"French Training in Loose Order Fighting" Topic

what is the evidence for French troops training to fight in loose order or 'heavy skirmish' lines and could you point me in its direction please?

Regards

I'm new to this too. Have I told you about the joys of buying Napoleonics by the pound?

Clarify?

Light companies of line regiments?
Light regiments?
Line regiments?

WW,

You can look in Duhesme's work on light infantry, Roche-Aymon, an emigre general, wrote on light infantry, Robert Quimby's The Background on Napoleonic Warfare might be useful to you as it has an excellent chapter on tactics and has a section/chapter on the French tactical experiments in the 1770s.

There is also information in Lynn's Bayonets of the Republic, John Elting's Swords Around A Throne, and Gates' work on the British light infantry arm. The bibliographies of the secondary works can lead to more material.

Sincerely,
K

Clarify?

Light companies of line regiments?
Light regiments?
Line regiments?

@CS: All of them, because it is reported that they all did it. However, if there was a difference between them, then that would be interesting too.

Regards

Thanks Kevin. I have read some of those and although they describe the phenomenon to a certain extent, they don't IIRC describe French troops ever training to do it. When I am able to return to my books in a couple of months I will certainly re-read them to see if I have missed something.

Regards

Thee must be some somewhere, as the French seem to have done it a lot.

I've got Quimby, I'll have to read hi again.

I would image that you could not send skirmishers out, if they had not had any training.

Whirlwind:

You'll need to be more specific than that. What kind of evidence?

You have Ney, Davout, Marmont, Duhesme, St. Cyr, as well as several French Revolutionary generals, let alone dozens and dozens of authors writing about how to train light infantry from 1730s to the 10th Legere instructions in 1823 and beyond.

There are a number of accounts of French troops training in all forms of combat including skirmishing during the Bourlogne [sp?] camps in 1804-5.

So, do you want the training manual titles, instructions from generals, or just narratives of that training taking place?

When you are sending out hundreds of men to fight without any training they do what the "sans coulettes" did in 1793 when sent out to skirmish en tirailleur. As St. Cyr, a French general observed, "We send them out, only to watch them disappear into the woods and over the rise, to be lost for the remainder of the battle."

Bill H.

Bill H,

Anything that refers to them being used en masse or in a heavy skirmish line, whether in a regulation or a narrative. I'm not interested (for the purposes of this thread) in general light infantry/skirmimsher training.

Regards

IIRC there is a reference in Davout's Combat Journal of Operations of III Corps talking about Auerstadt that refers to Morands Corp using massed skirmishers as a result of training at the Boulogne Camps. Not a drill manual as such if thats what you're after.

No, somthing like that would be great, I'll look it up.

Thank you

link

An example how it was done with a very short time for training. But the system was simple and easy. ;-)

Well, Poles, not French, but the officers were French …

Here a very good article by Geert van Uyhoven

French mass skirmisher tactics during the Revolutionary Wars
by Geert van Uythoven

