"Guibert's so-called 'column of attack'" Topic

Reading the late Paddy Griffith's 'French Napoleonic Infantry Tactics' (p.11)…
link
…I am interested to see that Griffith isolates and highlights a formation/evolution devised by Guibert in the 1770s as a key advance in French infantry tactics.

The formation/evolution in question is the two-platoon-wide column, often called the 'column of attack', and the oblique ployment method by which this shook out into line (see very clear diagram).

By highlighting this formation/evolution, Griffith seems to imply that: (i) they were highly original; and (ii) they contributed significantly to the superior flexibility of French combat tactics during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.

Is that so? What do you think? I am sure that I have seen drillbooks (such as the British 1764 Regulations) contain similar formations (column by grand-divisions?). And I thought the 'en tiroir' method of deploying columns devised by Frederick the Great was the revolutionary step forward.

Any views?

After their dismal perfomance in the Seven Years War, the French military thinkers were groping around trying to find SOMETHING that might allow them to win over folks like the Prussians. A number of different ideas came up, including Guibert's. It wasn't entirely original, as you point out. But then along came the French Revolution and the disruption of the old French Army. The new revolutionary armies weren't trained well enough to use the old rigid linear tactics (at least not very well). But Guibert's system of attack columns supported by swarms of skirmishers was something that could be quickly learned by raw recruits. The results were pretty good and the system was incorporated into the French tactics even after the revolutionary period.

So it wasn't so much a matter of Guibert's system being so much superior to other systems as it was of being the right system in the right place at the right time.

One difference is that the French column here is formed on the centre two peletons (or centre division). This is correctly termed column on the centre but seems to equate to column of attack.

Other drill regulations probably show columns formed on the rightmost or leftmost companies. Similar but not the same. Deployment is different.

Indeed Mike, the most interesting and apparently often overlooked factor when considering this column and the later Prussian equivalent(for example), is that the formation is apparently designed to minimise the theoretical time taken to form line, presumably close to the enemy.

As to novelty it may have been an innovation in the 1770's but this is not relevant to our period as for example the 1792 British regulations (p. 52 & plate 64) include similar column-line conversions, based on centre platoons/companies.

Rather, in our period, novelty seems to derive from the use of the tools rather than the tools themselves.

Regards

Garry Wills
caseshotpublishing.com

As to novelty it may have been an innovation in the 1770's but this is not relevant to our period as for example the 1792 British regulations (p. 52 & plate 64) include similar column-line conversions, based on centre platoons/companies.

And as Dundas' 1792+ British regulations were modeled on the Prussian regulations, the 'attack column' was part of the Prussian lexicon of formations.

The 'new' part was the use of the column as a combat formation rather than the line, not then formation and the manner of its 'unfolding' into line. Also, the French had the habit of naming column formations by intended use, so the column of divisions could be called an 'attack column' in one place, but be termed a 'maneuver column' by someone else, or just a column of division in a third.

Over all, I was surprised by Paddy's book. He played fast and loose with history in places, giving broad opinions rather than facts in others. I would recommend viewing the Osprey book with a good deal of skepticism. For instance, what he says about 'l'ordre mixte' is just plain wrong, and knowing him, I for the life of me, can't figure out why he wrote what he did. It's like he sat down and scribbled something in an evening after a couple of beers without ever going back and reading what he'd wrote.

Bill H.

@ redcoat,

The colonne d'attaque and colonne par divisions are two different things. I would not credit either of them to Guibert and I think Paddy Griffiths is wrong.

The colonne d'attaque is formed on the centre two companies (peletons) of the battalion in line and the wings thrown back forming a column consisted of companies from different divisions. It is, in essence, two columns side by side, formed by the left and right wings of the battalion. The first description of this kind of column that I know of is Prussian and dates from 1755.

The colonne par divisions was formed on a division, usually the left or right of the battalion in line. The column consisted of the remaining divisions in order right to left, or left to right, front to rear.

XV you bring out an interesting point, that of the double column. Meunier in his treatise describes these operating in combination but with some separation between them.

Some British brigades at Waterloo appear to have used something similar, battalions paired together as contiguous columns at quarter distance. I am not here claiming British use of attack column, just column on the centre od double column.

On a table top there may not be all that much difference between a "double column" or a "column of divisions". But in the field the reasons for forming them and the method of doing so are very different.

For instance, what he says about 'l'ordre mixte' is just plain wrong, and knowing him, I for the life of me, can't figure out why he wrote what he did.

McLaddie, I'd love to know what you mean by this – would you mind elaborating, please?

@MtM,

The thing is, I suspect, that a lot of what is written about French Napoleonic regulations is so much rubbish, repeated down the years. I don't expect that there was much real innovation as far as regs are concerned in the 100 years between 1750 and 1850 and what there was came from Prussia.

