"Hof's Prussian Napoleonic Tactics" Topic

Turner

I think if the editor bans Hansi depp (whoever he is) it will only make him feel important and pretend that people here do not want to listen to his views. We know he hasn't actually put forward any view or defended the title in question, which is a bit odd. To stifle him will also have the effect of making him feel important, which of course, he isn't. Best thing, just laugh at his posts and enjoy the more interesting posts by 10th Marines, Whirlwind and others.

Whirlwind

In a sense, PH is the one who is saying that the French were better. He actually admits as much when he states that the Prussians were outfought and crushed at Jena.

'The Prussians were outnumbered and outfought, and were crushed during the retreat.' (page 40)

and

'The greatest mistake the Prussians made at Jena was not in using 'outdated' battle-drills, but in fighting the battle in the first place; given their disadvantages of both numbers and terrain, they would have been wiser to engage in a holding action while making an orderly withdrawal.' (page 40)

So even when not using outdated tactics they were still defeated. And it is interesting that after all the praise and the statements he offers that the Prussians were not using outdated tactics, they were still not 'wise' (to use his word) enough to realise they should not have fought the battle in the first place! He also fails to mention that not all the French troops were employed in action against the Prussians at Jena.

His statements (page 40, in a sense, also contradict what he said earlier (page 36) 'In fact, the Prussian tactics at Jena cannot have failed completely…' But they did fail, otherwise they would have won at least one of the two battles, rather then losing both of them.

Of course, most of the views expressed are the author's view based on hindsight, and the Prussians obviously did not think the same as he did at the time, otherwise they would not have made the mistake of trying to take on the French at Jena.

At Auerstedt he states 'the Prussians enjoyed superiority in numbers, but for various reasons did not make good use of them.' (page 40 again) One of the 'various reasons' appeared to include the fog, which he states caused the Prussians problems. But the same fog did not cause the French any problems because they only had to stay where they were.

Obviously the French could see in the fog! And oddly, the account he offers by Col Christian von Elsner in which he hopes it persuades us that the fog was a problem, does th eact opposite – 'When the battalion deployed on the ridge on the other side of the village of Rehhausen I finally saw the enemy's positions, and we wheeled a quarter to the left to face an enemy square.' (page 41). This suggests that the Prussians could see the French and were able to manouevre to face them.

I think there are two lines which might offer some elements of truth and accuracy when talking about the Prussian, especially at Auerstedt – PH referring as to why Davout won-'Finally, he profited from a lack of proper battlefield management by the Prussians…'
and in Elsner's account -
'We continued our advance through battalions that had already been driven back, and battalions advancing on the left, and joined in with these unco-ordinated attacks, which achieved nothing.'

'Unco-ordinated attacks', 'lack of battlefield management' -perhaps these two statements, offered by PH to praise the Prussians, in fact best describe why the Prussians lost both battles.

The more you read PH's book, the more you can read between the lines and see a different interpretation to what the author intends us to accept.

Shanahan on Prussian Army in 1806:

‘To make our army more like the French'-Frederick William III, 1806.

The following material is taken from William Shanahan's Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813:

‘Artillery had been a neglected branch of the Prussian army since the time of Frederick the Great who had underestimated its importance.'-20

‘Artillery was the least trained branch of the Prussian amry…Practice firing at unknown ranges was rarely attempted in peacetime, for the state's supplies of powder and shot were limited and had to be conserved for a more serious use. Drill engagned as much of the artillerist's time was it did that of the infantrymen. Batteries were judged by the speed of unlimbering and the smartness of appearance rather than the rate and accuracy of fire.'-24.

‘The training and organization of the Prussian army developed many smart and well-drilled regiments without bringing together in peacetime units as large as divisions and corps. It was impossible for the several arms to train with another. Commanding officers were therefore inexperienced in handling large bodies of troops, and the men were unaccumtomed to any drills or exercise that involved more than one regiment. The principal training period occurred in the spring when the conscripts were taken from the cantons and sent to the regiments. For about six weeks there was an intense drill period in which the recruits were taught the military postures and the complicated parade maneuvers of the Prussian army. As long as the cantonists reported annually it was possible for provincial garrisons to drill as the regiment of Potsdam. After 1798, however, annual training was provided only in the Brandenburg regiments, which were personally inspected by the king. All other regiments trained their cantonists every other year.'

