"Was the Confederate Army superior at Gettysburg?" Topic

On Texas Brigade strengths:

At Gettysburg the four Texas Brigade regiments each had between 400 and 450 men active. They had received reinforcements to various companies in each of the regiments during the latter half of 1862 and early 1863. While Captain McBride was recovering from his shoulder wound taken at 2nd Manassas he was sent to Texas as a recruiter. He brought back 40 recruits from his home territory of Leon County to Co. C of the 5th Texas, in part due to the $50 USD enlistment bonus he was allowed to offer each recruit. Think of that enlistment bounty as 4 or 5 months pay for a Confederate private. That would have helped out the family back home during that mid-war time of deprivation. That was also a time period when a popular recruiter back in his home town could list a string of successes for Lee's army to encourage young men and assuage mothers and wives. McBride's recruiting records are about the only ones still available from that mid-war effort to boost the numbers of the Texans in the Army of Northern Virginia, so that number of 40 recruits is often quoted. I suspect it was on the high end of the success range.

Vicksburg upriver and Port Hudson down river didn't fall until the same time as Gettysburg in early July, so getting men and supplies across the Big Mississippi was still possible in the spring of 1863.

At the Wilderness in May 1864, the Texas Brigade regiments were each down to about 200 active men, half what they started the Gettysburg campaign with.

Commander quality really shouldn't be a factor in a refight, since YOU are the commander. In any battle the commander is responsible for placement, manoeuvre, and exploitation of battle conditions. It's galling to be out generaled by another just because a commander has a superior quality that allows a drastic ability to cover shortcomings, or alters the rules in extreme. Deployment, manoeuvre, and dice should be sufficient variables for the battle. Troop experience and equipment is fine, but not omnipotent command abilities.

Some toolbox actually did a re-fight of Fredricksburg, without allowing deviation from "the way it happened", and gave a 13 year old a Union division? That's child abuse!
So much for "recruiting the youngsters".

Oh yes! I had to be almost bullied into trying 1st edition Warhammer 2 years later, and when I actually got to decide what my goblins were doing I was amazed!

The toolbox in question could have posed for the role of 'Stereotypical Wargamer' in a Movie.

Pat

On the tangential question of "Commander Quality I completely agree with Cadoam 7th. I want to make my own mistakes and thereby triumph (if I should be so lucky) on my own genius. If you're going to bring in commander quality you might as well just run it by compute and call me later and tell me how I did.

As to the main question. I do not think anyone gets up in the morning and looks themselves in the mirror and decides that they're going to do a bad job that day. I think that generally, and I mean in the vast majority of cases, generals do their best with what they have, the information that comes their way, and the opportunities that they perceive. So much in war is pure chance that unless you are going to have a gross dispararity between contenders, questions of "the best" are pointless. I am a thoroughgoing and unapolagetic Clauswitzian, and I recall that Clausewitz said that "Warfare is the human activity most under the governance of chance." In his whole work Clausewitz said that the the training, equipment and operation of the machine was done to allow the best chance of recovery from an unforseen disaster or to take advantage of an unplanned opportunity. But then, in Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War he places in the mouths of the Athenian envoys these words to the Spartan Ephors. "Remember, while there is still time the inscrutable nature of war and how, when prolonged, it frequently ends by being a matter of mere chance."

The other corroboration from history that I have noted is that just because you use good tactics does not entitle you to expect victory, or that the enemy makes egregious blunders that he will of necessity be defeated. Good tactics are no more a guarantee of victory as bad tactics are a certainty of defeat.

OFM-
You raise a great question- How far should one take "commander quality" in any wargame?

Only for subordinate commanders who are not being played. The commander commanded by YOU should live or die solely by your own skill and ability.

Giving ME superior gaming traits because I amd Lee or Napoleon, or inferior because I am Burnsides is wrong, in my opinion.
I thought the whold point of reenactments on the table top was to see if you could do better, not to display their failings.

On the overall topic of winning. The Rebels lacked the things that made the battle outcome irrelevant, Supply and logistics. Meade seemed to understand that he didn't need to drive the rebels from the field. He didn't even need to win any given day or even the battle as a whole. He just needed to keep his men in the field facing the rebels. In Northern Virginia, that might have been a questionable objective. However, on home turf it was a fore gone conclusion. If the army had to retreat, they would be falling back on supply points like Baltimore or Washington. However, the rebels would not be able to maintain their front as they would need to forage or starve. Even this would only give them a week or so before they exhaust this. Making matters worse, Lee doesn't have away to cross the Susquehanna river. No bridging equipment. However, that handles only food and forage. How do they resupply ammo, particularly artillery ammo? Finally, the "winning" rebels would be surrounded in a sense. They would have a sizeable army between themselves and their supply with a constant threat of new Yankee troops coming in by train from any direction.

