"Ammo resupply Naps v ACW" Topic

OK I'm confused!

Why is it that I read of ACW units being pulled out of the fight (on occasions) to resupply and I have never read of the same thing in the Napoleonic period. Although units there also ran out during combat?

Different arrangements?

Different Tactical pressures?

It just simply wasn't the done thing!

I've not been reading the right books?

All of the above!

I've heard of Federal unit firing off all their ammo in an attempt to get out of harms way.

During the ACW it was simply easier to move the men than the ammo I guess, especially under fire. Remember how many tree lines and fences criss-cross ACW battlefields. Gettysburg has a fence about every 200 feet!

Frankly, I have no idea how resupply happened during the Napoleonic period.

My guess is that it was more likely in the ACW because they are carrying about the same amount of ammo (50-100rds) and usually firing at about the same rate (three rounds a minute), but the Civil War regiment usually opens fire at about double the range of the Napoleonic battalion (about 200 yards vs. about 100 yards). Thus, the ACW regiment runs out of ammo faster. Of course, there are exceptions to everything.

Billy Yank

After blasting thru their cartridge box of ammo the guns were pretty dirty and in need of some cleaning. Also, the guys were probably in need of a rest. If possible, it makes sense to rotate out and take care of everything.

In Nappy's time they opened up at 80-100 paces preliminary to closing with the bayonet. In the ACW they opened at 400-500 paces and went on firing, thus burning off more ammo.

A bit of an oversimplification, this. I wonder about the lights in the Napoleonic Wars, they had to burn off a lot of ammo.

Dear Trajanus
Consider that in ACW were using a modified version of the British Desguliers Block Trail System. The Americans copied the French Valee system which was a version of the British system with a different drafting system.

The Russians and the British often pulled batteries out of the line. The French, Prussians and Austrians could not due to their system.

The British had ammunition limbers and ammunition wagons that had boxes of ammunition. These were interchangeable. All vehicles had the same size wheels. Ammuition Wagons had the ammunition limber connected to the ammunition cart. This meant that there was always sufficient limbers to take the guns out of the line.

The Russian system was less sofisticated but use troika caisson that were light compared to the rest of Europe.

The French, Austrians and Prussians were still wedded to the 18th century warfare with a large four wheeled caisson with small front wheels. Unstable when moved at speed unless on level ground.

Stephen

Why is it that I read of ACW units being pulled out of the fight (on occasions) to resupply

Were the batteries equipped with breech or muzzle loading guns? The former are faster to serve than the latter.

I wonder about the lights in the Napoleonic Wars, they had to burn off a lot of ammo

I'm sure they would rotate men into and out of the skirmish chain to ensure that the chain always had sufficient ammunition. Also their rate of fire would have been much slower than would have been expected of a line of battle in a firefight. The rate of fire in the skirmish chain may have been one round per man per minute, or even less. This enabled the chain to stay active for an hour or more, before needing to be rotated or resupplied. Also the cleaning of their firearm, or the basic fatigue of the men themselves, after an hour or more in close combat, would probably require that they be relieved from the chain at some point in time.

npm

I didn't take the question to mean artillery. In the ACW each gun had 4 ammo chests. The idea being that when the gun began to fire out the 4th chest the caisson and its limber would pull out to the train and resupply. This would leave the gun in battery. It the cases I have read about guns being pulled out due to lack of ammo, it was really to replace them with a fresh team.

I took the original question to mean infantry. From my readings I take it to be a result of two factors; first the longer ranges and secondly, a tendency for the troops to remain in place and shoot the enemy away. This as opposed to the push of the bayonet from earlier times. Look at Fredricksburg, the Confederates began to run out of ammo, because the fellas in blue kept a'coming, but never got there.

I took the original question to mean infantry

Well spotted. Sorry everyone I should have made that more explicit.

I notice that where addressed, people are focusing on the likelihood that ACW units fired off their initial loadout in a shorter time, which may be true.

