"French Training in Loose Order Fighting" Topic

Certainly seems to be a major difference (if not the major difference) between the French and British in how they deployed entire units as skirmishers.

I mean, if the French did not set up a reserve of ~1/3 the force as a fall-back point and reserves for when the troops on the line exhausted their ammunition, they could cover more ground at the expense of being able to sustain the action for a shorter period and taking longer to re-form.

Here is an explanation of the grande bande from the French officer Duparcq writing in the mid 19th century:

Attack as skirmishers.
In mountainous and woody countries there are positions which can be attacked neither in line nor in column, the ground being too much covered or cut up by ravines and escarpments to allow any order of march to be observed. They are then attacked by skirmishers; but these must be in large numbers; thus battalions, sometimes even regiments, or a whole brigade, are detached for this purpose, and in this case they are designated as skirmishers en grande bande.

Much greater skill and valour are required of the soldier for fighting and advancing in this manner, than in combats in close ranks, where the touch of the elbow and the unity of the command sustains him.
The influence of the officers being purely moral, they can do no more than set the example of bravery. The soldier has here every facility for lagging behind, wandering away, and hiding from the surveillance of his superiors.
The men feel themselves less supported and more exposed to the chances of hand-to-hand combats than when they form parts of a mass, where the danger threatens no individual specially.
In this sort of combat, if the soldiers are not brave and enthusiastic, they will fire a whole day without advancing, and will squat behind trees, hedges, and walls, doing very little mischief, and scarcely receiving any. Such attacks are without vigor, and must often fail.

Note the similarities with the action at Busaco described by Pelet in Bill's posts above. Also note that this formation is for use when the terrain prohibits the use of close order formations and was surely not the ideal formation for troops operating in the open, unless they were incapable of doing anything else.

Regarding any difference between British and French skirmish practice, from the written instructions that have survived, there seems to have been very little difference at all.

The desciption of the skirmishing at Busaco by Pelet needs to be looked at carefully. In my opinion, he is not describing a typical skirmish screen, but rather the gradual disorder and disintigration of a brigade due to both enemy fire and the difficulties of the terrain. There are similar descriptions of large British units dispersing amongst rocks and bushes to carry on the fight when close order could not be maintained and also descriptions of entire British battalions being ordered to disperse and fight as skirmishers in vineyards, even though the troops were not trained as light infantry.

The term "skirmishing" was used to describe both regular skirmishing with formed supports and reserves, and also the more irregular type of fighting where close order could not be maintained, for whatever reason.

George Cathcart, who participated in the 1813 campaign in Germany, descibed how French light troops operated in regular skirmishing operations, specifically stating that all other nations followed the same system:

Every line of tirailleurs was invariably sustained by adequate small supports formed in rear, and, as far as might be, sheltered; but ready at hand to reinforce or relieve their comrades who were actually engaged. But, besides this, a sufficient and concentrated reserve was invariably stationed not far off, to sustain the whole of these advanced combatants. Thus, when people talk of a cloud of light troops, although the appearance may have warranted that figure of speech, the duty was nevertheless conducted with method, and in accordance with these principals. The author has dwelt on this particular feature more in detail than he otherwise would have done HAD NOT THE SAME SYSTEM APPLIED TO ALL OTHER NATIONS ENGAGED, with this difference only, that in its application, the duty of light infantry is perhaps more influenced by national character than any other tactical subject of consideration. In that duty individual intelligence is the main requisite; and the French are, without question, by nature the most intelligent light troops in the world.

John Mitchell fought against the French many times and wrote a book on tactics after the wars. Although he had some rather strange opinions, I think that his general condemnation of the French system is interesting. This is probably how many "heavy skirmish screens" came about:

The generals of the French republic and Napoleon Bonaparte, overran continental Europe with infantry masses 24 deep; thus placing 22 men out of 24 in a position that prevented them from making any use of their arms, but which left them needlessly exposed to all the fierce and fiery missiles of modern war. Such bodies were hurled on, mass after mass, to victory or destruction as chance directed. When the compact formation was broken, either by the fire of the enemy, the inequalities of the ground, or by other causes, it was not unusual for the whole mass to dissolve itself into swarms of Tirailleurs, who, continuing to advance, made up by the individual gallantry of the men and the intelligence of the regimental officers, for the incompetency of their leaders, and the wretchedness of their system.

Ardant Du Picq's observations are also interesting when discussing masses of skirmishers. Although he was writing in the mid 19th century, the problems with lack of control and disorder would have been no different in Napoleonic times:

We have a method, a manner rather, that accords with the national tendency, that of skirmishers in large numbers. But this formation is nowhere formulated. Before a campaign it is decried. Properly so, for it degenerates rapidly into a flock of lost sheep. Consequently troops come to the battlefield entirely unused to reality. All the leaders, all the officers, are confused and unoriented. This goes so far that often generals are found who have lost their divisions or brigades; staff officers who have lost their generals and their divisions both; and, although this is more easily understood, many company officers who have lost their commands.

I think that that the Major has provided some great descriptions of skirmishing, particularly French skirmishing from the 19th Century. And I agree, the actual difference between French and British practices in deploying a skirmish screen are minimal.

However, in describing Pelet and his narrative, I do disagree with this analysis:

In my opinion, he is not describing a typical skirmish screen, but rather the gradual disorder and disintigration of a brigade due to both enemy fire and the difficulties of the terrain.