The 'highest' separate sub-unit of a battalion was the wing. Below that you have the familiar division and then companies/pelotons. There was much more tactical flexibility in a battalion than they are given credit for I think.

The colonne d'attaque was a difficult formation to use because it had to be formed from line. The Colonne par divisions could be formed directly from colonne par peletons. Both deployed en tiroir, and both need space to do so.

I use a template in my games which provides a ‘footprint' for evolutions and if there is not enough room, you simply can't deploy. It does stop ‘crowding' and is a kind of penalty for incompetence!

XV Brigada wrote: "The colonne d'attaque was a difficult formation to use because it had to be formed from line."

But from a practical standpoint that would've ensured that there was enough distance between the battalions to deploy back into line. So, it wasn't so much a difficulty as the French way of using a template for deployment. Further lends itself to the conclusion that the ability to deploy quickly into line and even back again was just as important to the tactics as the attack column itself.

In the instances where the French packed their columns together, so that deployment into line was impossible at the individual battalion level, there probably ought to be some mechanic to combine fire power between battalions, as I can't imagine the French would've done that without thinking that the combined firepower of each of the battalions' three front ranks was intended to offset the inability of the individual battalions to deploy into line.

Perhaps Napoleon's increasing reliance on artillery to soften opposing lines can be seen as the grand development of the "mixed order" concept? Rather than using localized fire from lines of infantry and foot artillery to soften and then smash with individual battalion attack columns, he used grand batteries to soften and then smashed with brigade columns ?

Would it have been possible for say 6-8 battalions of French infantry to combine into a single column of any number of widths and depths and which could then operate as a single tactical entity under the command of say a brigade general ? Wasn't that part of French tactical versatility ? They could scale up or scale down, quickly adapting as situations demanded.

Either way the ability to combine firepower between units seems to some extent a necessary mechanic in game systems .

The colonne d'attaque and colonne par divisions are two different things. I would not credit either of them to Guibert and I think Paddy Griffiths is wrong.

XV Brigada:

How are they different? The only way they are 'different' is that different column formations were all called 'colonne d'attaque on different occasions.

I do agree that Guibert didn't invent them. The only possible credit, and this isn't a sure thing, is his suggestions for 'their' use were new.

Bill H.

In the instances where the French packed their columns together, so that deployment into line was impossible at the individual battalion level, there probably ought to be some mechanic to combine fire power between battalions, as I can't imagine the French would've done that without thinking that the combined firepower of each of the battalions' three front ranks was intended to offset the inability of the individual battalions to deploy into line.<\q>

But can you point to anywhere in the French 1791 Regulations which permit columns to be packed together, or a single historical instance of it happening. The fact that the majority of wargame rules permit it does not make it historically accurate.

Rod

Rod MacArthur wrote: "But can you point to anywhere in the French 1791 Regulations which permit columns to be packed together, or a single historical instance of it happening."

Ah, no. But I could point to about 90% of the Napoleonic miniature war gaming tables I've seen :) I could also point to some of the diagrams in P.Griffth's book, specifically the Wagram diagram where according to Paddy the French deployed attack columns side by side in a gigantic, yet hollow box. The illustrated diagram in that book--see link above- shows attack columns closed on the flanks. No way to deploy into line from that.

I agree I jumped to an assumption, but then again even with some of the most well documented battles, such as Waterloo, the historians and perhaps even the eyewitnesses can't seem to come to a consensus as to exactly how d'Erlon was deployed. So, yes, I have jumped to some conclucsions which I've seen a majority make and even there I would argue my jumpiness isn't half as bad as I've seen in some of the venerable histories :)

Bottom Dollar wrote

Ah, no. But I could point to about 90% of the Napoleonic miniature war gaming tables I've seen :) <\q>

OK, so I agree with you that 90% of wargaming rules have got it wrong. I believe in primary sources only, contemporary drill regulations supported by contemporary memoirs. Everything else is opinion.

Rod

@McLaddie,

The internal disposition of the peletons of a colonne d'attaque is different from that of a colonne par divisions.

Rod MacArthur wrote: "Everything else is opinion."

So, you must have a lot of opinions.

Or maybe you just game the Peninsular Theater but then call it "The Battle of Leipzig".

The internal disposition of the peletons of a colonne d'attaque is different from that of a colonne par divisions

XV Brigada:

Are you saying that a 'colonne par divisions' couldn't deploy on the center, but had to deploy left or right into line?

Bill H.

For instance, what he says about 'l'ordre mixte' is just plain wrong, and knowing him, I for the life of me, can't figure out why he wrote what he did.

Redcoat:

I'm not ignoring your question. I will give the answer the question deserves tomorrow.

Bill H.

I would agree that a colonne par divsionions is either formed to the right or to the left – depending how the initial column is formed ( to the right or left)

Bottom Dollar wrote:

Rod MacArthur wrote: "Everything else is opinion."

