"Guibert's so-called 'column of attack'" Topic

>Or were they entirely constrained by the drill manual?<

Yes. Absolutely. Troops could only do what they were trained to do.

Alternatively, from:

Gren
1st
2nd
3rd
4th

Might they not deploy into a hollow square as such? :

Gren co---------1st co
2nd/a ------------2nd/b
3rd co------------4th co

That way they're maximizing firepower to the front ? Isn't that why many squares were described as oblongs ? Either way the French didn't appear to like splitting inherent units on the firing line unless they had to.

Anyway, you guys have got better libraries than me. Further to the point, I think Napoleonic miniatures war games could do a better job of modeling some of these distinctions.

And Brigada, there's a difference between the drill manual and what they were trained to do !

@McLaddie,

>So, after the change to six company battalions, the attack column would have the five companies,[the voltigeurs being out] arranged on the center company [a battalion column]with the companies behind stacked by half companies so it could deploy on the center like so:<

No. When the voltigeur company was detached the battalion formed in colonne par pelotons, one peloton behind the other. There is a decree to that effect that I can dig out if you like.

A battalion with uneven numbers of companies could not form colonne par divisions or colonne d'attaque.

XV Brigada wrote "No battalion with uneven numbers of peltons could form a column par divisions or a colonne d'attaque."

Not aocording to Rod MacArthur and the 1791 Regulations.

XV Brigade you ought to be hashing things out with Rod MacArthur, not me ! :)

Maybe they equalized the Grenadiers across the peletons ? Or perhaps they were sent on to the skirmish line as well ? Elite troops are trusted skirmishers after all.

@Bottom Dollar.

>And Brigada, there's a difference between the drill manual and what they were trained to do!<

I disagree. I have seen this said many time but I have never seen any evidence to support it.

Troops could only do what they were trained to do and that is in the various regulations and instructions.

'Troops could only do what they were trained to do and that is in the various regulations and instructions.'

Then how were the French able to skirmish either in companies or battalions and regiments in open order? They had no drill manual for skirmishing and it isn't covered in the 1791 Reglement.

There's your example.

And the French 1791 Reglement offered a 'menu' for what commanders could use or not. Lannes and Massena were noted as excellent drill masters while St. Cyr was noted as not caring for the Reglement at all.

Sincerely,
K

XV Brigada, Rod and all the ships at sea:

Here is the reason I am still confused. Below is the description of the French V Corps advance at Albuera by Jean Pierre Maransin. He was one of the brigade commanders. He is correcting a description given by Captain Lapene, a V Corps staff officer.

Text reproduced in Jean Cambon, Jean Pierre Maransin, General de Division, Baron de l'Empire (Tarbes 1991), pp. 81-83.

Observations adressées a Mon. le Capitaine Lapène pour la rectification de quelques erreurs et inexactitudes concernant le 5ème Corps qu'il a committer dans la relation de cette bataille qui se trouve dans l'ouvrage intitulé « Conquête de l'Andalousie".

Edited out a few paragraphs to get to the point of my confusion. Maransin states:

Arrive au point d'attaque, le 5éme corps change de direction par un mouvement de tête de colonne à droite ; la division Girard marche a l'ennemi en colonnes d'attaque, la 2eme division derrière a 150 pas de distance en colonne d'attaque par bataillon.

Now, as the battalions in the corps were six companies, and from all indications the voltigeur companies were out, how does Girard form 'encolonnes d'attaque' while the 2eme division behind forms 'en colonne d'attaque par bataillon? In fact, Maransin corrects Lapene on the latter point, who said they were 'colonnes par bataillon'.

Inquiring minds want to know. I haven't been able to figure it out.

Bill H.

And the French 1791 Reglement offered a 'menu' for what commanders could use or not. Lannes and Massena were noted as excellent drill masters while St. Cyr was noted as not caring for the Reglement at all.

Not quite a menu, though there were decisions given to battalion officers that hadn't been present before. However, the French regulations were very much like the Prussian 1788 regulations.

The 1791 regulations remained in use by the French throughout the Napoleonic wars, even though such officers as Duhesme and Augereau complained about the Regléments, having French troops trained "in the Prussian style" as early as the Revolutionary Wars. Etling, Swords around the Throne, pp.531-34

There were limits to that menu simply because, unlike the skirmishers, battalions had to work together in a battleline…

Bill H.

Bill wrote: "Now, as the battalions in the corps were six companies, and from all indications the voltigeur companies were out, how does Girard form 'encolonnes d'attaque' while the 2eme division behind forms 'en colonne d'attaque par bataillon? In fact, Maransin corrects Lapene on the latter point, who said they were 'colonnes par bataillon'."

