"Guibert's so-called 'column of attack'" Topic

I have somwehere read that the combining of French grenadiers into seperate battalions stopped when the guard was formed; they took the place of reserves to stop gaps in he battlelines or made the coup de grace.

In Spain where ther were nog French guards the combining of grenadiers (think eg of Vimeiro) still sometimes occured.

Soult employed two battalions of Grenadier Reunis at Albuera – however, I believe these were formed from battalions not present at the actual battle, and were taken from garrison units. This meant that the field battalions were not compromised by losing their integral grenadier companies.
In another theater, apparently, as late as 1812, Compan's division of Davout's I Corps at Schevardino fielded Voltigeur Reunis battalion[s] – a possible reason for this was that the division had no integral light regiment, so Compan's possibly felt the necessity to form a composite cohesive light battalion from several voltigeur companies, to act as light infantry. In this case the individual companies came from the field battalions. Whether this was done specifically for the battle, or on a more permanent basis I do not know.

npm

A good point, and well taken. I was coming from the direction that if figures already exist that are – more or less – what we are aking for, it would be good for the hobby as a whole to support what is already in production. Not to say that you are not! That's just where my thoughts immediately went. But you make a valid point too. And if we don't ask, we definitely won't get what we want.

It is sometimes hard to know when elite battalion are used as they do not get reflected on OBs because they are ad hoc in nature. You find them metioned in formation returns from time to time though. 1806 is a typical example of this.

G'Day Gents

I would like to add a few thoughts on the subject if I may.

There are those on this forum who believe that the French Reglement 1791 was an Ordnance from which battle drills were used by the French military.

The Reglement de 1791 was not used in this manner, but was viewed as the foundation of rules, general principles, for formations and manoeuvres. It is for this reason that the French military were able to keep the Reglement de 1791 for as long as they did. Nevertheless there were plenty of changes that were published by La Commission.

The Reglement de 1791 was a settlement of older instructions of discipline, which were developed after the Seven Years War, under the influence of the Prussian methods and their military system. It was therefore a continuation of the Prussian tactics in all its forms. It was better suited for an armee lineaire, and not one was that was soon to become a Nation that were supporters of the new French system (system means doctrine) called "l'ordre Francaise" ou "l'ordre perpendiculaire".

The Reglement de 1791 was appropriate for a lineal army in that it killed all initiative on the part of the officers, and was better suited for a defensive battle. To manoeuvre in such a formation as found in the Reglement de 1791 was very difficult. The Ordnance required easy country to operate over, and even then, an advance for a great body of troops in line would be slow.

The French Ordinance of Manoeuvres of 1791 fixed the deployed orders as the sole order of battle, of course this Ordinance did not absolutely prohibit the employment of the column formation, but it prescribed the line of deployed battalions as the primary order of battle.

The foundation of the Reglement de 1791 became more and more of a contradiction to l'ordre perpendiculaire with each passing year. Even musketry from a formed body became the exception while musketry from tirailleurs became the customary means of firepower for the battalions, but that does not mean that any general could just change any formation or movement in the Ordinance on a whim. He first had to get it approved by the hierarchy within La Commission and then train his troops on any changes approved upon. Which were then taught by a designated cadre of instructors assigned to each Commander. Of course according to the Ordinance it was the responsibility of each Regimental Commander for the instruction of the Regiment, of which the Major was in charge of all general training. The Compagnie Commanders were in turn responsible for instruction of their own companies.

The Reglement de 1791 laid stress on the march in line of battle; but paid no particular thought to skirmishers, because the deployed battalions constituted the true fighting line, and the columns were only intended for assembling, passage of lines, or rallying troops before and during action. The skirmish lines and ligne d'approche ( the skirmish line advancing with artillery in advance of the two battle lines) for a great body of troops, were to come from the detached grenadiers, light battalions, or from the third rank (prior to 1804).

The authors for the light infantry manuals were diverse, sometimes they are officers of the line that dealt only with the use of the soldiers and sharpshooters caught in the
battalions, sometimes they are light infantry officers who would laid down principles for the service of the weapon, others instruction came from instruction manuals that originated from other countries. As late as 1829 the French ordinance still did not have one universal reglement on the manner of forming and how to employ their trailleurs. Because of this, a commission was charged for the revision of the Reglement de 1791, as well as an insertion of instructions for the trailleurs (… 'just like l'ordonnance Autrichienne 1807, l'ordonnance Prussienne 1812, l'ordonnnce Piemontaise 1818, and British Rules and Regulations of 1792' …).

But it was dissolved before the commission was able to put the last hands on its work. This was due to the untimely death of Comte Curial (who was once the Commander of such commands as the 3' division de la Vieille Garde en Russie, and died on 30 May 1829), who presided over the charged commission.

There are two points I would like to bring up in regards to Griffith, and since I do not own his book, I cannot comment on what he actually wrote. But Guilbert did not in his writing ever suggest that he was the originator of the colonne de attaque or a body of troops formed en colonnes serrées et de la ligne déployée.

The second point that needs to be explained is that Napoleon never claimed to be the originator of the body of troops en colonnes serrées et de la ligne déployée at the Battle of Tagliamento. But he can claim that he was the first to use a body of troops en colonnes serrées et de la ligne déployée in an execution, that was not in accordance to l'ordre Prussien.

The French military state that when Napoleon executed the manoeuvres of his bodies of troops en colonnes serrées et de la ligne déployée, it was the beginning of what the French military called "l'ordre Francaise" ou "perpendiculaire". Of course we must also give partial credit to General Schauenbourg for bringing the French military system into a new age with l'ordre perpendiculaire. Hence Napoleon can claim that at the Battle of Tagliamento in 1797, his manoeuvres were the birth of the l'ordre Francaise.

Since there are currently102 postings at the moment, I will briefly pick a few observations that have been posted and brief explain why I do not agree with them. Hopefully I will be able to explain in detail at a later date.

1) "…the most interesting and apparently often overlooked factor when considering this column and the later Prussian equivalent(for example), is that the formation is apparently designed to minimize the theoretical time taken to the enemy…"

--- this is not what the colonne de attaque was designed for, it was designed to be an action column.

2) "I don't expect that there was much real innovation as far as regs are concerned in the 100 years between 1750 and 1850 and what there was came from Prussia."

--- this will take quite a bit of explanation, but the innovations are numerous .

3) "…The colonne d'attaque was a difficult formation to use because it had to be formed from line…"

--- This is one observation that continues to circulate and still amazes me, if the battalion was formed en colonne d'attaque prior to marching down a road, then suddenly had to prepare to form for battle a few miles later, it would manoeuvre par divisions sur les ailes. The real problem of the colonne d'attaques is that it was a failure in what it was designed to do as an action column.

4) "A battalion with uneven numbers of companies could not form colonne par divisions or colonne d'attaque"

. --- they can, and there is enough instructional documentation on how it is accomplished.

5) "The great advantage is that the leading companies can open fire to cover the deployment of the 4th and 1st companies, and four companies can be firing as the elite flank companies complete the line."

--- even the leading companies of a colonne par division can fire both pelotons to cover the deployment of the battalion. But in all actualities, even though the colonne d'attaque was a success in 1805, and 1806, it was realized it was too fragile to deploy while staggered. I'll explain more about this failure of the colonne d'attaque in my next posting.