So, you must have a lot of opinions.

Or maybe you just game the Peninsular Theater but then call it "The Battle of Leipzig".

Not really. I started wargaming 50 years ago in Southampton but dropped in and out of it over the years (mainly due to moving around in the Army). I have got back to wargaming a bit recently (Black Powder at my local Wargames club in Tunbridge Wells and Art of Command at the Liphook Historic Wargames Group). I own a lot of wargame rules but none I really find totally satisfactory.

I spend more time researching Napoleonic Military History, writing articles for publications such as The Society for Army Historical Research and giving PowerPoint preentations on Military History than I do wargaming. I do however continue to paint my ever expanding Napoleonic Army.

Rod

@ Rod M,

I agree entirely. Although we might not know everything about Napoleonic battle drills, all that we do know is in primary sources, the regulations or what memoirists tell us. Anything else is just speculation.

@ McLaddie,

>Are you saying that a 'colonne par divisions' couldn't deploy on the center, but had to deploy left or right into line?<

No.

What I am saying is that the colonne d'attaque is formed on the two centre pelotons of the line, not on a division, and the disposition of the pelotons is different.

For an explanation of how the different columns were formed and deployed, see the Réglement 1791, École de Battailon, Articles 3 and 13, and Colin's La Tactique et la Discipline, IV, Écoles de peloton et de bataillon. Les formations.

The drill in the ACW was very similar. There was the column of divisions which could be formed on any of the five divisions in the battalion and then could be deployed back into line on any of the five divisions. So, in theory, you could actually side-step the battalion by ploying into column on the 5th division and then deploying back into line on the 1st division (or vice-versa).

There was also the "Double Column" which was always formed on the center two companies. The end result was a column two companies wide and five 'divisions' deep, but it could be deployed back into line only on those same two companies (although it could also be deployed facing to the right or left of its original facing in a manner that you can't do with a column of divisions).

So each type of column had its uses.

I would mention that a cologne par division forming on the centre, would have its leading division turning right and marching the length of the division to the right, while presenting its left flank to the enemy, meanwhile the centre division marches straight forward and the rear division turns left and marches the length of a complete division to the left, whilst presenting it's right flank to the enemy. All of the companies are moving simultaneously. All this assumes the column is being led by its senior division of grenadiers and 1st fusilier companies.

By contrast a cologne d'attaque forms on the centre by its leading (centre division of 3rd and 2nd fusilier companies halting, the 1st fusilier company and grenadier companies successively forming on the right, whilst the 4th and voltigeur companies do the same on the left. The great advantage is that the leading companies can open fire to cover the deployment of the 4th and 1st companies, and four companies can be firing as the elite flank companies complete the line.

Rod

The great advantage is that the leading companies can open fire to cover the deployment of the 4th and 1st companies, and four companies can be firing as the elite flank companies complete the line.

I agree, but do you know of any single incident when this really happened ?

XV Brigada:

Okay, I think I see the issue. It is my understanding that a 'colonne par divisions' is a description of the column by it's frontage, not it's internal layout of companies.

Are you saying that it means more? So if a battalion column [with a company front like that of the V Corps advance at Albuera] had sections organized within it to deploy on the center it would be an attack column, but if organized to deploy in the left or right it wouldn't be?

I appreciate the clarifications.

Rod wrote:

I would mention that a cologne par division forming on the centre, would have its leading division turning right and marching the length of the division to the right, while presenting its left flank to the enemy, meanwhile the centre division marches straight forward and the rear division turns left and marches the length of a complete division to the left, whilst presenting it's right flank to the enemy.

Rod:
The point being that an attack column [could or would have to?] have a division front and the 2 center companies/division leading and a cologne par division must have the right 2 companies leading?

Bill H.
Bill

As an example on how a the colonne par division could be formed, here a plate from the French regulation of 1 August 1792:

The battalion has 8 pelotons, in 4 divisions, plus the two pelotons of grenadiers which form an extra division on the right.

In this case the column is formed on the 2nd divison (pelotons and divisions are always counted from the right), so this division doesn't move. But it could be formed on any division: grenadiers, 1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th.

Just asking, hadn't the 1792 french battalion 9 companies so 9 peletons?

Yes, 8 companies of fusiliers, 1 company of grenadiers. For the manoeuvering, these were formed in 8 equalised pelotons of fusiliers and 1 (not equalised and – by regulation – weaker) peloton of grenadiers.

Two battalions. Usually, the two pelotons of grenadiers were to be united to form a division.

Therefore, the plate above from the regulation is wrong in so far as it shows the division of grenadiers in equal strength to the other divisions. As the guides are on the left, in the formed column depicted here, some files on the right of the front, grenadier, division should be missing, "demasking" some files on the right of the first fusilier division (which is the second of the column) behind it.