What the French generals favoured most during the Revolutionary Wars was the tactic to engage the enemy frontline with thousands of skirmishers, operating 'en debandade', replaced after a while for new swarms. These were closely supported with artillery that was deployed in front of the enemy, as close as possible, not counting its losses. In this way the Allied units in their first line, especially their light infantry which was not easy to replace, suffered heavily. The French generals were able to do this because of first: the enormous amount of men available to them, enabling them to replace the frontline troops several times during their fight against the weakly held, seventy hours long cordon of posts; secondly, the basic of the system of terror utilised by them, not to spare their soldiers, while every loss was immediately replaced, and they had not to account for those losses: only the results would count. An example for this tactic is the combat which took place on 16 July 1794 at the canalized river Neete, were near Waehlem village the French attacked the Anglo-Allied cordon. The Allied first line was positioned behind the cover of a dike along the river:
Source: H.P.R. von Porbeck, "Kritische Geschichte der Operationen welche die Englisch-combinirte Armee zur Vertheidigung von Holland in den Jahren 1794 und 1795 ausgeführt hat" Theil 1 (Braunschweig 1802) pp. 143-144:
"(…) Five times the enemy relieved their forward troops, and our side received a replenishment of cartridges several times. In addition, these also were relieved a few times, which was difficult because of the open space which had to be crossed before the dike was reached.
Around noon, the enemy deployed a number of cannon and mortars on the churchyard of Waehlem village and inside the Rosendael Abbey. On our side, beside both Austrian 12-pdr's and the regimental guns, an additional four 12-pdr's and a complete English battery of eight guns were deployed, after which beside the continuing musketry, a heavy cannonade started. It rained bullets, grenades, and stones, and the artillerymen and horses suffered heavily; already an Austrian gun and an ammunition caisson were demolished. But finally our artillery defeated the enemy artillery in such a way, that when evening fell it was completely silenced. The musketry however continued with all its fierceness during the whole night. Finally, the jäger and fusiliers had to be withdrawn to Lazarus-Capelle around 10 o'clock in the evening, because of lack of ammunition and necessary repairs to their rifles. Their place had to be taken by infantry-commands drawn from the reserve. (..) On the 17th, in the morning, the enemy continued its fire with the same fierceness."
© Geert van Uythoven

My personal view – those dense skirmishers lines were line infantry which could not maintain cohesion and opened up during a fire fight.
Later in the Napoleonic Wars the French tried to restrict skirmishers and used much more refind tactics of line – column and skirmishers – in mutual support.

I did not come at any source referring to mass skirmishing being trained – I am looking forward to quotes from primary sources.

Thank you both for the interesting posts.

I did not come at any source referring to mass skirmishing being trained – I am looking forward to quotes from primary sources.

Me neither. I'm looking forwarding to them too! And to having a look at what Davout said ,if nsolomon above recalls correctly.

Regards

No, I've been looking and I can't find it. Was sure I had read it in Davout's Journal. Sorry, have to think where I saw it.

No, I've been looking and I can't find it. Was sure I had read it in Davout's Journal. Sorry, have to think where I sa it.

Nick
There is a reference to this type of formation in Bressonnet. It is during Auerstadt, as you thought.
- Allan

Here is one where a whole division dispersed as skirmishers as per 'our system'. Pelet was a member of Ney's staff at the battle of Bussaco 1810, which this is an account of:

The French Campaign in Portugal, 1810-1811
An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet. Translated by Donald D. Horward 1973
Page 181

As Loison's division was thrown back, a brigade of Marchand's division was pushed forward, but too late. It occupied the abutment beyond the passage of the upper Moura after a dispute with the enemy; each occupied it successively. The English maneuvered and fell back as soon as they received some cannon fire. Our brigade, attacked on its flank by artillery, was thrown to the left of the road. After fighting for some time, it found itself almost entirely dispersed into groups of skirmishers, and in the end it was necessary to support this unit with the second brigade. Thus we covered the entire slope below the convent of Bussaco while the enemy successively reinforced their line of skirmishers, hidden behind the rocks and the trees, but these Allied troops were not allowed to stay there very long, they were recalled by horns and replaced by fresh troops—an excellent method neglected by us for too long. Our system permitted the French regiments to be dispersed during a battle and in the end only the officers and bravest soldiers were left, and they were completely disgusted, even with having to fight for an entire day. The Portuguese were interspersed among the British; they acted perfectly, serving in the covered positions. Nevertheless, our skirmishers gained ground on the enemy and from time to t time pushed them beyond the reserves, which they were obliged to reinforce.