6) "…The reason for the 1808 Decree was that battalions needed a minimum of three complete rows of divisions or companies in order to form square. Two divisions plus a loose company at the rear cannot form square…"

--- this is not what the Decree of 1808 is explaining. And a body of troops can form square with only two companies. The light infantry instructions with one or two companies deployed as skirmishers, shows how to form the reserve with four or five companies. ‘Si un battaillon, marchant en colonne par pelotons, a distance entiere et la droite en tete, est harcele par la cavalerie, le chef de bataillon fera serre la colonne a distance de section…Le bataillon pourra continuer sa marche dans cet ordre, mais, si l'ennemi approache, le chef de bataillon fera serrer la colonne en masse…Si la charge s'annonce, le chef de bataillon arretera la colonne et commandera: formez le carre…Cette colonne est sans contredit plus solide, et peut-etre plus maniable que le carre simple, puisqu'elle peut, sans aucun mouvement preparatoire, marche en tous sens, changer de direction, augmenter ou resserrer les distances entre ses subdivisions etc. , comme les colonnes ordinaires.'

7) "…five years later, Davout in his 1811 instructions still considers deploying the third line of line battalions as skirmishers before detailing how center companies should be deployed in conjunction with the battalion voltigeurs or alone, so that skirmish operations should be uniform…"

--- it doesn't state that at all.

8) "The bottom line is that if a French battalion after 1808 was so stupid as to operate with its voltigeurs deployed, with the remainder of the battalion in a column of two divisions and it's grenadier company forming a half-division at the rear, it would be unable to form square without first forming into a column on single company frontage."

--- no this is not true, it's even explained in the Reglement how this is done… "Dans toutes les formations de carres, les compagnies de grenadiers sont toujours divisees par sections, et placees aux angles sur une ligne diagonale, a dix pas en avant." But the most of all documents that validates this is from General Brennier, he explains how battalions formed square in various manners while in in combat and how grenadiers and voltigeurs were positioned in a square, or exterior the square on the four corners.

9) "I think that we today have a very uniform notion of army operations compared to the Napoleonic Period. Colonels and generals from division to army had a great deal of leaway in determining what was 'institutionalized…'

--- I have already explained that this is not true

10) "‘From 1800 to 1805, French infantry trained in Guibert's drill.

--- no

11) "By the time we get to the six-company battalion the detachment of grenadier companies seems to have gone 'out of fashion' and they were just the right flank company of the battalion. The grenadier company had become largely a means of reqarding good soldiers. I am not aware that French grenadiers ever had a specific role to protect artillery.

--- I have plenty of documentation on the role of grenadiers from the French military. In Marmonts' Corps in 1813, there is plenty of documentation of combined grenadier and voltigeurs in 1813.

12) "I am not aware that French grenadiers ever had a specific role to protect artillery."

--- yes it is found in various instructional documents.

Bien…I am certain that I have left something out. But I really did want to explain a little bit about the colonne d'attaque, and never got around to it. Therefore that will be my next posting. Again in regards for the 13 comments, I will get back to those that need a better response.

Best Regards
Art

Addendum: Gentlemen , like yourself my time is limited, and I will attempt to give full explanations in all my postings. I fully understand that this forum is liberal in regards to being able to keep one's identity to themselves. Which is acceptable to most, but I kindly ask those who post a comment in my direction to please identify who they are, and please give more than a two sentence rebuttal. Otherwise regrettable I will not respond.

XV Brigada:

The Provisional Regs do provide light infantry instruction, part of which is quoted in Paret's book on York and the Prussian Reforms:

The light troops are placed in small thickets, behind hedges, ditches, or small rises, according to the nature of the ground. They are commanded to fire at the enemy batteries, and to try and kill the gunners. These men do not form troops, so as not to draw artillery fire, …"
[ p.68]

Of course, this itself had been drawn word for word from the French Reglément of 1778, fourteen years before, so it hardly represented new instructions on the subject.

Davout, in a letter to Morand about the instructions [not that one of the 16th which is after Morad had created the instructions] mentions that the officers of his Corps discussed the relative benefits of using the 3rd rank versus whole companies of line troops before deciding to instruct that whole companies be used. I don't know how seriously the use of 3rd rank was put forward, but the fact that it was even considered at all in 1810-1811 is in itself interesting. I will see if I can't dig that up in a reasonable amount of time.

Bill H.

Bottom Dollar,

In his book, "Albuera 1811", this is how Guy Dempsey has the regiments and battalions of Gazan`s division arranged in columns by battalions.

1/21e 1/28e
2/21e 2/28e
-------- 3/28e
1/100e 1/103e
2/100e 2/103e
---------- 3/103e

Michael:

Why Dempsey provides this array, I don't know, but I do know it is wrong, for the following reasons:

1. The battle array convention was the opposite, with the 21st and 100th being on the right so that the formation could deploy out to the left. With the first brigade appearing to have been in attack columns deploying on the center, looking at the battlefield and the V Corps situation, as well as Soult's plan of attack, deploying to the right by the 2nd brigade and Gazan's division doesn't make any sense.

2. Both divisions do attempt to deploy and extend the French battle line to the left.

3. The colonel of the British 3rd Regiment says he was captured by men of the 28th Leger, and the 3rd was on the far left of the French line.

4. The 28th and 103rd are specifically mentioned by Lapene together, as facing the same fire/situation as Girard's division, but the 21st Leger and 100th ligne aren't.

5. The only reason Dempsey gives for placing the 21st Leger on the left is that it took heavier casualties than the 28th, which is not a sound conclusion for a number of reasons.

Bill H.

XV Brigada:
I am still hunting for that earlier letter of Davout's, but this is the letter sent out with the new instructions to the divisional commanders and it references that discussion:

To the generals: Friant, Gudin, Dessaix, Compans and Barbanègre.
Hambourg, 16th October 1811.

We recognized that it was generally harmful to take a certain number of men by company, for flankers and skirmishers, and that it was preferable to take entire companies.

['We' being the staff of officers and their recognition being during the 'discussion.' Again, it's not that the 3rd rrank option was ever a serious choice, but that it was even considered at this late date.]

The companies of voltigeurs who are elite companies, cannot always perform this role without serious inconvenience, it has, therefore, appeared appropriate to me that in the case of the companies who could be used for the role, are trained for it.

He has to explain this to experienced officers in 1811???

As it is important for the sake of uniformity that there is some method to adopt, I send you, my dear General, a summary of the manoeuvres that I invite you to train the regiments under your orders to do, whether of light infantry or of infantry of line. I want us to benefit from the present season for training the troops.

I find this fascinating. In 1811 Davout is saying that for the sake of 'uniformity' that 'some method' should be adopted. So in 1811, even in Davout's Corps that uniformity as far as skirmishing with line troops wasn't typically uniform.

Forward this instruction to each of the colonels of the regiments under your orders and one for each general of brigade; recommend that more copies are not made of it by the rest.

This is how instructions were disseminated…

The companies of the voltigeurs are already familiar with these manoeuvers, it will be proper to exercise the centre companies with the companies of voltigeurs for the first time, it means a mixing of the fusiliers with the voltigeurs.

Davout's corps did have a lot of new troops or troops that had not been in his corps previously, but still, that 'for the first time' is a surprise.

In September 1811, I army corps under the command of maréchal Davout was composed of the following regiments of infantry:

7e, 13e, 15e & 33e régiment d'infanterie légère
12e, 17e, 21e, 25e, 30e, 33e, 48e, 57e, 61e, 85e, 108e & 111e régiment d'infanterie de ligne

I will be obliged if you let me know of measures you have taken, and the progress of the troops in this training, made on different ground, which can only develop the understanding of the soldiers and the same of the officers.

(To the general Dessaix) It will be needless, my dear General, that you send a copy of this instruction to the 33e léger, as I send a copy to the general Barbanègre, so that he forwards a copy to it.

It is interesting that while the colonels of the léger regiments are 'familiar' with the methods outlined in Davout's instructions, Davout felt it important to get those instructions to them all the same.

