"Panther vs Sherman" Topic

Who needs real life when you can prove the theory with toy tanks on a tabletop?

Connard you old charmer, may I respectfully remind you that the original poster, Armand, was actually also enquiring about how the problem is resolved 'with toy tanks on a tabletop'?

Dont necessarily disagree tuscaloosa however he was not the only one with such access and information. As stated even he concedes that German gunners continued to fire on Shermans which had been disabled until they eventually caught fire. I feel it just a bit dishonest he talks about how many were burnt or destroyed but fails to mention the multiple hits these tanks suffered.

As I said he was not the only one with such information yet with all the books, memoirs and official studies no other single source I can remember has even approached the level of anti-Sherman rhetoric that Mr Cooper does. As stated elsewhere here his book must be taken with a grain of salt.

Much better or more comprehensive studies are out there and they bring some of the allegations into dispute. A much more balanced review and approach can be found int Steven Zaloga's recent book "Armored Thunderbolt: The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II."

And by the way Mr Cooper was not the divisional maintenance officer but rather a Lt in the maintenance battalion of Combat Command B assigned as a liason for vehicle repair.

Some quick reflections on a great discussion from a lurker deep into research about WW2 tank warfare at the moment…

- the Sherman WAS more liklely to brew than the Cromwell or Churchill, and by a distinct margin. Buckley, in the book already cited, has the statistics. He says operational analysis never completely nailed the 'Ronson' factor on Shermans, but there is a strong suggestion that it was to do with the ignition of cordite in stowed ammunition. The British made tanks stowed their ammo lower in the hull.

- Von Luck criticised the Panther as being too tall for the Normandy country, having too long a gun barrel, and weak flank/rear armour. I would add the issue of situational awareness. I have been in a Panther as part of my research, and the commander's station is VERY well designed. However the other turret crew have no hatches (except the rear escape one) and even the two men in the hull have a very limited field of view. In other words, if the commander was hurt, or distracted, that tank was in grave danger – all the more so in close country. The Sherman loader / wireless op provided a second pair of eyes + ears outside the turret.

- some stats cited earlier about 20% losses are too high. I have done detailed research on one British tank battalion that landed on 7th June and fought until VE Day in Germany. They had 84 fatalities during those 11 months, 53 of them in the Normandy battles. They landed with around 830 officers and men. So the deaths for the whole NWE campaign equate to about 10% of that original strength (but note: of course some men changed during those months, and some of those deaths were not men on tank crews).

- the statistics cited earlier (Jarymowcz's book Tank tactics) suggest 18% of German tanks were abandonned and 20.7% destoyed by their own crews. 'Tank fright' or indeed 'Jabo fright' existed in all armies, and quite a lot of German tanks were evidently left in working order by their own panicked crews.

If I had to make a choice, and boy I am glad that I don't have to fight as those guys did, I would have taken a Sherman Firefly to Normandy rather than a Panther.
EC

EC – the modifications made to the Sherman (wet stowage, applique armour over the vulnerable spots) produced a significant reduction in "The Ronson effect", so Buckley seems on the right track.

"Buckley, in the book already cited, has the statistics. He says operational analysis never completely nailed the 'Ronson' factor on Shermans, but there is a strong suggestion that it was to do with the ignition of cordite in stowed ammunition. The British made tanks stowed their ammo lower in the hull"

This is precisely why the wet stowage Shermans were more successful. Analysis after the war showed the water filled ammo storage racks, from which the wet comes from, had no appreciable effect on preventing fires/explosion. However what did matter was on the wet stowage Shermans the rounds were moved lower and no longer in the side sponsons (reason why you dont see applique armor plates on the sides of wet stowage Shermans).

Not water, glycerine and water; it didn't totally prevent the ammo from exploding but it slowed the process to give the crews a few extra precious seconds to bail out.

Originally water. About 10-15 percent glycerine was added to prevent the water from freezing in the racks. Glycerine burns quite well by the way. And once again tests by the Army after the war showed no appreciable protection provided by the rack design.

– some stats cited earlier about 20% losses are too high. I have done detailed research on one British tank battalion that landed on 7th June and fought until VE Day in Germany. They had 84 fatalities during those 11 months, 53 of them in the Normandy battles. They landed with around 830 officers and men. So the deaths for the whole NWE campaign equate to about 10% of that original strength (but note: of course some men changed during those months, and some of those deaths were not men on tank crews).

I think you are trying to compare apples and oranges here. That 20% fatality rate was given in relation to the crew of a knocked out tank.

How many tanks did that battalion have knocked out in the same period as they lost those 83 men as fatalities?

Griefbringer,
yes, I take your point. I would have to do the work on tank casualties versus people.
EC