"How did the Allies turn the tide from 1807?" Topic

Napoleon made mincemeat of successive Allied armies – Austrians, Russians and Prussians – between 1796 and c.1807.

From c.1807 the Allies put up ever stiffer resistance. Leaving aside Napoleon's mistakes and the deterioration of his army, what were the BIG Allied changes/reforms that facilitated this turn of the tide?

For example, when did the Austrians, Russians and Prussians adopt the corps system?

The British army never adopted so-called Napoleonic innovations and made 'mincemeat' of French armies more often than not.

I'm not sure that there were any BIG allied changes or reforms, it was simply that Napoleon managed to thoroughly -off the whole of Europe to the point that they started pulling together.

Napoleon's own terminal errors of judgement coupled with a belief in his own infallibility were the causes of his downfall. He bit off more 'mincemeat' than he could chew.

The Prussians began a period of intense reform in 1808, right after thier humiliation by Napoleon. It was a much different Prussian army that took up the fight in 1813.

From 1807 to 1809 they did not fight him. Then from 1809 to 1812 they avoided fighting some more. From 1812 through 1815 they did not stop (other than during the exile to Elba) but chosing to fight where Napoleon wasn't.

Learning bitter lessons about strengths and weaknesses coupled with a better understanding of your opponent were changes. Showing your opponent grudging respect was important as well. You get the feeling that for a long time the Allies felt they just needed to show to beat the French rabble, still associating the French army with that of the early Republic. Pretty much everyone (including the British) had a corps structure in mind after 1808 but not everyone used it with the same flexibility as the French.

I'd still chalk it up to hard lessons, a leveling of troop training and tactical flexibility, plus as XV Brigada infers – overwhelming numbers.

After 1812, the policy was to avoid battles with Napoleon, where possible, and fight his far less able subordinates: Ney,Vandamme, Oudinot etc.

This worked outstandingly well in 1813 & mostly in 1814.

For me, if napoleon hadn't gone into Russia he'd still be there…even now…though somewhat venerable at well over 200 years old.

I agree with the notion that the Emperor was largely the agent of his own downfall, not the allies.

When you think of the position the Empire was in in 1811… well, the 1812 catastrophe removed from history, if he'd chosen instead to sit on what he had, nothin would have moved him. Even if he'd sent the 600,000 into spain instead that war would have been over in 5 minutes..

But then if he had done that, he woudln't be Napoleon would he?

A wild guess… but for the Austrians, Prussians and Russians I bet a big part of it had to do with renovating their systems of command. Promoting competent officers on merit or at least making sure the aristocratic buffoons weren't making that many important battlefield decisions. Creating better efficiency and competency in their staffs also. And almost without a doubt better training, drill and discipline for their soldiers and better retention of veterans through promotion, etc… As far as the battlefield was concerned it seems the Russians, the Austrians and the Prussians wised-up tactically within a few years… getting whipped like there's no tomorrow can do that to you, but the total rout thing with Napoleon shelling frozen lakes to sink terror stricken enemy artillery thing was getting harder to pull off for sure. The Russians were the first, I think, to really start thinking hard and then doing something about it during the Polish campaign I suspect.
And yes, it was either Napoleon's complete inability to go along with a balance of power or Britain's complete refusal to allow Napoleon in on the balance. I often wonder if Nappie was more driven to the former. Not for nothing, "Perfidious Albion".

I think in particular the Prussians improved staff is the perfect example of the point you're trying to make Bottom Dollar..

It is interesting to speculate on whether the Allies (let's throw in Austria just for giggles) would have been able to successfully use the sames strategy if Napoleon hadn't gone into Russia.

cannons.

More artillery changed everything and changed the battles into attrition contests where population mattered more than elan.

I think that Boney's early successes were dues to the greater ease of handling the French army: The Corps system, faster formation changes, superior battalion structure, an efficient conscription system.

Between 1806 and 1808 most of the major continental powers got more frenchified in all these ways and more.

As someone noted up above, the Brits just had a well drilled 18th C army with skirmishers and won anyway. Against that, they weren't on the lush plains of the low countries in 1808 facing a quarter of a million well fed men. I think putting another 600,000 men into Spain would have merely proved Wellington's point that in Spain large armies starve.

You might be right Grizzlymc, but I'm not sure about this? If the French Empire in 1812 devoted their entire attention on Spain (them not going to Russia as an interesting what-if) I think they may well have been just fine.

There would be no British army in Spain to start. They needless to say would have legged it in the face of 600,000 men and that would leave "merely" the population to deal with. And remember the British were only successful in Spain because the french were always split between them and a hostile Spanish population that constantly needed to be dealt with. Even Chandler concedes this point.

Not to mention, regardless of Wellingtons's view that "in Spain large armies starve" Spain is a whole different kettle of fish to trying to supply an army in moscow in the middle of winter! I think 600,000 men with the entire French Empire supporting them would rather change the landscape in the peninsular…

As long as Austria, Russia, Prussia and Britain were arrayed against him. United with a singular purpose his fate was sealed. With the latters navy and financial clout, and the combined numbers of the latter even a streak of classic victories would ruin France eventually. This is less true if having took power in France, he had stayed there and fended off the enemy he could have eventually become accepted. But as soon as started Empire building… In Europe. His greatness may stem in part from dragging it out as long as he did.