I will continue to look for that letter where Davout mentions the 3rd rank use.

Bill H.

Bill,

OK I`ll hazard at being wrong again here, but I think that points 1 and 2 are linked.
I recall saying this before about this particular arrangement of brigades in Gazan`s division; I think I said then that I believed that it was their original intention to deploy to the left of the first divison. So with seniority being reversed to the left wing, the most senior brigade of that divison is positioned on the left of the column.

Regards,

Mike.

G'Day Gents,

This posting is not really one that requires a response, it is more of why I got involved into l'etude de la colonne tranchee.

There were many questions that I needed answered, and no one knew or didn't care to research, thus I sort of got stuck doing my own research.

Hence before I begin about the colonne d'attaque, it must be understood that l'étude de la Colonne Tranchee was a project according to the times, and a few distinguished military theorist were thrown into the assignment of working on the colonne d'attaque, which in the end was a failure, even as late as the 1830s.

This is to include the Prussian column of attack that was never quite able to perform for what it was expected to do.

When I first started to try and understand the colonne d'attaque, these were but a few questions I had:

What was the purpose of the colonne de peloton

What was the purpose of the colonne par division

What was the purpose of the colonne d'attaque

What was the purpose of a "colonnes de companie"

What was an colonne d'action

If the colonne d'attaque was such a success in 1805 and 1806, why was it dropped from the French system after 1807, and used less frequently.

Why did the American consider the colonne d'attaque the best kept secret and use it as their principle column in their Rules and Regulations, just to actually remove it from the later Rules and Regulations, with a note that says replaced by the closed column.

If the colonne d'attaque was a column for action, unlike the colonne par division orignially, how was it that eventually the colonne par division replaced the colonne d‘attaque.

What was the reason for forming a battalion on the right, left, and center.

Why is the colonne de peloton and colonne par divison referred to, through the entire Reglement de 1791, but there is only one section on the colonne d'attaque. which is found in the Ecole de Bataillon, Cinquième Partie, section 682, page 387.

Why was it, that in every French military document of instruction, whenever the colonne d'attaque was referred to, there was alway this note attached : Cette colonne ne devant jamais avoir lieu que par bataillon, son peu de profondeur dispense de la faire serer en masse pour la deployer…what did it mean, and why was it so important. Yet whenever I asked anyone, I would just get a fleeting speculation at best.

Why was the colonne d'attaque used in such missions, as in partial combats. This was applicable an attack on isolated positions, on a village, on a wood, on a small entrenchment, soutien/support for a chain of skirmishers (intended for assembling or rallying troops before and during actions).

Why was this colonne best suited for these types of missions and not the colonne de peloton, or colonne par division?

Again these are not questions that I am asking those from the forum members, but why I took an interest into l'etude de la colonne tranchee.

With that said, I'll try and write a brief synopsis of what I have learned in regards to the French colonne d'attaque.

Best Regards
Art

Art,

Did it have anything to do with the fact that they had a more versatile formation by reducing the number of companies? It could be right in front, left in front, center in front…. when you're only talking probably 4 combat companies in column with a frontage of aprrox. 40 -50 yards …. They could do more or less whatever they wanted VERY EASILY. Therefore, no need to specify the "center" with "wings" folded.

To guess at the missions you identified for the textbook "attack column", with a designated center you also have wings that can envelope for close, potentially concentric fire support. Depending on how far you unfurl those wings, you might also have the storming party which would be the last line. The skirmish support thing though, I won't even try guessing on that one.

I look forward to your synopsis.

Jim

Bill,

Did the Spanish/Brits have much artillery to deploy against that formation ? Cause even a few pieces judiciously placed would've done a tremendous amount of damage.

"The skirmish support thing though, I won't even try guessing on that one."

Actually, Art, I will take a shot at that. The center would be the reserve which would allow the flanking companies to fall back behind and under cover of the center, and yet still remain in formation. Also, both wings would have the same distance to travel to get there.

Anyway, my two guesses.

Jim

BD:

At Albuera? The Spanish had a battery with Zayas, but the French places @30 guns on the opposite hill across from them and that was about 6-700 yards away. Corburne's brigade coming up behind Zaya's was taking casualties from it before ever seeing the French.

One British battery was placed between Zayas and Colburne, but from all the accounts it did limited damage because it was chopped up by the French cavalry when it wrecked Colburne's brigade. I think the Spanish were silenced by the French artillery. I'd have to go back and look at the British artillery captain's report to know what damage was being done by and to the British.

Bill H.

Mike wrote:

OK I`ll hazard at being wrong again here, but I think that points 1 and 2 are linked.
I recall saying this before about this particular arrangement of brigades in Gazan`s division; I think I said then that I believed that it was their original intention to deploy to the left of the first divison. So with seniority being reversed to the left wing, the most senior brigade of that divison is positioned on the left of the column.

Mike:

It is quite possible, though I haven't seen that particular array used by the French half as much as the British. I don't think so because of the additional points 3-5, but it certainly isn't conclusive. I would *think* that if the 21st were on the far left, it would have been infantry from the 21st Leger that captured the colonel of the British 3rd and not the 28th…but that ain't necessarily the way it had to happen…

Bill H.

G'Day Bill

I am afraid you must be thinking about some other correspondence, when referring to General Morand.

Over 3,000 documents were recovered by the Russians during Napoleons retreat from Russia.

In Davout's Correspondence volume III, all the missing documents in the book are those captured and now in boxes in the Leningrad Museum.

About 10 years ago there was a Gentleman who lived in Leningrad who belonged to the Russian Napoleonic Society. I remember offering to pay him or anyone handsomely to make copies of those documents.

Alas…could not bribe anyone…amazing…

The instructions that General Morand gave Davout which are called:

Manoeuvres Pour Une Companie De Tirailleurs Ou De Flanquers, are those that were captured by the Russians and released in the book called "The 1812 Patriotic War" and published in 1903.

I checked in Davouts's Correspondance volume III, and there is no letter to General Morand on the subject of skirmishers. But there is correspondence in regards to Madame Morand being charged to take packages to the Emperor and other small trusts as well.

If such a letter was to exist, it would have to be in the Russian book, "1812 Patriotic War".

I do not have the entire book, just the following.

1) Manoeuvres Pour Une Companie De Tirailleurs Ou De Flanquers. 16 oct. 1811. pp. 6- 11.

2) Instruction Sur La Formation Des Reserves Et Les Manoeuvres Des Carres. 3 nov. 1811. pp. 58-62, 3 plates.

3) Le Cadre Du Bataillon De Cordes …. 17 nov. 1811. pp. 114-116, 1 plate.

As for why Davout gave a copy of General Morand's instruction to the Light Infantry, if they already were trained.

This was so that the entire Corps was trained in the same methods of skirmishing, and that there would not be any variation in application should two different Units need to work together.

The knowledge of Skirmishing during the Napoleonic era is much like having my Cadre train Urban Combat and MOUT today.

Even though my Cadre know the American, French, and British doctrinal (current) methods of MOUT, I still need to validate that everyone is teaching it the same way.

When teaching room clearing procedures, it is a killer, for each of my Instructors teach it slightly different (because that is how their Unit SOP), so we must set a standard SOP ourselves prior to teaching it. The worst is when we teach American doctrine to a Unit that still uses the old French doctrine with a 5 man stack from the mid 80s.

Anyway if you go back in Davouts correspondence, there were Units that had been in Spain, and needed cyclic training, as a matter of fact the entire Corps needed cyclic training.

Davout himself said that it was a good time for it, while they were in garrison, and it was a good opportunity to get the entire corps using the same methods was a bonus.

