"Was the Confederate Army superior at Gettysburg?" Topic

I think that it's hugely underestimated just how big an impact Meade replacing Hooker had on the battle.

Meade's personality instantly transformed the AoP from an unsteady, schizophrenic, juggernaut leaving its flanks in the air, to a sensible, grounded, defensive fighting force capable of holding its ground against the best Lee could throw at it.

People might disagree, but in my mind there is no question that Hooker at Gettysburg would have resulted in a confederate victory.

What would have happened after that victory is another issue all together.

Unless by some chance Reynolds or Hancock took command over from Hooker, in the face of a reocurrence of Hooker's personal emotional collapse.

I just think it's not appreciated enough that the AoP was put under the command of a general, a man such as Meade, just in the nick of time, who was sensible and steady enough to "not w it up."

Hand that same Aop over to another general on June 28th? Wow. I don't know.

But to get back to the topic at hand…Meade taking command, in my mind, was one of the biggest factors that reduced the psychological advantage the confederates were enjoying up until that time. Meade's sensibleness, combined with the logistical realities facing Lee, were what neutralized any advanatge of psych./emotional superiority at Gettysburg.

When I think of the Gettysburg campaign, I don't think of it in terms of the confederates "peaking" and reaching a dramatic "high water mark". Rather I think of it in terms of the confederates having too many fronts to fight, and trying to water down and stretch the milk one too many times.

I don't think of it in the dramatic historical sense, but rather in the practical sense of that the Union just had too much, in too many places. In reality, the confederates were not peaking at Gettysburg, but the Union was. For all the defeats the AoP had suffered, the confederacy was still reeling on several fronts, and about to lose BIG in the western theatre.

Vicksburg was hours away from surrendering to Grant, the Mississippi was about to be lost and the confederacy was about to be cut in two. Washington was fully garrisoned, its warehouses and depots were full.

I think Vicksburg trumps Gettysburg in terms of military significance.

I'm not saying that a victory by Lee wouldn't have caused havoc politically for the Union, and a crisis. It would have, but Lee still would have to figure out how to keep his army intact and from logistically collapsing.

Capturing Washington would have taken a huge back seat to keeping his army supplied and outfitted.

Bottom Dollar 07 Apr 2012 2:35 p.m. PST

I've always thought Hooker got cowed by the sheer overwhelming audacity of General Lee. All military logic prescribed that Lee should have retreated, but he didn't. Didn't Hooker admit as much ?

*NJH: The cannon ball that knocked Hooker senseless probably caused a concussion. No one is fit to do much of anything with a concussion, let alone lead an army.

Just a thought

This has been an interesting post to read and people have made some really good points. But I think a few people who have been critical of Lee's mistakes at Gettysburg are forgetting some very important facts. Lee initially wanted no engagement on the 1st of July but his subordinates pressed the attack. When he arrived on the field he realized he had a good opportunity to crush part of the Union army and decided to take advantage. Some of his subordinates did not take the initiative and his opportunity was lost. On the second day Lee had a pretty good plan, albeit overly complicated. However, his usual workhorse Longstreet failed him. Of course the third day's attack was ill-advised to say the least and the blame falls squarely at Lee's feet. Lastly, it can't be forgotten that there is evidence Lee may have been suffering from the heart disease that would eventually kill him during the Gettysburg campaign and so his judgment may have been clouded by bad health. To make matters worse for him he was also suffering from diarrhea. While Lee was no doubt the superior general to Meade, athough Meade was damned good, Meade was certainly Lee's superior for those three days.

Sorry JeremyR Longstreets attack on the 2nd July dragged in half the Union army. Lee should have forced A.P.Hill and Ewell to take advantage of his rolling right to left assault and the Confederates would have prevailed. Longstreet cared for and was respected by the soldiers in his command, he was used as a scapegoat by lesser men who were found wanting at Gettysburg.

You have to lay the blame on Lee's doorstep. Sure he didn't want to fight so when informed a battle was in progress it was his job to make a big decision:

1. Stop the fight ASAP
2. At the end of the fight issue orders to NOT keep fighting
3. Press home the attacks and take direct control of the situation to reach some goal

He did none of those. He let things play out with little or no oversight. During the night of the first he could have hit the pause button and decide:

1. Do we really need to fight here? What are our goals here? Is this the best tactical/strategic position to attack?

2. Would we better off to move to another position to our advantage and let the Union army come at us?

As far as we know his only idea was to crush the Army of the Potomac. Given the defensive ground it was obvious this was the worst decision to make. To top it off it was also very bad even if they damaged the Army of the Potomac badly because Lee's army STILL couldn't hang around and fight another battle regardless how bad he beat them. Some historians speculate that some time during the march North he may have had a silent heart attack in addition to having the 'Virginia Quick step'. It may be the cause for his very poor performance.

