"Infantry Order in 1914" Topic

I'm thinking of using Volley and Bayonet to model the early clashes of WWI in 2mm, but I'm not sure what kind of units to use on the base.

How did infantry deploy at the start of the war? I've heard a lot about French bayonet charges and British rifle fire, but little on how they engaged. Was it still FPW-style, or a more modern skirmish approach? Somewhere in the middle? Did it change between armies?

Are there any good free resources on the topic?

I've seen early WWI photos of German infantry advancing in columns!!

I think there is already a 1914 version of V&B floating around on the interweb as well as an RCW one. One base to a battalion should work.

1914 is essentially the Franco Prussian War fought with magazine rifles and quick firing artillery. Firing lines, supports, reserves etc and the company as the tactical unit (as opposed to platoons later in the war). Relatively dispersed though, two to five metres per man, but certainly not 'modern' in the sense of fire and movement by sections but using smokeless powder from concealed positions produced some modern style battlefield emptiness.

The actual formations and density varied both between armies and even within them depending on the prejudices of local commanders.

I really can't think of any free resources apart from various yahoo groups, the Great War Spearhead one is pretty good. Basic tactics (as in the roles of the arms within divisons) in 1914 are covered fairly well in the various Ospreys or single volumes such as Haythornthwaites 'First World War Sourcebook'.

"Tactics" (Vol 1 & 2) by William Balck:
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"The evolution of tactics" by Edwin Lloyd Gilbert:
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On my computer I have another book written by Balck, soon after the war, about all the changes occurred but I can't find a link to download it

I have gamed 1914 for years now. While I love V&B, I don't think it is a good model for early WW1.

It will be very hard to define units into "brigades" that operate exclusively inside the 300yd x 300yd area defined by a V&B stand. A company or two might attack inside this area, but they could easily spread out far beyond these limits. A possible solution is to allow most units to break down into skirmish bases, but that kind of defeats the point of V&B, which is to organize the army into neat little 'brigades'.

The universal use of smokeless powder, combined with longer ranges, created an "invisible" or "empty" battlefield. Sure there are accounts of spotted enemies and massed charges, but I believe a more common experience was to take fire and not even know where it was coming from. I have read accounts of attacking forces 'disappearing' as soon as they halt and go to ground, and there is no smoke to indicate where they are firing from.

But, if you want to press on, check out Wilhelm Balck's "Tactics" (written around 1908 and translated into English). It is free on line. I think it gives a pretty good description of what was being taught as tactics (not necessarily practiced) at the start of the war.

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As Martin said, I'd do one stand is a battalion (maybe a stand is a regiment for very large actions).

It would be very unusual for a WW1 infantry company to be extended much beyond 150 yards. This is a major difference from WW2, which is a mistake that is made when using WW2 rules for WW1. Often the frontage was less.

The 'empty' battlefield was very characteristic. This didn't mean that the direction of fire could not be figured. It was not difficult to ascertain where fire from coming from. It was difficult to see who was firing.

Comments about columns of infantry usually refer to situations where the advancing infantry had not detected the enemy. This was down to poor recon or poor communications. In the early war, both were more common due to the pace of operations. All major combatants used columns as the mechanism for approaching the artillery beaten zone. Once in enemy artillery range, the idea was to begin spreading out.

All major combatants taught fire and manoeuvre before August 1914. The section (or equivalent) was considered the smallest unit once the attack was within close range of the enemy's small arms beaten zone. It is very rare, however, to find books that describe this. Most focus on higher level tactics, particularly around the company as the unit of manoeuvre.

Robert

German infantry in 1914 used the company column, the same formation they started with in 1870. Each company formed up on a front of a deployed zug, 4 zugs deep. While each zug was in open order, the effect from the front was much like a close order line. There's a photo of a Russian column in Keegan's Face of Battle where the target looks much like a close order line. What a target.

I don't know what the standard French formation was, but note the photos of French bayonet charges in open order, still a fine target with the pantalons rouge and all.

The Germans, French and British used the column as the formation for approaching the battlefield. Different widths of column were advocated, depending on the type of terrain and other factors.

Within artillery range of the enemy, all countries advocated shaking out columns into less vulnerable formations. Photographs should treated with considerable caution. Most are wrongly labelled and come from training scenarios. Photos of empty battlefields with, at best, small groups of figures advancing do not make for great photos :)

Close order line was not the unit of manoeuvre within the enemy's small arms beaten zone, even before the war.

Robert

Here is an example to illustrate. It is from the first encounter of a German unit with the French during the Battle of the Frontiers:

"'To your rifles!' came a shout from outside. Two shrapnels burst over the next house. We ran for our rifles and baggage.

'Platoons advance in open formation!' cried the Lieutenant.

We deployed over a bright green field. Zip! Zip! it went past us.

'Lie down!' shouted Sergeant Ernst.

We flung ourselves down on the wet grass. To the right there was a tree behind whose thick trunk Corporal Pferl, our section commander, threw himself."