Perhaps something like this, assuming all the voltigeur companies from both divisions are skirmishing and the grenadiers are either equalized into the 4 fusilier companies, are placed on the skirmish line or are consolidated into a 1 or 2 battalions as a reserve. (Either way the grenadiers companies would fit into this scheme by adding more depth or width to each formation.

(part of Girard 1st line)

34e1 34e2 --------------------------------40e1 40e2
34e1 34e2 ------------------------------- 40e1 40e2
34e1 34e2 --------------------------------40e1 40e2
34e1 34e2 ------------------------------- 40e1 40e2

( part of Gazan in 2nd line after correction by Marasin)

21e1 21e1 21e1 21e1
21e2 21e2 21e2 21e2
28e1 28e1 28e1 28e1
28e2 28e2 28e2 28e2
28e3 28e3 28e3 28e3

(part of Gazan in 2nd line according to Lapene)

21e1 ----------21e2----------28e1----------28e2------------28e3
21e1 ----------21e2----------28e1----------28e2------------28e3
21e1 ----------21e2----------28e1----------28e2------------28e3
21e1 ----------21e2----------28e1----------28e2------------28e3

It may have made sense for Gazan to deploy like this too:

21e1 21e2 28e1 28e2 28e3
21e1 21e2 28e1 28e2 28e3
21e1 21e2 28e1 28e2 28e3
21e1 21e2 28e1 28e2 28e3

Anyway, good thread. I learned a lot.

OK. Revised :)

(part of Girard 1st line--"columns of attack")
34e1 34e2 --------------------------------40e1 40e2
34e1 34e2 ------------------------------- 40e1 40e2
34e1 34e2 --------------------------------40e1 40e2
34e1 34e2 ------------------------------- 40e1 40e2

(part of Gazan in 2nd line after correction by Marasin "columns by battalion")
21e1 21e2 28e1 28e2 28e3
21e1 21e2 28e1 28e2 28e3
21e1 21e2 28e1 28e2 28e3
21e1 21e2 28e1 28e2 28e3

(part of Gazan in 2nd line according to Lapene "a column of attack by battalion")
21e1 21e1 21e1 21e1
21e2 21e2 21e2 21e2
28e1 28e1 28e1 28e1
28e2 28e2 28e2 28e2
28e3 28e3 28e3 28e3

PS I think there would have been a tremendous amount of inherent tactical and grand tactical flexibility possible in however Girard and Gazan deployed at Albuera.

PSS Girard may have deployed into individual battalion attack columns, but I'm jumping to the assumption that that would've read something more specific than "en colonnes d'attaque". Such as "en colonnes d'attaque par division" or "peleton".

PSS In general, it seems the level of training and experience of the troops would've had a significant impact on the sophistication of the formation actually adopted and that's not easy to readily determine as far as I understand. Napoleon seemed to be very good at transferring experienced troops across and within theaters without his enemies knowing about it.

Anyway, that's my two inexpert cents.

'Troops could only do what they were trained to do and that is in the various regulations and instructions.'

Then how were the French able to skirmish either in companies or battalions and regiments in open order? They had no drill manual for skirmishing and it isn't covered in the 1791 Reglement.

There's your example.

True, but in the case of skirmishing, we know that the French were training for it because the commanders talked about and we know that the French did it in practice. But are 'new' ways of forming close order formations equivalent?

Regards

Now, as the battalions in the corps were six companies, and from all indications the voltigeur companies were out, how does Girard form 'en colonnes d'attaque' while the 2eme division behind forms 'en colonne d'attaque par bataillon?

The complete battalion in line:

V-4-3-2-1-G

The normal colonne d'attaque:

3-2
4-1
V-G

The colonne d'attaque with the skirmishers out:

3-2
4-1
--G

There is no law that a column must be geometrically-aesthetically appealing ;-)

Bill,
I think that we may be over concerned as to whether there were 6, or 9 companies present and we assume that the Decree of 1808 had taken effect here in Spain by May 1811.
I think that Maransin is only correcting Lapene on one point here and that is that Girard`s command was advancing in attack columns (with battalions in regiments side-by-side) whilst Gazan`s division was not arrayed and still coming up with battalions in each regiment behind another.

It is then, a question of battle array; not of tactical unit formations.

Another witness, d`Heralde, of the 88th in the first division actually mentions unit formations; "columns by division" and "colonnes par peloton".

So if the Decree was in place by then, in the first division some, possibly the leading regiments (40th and 34th), had volitgeurs deployed and the supporting ones (88th and 64th) in columns of divisions did not.

Regards,

Mike.

WW,

Yes, the troops were trained to skirmish. But the point made was that it had to be in the regulations ('and that is in the various regulations and instructions').

