"Infantry company question" Topic

Just a quick question. There were 10 companies per regiment on both sides. I thought I'd read somewhere on here that thye tried to keep the companies the same size, even accounting for unequal losses, because if they weren't the drill wouldn't work right. Is this correct? I've tossing around an idea for basing…

No. The sizes of companies were not 'equalized' as any general rule. If a company became TOO small they might fold it into another one though. If you see that as equalizing' then okay. There are many account of companies with 40's and another with 14 etc etc

Don

Yes, in combat companies were equalised. However, administratively they were not. So a soldier of company A will mess with company A, but if company A is much stronger than company B he may find himself move over to that company tactically. Without equalising the whole system of tactics ("drill") falls apart.

See this example, where the 5th NY "tells off" within canister range: link

Another example is the 3rd Maine at Gettysburg. They carried 210 men and officers on the books as present for duty, and administratively kept them in their assigned companies. However, in the field, for combat, etc, they reorganized as 5 companies.

Note too, that there was, at any one time, between 10% and 20% of a unit detached for "other" reasons. Brigade staff, teamsters, provost marshall, medical orderly, etc. The army didn't have permanent staff for all these needs, so simply drew men from the regiments within each brigade to form ad hoc staffing, et al.

You will find that this shows up when researching actual strengths of units in battles when compared with the muster rolls. There are almost always a lower number in the field than on the returns, and the ad hoc staffs are the primary reason for this.

67thtigers,you state that "without equalising the whole system of tactics … falls apart." Could you please elaborate and give an example. Thanks.

Sorry, 67th, I hadn't read the last sentence in your message. The account quoted does indeed state that the 5th NY equalized its companies. I had never come across that practice before and I still don't understand why it would be necessary. Counting off, of course, would be necessary, but many times in reenactments I've drilled in multi-company battalions with unequal companies and encountered no difficulty in marching or changing formation. What reason do you see for equalizing?

William,

As an ACW reenactment battalion commander with many, many hours of drilling under my belt, I can say that the period tactics (drill) work BETTER if the companies are of equal size. It's not absolutely essential, but it does work better. Many of the manuevers in the manuals assume equal sized companies and if you do them with companies of significantly different sizes it will call for a lot more dressing of the lines than would be needed otherwise.

Also it looks prettier :)

I think it's interesting that regardless of the paper strength of the unit, they would maintain a standard micro-tactical unit throughout, i.e. a 40 man company. One might argue that therefore miniature stand size should remain the same regardless of regimental/battalion strength.

"One might argue that therefore miniature stand size should remain the same regardless of regimental/battalion strength."

It really depends on the scale of the action you are portraying. If a stand is a brigade as in some grand rules, the company is irrelevant. At the other extreme, man on man skirmish level, the size of a company will make a difference. I generally game at a regimental level where a stand is a company. So I don't vary the size of the company, but vary the number of companies (stands) to represent different sized regiments. Not exactly correct, but works at the scale of action I generally play (10mm regimental). However, if it is bothering you, remember there is always some level of abstraction unless you model ever man in every conceivable pose. Otherwise, said man might be in the wrong position in a given formation or point in the drill.

From what I read the more common practice was for a battalion commander to balance his line. He may reassign companies line positions based upon strength. He may then "divisionalize" weak companies, placing them together on the field to act as one company. Several regiments did converge companies particularly in '64. I have read of some regiments being only 3 companies.
The biggest point of reorganization was early in the war when the 15 company regiments where reduced to 10 companies.
This is all from the the Federal side, not really sure what those other people did.

To the re-enactor practice of Counting Off for each formation. This was usually only done during the first couple of days of training. After that each man knew is position and who stood around him. If men were lost or missing the soldiers knew where to move to cover up. Only if a company would be completely reorganized would there ever be a need to re-count. Since re-enactors don't stand in ranks on a daily bases and each time the do the guy next to them changes – there is more of a need to reorganize.

Hmm…

Well, I asked because I've been rethinking my previous basing idea of 10mm=33m=100 troops. It sounds good on paper and even when based up, the only problem is playing with them. When a regiment of 300 men is only 30mm and 100m in frontage is creates a lot of problems in showing terrain. It's just too small. If I was doing something mroe permanant then maybe I would continue on this way, but it doesn't seem like any set-up of this sort would be very transportable. One alternative would be to play on detailed, painted maps, but I'm not sure if I want to go that route.