‘The emphasis on smartness and correctness of drill went hand in hand with the tactics of the Prussian army. The tactics of the thin line used by the army of 1806 derived from the time of Frederick the Great. To achieve firepower, as many men as possible were crowded into the line of battle. This deployed the troops in great breadth and reduced the battle order to three ranks. Precise alignment, speed of fire, and maintenance of discipline even in the heat of battle were the three objectives of training. When these were attained it was possible to form the long battle line quickly and at a moment when the enemy could be attacked in the flank instead of frontally. This was the favorite battle tactic of the Prussians. The men were drilled endlessly in the art of forming a line of battle out of an echelon of battalions, which could advance on the enemy diagonally and overwhelm him with fire directed at a segment of his line.'

‘Soldiers were as carefully trained in musketry as in drill. A volume of fire was preferred to accurate shooting; therefore, quick-loading and firing rather than target practice were stressed. Double-ended iron ramrods, large funnel-shaped charge holes in their flintlock muskets, and careful rehearsal of the movements of loading, gave the Prussians a speed of fire that exceeded that of any other European army. With the new muskets in use in 1806 the infantry could fire six shots a minute in practice, but only two and a half shots were expected on the battlefield. Most of the artificial styles of shooting that had been common under Frederick the Great, such as fire by companies or sections of companies, had been abandoned by 1806 in favor of battalion salvos.' 21-22

‘The light infantry troops of the Prussian army were among the best trained units. Experience in Poland and in the Rhine campaigns of 1792-1795 had shown that the thin lines of infantry required protection in front and on the flanks. Sharpshooters and the type of light infantry known as fusiliers had been developed to supply this need. By all accounts they were well versed in their art of deploying, fighting from irregular positions, and repelling attacks of enemy light horse. Accurate shooting was particularly stressed and they were armed with a rifle instead of the smoothbores carried by the other foot soldiers. Yet the Prussian light infantry were not numerous enough to meet the army's requirements, and like other units, had perfected the army's requirements, and like other units, had perfected individual training at the expense of cooperation.'-22-23

Sincerely,
Kevin

My review of the book:

Initially the author sets up an opposition as a foundation for his discussion of the Prussian Army's tactical doctrine and performance during the period of the Revoultionary and Napoleonic Wars. He quotes respected (mainly Anglophone) Napoleonic historians being fairly dismissive of the performance of the Prussian Army (although not explicit in all cases, they refer to the Army in the 1806-07 period), and juxtaposes a contrary view from a more recent German historian.

The book begins with an admirably clear exposition of the late and post-Seven Years War Prussian Army. It shows an emphasis on achieving rapid rates of fire and includes details of the changes to Prussian muskets made to assists this process and explains the reasons behind this.

In a short but fascinating passage, it details the nuanced truth behind the oft-used term of 'mercenaries' to describe the composition of the Prussian Army.

The book then describes the organizational changes made between the War of the Bavarian Succession and the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars, in particular the increase in the number of light infantry.

The next part details in brief the experiences of the Prussian Army during the Revoultionary Wars, with short sections on such affairs as Valmy and Pirmaesen. The author concludes from the examples he used (covering the 1792-5 period) that "The Prussian senior commanders had led forces of all arms with skill, showing tactical flexibility in both the attack and thedefence, and they withdrew from this war withboth their army and their professional honour intact. They apparently had little to learn fromwhat is often praised as the ‘new, Frenchmethod of warfare' "(referring here to the French Revolutionary Army, rather than its Napoleonic successor).

The book goes on to describe the reforms made in the period before 1806, and deals in particular with the attempts of the Prussians to increase the numbers of their light infantrymen. Then, in what may be the most controversial secction of the book, takes on two of the judgements made against the 1806 Prussian Army directly – firstly Paret's assertion that the reforms of this period hd no effect in practice and secondly "examination of the battle as a whole presents a totally different picture fromthat created by the comments of Elting, Chandler, Fuller et al", that the Prussian Infantry spent large parts of the battle being used as target practice by French skirmishers. This section contains an examination of the Prussian Amy's organization in 1806 and a detailed look at some of the episodes of the battles of Jena and Auerstadt.