Ergo what better way than to train your entire Corps using one set of instructions. Sound like I could use Davout on my team, I would put him in charge of Staff Training ;-)

Best Regards
Art

G'Day Jim

I will send a rejoinder to your posting, but first I have to make a major amendment in that posting about the colonne d'attaque…

"There were many questions that I needed answered, and no one knew or didn't care to research, thus I sort of got stuck doing my own research."

This statement is somewhat wrong…hmmm…quite wrong…no…most emphatically wrong…for I owe… everything to Vox!

I am deeply indebted to Vox…and if it was not for Vox…none of my research would have been possible…

I humbly bow down to Vox ;-)

Best Regards
Art

@artpdn,

Thanks for your long post, which I am still digesting.

On the colonne d'attaque when Georges de Chambray wrote,

"La colonne d'attaque ne s'emploie pas aussi souvent qu'on pourrait le croire, en voice le raison: l'infanterie, tant qu'elle suit les routes et qu'elle est à une certaine distance de l'ennemi, march ordinairement par le flanc; lorsqu'on est assez rapproché de l'ennemi pour qu'il soit nécessaire de s'éntendre afin de prendre position, elle quitte les routes et se forme par peletons; puis on forme les divisions, on serre ensuite à distance de section….On voit que, pour se former en colonne d'attaque, il faudrait préalablement se déployer"

If he did not mean that to ploy into a colonne d'attaque the battalion would first be deployed, which I take to mean into line, what does he mean?

Can you describe how a battalion formed a colonne d'attaque, other than throwing back the right and left half battalion from line.

Finally, are there any examples of grenadier companies be detached to protect artillery. I have never seen any. I am really only interested in 1805 and later.

Thanks

"march ordinairement par le flanc"

That would mean in column either to the left or to the right and not to the center – OK, then it is obvious why you would avoid a classic colonne d'attaque because you have almost one.

I don't see the huge benefit of a colonne d'attaque – compared to a colonne par divisions – lets say to the right.
Also this column could start firing as soon as it would deploy, the only difference, the whole following divisions have to deploy to the left and by that would need longer time to deploy – a coumn from the center can deploy left and right and by that is faster in deployment.

Art wrote:

Ergo what better way than to train your entire Corps using one set of instructions. Sound like I could use Davout on my team, I would put him in charge of Staff Training ;-)

Art:

Absolutely. I didn't think it suggested otherwise concerning his troops and why they should be trained… That he [and Morand] felt it required instructions etc. is what interested me. The French army wasn't the monolithic primer on uniformity and training it is often stated to be.

And when I find the letter/missive I am thinking of, then I will know who wrote what to whom because right now I am operating on memory as to who was the author and whom it was written to…

This was so that the entire Corps was trained in the same methods of skirmishing, and that there would not be any variation in application should two different Units need to work together.

Duh! I realize that. However, Davout states that the lights were already familiar with the methods detailed in the instructions, and the instructions themselves are pretty basic, you'll have to agree. So, the inference in Davout's providing the instructions to the lights is what you say about 'variations': i.e. There were variations in even the methods the lights were 'familiar with', even between the Legere regiments and voltigeur companies… those units did have their own ways of doing things that differred from the instructions Davout had disseminated.

That was my only point.

Best Regards,
Bill H.

The first four divisions of Davout's corps each had an integral legere regiment. And it's probably safe to assume that battalions from those regiments would have been given regular light infantry duties, above and beyond simply providing a skirmish chain in advance of the the battle lines during combat – such as operating within disruptive terrain, or in the advance guard etc.

However, Compan's division, Davout's 5th, as I mention above in an earlier post, did not have an integral legere regiment. As a result, Compan's felt it necessary to create ad hoc light battalions by bringing together voltigeur companies from the individual regimental battalions. Interestingly Compan's was attached to Murat, in the approach to Borodino, and it is surprising, at least to me, that the lack of any legere regiments was not considered an issue from a tactical or operational sense for a force of infantry deemed an advance guard.

But, if the voltigeur companies were drawn from the parent battalions, in order that the ad hoc light battalions could then operate semi-independently of their parent regiments, then who would have provided the normal skirmish chain for the battalions that were now separated from their integral voltigeurs?

In this situation, Davout and Compan had two choices. Either retain the battalion frontage and send out third-rankers, or reduce the battalion frontage, and send out a complete company in direct imitation of sending out the voltigeur company. It is clear from the 1811 correspondence that the conclusion and the doctrine used by Davout's corps was to send out a complete company. Bottom line, in the event that the integral voltigeurs or light battalions were otherwise occupied, the battalions needed the option of still forming a skirmish chain – Davout had ensured that I Corps in 1812 was at least prepared for this situation.

npm

@v W,

If I understand Chambray correctly:

"The colonne d'attaque is not used as often as is thought, and this is the reason. When infantry is following a road and is at a distance from the enemy it usually marches by the flank (this, I think, is what we would call a flank march of files in English and is essentially a battalion in line marching to its flank in threes). When the enemy is close enough to necessitate it taking position, it leaves the road and forms by peletons. It then forms the divisions, closed to section distance….One can see that to form colonne d'attaque it would be necessary to deploy first."

I still do not see how a colonne d'attaque can be formed, except from line.

No, I don't think the French saw ‘huge' benefits either, if Chambray is to be believed. Colin has something to say on the subject in La Tactique as I remember, using Chambray and Pelet as his sources I think. The alleged advantages are as you describe and the ability of the colonne d'attaque to separate into two smaller columns formed by right and left half-battalions.

How much use the colonne d'attaque saw, compared to colonnes par peletons and divisions, is a moot point. I am confident though that French infantry used the menu formations and conversions described in the ecole de battalion. I don't believe in tactical anarchy.

@XV Brigada. I think if they had wanted to form attack columns with center and folded wings they would've done so regardless of the marching order and straight from a road column without deploying into line. Perhaps Chambray is saying the formal textbook disposition became unnecessary or superfluous, especially following the reduction to 4 fusilier companies. That is not to say that they didn't follow and train using drill book forms and techniques, nor to say they threw those forms/techniques out once they were on the battlefield. But I do think they dispensed with parade ground formalism and used hardheaded commonsense in a necessary and practical conjunction with the techniques and forms derived from the drill book.

‘The 1791 regs describe a regiment with two battalions, each of eight fusilier companies, and a grenadier division of two grenadier companies. Although, as I remember, the regs don't mention these being used to form grenadier, or elite battalions, that is clearly their intent, in my view, and it was also done in the Prussian, British and other armies.'

‘There are many examples of the French doing this up to 1806 and beyond. Grenadiers were often detached and used as ad hoc elite battalions frequently as part of a formation advance-guard.'

‘By the time we get to the six-company battalion the detachment of grenadier companies seems to have gone 'out of fashion' and they were just the right flank company of the battalion. The grenadier company had become largely a means of reqarding good soldiers. I am not aware that French grenadiers ever had a specific role to protect artillery.'

The strength of the battalion grenadier/carabinier company in the nine-company battalion structure in 1805 was 83 all ranks. The fusilier, chasseur, and voltigeur companies had an authorized strength of 123 all ranks.

In the new 1808 battalion structure, all six companies had a uniform authorized strength of 140 all ranks. The companies were organized internally in two sections, each of which had two squads.

Sincerely,
K

‘…weren't the grenadier and voltigeur companies somewhat smaller than the fusilier companies?'

In 1805 the grenadier and carabineer companies were smaller than the fusilier and chasseur companies, but the voltigeurs were not. After the 1808 reorganization, all of the companies in the battalion had the same authorized strength.