The divisons in this column are named (starting from the front):

division de grenadiers
1ère division
2e division
3e division
4e division

McLaddie wrote:

Are you saying that it means more? So if a battalion column [with a company front like that of the V Corps advance at Albuera] had sections organized within it to deploy on the center it would be an attack column, but if organized to deploy in the left or right it wouldn't be?

Absolutely correct.

Napoleonic battalions, of all nations, kept their companies in strict order to avoid confusion as they changed formation. A column of attack is purely a column where the leading division is the centre companies (from the left 3rd and 2nd), the next division is 4th and 1st and the rear division is voltigeur and grenadier.

A column of divisions could be formed "on the right" (which means led by its senior company, so divisions were 1st and grenadier, 3rd and 2nd, finally voltigeur and 4th), or "on the left" (which means led by its junior company so divisions were the same but in reverse order).

According to Napoleon's 1808 Decree, battalions would only operate by divisions if all 6 companies were present. If grenadiers or voltigeurs were detached then the battalion would form columns of companies, which could still form columns of attack by forming by half-companies (so with the voltigeurs deployed the column would be led by the 2nd coy, followed by half 3rd and half 1st companies, other half 3rd and 1st companies, half 4th and grenadiers, finally other half 4th and grenadiers).

The reason for the 1808 Decree was that battalions needed a minimum of three complete rows of divisions or companies in order to form square. Two divisions plus a loose company at the rear cannot form square. In this respect the Osprey's on British and French tactics have diagrams which are wrong, because no battalion commander would place himself in such a vulnerable position.

Rod

Hi Redcoat:

Concerning my comments about Paddy Griffith's French Napoleonic Infantry Tactics 1792-1815 and his section on L'ordre mixte , pages 22-23.

I have a great deal of respect for Paddy and he has written a number of great books on military history. However, his section on L'ordre mixte a great deal of innuendo and not a lot of accurate history. The section is three paragraphs in which he makes these points:

1st Paragraph:
He starts by noting that Bonaparte lodged the dubious claim that he originated L'ordre mixte, though Gilbert describes it in his works some thirty years before. He describes the formation as one used for protection against cavalry and gives the ‘prototype' as seen at Tagliamento in 1797.

So far so good, except that Bonaparte gives that instance [Tagliamento] as the example for his claim, even though the formation was seen a year before at Castiglione where Massena's entire division of demi-brigades were arrayed in that formation. So, after dinging Bonaparte for his claim, Paddy uses his example as the ‘classic' prototype, when it isn't…other than Bonaparte's ‘dubious claim.' Why not provide the real history of the formation instead of this anti-Bonaparte snipe, deserved or not?

In Paddy's own book, The Art of War of Revolutionary France, 1789 – 1802, he discusses L'ordre mixte [pages 219] where he says:

It is very likely that the widely-cited 1796-97 description of the L'ordre mixte as the recommended formation for a single demi-brigade is nothing more than an intellectualized shorthand which attempts [but fails] to describe the flexible practice common to all French armies well before 1796.

Later on page 221, after giving examples of the above, he says:

…so we can confidently dismiss the much-hyped idea of a special L'ordre mixte formation as merely a Bonapartist vanity that had no real substance apart from the pre-existing common practice that dates back at least to experimental manoeuvre camp held at Vaussieux (near Bayeux, Normandy) in 1778.

So why not give the 1778 origins and it's earlier uses?

2nd Paragraph:
Paddy goes directly to later 'variations" being "attempted", down to Macdonald's "monstrous column" at Wagram. He wrongly then says that Suchet's Division at Jean was in a similar column formation, completely closed off. It wasn't. Then he cites Ney's "grotesque" variation at Friedland, then noting Victor's Division used a highly conventional arrangement that might be seen as "sort of" a L'ordre mixte, but that "it is stretching the definition." So what do we have here? Attempted variations that are monstrous, grotesque or outside the definition, except for Suchet's division, which actually wasn't in such a column formation, but at least part of the time was in a ‘classic' L'ordre mixte array. This goes way beyond biased history, particularly in such a short time.

3rd Paragraph:
Paddy begins the third paragraph by stating "In practice, however, the whole idea of L'ordre mixte smacked of an over-theoretical solution." He then points out how weak the formation is against cavalry or and too vulnerable to artillery. He then states that Bonaparte continued to advocate L'ordre mixte throughout his wars, though few of his subordinates ‘seemed to have adopted it only when not directly under his eye." Then he states that Marshal Marmont was openly critical of Bonaparte's command of infantry tactics, which is supposed to suggest that Napoleon's support of L'ordre mixte was part of Marmont's criticisms… but Marmont didn't criticize Napoleon for advocating the mixed formation, so why did Paddy suggest that Marmont did?