The author has four conclusions that he draws from the fighting at Jena:

1. The Prussians deployed a large number of skirmishers, which however, were still insufficient to defeat the French.
2. There was a serious lack of co-ordination between arms – in this respect the quality of the army had declined from the Revolutionary War.
3. The Prussians were outnnumbered, outfought and then crushed – but the way that the battle was fought does not indicate any great difference overall at the tactical level, there are several instances of the army (in particular the infantry) achieving successes in a very 'modern' manner.
4. The main mistake of the Prussians was fighting at Jena at all.

The book then moves onto the period of the reformed army, describing the organizational and doctrinal changes made by the Army in some detail. This section, although very strong, is less flavourful than the preceding sections as it contains only one detailed description of the fighting the later Army became involved in (cavalry at Liebertwolkwitz), although as the tactical performance of the later Army is not as controversial, perhaps this is not surprising.

The book does not refer much to the Prussian Army's involvement in the Russian campaign of 1812 – perhaps the author felt this to be insignificant from the tactical point of view?

Throughout the book, the writer attempts to emphasize the continuity in the reforms attempted during the period. This works to an extent, but the doctrinal changes described in the latter parts of the book do seem to indicate a significant break between the pre- and post 1807 armies.

The book contains numerous illustrations and diagrams, including such things as a 1792 Infantry Battalion in line, a very interesting 'crescent' withdrawal formation and a Fusilier Battalion with skirmishers deployed. It is good to see the full period being given illustrated this way. There are many illustrations and prints, but it does not contain a full uniform guide within the book. If there is one minor niggle, it is that the plates and illustrations do not always lie exactly with the most appropriate bit of of text – this however is common to all the books in this series and is as minor a complaint as it sounds.

This book is highly recommended. It is full of useful information and illustrations. There are some fascinating sections on the 1790s army, and the author's position on the 1806 army is well-argued and supported, without attempting to minimize the extent of that Army's defeat. It should be well-received by anyone with an interest in the subject, both by those inclined to support his positions and those inclined to differ.

Whirlwind, A very interseting review unfortunately after the childish episodes from Hofschroer regarding the book I for one would never buy one of his works again the two that I own will be with the trash tomorrow.

Whirlwind

I would have to disagree with you on your far too positive description of the title, but will agree that it is a title worth owning, albeit to read with care and between the lines.

You mention he juxaposes against the many (perhaps overwhelming would be a better word) negative views of the Prussian army (and that's not including the historians and military men offered by 10th Marines), with that of one late historian.

Don't you think that is odd? Just one? It hardly supports his biased viewpoint, does it? Surely, if others held the same view as the author, and were aware of the so called false view, they would have made comments which the author could have and should have used, rather than just the one he did use? Plus, I don't think the historian he did use was known for his Napoleonic studies. From what I can see, his area of knowledge was 1870 onwards and mainly World War One and Two. I believe he did write a general audience book on the history of Prussia but that does not make him an expert on the Napoleonic period.

And why would the author not mentioning much on the Prussians in 1812 not matter? How they faced up to the Russians would have been interesting, surely? Could it be more that they were on the French side at the time, something the author perhaps does not want to reflect on or accept?

As for Jena. You have the book. He states how good the Prussians were and that they did not use old fashioned tactics etc, but fails to explain why, after such a positive build up on them, they still lost both battles.

And the fact that you say in No 4 in your list, 'the main mistake they made was fighting at Jena at all', suggests that they were as not good or as organised or as progressive as the author makes them out to be in 1806. That suggests the so called negative historians may have been right after all, otherwise, as I said before, the Prussians would surely have won one of the two battles?

The reality is, they lost both battles in 1806 and I get the feeling that the author does not want to accept this and makes feeble excuses for what happened. Using the fog as one excuse, is a perfect example. He even says the fog wasn't a problem for the French? Well really, that would make them super soldiers, would't it? The phrase 'clutching at straws' comes to mind.

But I guess we will have to agree to disagree on PH's book. Yes, there are some good bits in it and yes I would recommend people read it. The pictures are certainly good and possibly the best out of the three titles on Napoleonic tactics so far. But overall, I think 'could have done better' also springs to mind, and the author should not have wasted so much space and effort attempting to pull down other authors and historians.

Anyway, I think he has had enough free publicty for now. And besides the free publicty he (and Hansi Depp) should really thank us all for talking about the Prussians. I'm not sure they would have got a mention otherwise.