And for the French regarding skirmishing techniques for all types of skirmishing, there was no army regulation for it in the French service throughout the period.

What instructions did exist came after the practice was army-wide and came from various unit commanders, such as Davout, and that was quite late, in 1811.

If you want to discuss the Prussians, Austrians, et al, then yes it had to be in the instructions because that is the way they worked-instructions first, then the practice 'by the manual.' For the French it wasn't always that way. And that is a very big difference in the armies of the period.

Sincerely,
K

@ McLaddie/Bottom Dollar etc.,

I think I'll have to take back what I said about colonnes d'attaque needing an equal number of companies.

As far as I know there is nothing in the 1791 Règlement which says specifically that either colonnes par divisions or colonnes d'attaque could not be formed if one or more companies were detached, or if there were an uneven number of companies.

But, by definition a colonnes par divisions consists of divisions, and a division is two companies. If it does not consist of divisions, it is something else.

There is an indication in the Reglement, nevertheless, of how colonnes d'attaque might be formed with an uneven number of companies and that is when the eight company battalion was complete with its grenadier company to make a total of nine companies.

In this case the grenadier company followed the movement of the half battalion of which it was part, except that it placed itself behind the interior sections of the last division of the column in such a manner as to be flanked on the left and right by the two exterior sections of that division.

I can't see any reason why this should not be the same with a six-company battalion. But, on the other hand, the 1808 decree that deals with the six-company battalion says that the grenadiers and voltigeurs were on the right and left of the battalion, and that when the "six companies are present with the battalion it will always march and act by divisions. When the grenadiers and light infantry are absent from the battalion it will always manoeuvre and march by platoon. Two companies will form a division; each company will form a platoon; each half company a section."

As far as battle drills are concerned generally, training was fundamental. Large bodies of men simply had to be trained to move together, convert from one formation to another and do all the other things that were required of them, in conjunction with other bodies of troops, all marching to the ‘beat of the same drum'.

I have yet to see any evidence whatsoever that troops of any nationality did any controlled activity on a battlefield for which they had not been trained. Where that training came from is another matter and regulations, like the French 1791, were often overtaken by change, but you will find all kinds of other written instructions and regulations, some from the very top, other quite local, that take such changes into account.

The concept of troops executing drills for which they had not been trained, including skirmishing, is in my view, just not credible. Untrained troops are a mob.

'I have yet to see any evidence whatsoever that troops of any nationality did any controlled activity on a battlefield for which they had not been trained. Where that training came from is another matter and regulations, like the French 1791, were often overtaken by change, but you will find all kinds of other written instructions and regulations, some from the very top, other quite local, that take such changes into account.'

And the point being made is that any instruction on the various types of skirmishing in the French service came after the fact, not before. Those instructions were based on what had already become institutionalized in the army based on practice and experience. With the other nations an instruction or regulation came first, and then the practice was developed from that basis.

'The concept of troops executing drills for which they had not been trained, including skirmishing, is in my view, just not credible. Untrained troops are a mob.'

For drills based on a regulation, I would agree. However, it was noted at Dresden in 1813 that the French conscripts outfought their veteran opponents in the Great Garden in 'help yourself' fighting. Was there time to train the French conscripts in this type of fighting before August 1813 or was the practice so institutionalized because of long experience that it was expected? I would conclude that it was both.

Sincerely,
K

Those instructions were based on what had already become institutionalized in the army based on practice and experience.

You put my questions very well. With skirmishing, the French had institutionalized tactics based on practice and experience. Are close-order drill evolutions amenable to the same thing and did this in fact happen?

Regards

Whirlwind wrote: "Are close-order drill evolutions amenable to the same thing and did this in fact happen?"

How about the deployment from close Brigade/Divisional columns immediately into full length battalion firing lines ?

'Are close-order drill evolutions amenable to the same thing and did this in fact happen?'

That would depend on the army and the individual commanders.

Wellington's use of the two-rank line is one example I would think.

The French practice of forming their first line into a heavy skirmish line instead of the regulation three-rank line is another.

The French 1791 Reglement called for the first rank to kneel, but that went out as it was found that it was hard to get them to stand up again.

So the answer seems to be 'yes.'

Sincerely,
K

After reading thru posts here and knowing a little bit about the French mentality, I would further argue that Marasin made the correction to Lapene b/c Lapene described a less sophisticated tactical formation than what Gazan's division performed and Marasin wanted to make sure to give credit for greater sophistication where that credit was due !

Thus, the "columns by battalion". Further b/c it wasn't a formation with the center in front and the wings folded behind technically it wasn't an "attack column", but "columns by battalion".