What amazes me most is his notion that L'ordre mixte ‘smacked of an over-theoretical solution' after giving only the most extreme examples of it's use. Then later in the book he notes:

On page 24 he has a table that suggests that L'ordre mixte was only used 8% of the time. However, that is very misleading, even by his own statements. He found 226 accounts of infantry attacks and noted that 174 of the were in column, 19 in L'ordre mixte and 3 in skirmish order. However, he goes on to say that 148 attacks were in rough or narrow ground and/or 58 were against British troops, that is over half [65%], on ground that he says would recommend the use of columns. If you subtract that many column attacks from the total, on open ground you have 26 column attacks, 30 line attacks, and 19 L'ordre mixte which suggests something entirely different from 8%.

On page 28 he notes that General Desaix attacked in L'ordre mixte at Marengo. Then on page 42 writes this:

The weather had improved by the time of the battle of Friedland on 14 June, (the actual anniversary of Marengo), which started with a demonstration by a heavy skirmish screen. Then some of the old tactical virtuosity could be again be demonstrated, with a particular emphasis being placed on L'ordre mixte.

So now, tactical virtuosity is demonstrated by successfully using what he feels is a weak formation and 'overly-theoretical'? This isn't making much sense. Where did he get the ideas for his criticisms and why is now an example of virtuosity??

He mentions General Dupont's Division specifically. He doesn't mention the French use of the ‘classic' L'ordre mixte formation at Auerstadt, Aspern- Essling, as well as several instances in 1813 and 1814, [which he counted in his sample?] tEven the Allied nations used the L'ordre mixte: the British used the same formation successfully at Albuera 1811 [Myer's Brigade] and the Russians at Borodino 1812, and the Prussians established it as part of their Brigade array 1811.

It was hardly seen by Napoleonic military men as ‘an over-theoretical solution.‘ What is also surprising is that, according to the French, the last use of the L'ordre mixte, was the Guard attack at Waterloo in a line of open squares similar, but smaller than MacDonald's divisional square, front and back sections in line, the sides in column. The British describe them as columns, but then they might not have seen them as hollow squares. At this point in the battle, both the French and the British were concerned about roaming cavalry. The British formed up in 4 ranks, ready to form square. The aerial view of the Waterloo attack [plate E] is a waste of paper.

So, what do we have with the Osprey booklet concerning the L'ordre mixte? Instead of giving a clear picture of the origins and the typical uses of theL'ordre mixte, we have its use bursting forth in 1797 at Tagliamento as a ‘prototype' after being mentioned by Gilbert… and Napoleon is derided for claiming he created it. After that, the rest of the section is monstrous squares and Napoleon's lack of knowledge regarding infantry tactics…

All-in-all, I know that Paddy knew the real history, but instead presented a very skewed explanation of the L'ordre mixte, far from his own conclusions in his other works, primarily focused on Napoleon's dubious relationship to the formation, completely misrepresenting the formation's use and place in Napoleonic wars, let alone in the French lexicon of tactics.

There are other issues I have similar to this one, but that is my take on that section. I did hear that Paddy was not happy with the Osprey book, but not much beyond that.

Best Regards,

Bill Haggart.

Rod:

Thanks for the explanation. I take it that the plate Oliver S. shared is diagram of how a colonne par division would be formed as an attack column…

Bill H.

The internal disposition of both columns is important for deployment and unique to each.

I am writing from memory here but the 1791 Reglement describes a regiment of two battalions each consisting of eight fusilier companies (pelotons) and a grenadier company. The grenadier companies were often combined to form a division of their own, and detached to form grenadier battalions, though not always. They could be attached individually or as a division to any battalion to make nine or ten companies.

The battalion was divided into a right and left half-battalion (wing). The right half battalion consisted of 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th companies, the left half-battalion consisted of 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th companies. The 1st and 2nd companies formed the 1st division in each battalion, the 3rd and 4th companies the 2nd division, the 5th and 6th companies the 3rd division and finally, the 7th and 8th companies formed the 4th division. If present, the two grenadier companies formed a fifth division, as shown in Oliver Schmidt's post. I think that during the Napoleonic period the norm was probably an eight company battalion with grenadiers detached to form grenadier battalions. Let's forget about voltigeurs and six company battalions for the moment though the principles are the same.

The colonnes par divisions was formed from line on any one of the divisions with the 1st, or right, division, in front as per Oliver's picture from the Reglement. The colonne par divisions formed thus consisted of, front to rear, 1st division, 2nd division, 3rd division, and 4th division. Each peloton remained with its own division and would deploy back into line in the correct hierarchy.