[Two paragraphs on how Mermet's division reinforces Marchand's two brigades, and the how the rest of the day passed after the French attacks were repulsed, both sides firing cannon and skirmishing. ]

p. 182-183

….Thus the day passed, skirmishing and losing men uselessly. I cannot express how much aversion I have always had for skirmishing. It is difficult to imagine how much it costs in casualties or, as one my day—drop by drop. Two new attacks against the position, just like the first, would not have been more deadly. I could not resist saying a few words. The skirmishing ended on our side and the enemy started it again. As a matter of fact, it was extremely difficult to stop bickering except by withdrawing our troops, and this was not without inconvenience for either advantageous terrain or the morale of the army. However, I do not think skirmishing can be allowed for its own sake in any case, unless it is to prepare attacks, cover movements, or momentarily detain the enemy at one point while they are being attacked or outmaneuvered at another. General Reynier had wisely withdrawn his troops and taken up positions. There was hardly any more fighting in this direction.

…Towards evening the enemy, holding half the slope with a strong line of skirmishers who were seated and even lying down, was reinforced by large reserves, but several times we pushed them back as far as the summit. The enemy extended their line on both flanks as if to take a night position and form a chain of advance posted. Later they pushed their line forward and again started the fight. I did not know their goal, unless it was to recover the ground we had seized and not to abandon any part of the battlefield to us. This useless attack was repulsed by out infantry with the artillery hardly engaged. The enemy line was forced to retire even higher. Ours was formed and we remained there without any indication that the fighting might start again. Mermet's Division replaced the exhausted division of Marchand which had lost many men during the firing. It occupied both the upper and lower Moura with its posts extended to the height of upper Moura.

There are lots more examples.

Bill H.

It seems there were very limited ammunition allocations for training in general.

So for skirmishers to train without ammunition would seem to me to be a bit pointless.

Thanks for that Bill – indeed you have sent me that before. However my question is very specifically about training to do this, rather than the fact of it happening.

Regards

Here is their training manual.

1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general good.

2. The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.

3. The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation.

4. Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only be determined by law.

5. Law can only prohibit such actions as are hurtful to society. Nothing may be prevented which is not forbidden by law, and no one may be forced to do anything not provided for by law.

6. Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a right to participate personally, or through his representative, in its foundation. It must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction except that of their virtues and talents.

7. No person shall be accused, arrested, or imprisoned except in the cases and according to the forms prescribed by law. Any one soliciting, transmitting, executing, or causing to be executed, any arbitrary order, shall be punished. But any citizen summoned or arrested in virtue of the law shall submit without delay, as resistance constitutes an offense.

8. The law shall provide for such punishments only as are strictly and obviously necessary, and no one shall suffer punishment except it be legally inflicted in virtue of a law passed and promulgated before the commission of the offense.

9. As all persons are held innocent until they shall have been declared guilty, if arrest shall be deemed indispensable, all harshness not essential to the securing of the prisoner's person shall be severely repressed by law.

10. No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.

11. The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law.

12. The security of the rights of man and of the citizen requires public military forces. These forces are, therefore, established for the good of all and not for the personal advantage of those to whom they shall be entrusted.

13. A common contribution is essential for the maintenance of the public forces and for the cost of administration. This should be equitably distributed among all the citizens in proportion to their means.

14. All the citizens have a right to decide, either personally or by their representatives, as to the necessity of the public contribution; to grant this freely; to know to what uses it is put; and to fix the proportion, the mode of assessment and of collection and the duration of the taxes.

15. Society has the right to require of every public agent an account of his administration.

16. A society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all.

17. Property being an inviolable and sacred right, no one can be deprived of it, unless demanded by public necessity, legally constituted, explicitly demands it, and under the condition of a just and prior indemnity.

I'd also venture a guess that one of the reasons French attack columns worked so well was even if a column were to lose its ‘formation' while charging/attacking, if it successfully smashed or disrupted the enemy line the men probably had the presence of mind to continue ‘irregular/unformed' fighting by skirmishing, harassing, enveloping subsequent enemy units or perhaps simply swarming en masse to the next target. If that occurred simultaneously with the advance of other close order formations and/or in conjunction with other attack columns? Of course, some kind of ‘preparation' would've been necessary to the enemy line and if the attack column were able to maintain formation after a breach, it probably would've been more dangerous still.