Thus, I was thinking of going back to just basing up for Black Powder. It'd still look impressive on the table, as I'll have the same number of figs on the table- 6000+. So, I was thinking of using 5 bases for each regiment, but keeping my current breakdowns of 20mm, 30mm, 40mm, 50mm increments, which had previously represented regiments of those strengths (200, 300, 400, 500…). This way I could avoid rebasing. I think it would probably still work, and is something I'm kicking around. That's the problem when playing a scale that no one else does. You need to go around inventing new ways of doing things!

If you're going to fight battalions, then you're already thinking in tactical increments, so why water it down with small, medium and large regiments. Let the increments speak for themselves.

For instance, are there any grand tactical ACW games which deploy all brigades with an equal number of stands regardless of brigade strength, varying only the number of figs per stand ?

"If you're going to fight battalions, then you're already thinking in tactical increments, so why water it down with small, medium and large regiments. Let the increments speak for themselves."

In ACW terms a battalion/regiment (they are interchangeable) can be anywhere from under 100 men to over 1200 men.

So, better to have 1 battalion of 5 stands with 1 fig per stand and another battalion of 5 stands with 10 figs per stand… on the same table ? Or a 1 stand battalion with a 10 stand battalion on the same table ?

The more interchangeable choice is obvious to me.

Well…

My original idea was to have each stand be a regiment of varying size, from 16 figs representing 200 actual combatants in line (2 ranks) and up. Each stand would have its own standard and represent a regiment within a brigade. The problem is that if you use such a small groundscale something like Devils Den becomes the size of a half dollar on the map- check it out online. The wheatfield becomes about half the size of a dollar bill. Thats what happens when you use 30mm as 100m of frontage in an ACW game. There's just too much abstraction involved. You might as well literally count difficult terrain as part of the combat roll… an idea I've toyed with. It also makes creating terrain very difficult, as you have a massive amount of features to model in a very compressed way. As I said, at the scale I mentioned I would be better off using a painted map. This isn't just a problem for me, actually, but for any brigade level set of rules.

The second idea I had was to use the same number of bases (5) for all regiments but have the sub-bases change size. The advantages of this are a) I don't have to rebase 1000 (or 6000) figs and b) I can have the standards stay centered in the units. Off-center standards kill me.

BD does have a good point though- it seems a bit smarter to have a standardized base size and then construct units from those. I'd standardize them at either 40mm or 60mm, 32 or 48 figs per base. Then I'd constuct the units from these. This was, for those following my project on here, the original idea, back before I started thinking about doing whole armies at 12:1, which would basically be using my 3mm figs as smaller 25mm figs, which was the exact opposite of my original-original plan, which was to do really big units, 3:1 and up…

I'd base them by company. That way you never have to rebase again. That or mount them individually on magnets. Rebasing anything should be a high war games crime.

Sorry I'm a bit late on this one guys but just to confirm:

"For manoeuvring, the companies of the battalion will always be equalised, by transferring men from the strongest to the weakest companies."

Formation of the Battalion, Item 11 – Hardee

Exactly the same wording in Casey and in the 1863 US Infantry Tactics.

All close order drill armies had this throughout the Horse and Musket era. The Napoleonic French and British (for example) even had it done as soon as a unit was pulled out of the line, even in the middle of a battle.

It really was that important in avoiding confusion during formation changes and manoeuvring a battalion.

Trajanus,thanks for that information. The evidence is growing clearer. They used a standard size micro-tactical unit. Why should a war game be any different ? If a regiment had 200 split between 10 companies, prior to battle they consolidated into 5 micro-tactical units of 40. That way a commanding officer such as a brigadier or division commander knew his relative strength at a glance… without having to say to himself hmmmm…that rather large company plus those 2 average sized companies plus those 3 scrawny companies might be worth 1/2 a battalion. In part that was the reason, I would argue. There was probably also a functional combat componenet in the need to be able to readily and quickly assign all units of a given type to all possible combat roles for that type . For instance, a brigadier rides up to a regimental commander and says "Deploy your two flank companies forward to the skirmish line." The regimental commander doesn't want to say, "Well, sir, I can do that, but my two flank companies are down to 10 men apiece." Consolidation --equalization--was part of making sure everyone was on the same page prior to the maelstrom. Now we play a tactical game, but there is no micro-tactical unit, just small, medium and large regiments. The player scans the table top and sees some regiments made up of 2 figs components, some of 3 figs, some with 4 and maybe some with 5. Now he has a visual impediment to digest, more mental gymnastics to perform even before understanding his own relative strength. Now throw in understanding the RB on top of that and what your opponent might be doing. Now throw in the bias of a CBT which favors the firepower of large regiments. You get a brigade force of 1500 facing an enemy brigade force of 1500. Equal ? No. Why ? Because you get stuck with the force made up of 5 regiments with 3 figs per stand facing a brigade force 3 regiments with 5 figs per stand and no recourse to delivering anything but 12 fig attacks. It's for the same reason, I would argue, that they equalized units in the field.