The colonne d'attaque was formed on the centre two companies, with those two companies in front. In the case of an eight company battalion this would be 4th company 2nd division and 5th company 3rd division in front. When formed the colonne d'attaque consisted of the right half-battalion behind the 4th company 2nd division, and the left half-battalion behind 5th company 3rd division. The paired companies were all from different division and different half battalions, front to rear 5th and 4th, 6th and 3rd, 7th and 2nd and 8th and 1st bringing up the rear. The colonne d'attaque deployed into line to both left and right flank on the head, maintaining the hierarchy.

I think I have got it all in the right order though it is a little late. A picture is truly worth a thousand words.

Perhaps there is a need to consider Order Mixte as a concept rather than a specified formation. It fits in as a hybrid between Ordre profonde (deep) and ordre mince (thin)

Much of this thread is focused on how single battalions form and deploy columns by divisions on a flank or centre. The formation on the centre is generally accepted as needing to be in line first.

So what happens for a regiment of three battalions, a brigade of six or a division of twelve?
Do you need to deploy the division into line before forming the battalions into columns on the centre?

Do you form each battalion on the centre then operate as a line of battalion columns or do you form a column of battalion columns. In the latter case is a Division (ie 12 battalions) formed into column by the centre or right in front even if the battalions are columns on the centre?
If formed on the centre then youu have the left wing of the first line in front of the left wing or the second line and ditto for the right wing.

Confused? then what also happens to the Division, it can get confused by the choices.

The column on the centre had is proponents and opponents probably because handling single battalions was similar for both column on the centre and column by the flank but for larger formations columns by the flank were easier to manage. As a division would march on the road right(or left) in front it would be easier to form the battalions into column lead by the rightmost peleton or division.

I also think understanding when and why closed, half and full distances were used, is just as important to understanding the attack column in all of its variety.

Bottom Dollar wrote:

I also think understanding when and why closed, half and full distances were used, is just as important to understanding the attack column in all of its variety.

Absolutely agree. The problem is that you cannot rely on drill books alone for this, because they are a little like a cookery book, giving you all the possible menus, but you might use one hundreds of times and some not at all. The best solution is to cross-reference the drill books with contemporary memoirs to find out what troops actually did, but I personally have a problem with this for French since I only have about a dozen memoirs of French (or their close allies using their drill books), of which only a few are infantry. If it was British it would be another story since I have more than 100 contemporary British accounts from the Napoleonic Wars.

In respect of the question my views are based on "tactical logic" (ie what would be sensible, but this is not necessarily what was actually done).

I would suggest that during the Napoleonic era full distance columns would only be used for non-tactical route marches or possibly for manoevring at the rear of the battlefield, but never when there was any enemy cavalry threat.

Half distance columns (whether on a division or company frontage) would be used for most battlefield movement, because square can be formed in no more than 20 seconds from that formation. The French liked its internal layout to be in the "column of attack" structure so that it could form line to both flanks simultaneously. Half distance columns could also form line whilst still moving forward by using a diagonal march at a faster pace by the rear companies.

Close columns (colonne serre) would be used if it was actually intended to attack in column (eg into a breach in a fortress, into a town, across a bridge or into a defile). The French sometimes attacked in the open in this formation. The problem with it is that, although it could form square as fast as a half distance column, these were relatively immobile solid squares, which were not a good formation to be in if under infantry or artillery fire. It could also only form line when halted.

Most of what I have said above is certainly true for the British (and I have plenty of extracts from memoirs to substantiate it), except that they preferred moving in quarter distance columns because this facilitated their 2 rank companies to form 4 rank squares.

Rod

@ McLaddie,

>Thanks for the explanation. I take it that the plate Oliver S. shared is diagram of how a colonne par division would be formed as an attack column<

No! It is not a colonne d'attaque. It is a colonne par divisions. Oliver's illustration does not represent an attack column (colonne d'attaque). The two terms, as I mentioned before, are specific ones from the 1791 reglement to describe two different columns. Both columns could be used as attacking options, or more properly for the advance to contact where, if necessary, they'd deploy. But so could a colonne par peletons.

Oliver's is actually the second illustration of three showing how to form a closed column of divisions from line. The first is "a battalion forming in close column by divisions behind its right". Oliver's illustration shows "a battalion forming in closed column on an internal division". The third illustration shows "a battalion forming in close column in front of its left.". In every case the divisions (see my post above) are not disturbed and the column is formed with its right in front.

The colonne d'attaque is a different column entirely, formed behind the two centre peletons OF THE LINE (emphasis – not shouting!). The column consisted of pairs of peletons from different divisions.

A colonne d'attaque was only formed with the centre in front. This enabled it to deploy on its centre to both flanks at once.

Furthermore, the colonne d'attaque could only be formed from line, by throwing back the right and left wings (half battalions) as previously described.

Colonnes par divisions, on the other hand could also be formed from colonnes par pelotons, by the simple expedient of having even numbered peletons advance and take position alongside the peloton to its front.