Pelet speaks specifically of 'our system' and contrasts it to the British practices during the same engagement. While the terrain and enemy fire certainly could and did lead to disorder, it is the 'system' chosen by the French, in this case, Pelet identifies the conscious choice of mass deployment of the entire brigade as the problem and that is why he contrasts the French 'system' to the British practices.

It is the French decision to deploy en mass that Pelet identifies as the cause of the problems, problems that Pelet notes were not suffered to the same extent by the British, even though the French did drive the British skirmishers back on their own supports.

And Pelet's comments about 'our system' does not agree with du Picq's statement that "…this formation is nowhere formulated" half a century later. That it can lead to degenerate rapidly is obvious.

Bill H.

You think it surprising that I think that Napoleonic infantrymen weren't generally or typically trained to carry out fighting in urban areas or carry out the storming of breaches.

Whirlwind:

Yes, I was surprised that you held that view. I hadn't heard that view expressed or written about except in the claim that the 1806 Prussians were 'trained' to fight in villages, which isn't true. There is a great deal of writing during the Napoleonic period concerning the 'how tos' in fighting in urban areas.

Best Regards,

Bill H.

It is interesting what Mitchell has to say – but it is a one sided remark as well, Napoleon did not overrun Europe with a colonne de bataillon par peloton, the French used a much more refind system of tactics combining line, columns and skirmishing.

So far I also would have agreed that tirailleurs en grande bande were only dissolved infantry (and sometimes this could be) due to lack of discipline in internal cohesion, but after reading Rogniat and especially the response of Marbot – it is evident that this deliberate skirmishing in masses did exist in the French army.

In reading the comments above and the refernces contained, I was somehow reminded of some observations I made when I was in college. The university built a new student union building surrounded by lawns and carefully thought out paved pathways radiating out to where they expected the foot traffic to be. The students worn the lawn out making paths that defined where the foot traffic really was. The university later tore up the original paved paths and put them down where the people were actually walking. The point that I try to develop is that sometimes complicated relationships are best left to happen first and then be described, rather than planned and then happen to plan.

I am wondering if the spontaneous, improvised nature of much of skirmishing just "happened" and the manuals were written later in order to define what already was. They added some structure to it, attempts to control its start and supports and some (usually futile) attempts to be able to end it. I see officers writting descriptions of skirmishing and charterizations of it, and definitions of good qualities of it. I see them talking about "our usual methods" and the like. I don't see much (but there is some)talk about "fire and movement", "zones of fire", "establishing fire superiority and advancing", "flank attacks" and "covered approaches". These are modern terms for small infantry tactics & we don't see like terms in literature published then. I am suspecting that the actual tactics were developed and taught at the NCO level and were very flexible & not very amenable to rote classification and definition by officers. So we don't see the citified, educated, townsmen officers writing about the nitty-gritty of skirmishing. We do see them hiring forresters, poachers, and frontiersmen (Croats) to cover these skills.

Summation: Skirmishing was a fluid skill controlled and practiced at the NCO level.

After reading the discussions in Rogniat and Marbot I come to the conclusion that mass skirmishing, or tirailleurs en grande bande was a tactical tool – well established and used within the French army – not restricted to regimental structures but going up to a infantry division.

this has nothing to do with the so called irregular firing invented by Elting, which did not exist in military terms of French Napoleonic infantry while en grande bande is mentioned

After thinking a little more, the "drill" on spacing of skirmish pairs, and the very typical instruction that one musket of the pair should always be loaded, does constitute some rules down to the lowest level. Another comment is that any fine officer-based tactics need to be within the sound of a voice (coarse tactics could be by music). For skirmishers, especially in any broken terrain, where these tactics often replaced the use of formed units, the command radius was that of a NCO or a senior enlisted man. There were also maybe a hundred tactic units to control rather than one per company or battalion. Hence the angst expressed by officers who wrote manuals and histories.

Bill,

Regarding Pelet's description of Busaco, like the majority of eyewitness accounts of the period, it is incomplete and leaves us having to guess in order to fill in the gaps. You see the word "system" implying that there was some sort of plan being followed, and you could be correct, but looking at what he actually wrote leaves some serious doubts in my mind. In making any judgement, we also have to assume that Horward's translation is 100% accurate and reflects the true meaning of Pelet's original text, which may or may not be the case. Assuming that Horward's translation is accurate, lets look at what is written:

As Loison's division was thrown back, a brigade of Marchand's division was pushed forward, but too late. It occupied the abutment beyond the passage of the upper Moura after a dispute with the enemy; each occupied it successively.

I am presuming that it was Marchand's brigade that occupied the abutment. What seems obvious from the subsequent sentences is that Marchand's troops were still in close formation at this point.

The English maneuvered and fell back as soon as they received some cannon fire. Our brigade, attacked on its flank by artillery, was thrown to the left of the road.

"Thrown to the left of the road" could mean that either the men moved of there own accord to escape the fire, or that the columns were ordered to move in this direction – it just isn't clear.

After fighting for some time, it found itself almost entirely dispersed into groups of skirmishers, and in the end it was necessary to support this unit with the second brigade.

What is clear from this phrase is that the brigade did not commence the assault or fighting in loose order, but this was something that occured during the fighting. What is not clear is how this came about, and whether this was from necessity or intention. The phrase "found itself" doesn't imply to me that it was a planned activity. Also, by Pelet's own admission, the brigade was not entirely dispersed as skirmishers, so what were the rest doing? Had they managed to retain their formation, or had they been held back in reserve? It just isn't clear, but his later comments about the Anglo-Portuguese system of skirmishing suggests that the former is the case.
It is also not clear how the second brigade provided support, but from the rest of the passage the implication is that they just joined the crowd.