Good Points there BD.

It must have been a lot easier for a Brigade commander to view the amount ground he had to cover (frontage wise) if his Regiments (or what was left of them) were in well ordered blocks.

Also moving things about was much easier to visualize if you could see five equal elements moving in field column you would have a much clearer idea of how wide a line they could form into than an unequal ten company straggle.

Wargames wise, I think I catch your drift but isn't using a rule set that fires and takes hits on a stand by stand basis the way out of that one? Or am I missing something?

I'm not sure if you're missing something, but if a game fires and takes hits on a stand by stand basis, then my 3 fig stands are at a distinct disadvantage to your 5 figs stands in terms of both FP and morale even if my total number of figs equals yours.

I understand that games can still work and be fun and have a realistic feel even if they don't use a standardized base size. But my griping about it stems from not only the fact that the actual armies used them, BUT ALSO from a practical hobbyist standpoint. In miniature games design, I think the FIRST thing a designer should decide upon is a standardized base size. For instance, GdB has two. 6 figs and 8 figs. Why? And don't tell b/c well the Russian had large companies. So, what ? Even with 6 figs stand 8 fig stands you're not getting complete accuracy. Standardize, like the did in the field and you'll have more historical accuracy than if you try and finesse paper differences between the French and the Russians. What were the field strengths of Russian to French companies over time and through a campaign or several campaigns? Enough to justify prescribing that in the building and painting of armies that one should be 6 figs and the other 8 figs?
I don't get it. Miniature war gamers like to make additional work for themselves, myself included. Anyway, war gamer designers should arrive at some kind of consensus. Hah ! That'll be the day.

I think the FIRST thing a designer should decide upon is a standardized base size

Agreed!

However, they could do it on a decent scale frontage rather than worry about the actual number of figures involved. Frontage was standard across armies and periods. You can't get men closer together than touching elbows, so all that's needed is the number of men you want your base width to represent.

At that point you pick a number, around 24"-28" per man was common, multiply up and there's your stand width. Stands to equal companies – no problem.

At least in the Civil War you don't need to worry about representing a difference of two or three rank units for the opposing sides.

Anyway, war gamer designers should arrive at some kind of consensus

And then how would they sell rules? :o)

"At least in the Civil War you don't need to worry about representing a difference of two or three rank units for the opposing sides."

And the best way, IMHO, to handle that would be to have a single rank of figures maybe 3 wide for Napoleonics which are then stacked 2 or 3 deep according to preference, but the only place I've ever seen that done is in the ACW w/ regimental F & F ? Go figure and I give up :)

Trajanus, I find it odd that in all the accounts I've read from "rank and file" in the ACW I've never seen this practice mentioned among infantry. Of course that means absolutely nothing: It may not have happened to the writers' units, or the writers may simply have thought it wasn't worth mentioning. However I do think the idea that unusually weak companies may have been paired up is an equally good explanation.

Anyone have links where I can read up on this being actually done?

Bill N,

You raise a good point here. My knowledge of first hand accounts is far better in the Napoleonic period than the Civil War and its not well mentioned in those either. There a good number of recorded instances of it being done though.

There again neither are things like marching with the Regiment 'left or right, in front'. Those present would have known if the 1st Coy or the 10th Coy was leading at any point when stepping off but its not generally recorded.

It remains a puzzle and frustration that in both periods there are regular daily practices that we know went on from higher sources but the boots on the ground never mention. One can only assume that these were such a routine part of military life that authors never bothered with them.

This may be particularly so when the routine matter was being done to the author, rather than him being the one doing it to others. Its that 'same old, same old' feeling.

I find it odd that in all the accounts I've read from "rank and file" in the ACW I've never seen this practice mentioned among infantry.

Bill N.~

Some narratives of combat equalizing have been mentioned above.

See this example, where the 5th NY "tells off" within canister range: link

Another example is the 3rd Maine at Gettysburg. They carried 210 men and officers on the books as present for duty, and administratively kept them in their assigned companies. However, in the field, for combat, etc, they reorganized as 5 companies.