(part of Gazan in 2nd line after correction by Marasin "columns by battalion")
21e1 21e2 28e1 28e2 28e3
21e1 21e2 28e1 28e2 28e3
21e1 21e2 28e1 28e2 28e3
21e1 21e2 28e1 28e2 28e3

From this formation the whole could attack as one. In addition, while remaining part of the whole, the flanking battalions could deploy into full length battalion firing lines as needed or individual battalions or regimental attack columns could be pealed off in increments to reinforce different sections of the 1st Divisions line as needed without disrupting the entire formation. Extremely sophisticated stuff, IMHO.

Bottom Dollar,

In his book, "Albuera 1811", this is how Guy Dempsey has the regiments and battalions of Gazan`s division arranged in columns by battalions.

1/21e 1/28e
2/21e 2/28e
-------- 3/28e
1/100e 1/103e
2/100e 2/103e
---------- 3/103e

Guibert never intended his columns to be formations of combat. To the contrary he was derisive of those such as Folard and Mesnil-Durand who advocated fighting in columns. On viewing Marshal de Broglie's maneuvers based on Mesnil-Durand's ordre profound (attack columns), Guibert wrote there is no such thing as mass. How are the men from the 4th rank to the rear to get at the enemy climb over the first 3 ranks? He also pointed out that all routs start at the rear. He advocated and the French army adopted the practice of deploying from columns, which he considered formations of maneuver, to line prior to entering combat.

From 1800 to 1805, French infantry trained in Guibert's drill. That a goodly portion of that army consisted of veterans from the Revolutionary and Directory wars didn't hurt. The result was the Grande Armee of 1805-1807.

After the break-up of the Grande Armee in 1808 (mostly due to retirement) the French didn‘t have time to properly train new recruits or officers. The initial result was to decrease the number of companies in a battalion, doubling the front and firepower of an attack column. Even so units were supposed to deploy before entering combat but due to the lack of experience of the new regimental and battalion officers this often did not happen.

The expansion of the Army in 1812 combined with the manpower drain in Spain led many units to have only the barest of training and from that time there was little thought of attempting to deploy before entering combat. Napoleon recognized the severe drop in the quality of training of officers and enlisted men and compensated by increasing the number of guns. In 1813/14 training was even spottier and save for the Guard few units had the ability to change to or move in line without becoming disordered. Even though, the 1815 Army consisted of a significant number of veterans who were capable of changing formations and advancing in line, the senior commanders, for reasons known only to them, deployed them into massive columns.

Bob Coggins

I think that we may be over concerned as to whether there were 6, or 9 companies present and we assume that the Decree of 1808 had taken effect here in Spain by May 1811.

Mike:
I'm just trying to make sense of the attack column moniker, and others seem to feel that makes a difference.

I think that Maransin is only correcting Lapene on one point here and that is that Girard`s command was advancing in attack columns (with battalions in regiments side-by-side) whilst Gazan`s division was not arrayed and still coming up with battalions in each regiment behind another.

Could be, but Maransin corrects Lapene on the point about the column by battalion [actually a company face] was an attack column.

It is then, a question of battle array; not of tactical unit formations.

It's always a question of battle array…that's what the battalions had to fit into. ;-7

Another witness, d`Heralde, of the 88th in the first division actually mentions unit formations; "columns by division" and "colonnes par peloton".

So the first division whas in both?

So if the Decree was in place by then, in the first division some, possibly the leading regiments (40th and 34th), had volitgeurs deployed and the supporting ones (88th and 64th) in columns of divisions did not.

So the first division was in both formations? Where is d`Heralde found?

Bill H.

BD:
I have to disagree on the array here:

(part of Girard 1st line)

34e1 34e2 --------------------------------40e1 40e2
34e1 34e2 ------------------------------- 40e1 40e2
34e1 34e2 --------------------------------40e1 40e2
34e1 34e2 ------------------------------- 40e1 40e2

The 40th would have been on the left, the 34th on the right as per convention. From all indications Girard and Soult saw the corps extending the line to the left, wheeling from the left if necessary, so the 40th would have to be on the left.

( part of Gazan in 2nd line after correction by Marasin)

21e1 21e1 21e1 21e1
21e2 21e2 21e2 21e2
28e1 28e1 28e1 28e1
28e2 28e2 28e2 28e2
28e3 28e3 28e3 28e3

I'm not sure. It is possible, but then what about the other brigade in the division? All the descriptions I have seen the 28th is on the left, 21st on the right except for Dempsey's book. The reason he has them reversed is surious, and from his comments, he doesn't seem aware of battle array conventions.

Bill H.

Bill,

"…others seem to feel that makes a difference."

