"Guibert's so-called 'column of attack'" Topic

What if they just equalized the grenadier squads and then placed those squads on a flank of the fusilier peletons ? Or would that break procedure too much ?

What was the grenadier company's role within the battalion?

Where is the evidence that the grenadier company was always deployed as a 5th tactical unit, entirely complete and either on the right of the line or at the head of the column ? Maybe they were… and the fusilier companies lined up behind them and either deployed in whole to their right or to their left, or potentially in halves to either side as wings ?

The voltigeurs were almost always out though, correct ? And assigning a voltigeur company to a 6 company battalion means that the majority of the time you intend a battalion to operate with 5 formed and close ordered tactical units, correct ? So, the post-1808 reduction in close order tactical units within the battalion was 9 to 5, not 9 to 6.

Was the French system versatile or not ?

@Bottom Dollar

Read what the regulations have to say forming a regiment – there it will be specified where the grenadier companies should stand when with the unit and when formed speratley.

The grenadier companies were only equalized when the formed their onw "tactical" unit.

As Oliver shows in this diagram – the center division remains standing while the flank disvisions fall back behind them.

There the grenadier company would be placed at the right flank – when being a battalion on the right – or on the left – when being a battalion on the left – they would be either on the back right or back left – regardless of being an old 9 company structure or 6 company structure.

it would be

Fusilier – Fusilier
Fusilier – Fusilier
Fusilier – Fusilier
Fusilier – Fusilier
xxxxxxxx – Grenadier

or post 1808

Fusilier – Fusilier
Fusilier – Fusilier
Voltigeur – Grenadier

The question is – what was the intention of an colonne d'attaque – in case it was a colonne d'action – it could either deploy or not deploy – but it shouldn't manoeuvre – this was for the colonne serrez (which could be formed on the center as well, in case I remember correctly formed on the interieur).

von Winterfeld,

Fusilier-Fusilier
Fusilier-Fusilier
Grenadier

assuming the voltigeurs are out skirmishing that looks more like a supported line to me. Yes, what was the intention of the colonne d'attaque and what if it were attacked by cavalry in the above formation ? Would they form square(s) or would they close en masse ? And I'm not arguing the French never deployed battalions as you show. As you point out though 4 lines in column would've been more versatile. It would've maneuvered more easily, converted into square more easily and forming into line wouldn't have been too much trouble either… unless of course, your opponent is knocking down your officers and grenadiers with volley's of small arms fire even before your battaliion has entered its effective range.

@Bottom Dollar

I agree that a colonne d'attaque in the pre 1808 system is more versatile – forming a square – a realy beauty to do so – and very quick, while a colonne d'attaque post 1808 – is more like a doubled line.
Indeed when the Voltigeurs are detached, or skirmishing – it would be easier (my view, I don't know what the real professionls, the chefs de bataillons say about this) to form a battalion column, with one peloton (company) frontage at half distance.
Maybe this is one of the reasons why the colonne d'attaque was hardly used in the post 1808 period – but also a colonne par disvisions would cause the identical problems and a battalion column with a peloton frontage – could be used more "convenient".

But first I like to see the questions answered Art Pendragon is offering to answer himself.

Like what is a colonne tranchee??
What is a colonne d'action? compared to a colonne de manoeuvre??

an oponent could not knock down my grenadiers or officers by volley's of small arm fire, there they hardly did volley fire and volley fire was at random, more likley they would try to do this with skirmishers and then again – ones own skirmishers could neutralize (to a lesser or greater extend) those efforts.

About fire fights go for

Dauriac, Eric : Les armes de Napoléon

A kind man has sent me this little piece of possible interest:

1498. — MANOEUVRES A FAIRE EXÉCUTER PAR LE CORPS D'OBSERVATION D'ITALIE.

Au Général Comte Bertrand, Commandant Le Corps
D'observation D'italie, A Trieste.

Paris, 2 mars 1813.