@Rallynow: Gettysburg had play balance, why shouldn't we?

@DJCoaltrain: Yes, that's a good point, perhaps it wasn't cowing. Maybe he just got knocked defensive.

@Old Pete: That makes three of us.

I believe was trying to take advantage of the situation on the first after he arrived on the field. However, his two new corps commanders probably didn't fully understand his style of command. He tended to give suggestions to his corps commanders instead of direct orders. He urged Hill to continue the attack late in the day, but Hill declined. He certainly was not taking direct control by suggesting to Ewell that he should take Culp's Hill if "practicable." Early in the evening it may well have been practicable, but Ewell apparently didn't see it that way. When Lee finally arrived at Ewell's headquarters that evening the opportunity had passed. With the Union securely in place for the second day's battle it may well have been a better option for Lee to take a defensive posture but he chose to attack. This was certainly a point of contention between Lee and Longstreet who wanted to take the defensive. The tension between them may well have increased when Lee attempted to give orders directly to McLaws that morning during an officer's conference to lay out the day's plans. I believe Lee's plan for the second day was a good one, but like I said before it was overly complicated. He never gave any written orders and never gathered his three corps commanders together during the day, sometimes riding back and forth between all three. These were certainly huge mistakes by Lee. Lee told Longstreet "I thiink you have better move on," at 10 a.m. To Lee's dismay, Longstreet didn't move out until noon because he was waiting for one of his brigades to arrive. Unforunately for Longstreet he had no good intelligence on the ground he was to cross to get into position, and no intelligence on the enemy position because of the failings of Stuart. His corps wasted precious time marching and countermarching before getting into position. Had Longstreet set out two hours earlier when Lee wanted him to, albeit with one less brigade, perhaps the attack on the right flank may have actually succeeded and the Federal line may well have been rolled up, especially if the divisions of Hill had attacked in echelon. Longstreet was put into a tough position that he didn't want to be in and he didn't act decisively when he attacked. Hood wanted to move south and flank the Union left, but Longstreet said that Lee wanted him to attack up the Emmitsburg Road and that's exactly what he did. However, Hood ignored Longstreet's orders and attempted the flanking maneuver on his own, nearly succeeding but for some lucky circumstances for the Union. These are the reasons I believe Longstreet failed Lee on the second day. Unfortunately for the Confederate army, Lee failed Longstreet on the third day. The reason half the Union army was able to reinforce the attack on the left flank was the fact that Ewell did not perform his part of the plan. His job was to pin down the Federal right flank which he did not do and allowed reinforcements to travel south. When Ewell finally did do something that day he launched a disastrous frontal assault on Culp's Hill that ended in disaster. At this point in the war only a few men like Early realized Ewell was unfit to command at the corps level. I am just trying to make points that the battle of Gettysburg, for at least the first two days, was a close fought battle that could have gone either way. As others have pointed out, even if Lee had won at Gettysburg the Confederate army would have gained little by the victory. In enemy territory with ammunition and food running out they would likely have had to return to Virginia win or lose.

Late on July 1st after the first day of battle where the Confederates had mauled the Union 1st and 11th corps Gen. Lee and his trusted subordinate Gen. Longstreet discussed what would be the armies' next move. Longstreet strongly put forward the facts against continuing a struggle that could only loose more men and material which the south could ill afford Lee stated "No the enemy is there and I am going to attack him there." Longstreet responded"General, if the enemy is there tomorrow, it is because he wants you to attack him, which is a good reason, in my opinion, for not doing so." after much discussion Gen. Lee finished by telling Longstreet that they must attack.
This is one of the most decisive points in the battle, Gen. Lee was used with success the troops were confident, he was confident, but Ewell and A.P. Hill had shown very poor command control and he appeared to ignore this.
The next two days only proved Longstreet to be correct; Lee never doubted "Old Pete" and his corps delivered on the 2nd July. Where was Gen A.P. Hill on the 2nd or 3rd? Also Ewell seemed to lack confidence, depending heavily on Gen. Earlys poor council.
But even if the Confederates had prevailed at Gettysburg, would it not have been a fruitless victory?