Sincerely,
K

‘There was also Oudinot's division/corps made up entirely of grenadier (and voltigeur) companies formed into separate battalions.'

There were three iterations of Oudinot's command, each one being different from the one that preceded it.
The Gredadiers d'Oudinot (also called Grenadiers de la Reserve and Grenadiers Reunis, and in 1809 Divisions Oudinot) was a provisional unit (not ‘converged') was formed originally for the projected invasion of England.

It was actually a junior version of the Imperial Guard and was initially (1803-1806) composed of the grenadier/carabineer as well as voltigeur companies of the regiments that were either on garrison duty and not assigned to the field army or regiments that were still in the process of organization and training.

The unit was disbanded after Austerlitz where it was present, but saw little action.

In November 1806 it was reactivated, now being made up of the elite companies of the 3d battalions of the regiments not in Poland and East Prussia on active service.

There were five regiments organized in three brigades and the unit was brought up to strength with conscripts. Each of the regiments d'elite were composed of two 6-company battalions, each company having the strength of about 100 all ranks.

The regiments were commanded by majors. Oudinot commanded it at the siege of Danzig, the Battle of Ostrolenka, and at Friedland where it was assigned to Lannes Reserve Corps.

When the Young Guard was activated the unit was disbanded again and the individual companies were sent to two places: first, the companies that belonged to regiments in Davout's Army of the Rhine were sent back to their parent regiments but were used to cadre the new 4th battalions those regiments were in the process of forming.

Second, the companies that belonged to regiments either on garrison duty in France or on the road to Spain were used to cadre the 4th battalions of their regiments, but were then used as the basis of a new three-division provisional corps commanded by Oudinot and retaining the title ‘Grenadiers d'Oudinot.'

This was not considered an elite unit. New personnel were to be hand-picked conscripts trained in the Guard's depots who would form the elite companies of the new units and the fusiliers and chasseurs would be taken from the parent regiments' depots.

The original idea was to organize and field thirty-four 4th battalions and organize them into three divisions. Because of the Austrian invasion of Bavaria in early 1809, only nine battalions had been organized and these were formed as two small divisions.

Two veteran infantry battalions, the Tirailleurs Corses and the Tirailleurs du Po were assigned to them to give the unit some combat veteran and reliable units. The unit did well during the campaign but was permanently disbanded in 1810.

Sincerely,
K

How much hardheaded practical interpretation they could extrapolate from the drill manual while still remaining 'formed' probably depended to a greater extent on the experience and ability of the line troops. My sense is tactical embellishments weren't often written down or if written down were kept close to the vest which is why so many years later people are still trying to figure out exactly what they did, when they id it and why. Battles, and if not whole battles, then localized combats within battles could turn on them. The 1791 manual, and the formal revisions, addendums were templates. And the end of the Napoleonic Wars didn't mean the end of military rivalries, so I wouldn't have expected the participants to suddenly open up in writing about their military knowledge.

10th Marine wrote: "In the new 1808 battalion structure, all six companies had a uniform authorized strength of 140 all ranks. The companies were organized internally in two sections, each of which had two squads."

So, 4 squads of grenadiers probably about 20-25 men per in terms of field strength.

I think marching by flanks and by files is not the same and Chambray would be clear to state so.
Generally it was not marched by files or in files there this would stretch the marching column and by that slow down tactical formation, usually it was marched in sections, infantry ever so often at the side of the road.

I don't believe in tactical anarchy either – this is total nonsense, I believe in tactical simplicity and structure.

Prior to the introduction of voltigeurs it was quite common to form ad hoc elaireur companies or sub units, to complicate the discussion.

@BD.
Frankly, I doubt it. When you are moving hundreds of men in half a dozen or so sub-units, in dozens of battalions, some kind of choreography is essential. I am sure, looking at the disposition of the colonne d'attaque and what Chambray said, that the colonne d'attaque is formed from a deployed battalion, which means line.

Bear in mind that the battalion formations and conversions from one to another were not parade ground stuff, as they are today, but the battle drills of the time.

I have seen the argument made, many times, that the regulations and instructions were ignored and something else replaced them. What I have never seen is that something else.

But, as this is wargaming, how important is it?

@XV Brigada

When the French had 8 fusilier companies they could've marched into an attack column formation by divisions irrespective of the marching order or which flank was in front. All the companies would need to know was which side of the attack column they were on and there place in it and they would know if they were to deploy the left or the right and if they were to have another company on either flank when deploying into line. In short, if marching by the right flank the two right flanks companies ‘could' form the center for the action, all other companies despite their official designation would deploy in the attack column behind them and would know which side of the center they would be deploying to. If the French wanted to get particular they could've road marched with the ‘center' companies in front.

Once the reduction to 4 companies took place, there was no longer an inherent division of the battalion if it were to deploy into a column of 4 lines. Therefore, by default the official attack column designation went by the wayside. An experienced 4 fusilier company battalion could probably unofficially perform it anyway, and I'd be willing to bet when they had the time they drilled the reduced battalions in dividing by section. Otherwise, to get conscripts up to speed they may have drilled the rear companies to simply face by a flank and march out from under cover of the center by company.

Chambray wrote: "One can see that to form colonne d'attaque it would be necessary to deploy first."

Yes, and his audience is probably people who are eyeballing the drill manual with its battalion evolutions by companies in their officially designated parade ground places. Why does he make no reference to the change from 8 to 4 fusilier companies which would've affected the official attack column more than anything else? Or does he by saying which ever flank marched in front it made little difference b/c they could easily deploy a battalion into column by companies which may or may not have deployed into line on the center.

In wargaming terms, it matters depending on how you want to model certain things at particular echelons.

And there's nothing in what I am arguing which doesn't REQUIRE choreography.

Chambray wrote: "When the enemy is close enough to necessitate it taking position, it leaves the road and forms by peletons. It then forms the divisions, closed to section distance…."

Yes, and if it were an experienced 4 fusilier company battalion, "section distance" would've been ½ distance allowing the rear companies to deploy into line on both the right and left wings by section, if so desired and capable of doing so through training. The mark of experience is interchangeability and knowing the job of the other parts in the formation and when you are unofficially required to act as a part different than your official parade ground designation.

Which is why I think the grenadier companies either as whole companies, sections or squads could fill a number of different roles depending on the tactical requirements and the decision of either the battalion, brigade or division commander. It would also appear that the French were expert in coordinating individual tactical constitutions from the corps on down.

I'm away from my books and will be for a couple of months at least, but do I vaguely recall from Rory Muir's book a quote from a British officer implying that a decent proportion of Dundas' had been discarded and that drills had been simplified wherever possible?

Regards

@ Kevin,

Where did the phrase 'help yourself fighting' originate? I'm sure I knew this once…

Regards

G'Day Jim

I read your two postings you sent me, and after pondering your answers and questions, I decided that the best way to reply, would be to do so in a methodical manner.

Therefore in response to your postings to me, this is my synopsis for: l'etude de la colonne tranchee – Colonne d'Attaque and the Reglement de 1791

PART I:

The colonne d'attaque is found to be in existence as early as 1701, and was called various names as e.g., "colonne Folard", "colonne couplee", "ordre de charge", "ordre de choc", colonne epagogique" , "colonne de marche", "colonne sur le centre", "colonne accoutlee", colonne jumelle", or even the "colonne double" in 1831.

To fully understand the reason for a colonne d'attaque, one has to understand that the colonne d'action was synonymous with a colonne d'attaque. Which means that unlike the colonne par peloton and colonne par division, that were destined as formations de marche et formations de manoeuvre; the colonne d'attaque was always in a state to act offensively or defensively. The colonne d'attaque was either an offensive or defensive formation, which renders it capable of an action other than deploy, or form square.