Maybe the following makes the differences clearer, the front of the pelotons, represented by their numbers, is always to the top of this page:

In line, the 8 pelotons of a battalion will stand one beside the other, the first peloton on the right:

8-7-6-5-4-3-2-1

The colonne d 'attaque (1791 reglement, batallion school, §§. 663-673) had the pelotons always arranged in the following order:

5-4
6-3
7-2
8-1

The colonne serrée par division (1791 reglement, batallion school, §§. 71-107), regardless of how it was formed in detail, had as a result the pelotons arranged in either this order (la droite en tête = the right to the front):

2-1
4-3
6-5
8-7

or in this one (la gauche en tête = the left to the front):

8-7
6-5
4-3
2-1

A simple colonne par peloton (e.g. 1791 reglement, batallion school, §§. 47-56) looked either like this (la droite en tête):

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

or like this (la gauche en tête):

8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Hope this helps.

Yes, that helps.

Rod MacArthur wrote:

"Close columns (colonne serre) would be used if it was actually intended to attack in column (eg into a breach in a fortress, into a town, across a bridge or into a defile). The French sometimes attacked in the open in this formation. The problem with it is that, although it could form square as fast as a half distance column, these were relatively immobile solid squares, which were not a good formation to be in if under infantry or artillery fire. It could also only form line when halted."

My understanding is that the French saw particular merit in the close column "en masse" later in the Napoleonic Wars. I forget the specific batttle, but I think the Young Guard used it with success for the first time, the "newness" being the deployment into line by--first halting--then having the rearward ranks simply face to the "right or left flank" then marching out from behind the leading first line and then turning to the right or left flank. I don't know, but my impression seems pretty clear that this was innovative for them at least in the sense that they hadn't "cooked up" that maneuver from the regulations yet at least in close proximity to the enemy.

As you say, I agree that it was liked b/c it was very good against cavalry b/c the entire formation was basically in solid square and the French were probably outmatched by enemy cavalry on battlefields in later years However, I suspect that it was highly vulnerable to artillery fire, especially of the grand battery type, and perhaps it wasn't used much or an alternative was sought when they knew it would face lots of artillery. The other possibility is that against infantry whose musket accuracy and/or morale was in question it may have been excellent too. One could also imagine a deployment into line and then relatively quickly back into close column depending on the circumstances and/or General de Brigades/Divisions fiddling with their deployment distances, full, ½ etc… depending on their proximity to enemy artillery, cavalry, etc… and the training, quality of their troops. I further suspect that when the troops that composed it were willing and well disciplined, it could be fearsome even when opposed by artillery. So advantages being excellent against cavalry and infantry of the ordinary type. Disadvantages being poor against artillery, especially massed artillery and its vulnerability to cavalry when deploying into line.

But yes, I also see your earlier point, and after looking at some deployment maps that have been floating around here, I totally agree that as a rule the French looked to deploy EVEN the close column en masse, i.,e of Brigades or Divisions with enough room to deploy into line when necessary. But all of that is not to say they would've preferred it to more sophisticated formations with higher quality troops, such as troops that could maneuver well at 1/2 and full distances with ease.

Some further thoughts… perhaps the French saw a certain versatility in the deployment into line from close columns of Brigades/Divisions. Such as they might have felt comfortable deploying it into a single line or a supported/double line (I know another thread of debate there).

For instance, the deployment into line may have looked like this. Let's assume a 4 battalion brigade and yes, I know this is not on the center.

From:

1
2
3
4

To:

1 2
3 4

Or:

2 1
3 4

Or

2 1 3

4

Or simply

4 2 1 3

In all cases, I could see them staggering the deployment of battalions to the right and left in order to immediately start creating separation. And I know the above is not technically a deployment on the center or an "attack column" per se. With Brigade or Divisional attack columns formed on the center, might they not have attempted to deploy into a full single line ? Rather only sending some of the supporting "divisions" to the firing line while holding others back ? All possible because the order was simply a left or right face turn by the ranks, followed by a march to uncover themselves and then another right or left face turn? Basically, the simplicity of the maneuver allowed them to find an alternative to the regulation "attack column" based on the center ? Might it also be assumed that once the deployment into any line formation was made, responsibility for going into square was left to the individual battalion and it was in that attempt to gain room for battalion squares where they were the most vulnerable to attack by enemy cavalry.

XV Brigada wrote:
Oliver's is actually the second illustration of three showing how to form a closed column of divisions from line.

Understood.

So, as Oliver describes it:

The colonne d 'attaque (1791 reglement, batallion school, §§. 663-673) had the pelotons always arranged in the following order:

5-4
6-3
7-2
8-1

While the diagram he shared has the column formed from five divisions:

Grenadiers
1st
2nd
3rd
4th

Which has the far right division, the grenadiers, in front. This column would normally deploy to the left of the Grenadier division.