I think there needs to be some context. Equalizing was such a common practice in simplifying maneuver etc. that it wouldn't be mentioned anymore than a modern unit calling for an equipment check or ammo count. Equalizing had been done since at least the SYW and is mentioned in all the treatises and regulations.

How it is mentioned gives you some idea of how conventional and expected it was. Hardee's work is mentioned, and quoted in a previous post, and Casey was basicially an extended copy of Hardee. Equalizing is instructed in just two sentences, #18 in the first chapter of 76 points. There is no explanation of how to do it, unlike some of the practices outlined in excrutiating detail, such as #73

The command attention is pronounced at the top of the voice, dwelling on the last syllable.

The instruction to equalize is always given in any instructions before maneuvers are described, and by reading them you can see that the expectation is that each division or company will be of equal size.

Darrow's 1821 version of Scott's Militia Tactics notes that the division/company sargeant does the honors, but again no instructions, though other things, like 'sizing' the battalion is explained.

What I find fascinating, and encouraging, is that when we know what methods were used by military men to move large numbers of men in combat, the system is always regularized and done with simplicity in mind. Two great qualities when thinking of designing wargame rules to model them.

Bill H.

Thanks Bill,

Here's another:

It seems that the 115th is not forgotten entirely, from the fact that we have received quite an accession to our numbers; about 165 conscripts or substitutes were added to our Regiment a few days since. These were proportioned so as to equalize the different companies. "H" received 23 good stalwart fellows

From the 115TH New York – Beaufort, S. C. November 20th, 1863.

Trajanus-I don't think allocating new recruits between companies on a permanent basis is quite the same thing as temporarily re-allocating troops between companies prior to combat.

I know that equalizating was done in prior eras, and that it was part of prior manuals, so I would not be surprised if it was REGULARLY done in the ACW. It just wasn't mentioned in any accounts I'd read that were written by infantryment. Knowing of it now it might be easy to spot signs of it in future readings. Oh, and Bill, I do recall reading accounts of Vietnam where they do mention doing equipment checks.

I would be surprised if men were routinely transferred from one company to another. The volunteer companies were often recruited from the same village or town. The men in the companies were friends and neighbors and relatives even before they developed any comradeship within the unit. I think most men would strongly resent being transferred away from their own company and most officers were probably smart enough to know that. And we should remember that the strengths of the companies would be changing constantly and not just downward. Men did return from the hospital or furlough or detached duty, so the strengths did go up as well as down. I would guess that men stayed in their own companies, camped, ate and marched with them. But for drill or battle, the companies would be equalized or consolidated as necessary.

It may have also been a point of company, regimental or officer pride to not report it. When companies were consolidated, it meant company CO's were not commanding a company, but a sub-section of a company. For the men in the ranks, they were still fighting with their company buddies and their company CO was probably directly in charge of them anyway, no matter how small the number. As it was probably the senior company commanders and/or regimental officers who were in charge of consolidated companies, the system worked effectively b/c the command hierarchy was still in place albeit with reduced numbers, in some cases severely reduced numbers.

After reading through some of the Confederate Antietam reports here, it's amazing that consolidation wasn't mentioned:

antietam.aotw.org

(Very cool site, BTW)

Early's Brigade report is particularly interesting b/c he mentions picking up fragments of whole brigades some number 100 or 200 men and incorporating them into his brigade line as separate entities, but doesn't mention consolidation.

I've always wondered how the Irish Brigade fought at Gettysburg as it had one small regiment and 4 very small one's. I think some of the regiments were already administratively reduced in terms of company numbers but here are the numbers.

Second ("Irish") Brigade (532)
Col. PATRICK KELLY
28th Massachusetts, Col. R. Byrnes (224)
63d New York (two companies), Lieut. Col. Richard C. Bentley, Capt. Thomas Touhy (75)
69th New York (two companies), Capt. Richard Moroney, Lieut. James J. Smith (75)
88th New York (two companies), Capt. Denis F. Burke (90)
116th Pennsylvania (four companies), Maj. St. Clair A. Mulholland (98)

From some of the descriptions I've read of their attack, the brigade appeared to attack as a SINGLE unit or battalion and had great success in driving Kershaw off the Stony Hill. I think a Confederate identified it as a single line with emerald flags out front and admired their precision of line. I can only see that fitting if the Irish Brigade went in as a single combat battalion. Would be interesting to know how and if they consolidated before going into action. It may have been such an integral part of going into battle or conducting drill, that it wasn't reported and undoubtedly it wasn't always necessary.