Ludwig Renn then describes the disconcerting effects of being under sustained shrapnel fire, then:

"'Ernst's platoon! Up! At the double!' bellowed the sergeant.

I tore myself to my feet and advanced. We came to a slope falling abruptly.

'Lie down!' bellowed Ernst.

I looked round me. Where were the shells falling now? A few rifle bullets whizzed from the hollow.

'The French are straight in front there in the bushes! At nine hundred yards – fire!' barked Ernst.

'Advance by sections!' bellowed Ernst.

'Lamm's section!' cried the one year's man on my left. 'Ready! Up! At the double!'

We ran forward, Lamm in front. A stone wall with a thin line of bushes lay before us.

'Halt!' shouted Lamm. 'At eight hundred yards!'

We threw ourselves behind the wall. He was a lad, the one year's man! And in the garrison he had not even become a lance-corporal, because he could not give an order.

'On the retreating Frenchmen!' cried Lamm. 'At a thousand yards – fire!'

Right enough! Small bands were popping out of the bushes and sneaking back. We fired hurriedly, but we did not seem to hit anyone.

The French soldiers disappeared into a wood. Our firing ceased."

Note how the unit of manoeuvre became smaller as the advance closed on the enemy.

Robert

Here is another example. This time from General Haking's book 'Company training', which was published before the Great War. Haking was British. The following pertains to the process of overcoming an obstacle, in this case a hedge, while advancing towards the enemy. The advance is taking place inside the enemy's zone of rifle fire. I picked this quote at random:

"An attempt would then be made to obtain temporary superiority of fire over the enemy by rapid bursts [of fire], aided, if possible, by the artillery. A group from each [infantry] section in the firing line would then rush forward, extended, to the edge; these men would commence immediately to work their way through the hedge, and once they had made holes big enough to wriggle through the non-commissioned officer would give the word or signal to advance, and the group [not the whole section] would rush forward and commence the establishment of a fire position about fifty yards beyond the hedge. The task in front of the next group [not whole section, ie smaller than a section and perhaps the size of a Trupp] would be easier, because many of the men would find the gaps made by the first group, who were the pioneers of the operation. Meanwhile an efficient covering fire would be maintained from the original fire position in rear…"

Robert

And from an Englishman's perspective of the training he received in the pre-war French army ('The French Army from Within 1914' by Ex-Trooper):

"As an infantryman, his business is to entrench himself when ordered to do so; to advance by short rushes, squad alternating with squad, during the work of getting nearer to the enemy; to charge if bidden, or to retreat as he advanced, in the way that would produce least damage to the force of which he is a member if that force was exposed to actual fire."

The French did not make massed bayonet assaults against German machine guns and unbroken wire during the Battle of the Frontiers. Zuber and Delhez ('Le jour de deuil de l'armée française') have exposed this myth.

Robert

For a game at the level of granularity of V&B however, a battalion sized base on a V&B size 300m x 300m is going to be fine as a reasonable approximation of both unit footprint and the level of concern of divisional and corps commanders.

You _could_ split it into two half size bases to do extended firing line, but really a square base is as good a represention of multiple skirmish lines as anything else.

I've done plenty of 1914 games with battalion bases with a variety of rules and they work fine (and platoon bases, company bases and half battalion bases).

I don't know V&B but Martin's suggestion of a battalion of 300 x 300m would work for WW1. I agree, FWIIW, that a square base is better. In 1914, the idea was to attack in depth. If a battalion was spread across a large frontage on the defensive then it did not tend to spread everybody out evenly. Rather, men were concentrated into defensive strong points. This meant it was possible for the enemy to infiltrate through the lines, as happened with 4/Middlesex near Mons and the cavalry division near Messines for example. Square bases are a better abstraction of this IMHO.

Robert

V&B is about the horse and musket period. Everything is under the centralized direction of a single commander, posted on top of a hill or other vantage point, from where he can observe and direct the battle more or less successfully. Communications flow freely, and everyone gets 'real time' information.

This is not a reasonable model for the Napoleonic Period and its still somewhat applicable in the Franco-Prussian War. I do not think that is an acceptable model for 1914.

For 1914 I see highly decentralized command by a number of commanders with slow or no communication. Each is only partially aware of the 'big picture'. Success or failure is in large part due to their ability to overcome these obstacles and work as a team.

I also see shooting in 1914 as very different than the horse and musket model presented by V&B. In V&B, units shoot at or charge at each other. Eventually one is shot to pieces or runs away. I find this a reasonable model for the horse and musket period.

As I see it, in 1914, shooting creates beaten zones placed on terrain features that affect the movement and shooting of all units inside (including friendly units), besides simply causing losses and morale tests.

But if you like using V&B for 1914, I say go for it. I'm not uptight about it. I just think its not the best model.

Well I meant to say V&B is a reasonable model for the Napoleonic Period. Sorry for any confusion. I should proof read better.