Anyway, a skirmishing tangent via wild speculation :)

BD:

Where did you get the list of political statements?

Whirlwind wrote:

Thanks for that Bill – indeed you have sent me that before. However my question is very specifically about training to do this, rather than the fact of it happening.

Whirlwind:

Note that Pelet says "Our system permitted the French regiments to be dispersed during a battle…"

That suggests that it was trained. However, you asked for examples of troops being used 'en mass' as skirmishers.

Bill H.

Bill,

From here:

link

Note that Pelet says "Our system permitted the French regiments to be dispersed during a battle…"

That suggests that it was trained. However, you asked for examples of troops being used 'en mass' as skirmishers.

Bill,

No, in itself Pelet's statement doesn't suggest they were trained to do so, only that in fact they did so.

My question is (emphasis) added:

what is the evidence for French troops training to fight in loose order or 'heavy skirmish' lines

Regards

Whirlwind:

In other words, an army can have "a system that permits French regiments to be dispersed during battle", but never trained for it?

Davout, in his 1811 instructions, specificially states that his regiments will be trained in the skirmish procedures laid out in the instructions, which were given to every regiment commander.

Bill H.

The system permitted that whole regiments could be dispersed as skirmishers …

Look at the example given by Oliver Schmidt, certainly no text book skirmishing, the men firing should step out of formation and then return.

Also at Bussaco, seemingly the terrain favoured that whole regiments got dispersed and it shows the very weakness of the system.

The interesting point is that apparently no reserves were formed within those regiments dispersed so effentually they dwindled due to lack of ammunition, exhaustion and lack of control.

@McLaddie, in case you have more examples – please provide them, very interesting.

Whirlwind:

In other words, an army can have "a system that permits French regiments to be dispersed during battle", but never trained for it?

Davout, in his 1811 instructions, specificially states that his regiments will be trained in the skirmish procedures laid out in the instructions, which were given to every regiment commander

Bill, this is hardly radical stuff. On the one hand, there are plenty of accounts of what troops were trained to do. On the other, Napoleonic troops did plenty of things that they weren't trained to do, for example, fight in towns, occupy strong points, conduct sieges. Pelet's account actually suggests that what happened was habitual but hardly planned or controlled.

Did Davout's instructions mention the 'heavy skirmish line' or 'loose order firing line' or whatever, as opposed to the traditional skirmishing skills?

Regards

Whirlwind,

If you want to have a concept of a French skirmish line simply watch the Russian War and Peace, the Battle of Schoengraben. The French advancing through the vinyard are in skirmish order. When the Russian battalion attacks they fire and retreat.

When you are in the army today or in the 1800s you just don't sit around; you train. Some of that training was in skirmishing.

On the day of battle all infantry were potential skirmishers, well-trained or not. Who was chosen to skirmish depended on the philosophy of the brigade, regiment and battalion officers.

Bob Coggins

<<On the other, Napoleonic troops did plenty of things that they weren't trained to do, for example, fight in towns, occupy strong points, conduct sieges.>>

But in this era was, for example, fighting in a built-up area actually an aspect of "training" per se (especially given that [a] it was quite rare in battle – and usually avoided for several reasons – and 1800s armies had no "mock" towns or villages to practice in), or was it just a different environment in which to fight, using the same tactics/formations that they HAVE been trained to use?

Did these "hordes" just fight randomly, or did they work in pairs, as normal skirmishers did?

@ ratisbon

If you want to have a concept of a French skirmish line simply watch the Russian War and Peace, the Battle of Schoengraben. The French advancing through the vinyard are in skirmish order. When the Russian battalion attacks they fire and retreat.

When you are in the army today or in the 1800s you just don't sit around; you train. Some of that training was in skirmishing.

Fine, no dramas with any of that, I understand the concept. So if they did so, there will certainly be accounts of French troops practicing their 'heavy skirmish line'. I'm asking where those accounts are.