Thus we covered the entire slope below the convent of Bussaco

This isn't particulary helpful to us in determining the extent of the formation. Is he talking about the entire width, the entire depth or both?

The most difficult thing to get clear in my mind is how a large unit such as a brigade, in close order and already in combat, would be able to extend into skirmishing order. Even if the skirmishing was en debandade, rather than in organised files, space would be required, otherwise the soldiers would just be getting in each other's way.

If the brigade was in a line of battalion columns at deploying intervals, there would probably be 4 or 5 men per yard once the formation was abandoned. Although the formation would probably have expanded sideways to a certain degree, I imagine that most of the dispersal would have been from front to rear and going by other descriptions posted above, the bravest men and officers would be at the front, the rest some way behind, looking for an opportunity to bunk out.

We are perhaps trying to squeeze too much out of this passage, but if there is any organised "system" here, I'm afraid I can't see it.
:-)

General Desmichel's 1828 Essai sur le Service des Tirailleurs suggests that the French 'system' for tirailleurs en grande bandes was the same as for skirmish companies.

Battalions deployed in three elements, a skirmish line, support to the skirmish line and a reserve. The distance from reserve to supports was 50m.

I don't see the mystery about controlled skirmishing.

XV Brigada wrote:

I don't see the mystery about controlled skirmishing.

I agree that there isn't any mystery here.

The mystery, in my opinion, is whether the "grande bandes" of the Napoleonic era functioned in the manner described by Pelet at Busaco, where there were clearly no supports and reserves, or in a more regular manner as described by Desmichel. For example, when it is claimed that 5,000 French infantry fought as skirmishers in the woods at Hannau in 1813, how were they controlled? Were they regularly organised as described by Demichel, or is the term "skirmishers" being used just because they were not in a regular formation?

Very interesting read boys.

Desmichel is describing "The Manner of Dispersing one or more Battalions as Skirmishers"

It is properly controlled and more or less the same as deploying a skirmish company but on a larger scale, as I described, with the battalion divided into the three elements.

The line of deployment is identified to battalion commander/s and the end of the skirmish line has markers and/or a regulating unit. Each line is commanded by captains and orders are transmitted by horn or drum. I will get round to translating the whole piece one of these days.

I think that the French, based on the various surviving instructions we know about, used controlled skirmishing much as any other nationality did.

On the other hand I suspect that they were more willing to throw troops into terrain such as woods and built up areas, than their peers were, where control was not possible. But that is just my opinion.

Tirailleurs en grandes bandes, simply means skirmishers in a large party, in contrast to a smaller skirmish company. It was 'mission oriented' and not subordinate to another unit, like a skirmish company, and did not function on behalf of one.

The battalions of a brigade might, for example, deploy all their voltigeur companies. These consititute a lot of skirmishers but each company conformed to the battalion it comes from. They are not en grande bande.

A single battalion from a brigade might, on the other hand, deploy entirely as skirmishers for a particular mission. This is en grande bande even though it might actually consitute fewer men than every voltigeur company from the brigade, as in the previous example.

It was size that mattered, and purpose.

Tirailleurs en grande bande were a main body, a "corps principale", used in attack or defence, where circumstances preculded the use of formed bodies of troops.

The term tirailleur is also used indiscriminately. There is one example where, at Jena I think, a battalion is described as breaking down 'en tirailleur' when it came within "pistol shot". This is clearly not skirmishing per se but unit control being lost as it closed with the enemy.

I feel that Busaco is possibly atypical and does not reflect controlled skirmishing. I am not familiar with Hannau but controlled skirmishing in woods, would, in my view, be almost impossible.

I think two different things are going on. Controlled skirmishing on one hand and a breakdown of unit structure and control, be it by individual skirmish companies, grande bandes or formed units, on the other.

The mystery, in my opinion, is whether the "grande bandes" of the Napoleonic era functioned in the manner described by Pelet at Busaco, where there were clearly no supports and reserves, or in a more regular manner as described by Desmichel.

I'm sure it could have been both. There is Friant's division at Echmhl in 1809, for instance. Three battalions of the Pavlov Grenadiers fully deployed in woods at Leuthen. The 'control' followed the same process, regulating file, flank etc. for the skirmish line, as with closed infantry. Bugle calls were for advancing, retreating recall, etc. Like the rest of the army organization, for simplicity, the principle methods use to 'control' a battalion were those used to control a brigade or a division at a larger scale. Dundas, Wellington and other make that point.

Bill H.

like the majority of eyewitness accounts of the period, it is incomplete and leaves us having to guess in order to fill in the gaps. You see the word "system" implying that there was some sort of plan being followed, and you could be correct.

Major S:
It isn't just his use of the word 'system', though that is important. Pelet contrasts the French activities to those of the British. He describes the British 'system' [he says methods] in some detail. Let me highlight his description of the British methods he contrasts to the French. He doesn't suggest that the French 'lost control', which I would think he would have if that was the case when the brigade 'found itself almost entirely dispersed.'