For all those in this thread making materialist arguments about how much stuff and men the Union had which made the Union army superior, and how troops could've been rushed in and whatnot… troops is one thing, but hardened veterans is another. If the ANV had even one more tactical victory on July 2nd or July 3rd the way they did on July 1st, they may have had a numerical advantage in veteran infantry over the AOP, if they didn't already have one. So, once the AOP is on the defensive, pulling back towards Washington, where is the Union going to rush in loads of veteran troops from and how quickly ? Lee would've had probably two weeks to do something more to cut DC completely off… and he wouldn't even have to try to capture it.

where is the Union going to rush in loads of veteran troops from and how quickly ?

Rosecrans certainly could have spared some troops if allowed to put his advance to/over the Tennessee River on hold.

Grant had troops to spare after 4 July, but most of them were off with Sherman chasing Joe Johnston. Perhaps most importantly, Grant himself could have been spared from Mississippi (leaving Sherman in charge).

The operations vs. Charleston could have been put on hold and at least a division hurried north from Gillmore's department.

Again, how many days/weeks is it going to take to transfer them ? And wouldn't Davis have been more inclined to release/rush reinforcements to the ANV if Lee had won even a moderate or limited victory at Gettysburg? Someone mentioned here 5 brigades of troops officially assigned to the ANV that Lee had requested before the campaign began. And I'm not saying Lee would've decisively destroyed the AoP, only that he didn't need to in our order to put the Confederacy in a position that tipped the political scales decisively in its favor.

Davis and Lee weren't trying nor did they expect a crushing victory over the AoP, but they knew they could win a major battle… and if Davis and Lee thought that a major victory would be fruitful then that's good enough for me… and they knew far more than we'll ever now. I don't think they would've risked the operation if they didn't think it would've accomplished more than just Northern newspaper hysteria. It makes much more sense and takes far less casualties to just sit on the defensive in that situation and make the North conquor you. The one thing that Lee had over just about every other ACW general is that not only did he understand the political-strategic situation as well as any general if not better and for longer, but he was the master at precisely applying the force of an army to leverage the Confederacy's advantages.

JERRMY R said above that Ewell might have been sucessful if he attacked on July 1. A number of historians disagree. That the ANV was too tired by its fighting and marching to be sucessful. Even Gingrich in his fictional book about Gettysburg( which is based on research) wrote that Ewell would have been defeated.
Lee would not try Longst flank attack as he still did not have JEB's troops. Any flank march would have been didcoverd and destroyed.

I believe that the confederate army was superior at the Gettysburg REUNION of 1938…..better dressed, bigger tents, prettier lady companions…

Sorry, just had to inject some humor in here, heavy debate and lots of heavy hypothesis, I had to tell a joke to prevent myself from taking myself too seriously which I'm good at doing…. :P

Does that mean you were too serious in your previous posts?

I think Lee knew how to keep his army intact. He got away didn't he?

Where was Gen A.P. Hill on the 2nd or 3rd?

If you believe modern commentators he was in ill health.

Of course there is more than one version of events. Anderson's report indicates that on July 2 his division was under order to advance once McLaws advance reached him, and that he did so. I believe Lane stated that he was supposed to support with Pender's division an attack by Rhodes at the end of July 2 that never occured. The deployment of Pender's division was consistent with this mission. Heth's division was not in line. I believe Lee's Report indicated on July 2 that Hill was to threaten the U.S. center and to attack if an opportunity presented itself. This all suggests that if the master plan was that Hill's corps was as a whole to assist Longstreet in rolling up the U.S. left, somebody had neglected to inform the 3rd Corps.

On July 3 the situation is a little clearer. Pettigrew's and Trimble's forces were under Longstreet's direction, and Anderson was to support a breakthrough that didn't occur.

Some of Anderson's units did attack in support of Longstreet, but others didn't advance at all. Wilcox's brigade advanced and took major casualties from Gibbon's division and they were forced to withdraw. When Gibbon's division purued they forced Lang's brigade to withdraw. Wright's brigade advanced but was unsupported by the withdrawal of Wilcox and Lang to the south and Wright was flanked. On Wright's left, Posey withdrew from the fight after facing only slight resistence. To Posey's left Mahone never moved his brigade, insisting that he had orders from Anderson not to advance. It's hard to know if Pender was supposed to advance in support of Anderson's division as he was struck in the leg by a shell fragment and taken from the field. He died a few days later. Even more problematic for 3rd Corps was that Hill may have thought Anderson's division had been detached to Longstreet's corps. If this was the case it may have been Lee's fault as his verbal orders were less than clear.

@Bottom Dollar,

No, I didn't mean I was being too serious, I was just trying to lighten up a heavy topic for a moment, it backfired, oh well.