Monsieur le comte Bertrand, recommandez aux généraux qui commandent vos divisions qu'on fasse faire aux troupes l'exercice à feu deux fois par semaine; que, deux fois par semaine, elles tirent à la cible, et enfin que trois fois elles fassent des manœuvres. On leur fera faire les colonnes d'attaque par bataillon; on les fera charger en colonne d'attaque et en se déployant sons le feu de la première division et faisant feu tout en arrivant sur la ligne de bataille. On formera également la colonne d'attaque, tandis que la division du centre commence le feu de file et se déploie sous le feu de file. Après cela, on fera une charge de cent pas, battant la charge simplement et sans fion ni variantes, et on fera faire feu de file à tous les pelotons, à mesure qu'ils viendront se placer sur la ligne de bataille. Vous ordonnerez aussi qu'on fasse souvent la manœuvre de se mettre promptement en bataillon carré, en ployant derrière les dernières divisions du bataillon, à distance de peloton et en faisant feu de file. C'est la manœuvre qu'il est le plus nécessaire que les colonels connaissent bien, car la moindre hésitation peut compromettre la troupe.

Enfin ordonnez que chaque compagnie de voltigeurs soit instruite à former promptement le carré et à faire sur-le-champ feu de file, afin qu'étant en tirailleurs ils puissent promptement se réunir et résister à la cavalerie. Faites donner la poudre nécessaire pour ces exercices, et annoncez que ce sont ces manœuvres plus particulièrement que je ferai faire devant moi.

Napoléon.

D'après l'original comm. par M. le général comte Henry Bertrand.

Même lettre au général Lauriston et au maréchal duc de Valmy.

books.google.com/books?id=h6xCAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA329

(Not visible for people from the author's continent, therefore I have inserted the Google text version, however without correcting anything.)

vonWinterfeld wrote:

"Maybe this is one of the reasons why the colonne d'attaque was hardly used in the post 1808 period – but also a colonne par disvisions would cause the identical problems and a battalion column with a peloton frontage – could be used more "convenient".

I agree, but I think it was the original conception of the colonne d'attaque as an EVEN deployment on center which was hardly used. It was replaced by a formation--column by companies--that retained the essential tactical advantages of the original colonne d'attaque, if not the official designation. Moreover, the column by companies was a formation which allowed raw conscripts to learn/train in the advantages of the attack column by stages.

von Winterfeld, what if the 4 lines in column faced an opponent who could knock down practically the entire front rank of the leading company with the first volley ? If the column was outside of its own effective small arms range, the lead company might be non-existent by the time the column deployed into line.

Thanks for the book rec.

Oliver, could we have an english translation of that please ? Even with google translate, it's still somewhat unclear.

It would seem from Oliver's quote that the French were still deploying attack columns on the center division…. or at least practicing the deployment with the center providing fire as the rest deploy into line.

Bill H.

OK, but French is not my mother tongue, nor is English ;-)

I have added some annotations on how I understand it (or not), in square brackets:

1498. — Manoeuvres to be executed by the Observation Corps of Italy.

To Général Comte Bertrand, Commander of the Corps
D'observation D'italie, in Trieste.

Paris, 2nd March 1813.

Monsieur count Bertrand, recommend to the generals who are commanding your divisions that they have their troops do firing practice [without bullets, I presume] twice a week, that they will have target practice twice a week, and finally that they will do manoeuvres thrice [a week, I presume].

You will have them form the colonnes d'attaque par bataillon, you will have them attack [charger] in colonne d'attaque, and by deploying [et en se déployant] under the fire of the first division [which is the leading division formed by the 2nd and 3rd company of fusiliers, see below the letter to Bertrand of 27 March 1813], and giving fire all [faisant feu tout] when they [the other four pelotons] arrive in the battle line. [I have corrected my first attempt of translation.]

You will also have the colonne d'attaque formed [from line] while the division du centre [center division, formed by the 2nd and 3rd company of fusiliers], begins with the feu de file [firing by files] and you will deploy under the feu de file [the colonne d'attaque will redeploy in line while the two leading pelotons execute a feu de file, but I am not 100% sure of my translation].