However, what I was looking for is what happened next. I did find one instance of a British unit being pulled out of the line when ammo ran out but they were just ordered to take cover on the ground by laying down. They were not resupplied and sent back in.

As I said, I have read about resupplied ACW units returning to combat, which is altogether different.

That's my point of curiosity.

There are several instances in the 7YW – one with Austrian regiment Botta at Kolin – where drummers cut their drums open and loaded them with the cartidges of the dead and wounded of the unit. That was not enough at Kolin, so the commander of Botta commandered a passing ammunition cart at pistol point to resupply his men.

Something like this – with the drums – may have become common in European battles after the 7 YW.

The King's German Legion lights defending the farm La Haie (spelling?)Sainte at Waterloo ran out of ammunition. An ammo wagon was sent to re-supply them – but it was loaded with musket ammunition, too large to fit into the rifles!

GdeP

I've heard from somewhere that some (French?) units went into the line in Boney's day without any ammunition at all. I suppose just being there was better than not.

Alexander V. Suvorov (1729-1800) is reported to have said; -
"The bullet's an idiot, the bayonet's a fine chap." (Underlying principle of the Western Way of War: "Get in the enemy's face.") "Stab once and throw the Turk off the bayonet. Bayonet another, bayonet a third; a real warrior will bayonet half a dozen and more. Keep a bullet in the barrel. If three should run at you, bayonet the first, shoot the second and lay out the third with your bayonet. This isn't common but you haven't time to reload…" (Tsouras, 1992, 23)

For some units of that period I expect that the act of firing was more of a morale boost that an attempt to actually hurt anyone…

rabbit

As far as artillery goes in the ACW there is no strict rule from the beginning of the war to the end for either or both sides. When Gen. Hunt was put in charge the batteries in the AoP were not allowed to pull off the line by their own accord if they ran out of ammo. Did they do it anyway? Yes. They didn't want battery commanders just deciding willy-nilly what they felt was best for the action overall.

What generally happened was a battery was supposed to send the caissons back for a resupply when the caissons were empty. They would fill or refill the limbers and once the caissons were empty they would be sent to resupply themselves. The problem as sometimes that the wagons were either too far away or not available. In this case they didn't want to just leave the guns in place without ammo and have the horses shot-up for no good. Once the horses were down you couldn't withdraw the guns so it was better to just remove the battery off the line. It was rare that they would just abandon the guns but it did happen from time to time. This was considered a very bad disgrace. Capt. Smith's 4 guns on Devil's Den were ordered to be abandoned plus there was no way to withdraw them anyway and yet some fellow officers chastised him for it after the battle. After the war he felt the stigma was bad enough that he wrote a lot about why he did what he was told to do and the circumstances.

For infantry remember the type of combat was very different between those two periods. The ACW was all about shooting and less about HtH combat like Nappy. In the ACW you could blaze away at your foe at over 300 yards and wipe them out without bothering to ever engage in HtH combat. If you were out of ammo you were at a SEVERE disadvantage. The carried usually 60 rounds or more with them and in many battles used it all up. When possible men were sent to the rear to bring up more ammo boxes but you needed two men to carry one box and it was so heavy that you couldn't run very far if needed, it was that cumbersome and heavy. In a perfect world the ammo trains would be brought up as close as possible and parked in a 'safe' place out of harm's way to make the trip shorter for the men. Easier said than done.

Don

actionfront.blogspot.com

"Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?"

As Don points out, a wooden box of 1000 rounds of .58 cartridges is heavy. It weighs in right around 98 pounds. A few more for a .69 box. Rule of thumb is 100lbs/1000 cartridges. You don't carry those very far.

rarely was a unit pulled out of the line in the ACW to resupply. Usually, the affair was settled by the time one unit or the other ran out of ammunition. In many cases, such as the 17th Maine in the Wheatfield at Gettysburg, they were ordered to hold their position with the bayonet if needs be.