PS Others who have been to Gettysburg can confirm this, but I remember viewing the Irish Brigade monuments on Stony Hill and thinking how close they were… pretty much side by side. I wondered how that was possible or historically accurate given there were 5 regiments, but now it makes me think they possibly put all the flags in the center under a consolidated color guard/company.

Nope. Just the 63rd, 69th and 88th NY were specifically consolidated and their monuments are near each other. All three regimental reports note this and perhaps their flags were consolidated into a single color guard ? Perhaps the fact that it was an administrative consolidation explains the openness in the reports as opposed to a pre-battle combat consolidation which never seems to get reported ?

I'm still left with questions about how many companies the 28th had and how many men the 116th actually had. Why they would've consolidated 3 regiments, only to add another regiment of less than a 100 men ?

So, three small battalions 224,240 and 98. How they went formed into battle is another question. They were a single line according to the reports with Col. Patrick Kelly in command.

The official Gettysburg National Park Map only shows I believe the Irish Brigade monument, but aren't there individual monuments as well for the 69th, 63rd and 88th ? That I can't remember.

Anyway, for another day…

Oh, and Bill, I do recall reading accounts of Vietnam where they do mention doing equipment checks.

Bill N.

Yep, probably just as often as equalizing. ;-j As equalizing was a technical term, when they say they equalized the companies with new recruits, the process and goal was the same as battle. It was done when needed.

Bill H.

Trajanus-I don't think allocating new recruits between companies on a permanent basis is quite the same thing as temporarily re-allocating troops between companies prior to combat

Well not the same but that quote shows equalizing was always on the agenda and done at two levels. This being the first, as might be expected, when new drafts arrived you had to spread them where they were most needed or sooner or later a company or more would just cease to exist. Equalizing before a fight is secondary but no less important.

Scott has made some good points about the nature of companies in the Civil War. The fact that they often were created from men from the same area and in the early war from drill teams, meant that they had a fairly unique position in army history.

We know that post battle some were reduced to 20 or less personal on occasions but they retained their identity because the company stayed as an administrative and mess unit. It was only for fighting (and battle maneuverability) that they formed with other units.

Also we need to remember that equalizing wasn't by pure head count it was by file. You may have shifted 16 men but in counting you shifted 8 files.

I appreciate the comments about people fighting under their own officers but that could not have always been practical or there would have been parts of the Regimental battle line that would have had no officers present at all on some occasions. No Regimental commander could have allowed that to happen voluntarily.

I also think that the company identity might well have a strong bearing on the lack of commentary by those present. As men always reverted back to the core group after the shooting stopped and these are the same guys you enlisted with, you will say Company K lost 15 men that day as they were men you knew.

You won't mention that a further 7 were hit from the 28 Company D boys who were assigned to you on that occasion but any one writing home from their part of the camp would include that 7 in their reckoning, as would their real company commander.

Equalizing at battle level was transient, memories of lost comrades was not.

"After a time the general called us back to the first hedge. All but the last company had got through the opening, when the general said he wanted us again, and we faced about and reentered the open field, where I completely reformed my regiment at K, equalising companies, reassigning officers etc."
Col. Joshua R.Hawley, 7th Connecticut Infantry
Report on engagement at Secessionville, James Island S.C. June 16 1862

OK, so we have a Regiment equalised in action, complete with reorganisation of command.

The Defence rests!

The "K" mentioned is a point on a map shown as part of a report in the Civil War OR.

Yes, I know its only one instance but it meets the criteria and was written not only by someone there at the time but by the man that ordered it!

There will be more, so feel free to look!

Question I have is, does equalizing companies mean simply the companies within the battalion are equalized, so that every company is about the same size as every other company in the battalion without regard to a specific number? Or does it mean there was an approx. numerical strength which was sought for each company prior to going into battle ?

Take the 28th Mass. above as an example. Prior to going into battle would they have equalized 10 companies, so that each company in the regiment would've been 20-23 men ? Or did they consolidate and equalize, so that there were 5 companies of 40-45 men ?

In effect, did the Irish Brigade go into battle at Gettysburg with 14 companies of 20-25 men & 6 companies of 40-45 for 20 total combat companies ? Or did it have 14 combat companies at 40-45 men each ?