To understand the system (doctrine) of the colonne d'attaque in l'Ordannance de 1791, one must first go back to the following Ordannances to examine the number of battalions permitted or required to form a colonne d'attaque.

In l'Ordonnance de 1755 there were two battalions that were joined together to form a colonne d'attaque.

In l'Ordonnance de 1766 there were two battalions joint together to form a colonne d'attaque.

In l'Ordonnance de 1769 there was one battalion or two battalions joint together to form a colonne d'attaque.

In l'Ordonnance de 1774 and 1775 there is no mention of the colonne d'attaque.

In l'Ordonnance de 1776 had only one battalion forming a colonne d'attaque

In l'Ordonnance de 1788 had only one battalion forming a colonne d'attaque

In l'Ordonnance de 1 Janvier 1791 (Garde Nationales) it had only one battalion forming a colonne d'attaque.

In each of l'Ordonnances, the mechanics and purpose of the colonne d'attaques varied to some degree, but the mechanics of the colonne d'attaque from l'Ordonnance de 1791 was taken from l'Ordonnance de 1776.

The Reglement de 1791 was a settlement of older instructions of discipline, which were developed after the Seven Years War, under the influence of the Prussian methods and their military system. It was therefore a continuation of the Prussian tactics in all its forms. It was better suited for an armee lineaire, and not one that were supporters of the new French system (system means doctrine) called "l'ordre Francaise" ou "l'ordre perpendiculaire".

The Reglement de 1791 was appropriate for a lineal army in that it killed all initiative on the part of the officers, and was better suited for a defensive battle. To manoeuvre in such a formation as found in the Reglement de 1791 was very difficult. The Ordnance required easy country to operate over, and even then, an advance for a great body of troops in line would be slow.

The French Ordinance of Manoeuvres of 1791 fixed the deployed orders as the sole order of battle, of course this Ordinance did not absolutely prohibit the employment of the column formation, but it prescribed the line of deployed battalions as the primary order of battle.

When the l'Ordonnance de 1791 was nearly finished to be distributed to the French Army, there were only three columns in l'Ordonnance; the colonne par section, the colonne par peloton ,and the colonne par division. These columns could form by sections, platoon or divisions, at full distance to half distance, or mass, but when actually employed we find the following:

Les colonne par section at full distance was a formation de marche.

La colonne par peloton at half distance was a formation de manoeuvre.

La colonne par division closed to distance section, or in mass, which was either a formation de manoeuvre, or used for a body of troops waitng to manoeuvre.

Since the colonne d'attaque was a tool that was not in accordance to the principles of l'Ordonnance de 1791, La Commision never adopted it. It wasn't until the last moment, that to satisfy the partisans of Folard and Menil-Durandt, that the colonne d'attaque was accorded a place in the manual. There was now a formation d'attaque in l"Ordonnance.

Nevertheless, once the partisans were happy, the editors of the Reglement de 1791 dismembered it, and removed all its innovations, leaving only a small portion in the manual, which can be found in the Ecole de Bataillon, Cinquième Partie, with a notification attached:

"Cette colonne ne devant jamais avoir lieu que par bataillon, son peu de profondeur dispense de la faire serrer en masse pour la deployer"

The literal translation means: ‘This column should never take place but by battalion, its little depth keeps it from closing in mass in order to deploy.

When we discussed the possible meaning of this notification, we were divided into two camps.

One camp decided that the notification meant that two battalions were not to join together to form a colonne d'attaque.

The second camp decided that the notification meant that a battalion in colonne d'attaque should never form with other battalions in a great body of troops…that it was now considered to operate en "bataillon isolées" which coincided precisely with what it was designed to do; to be utilized as an action column for such partial missions as an attack on isolated positions, on a village, on a wood, on a small entrenchment, soutien/support for a chain of skirmishers (intended for assembling or rallying troops before and during actions).

I myself found myself in the second camp.

Hmmm…

Jim…I shall stop here and give you time to digest what I have written, and as I mentioned in my first posting in the addendum, like yourself my time is limited, but I will I continue on to part II…

Best Regards
Art

Whirlwind,

Rory Muir claims that Abercromby introduced a simplified version of the 1792 Regulations for the 1801 campaign in Egypt. There is no real detail of what changes were introduced and no actual quotes. The reference is Piers Mackesy's "British Victory in Egypt 1801".

In my opinion it would be wrong to assume that large sections of Dundas' work had been completely discarded during the Napoleonic era. During the Peninsular War, Wellington ordered that all troops should not be dismissed from parade "without performing some one or other of the manoeuvres prescibed in His Majesty's Regulations". Also it is possible to reconcile nearly all eyewitness descriptions of battlefield manoeuvres with those prescibed in the 1792 Regulations.

Having said that, minor modifictions were certainly introduced as can be seen in the introduction to the 1824 Regulations, and these modifications were not common to the entire army. This passage is from the introduction to the 1824 Regs:

Improvements…were partially adopted, without adherence to any general or fixed principal of formation: The result was a practice at once desultory, and disunited; and the advantages to be derived from these improvements, were liable to become nugatory by the revival of that discordant variety of system, with its consequent evils, which had called forth the labours of Sir David Dundas.

The "improvements" perhaps originated from the Shorncliffe system of movement introduced under Sir John Moore. The following two passages are interesting in this respect.

Sir Henry Bunbury wrote:

..the new system of drill and movement which was introduced by Moore became the model for our infantry, and laid the foundation of that superiority which it afterwards evinced in the arduous campaigns of the Spanish Peninsula.

And along similar lines, John Cooke of the 43rd Regiment wrote:

Those Corps [the regiments trained at Shorncliffe] were indeed the admiration of all, for their discipline, and the rapidity of their light movements, all of which being executed on the moveable pivot, by divisions, or sections, formed columns, squares, lines, and echelon, without a halt, by merely marking time. The moveable pivot preserved a regular cadence, handsome to the sight, and of great utility. In the course of time these useful evolutions extended throughout the army, and, for aught I know, are still called "Maw!" with perhaps a few alterations

Further evidence that the army partially adopted some of the Shorncliffe system can be found in an 1812 letter from Colonel Mackenzie, who was apparently the originator of the system under Sir John Moore, to General Goss, where he claims that "The style of march has been adopted by many regiments, but neither [the style of march or platoon exercise] have ever been sanctioned by Head Quarters."

There are a couple of examples of Moore and Mackenzie's system being used in action. One clear case is found in a letter written by John Colville describing his brigade's actions at El Bodon and more particulary the method used to form square:

The square is the Light Infantry or Sir John Moore's. The column marching in wheeling distance gets the order to form square four deep, on which the leading company halts, the next moves up close to it, the remainder, with the exception of the last two who only close up, as they arrive at quarter distance, wheel outwards, two by two sections, the rear then closing with the front.

Although this square is pretty much the same as one specified by Dundas, the apparent difference is that it was formed on the move while closing up the column from full to quarter distance instead of waiting for the entire column to close to quarter distance first. This corresponds well with the above quote from Cooke of the 43rd.

Art,

I would agree both camps were right. The larger battalions should use caution when using the attack column in pairs b/c it could disrupt their ability to deploy efficiently into line. Deploying at full distance or preparing to march the divisions out of the formation by the flank probably would've been prerequisite for a 2 battalion attack column if they expected to form any semblance of a firing line.

Thanks for the broader historical synopsis.