After this, you will have make an attack of 100 paces, by simply beating the charge without "fion" [I don't know what this word means] or variants [does the Emperor really care here about the rhythm of the drums ? Would this matter ?], and you will have all the pelotons execute a feu de file, as soon as [à mesure que] they reach their place in the battle line.

You will also order that the manoeuvre to form a battalion square quickly, will be frequently practiced, by bending backwards [ployant derrière – I am only 90% sure that my translation is correct, a grammatical alternative would be: bending behind] the last divisions of the batallion [yes, he says: last divisions, plural, in a battalion which consists only of three divisions], in the distance of a peloton, and by executing a feu de file. [I presume, forming the square starts from the battalion being formed in line, but I don't understand at all how this manoeuvre is meant ot be executed. I hope the colonels were better in French than I, as:] This is the manoeuvre of which it is most important that the colonels will know it well, as the slightest hesitation could compromise the unit.

Finally, give the order that every company of voltigeurs shall be instructed to form square quickly and make a feu de file immediately, so that if they are en tirailleurs, they can reunite quickly in order to resist against the cavalry.

Have the necessary powder for these exercises [firing and target practice mentioned in the beginning] distributed, and announce these are the manoeuvres which I will have executed in most specifically my presence.

Napoléon.

After the original communicatd by M. le général comte Henry Bertrand.

Same letter to général Lauriston and to maréchal duc de Valmy.

On one of the possible formations of a company square, see here:

link

@Oliver Schmidt

Thanks for that.
It is really good to have the original French text.
And of course translating this type of text is very hard as it is very technical, and we don't always know what the original author meant.

But I was surprised at the level of detail Napoleon himself went into at this late stage of the war.

Also of interest the order to Betrand of 27e mars, concerning the manoeuvres of infantry for square, colonne d'attaque – ploiment and deploiment, to be found in correspondence militaire de Napoléon, volume 8, page 387, it is available on google books for those in the US – I don't know how to copy and paste from a pdf document to show it here.
Courtesy : To Vox Magnus

It could be that N means by 1st division the leading division of a colonne d'attaque (remember he was an artillery officer ;-)) – and by that not versed with the small print of infantry regulations).

Here it is:

1509. — ORDRES CONCERNANT LES MANOEUVRES DE L'INFANTERIE : FORMATION DES CARRÉS, DE LA COLONNE D'ATTAQUE; PLOIEMENT ET DÉPLOIEMENT.

AU GÉNÉRAL COMTE BERTRAND, COMMANDANT LE 4e CORPS DE LA GRANDE ARMÉE, A VÉRONE.

Paris, 27 mars 1813.

Le carré se forme indistinctement sur toutes les divisions d'une troupe en ligne, parallèlement ou perpendiculairement à cette ligne, et selon les circonstances et la nature du terrain; il y a, à la suite .de l'Ordonnance, une instruction sur ce point, donnée, je crois, en 1805, qui ne laisse rien à désirer; mais il importe de la rendre familière aux troupes et de faire serrer les serre-files sur le troisième rang, le carré étant formé et la cavalerie cherchant à l'enfoncer, Il convient qu'une compagnie de voltigeurs ait toujours une réserve sur laquelle elle se ralliera, quand elle ne pourra résister à une charge étant en en tirailleurs.

La colonne d'attaque se formera toujours d'après les principes de l'Ordonnance; mais, si la ligne devait se porter en avant dans cet ordre, la première division, ou division de tête de chaque colonne, croiserait la baïonnette, et, arrivées à la hauteur où la ligne devra s'arrêter, ces mêmes divisions de tête ouvriront leur feu de deux rangs, et les colonnes se déploieront sous la protection de ce feu.

Je désire dans cette manœuvre plus de promptitude que n'en indique le règlement, c'est-à-dire que chaque peloton doit commencer son feu en arrivant sur la ligne, et qu'il faut supprimer les guides.