Assuming the latter… it would've been made up of three small battalions.
1st Battalion: 6 companies, 40-45 each
2nd Battalion: 6 companies, 40-45 each
3rd Battalion: 2 companies, 40-45 each

Assuming the former…
1st Battalion: 10 companies, 20-25 each
2nd Battalion: 6 companies, 40-45 each
3rd Battalion: 4 companies, 20-25 each

Was there a fighting size for each company ? I can already see I'm in a rapidly narrowing range band between 20 and 60, so this is probably getting near unanswerable.

Would having companies of say 20 as opposed to say 40 have made a difference in terms of drill and maneuver ? Even with those two different sizes within the same battalion ? Or did they equalize b/c it was always better to have equal numbers ?

Bottom Dollar,

Go to the Gettysburg Daily and watch the various video tours/clips of the Irish brigade at Gettysburg.

link

avidgamer, cool link. Thanks ! I tink I'd have some questions for Mr. Fitzpatrick ! :)

Thanks, Trajanus just noticed your last post. Here's another one. 8-4-1

No. 320. Report of Got. H. B. Tomlin, Fifty-third Virginia Infantry, of the battle of Malvern Hill. JULY 10, 1862.

"…But few of my regiment, as well [as] the other three which started together, reached the ravine at this time. You will recollect that two of our companies were detached on the 29th to collect and guard stores taken from the enemy, and the other eight were so small and the officers so few that they were consolidated into four companies having only four captains for duty; three of these reached the ravine, and one, Capt. Henry Edmunds, was utterly exhausted and instantly taken so ill that I advised him to return, with the assistance of one of his men. After remaining in this position for about an hour I dispatched the sergeant-major to General Armistead to inform him of our position and condition, and that in my opinion we ought to be re-enforced….Somewhere between 6 and 7 oclock General Wright brought with him into the ravine two regiments and formed line of battle immediately behind ours, and addressing a few words to the men, led the charge up the hill to take the battery. Captain Saunders was severely wounded in the thigh soon after reaching the top of the hill. The different members of our regiment were formed into one company, under command of Captain Martin, whose gallantry was not exceeded by anyone in that memorable battle, and with the other parts of the two brigades were compelled to fall back as often as they charged the batteries of the enemy. Our line composed of parts of three regiments, was yet a short one, with two colors, and for our one company it would have seemed that a musket would have been of more value than the color, but Corporal Pollard, Company E (one of the color guard, insisted he would carry it, and when he fell gallantly bearing it along handed it to a Georgian who was fighting by his side."

According to Wikipedia, the 53rd VA had 128 in action at Malvern Hill, that would've made each consolidated company approx. 32 men apiece.

link

Thanks Trajanus and Bottom Dollar. I suspect that the more common reference is going to be someone from Company F talking about being lead by Capt. "Smith" or Sgt. "Jones" from Company D in a particular action rather than a more formal reference to equalizing. References to "consolidation" of companies do get mentioned, perhaps because they were more permanent events.

Now if you are equalizing a larger number of administrative companies into a smaller number of operational ones, what happens to the excess officers and sgts?

McLaddie-Usually they are referenced for a reason, such as the unit discovering that a piece of equipment no longer worked.

"Now if you are equalizing a larger number of administrative companies into a smaller number of operational ones, what happens to the excess officers and sgts?"

Well, you'd expect an understrength regiment to have lost proportionately as many officers and NCOs as enlistedmen so you might not have any great excess. I recall that the 61st NY at Gettysburg had ten officers and about a hundred men and was consolidated into three companies tactically (they still had all ten companies administratively). So that's around three officers per company--which is exactly how many they were supposed to have.

I could also see it as being a question of how many trusted and qualified officers does the regimental commander have to give a field size company of say 40 troops to ? That may effect his decision to temporarily consolidate, even if he equalizes. And wouldn't three officers per company in the field with a veteran regiment on campaign have been a lot ? And can't Sgts be put in the ranks when necessary ?

I thought this was interesting too and figured I post it.

GENERAL ORDERS ~ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, No. 56. Tullahoma, March 16, 1863.

Misapprehensions seem to exist in many corps of this army in regard to the recent orders of union on duty, or consolidation, as it is erroneously called, of certain companies and regiments for temporary convenience and service in the field. To remove all doubts and produce uniformity in all such organizations, it is ordered that where companies, battalions, and regiments are reduced so low in rank and file as to render the commissioned officers largely in excess, temporary union for field service will be made, and the supernumerary officers will be de- tached on recruiting, conscript, or other special duty. In this arrangement it must be specially understood and provided, however, that no legal organization is to be changed, and no officer or soldier displaced or discharged from his-official and legal position. Company, battalion, and regimental organizations will be preserved in all records, reports, and musters, the union being only intended for drills, parades, marches, and battles, and standards will all be preserved and carried as heretofore. Whenever the rank and file shall justify it, these tem- porary unions will be dissolved, and officers will be ordered back to their duties in the field. In the mean time, a sense of duty and patriot- ism should incite all to the utmost exertion in filling the ranks of our regiments. The officer or soldier who furnishes a man to our ranks is doing as good service, and deserves as much credit, as he who slays an enemy in battle.