United with a singular purpose is the key here. I often think they hated each only slightly less than Napoleon. If they managed this, keeping in mind the 4 only ever really achieved this in practice in 1813 after Napoleon had been annihilated in Russia and they got brave, is one of those interesting what-ifs for me.

I'm also not convinced, if from 1811 Napoleon simply concentrated on maintaining his continental Empire, British naval power could not have damaged France economically enough to change much. It might have been hurting but was hardly about to topple the Empire and may well never have. One can gear an economy through land-based Europe.

The internal and military structure of the French Empire was intact. All the NCOs, Officers, superior generals, tradition and political strength was there… the whole machine was pretty frightening and Napoleon was still at the helm. It's not just the fact that the French empire could put 600,000 men in the field in 1812, also it was proven in 1813 another (albeit half trained) 600,000 could be put in the field in 12 months (assuming the Russian disaster had not happened) but also the quality of that 1812 army and in particular it's leadership across the board. Britain only had one Wellington, who's generalship was only proven (in good style) to a certain scope…and the other countries had, well…whomever?

Britain still would have ended up with their more ‘globalish' Empire though, and what a strange dual world it would have been…

I could also be talking total crap and underestimating the economic factors in play, and the ability of the allies to cooperate, who knows?

Sorry that should have been combined with the numbers of the former.

I think a significant factor was the deterioration in the Grande Armee which resulted from the losses at Eylau and Friedland, thus preventing the "knock-out blow".

Even the army in 1809 was diminshed. For instance, would McDonald's column at Wagram have ever been contemplated in the earlier "Glory Years" of 1805-7?

In itself, no, Britains navel might alone could have hurt France but while that is combined with the three largest armies in Europe now DEDICATED to seeing you destroyed… It's merely seeing how long you can last. Prior to 1812/3 I'd agree, there was mixed feelings. The allies may not have trusted each other, or have been intimidated by Napoleons apparent prowess and French military skill in the field, but id suggest that possibly at different times some powers may not have been as committed self preservation, mistrust or even pride perhaps.

I'm no expert in these matters, but I from the moment he started annexing states and placing family members as their rulers he was done. Now, if he had held back the initial storm then promised to be good if they left him alone… Waited a while then started expanding French possetions in Africa, Asia ect, maybe he would have eventually established himself, even become an accepted King?

That's another advantage for the allies, if one of them does lose a lot of men and needs time to recruit, they can rest up while the others smash in while the French have no respite, even if they keep winning and they beat off the other two, low and behold Austria is back, fresh, re equipped and ready. France, despite it's victories is running out of men. If the allies hadn't have ousted him themselves but kept up the fight, eventually the French would have deposed him in an effort to get some peace. This is aslong as the three allies keep up the pressure. The public loves short sharp wars, they hate protracted conflicts with a constant drain on its men folk.

I would suggest that it was growing megalomania that destroyed him, rather than the actions of the "Allies", with the exception of Britain.
He invaded Spain in 1808 when he didn't need to, but because he wanted to, in order to impose his authority. He was thus involved in a war that he couldn't win. The French only controlled where their armies were, and, as was pointed out above, Spain couldn't support large armies.
The Prussians, Russians and Austrians were simply waiting for an opportunity to get their revenge on him, so any lapse in judgement would have caused a potential disaster, and with Britain steadily destroying Bonaparte's economy's base, the Empire was doomed. Even without invading Russia in 1812 the Empire was dying due to economic strangulation. In any case, it wasn't the Russian winter that beat Bonaparte; he'd already lost half of his army before the Battle of Smolensk through inadequate logistics. The winter just finished it off.

They killed off too many Frenchmen, and adopted French methods to varying extents. They also retired old generals. The Prussians had already started this prior to 1806, Decimating the army just sped it up. The Austrians were the last to see the light.

Heads of state, War Councils, and Weyrothers stopped interfering.

One thing's for certain, it's certainly interesting to speculate.

All points mentioned may be true but we'll never know for sure. I hazard to guess that if Napoleon was the type to play it safe and "consolidate" in 1811 he may never have had the somewhat megalomaniacal personality required to have won his empire in the first place, so in one sense it's a moot point…

It needs a kinda half-mad genius to achieve (if that's the right word) what he did in such a short time, in part you'd almost have a have to believe there was nothing that was impossible…. with predictable results in Russia.

Yes, it gets to the same point as "Could the Nazis have won if they werent such silly psychotic murderers?". If Boney wasn't a double or nothing gambler there would have been no Napoleonic wars.

Yes, and it also gets to the same point as "Did Boney win even though he lost?"

I could also be talking total crap and underestimating the economic factors in play,

And cultural, and political and psychological… you name it.

Agreed. Though the 3 factors you mention can very much swing both ways..

I agree with the notion that the Emperor was largely the agent of his own downfall, not the allies.

And I really disagree with it. All sides were capable of doing bold and clever things, all sides were capable of making a real hash of things too. Napoleon, in general, did more of the former than the the latter – that is why he was a great general. It is too Franco-centric to start from the position of Napoleon must have won if he hadn't made the mistakes.

Regards