The only time that a unit would be withdrawn (and yes, there ARE exceptions, I'm speaking generally) is when an entire Brigade is withdrawn, and then only after a fresh brigade is in position to take it's place.

Generally, infantry ammunition exhaustion is NOT a problem, as actual rates of fire are 1-2 rounds a minute, and often slower. As I said, almost always the affair is settled before one side or the other is out of ammunition.

2 Men carrying a 98lb box is nothing but not far a TKindred said.

I have read many instances where the infantry pull back, the 2nd line goes in and carries on the fight, 1st line clean weapons, resupply ammo get ready to do it again.

I do though think 3 reounds a minute is realistic and has been done in many studies (ok being shot doesn't kelp), but I bet you a pound to a dollar that i'd load faster under fire than under test conditions, kill him before he kills me……and with that adrenalin rush???? who knows.

The only time that a unit would be withdrawn (and yes, there ARE exceptions, I'm speaking generally) is when an entire Brigade is withdrawn, and then only after a fresh brigade is in position to take it's place

Yes that's what I thought. IIRC The Irish Brigade where involved in this sort of thing at Antietam, for example.

I wonder would the consensus be that it was more likely to see an entire Brigade rotated than a single regiment (unless the Brigade itself were deployed in two lines?

Reading the wrong books. Napoleon ran at of ammo at several battles. ALso how many battles were fought without musketry due to rain? Katzbach being just one of many.

We have accounts of British ammunition resupply in the Peninsula. Chests of cartridges were dropped behind each company, and they'd constantly resupply in a firefight in an effort to have the pouches constantly full. When the infantry moved the ammo was abandoned by them and the commassariat would issue a fresh chest.

Ammunition expenditure is lower than you'd think. The resupply request after Gettysburg was for 1.33 millions rounds (see my blog post at link ), which was about the same as Vittoria per man engaged ( link )

We have accounts of British ammunition resupply in the Peninsula. Chests of cartridges were dropped behind each company, and they'd constantly resupply in a firefight in an effort to have the pouches constantly full. When the infantry moved the ammo was abandoned by them and the commassariat would issue a fresh chest.

Yes I'm familiar with that although I though musket ammo came in small barrels but that's just a detail.

It does assume that the firing line is not going anywhere for a while though. They didn't have a constant stream of people running ammo like powder monkeys in the Navy.

Reading the wrong books. Napoleon ran at of ammo at several battles

Not exactly. I know ammo ran out. How that was dealt with is under discussion.

"I have read many instances where the infantry pull back, the 2nd line goes in and carries on the fight, 1st line clean weapons, resupply ammo get ready to do it again."

Yes that did happen exactly like that such as Union troops on top of Culp's Hill at Gettysburg. That kind of action was rare though, very rare. Generally when they took a brigade off the line it was for a very different reason, the brigade was almost totally 'used up' during the fight.

Don

That's why at most reenactment events,the battles only last close to an hour,even if you're just using blanks.

'Consider that in ACW were using a modified version of the British Desguliers Block Trail System. The Americans copied the French Valee system which was a version of the British system with a different drafting system.'

And that gave, in effect, a caisson that was four-wheeled: two for the limber and two for the caisson.

'The Russians and the British often pulled batteries out of the line. The French, Prussians and Austrians could not due to their system.'

Your insinuation here is that the French, Prussians, and Austrians artillery companies/batteries were not mobile on the battlefield and that is not an accurate assessement. The artillery of all three nations was mobile, unless it was intended by role or employment not to be. For example, one of the hallmarks of the Gribeauval field artillery system was mobility, which was the point of the exercise. As was pointed out by Howard Rosen, that was one of the hallmarks of the new artillery system as was designing it for the next war, not the last one.

The Russian system was less sofisticated but use troika caisson that were light compared to the rest of Europe.

'The French, Austrians and Prussians were still wedded to the 18th century warfare with a large four wheeled caisson with small front wheels. Unstable when moved at speed unless on level ground.'