Si l'on se trouvait dans le cas de se remettre en colonne d'attaque, le feu étant établi sur toute la ligne, on pourrait de même le faire sous la protection du feu des divisions de tête; mais alors le chef de chaque bataillon fera prévenir, par son adjudantmajor et ses adjudants, les chefs des pelotons des ailes du mouvement qu'ils devront exécuter, le roulement pour faire cesser le feu ne devant pas être ordonné. La charge ne doit jamais se battre qu'en présence de l'ennemi ou à la manœuvre, et toujours de la manière la plus simple, c'est la plus imposante. L'instruction sur le tir à la cible est bonne; il faut s'attacher à faire tirer beaucoup, individuellement, et donner un léger encouragement aux plus adroits.

D'après la minute. Archives de l'Empire.

books.google.com/books?id=h6xCAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA387

It sheds some light on an unclear point in my translation above of the letter of 2nd March 1813, von Winterfeldt's assumption is correct:

The colonne d'attaque will be always formed according to the principals laid down in the Ordonnance [Règlement d'Exercice of 1st August 1791], but if the line [of battle] shall advance in this order [i.e. all its battalions in the colonne d'attaque formation], the first division, or division at the head, will charge bayonets, and, arriving at the spot where the line [of battle] shall make halt, just these divisions at the head [ces mêmes divisions de tête – he uses the plural, as the head divisions of all the battalions are meant] will commence their feu de deux rangs, and the columns will deploy under the protection of this fire

And, thanks to Jakub Samek, an improved version of the 5th paragraph of my translation above, unfortunately, I couldn't edit the message above any more:

You will also order that the manoeuvre to form a battalion square quickly [from line], will be frequently practiced, by drawing behind [ployant derrière] the last [2nd (2nd and 3rd peloton of fusiliers) and 3rd (4th peloton of fusiliers and voltigeurs)] divisions of the batallion, in the distance of a peloton, and by executing a feu de file. This is the manoeuvre of which it is most important that the colonels will know it well, as the slightest hesitation could compromise the unit.

The result is a simple colonne serré par division:

1G
32
V4

Probably, in order to arrive at a square formation, it is meant that only the second divison will have a distance of one peloton to the first, the 3rd division will be directly behind the second, and – not mentioned here – the two pelotons of the 2nd divison will wheel right and left respectively, to build the hollow square.

And, from the letter of 27 March 1813 cited above, on a question of music:

The charge may never be beaten, except in the presence of the enemy or during the exercise, and always in the simplest style, this is the most impressive one.

Interesting – it is fairly explicit that deployment under small arms fire was expected then?

Regards

Oliver in reference to your post on:

1498. — Manoeuvres to be executed by the Observation Corps of Italy.

Given a 5 company battalion with the voltigeurs out -- I reference Napoleon's specific instructions for that company to deploy back to the square---would it be two and half divisions ?

Fusiliers Grenadiers
Fusiliers Fusiliers
Fusiliers

Or

Fusiliers Fusiliers
Fusiliers Fusiliers
Grenadiers

Or is Napoleon using the word ‘division' not in terms of two companies, but in terms of the common French military usage of the time which refers to each successive line in their ‘attack column' as a ‘division' regardless of the number of companies, sections, troop types, etc… in each line? If so, the idea of 4 divisions to an attack column--carried forward from the pre-1808 regulations--might still apply. Likewise, might he not be carrying forward the usage of referring to the lead--premier--‘division' as the center b/c the following ‘divisions' did and could still deploy to either of its sides or flanks ?

I agree Oliver that the reference to forming square must be for the battalion when in line and Napoleon is therefore specifically addressing the most vulnerable formation. Hence, the reason for his sense of urgency.

"C'est la manœuvre qu'il est le plus nécessaire que les colonels connaissent bien, car la moindre hésitation peut compromettre la troupe."