Why would the author not mentioning much on the Prussians in 1812 not matter? How they faced up to the Russians would have been interesting, surely? Could it be more that they were on the French side at the time, something the author perhaps does not want to reflect on or accept?

Well it might be that of course, but I think my suggestion is more likely – from the doctrinal point of view, this campaign was not that important and given the need for brevity in this format, then there was nothing to be gained by adding it in.

As for Jena. You have the book. He states how good the Prussians were and that they did not use old fashioned tactics etc, but fails to explain why, after such a positive build up on them, they still lost both battles.

Well, two things about this. He doesn't describe them as superior to the French, just that they were not as bad as some have described them. He does suggest reasons for the Prussian defeats, which I alluded to above:
Failure to co-ordinate the different arms (by comparison with the French)
Fighting at Jena at all (Napoleon caught Hohenloe out of position at Jena, who wasn't expecting to fight at all – Petre goes through this)
The French simply outfought them – even when very hard pressed, key French formations simply kept on fighting (e.g. Lannes and Gudin).
The fog causing more problems for the Prussian commanders in co-ordinating the attacks at Auerstadt than for Davout defending, whose units were then able to defeat the uncoordinated Prussian attacks in detail

The fact that you say in No 4 in your list, 'the main mistake they made was fighting at Jena at all', suggests that they were as not good or as organised or as progressive as the author makes them out to be in 1806. That suggests the so called negative historians may have been right after all, otherwise, as I said before, the Prussians would surely have won one of the two battles?

Well, battles may be lost for many reasons, not simply tactical inefficiency. PH's argument is that the causes of the Prussian defeat lie far more in other factors – the planning, leadership nd co-ordination in which the French Army was so strong – than superiority of French infantry and artillery at the tactical level.

You mention he juxaposes against the many (perhaps overwhelming would be a better word) negative views of the Prussian army (and that's not including the historians and military men offered by 10th Marines), with that of one late historian.

Don't you think that is odd? Just one? It hardly supports his biased viewpoint, does it?

We sort of went round the houses about this before. PH thinks the majority view is wrong and that certain negative statements about the Prussian Army are incorrect. To be fair, he does quote Bressonet in his support (much the same as XV Brigada's above) as well.

The reality is, they lost both battles in 1806 and I get the feeling that the author does not want to accept this and makes feeble excuses for what happened. Using the fog as one excuse, is a perfect example. He even says the fog wasn't a problem for the French? Well really, that would make them super soldiers, would't it? The phrase 'clutching at straws' comes to mind.

But I guess we will have to agree to disagree on PH's book.

We will have to part on this in friendly disagreement I guess. I just don't see what you are seeing on this – to me, PH emphasizes the crushing nature of the defeat, he has just disagreed with the 'majority' view as to the relative importance of the reasons.

PH does spend some time on this in the book, but it is important to emphasize that the book is far more wide-ranging than a discussion of this point.

@ Turner,

Don't do that, give them to a charity shop or somebody who will be able to see through the strange behaviour of the apparent author here. I feel you are cutting of your nose to spite your face. Your choice, of course, but Hofschroer is one of the few English language writers who knows the subject.

Anyway, the book arrived this morning and though I haven't read it properly yet, I see little wrong with it and tend to agree, at the moment, with Whirlwind.

Turner

I agree with XV Brigada on this. Don't bin the book. No matter what you think about the author or his motives, since I believe the way he acts is more in line of creating publicity and in order to get people talking about his work, than what he might actually believe about other historians.

My view does create a somewhat negative and suspect view of his latest piece of work, but I still think it contains some good bits and is worth keeping. I am certainly keeping my copy, even though I disagree with Whirlwind's positive view of the title.

Whirlwind

I agree that, despite my mainly negative view on PH's latest book, there is still some good stuff in the title and I think people should buy it and make up their own minds. And I would certainly not recommend or advise those it might disappoint, to bin the title.

But, as with his 'Prussian Victory' publicity nonsense, he does contradict himself again, only not so clearly this time. For example, I still think the fog is a convenient excuse for the Prussians failing to win either battle in 1806, especially since he considers the same fog not being a problem for the French! Going by what PH says, it must have been a form of anti-Germanic weather, a French secret weapon, or as I suggested earlier, the French could see in the fog?