Jim

I don't know who was Chambray's (1783-1848) intended audience but he was a French officer who served in the French Grande Armee during the campaigns of 1805, 1806, 1807, 1809 and 1812. Although of junior rank at the time he is a primary source so it is likely that he knows more about the subject than anybody posting here. So if he states, writing in 1824, that the colonne d'attaque needed to be ‘ployed' from a deployed battalion, then I believe him even though he might have a vested insterest for saying so, that we don't know about; something to be aware of with all sources, primary or otherwise.

Other than Guard battalions, the French infantry were in six companies, not four, after the reorganisation. Are we saying that a battalion marched in column of platoons on the centre, front to rear, 3, 2, G, 4, 5, V, or indeed 4,3,2,1,5,6,7,8, in order to facilitate ‘ployment' into colonnes d'attaque to the front.

I also don't believe that the menu of conversions available to a battalion in any regulations makes the army concerned either defensive or offensive in nature.

The preface to Cdt Colin's La Tactique has quite a lot to say about columns and is well worth a look. I expect it is on Google by now. The essence of it is that colonnes d'attaque, as per the 1791 reglement, were a comparative rarity.

I have often wondered when the term is used, what it actually means is any column being used to make an attack.

XV Brigade wrote:

I don't know who was Chambray's (1783-1848) intended audience but he was a French officer who served in the French Grande Armee during the campaigns of 1805, 1806, 1807, 1809 and 1812. Although of junior rank at the time he is a primary source so it is likely that he knows more about the subject than anybody posting here. So if he states, writing in 1824, that the colonne d'attaque needed to be ‘ployed' from a deployed battalion, then I believe him even though he might have a vested insterest for saying so, that we don't know about; something to be aware of with all sources, primary or otherwise.

"….One can see that to form colonne d'attaque it would be necessary to deploy first"

Does this refer to a diagram? Or to what Chambray just wrote? Were there sentences prior to this sentence or was the …pause… his own ? I'm not questioning whether Chambray knew what he was talking about or not. Obviously, he did. I'm just questioning the reasoning behind his quote as stated here. It isn't necessarily all or nothing reasoning either. The French may have been able to form the classic attack column whenever they needed to, but preferred to deploy into line first, so that they could ensure proper spacing between the battalions prior to an advance… like using a template as you said earlier which makes perfectly good sense. However, neither answers the question of the transition from the 9 company battalion to the 6 company battalion and how it affected the attack column which Chambray was around to see, but for some reason doesn't address in his writing. Needless-to-say, I'm sure Chambray knew there was a more than significant difference between deploying 8 fusilier co's and 4 fusilier co's when attempting textbook maneuvers.

XV Brigade wrote:

Other than Guard battalions, the French infantry were in six companies, not four, after the reorganisation. Are we saying that a battalion marched in column of platoons on the centre, front to rear, 3, 2, G, 4, 5, V, or indeed 4,3,2,1,5,6,7,8, in order to facilitate ‘ployment' into colonnes d'attaque to the front.

I think they might have deployed 4 combat companies in line on a regular basis. The voltigeurs would've been skirmishing, and I suspect the grenadier company may have been equalized with the fusilier companies, so that perhaps a squad may have been assigned to one or the other flank of each of the 4 fusilier companies. They may also have been assigned a number of different roles, including full detachment or perhaps making a 5th line. But I suspect that given their greater combat experience it may have been preferable to integrate the grenadiers in some manner into the actual formations of the fusilier companies when going into action.

All I'm saying is that the French could've marched their companies in any order they wanted to and they still could've formed an attack column at the end of the march without absolutely having to deploy into line first. For instance, what if a French column was approaching a battle at top marching speed and there was a traffic snarl and the battalion finally got itself sorted out, and though the companies were out of textbook order, they were still ready to march at full speed to head into the battle say 1 mile away. Would the battalion commander have said, "This won't do. We can't perform any formation changes if our companies are out of order. We MUST get ourselves in proper company sequence or we can't fight." Maybe if they were conscripts, but how about veterans or the Guard ? I'll posit a part of good training is jumbling your companies up to make sure everyone can do everyone else's job when its needed. It's also the mark of experience.

G'Day Jim

As I promised here is PART II

Synopsis for: l'etude de la colonne tranchee – Colonne d'Attaque and the Reglement de 1791

For the colonne d'attaque, I will only deal with the innovations and general principles from the French Revolution to the Empire.

It is commonly thought by the general forum that the principle benefits of the colonne d'attaque, was its ability to deploy both wings simultaneously before the enemy, thereby giving it potentially more fire power than a colonne par division while deploying into line. This is mainly due to the reason that most forum members conceive the colonne d'attaque as one single body of troops.

When referring to a colonne d' attaque (colonne tranchee in the Reglement de 1791), it is separated into two demi-bataillons.

When referring to a colonne d'attaque par bataillon (colonne tranchee in the Reglement de 1791), it is the entire battalion formed together.

Since the colonne d'attaque was not a single body of troops, it is therefore contrary to the principles of the colonne d'attaque to be deployed on line in the French military system (doctrine).

Nowhere in the French repertoire is it found that a colonne d'attaque while assaulting the enemy position, was it to deploy en ligne of three ranks, but it could and did deploy en bataille sont deployer after executing a passage of lines, or charging the enemy.

On the other hand the colonne d'attaque par bataillon was expected to deploy in accordance to the old military system, but as the French became more efficient with their manoeuvres with their new system, it became nearly nonexistent, except when being staggered, or checked due to surprise.

Nevertheless French Generals and Commanders in the late Empire (documented in 1813) expected that their troops were to be trained weekly in maneouvres of the colonne d'attaque par bataillon. To be able to use musketry while deploying due to the possibility of being staggered, or checked due to surprise.

The entire concept of the colonne d'attaque had two primary guiding principles:

First it had to have the ability for the bataillon to separate into two demi-bataillons, and secondly to protect itself while en bataillon isolé in a disposition against cavalry, whether as one bataillon or as two separated demi-bataillons.

Since the colonne d'attaque was divided into two separate bodies or demi-bataillons, the primary distance between the two demi-bataillons was 25 paces, and employed the bayonet in the assault..

When the colonne d'attaque marched, it was able to march to its front, rear, left, and to its right. If the colonne d'attaque was in closed column en mass, it could face any direction, simply by a demi tour a droite, vers la droite ou par un a gauche.

The peloton of grenadiers would be positioned centered behind the two small columns of demi-bataillons, or if the two demi-bataillons were manoeuvring separately, the grenadier peloton would then center behind one demi-bataillon.

During the Revolutionary period, a great body of troops would have the first line of battle entirely en tirailleur without any formed reserve, while the second line of battle was in colonne de attaque par bataillon or colonne d'attaque with grenadiers centered behind the two small columns.

During the period of 1805 to 1807 the French developed a new Divisional System where a great body of troops, would no longer have the tirailleurs entirely deployed in the first line of battle, but now had a formed reserved, which was a colonne d'attaque. The battalion as a whole was capable of deploying one or two pelotons as skirmishers, since the bataillon was not in colonne d'attaque par bataillon.

If you recall in my prior posting, I pointed out that a colonne d'attaque was able to form square with an even or odd number of pelotons while separated in two demi-bataillons. This was also possible for a colonne d'attaque par bataillon.