Accepting that …

"Vous ordonnerez aussi qu'on fasse souvent la manœuvre de se mettre promptement en bataillon carré, en ployant derrière les dernières divisions du bataillon, à distance de peloton et en faisant feu de file."

refers to the battalion forming square when in line, bending back the "last" divisionS might simply mean bending back ALL of the divisions which followed or were behind the premier division--therefore his plural might simply mean all THREE of the divisions minus the premier division. Further evidence for that case can be seen when Napoleon notes that the ‘last' divisionS should "bend' themselves back " à distance de peloton et en faisant feu de file". I translate that possibly to mean the distance of a peleton in firing line, therefore making each side of the square a peleton in length, i.e. a combat company in other words each side is the length of a single ‘division‘ from the original attack column.. That's the only way it makes sense to me, and I see no reference or place for a separate 5th division or ½ division in any of it.

And after reading your second post Oliver-thank you, BTW --- I am quite far from being convinced of your two company ‘division' in the post-1808 period.

von Winterfeldt wrote:

It could be that N means by 1st division the leading division of a colonne d'attaque (remember he was an artillery officer ;-)) – and by that not versed with the small print of infantry regulations).

VW:
After twenty years of war, with lots of experience micro-managing [e.g. He drew up the array of Soult's Corps the night before Austerlitz] and working with the 1791 regulations the entire time, I find it hard to believe he would make errors like that in 1813.

But that's just me. ;-7

Bill H.

"You will also order that the manoeuvre to form a battalion square quickly [from line], will be frequently practiced, by drawing behind [ployant derrière] the last [2nd (2nd and 3rd peloton of fusiliers) and 3rd (4th peloton of fusiliers and voltigeurs)] divisions of the batallion, in the distance of a peloton, and by executing a feu de file. This is the manoeuvre of which it is most important that the colonels will know it well, as the slightest hesitation could compromise the unit."

A rather liberal interpretation don't you think ? Where are the grenadiers ?

I‘ll posit:

"You will also order that the maneuver to form a battalion square quickly [from the firing line], is frequently practiced, by drawing behind the last [three rear] divisions of the battalion, to the distance of a peleton in firing line. This is the maneuver that it is most important that the colonels know well, as the slightest hesitation could compromise the unit"

And then a couple of weeks later….

1st paragraph of 1509. — ORDRES CONCERNANT LES MANOEUVRES DE L'INFANTERIE : FORMATION DES CARRÉS, DE LA COLONNE D'ATTAQUE; PLOIEMENT ET DÉPLOIEMENT.

"Le carré se forme indistinctement sur toutes les divisions d'une troupe en ligne, parallèlement ou perpendiculairement à cette ligne, et selon les circonstances et la nature du terrain; il y a, à la suite .de l'Ordonnance, une instruction sur ce point, donnée, je crois, en 1805, qui ne laisse rien à désirer; mais il importe de la rendre familière aux troupes et de faire serrer les serre-files sur le troisième rang, le carré étant formé et la cavalerie cherchant à l'enfoncer, Il convient qu'une compagnie de voltigeurs ait toujours une réserve sur laquelle elle se ralliera, quand elle ne pourra résister à une charge étant en en tirailleurs."

"The square will take shape indiscriminately on any division in the battalion line, parallel or perpendicular to this line, and according to circumstances and the nature of the terrain; The result of the Ordinance which investigated this point, I believe in 1805, leaves nothing to be desired, but [therefore] it is important to make [my instructions] familiar to the troops and to tighten the file-closers in the third rank [.] The square being formed and enemy cavalry driving/attacking it , the company of voltigeurs will [then] always have a reserve on which it can rally, where they can withstand the [enemy cavalry] charge/attack as sharpshooters [within/as part of the square]."

Form square on whichever division is most convenient and expeditious ! The premier division, or one of the two center divisions when in line or one of the two flanking divisions. "What is easiest, is best"

Amazing that Napoleon is writing these minute tactical instructions in the midst of rebuilding an entirely new Grand Army in record time--one of the greatest feats in military history, IMHO. It certainly shows how important the tactics were, and how keen and particular his mind continued to be, and indeed how much inherent tactical flexibility the French military continued to have even after the disaster in Russia.
In a sense, it emphasizes the point that tactics and tactical planning are the foundations for operational planning.