And I still find it highly suspect that he should use up two whole pages in such a short book displaying the negative (and therefore according to PH, incorrect) views, while only offering one positive viewpoint, and that from someone not known for his work on the Napoleonic period.

Since he felt he did not need to include the positive views of historians (or could not find any) then surely he could have said all he wanted in one paragraph. You do have to question his reasoning as to why he felt so compelled to pull down such well known authors and historians. Perhaps a hint of jealousy, who knows.

And yes, I'm glad you agree on the suggestion of parting on friendly disagreement terms and both of us accepting (although obviously not agreeing) with each others point of view. If only others could have done this in the past, instead of taking things so personally.

Thanks for the review, Whirlwind. That kind of thoughtful commentary is what I was waiting for!

Gazzola and XV Brigada,

Thanks for the advice but the books were thrown out this afternoon.In my opinion the man his deranged and I wouldn't like him to influence other no matter how much he knows about the Prussians. I note he has is admirers and I repect their opinions but I for one have given up on his fixations.

Turner

"Thanks for the review, Whirlwind. That kind of thoughtful commentary is what I was waiting for!"

Seconded! Job well done on a comprehensive, unbiased review. I'll add this book to my wish list.

Thanks again, Whirlwind!

@ Turner,

Pity. I have a copy of Mein Kampf which I have no intention of throwing away, though I think even less of Herr Hitler than I do Herr Hofschroer:-)

@ Whirlwind,

Well, I have finally read the book and my first impressions are as I thought. There is not much wrong with it. For those who have been around a few years and remember EE&L, Courier and other magazines in the 1970s and 1980s it will be familiar stuff.

I have no issue with Hofschröer quoting from various writers to set out his stall, but would say a couple of things. The first is that it his book and he can write what he likes. Second, it actually takes up about a page, the rest of the two being taken up by the title of the book and a picture of the old Frederick the Great attributed to Richard Knötel, which, I am fairly sure, is actually by Carl Röchling.

The second is that none of the writers Hofschröer holds responsible for peddling what he calls ‘received wisdom' are, I would say, Prussian army specialists. I had never heard of Martin Kitchen and had to look him up! Similarly the ‘late' Sebastian Haffner was new to me. I was relieved to find that both are better known for 20th German history, especially The Third Reich and the First World War neither of which interest me very much, which rather explains my unfamiliarity.

I would not consider either Chandler or Elting, two other ‘late' authors, who will be well known to every reader, I expect, as authorities as far as the Prussian army is concerned, but as popular writers they are probably as responsible as any for the 'received wisdom' of which Hofschröer complains. Fuller, another ‘late' author, is not a writer I would resort to, I think, to make a case, one way or the other about almost anything. Gates is similarly inexpert where the Prussians of 1806 are concerned.

It is ironic that Hofschröer chose Col FN Maude as another writer to castigate because Maude was busy ‘rehabilitating' the Prussian army of 1806 over a hundred years ago, indeed, Hofschröer reviewed Maude's Jena Campaign on Amazon some years ago in these terms;

"Maude's is probably the most authoritative work on the 1806 Campaign published in the English language. Obviously, it does not go into the subject matter in the same depth as the French and German General Staffs, but Maude drew extensively on this material and made it available to the monolingual reader. His account is largely balanced and Maude shows a deep understanding of the issues surrounding this campaign. Maude is certainly more authoritative than his contemporary Petre and the quality of his work has yet to be surpassed by anybody writing in the English language.".

Yes, Maude probably did make a mistake about Vierzehnheiligen but there is enough in Maude, a work well known to an English readership, to make an ‘ally' of him, rather than an ‘enemy'. I am surprised Hofschröer chose not to do so.

In any event history is not decided by a majority vote but it is very likely, I think, that the there is no majority here at all. I would bet that Elting, Chandler, Fuller and most of the others, are merely copying what they saw written somewhere else. I would further bet that a lot of it, if perhaps not all of it, can be traced to Delbrück.

A couple of minor things I would also add.

I am not sure that the Reglement für die Königliche-Preußischen leichte Infanterie 1788 is quite the document Hofschröer would have us believe. It is only a hundred or so pages shorter than the 600-plus page Reglement für die Königlich Preußische Infanterie 1788. Both give most of their space to close order battle drills.