"Our brigade, attacked on its flank by artillery, was thrown to the left of the road. After fighting for some time, it found itself almost entirely dispersed into groups of skirmishers, and in the end it was found necessary to support this unit with the second brigade. Thus we covered the entire slope below the convent of Bussaco while the enemy successively reinforced their line of skirmishers, hidden behind the rocks and the trees, but these allied troops were not allowed to stay there very long. They were recalled by horns and replaced by fresh troops – an excellent method neglected by us for too long. Our system permitted French regiments to be dispersed during a battle and in the end only the officers and the bravest soldiers were left, and they were completely disgusted, with having to fight for an entire day. The Portuguese were interspersed among the British; they acted perfectly, serving in covered positions. Nevertheless, our skirmishers gained ground on the enemy and from time to time pushed them beyond their reserves, which they were obliged to reinforce………

"Permitted" is the word he uses, suggesting intention rather than the brigades losing control. The lack of relief is pointed out as what disgusts the French soldiers, having to fight the entire day…unlike the British skirmishers. A loss of control may have been one common result, but that is the case for the French methods of attacking the British in column too: a loss of control and then retreat.

Bill H.

Bill,

Isn't that over-interpreting permitted as well as system? It might just as well mean "allowed/didn't stop" as "intended"?

Regards

some of Marbot's remarks pasted and copied as Nur Text

REMARQUES
CRITIQUES
SUR L'OUVRAGE
DE M. LE LIEUTENANT-GÉNÉRAL ROGNIAT.*
De imprimerie de DEMON VILLE, rue Christine, n° a.
CRITIQUES
SUR L'OUVRAGE
DE M. LE LIEUTENANT-GÉNÉRAL ROGNIAT,
INTITULÉ:
CONSIDÉRATIONS SUR L'ART DE LA GUERRE;
Par le Colonel MARBOT ( Marcellin )

La troisième espèce de tirailleurs, que je nommerai tirailleurs en grande bande, diffère entièrement des deux autres ; elle était inconnue ou du moins très-peu en usage avant les guerres de la révolution, et même dans cette guerre, les Français sont presque les seuls qui s'en soient servis; ils lui doivent des succès éclatans, et cependant elle est encore désapprouvée par M. le général Rogniat , quoique vingt-cinq ans de victoires en aient constaté l'utilité.
Pour se former une idée bien juste du genre de service des tirailleurs en grande bande dont je parle, il faut se figurer une position formidable défendue par une ou plusieurs redoutes garnies d'artillerie et de bonnes troupes. Si nous devons attaquer cette position de front, il est probable que le canon de l'ennemi couchera par terre un quart de nos gens avant que nous soyons
A la bataille de Jemmapes, Dumouriez employa un grand nombre de tirailleurs qui contribuèrent infiniment au iuccès de la journée.
perfection par les généraux TVIasséna et Augereau, et c'est principalement à ce terrible genre d'attaque, que leurs célèbres divisions durent leurs plus brillantes victoires aux Pyrénées et en Italie. J'en citerai quelques; éxémples que je choisis parmi un très-grand nombre. Ce fut en mettant'une partie de sa division en tirailleurs sur les flancs de l'ennemi, que le général Augereau, en 1794, emporta, dans les Pyrénées la forte pov sition de la Magdelaine , défendue par vingt-deux redoutes, et la moitié de l'armée espagnole qui éprouva dans cette journée, une perte immense en hommes, en artillerie, et laissa son général en chef, le eomte de La Union, mort sut le champ de bataille. '''
Dans la campagne dltàlie, en 1796, le général Augereau devant forcer le passage de Primolano, mit trois bataillons, de la cinquième demi-brigade légère en tirailleurs, qui prirent l'ennemi en flanc, tandis que la quatrième de ligne l'attaquait de front; le passage fut forcé, et l'ennemi se retira en désordre.
Dans la même campagne de 96, le général Masséna, pour enlever la forte position de Caliano, mit deux bataillons de la dix-huitième en tirailleurs, qur gagnèrent le flanc et même les derrières de l'ennemi, en gravissant des rochers très-escarpés, d'où ils incommodèrent tellement les Autrichiens, que ceux-ci ne résistèrent que faiblement aux colonnes qui les attaquèrent defront; la position fut enlevée, et l'ennemi fortement maltraité.
Ce fut encore dans la même campagne de 96 que le général Masséna , attaquant San-Marco , mit toute la dix-huitième légère en tirailleurs sur les flancs de l'ennemi, pendant que la dixhuitième de ligue le menaçait en front, ce qui força les Autrichiens à battre en retraite après avoir éprouvé une grande perte.
Je pourrais citer cent affaires (entre autres la batadle deHanau où l'armée française eut un moment plus de 5,ooo tirailleurs dans le grand bois); je pourrais, dis-je, citer cent affaires où les généraux français les plus distingués se sont servis avec avantage de grandes bandes de tirailleurs, pour tourner et forcer une aile appuyée à un abatis, à un bois garni de canons, un coteau planté de vignes, un village retranché sur uue ou deux faces, etc. Enfin, pour attaquer en flanc tout poste difficile à aborder de front, et dont les avenues embarrassées sont impraticables pour des colonnes ou des lignes. On ne borne même pas l'emploi des grandes bandes de tirailleurs à attaquer de pareils postes, elles servent aussi à les défendre et assurent les flancs d'une position contre une attaque du genre de celles que je viens de décrire. Les grandes bandes de tirailleurs sont encore utiles, lorsque deux corps ennemis , marchant en colonne dans des directions opposées et sur une route dont les flancssont embarrassés de bois ou de vignes, se rencontrent face à face; alors celui des deux coramandans qui jettera sur les flancs de la colonne ennemie, un grand nombre de tirailleurs pendant qu'il l'attaquera de front avec le reste de sa troupe , aura infailliblement l'avantage. Par exemple, le général Allix, après sa belle défense de Sens, reçoit l'ordre de se rendre à Fontainebleau avec les deux mille hommes qu'il commandait; il traversait la forêt de ce nom, lorsque sa colonne se trouve vis-à-vis la tète d'une forte division autrichienne, marchant aussi en colonne sur la route. Les premiers pelotons des deux colonnes s'engagent à l'instant; mais le reste des troupes ne pouvait prendre part au combat. Qu'eût fait, dans cette circonstance, M. le général Rogniat qui condamne l'emploi des grandes bandes de tirailleurs? Je l'ignore. Mais voici ce que fit le général Allix : il jeta sur les flancs de la colonne ennemie 8 à 9oo tirailleurs, et la poussant en même temps de front, il la mit dans le désordre le plus complet; les Autrichiens, quoique six fois plus nombreux, furent battus par l'emploi des grandes bandes de tirailleurs fait à propos par le général Allix, qui prit ou tua plus d'ennemis qu'il n'avait lui-même de coinbattans sous ses ordres.: On voit que les tirailleurs de la troisième espèce forment un corps principal, dont le but est d'enlever ou de défendre une position, ou de
tourner les flancs de l'ennemi, et que par conséquent, ils n'ont de commun que le nom avec les tirailleurs de la première classe, dont le but est de voir et d'avertir; non plus qu'avec ceux de la deuxième qui sont très-accessoires, et se bornent à tourmenter par quelques coups de fusil, une colonne ou une ligne ennemie qu?on va attaquer, ou qui vient attaquer. (La cavalerie se sert comme l'infanterie de grandes bandes de tirailleurs; par exemple, lorsqu'il faut tourner et enlever par un de ses flancs, un plateau dont le front est garni de vignes, ou coupé de fossés, de bouquets d'arbres et d'obstacles au milieu desquels il serait dangereux d'engager une colonne de cavalerie, ou lorsqu'il s'agit de prendre à revers des pièces en batterie, d'attaquer un convoi, etc.)
Les exemples que je viens de citer, sur l'emploi des grandes bandes de tirailleurs de la troisième classe, ne prouvent pas, je pense, que cet emploi soit vicieux, ni que les généraux qui l'ont mis en usage aient jamais eu le dessein de se délivrer par-là du poids du commandement] Car cette manœuvre , en assurant à leur patrie d'éclatans succès , les couvrait eux-mêmes d'une gloire immortelle. Je suis on ne peut plus convaincu qu'il faut sagement ménager l'emploi des tirailleurs des deux premières classes dont nous avons vu trop souvent les abus; mais quant à ceux de la troisième, je répète qu'il est des occasions oùil faut en envoyer de grandes bandes, et je crois que M. le général Rogniat a beaucoup trop généralisé en les proscrivant «ans aucune espèce d'exception.