Oliver Schidt wrote:

"The charge may never be beaten, except in the presence of the enemy or during the exercise, and always in the simplest style, this is the most impressive one."

I spent some time trying to decipher that one too. Can't say that I did… not yet at least :)

Thanks for your posts.

BD

Can "La charge" in French also mean "The responsibility.."?

Therefore, "The responsibility …" ?

I don't know, but that seemed to opened up a few of doors….

OK. I interpret that passage as:

"The responsibility is to never struggle in the presence of the enemy or on maneuver, and the easiest way [to accomplish that objective] is the best [or the most impressive]."

Again, I don't know, but it sounds right in the context of his previous statements.

@Mcladdie

"VW:
After twenty years of war, with lots of experience micro-managing [e.g. He drew up the array of Soult's Corps the night before Austerlitz] and working with the 1791 regulations the entire time, I find it hard to believe he would make errors like that in 1813.

But that's just me. ;-7
"

See his second order later, my assumption was prooved to at least going into the right direction, Napoleon was human and not a half god.

More interesting to know is – what was made with his advise, did the generals use it and deploy their infantry like this.

As seen before – like Napoleons instruction for attacking the Pratzen at Austerlitz were changed by Soult – and Soult's instructions were again changed by the Généraux de Brigades.

"You will also order that the manoeuvre to form a battalion square quickly [from line], will be frequently practiced, by drawing behind [ployant derrière] the last [2nd (2nd and 3rd peloton of fusiliers) and 3rd (4th peloton of fusiliers and voltigeurs)] divisions of the batallion, in the distance of a peloton, and by executing a feu de file. This is the manoeuvre of which it is most important that the colonels will know it well, as the slightest hesitation could compromise the unit."

A rather liberal interpretation don't you think ? Where are the grenadiers ?

The grenadiers are forming the 1st division, together with the 1st peloton of fusiliers.

I am still convinced that "division" refers to two united pelotons, and that the French infantry battalions consisted of 3 divisions after 1808.

Oliver Schidt wrote:

"The charge may never be beaten, except in the presence of the enemy or during the exercise, and always in the simplest style, this is the most impressive one."

Bottom Dollar:

Can "La charge" in French also mean "The responsibility.."?

"The responsibility is to never struggle in the presence of the enemy or on maneuver, and the easiest way [to accomplish that objective] is the best [or the most impressive]."

I am 100% sure that my translation is correct here.

Of course being sure does never rule out to be wrong.

@ Oliver Schmidt,

In this context beating the charge means exactly that. It is a signal given by drum beat.

The terminology is unambiguous and I am sure your translation is correct.

Similarly a division of a battalion is two companies.

Post 1808 the battalion formed three divisions from six peletons. The Decree of 18 February 1808 is clear enough, is it not?

"When the six companies are present with the battalion it will always march and act by divisions. When the grenadiers and light infantry are absent from the battalion it will always manoeuvre and march by platoon. Two companies will form a division; each company will form a platoon; each half company a section.".

I agree also with Oliver and XV Brigada, it is pretty obvious that the pas de charge is ment, as well as in this context a division are two pelotons.

"The Decree of 18 February 1808 is clear enough, is it not?"

Not sure actually. Anyone have a copy ?

Here ist is, especially articles 6 & 7, XV Brigada in his last posting has translated the complete article 7:

link

I have a copy and XV Brigada is spot on.
A lot of stuff is on-line, one can google it.
Also the manuel d'infanterie helps as well, also available on – line.
there was once a thread where Vox Magnus – commonly known as Steve Smith – did provide all those links.

Why is there any doubt about it?

Is this the thread you are talking about vW?

TMP link

Regards

I'm still surprised that this drill was expected to be done when under fire from close-order infantry.

Regards

See his second order later, my assumption was prooved to at least going into the right direction, Napoleon was human and not a half god.

More interesting to know is – what was made with his advise, did the generals use it and deploy their infantry like this.