The Austrians and Prussians may have been (the Prussians more so, artillery-wise, than the Austrians) but that was not so with the French system, as has already been demonstrated. That the four-wheeled caissons did keep up with the field pieces in the field and did displace with their gun companies is evidence that, unwieldy or not, they were functionable. French caissons belonging to the gun companies indeed accompanied Senarmont at Friedland as they did at Lutzen, Wagram, and Ligny.

If you have evidence to the contrary, then please provide it. If it was an accurate assumption, then the French artillery would never have been able to accomplish what they did and fire the amount of ammunition that they did. French gun companies, both horse and foot, displaced during combat and took their caissons with them.

Sincerely,
M

French small arms resupply was accomplished in the same manner that artillery ammunition was-it was done forward on the firing line, or close behind it. French artillery companies that were attached to infantry divisions had four extra caissons assigned to them which carried infantry cartridges for the long arms.

At Eylau's ending Davout's caissons were already forward resupplying his infantry with cartridges.

Sincerely,
M

In the British Army of the Napoleonic Wars, and I think most others, the official doctrine was for re-supply to be organised so that it was the responsibility of rear depots to get the ammunition forward.

The British ammunition supply, both for artillery and infantry was through the Board of Ordnance Field Train, whose officers wore uniforms virtually identical to the Royal Artillery (ie blue jackets etc), but they were in fact Board of Ordnance Commissariat (a completely different branch to the "normal" Commissariat, who were controlled by the Treasury, issued provisions,not ammunition, and wore red jackets).

During the Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns, the commander of the Field Train was Sir Richard Henagan, whose memoirs are available as a free Googlebooks download. He says the problem at La Haye Sainte was because the rifle armed units (95th Rifes and KGL Light) used more ammunition than anticipated, so when Baring called for more there was no more to give him.

Such a sophisticated logistics structure took time to build for a regular army. I would guess that the relatively amateur American Civil War armies (in the sense that they both rapidly expanded from a small base) did not always have such complex forward re-supply logistic structures in place, so had to withdraw troops from the line if they ran out of ammunition.

Rod

Rod,

Excellent posting.

The large armies of the Civil War period were something new in American military history. No one had commanded anything like that before and it was the first use of the corps system by the United States, along with the Confederacy, although the Federals used them first.

The large numbers of artillery units posed a significant logistical problem that had to be dealt with. Luckily for the Army of the Potomac, they had a gifted artillery commander, General Henry Jackson Hunt, who finally got his ideas across to his superiors and the artillery arm of the Army of the Potomac dominated the field at such battles as Antietam and Gettysburg.

Sincerely,
Kevin

IIRC. At Perryville the Union pulled regimental units out of the left flank of their battle line to resupply.

IIRC. At Champion Hill the Confederates had serious ammo problems because some idiot sent the supply wagons rolling towards Vicksburg. That meant the Rebs had what they carried or scrounged from the dead/wounded on the battlefield.

I am not familiar with the method of the resupply of musket rounds during the ACW. I am familiar with the Napoleonic era. Most cartridge boxes held 40 rounds. Typically the French and British stuffed an additional 20 rounds into their pockets. Thus, they entered battle with 60 rounds.

While 60 rounds were usually sufficient for a battle, should a French unit need resupply, musket ammunition was available in the nearest battery each of which carried tens of thousands of rounds in its caissons.

The Austrians and Russians entered the Battle of Austerlitz 40 rounds and during one notorious extended long range firefight, they ran out of ammunition and had to withdraw.

Long range blazing away occurred often as ammunition expenditure when compared to casualties confirms. Regardless of range, almost all units would start firing when they could see the enemy. Thus blazing away at well over 100 yards was normal if mostly ineffective.

Wellington's reverse slope tactic was brilliant in that it cut both ways. Not only could the French not see the British but the British could not see the French till they were at or within 100 yards. Thus, because they were incapable of firing at long distances the first two vollies delivered at short range were devastating.

Bob Coggins