I don't think Hofschröer overemphasises the fog. It was described by both sides but his book is about the Prussians. I do think that Hofschröer could have said something about the ground at Auerstedt because it is so important in explaining how events transpired.

Auerstedt was one of those relatively unusual things, an encounter battle, where the two armies blundered into each other. Not only did the French have a position with secure flanks, but Hassenhuasen is about 200-250 meters above Auerstedt and the Prussian army was already stacked up as it passed through the streets of the latter, before making the climb, piecemeal, through the fog, towards Hassenhausen and the unseen French.

I did find the Hartwig plates interesting though some could have been bigger. You are right that the book is wide-ranging, it is important to remember that it is focused essentially on tactics. Why would Hofschröer waste space writing about 1812 unless there were tactical examples to be drawn from it? As I remember the Prussians did very little.

There is nothing else I would add to your review, or later comments. Where Hofschroer makes a point he produces evidence to support it. This book is much better than the two other titles on Napoleonic tactics and I'd recommend it to anybody.

So nothing new on the Prussian Army form 1792 to 1807 – at least when you are able to read German, which apparently a lot of authors in the past were unable to do,moreover to understand.

About the fog – I was there once in october – and encountered the fog, from brilliant sunhsine – to a sudden bank of fog, and then there was nothing more to do then to go backwards out of it, and then to be suddenly in the sun again.
A re-enactment had to be once stopped because of that – there units got lost and did not any longer know where to go to.
I wish all those playing down the fog in this area, whould have shared the experience.
Otherwise – is there anything on the reserve infantry regiments, how they used their third battalion as Füsiliere – or the Landwehr, did they use a battalion as Füsiler Battalion as well??

Both regulations of 1788 would not be valid any longer for 1806 – one has to read only Jany's Gefechtsausbildung der Infantrie on this to see the continous development of Prussian regulations and tactics.

@ v W,

No, not really very much new, but it is a worthwhile publication that makes the essence of the subject accessible to everybody who speaks English. In that respect it is very worthwhile indeed.

I get the impression that people often tend to view all battlefields as some kind of giant billiard table. A view, perhaps, reinforced by wargames tables that dont reflect terrain very well.

Hofschröer doesn't have much to say about Fusilier battalions in Reserve or Landwehr regiments that I can see, except to say that in 1815 there was an instruction that those Landwehr that had not already designated a light battalion were to do so.

He mentions various Instructions that appeared between 1788 and 1812, but not in any detail.

I agree with you about Jany's Gefechtausbildung, which is one of Hofschröer's sources. I think it can be had on Google these days.

VW

I bet the fog affected the French Napoleonic re-enactors the same as it did those of other nations?

XV Brigada
The quote section actually runs over to the third page, if you look closely! And surely, you are not suggesting that the author could not put in any more than ONE positive viewpoint because of the picture taking up half a page and the large lettering in the title of the book?

As with all authors, he would have had the final say on what should or should not be included. It seems odd that he would prefer an illustration of an old Frederick the Great, sitting in an armchair, rather than offering the readers some positive viewpoints?

He did not need to mention the other authors, but if he believes the overwhelming viewpoints is incorrect, just say he disagrees with it. He could, if they exist, then offering evidence to support his view. As it is, he did neither because he just wanted to have a go at better historians, probably out of jealousy.

the ironic point is – that those who would be in most need to read this book won't read it.

@ v W,

It doesn't matter. There aren't many of them.

I see the fusilier battalion question has been raised in another thread and has been answered by Stephen S and Oliver S.

I must say you can hardly blame them for keeping away from this one, which is now done as far as I'm concerned.

If you want to try your hand at the Prussians in 1806 check hand out our new game, La Bataille d' Halle 1806. It is available free at our website: labataille.me
You may not be able to change history but you could successfully defend a critical river crossing against Bernadotte.

Interesting review of the title on US Amazon.com

Oh dear, I gather someone wasn't too happy with the US review.

I should think, if PH's titles did not sell, then the publisher would soon end their relationship with the author and any plans for future titles.

What Hansi Depp doesn't seem to appreciate or understand is that customers buy products and write reviews based on what they find after purchase. In some cases, the customer finds, in his or her opinion, that the product did not live up to its pre-sales hype and they explain why they think this. Reviews can also help potential customers become aware of the positive or negative aspects of a title that will not be found in per-sales hype or advertisements.