I`m not sure it does make much of a difference… as the column formed on the centre was falling out of favour generally because the column of divisions was seen as easier to employ instead.

"…the column by battalion [actually a company face] was an attack column."

A column with the face of a company would be a "colonne par peloton" and yes, it might also be described as an attack column.

I believe that the distinction Maransin is making is about arrays of the two commands; he does not refer to the battalion formations of either division.
I take Maransin to mean that the commands were possibly arrayed as follows:

1/40e 2/40e 2/34e 1/34e
1/882 2/88e 3/64e 2/64e 1/64e

1/21e 1/28e
2/21e 2/28e
-------- 3/28e
1/100e 1/103e
2/100e 2/103e
---------- 3/103e

"So the first division was in both?"

Yes, it was possible for lines within divisions to be in different formations.

"So the first division was in both formations? Where is d`Heralde found?"

d`Heralde would be with the 88th in a column of pelotons.
d`Heralde is quoted on page 109 of Dempsey`s book with footnote: Memoires pages 154 and 155.

Regards,

Mike.

Also possible…?

(part of Girard 1st line--"columns of attack" by division/ple.)
2/40e --------------1/40e---------------2/34e--------------1/34e
2/40e --------------1/40e---------------2/34e--------------1/34e
2/40e --------------1/40e---------------2/34e--------------1/34e
2/40e --------------1/40e---------------2/34e--------------1/34e

(part of Gazan in 2nd line after correction by Marasin "columns by battalion")
3/28e 2/28e 1/28e 2/21e 1/21e
3/28e 2/28e 1/28e 2/21e 1/21e
3/28e 2/28e 1/28e 2/21e 1/21e
3/28e 2/28e 1/28e 2/21e 1/21e

XV Brigada wrote:

As far as I know there is nothing in the 1791 Règlement which says specifically that either colonnes par divisions or colonnes d'attaque could not be formed if one or more companies were detached, or if there were an uneven number of companies.

True, but the 1791 regulations were written with an organisation on 9 companies per battalion in mind, and all the diagrams show 8 with one detached. When the French changed to 6 companies per battalion Napoleon issued his 1808 Decree which said that battalions were to operate by divisions if all companies were present and by peteton (companies) if the flank companies were detached.

The bottom line is that if a French battalion after 1808 was so stupid as to operate with its voltigeurs deployed, with the remainder of the battalion in a column of two divisions and it's grenadier company forming a half-division at the rear, it would be unable to form square without first forming into a column on single company frontage. If there were enemy cavalry nearby they might all be dead before they achieved this.

Battle drills, then and now, we're designed to be fast and instinctive.

Rod

So the answer seems to be 'yes.'

I don't know how to make myself more clear I'm afraid. The examples you cited were well-known at the time ('institutionalized') and recorded for posterity. I'm asking if it is possible that we can deduce that certain changes to battle drills were made without this clear, wide-spread testimony.

Regards

The bottom line is that if a French battalion after 1808 was so stupid as to operate with its voltigeurs deployed, with the remainder of the battalion in a column of two divisions and it's grenadier company forming a half-division at the rear, it would be unable to form square without first forming into a column on single company frontage.

They could always serrer en masse (close up), if they weren't already in close order, and resist the cavalry this way. The grenadier "bulge" at the back wouldn't have disturbed much, I presume.

The Prussians (1812 regulation) always formed their square from the attack column (which was in close order anyway), by having the ranks face outwards. Kind of waste of potential firepower, but thus the square could be formed very fast, and get in back in column very fast as well.

Haven't checked whether this is in the French 1791 regulation, though.

Sorry Bill,
I should have said:
d`Heralde would be with the 88th and possibly in a column of divisions.
Mike.

@RodMacArthur,

Indeed they are but what can I tell you? The description of the column with the grenadiers at the rear is there. I have no sensible answer for the square issue, I'm afraid.

The 1791 Reglement had long been overtaken by all kinds of tinkering.

There is an annex to the 1791 regulation, dating from 1804/5 or later. The earliest occurence I have found up to now that it is annexed to the regulation in print, is from 1808, and I have seen it also in an 1816 editon.

This annex contains the Feux de rang (firing alternatively by single ranks, the other two ranks always kept in reserve) and dispositions against cavalry (forming squares, all those described are hollow squares).

In the end, it says about the grenadier companies when forming square, that they should be split in their two sections, and placed on a diagonal 10 paces ahead of the (probably front-) corners of the square:

books.google.de/books?id=OUgMAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA421

I don't understand what institutionalized tactics are.

As far as French skirmishing is concerned I simply can't accept the notion of an unwritten, unrecorded method, or that there was no method and French skirmishing was uncontrolled. A 'psst, pass it on' solution and dissemination by ‘secret handshake' is just not credible.