As seen before – like Napoleons instruction for attacking the Pratzen at Austerlitz were changed by Soult – and Soult's instructions were again changed by the Généraux de Brigades.

VW:
Yep, I know that his generals, like Soult, didn't always, [or often?] follow his 'suggestions'. I have no doubt that Napoleon was human, and capable errors.

On the other hand, if he is making such errors on a regular basis… two orders in a row, that is something else.

Bill

BD:

I believe this passage:

"The charge may never be beaten, except in the presence of the enemy or during the exercise, and always in the simplest style, this is the most impressive one."

Refers to drums beating the 'pas de charge' [quick time, I think] which British and Allied officers often remarked hearing when the French advanced on them.

Bill H.

Here's my doubt taken from Napoleon's March 2nd letter.

"Vous ordonnerez aussi qu'on fasse souvent la manœuvre de se mettre promptement en bataillon carré, en ployant derrière les dernières divisions du bataillon, à distance de peloton et en faisant feu de file."

Clearly, the later attack column formed in a column of peletons, there being four of those for four divisions. The voltigeurs being out the majority of the time. The grenadiers were probably attached to the the 4 divisions or peletons which is probably why they could still call them divisions b/c they were composite of fusiliers/grenadiers. That's why Napoleon's instructions above to form square make sense. Four parts, four divisions, each the length of a peleton firing line.

Article 7 even states each company was a peleton and a column of peletons was expected. There is no provision in the Article for half divisions either such as

Fusilier Fusilier
Fusilier Fusilier
Grenadier

I see four divisions or 4 peletons with the grenadiers attached to them. Look at his letters posted above. He talks about deploying by peleton, peleton firing lines, peleton distances, and peleton chiefs.

Bill,

It's not that I don't believe it but

"battant la charge" is beating the charge to my understandign

"La charge ne doit jamais se battre…" may mean something else…

Given the context of the paragraph where he has just described an incredibly risky maneuver, i.e. forming attack column while in line under fire…why would he suddenly say the charge should never be beaten except in the presence of the enemy or while maneuvering ?

to me this makes more sense

"The responsibility is to never struggle in the presence of the enemy or on maneuver, and the easiest way [to accomplish that objective] is the best [or the most impressive]."

In that it further impresses on the reader the importance of making sure everyone in your battalion knows what they are doing and their role when you reform into attack column from a line under fire.

Of course, I could be wrong…

I am more likely to be convinced that from time to time they would've formed a column as so…

Grenadiers
Fusiliers
Fusiliers
Fusiliers
Fusiliers

when they really needed to crack a tough nut.

But this ?

Fusilier Fusilier
Fusilier Fusilier
Grenadier

or

Fusilier Grenadier
Fusilier Fusilier
Fusilier

?

Where's the evidence for those ?

Again, I see these as more likely

GFFFG
FFFFF
FFFFF
GFFFG

or

FFFGG
FFFFF
FFFFF
GGFFF

or

FFFFG
GFFFF
FFFFG
GFFFF

or

FFFFG
FFFFG
FFFFG
FFFFG

or

GGFGG
FFFFF
FFFFF
FFFFF

or

FFFFG
FFFFG
GFFFF
GFFFF

or

FFGFF
FFGFF
FFGFF
FFGFF

or on occasion

GGGG
FFFF
FFFF
FFFF
FFFF

To explore different possibilities, what if a battalion commander put the grenadiers in the 3rd rank of each peleton ? Or the 1st rank ?

In the 3rd rank the grenadiers could've served as file closers and would've been in excellent position to make sure everyone was doing what they were supposed to do.

What I also find interesting is that clearly even the later version of the attack column was meant to deploy into firing line. Further, the French weren't firing with 3 ranks very much.

Anyway, if it makes you feel better, you guys are right :)

@Bottom Dollar
it is nice to see enthusiasm, but a lot of your reflexions are wild immagination.
Read the book about Dauriac I mentioned.
To mow down the first rank by a fire fight, the distance would have to be 50 meter or closer – a colonne d'attaque would usually try to deploy outside that range, let's say at 300 paces.
The wild mixing of grenadier subsections along with the fusiliers is highly unlikly there it would rupture all tactical unity.
There were file closers, but certainly no grenadiers.
I am surprised that you think the French were firing with 3 ranks, that was the exception but usually they did a fire by two ranks or fire at will.