All very interesting vW. I thought this was an eye-opener though:

On ne borne même pas l'emploi des grandes bandes de tirailleurs à attaquer de pareils postes, elles servent aussi à les défendre et assurent les flancs d'une position contre une attaque du genre de celles que je viens de décrire .

Regards

my eyes remain shut dear Whirlwind – please explain a bit more so I can see as well.

Sorry, I mean the only thing that Marbot can mean is that the French considered every Army the French fought against was capable of doing exactly the same things that Marbot has just praised French units for, so therefore this tactic was also used to defend against them.

Regards

Reading Pelet on Busaco one could be forgiven for thinking that the French had forgotten how to skirmish!

I agree that some other nations were capable of exactly the same tactics when the situation demanded – the situation always being terrain not suitable for close order movements.

For example, the attack of the British Guards at Barossa is described by some eyewitnesses as being neither in column nor line, but in a very irregular formation that no doubt could have warranted either the terms "grande bande" or "tirailleur" if used by the French.

The clearest evidence, however, is provided by James Campbell, who served as a brigade major with the 3rd division, who wrote about the tactics used in the vineyards and enclosures around Vic Bigore in 1814, describing the French fighting "in their own favourite manner – skirmishing on a large scale". This is a very interesting passage as he includes clear details that are often missing from similar accounts. This is how the British reacted:

But even in acting as skirmishers on a large scale, when Sir Thomas Picton's division had, at Vic Bigore, to contend with two French divisions…the same system of fighting was, as far as practical,observed [this system being closing with the bayonet]. Besides the 5th battalion of the 60th, a battalion of Cacadores, and our own light infantry companies, whole regiments, (and here we felt the want of knowledge of light infantry movements in all corps) only retaining some companies in reserve and for support, were engaged as sharpshooters. They were however, constantly pushed forward upon the French, and recommended not to throw away their fire in long shots, but rather, as much as possible, to endeavour to close with them; and if a halt was anywhere perceived in any part of the advancing skirmishers a staff officer was invariably sent to the point to ascertain the cause. The French, therefore, invariably gave way, and in their confused retreat they became exposed, in running from one enclosure to another, to the fire of our troops…but had we stood and fired, as usual on such occasions, this brilliant feat of the 3rd division would never have been heard of.

@MajorS

and here we felt the want of knowledge of light infantry movements in all corps

That's an interesting statement, and seems to infer that the British regular foot regiments certainly didn't receive training in this form of fighting – but that they would, and could, within limits, perform the same or similar duties as the light troops [5/60th, Cacadores, and light companies in the 3rd Dn] when necessary.

npm

‘After reading the discussions in Rogniat and Marbot I come to the conclusion that mass skirmishing, or tirailleurs en grande bande was a tactical tool – well established and used within the French army – not restricted to regimental structures but going up to a infantry division.'