In reverse, Meade learns this lesson and the AOP heads south in 64-65 with all logistic details worked out to the point the army could get their bread warm at Petersburg.

So, the whole question for anyone in Lee's shoes is how do you not lose?

OFM-
I'll see if my group will agree. I found myself taking an entire game trying to get my US militia out of the woods at Monmouth. Reason? Partly because it was militia, but also because I was playing Dickinson, an apparently "mediocre" commander. I'm already a mediocre commander. I don't need help! ;)

Thanks, doc mcb. Heck, 400 men plus ! It's like they took special care to keep the ranks full and combat ready. According to Scott Mingus' scenario book, Enduring Valor, here were their numbers at Gettysburg

1st Texas: 426
3rd Ark: 479
4th Texas: 415
5th Texas: 409

I believe all 18 of Hood's battalions/regiments were over 300 men and quite a few as noted were over 400. An entire division staffed with full ranks combat ready… looking at McLaws or Anderson's division, I see much the same each with 4 brigades fully staffed and ranked… they did have a couple of official battalions and legions but even those were full. Was there even a single comparable Union division in the AoP as far as consistency of numbers and uniformity of ranks was concerned ? Then add in the experience of those three divisions, under a unified command, fully staffed and ranked, with a rationalized unit structure, and it becomes pretty much impossible to identify any AoP formation of similar size, consistency and power. My point being, it wasn't all about man vs. man and who had the better morale as some things were institutionalized or built into the system--or were not---which lent themselves to better combat performance, higher morale, etc…

"The commander commanded by YOU should live or die solely by your own skill and ability."

Yes, I agree. Restricted controls and historical personality handicaps should be left out. A player should feel free to bring their own handicaps and personality restrictions to the table without having to contend with someone else's purported ones. Sure give the Jackson figure a bonus, but YOU make the decisions.

PS Though I have to admit of all the one's I've seen, Johnny Reb's suggested order restrictions seem to sit the lightest.

A coment about Lee and Burnside. Lee makes one frontal assult against a hill and it's a GLORIOUS CHARGE. Burnside troops made ( I believe 13 ) charges at Fred-Burg and he is considered to be fool. Why

However, I am interested to know from a wargame perspective whether the result is a foregone conclusion irrespective of which army takes the role of attacker. A simple wargame role reversal.

From a wargaming perspective, I think the south can win the battle, so no, not a forgone conclusion.

What we know about the battle is that southern corps commanders on Day One did NOT follow up their gains, and push the union off a pair of hills which were barely occupied.

In a wargame, "you" as commander not only generally have a pretty good view of the terrain and enemy, you are not normally saddled with poor communications with your units. ANd your generals don't balk at your orders.

So a wargame with any good set of rules gives the south a pretty good chance of winning day one. Which would totally change the terrain being fought over on day two, which … heads you down what-if territory.

But can they win in a wargame? I sure think so.

Reversing the roles, and having the union attacking the rebels, would (for me) all come down to which units arrive when, and what constitutes a victory. I don't believe that "the attacker at Gettysburg is fated to lose."

John Keegan was once asked if the Allies were superior to the Germans in WWII. He said "of course they were, after all they won the war."

A coment about Lee and Burnside. Lee makes one frontal assult against a hill and it's a GLORIOUS CHARGE. Burnside troops made ( I believe 13 ) charges at Fred-Burg and he is considered to be fool. Why

You answered your own question. Because he did it 13 times!

I see things a little differently. I believe that the first day was the deciding day of the battle.
When Reynolds led the 1st Corps into battle on July 1st and smashed Archer' and Davis's Brigades and occupied Herbst Woods, that was the best start the AoP could have gotten. A one hour battle followed by 6 hours of Confederates massing for a counterattack followed by a 2 hour retreat to Seminary Ridge. I count somewhere between a 9 to 10 hour delay for the ANV. If the ANV had arrived at the big hills at noon I am sure his troops could have massed for an attack before dark. I don't believe that carrying the hills after dark with exhausted men who had been fighting in the heat all day was "practicable". Some of the AoP troops up there were fresh and some were battle hardened veterans.
"Give me one REGIMENT! and I'll take that hill. He said nothing!" That was the 1st Corps up there, Trimble and his 1 regiment would never have returned.
I would love to game July 1st some time. I've argued this before and many don't agree, but I think with Buford and Reynolds and the First Corps the AoP got off to the best start possible. If I may blaspheme, I don't even know if Jackson himself could have taken the high ground. (There I said it)
Anyway, July 2nd, the battle for the Roundtops would not have assured the ANV victory. That was argued in a recent thread, and day 3 had little chance of success. So IMHO July 1st was game.