The French did write about skirmishing and Davout's instructions, which are not unusual in any respect, are well known. The assumption that nothing existed prior to 1811 is certainly convenient for the purposes of the argument.

It was always possible for battle drills (ie Napoleonic Drill Regulations) to be amended by practical experience. That is of course how they evolve over the years.

The best way to determine this is to look at later regulations, because such battle drills were not created by theorists, but by practical usage, and there was inevitably a resistance to ratify them until they were well proven.

A good example is the British 1824 Regulations, which clearly states in the introduction that these were largely a codifying of tactical practice introduced during the "late" wars. Such practice includes finally recognising 2 rank formations, forming 4 rank squares from 2 rank companies (the 1792 Regulations showed 6 rank squares from 3 rank companies), increasing the normal pace from "ordinary" to "quick" and introducing a new "double-quick" of 150 paces per minute (very fast).

It would be reasonable to assume that all of these were introduced by 1812 at latest.

If anyone wishes to check these, both the 1792 and 1824 Regulations are available as free downloads. Unfortunately I bought my original copies of both of these, plus cavalry etc, many years ago and therefore paid a lot of money for them.

I would guess that a similar situation pertains for French Regulations but I am less expert on this (I do have photocopies of most of the French regulations for infantry, cavalry and artillery as I do for Prussian, Russian, Austria, USA and several other states).

Rod

‘I don't understand what institutionalized tactics are.'

Practices and procedures that are standard operating procedure in an army, especially something as important and that impacts on tactics and operations in a substantial manner can be said to be institutionalized.

In addition to skirmishing practices in the French service, staff operations and procedures were institutionalized without a written instruction in the French service from 1795-1800, when Thiebault wrote his first staff manual, because of Berthier and his insistence on proper prior planning, and staff procedures.

‘As far as French skirmishing is concerned I simply can't accept the notion of an unwritten, unrecorded method, or that there was no method and French skirmishing was uncontrolled. A 'psst, pass it on' solution and dissemination by ‘secret handshake' is just not credible.'

There's nothing in the 1791 Reglement on it and I haven't found an army-wide instruction on skirmishing procedures in the French service any place during the period. If I recall correctly, one French senior officer remarked that skirmishing procedures were instilled in the French service through tradition and practice.

‘The French did write about skirmishing and Davout's instructions, which are not unusual in any respect, are well known. The assumption that nothing existed prior to 1811 is certainly convenient for the purposes of the argument.'

What was stated in previous postings was that there was no army-level regulation for skirmishing. Subordinate commanders definitely trained their troops to skirmish and that was through the procedures initially begun and developed by de Broglie's experimental maneuvers in Normandy in the mid-1770s.

Robert Quimby's The Background of Napoleonic Warfare discusses in some detail those experimental maneuvers at Vasseuix. It makes for interesting reading and an understanding of what the French developed.
The French reform period which entailed infantry tactics, infantry/artillery cooperation, artillery innovation and improvement, and command and staff organization and procedures was quite thorough and long-lasting (1763-1789), much longer and more thorough than the much-touted Prussian reform period of 1808-1813.

Sincerely,
Kevin

I think that we today have a very uniform notion of army operations compared to the Napoleonic Period. Colonels and generals from division to army had a great deal of leaway in determining what was 'institutionalized', and they didn't all agree on how it was to be done. And this is for most armies of the period.

the French 1792 Reglément provisoire gave explicit instructions on how skirmishers were to operate. That didn't keep individual commanders from commanding other methods:

*General Houchard wrote instructions for light infantry as early as 1793, saying "From now on there will be sixty-four men per battalion . . . selected as tirailleurs." John Lynn points out "He was not the first (or the last) to oppose the indiscriminate and uncontrolled use of tirailleurs." Bayonets of the Republic, p.246]

That is a few years before the Prussians increase the numbers of Schützen to eighty per battalion.

*French General H. A. Meunier, proposed in his "Changements", written during the Revolutionary wars, that just twenty soldiers be designated in each company as light infantryman—the same number of the Prussian Schützen at the time.

*General Schérer's instructions to his Italian army in 1795 called for skirmishers to be taken from the third rank of the line infantry.

*French General Ney, in his 1803 instructions, recommended the use of the third rank of each line battalion as skirmishers.

*Only in 1806 are voltigeur companies formed for each French battalion.

*Five years later, Davout in his 1811 instructions still considers deploying the third line of line battalions as skirmishers before detailing how center companies should be deployed in conjunction with the battalion voltigeurs or alone, so that skirmish operations should be uniform.

