and speeded up, in the meantime trying to reconcile myself to the fact that I had lost this one by trying to wait for the theoretically perfect set up. Why he dove became a point of discussion because at
2105 Just one half hour later sound heard a swishing noise from general direction of target that was universally accepted as the sound of a submarine blowing his ballast tanks. At
2106 Sure enough, APR showed that 158 mgcs was back on and SJ made contact 8,650 yards, bearing 018° True. Whether the target head us or thought he heard us; saw us or thought he saw us; had us on his radar or thought he did or just make a normal and routine night dive I don't know; but I do know that unless he has radar detector that will intercept our SJ, he's going to have a hard time finding us this time.
2109 Manned battle stations and started end around.
2150 With range to target 6,000 yards, dove to radar depth. Target had speeded up, from 7 knots to 12 knots, and now tracked on base course 120° True.
2202 Commenced firing four tubes forward on a 100° starboard track, 880 yards range, torpedoes set to run at four feet using a 1 knot speed spread.
2202-50 First hit, timed as first torpedo. Target literally blew apart and sank almost immediately.
2203-07 Another muffled hit. Probably the third torpedo doing likewise.
2207 Two loud explosions, believed to be internal explosions. Maybe this guy was carrying ammunition to General YAMAA.
2210-02 One end of run explosion.
2211 One more explosion, very loud, which shook up the boat considerably. Thought at first it was a close bomb, but then realized it was the finale to the swan song of one Nip submarine. During this time and for the next 15 minutes sound had a variety of noises identified as small internal explosions, escaping air, etc.
2230 Taking sweep prior to surfacing, had possible plane contact at 5 miles. Dropped down to 100 feet.
2341 Surfaced. Set course for assigned area to west of CALAYAN Island. Reported results of attack to pack commander.
12 February
0536 SJ plane contact bearing 340° T., 12,300 yards closing.
0538 Dove for submerged patrol west of CALAYAN Island.
1823 Surfaced. Headed southeast for pass between CALAYAN and DALIPARI Islands.
2000 Received orders from pack commander to search for downed aviator west of SABTANG and BATAN Islands.
13 February
0155 Weak APR signal at 157 mgcs, 500 PRF. In hopes that this may be another Nip sub, started swinging ship to get approximate bearing of source.
0215 SJ radar contact 220° True, range 10,700 yards. Commenced tracking.
0227 Target tracks on base course 120 at 7 knots. Looks like another Nip sub so manned battle stations submerged and commenced approach.
0241 With range to target 7150 yards, he dove, why I'll never know, but he probably had a plane contact, or thought he did. Headed to a position ahead of him on his track so as to be in position when and if he surfaces.
0310 APR signal at 157 back on again so submarine must be surfaced or taking a sweep.
0353 Finally regained contact after a few bad moments when we thought he was making an approach on us. Target now bears 336° True, range 9,800 yards. Commenced new approach.
0412 Dove on targets track at 6,800 yard range and went to radar depth.
0430 Swung for 90 track with stern tubes. Tide rips are making depth control and steering very difficult and I hope they don't adversely effect the torpedo.
0448 Commenced firing 3 tubes aft on an 80 starboard track, zero gyros 1500 yard torpedo run, using a 1 knot speed spread. Torpedoes set for 6 feet.
0449-30 Saw first torpedo hit and target sank immediately. Target could be seen blowing apart on radar screen and the explosion was accompanied by a large yellow ball of fire and seen through periscope. The second and third torpedoes missed, not due to errors in data, but because target sank so quickly.
0452 Surfaced and headed for oil slick.
0457-08 Explosion – end of run.
0457-43 Second end of run explosion.
0500 Ran through oil and wreckage debris. Attempted to use the searchlight to search area and again this proved to be futile and unproductive method, due mainly to the wide diffusion of the beam and the short effective range so decided to stay surfaced until after daylight, planes permitting.
0620 After sighting several bits of wood and paper, lots of oil, but no survivors; our search for something tangible was rewarded when we recovered a wooden box that was found to contain Japanese navigation equipment and a book of tables. From the positions listed in the work book, it looks like this guy went from NAGOYA to FORMOSA before he headed down to LUZON to join his ancestors.
0630 Dove.
1835 Surfaced. Headed toward area west of CALAYAN Island to search for aviator reported in water."
ussbatfish.com/patrol-6.html

Gotta love the uboat.net set :). Robert

U-boats sunk by Allied submarines

uboat.net/fates/sub-sunk.htm

"On 10 April 1940 U-4, a Type II boat under the command of 25 year old Hans -Peter Hinsch sank the 1100 ton British submarine Thistle off Stavanger Norway. Thistle was the first submarine confirmed as being sunk by a U-boat and was the only Allied warship sunk by U-boats during the Norwegian campaign.