That answer is absolutely incredible, prompting the question ‘where have you been in the past 20 years?'

That information has been in books and on the forums for quite some time. You are merely stating the obvious which is, again, incredible.

‘this has nothing to do with the so called irregular firing invented by Elting, which did not exist in military terms of French Napoleonic infantry while en grande bande is mentioned'

Could you give a page citation for ‘the so-called irregular firing invented by [Col] Elting'?

I have found a reference in Swords for ‘fire at will' on page 7 of the volume.

Could you also put the term ‘irregular firing' into context as written?

Could it not be another term for ‘firing at will' or to describe any type of firing that was not ‘regular' or controlled, as in firing volleys by company or battalion?

Your comment is somewhat confusing and any clarification of what you are trying to describe would be helpful.

Here is what I found regarding the types of infantry fire in Swords, pages 481-482:

‘An infantry fire fight was a brutal, jostling, deafening affair. When your priming sparked, you got a small shower of half-burnt powder grains and flint particles in your face. Your musket kicked savagely; with three ranks of men firing, the center rank would be jostled, with many shots going wild. Every so often a front-rank man, bobbing about as he reloaded, got hit by a third-rank comrade…It was dry, harried work; muskets slamming all around you, smoke in your eyes. Biting cartridges dried out your mouth and throat and left your teeth and tongue gritty and hating each other. At the end, your shoulder might be bruised black, your head ached and rang, your voice was a croak, and your thirst intolerable.'

‘Effective infantry fire was a matter of careful, intense training so that the routine of loading and firing would become mechanical. Four or five rounds a minute was possible for short bursts as the battle opened. Later, two rounds would be good work as men tired and muskets grew foul. If the action dragged on, the rate would drop steadily, with hoarsely profane soldiers pounding their ramrods home with rocks. However, firefights seldom lasted very long…one side usually got its bellyful in short order and came apart.'

‘There were several methods of delivering musket fire. One was the ‘volley' in which the battalion or regiment fired all together, hurling a storm of heavy lead slugs that could literally gut the opposing line (frequently, however, one or both sides fired too soon, too high, or too low, and so barely tickled the enemy). A volley might be ‘by three ranks' in which case all three ranks fired, either in succession or all together, the front rank kneeling to give the other two a clearer field of fire and getting plentifully sprinkled with smoldering fragments of paper cartridges and other muzzle blast debris. Officers did not particularly care for this method; if you had to advance, there could be delay and confusion in getting the first rank to stand up and become full-sized targets again. A more efficient method was fire ‘by two ranks' in which the first and second ranks fired together, both standing, while the third rank ‘reserved' its fire. That was especially necessary against charging cavalry…'

‘In another version of fire by two ranks, the third rank passed its loaded muskets forward and reloaded empty ones passed back. That might work satisfactorily with solid troops, especially if they were defending entrenchments, but in the open it left the third rank feeling psychologically disarmed and ready to bolt.'

‘The ‘platoon fire' so emphasized in English and Prussian training, in which the companies of a battalion fired in succession, either from one flank to the other or from both flanks toward the center, was harder to control than volley fire. But all methods of fire control soon broke down into individual ‘fire at will' as the men became excited and began to fire as quickly as they were able to reload…Of all the various methods of firing, ‘at will' was the most wasteful of ammunition, the hardest to get under control-and the most deadly.'

John Elting, Swords Around A Throne, pages 481-482.

‘Fire at will' was what would be employed by skirmishers, either in small or large numbers. There are at least three ‘renditions' by Detaille of what French line and light infantry might look like when deployed as skirmishers, both as a firing line and in the open using what cover was available. I would highly recommend them as a point of discussion in any long or short discussion on skirmishing during the period, especially by the French.

Sincerely,
K

Ligniere,

British regular foot regiments were called on to operate as skirmishers on many occasions during the Peninsular War. Without going searching for examples, I know that O'Callaghan's brigade of the second division performed this duty at Vitoria, the 45th regiment fought as skirmishers at Orthez and a wing of the 50th were in skirmish order at St. Pierre.

The 79th and 24th were also used in this manner at Fuentes de Onoro and this prompted Stepney, who was with the Guards, to write "the 24th and 79th, in contest with an enemy, were practising light infantry movements for the first time in their lives". And as a footnote: "The folly of not accustoming our regiments at home to light infantry drill occasioned in this affair not only a great disadvantage, but the loss of many lives".

The common feature of all these actions is difficult terrain.

Any Napoleonic war games with ‘Disorder' as part of the 'drill manual' formation ?

it was not disorder – light cavalry could do so called swarm attacks – skirmishing was no disorder at all.

The power of the Revolution was that it unleashed individual initiative. No ? Isn't that why the French were known for their skirmishing ? Of course, the Brits skirmished better than they did…according to McLaddie.. so that makes one wonder how revolutionary it was…..

Isn't that over-interpreting permitted as well as system? It might just as well mean "allowed/didn't stop" as "intended"?

vW:
Well, I'd be the first, or at least second to say such narratives can be over-interpreted--a possible result when trying to get the most information out of limited content.

In this case, I don't think so. Pelet was contrasting the French operations to the British. If it was just a matter of the French doing the 'unintended', a mistake, loss of control, mismanagement etc….that is, screwing up and not following an establish 'system', then there would be no reason for Pelet to compare the French actions to the British methods… or call what the French did a 'system.'