If the French had an uniformly 'institutionalized' set of procedures and methods for skirmishing there would have been no reason for Davout to write down more instructions as late as 1811.

The truth is that skirmish methods were in transition over the entire twenty years of the Napoleonic wars, an entire generation.

Another point is that it was the habit of individual regimental colonels or brigade officers to write up their own drill manuals on 'how things were done.' This was a universal practice among the various nations' military. The supposedly 'rigid' Prussians before 1806 were producing manuals among their various commands at a prodigious rate.

Even England didn't have an 'officially sanctioned' set of regulations for the army until @1795, and it took York several years to actually make them stick…about 1806. There hadn't been army-wide regulations before that. All the manuals, like Bland's or Wolf's were privately published.

That doesn't mean that there weren't generally accepted methods between all the armies, such as chains of skirmishers at about the same distances or the need for supports etc. Scharnhorst was noting the need in his 1793 Officers' manual and the book about the French Revolutionary army a few years later.

There was a lot of propaganda during the French Revolution about the "New Man" fighting as an idividual, which clouded the analysis of what the French did, as well as a real effort to hide the facts from the Allies. For instance, General Le Couturier, writing in the 1790's—"That which by its nature is irregular submits badly to rules."

That doesn't mean there were clear, uniform methods being employed to move large numbers of men. It just wasn't uniform, constantly evolving, and to some extent pretty no mystery to the Napoleonic armies… that is how to skirmish.

Bill H.

@ Rod,

You are right about the 1824 regs and two ranks etc but the ‘how to do it' was already provided by the 1792 regs. I accept, of course, that the 1792 regs intented three ranks to be the norm. If I remember correctly Wellington felt it necessary to order that the army in the Peninsula was to adopt two as the norm, but he didn't need to tell it how to do it.

The thing about the legendary French skirmishing, which I am inclined, more and more, to suspect was little more than that, is that there is no ‘how to do it' until quite late in the period. At least there is none that we know about, I think.

The well known example of Davout's instructions on the subject show, clearly, that the practice was not ‘institutionalised' in the French army, because, not only was it necessary to train elements of his Corps in the skill but, moreover, it was also necessary to tell them ‘how to do it'.

That is unsatisfactory by any standard, I would say.

The instructions by Davout (or, in fact: Morand) were meant for the fusiliers of the regiments, whereas the voltigeurs were "already familiar with these manoeuvers":

To the general Morand. Hamburg, 16th October 1811.

I have received, my dear general, your letter of 16th and the five copies of your project to teach the service of the skirmishers [tirailleurs] to all troops. It seems excellent to accomplish this task, and I will send it to all generals commanding a division of infantry, ordering them to use the rest of the season to exercise all companies in this. And, thanking you, my dear general, I ask you to send a copy of this project, of which you surely will have kept an original for yourself, to each of your generals and colonels, directing them to stick to it and exercise the troops in the future.

The companies of the voltigeurs are already familiar with these manoeuvers, it will be proper to exercise the centre companies with the companies of voltigeurs for the first time, it means a mixing of the fusiliers with the voltigeurs.

I will be obliged if you let me know of measures you have taken, and the progress of the troops in this training, made on different ground, which can only develop the understanding of the soldiers and the same of the officers.

A translation of the complete instruction here:

link

@ McLaddie,

I don't see anything explicit about skirmishing in the Règlement provisoire du 5 avril 1792. Assuming we are talking about the same document can you say which chapter they are in?

I also don't see the reference to using the third rank in Davout's 1811 instructions, though Ney certainly did. On the contrary he seems to advocate the use of entire centre companies rather than a certain number of men by company. Davout is also clear that he issued his instructions so that there was a uniform method, adding that the voltigeurs were already familiar with them. Who taught the voltigeurs and where are their instructions? Dissemination of training and methods by word of mouth, even if only for voltigeurs, is not believable.

Generals can order whatever they like in the context of skirmishing but unless somebody knows how to do it, and tells the instructors how to do it, they are merely wasting oxygen. Detailing a number of men as skirmishers is not the same thing.

PS I see that Oliver has already posted Davout's instruction while I was typing this.

'Who taught the voltigeurs and where are their instructions? Dissemination of training and methods by word of mouth, even if only for voltigeurs, is not believable.'

You've missed the point. The necessary skills and procedures were learned by doing them-and these were developed over time by practice and experience. You don't always need a manual to teach you what to do. Instructors who know by having done it is also a method that this is what the French had done.

If not, then where is the evidence to the contrary?

Generals can order whatever they like in the context of skirmishing but unless somebody knows how to do it, and tells the instructors how to do it, they are merely wasting oxygen. Detailing a number of men as skirmishers is not the same thing.