Regards

@SM,

I don't particularly agree that fighting in built-up areas was rare in the Napoleonic period.

Neither the narratives of such fighting either in built-up areas or the 'heavy skirmish line', seem to resemble the details of light infantry training.

Regards

Napoleonic troops did plenty of things that they weren't trained to do, for example, fight in towns, occupy strong points, conduct sieges. Pelet's account actually suggests that what happened was habitual but hardly planned or controlled.

? IF it wasn't planned or controlled, he would hardly called it 'our system' or criticize it. He would have criticized the unplanned/uncontrolled nature of the engagement…something that obviously wouldn't be 'our system.'

Did Davout's instructions mention the 'heavy skirmish line' or 'loose order firing line' or whatever, as opposed to the traditional skirmishing skills?

Most all skirmish instructions, particularly British manuals spoke of loose order, extended order and chains. "Heavy skirmish lines" wasn't a technical term as far as I know, other than noting when large numbers were committed to the skirmish line in some fashion.

On the other, Napoleonic troops did plenty of things that they weren't trained to do, for example, fight in towns, occupy strong points, conduct sieges.

Come again? The French practiced such things at the 1804 camps at Bourlogne…Ney mentions it specificially in his memoirs.

The following treatises and manuals discuss fighting in towns:

Gilbert's Work on Tactics 1780

Ewald's Treatise on the Kleinen Krieg 1785/1790

Scharnhorst's Officers Handbook 1793/1803

Valentini's Treatise on the Kleinen Krieg

Jarry's Treatise on Light Infantry in the Field 1801 Very complete, including light infantry operations on the battlefield in cooperation with line troops and of course chapters on villages and out buildings. It is printed first in French, though Jarry is the head of the Prussian Military Academy. In 1803 Jarry's work is translated into English and Jarry is the Commendant of the Royal Military College at High Wycombe.

There are a lot more such works published between 1780 and 1815, filled with chapters such as:

"Of the manner of fortifying churches, mills and other detached buildings"

"Of the manner of fortifying villages"

"Of the defense of Villages or other detached posts"

And of course, "Of the attack of redoubts, field-forts, and villages."

And of course, there are a number of works on siege craft.

I have an eyewitness account in an American newspaper by an American of the Berlin Prussian Army Field Days in 1803. An attack on a village was one of the exercises.

With the amount of fighting that was done in and around villages and towns during the SYW, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, you bet lots was written on the methods surrounding attacking and defending villages.

Bill H.

Also at Bussaco, seemingly the terrain favoured that whole regiments got dispersed and it shows the very weakness of the system.

The interesting point is that apparently no reserves were formed within those regiments dispersed so effentually they dwindled due to lack of ammunition, exhaustion and lack of control.

vW:
Yes, I think that was what Pelet was saying too, though there is never any indication in his narrative that a 'lack of control' was an issue in moving the brigades. The French had a 'system' that included trying to simply overwhelm enemy skirmishers with numbers. Pelet points out why he believed it didn't work with the British/Portuguese.

Bill H.

@McLaddie
I agee that overwhelming by numbers was one of the ideas, as this is also an issue in the example transalted from Geert von Uyhoven.
It is just a game of attrition.
The lack of control is there as well, there Pelet speaks about how the officers and men remained in the "chain" were disgusted not to be relieved and also seeing their numbers dwindling.
I have a big problem to see how that huge mass of skirimishers were controlled (if at all) – over such an extend of frontage.

? IF it wasn't planned or controlled, he would hardly called it 'our system' or criticize it. He would have criticized the unplanned/uncontrolled nature of the engagement…something that obviously wouldn't be 'our system.'

Na that is just assumption on your part, assuming that the word'system' must imply certain things. It could just as easily mean 'that which we do' as 'that which we trained to do'.