I have played the first day using JR2 many times over the years and the results are about 50/50. A lot depends on player skill and knowledge of the rules.

If the Rebs win, it is usually because the Yanks hang around too long before falling back or they get caught before reaching Culps hill.

If the Rebs do enough damage to the Yanks before they get up on the hill then the Rebs have a chance to take it. But if a skillful Union player is able to conduct an ordered withdraw then it is very difficult for the Rebs to move them off that hill.

Confederate army superior at Gettysburg?

By virtue of a logical absurdity, it was not superior!

Apparently a concentrated Union Army holding good and high defensive positions was superior enough to inflict a Confederate defeat, sad for me to say.
Don't know if superiority without further defining it is applicable here. Circumstances throughout the three days certainly could have favored the Confederates such as Longstreet's flank attack day two, a little late, and a lucky Union recon saved it. The Peach Orchard and Wheatfield probably needed more Confederate concentration to push it through. Picket's charge with better Confederate artillery fire and a closer attack distance might have changed the entire battle. Many what ifs. I've always maintained that from a religious perspective, (my own of course), that the death of Stonewall Jackson may have been a sign that victory was not to be. And here we are today fellows, a big strong country that is a force to be reckoned with.

Scoreboard

chamberlin captured what brigade?

Plug it into a modified Lancester equation.

Union had 93,500 PFDE and took 23,055 casualties

Confederates had 75,268 effectives and officers and took 23,231 casualties.

Union is conducting a hasty defence (x1.3)

Actual combat power ratio = 23055/23231 = 0.992

Superiority of Confederates to reach known result from theoretical (assuming linear model) = (93,500*1.3/75,368)/0.992 =1.62

To answer why we must turn to Barloon's PhD thesis. An analysis shows that the Confederates were simply better at concentrating their strength at different points. For example in an average action during a battle the Union typically had more guns available, but the Confederates more guns actually in action. Part of their superiority was simply a more responsive system of command and control, not Confederate supermen.

My own feeling is, you gotta modify historical war gaming scenarios/battles by placing them within defined parameters in order to achieve play balance…. and that would go for any period. It's impossible to replicate all of the conditions and variables that the actual commanders coped with and which contributed to the historical outcome. In short, you can't just plunk down opposing armies using an equal fig to man ratio and say "There ! Now we're going to find out if Napoleon should've won ! "

Furthermore, in my view, if you want to recruit new miniature war gamers make sure to use scenarios which are as balanced as possible with scenario specific rules or modified OB's, entrance times, deployment optionsn, etc…, etc… Sure, go ahead and re-fight Fredericksburg and even use the same OB over the same terrain but get creative and figure out how to give both sides a 50/50 chance while still preserving the kernel of what Fredericksburg was or what it could've been ! Cause nothing draws people in better than a tight, hard fought and competitive battle/game.

Regarding July 1st, 1863, I think Ewell's decision to not attempt Culp's Hill had more to do with it than meets the eye.

I think that one of the reasons that the Battle of Gettysburg has lasting appeal for simulation gamers is that there are so many compelling "what ifs." If the Union reinforcements were more sluggish in their arrival, if Sickles had not advanced beyond the point of prudence, if the Rebels had driven up Cemetary Hill on day one, so much might have been different. And I think the reason that we can focus on these factors is because the armies were so evenly matched in so many regards. Had one side been patently superior at the outset, I don't think we would have as much fun as we do exploring alternative outcomes.

On the night of 2 July the decision to "Stay and fight it out"
by MG Meade. Seems to me to be the moment the AOP transformed. Lincoln had a decisive general in the old snapping turtle.
Cheers,
Joel

Well, there's one thing I think people understood about General Meade. A committment to duty and authority were high on his priority list… as well as being an old snapping turtle :)

This thread reminds me of why I don't do refights.

Yes the ANV could win the battle. Get Ewell off his arse. Coordinate attacks better. Enthuse Longstreet in what he didn't want to do, all manner of things. Same would apply if you swapped positions and had equal numbers of Union attack.