Oliver did already describe in detail all different kind of columns which you seem to mix at random.
The discussion is about a colonne d'attaque and not a colonne serrez en masse or a battalion column with peloton frontage.

Of course I feel better when my interpretation is shared by competent people like Oliver, McLaddie or XV Brigada.

I agree where the grenadiers actually were in the battalion formation is debatable. That Napoleon makes no mention of them in his tactical instructions posted above isn't debatable. In both he mentions the voltigeur companies as operating independently, but not a word about an independent grenadier company. Is it wild imagination that they where detached into separate grenadier battalions ? If their independent operation within the battalion isn't even mentioned by Napoleon himself, they weren't there, correct ? Therefore, in both of Napoleon's letters he is referring to a close order formation where the voltigeurs and grenadiers are absent, correct ? The only logical deduction is that the French were forming columns by 4 peletons as per the 1808 decree. Each peleton was a division by company sections.

And von Winterfeld, I meant there may have been exceptional circumstances when the 1st rank of the column was mowed down. And how can you argue that they deployed the attack column out of musket range, when in Napoleon's own writing above he is detailing how to deploy into line from the attack column and back again when the battalion has entered musket range ? He even instructs them to deploy under cover of the lead divisions fire !

Therefore, I'll revise my diagram of post-1808 attack column formation…

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clearly, the grenadiers were somewhere else in 1813 at least. Probably MIA'ed in Russia.

No, nothing like that.

Four companies you illustrate formed colonne par peletons.

Yes, but it still has a premier division, and could deploy on the center/lead peleton or to either flank and could form a square quickly.

From a wargaming stand point, a 6 fig or 3 fig stands in a column of 4's would replicate that fairly well. Still no ideal basing scheme… I guess that's Napoleonics.

BD wrote: To me this makes more sense

BD:
My thoughts on this: 'pas de charge' could be beaten anything the troops were to march quick time. However, to reserve the drums to just the charge, instead beating also in the presence of the enemy or on maneuver, and the easiest way [to accomplish that objective] is the best [or the most impressive]."

It was the easiest and most impressive [for both the enemy and French units] because

it further impresses on the reader the importance of making sure everyone in your battalion knows what they are doing and their role when you reform into attack column from a line under fire.

I am not sure how 'risky' forming line under fire was, but I do know that the fire from the center companies while the others deployed was one of the arguments for the attack column.

Isn't that deploying under fire one of the things the French kept trying to do in the Peninsula?

Bill H.

@Bottom Dollar

"And how can you argue that they deployed the attack column out of musket range, when in Napoleon's own writing above he is detailing how to deploy into line from the attack column and back again when the battalion has entered musket range ? He even instructs them to deploy under cover of the lead divisions fire !"

The deployment form column into line under musket cover was one of the ideas of a colonne d'attaque.
I am not arguing that the deployment should be made out of musket range – rather than out of efficient musket range, ones own troops would feel better when being shot at – to shot back, regardless how far the distance would have been.

Again my recommendations of Eric Dauriacs work – who looked recently into the efficiency of musketry.
Seemingly nobody is prepared to read this worthwhile publication, either of desinterest of lack of language skill.

Remember – out of 36 000 shots – you inflicted about 60 casualties, for some others the weight of the lead consumed equaling the weight of the casualty.

Also, it is not necessary to open fire while deploying, lets say because your own skirmishers are covering the battalion in the front.

This leads to another debate – is it advisable to deploy from column into line, start firing and loose the tactical initiative, that is your won troops won't advance any longer – or not to deploy?

Napoleon gives in his instructions a very defensive touch to the colonne d'attaque.

@Whirlwind
A good link as well – but in case memory isn't failing me, there was a thread dealing especially with drill regualtions