Reviewers do not, despite the pathetic excuses given by some, write negative reviews to affect sales. I can't see anyone spending money for such a stupid purpose. Surely, not buying the title would have more effect? And less Napoleonic sales could lead to less titles in the future, so no true enthusiast is going to write a negative review based on such a feeble reasoning.

At the same time, if customers are prevented from offering their views, then publishers might continue publishing titles that are just not wanted, not good enough and worse, won't sell, which won't help anyone. And those who might be put off by a negative review can spend their cash on other titles, so the sale of Napoleonic titles will not suffer, just those that are not good enough or not as popular.

But obviously, some people don't want reviews to be written, and some are those who do not want potential customers to be aware of anything negative within them. Reviews are a positive aspect and probably only disliked by those with something to hide. After all, no one is forced into buying or not buying a book, and certainly not by a review. Thankfully, customers can make up their own minds.

Maxshadow

I couldn't say for sure if Hansi Depp is PH. But even if he is, and despite the insults, I would not dimiss his books outright. After all, we can agree or disagree with the books and the views and information expressed within them. And we can also ignore the immature actions of the poster.

If the poster is the author, and it would be really sad and pathetic if he was, he is probably posting in order to create publicity for his books, albeit in a negative way. It would also suggest he's probably afraid he has become a has-been and forgotten about. Pitiful is the only word that can be used concerning his actions.

Just a few observations from me if I may;

1. A great deal of Hoffie's angst seems to stem from the fact that he feels he has not recieved sufficient kudos for being a German speaker, so please make all due reference to his ability in this completely unique area;

2. He opens his book with a rather mealy mouthed oblique attack on some military historians of repute, no doubt once again the marketing men have been whispering in his ear….

3. The majority of the historians he criticises have had military experience, some of them operational experience at that. The fact that they dont't happen to read academic German stands light in the balance compared to the experience they will of had at military command. It makes them less prone to the 'x should have know that y would be at z by w time, so why didn't he order p to move to q by u time…'

Personally I think this armchair generalship with 20/20 hindsight is one of PH's flaws that outweighs his amazing gift of German….

Just a few observations from me on your observations if I may.

1. Lots of people speak German sufficient to understand German language material, but not many speak both German and English to a level that they are able to write in the latter language, imparting the fruits of the research they have done in the former. People like you and I whose linguistic skills, I am fairly confident, are limited in comparison, should be pleased that such people make this otherwise inaccessible material available to us. I don't think PH's problem is lack of recognition as a German linguist. I think it is more likely to be that when he presents the results of original research from primary German sources, an unqualified muppet pops up here, or on some other forum, and tells him he's wrong, because some second rate writer wrote something different in an unoriginal work, based on easily available published secondary material. I am not sure it would prompt quite the same apparent response as Hofschroer's, but it would certainly irritate me somewhat. Perhaps most of us are able to suffer fools rather better than Hofschroer is.

2. I think the attack is far from oblique. It is pretty direct, I would say. He tells the reader that these authors are wrong and then he goes on to explain why he thinks they are wrong in the book.

3. The inability to understand German would render even the best historian, regardless of other experience, military or not, unable to make use of material written in that language and incompetent to write on the subject concerned. This seem so obvious that it is hardly worth saying. I am also not sure that the majority of writers Hofschroer mentions actually have had the military experience you claim for them, even fewer operational experience, though the relevance of military experience, operational or otherwise, to writing good military history is debateable. Elting certainly did during WW2, as did Fuller during WW1 whose work, according to Elting, was a ‘pot boiler'. It is not clear to me whether Col Maude had any operational experience but a soldier he clearly was. What experience these people had as commanders is even less clear. Fuller was essentially a staff officer though he did command a brigade post-war. Petre was a civil servant, Delbruck was an academic as are, I think, Gates and Kitchen. David Chandler was also an academic though he did do National Service, commissioned in the Education Corps as I remember. So few, if any, of these people have an advantage over anybody else that makes them less prone to pontificate.

In summary, just because Hofschroer apparently behaves like a fool here does not necessarily make his books less useful, any more than that Maude and Fuller were occultists and associates of Aleister Crowley, and that Fuller was a Fascist, makes their books any less useful. It may, of course, influence people.