Obviously, the original French is an issue here too.

Basically Pelet is saying "This is what we do, and here are the consequences…that is what the British do, and the consequences. Pelet even points out that while he felt the British methods were superior, the French did throw the British skirmishers back on their supports.

Of course, generally, he doesn't like skirmishing much at all.

So, in this case, no. I think what Pelet was saying is pretty clear. Whether he was right or not is another question. ;-7

Best Regards,
Bill H.

The power of the Revolution was that it unleashed individual initiative. No ? Isn't that why the French were known for their skirmishing ? Of course, the Brits skirmished better than they did…according to McLaddie.. so that makes one wonder how revolutionary it was…..

The Revolution undoubtedly fostered an environment in which individual initiative within the French army was encouraged, but I think its effect is often overstated. The Revolution did not make the French ‘better' at skirmishing in the sense of some newly discovered ‘national characteristic' based on Revolutionary thinking – it was more a case of the Revolution creating a military situation that FORCED officers to adopt mass skirmishing.

I agree France's Revolutionary officers certainly needed to be a fairly free thinking lot, but a good deal of what happened in terms of ‘tactical innovation' in the French army between 1792 and 1800 was forced upon them by circumstance – not planned choice.

During the early years, the army's systems were so overwhelmed by the huge numbers of raw, poorly trained recruits flooding into the army that officers were often obliged to throw out whole battalions in a loose, open order because their men were incapable of maintaining anything else! (It has been suggested that many grande bandes observed at this time were in fact attempted attack columns that had simply ‘dissolved' into semi-organised crowds).

By the mid 1790's time and experience (in particular) had rectified the training deficiency but the French were quick to realise that necessity had provided them with a tactical tool well suited to their theatres of operations… that – and the broken and restrictive ground that French commanders still tended to favour up until the late 1790's to negate the much feared and marked superiority of allied/Imperial cavalry.

During the Napoleonic period I do not think that on a soldier for soldier basis French skirmishers were any better than many of their enemies, but the Revolutionary Wars had left the French with a tradition of their use in greater concentrations and more aggressively than their opponents were used to. Just one of many solutions – old and ‘new'/adapted – that a French divisional or brigade commander could call upon when the tactical situation required it.

I am not that believer that the French revolutionary armies were flooded with untrained recruits, battalions were refused to be sent to the front – in case they were not battle ready and there was a huge "reserve" of ex soldiers, NCOs and officers, either from the regular army or the provincial battalion – which was taped.
However I agree that the "soldiers" as that – and their availability in big numbers produced some new warfare where the French generals could use more wastefull tactics there they could replace their losses quicker than the other armies, the Austrian Cordon system was a try to counter balance this.
The French learned the art of skirmishing – very quickly from the Austrians who used masses of skirmishers as well.

Some good points there vW. Especially about the Austrians. Napoleonic gamers who are used to the cautious Austrian methodologies of the later wars when, for example, the Grenz had all been constrained into some kind of second class line infantry, forget that during the Revolutionary Wars the Austrians fielded a plethora of Freikorps Jager and Grenz units all very adept at skirmishing and often deployed in large numbers.

just to expand on what I wrote earlier – I think it is worth remembering that the French Light infantry battalions – who prior to the Revolution were presumably the only ones who received anything close to formal skirmisher training – were a very new concept.

These battalions only existed as purely infantry forces from 1788, and prior to that they were organised as combined cavalry / infantry formations, with tactics and training which had more to do with the traditions of the irregular light ‘Legions' of the 18th century – rather than the official drill manuals of the regular army. Mid 18th century light infantry training was, I suspect, based more on the whim and pet theories of the particular Legion's colonel-in-chief, together with a reliance on the Age of Reason belief that recruits drawn from forested, mountain and other geographical ‘fringes' produced soldiers with a natural propensity for this type of warfare.

I can't recall an official French Light Infantry training manual for the Revolutionary Wars (if wrong I'm happy to be enlightened on that score) and from memory the 1791 drill book doesn't have much to say on mass skirmishing.

This makes me wonder if the tradition of training light infantry ‘in-house' from before the 1780's was carried over into the new French light infantry battalions on the eve of the Revolution. John Lynn (Bayonets of the Republic, page 217-18) claims "…French military opinion held that the light infantryman could best learn the techniques of open order combat through actual experience, not formal instruction." (although he doesn't footnote this comment). Also (taken from Lynn) Gay de Vernon states in his Memoire that light infantry required regular battles and small skirmishes to learn their trade and that "only such small combats without names could accustom the infantry, especially the light infantry, to battle."

I would tentatively suggest that this trend of learning skirmishing as an organic process is continued further and reflected by the apparent reliance on privately authored (rather than official) military manuals dedicated to light infantry instruction for the rest of the Napoleonic Wars.

Von W makes a good point about Austrian skirmishing.

The concept that a group of French, or any other soldiers for that matter, were capable of controlled skirmishing without any training is just does not credible. How would they know what to do?

Of course it is perfectly possible that units dissolved into a grown-up version of cowboys and Indians, but that is not the same thing. Controlled skirmishing was difficult enough and once deployed there was always the possibility that they'd not been seen again until the battle was over. With uncontrolled ‘skirmishing', the commitment of troops to battle without order or control, it was almost a certainty.

The concept that the French soldier's intellect or character was somehow superior, or different, such that skirmishing was more natural to him, or that he was able to grasp its nuances better than his peers is so much ‘brown stuff', in my view.