In the light infantry instructions for a bataillon en colonne d'attaque (bataillon of 6 pelotons) with trailleurs en grande bande, it explains how the odd peloton or grenadier peloton was centered behind the two demi-bataillons. then the two demi-bataillons would form square if together or each demi-bataillon could form square in the same manner as a bataillon en colonne par pelotons:

‘Si un bataillon, marchant en colonne par pelotons, a distance entiere et la droite en tete, est harcele par la cavalerie, le chef de bataillon fera serre la colonne a distance de section…Le bataillon pourra continuer sa marche dans cet ordre, mais, si l'ennemi approache, le chef de bataillon fera serrer la colonne en masse…Si la charge s'annonce, le chef de bataillon arretera la colonne et commandera: formez le carre…Cette colonne est sans contredit plus solide, et peut-etre plus maniable que le carre simple, puisqu'elle peut, sans aucun mouvement preparatoire, marche en tous sens, changer de direction, augmenter ou resserrer les distances entre ses subdivisions etc. , comme les colonnes ordinaires.

The new order called l'ordre francaise ou l'ordre perpendiculaire" now replaces the old ordre prussien in the French Divisional System of 1805, which officially permitted the colonne d'attaque to use all of its innovations.

French Divisional System of 1805

Ligne d'approche ( skirmish chain )

2 obusiers – Tirailleurs – 2 batteries ( soit 12 canons ) – Tirailleurs – 2 obusiers

The parent bataillons of the Tirailleurs were formed in colonne d'attaque with a distance of 25 paces between each colonne, the grenadier peloton was centered to the front or rear of the two demi-bataillons .

1ère Ligne de feu

one Régiment en ligne – one Régiment en ligne

2ème Ligne de choc

two Régiments with bataillons formed en colonne d'attaque par bataillon or two Régiments with bataillons formed en colonne d'attaque par régiment.

3ème Ligne en soutien ( if there was one )

Régiment de cavalerie de tirailleurs (to rally) -one Régiment with bataillons formed en colonne d'attaque par bataillon or Régiment with bataillons formed en colonne d'attaque par régiment.

When the great body of troops were formed en colonnes serrées et de la ligne déployée, en colonne vuide (such as the one formed by Marechal Macdonald in 1809), or in a "Flanking Brigade", the bataillons were en colonne d'attaque par bataillon ready to form colonne d'attaque and separate into demi-bataillons if needed, so as to be in a disposition against cavalry, or deploy tirailleurs.

Of course the variations for how the great body of troops were formed when in a colonnes serrées et de la ligne déployée, colonne vuide, or even in the Flanking Brigade, all depended upon the general situation, and due to l'ordre perpendiculaire, the repertoire of options increased.

Next comes Part III

Best Regards
Art

I can only repeat what's already been written.

See Rod MacArthur's post of 27 Jan 12 for the 1808 decree and six-company battalions. If the voltigeur or grenadiers were absent the battalion formed colonne par peletons. But, voltigeurs were not always deployed.

See Oliver Schmidt's post of 29 Jan 12 for the placement of the grenadier company when voltigeurs were deployed. Prior to 1808, if a single grenadier battalion (rather than the grenadier division) was attached to a battalion, it was posted at the rear of the column, behind the internal sections of the fourth division.

See my post of 01 Feb 12 for Chambray's French text from de l'infanterie quoted in Colin's La Tactique, Ecoles de peleton et de bataillon – Les formations, p34. De l'infanterie is not available as a download unfortunately.

I don't, to be honest, find speculation to be much use. It often gets confused as information and is wrong most of the time.

What I've been inferring is that the basic formation for the attack column pre and post 1808 was four lines. Pre-1808 it was 2 co's of fusiliers per line. Post-1808 it was 1 co of fusiliers per line.

Why would the grenadiers deploy in the pre 1808 attack column as follows when they were expected or were wanted at the corners when square was formed ?
FFFF FFFF
FFFF FFFF
FFFF FFFF
FFFF FFFF
---GGGG--
Wouldn't it make more sense to deploy for battle like this ?

GFFFF-FFFFG
--FFFF--FFFF-
--FFFF--FFFF-
GFFFF--FFFFG

Or post 1808 like this?

GFFFFG
--FFFF-
--FFFF-
GFFFFG

And if voltigeurs join the other companies in the ranks Post-1808 maybe this ?

GFFFFG
VFFFFV
VFFFFV
GFFFFG

Perhaps it was as simple and balanced as:

FFFFG
GFFFF
FFFFG
GFFFF

With voltigeurs

VFFFFG
GFFFFV
VFFFFG
GFFFFV

or even more simply…

VFFFFG
VFFFFG
VFFFFG
VFFFFG

Either way, I think they aimed at attack columns in four lines on the battlefield before and after 1808 with the elite companies--even by squad-- often placed at key or tactical locations WITHIN the battalion where veteran/elite troops could lead.

G'Day Jim

Pre-1804 for a colonne d'attaque par batallion

FFFF|FFFF
FFFF|FFFF
FFFF|FFFF
FFFF|FFFF
--GG|GG--

Due to the various missions and roles of the Grenadiers, they may be en tirailleur, they be detached to support the artillery, they may be detached to form a Regimental or Brigade reserve.

Also according to l'Ordonnance, the grenadiers may be positioned on the interior or exterior of the square. they may even be assigned the position of linking four squares together.

Pre-1804 for a colonne d'attaque when both demi-bataillons were near.

FFFF----FFFF
FFFF----FFFF
FFFF----FFFF
FFFF----FFFF
----GGGG--

FFFFGGFFFF
FFFF---FFFF
FFFF---FFFF
FFFFGGFFFF

Best Regards
Art

@Bottom Dollar
You would try to keep the tactical smallest subsection intact, that would be a peloton (for the French – an equalized company.
Usually a capitaine would lead this unit. When you disperse it as you suggested – you would ruin the tactical unity.
also how could a column deploy when you place tactical obstacles at their flanks, those subsection would have to reform behind the fusilsier which would cost precious time.
Bear in mind that usually also a elaireur company did exist – where to place it?

Since the colonne d'attaque was divided into two separate bodies or demi-bataillons, the primary distance between the two demi-bataillons was 25 paces, and employed the bayonet in the assault.

Art, could you give the source for this distance of 25 paces ?

Oli

von Winterfled, if the grenadier squads (35 men paper strength post-1808) had been equalized into the 4 fusilier companies for a given action, the battalion would still have just 4 tactical units or peletons. It was the Regelement 1808 which suggested dividing the grenadiers into 4 sub-units to be placed at the corners. I see no obstacles to deployment, just infantry.

Here's my post-1808 diagram equalized, a column by companies:

GFFFG
FFFFF
FFFFF
GFFFG

Deployed to either flank

GFFFG FFFFF FFFFF GFFFG

Or deployed on the center:

GFFFG FFFFF GFFFG FFFFF

If a straight split with front in center--I'm sure very possible--they needed to be ready to either have 3 tactical units or 5 b/c it was either

GF-FFFFF GFFFG FFFFF-FFG

So, the reasons the attack column with wings was not used regularly after 1808 seems to be:

The base number of tactical combat units per battalion was decreased from 8 to 4--only counting the fusiliers (I'm not arguing they couldn't form more with the grenadiers and voltigeurs if desired). Therefore, the 'even split' by attack column wings using 4 companies in column meant dividing or imbalancing the tactical units to either 3 or 5. However, the smaller tactical size of the battalion allowed the battalion to deploy more easily into line from a column of companies, rendering a balanced 'division' by wing less necessary.

I don't think grenadiers were also equalized.

According to the 1st August 1791 regulation, they were definitely not.

grenadiers would be only equalized when being used to form an elite battalion, then it would make sense.

I cannot agree with the post diagram of 108 by Bottom Dollar, somewhere such an instruction should be fixed, that is printed or written down, which isn't at all.

You would have to rupture all standing procedures to form a peloton which was usually done by formimg one line and then the sergent major would count the soldiers, determine the first – second and third rank and then form the one rank into the three rank battle formation, then number the files – fix the border of the first and second section, and eventually place the serrez fils.