However, it wouldn't be "Gettysburg" it would be a game played on the terrain of that battle.

For me this whole "lets see if we can do better" idea is pointless. The result still stands and nothing you can do in a wargame will change or come close to replicating the reality, so any outcome will be tainted. May be fun but doesn't prove anything.

The discussion on if the ANV were superior is a different question or questions.

One concerns how you rate units within sets of wargames rules and on what basis you make your judgements. The other relates to when the opposing armies in the East changed their relationships in terms of ability and confidence.

Napoleon won the 1809 campaign but by the end of it he had changed his view of the Austrian army.

For me the AOP were the Austrians.

The South beat them and their predecessors from 1st Bull Run to Chancellorsville but they couldn't get rid of them.

In the Overland Campaign they shot men down in droves but they still couldn't stop them getting to Richmond and inflicting mortal damage on the ANV en route.

You have to acknowledge the resistance of the ANV against odds and lack of all manner of supply but they were fighting for and in a territory they considered home after 1863, which counts for a lot.

After Gettysburg most of the AOP were fighting just to win a war which takes something extra.

Nobody has mentioned Lee's potential 10th division; he wanted to take three or four additional brigades of good troops, and had a good commander along as a supernumerary for them. Don't recall the specifics but someone can probably provide them.

Bowdein's Gettysburg book: Ransom's, Cooke's, Corse's, Evans', and Jenkins' brigades, 11000 + infantry, Lee wanted them and Davis refused.

Yes, those were all official ANV brigades, IIRC, guarding strategic points in Virginia. Lee wanted units from other depts. to release them.

Speaking of Gettysburg scenarios for a July 1st scenario, I would keep it exclusively on the ground west and north of Gettysburg, the town might be partially onboard The premise would be that Howard blanks and doesn't hold a force back on Cemetery Hill, but commits his entire force to the perimeter defense of Gettysburg north of the town. Basically, the full compliment of 1st and 11th Corps infantry and artillery plus Buford's screening cavalry versus 4 Confederate division---Pender, Heth, Rodes and Early--as well as a couple of the Reb cavalry battalions that were with Ewell and make sure to have most if not all of the Reb corps artillery available. Using corps deployment zones, all units will deploy onboard. Yanks deploy first, followed by the Rebs. Exit victory conditions for the Rebs along the south/east table edge into or through the town… say two good morale regiments.

Yes, the table edges would sort of act as strategic flanks forcing the battle into a head on, set piece confrontation. Deployment would be critical as would Game length. A further premise could be that the Rebs had decided to gather their full gamut of forces for the day before attacking the Federal position… a premise which I think is supported in the historical record, as that's what Lee wanted to do… not that it turned out that way… but it might have entailed a condensed period of action.

To 67th Tigers – You lost me on the math. But I've always had my own take on army strength and percentage of loss as a way to determine results. I think an interesting way to look at how the armies performed is to compare their strength to how many losses they inflicted. In the end of course it is meaningless, who won is what really matters. But it is another way to look at this "superiority" question.
Army of the Potomac had a strength of roughly 94,000 and inflicted 23,000 casualties on the Army of No.Va. That translates to every four men inflicting 1 casualty.
The Army of No.Va. had a strength of roughly 72,000 and inflicted 23,000 casualties. That translates to every three men inflicting 1 casualty; while on the attack no less.
Clearly demonstrating the superiority of the Southern fighting man vs. his northern counterpart. :)

Well I suspect that the disproportionate casualties has more to do with the breaking of the Howard's IX Corp – one with a less that stellar record under a mediocre officer* – that was then closely pursued. In contract, the Union remember that they had to hold their position and did not pursue the broken Confederates on the 2nd or 3rd Days.

* True Howard is not in the same league as Conferedate Generals like Braxton Bragg or Early Van Dorn, but he wasn't the brightest bulb on the Union tree.

My own feeling is that the average infantrymen in the ANV was EXPECTED and ASKED to do more than his counterpart in the AOP at that POINT in the war. That was going to change shortly though.

Those are interesting numbers and they do help in understanding. A similar set of numbers I've noticed is casualty rates. A unit that was in heavy action always seemed to have 1 in 3 getting "hit by something". In an average combat 1 in 4.