The following treatises and manuals discuss fighting in towns:

Gilbert's Work on Tactics 1780

Ewald's Treatise on the Kleinen Krieg 1785/1790

Scharnhorst's Officers Handbook 1793/1803

Valentini's Treatise on the Kleinen Krieg

Jarry's Treatise on Light Infantry in the Field 1801 Very complete, including light infantry operations on the battlefield in cooperation with line troops and of course chapters on villages and out buildings. It is printed first in French, though Jarry is the head of the Prussian Military Academy. In 1803 Jarry's work is translated into English and Jarry is the Commendant of the Royal Military College at High Wycombe.

There are a lot more such works published between 1780 and 1815, filled with chapters such as:

"Of the manner of fortifying churches, mills and other detached buildings"

"Of the manner of fortifying villages"

"Of the defense of Villages or other detached posts"

And of course, "Of the attack of redoubts, field-forts, and villages."

And of course, there are a number of works on siege craft.

I have an eyewitness account in an American newspaper by an American of the Berlin Prussian Army Field Days in 1803. An attack on a village was one of the exercises.

With the amount of fighting that was done in and around villages and towns during the SYW, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, you bet lots was written on the methods surrounding attacking and defending villages.

So it is going to be easy to point me to a primary source describing where the French practiced such things. Why do threads on this board always become so hostile? All I want is to be pointed to a French primary source or two describing French infantrymen training in a heavy skirmish line. I'm happy to tackle it in any European language in latin script if it is available online. Are there some available or not?

Thank you

I read the other in Swords Around The Throne that there was not much ammunition allocated for firing practice. (which is one reason they British may have done better in firefights, they had a more liberal ammunition allocation)

I would have thought that shooting prcatice was the most important thing to practice / train after marching and drill and formation changing.

So you tend to wonder what did the troops do all do day when they were in camp and not on campaign ?

You shouldn't believe all what you read in Swords Around the Throne uncritcally, when you read eye witness accounts, memoires, you will find mentioning life round firing again and again – like on revues where units had to show at the inspection to do different kinds of firing, or target training to make the units battle ready before going into a war zone (like a lot of Confederation of the Rhine troops before entering Spain).
Additionally they did full mock up battles, like re – enactments with life firing, occationally killing participants by a shot ramrod, or a general as well.
@Whirlwind
I don't see any hostility so far, ok some people here are on my stiffle list – so I don't read all posts.
It seems so far – that French infantry could be fighting is dense skrimishing lines – but it is difficult so far to find anything specific about training (in contrast to smaller scale skirmishing)

@Whirlwind,

The place to look for first hand examples will be memoirs and letters I expect, but off hand I can't actually think of any personal account that describes any kind of training, along the lines of "Sgt x took the company out for skirmish training today, rained all the time etc., etc.", though they must exist I suppose.

I am not sure what a "heavy skirmish line" is, as opposed to a 'normal' skirmish line? Does this term come from anywhere in particular? Are we taking about tirailleurs en grande bande?

@ XV Brigada,

I use the term following Kevin Kiley's usage, to describe the thick firing line sometimes reported as being used by the French in particular.

Are we taking about tirailleurs en grande bande

Yes, although IIRC there has been some disagreement over exactly what this term does, and does not, denote? Anyway, that is for more learned men than me to debate over.

Anyway, what you describe is exactly what I'm after, if someone could point me in that direction. Or alternatively, orders from a general specifically stating that this type of training was going to be carried out by troops under his command

Regards

en grande bande just means with big units.

@ vW,

Yes, I 'think' that the 'heavy skimish line' must by definition be 'tirailleurs en grandes bandes' but not all 'tirailleus en grandes bandes' will be the heavy skirmish line as used by Kevin…but more than happy to be instucted on this point…

Regards

Why do threads on this board always become so hostile?

Whirlwind:

I think the major reason is that posts are written fast, and any 'tone' to them has to be assumed. In conversation 10% of the meaning is the words, 20% the tone, and 70% the body language. With the posts, 90% of the communication is absent and folks 'fill in' the rest.