The average French conscript soldier, like any other, was drawn from the lowest levels of society. Like soldiers in all armies of the time, he was a poor physical specimen, a badly educated, peasant-type whose personal hygiene was basic and whose breath could stop a cavalry charge at 100 paces.

I am certain that the effect of French skirmishing is over-emphasised. Officers of armies that were defeated tend to look for reasons to explain their defeat and any reasons will do rather than their own mistakes. So, we get this stuff about French super-skirmishers, French columns and all the other stuff that goes to form the myths and legends so often accepted by latter-day writers without a second thought.

Regimental and formation instructions for skirmishing are few, but this does not mean that others never existed, or still exist somewhere. Has anybody ever really looked for such instructions specifically? A common theme they all share is their similarity to each other, and their similarity to skirmish techniques everywhere at the time.

Why, I wonder, did these French instructions appear at all? Certainly, as far as I know, no official regulation existed, which could explain the need. Could it also be perhaps that French uncontrolled ‘skirmishing' was actually inadequate and needed to be dragged screaming and kicking into the 19th century?

XV Brigada wrote:

Regimental and formation instructions for skirmishing are few, but this does not mean that others never existed, or still exist somewhere. Has anybody ever really looked for such instructions specifically? A common theme they all share is their similarity to each other, and their similarity to skirmish techniques everywhere at the time.

XV Brigada:

I have been attempting to do just that, and only up to 1806.
I have found a number of instructions and regulations, but very little that would be called 'official.' There are a number of reasons for this:

1."Official Regulations" were rare and fairly limited in scope, dealing with battalion or lower level drill, not brigade or larger scale operations.

2. Many 'regulations' were actually privately printed treatises. For instance, there were no 'official' regulations in the British army until 1792. It took more than ten years of inspectors to actually achieve any uniformity in drill among the British. The first official regulations were simply published treatises for the French no earlier than 1776, and not considered 'universal requirements' the way present day regulations are.

3. The tactical and grand tactical operations of an army were seen as the pervue of "Genius" and not something that could be 'regulated.' Skirmishing was also seen in that light, and many writers of light infantry treatises pointed out that commanding independent detachments was on a small scale exactly what commanders of armies did.

4. Because of that, various commanders could and did 'make up' their own rules of deployment and skirmish use. Between 1792 and 1806 I found that MOST generals of independent armies had their own rules for the deployment of skirmishers. This was also true of French corps commanders.

5. When infantry was trained in light infantry operations, you would find the trainers culling several manuals, regardless of 'official' regulations. For instance, Moore and McKenzie, in training the 95th and light infantry regiments in 1807 used Rottemburg's Official set of light infantry practices…which was originally written as a private work in German and then adopted in 1798 by the British. Even so Jarry's and Ewald's works also served as training manuals. Both were also privately published works, but by previously German officers, Jarry in charge of the Prussian Military academy and Ewald, a Hessian Jager officer during the American Revolution. Jarry came over and helped develop the British officer training school for the British in the 1790s.

Another example is Kutzov's 1789 Manual for Jagers was not an 'official' document, but privately publish and 'accepted' by the Russian army, but never designated as the 'official' regulations.

5. Any number of regimental manuals were written by officers, used, updated, and replaced, all usually written by hand, even beyond 1815 in ALL armies. So, these wouldn't be easy to preserve. Even the British artillery school had no 'official' regulations printed for the entire period of the Napoleonic wars. Cadets wrote down all instructions by hand into their own notebooks and that is what they used in the field. Ayde's work on Artillery was the first printed British work on handling artillery and it was published privately.

The approach to regulations, training and methods was quite different in many respects during the Napoleonic wars than today. Why else would Davout, as late as 1811, feel the need, or believe he had the ability, to write out light infantry instructions to just his corps, without reference to any other document?

Bill H.

Yes, I know all that. I think the origin of the document is irrelevant to be honest. It doesn't matter whether it was 'official' or not if it reflects the training.

I have seen of most of the documents you mention. The author of Davout's instruction was probably Morand but you are right, Davout certainly seemed to have the authority to issue them to his formation.

What is less clear is whether they reflect army wide practise or not. Was Davout's instruction unique? Did it just reflect 'making hay while the sun shone', and happened to survive because it fell into Russian hands with his baggage? Were other corps commanders doing the same sort of thing in 1811?

I think all the French skirmish instructions I have are late or near-post Napoleonic but the point is that they are all similar.

I see no evidence, yet, that the French did anything fundamentally different.

'The French learned the art of skirmishing – very quickly from the Austrians who used masses of skirmishers as well.'

The idea that the French learned skirmishing from the Austrians has been brought up before and not supported by any evidence as it hasn't been supported by evidence with this latest comment.

The French developed their idea of large numbers of skirmishers supporting and working with troops in formation during the field experiments and maneuvers conducted by Marshal de Broglie in Normandy in the mid-1770s. This is explained very well in Robert Quimby's The Background of Napoleonic Warfare and the origins is explained in Christopher Duffy's the Military Expience in the Age of Reason.

The French reacted to the Grenz problem in the Seven Years War by raising their own irregulars. The irregular and skirmish warfare, the 'petite guerre' waged by these type of troops was not the same as that which developed by integrating regular light troops on the battlefield to perform operations against the enemy in battle. The Grenz, ewt al, usually operated on the fringes of the battlefield and were not operating in conjunction with formed regular troops for specific missions.

Sincerely,
Kevin