By command of General Bragg: GEORGE WM. BRENT, Assistant Adjutant- General.

Regarding the officers.

In Scott's regulations the Adjutant was supposed to add up the number of available files and then divide them among the serving Captains.

As all this equalization stuff was handed down from one generation of drill/regulations to the next, I would guess that a similar arrangement continued, with perhaps a degree of latitude for the number of healthy Captains available!

I agree, there was a certain inherent and necessary latitude.

For instance, if the 28th MA and 116th PA equalized without consolidating, their company strengths would've been in the lower 20's. On the other hand, the officially and recently consolidated company strengths of the 62nd, 69th and 88th NY were in the upper-30's to mid 40's. As the general trend I've detected in my reading tells me a solid company commander or captain was expected to command in combat anywhere between 30-50 troops, the question becomes, if equalizing diminishes all of the companies into the 20‘s or lower, wouldn't a regimental commander rather temporarily consolidate to make sure that all of his senior company officers had 30-50 ? For instance, since the 116th PA was officially and administratively consolidated to 4 companies, it was probably an outside chance that it was assigned at the same time 4 fully qualified senior company officers since well Major Mulholland was only a Major commanding 100 and he probably wasn't given but two captains or senior officers to command companies in combat. Therefore, he had or was allowed to retain probably two senior company commanders, and two promising junior company commanders to command 4 administrative companies, but when it came to fighting at Gettysburg he probably had the juniors consolidate with the seniors to give both companies an effective combat strength of about 50 men apiece. For the 28th MA on the other hand, it is even less clear and probably less likely given the information and their numbers that they had 10 fully qualified senior company officers to command equalized companies in the low 20's. So, the 28th MA more than likely also looked to consolidate (temporarily, of course) for combat at perhaps 5 or 6 companies, pairing the junior company commanders--and their men--with the senior officers--yes, captains-- which would've given each company a fighting strength in the mid-40's.

BTW, fascinating subject.

Senior officers were either detached or their commissions revoked when unit strengths fell below a certain number of companies. This happened to the 10th Maine, which lost severely at Cedar Mountain.

The unit was unable to recruit sufficiently, and was reorganized as a battalion of 5 companies. The Colonel and Lt. Colonel were relieved of their commissions, there being insufficient men to require them, and the remaining battalion placed under the command of the Major. The unit was assigned as, IIRC, provost guard for Corps HQ of the 1st Army Corps, AOP, for the remainder of it's service.

Units like the 3rd Maine were able to keep their full compliment of officers, as, although they were reduced in the ranks to but 210 men and officers at Gettysburg, they had more than 60 assigned on temporary duty elsewhere, and another goodly number in hospital and awaiting return to the ranks.

The whole strengths and numbers is a sort of shell game too, as the example of the 16th Maine at Gettysburg will show. Although overrun and the colors (and Colonel Tilden) captured on July 1st, there were a number of officers and men who were able to escape that day, and were then able to reunite with a further 66 men who had been on temporary assignment to one of the 1st Corps artillery batteries. The regiment was later able to pull in the remainder of it's men on temporary duty, and thus keep from being disbanded and/or folded into another unit.

Lastly, it was a common practice that, when a regiment was mustered out, all of it's reenlisted men, and recruits whose time had not yet expired, were transferred en masse to another unit.

One example of this as a sort of domino effect was the 5th Maine Infantry, of 6th Corps. When it was mustered out, there were enough men reenlisted or new recruits to form two full companies. These were then folded into the 6th Maine. A couple months later, when THAT unit was due to be mustered out, the original 5th Maine men, plus enough 6th Maine men to form another 3 full companies, were all transferred into the 7th Maine infantry.

At the end of the 7th Maine's term of service, the 5 companies of the 5th & 6th Maine men, were combined with 5 companies of reenlisted and new recruits from the 7th to form an entire new 10-company regiment. This was then redesignated as the 1st Maine Veteran Volunteers. New uniforms, weapons and accoutrements were issued, along with wartime-service half chevrons, and the unit saw it's first action at Cedar Creek.