There was no hostility meant or felt on my post, for instance, but there was some surprise in your statements.

I have found it is much easier to post on the TMP and other places by always assuming a 'tone' of interested, but friendly debate in any post. I find it too easy to take offense when dealing with things you care about.

So, if my posts seemed 'hostile', I apologize. Not my intention or thought at all.

Bill H.

In another thread Oliver Schmidt posted a link to an account by General Scherer, from 1795. Which identified three light infantry battalions, adopting two rank depth, with files spaced up to 2 meters apart. These three battalions advanced covering twelve line infantry battalions each in column, presumably at regular intervals between battalions. The use of the light infantry in this example would be my definition of 'heavy skirmish line'.

link

The directives set forth by Morand/Davout in 1811, or Reille in 1815, define the 'light skirmish chain', or norm for individual light companies acting in concert with their parent battalion.

Both 'systems', if that's what they were, were used presumably throughout the period, from early Revolution up through 1815.

npm

There was no hostility meant or felt on my post, for instance, but there was some surprise in your statements.

Okay, no problem.

You think it surprising that I think that Napoleonic infantrymen weren't generally or typically trained to carry out fighting in urban areas or carry out the storming of breaches. Was I wrong in thinking that – I have never read that they were, or recall examples of such things but naturally that may be ignorance on my part? Is the reverse in fact the case? I had assumed that Napoleonic-era officers assumed that the men's basic training was enough to allow them to adapt to doing these things effectively. I don't mean that officers weren't thinking about such things (witness your long list of books, it is clear that some were) but I am wondering if, in fact, soldiers spent time training to do them.

Regards

@Whirlwind,
I think you make a valid point, the treatises were available, and could be read by those officers so inclined – but the opportunity to put those ideas into practice, away from the battlefield, would have been rare in the extreme. The example of the Boulogne camps was the exception, rather than the rule – the poor conscripts of 1813, and 1814 were lucky to get any form of training, let alone, the opportunity to experience the tactical finesse or theory of assaulting built up areas. But they were still expected to do it.

npm

The poor conscripts of 1813 got loads of training during the armistic.
I agree with Whirlwind that house to house fighting wasn't a priority training, I also agree that the usual training of an infantrysoldier would do for fighting in villages – as long as the officers and NCOs would know how to do it.
I just read several memoires of German troops in Spain – were excessive house to house fighting did happen – and seemingly they coped quite well – without that specific training beforehand.

The poor conscripts of 1813 got loads of training during the armistic

The manual of arms, rudimentary formations maneuvers; deploying to line, ploying to column, adpoting open and closed square, perhaps some line companies, other than the voltigeurs, received skirmish duty training. But they never reached the peak of performance, at brigade and divisional levels, to match the veterans of the grande armee of 1805 and 1806. Some may have had the spirit of those warriors, but few, if any, had the depth of practical experience that had been forged during the period 1802-1805.
FIghting in built up areas probably wasn't something that could be taught, at best it was probably very chaotic and sanguinary, sections and even individuals fighting it out in close confines. The more you do it, the more experience you get, and potentially, the better you get at it – at least those that survive.

npm

@Whirlwind

Here are three works who discuss some aspects of
tirailleurs de marche
tirailleurs de combat
tirailleurs en grande bande

thanks as ever to Steve Smith

Considérations sur l'art de la guerre. 3rd edition. Paris: Chez Anselin et Pochard, 1820. :

link

Marbot, Marcellin de. Remarques critiques sur l'ouvrage de M. le lieutenant-général Rogniat, intitulé: Considérations sur l'art de la guerre. Paris: Anselin et Pochard, 1820:

link

Réponse aux notes critiques de Napoléon sur l'ouvrage intitulé: Considérations sur l'art de la guerre. Paris: Anselin et Pochard, 1823:

link

en grande bande just means with big units.

So, in respect to skirmishing does it mean throwing the entire Bn out as a skirmishing line rather than screening with the light company?