An interesting study to do would be to study survival rates, how many times men were getting wounded. Sort of tracking and comparing. Like if you got a serious wound and recovered, what was the army culture like. Did people think you had "paid your dues" kind of thing. My ancestor in the 8th NJ got wounded at Williamsburg… I don't know how seriously… but he got furlough like a week before Chancellorsville, and I'm not sure if he was at Gettysburg either. But then in the Spring of '64 he gets out of an army stockade, and then promptly gets wounded in the Wilderness… not sure how seriuosly. I believe he stayed with the unit through all the battles of the Overland Campaign until mustering out later the summer. He was a 3 year volunteer.

Anyway, the point being a lot could be inferred by a comparative, long term casualty study of the ANV and AOP through different stages of the war.

138, I think one of the difficulties of gaming July 1st is that the 11th is bound to get flanked when deployed as they were historically. They put up a good fight until Early got into position and flanked the heck out of them. I believe most got captured while falling back thru Gettysburg. The 1st Corp may have had a clearer and unobstructed route AROUND the town to Cemetery Hill and Ridge which is why more of them got away.

Therefore . . . when gaming the Battle of Gettysburg, organise the sides using the OOB from the actual battle and command as YOU will. Whether you reverse the sides (Union attacking Confederates) neither side has a marked advantage over the other, in equipment, logistics, corp commanders, etc., and the AoV does NOT have a superiority over the AoP. Neither does Lee have a superiority over Meade.

And, apparently, no matter how one's own wargame refight pans out it will not effect the actual result of the real battle of almost 150 years ago.

Gentlemen, you have been treasures and I am sorry to have lost some of you along the way!

As aye,

Captain D'Ewell

I still say give the Rebs more elite brigades and give the Yanks more and better artillery for Gettysburg at least. And of course the Yank infantry could give as good as they got. They had learned to work pretty well together.

Don't forget that just before Gettysburg AoP had just lost thousands of troops that had seen the elephant… The short enlistments that were leaving in droves were a serious worry to Hooker. Some of the replacements were green troops. I think Hooker fighting with Hallack about getting replacement troops was one of the things that lead to his replacement.

This thread has been a very interesting read…

I think Hooker fighting with Hallack about getting replacement troops was one of the things that lead to his replacement

Getting screwed at Chancellorsville probably didn't help either. :o)

"Getting screwed at Chancellorsville probably didn't help either."

hmmm….. do tell.

I've always thought Hooker got cowed by the sheer overwhelming audacity of General Lee. All military logic prescribed that Lee should have retreated, but he didn't. Didn't Hooker admit as much ?

I'll admit it having a dog in this fight: I think there's *still* a reward in some states for members of my family due to their activity in the underground railroad.

But based on the final score, the Confederate Army was NOT superior to the Union Army at Gettysburg. Based on my readings, there were a couple close calls, but I would have to describe the conduct of the battle as … "blunderous" on the part of the Rebs. Failure to follow up on gains and attacks, failure to ensure that *everyone* knew who was in charge of the army.

And I'd say that the critical failure point was that all the Union troops knew Meade was in charge, end of discussion. There seems to be some debate as to whether Lee was actually in charge of the ANV.

"Getting screwed at Chancellorsville probably didn't help either."

hmmm….. do tell.

Well you know me BD, man of many talents. One of which is stating the freeking obvious! :o)

I've always thought Hooker got cowed by the sheer overwhelming audacity of General Lee.

The fact that Hooker got to Chancellorsville would indicate that he outmaneuvered Lee, his probably was then he stopped where he did.

Hooker totally didn't expect a battle THERE. He was completely thrown by Lee. Really a Southern masterpiece. Nearly surrounding and cutting off the the 6th Corps was icing on the cake. BRILLIANT.

I agree with Agesilaus. If A.P.Hill and Ewell could have shown the same level of control of their forces as Gen. Longstreet showed on his assault late on the 2nd July then the Confederates would have prevailed. Would this victory have changed the outcome of the war? I seriously doubt it.

Furthermore, in my view, if you want to recruit new miniature war gamers…

Who said anything about recruting anybody? The topic is "Was the Confederate Army superior at Gettysburg?"

The confederate army was not superior to the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg – not materially, practically, logistically, or in the quality of the men. In fact it was inferior in every key military category in terms of numbers, supplies, and logistics.

However, its men THOUGHT they were superior because of the string of victories it had enjoyed during the previous year and a half. Its men were riding a mental high of sorts I believe, and they carried that with them into Pennsylvania.

That feeling of psychological and emotional superiority over one's opponent can itself give a direct and meaningful advantage over an opponent.

I don't think the Army of the Potomac's situation was all that different from the situation like the Buffalo Bills found themselves in in the 90's, losing four Super Bowls in a row from 1990-1993. After enough failures, you just begin to get in your head, "hey, we can't do this, this just isn't meant to be."