I think I've got it. Thanks for your patience.

So, after the change to six company battalions, the attack column would have the five companies,[the voltigeurs being out] arranged on the center company [a battalion column]with the companies behind stacked by half companies so it could deploy on the center like so:

33
42
42
51
51

Correct?

Bill H.

I thought someone here said, "You can't have a line hanging in the wind" when forming square which is what happens if you use

Gren
1st
2nd
3rd
4th

Unless of course your closed rather than halved and then it wouldn't matter. I sense that after the change to 6 companies, the French uses regimental attack columns centered on the right front and left front of the respective battalions with the voltigeurs and grenadiers out skirmishing. Or the they used individual columns par divisions either at half or close distance with or without the elite companies out skirmishing.

Therefore, at Waterloo for the :

1er and 2e Bataillons, 1er Régiment de Grenadiers (Old Guard)
1280 (41 officers, 1239 men)

One possibly could have seen an advance with a deployment as such…

1st co./ 1 er ---1st co/2e
2nd co/ 1 er----2nd co/2e
3rd co/1 er---- 3rd co/2e
4th co/1 er---- 4th co/2e

Almost certainly halved.

Or possibly if advancing by square

1st/1er--1st/2e
2/-----------2/
1er----------2e
3/------------3/
1er-----------2e
4th/1er--4th/2e

PS if a square was advancing I'm guessing the colors, officers, etc… were on the inside ? From without, that almost definitely would've looked like a near solid column, yes ? Of course, they may have done a similar thing by battalion, and without a doubt the Guard had the full range of tactical versatility at their finger tips. Not for nothing that Nappie held them in reserve.

Bottom Dollar said:

I thought someone here said, "You can't have a line hanging in the wind" when forming square which is what happens if you use

Gren
1st
2nd
3rd
4th

There was no problem in forming a hollow square from a column of 5 companies at half distance as above. The grenadiers halted to form the front face of the square, 1st, 2nd and 3rd companies split into two and wheeled outwards by half companies to form the sides of the square, 4th company marched forward (12 paces if they were a typical 90 man company) and about faced to form the rear of the square.

This drill needs a minimum of three complete lines of troops, but it does not matter whether they are divisions, companies or half companies. Two and a half lines (as in two divisions with a spare company at the rear) does not work and cannot form square without first reforming into a column on a single company frontage.
Rod

Yes, it makes sense now that splitting would've been an option for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd companies, but I suspect that may have been attempted only with well trained troops, especially if they were in a close column to begin with and wanted to form a hollow square.

Bottom Dollar wrote:

Yes, I guess splitting would've been an option for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd companies, but I suspect that may have been attempted only with well trained troops, especially if they were in a close column to begin with and wanted to form a hollow square.

It is not a question of it being an option. Troops could only perform the drills they were trained in, and these would be those in the drill books.

The standard drill in the 1791 French regulations for forming squares from open column was to close to half distance (if they were not already in that formation) then form exactly as I have described, always splitting each row of divisions (in a column of divisions) or splitting each company (in a column of companies) apart from the first and last in the column.

From a close column (cologne serre) the column just halted and the outer files of each side faced outwards, with a few centre files squeezing into the gaps between ranks on each side to make it tighter (because the distance between ranks was greater than that between files).

The British 1792 regulations had identical drills for forming from open column to hollow square, with the variation that forming 4 rank squares from 2 rank lines meant that the column needed to be at quarter distance, the front of the square was formed by the first two companies, the rear by the last two and the sides by splitting each middle company into quarters, which wheeled outwards, the outer quarters forming the first two ranks of the sides and the inner quarters forming the rear two ranks. The British drill needed a minimum of five complete rows of troops, and since the light companies were invariably detached into brigade light battalions, the British almost always operated columns with a single company frontage.

The British drill for forming close columns into solid squares was identical to the French (as was the Prussian). Close columns could not form hollow squares.

Rod

Rod,

OK. Would they split the companies when forming into square from line ? For instance with a line deployment of:

4th--3rd--2nd--1st--Gren

How would they form a hollow square or might they form a pentagon ? Would they still split the companies to make it a 4 sided rectangle ?

BD

There's a difference between a cook book and a menu is my point. If it was all in the drill books why were the French marshals constantly issuing specific tactical instructions ? Moreover, the close column divisional and brigade deployment into line that D'Erlon attempted at Waterloo, were those in the Regulations ?

Also, part of what I meant by options was if there's a battalion deployed in companies as such:

Gren
1st
2nd
3rd
4th

Might they not close up forming a solid rather than a hollow square ?

If they had a little time, might the commander not open the column to full and then deploy a hollow pentagon if desired without splitting the companies ?

Or were they entirely constrained by the drill manual ? The manual said split the companies/divisions so that they must do ?