Thanks Tkindred, I was wondering if they just got to a point where they simply took commissions away. Perhaps another option was to recruit at home until they got the strength up ? I wonder why some regiments could recruite successfully and others couldn't? But the strengths and numbers shell game. I can see that completely. There were men coming and going to the regiments all the time for many different reasons. Absolutely astounding that Federal and State gov't and the military of the mid-19th century did such a thorough job of keeping track of it all.

On that note, here's an attempt at contributing to the understanding of ACW unit organization and what I think appears to be a remarkably flexible system.

An example of what a small union regiment looked like in its administrative structure by company prior to the battle of Gettysburg. The difference between the administrative structure and its actual combat structure in terms of fighting companies can almost be inferred. I'd guess 3-4 combat companies w/ either 48-49 m. per or 36-37 m. per co. on avg. after temporary consolidation/equalization. The consolidated reports didn't show the ranks of the officers, but I was able to figure that out for each company with about 95% certainty and 5% cross-checking the muster rolls with the lists of regimental wounded and killed published from two sources. 7 of the 10 company grade officers listed were casualties with their names, ranks and co's published, which narrowed it down a bit, while 37 of the 137 enlisted men were casualties. Also, the commander, Col. Ramsey, was wounded again (shoulder/slight) after being wounded at Chancellorsville.

Consolidated Morning Report of the 8th Regt. N.J. Vols. for June 28th, 1863.

Present for Duty and Equipped
Staff: 4 officers and 1 enlisted man
Co. A: 3 officers (Capt., 1st Lt, 2nd Lt.), 15 enlisted men
Co. B: 1 officer (2nd Lt.), 14 enlisted men
Co. C: no officers, 18 enlisted men
Co. D: 1 officer (2nd Lt.), 10 enlisted men
Co. E: no officers, 15 enlisted men
Co. F: 2 officer (1st Lt, 2nd Lt.), 11 enlisted men
Co. G: 1 officer (Capt.), 17 enlisted men
Co. H: 1 officer (Capt.), 19 enlisted men
Co. I: no officers, 7 enlisted men
Co. K: 1 officer (Capt.), 10 enlisted men
Total All Ranks: 151
Officers: 14
Enlisted Men: 137

Keep in mind that those 137 enlisted would likely be formed into 4 30-man companies, which would jive with the 4 Captains listed.

From that 137 you would need to deduct at least 9, and perhaps 12 men for the color guard, depending upon whether they were still carrying their regimental/state colours alongside the national.

Let's say 9, just for argument's sake, plus 120 for the 4 companies, which then leaves you with 8 remaining, and you can assume these are NCO's acting as company 1st sergeant and 2nd sergeant, the latter being needed to act as left guide for some maneuvers.

The 4 officers on the staff are likely to be Colonel, Lt Colonel and Major, and surgeon. One of the LT's would be told off to act as adjutant. The 1 enlisted on the staff is likely the Sergeant Major, though he may well be the Hospital Steward or Medical orderly. Hard to say.

That's just going off of what I know for regimental TO&E, but I think it's probably how it would break down.

Good thread so far.

There were also 28 present for duty but unequipped enlisted men reported, distributed about equally across the companies, 3 of whom were on the staff. I mentioned the possibility of 3 companies b/c I think but I'm not entirely certain that one of the company captains was held back, if not the equipped men assigned to his company. When the colonel was wounded he was the Capt. who took command of the regiment, and I was thinking he was held back to keep charge of the unequipped and serve as the officer in reserve, so to speak, in case anything happened to the colonel (which did). I believe he also took command when the same colonel was wounded a month before at Chancellorsville. Any thoughts on how and why 28 enlisted men could go unequipped or what their role on the battlefield or in the rear areas was? Perhaps one of their hardest battles of the war, Chancellorsville, fought only a two mos. before--less if calculate in active campaigning-- played a role ? Thanks.

There was a Lt.Col. with an arm amputated (1st Bull Run I believe) in the regiment during the battle of Gettysburg, and I would think he would've taken command, but at both Chancellorsville and Gettyburg this one particular company captain appears to have taken command when the colonel was wounded.

PS I may be mis-reading the command hierarchy and who was in the front line and who wasn't, but this particular company capt. did take command after the colonel was wounded and not a major or lt.col.

Lastly, it was a common practice that, when a regiment was mustered out, all of it's reenlisted men, and recruits whose time had not yet expired, were transferred en masse to another unit

Hence the story line in the Gettysburg movie.