I know that's overly simplistic, comparing the NFL to the Civil War. But I think the psychology of repeated victory vs. repeated failure is very similar.

I think the Army of the Potomac was beginning to suffer a little from the Buffalo Bills syndrome as they tramped into Pennsylvania. However, I think the big difference was, THIS time it was going to be a game on their home turf, and despite all the recent failures, they got it in their heads that "we'll be DAMNED if we're going to lose the NEXT one, not on our own soil. We HAVE to win this one. We simply cannot ALLOW another defeat."

I feel that collectively there was a test of wills at Gettysburg, and I think in the end the psychological advantage actually went slightly to the AoP, because of their pride and refusal to lose yet another one, NOT this one.

On a more practical level, to the contrary I assert that the confederate army was materially and numerically inferior in just about every way possible. Longer lines of supply and communication, no possibility of reinforcement, exterior lines, generals new to corps commmand. They suffered from every military disparity possible, on a command, strategic, and tactical level.

With Meade in command of the Aop, a man who was not afraid to dig in his heels, and with enough common military sense to prevent himself from commiting a major blunder in Lee's front, it caused the Army of Nothern Virginia to lose most of its psychological superiority at Gettysburg.

I believe that the AoP stole back the mental initiative at Gettysburg, if just barely so and just barely in time.

One could say that things "evened out" psychologically, and did so just in time, to the great fortune of the Union.

EJ Nashill's post of April 3rd nails it, particularly the points about artillery and Gen. Meade.

The confederates were shackled by the fact that they had limited artillery ammunition, that was a huge factor.

One of the things that initially frustrated Lincoln, was that Meade only stopped Lee at Gettysburg, but did not pursue and finish him off.

When Lincoln thought better on it, he realized that Meade had accomplished quite a bit in stopping Lee, and softened the tone of his criticism.

Meade was very sensible and wise in the sense that, as EJ Nashill said, Meade knew he didn't need to drive Lee from the field, and he didn't need to destroy Lee completely in pitched battle. All that was necessary was to engage Lee in a battle that was prolonged and pitched, and therefore force Lee to use up his army's resources.

Meade simply had to maneuver, fight, and not lose. Dig in, hang on, and let Lee shoot his bolt so to speak.

Even a partial victory at Gettysburg for Lee wouldn't have solved his immediate problems. A retreating AoP could have fallen back on the Washington defenses, and received thousands of reinforcements and virtually an endless supply of rations and ammunition.

By contrast Lee would have been floating on an island in the Pennsylvania countryside, short of ammo, short of food, short of forage for his horses and mules, and NO way to sustain the campaign further and NO way to engage in another pitched battle. The ANV would be in lower Pa. with the choices of turning back to Virginia, or attempting an attack on the Washington defenses.

The great irony is that, even with a confederate victory at Gettysburg, the events afterwards wouldn't have looked much different than a confederate defeat. In all likelihood, even with Lee in possession of Cemetery Hill, Ridge, and with Meade in full retreat, Lee would STILL have had to withdraw.

His army couldn't eat dirt, they couldn't shoot rocks.

There is always this assumption that if Lee had forced Meade to retreat at Gettysburg, the end of the world would have suddenly been initiated, and that Lee could have simply marched any where he wished and captured Washington or any other northern city he wished.

This is a fantasy. You've got 60,000+ stomachs to fill, you've got several hundred artillery pieces running low on ammunition, you've got thousands of horses and mules all needing tons of forage daily. You're hanging with your in the air in enemy country, facing an enemy who can fall back on the full magazines and loaded warehouses of Washington D.C. and Baltimore, not to mention a garrison of some 30,000 Union heavy artillery and infantry units manning the defenses of Washington.

Forget for a moment all the Gettysburg possibility what-if scenarios, what he could have done, what he couldn't have done, where Lee would have gone next, how would he have ended the war.

The reality is that Lee, win or lose, would have found himself at the mercy of the laws of energy and physics, those laws are irrefutable and indelible.

His army would have run out of military fuel very quickly, in the face of an enemy with nearly limitless military fuel.

Lee wasn't a magician. His army wasn't supernatural. His men and animals couldn't live without food and water. They couldn't shoot magic bullets and shells.

It was vulnerable to starvation ,destitution, and logistical collapse just the same as any other army.

And if a Civil War army found itself in a situation where it could not support itself logistically, it could find itself in trouble VERY quickly.