But to get back to what you said about Lee keeping his army intact. Well yes, he got away intact…… but he had great anxiety about his prospects for escaping back into Virginia. Particularly when he reached the river and found it swollen from rains. It was a closer thing than many remember, the ANV WAS intact but badly wounded and its abilility to continue campaigning was spent, militarily and logistically. In addition, his army may have been physically intact, but being intact doesn't mean you're properly fed, supplied, and secure by any means.

Lee was damaged, and reeling. He had to get back to supplies and safety across the river.

@Bottom Dollar,

I guess the point I'm making, is that getting away intact after disengaging from a three-day battle doesn't solve the logistical realities of a campaign or the needs of an army. Lee was using up his ammo, food, forage, animals, and on top of that had a 17-mile long wagon train of wounded that he was responsible to get safely back into Virginia.

It is true, based on soldier's accounts, that the morale of the ANV was actually pretty high even after the failure of July 3rd.

But high morale doesn't fill a stomach or load a musket.

The window of opportunity closes very quickly on an army in the field, especially if that army is low on suppplies.

Campaigner, perhaps supplies would've been sent across the Potomac if the decision at Gettysburg had been favorable. That they weren't is because a decision hadn't been reached. Once it was, and it wasn't favorable, there was no need to send supplies across the Potomac. I wonder if there were any fist fights at those reunions between the AoP and ANV veterans? You know, maybe they knock a few back and the old timers start thinking about the old days, and one says "You know we whipped you boys a lot back then" and before you know it the old timers are standing toe to toe, pushing, punching and jabbing each other with canes and whatnot.

I don't think you stop supplying an army in the field just because they lose a battle. An army has to be fed and supplied whether they win or lose. You can't seriously be saying Richmond withheld supplies because Lee lost at Gettysburg?

If Richmond withheld anything they withheld troops, not supplies. Lee had what he needed for one battle. If he needed more after a favorable decision he would've sent for it. Prior to the decision it seems he sent for more cavalry and he probably sent for more artillery ammunition. The ANV probably sent more supplies back into VA then they brought with them. Why keep more or have more than what you need sent ahead of time when you don't know how long you're staying or not.

I was going to quip "for a couple of days anyway", but don't you think it verges on who won? There were fortunate events and unfortunate events and mistakes on both sides. Both sides fought valiantly in my southern opinion. Pickett's charge may have been very brilliant if it had succeeded or unnecessary if Chamberlain was outflanked at Little Round Top. This will be discussed in hisorical and military circles for a very long time.
Now let's answer the intriguing question: True or False: the Civil War was lost at Shiloh in 1862. There are some interesting agruments for that as well.

Militarily, the Civil War (that is, the War of the Southern Rebellion) was lost at Appomattox Court House, although it dragged on for another month or so.

Politically, it was lost when Lincoln was reelected (Nov 1864).

The ANV was superior on the first day. By the 2nd both armies were almost fully present turning the tables.

With the failure to completely dislodge the AoP from Cemetery Hill Lee, knowing he was blind without Stuart, should have reorganized and prepared defenses in hopes that (1)Stuart would show and provided his much needed intel for followup operations and/or (2)the Union would rush into, pushing him out of PA, and the defensive battle that the ANV excelled at ie. 2nd Bull Run, Fredericksburg.

In answer to others comments on unit strengths, the rebels tended to feed fresh recruits directly into already organized units, which keep numbers up and provided for better training for those new recruits who could look not only to the officers but the already battle hardened vets.
The Union on the other hand continued to create entirely new units while numbers constantly dwindled in veteran units until they just combined under strength units together. This not only led to animosity for those units forced under a new name, but also failed to provide that valuable combat experience to its new units whose officers sometimes themselves were also lacking.

Last, in regards to playing historical scenarios, restricting yourself to the personalities of the General in charge only lead, as someone else stated, to recreating that which has already transpired when the point of playing is to test your style, skill with the same situation. Personalities should only come into play with subordinate commanders ie. Timidity, Slowness, Over-zealousness. Now we all have hindsight and thus one shouldn't adhere to the exact specifics of the altercation in order to keep you on your toes while still keeping in the flavor of the engagement. When I was younger, playing games with my father and brothers, we would randomly create slight variations in the reinforcement schedules to show subtle changes that could have happened due to any number of reasons, some units may arrive later, others earlier and some didn't change.

Let's be clear about this. No. They lost. Clear enough?

Mollinary

Would say AoP. Numbers, equipment, supplies say so (not to mention they had the advantage of fighting on familiar land). Obviously Ewell put Gen. Lee in a prediciment, but the age-old question persists; was PC a calculated risk or an act of desperation? I believe a bit of both. He had to know he would never get another good chance to invade the north if he didn't git-r-done right then and there.