9 May 1940, Wolfgang Luth in U-9, one of the little Type II boats, sank the surfaced French submarine Doris

1 August 1940 Wilhelm Rollman skipper of U-34 a Type VIIA boat sank the British submarine Spearfish while returning to base with his last torpedo, there was one survivor. This was in Norwegian waters also."
link

Sub v. sub encounters were not really as unusual as one would think they would have been.

The Italian Sub Enrico Toti sank the HMS Triad in a surface action:

The Enrico Toti was commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Bandino Bandini. On October 15, 1940, she encountered the Triad off the Gulf of Taranto.

Bandini, the officer on watch at the time, sighted the Triad on the surface at 01:00 hrs, and sounded battle stations on board the Italian submarine. Both submarines altered course until they were heading towards each other, with the Royal Navy submarine opening fire first with her deck gun.

Italian accounts record that the British submarine scored no hits. Triad also fired one torpedo, which the Italian ship turned to avoid. Bandini's vessel opened fire on the British deck guns with her four 13.2 mm machine guns, preventing the Royal Navy personnel from operating their deck gun and driving them below deck. Accounts show that the two submarines passed within four feet, with Triad cutting across the stern of the Italian vessel.

Enrico Toti launched a torpedo, however the distance was such that the torpedo failed to arm in time prior to impact and caused no damage to the British submarine. At this stage, Lieutenant-Commander Salt began to dive his ship, however she was sunk during this manoeuvre by two direct shell hits and possibly a further torpedo from the Enrico Toti. The time from first sighting until sinking was 30 to 45 minutes, and there were no survivors picked up by the Italian submarine or any other vessels. For this action, the entire crew and their commander received an award.

There are a few books out on Sub vs Sub encounters, notably "The Hunter Hunted: Submarine Versus Submarine Encounters from World War I to the Present" by Robert C. Stern

Dave G
The PT Dockyard

You are right Sundance. Just 22 U-boats alone. And this over on Felgrau.net,

"the S-Class submarine HMS Spearfish. This boat was lost on the 2.8.1940. She was caught on the surface by U.34 during a patrol off the Norwegian coast, and was sunk by torpedo.

b) HMS P615 (ex-Turkish Uluc ali reis). This boat was one of a class of four being built in the UK, by Vickers-Armstrongs for the Turkish Navy. On completion the whole class was requisitioned by the Admiralty. Later on, in 1942 two of the class were delivered to the Turks.

HMS P615 was hit by a torpedo from U-123 off West Africa and sank on the 18 April 1943.

The only other allied submarines sunk by U-boats during WWII are as follows;

French:

Circe class submarine Doris. This submarine was torpedoed by U9 in the north sea, on the 9th May, 1940.

Redoutable class submarine Sfax. This submarine was torpedoed by mistake by U37 after the surrender on the 19th December 1940.

Diane class submarine La Sybille. This submarine was sunk in error by U173 of Morocco on 11 November 1942

Soviet Russia

The only Soviet submarine to be sunk by a U-boat, was the Serie VIbis type M78. she was torpedoed by U144 off the coast Latvian on the 26 April 1941.

HMS Simoom. This S-class submarine was probably sunk by U.565 on the 15 November 1943 in the Aegean.

HMS Thistle. This T-class submarine was sunk by U.4 on the 10 April 1940 off Skudesnes."

link

I have the board game "Attack Sub"

for cold war sub combat.

link

While the German U-boats only sank one Soviet sub, the little Italian CB subs in the Black Sea sank two,

On 15th and the 18th June 1942, CB submarines number 2 and 3 succeeded to torpedo and to sink Soviet submarines S32 and SHCH 306 (with a respective displacement of 1,070 and 705 tons) which were sailing in surface.

link

Dave G
The PT Dockyard

HMS Venturer – the only submarine ever to have sunk a submarine whilst both were submerged.

link