It is obvious by Morand's/Davout's instruction that the voltigeur companies in the divisions of the corps knew how to skirmish in the various methods that had been common practice in the French army beginning in the mid-1770s. That's how they learned and were going to pass their 'institutionalized' knowledge onto the other companies in their respective battalions.

Sincerely,
K

Skirmishing was a very controlled affair. The skirmish line was thicker than generally believed. The distance between files was often 4 feet or less. The men were controlled with whistles and horns. There were rally platoons for protection from cavalry and foremen were not supposed to fire till their backman was loaded.

An excellent movie example of a French skrimish line was the Battle of Schoengraben. The scene has a thick French skirmish line advancing then firing and retreating in the face of the Russian unit's attack.

Bob Coggins

'Only in 1806 are voltigeur companies formed for each French battalion.'

Voltigeurs were not the only light infantry in the French army. The light infantry regiments were also light infantry-the entire regiment, including the carabinier companies. Authorizing each infantry regiment, both line and light, to have a voltigeur company gave each battalion another elite company, and in many cases was only officially recognizing what was already practice in many of the regiments.

Between 1796 and 1801 some regiments had formed 'eclaireurs' companies. both Coignet and Teste mention this. Further, the Royal Army had established regimental chasseur companies before the Revolution.

The light infantry was officially authorized to form voltigeur companies in March 1804. it was authorized for the line infantry regiments in September 1805.

Sincerely,
K

What were the roles of the Grenadier companies ?

‘From 1800 to 1805, French infantry trained in Guibert's drill. That a goodly portion of that army consisted of veterans from the Revolutionary and Directory wars didn't hurt. The result was the Grande Armee of 1805-1807.'

What would a ‘goodly portion' be?

The farther along the wars continued, the number of veterans from the Revolutionary Wars were relatively few in the Grande Armee of 1805.

One-third of the soldiers in 1805 (including almost all of the officers and NCOs) were veterans with at least six years of service.

At most, one soldier in thirty was a veteran of the old Royal Army. A larger percentage were the old volunteers of the early Revolutionary period. Most of the veterans, though were the conscripts who had been called up in 1799-1800.

More than half of the cavalry and about 43 percent of the infantry had combat experience. The rest were new soldiers, called to the colors called up after the Revolutionary Wars were over. They were thoroughtly trained because of the intense training in the Channel camps, but they were without combat experience.

So, the comment of a 'goodly portion' is probably appropriate, but the numbers of those veterans of the Revolutionary Wars was probably less than a quarter of the total in the Grande Armee of 1805, and in actuality probably somewhat less.

Sincerely,
K

Also, weren't the grenadier and voltigeur companies somewhat smaller than the fusilier companies ?

How the grenadier companies were assigned seems more of a mystery to me.

From what I understand they could skirmish and fire artillery. Would they be assigned to protect the divisional close support artillery for the duration of a battle? And if they were not skirmishing or backing up the divisiional artillery, but were part of the battalion formation where would they be assigned, what was their role ?

@ BD,

The 1791 regs describe a regiment with two battalions, each of eight fusilier companies, and a grenadier division of two grenadier companies. Although, as I remember, the regs don't mention these being used to form grenadier, or elite battalions, that is clearly their intent, in my view, and it was also done in the Prussian, British and other armies.

There are many examples of the French doing this up to 1806 and beyond. Grenadiers were often detached and used as ad hoc elite battalions frequently as part of a formation advance-guard.

By the time we get to the six-company battalion the detachment of grenadier companies seems to have gone 'out of fashion' and they were just the right flank company of the battalion. The grenadier company had become largely a means of reqarding good soldiers. I am not aware that French grenadiers ever had a specific role to protect artillery.

I've seen it mentioned online that at one point in time the grenadier companies were specifically detailed to assault the Chateau de Hougoumont. So, it sounds like they were still somewhat differentiated from the fusiliers.

In war gaming terms, perhaps they should confer a moderate "charge home" bonus to their battalion, but also allow them to be detached and grouped into elite/veteran battalions. They could also be used to replace casualties in batteries and to skirmish of course. Perhaps it should be a toss up that even some battalions qualify to have them ?

@BD,

There was also Oudinot's division/corps made up entirely of grenadier (and voltigeur) companies formed into separate battalions. Somewhere I have a list of which regiments sent companies to whoch battalions.

I would tend not to detach grenadier companies to elite battalions in any scenario post-1810, but before that, certainly. Voltigeurs were also detached to elite battalions sometimes.

I'm not sure about the bonus in wargaming terms. I don't think I'd rather apply a penalty if they were
absent. But I don't reflect individual companies in my games.

A slight pinching penalty. Would be shame to game the stands and not be able to do something different with them !