@Sparker

Can you please name the historians he is ciritcising and gives quotes?

I disagree that military experience makes you less prone to make unqualified comments on the opertional art of war.

We should be used to sour writers insulting those who disagree with their viewpoints. Sadly, they must really believe they are superior and that everything they write is correct and that their sources material are unquestionable. They believe what they say and don't question their sources, so why should anyone else? A blindfold mentality.

To defend their own self belief (basically an exaggerated sense of self-importance) they throw out terms such as 'idiot tendency' and 'The Mental People.' It does seem odd that such people, supposedly bringing us new material, although most of it is usually already available, feel incapable (or perhaps not confident) enough to let their work do the selling.

And speaking and writing in a certain language does not make someone a better writer, researcher or historian. Anyone thinking that they or anyone else is, is fooling themselves, probably because other writers/historians write better books and are more popular. And the obvious jealousy in these people, always creates anger and the urge to pull other writers and historians down.

They are cowards really, who have no confidence at all in their work and shake and tremble whenever someone dares to challenge or display the negative aspects of their work. That, of course, is one of the reasons they really hate reviews. They can't stand the truth and they can't stand opposing viewpoints.

@Sparker

Can you please name the historians he is ciritcising and gives quotes?

I'm afraid I can't give you a quote as I don't have my copy to hand – from memory, XV Bde's list seems fairly accurate. The reason I say his attack is mealy mouthed is that he does not say they are wrong, rather a convoluted implication they are wrong – something like, and please note I am paraphrasing wildly here for reasons given above; 'Their opinions could be thought to need revising given the brilliant new research I have done in German, because I can read original sources in German, something no other historians, even German ones, have done before. And did I mention I could speak German'

As I say that was only my take on the general gist….

As it happens, PH's biggest ever howler concerned an english language primary source, Wellington's Waterloo Despatch…

I disagree that military experience makes you less prone to make unqualified comments on the opertional art of war.

I confess I'm a little confused by the double negatives here, but if you are saying that actual military experience does not give one an insight into the pressures and considerations of previous military experiences, then I will leave that fatuous statement unchallenged, to stand on its own 'logic'!

@ XV Bde,

I think we are poles apart on this and both have fairly entrenched positions. I do understand your logic, but in your post above you demonstrate a shallow understanding of military operations which, to my mind, invalidates your views on the value of a piece of military histor such as we are discussing.

For example, you write off Fuller' considerable military experience and insight 'because he was essentially a 'staff officer'!– Staff Officers are the very people who are best positioned to understand the relative importance of tactical and strategic decision making and the evolution or revolution of tactical and strategic doctrine!

Perhaps you obtained your views of Staff Officers from watching TV, if so Captain Darling fussing over his lorry load of paper clips would bear little resemblance to Col Fuller planning the first ever successful combined armour-infantry all arms assault at the Battle of Cambrai…

To put it into plainer terms, if a court needed an expert witness on a commander's alleged adoption of new tactics c.f. outdated ones, a GSO1 such as Fuller would be the most credible witness possible…They would have layered formal teaching and practice of the new and old tactics over unit level command experience of implementing the same.

There is nothing mealy mouthed about it I'd say. He says that this is "received wisdom" and that there is a "counter argument for a much more careful analysis of the sources".

That seems pretty frank to me, no implication about it but very straightforward criticism and fair enough.

Hofschroer makes no comment at all about limited language skills of any of the writers he mentions and the inference you draw in that respect is just silly, particularly as Delbruck is German and he identifies Haffner as another German author who, apparently, has done some new and original research.

I think your apparent dislike of Hofschroer is getting the better of you.

Although von W's first language is not English, what he said is perfectly understandable. He does not agree that military experience makes a historian necessarily less prone to fatuous comments and he is clearly right.

You assume I have never been a soldier. For your information I joined the British army as a boy soldier in 1962 and held every rank from lcpl to major during a 33 year career. I know exactly what staff officers do.

For your information I joined the British army as a boy soldier in 1962 and held every rank from lcpl to major during a 33 year career.

I respect your Service; and if it is in any way relevant acknowledge that you served for longer and achieved a higher rank than I did; however, I did not:

assume I have never been a soldier

I simply observed that

in your post above you demonstrate a shallow understanding of military operations

and I stand by that, most typically in your facile writing off of a Staff Officer's role in operations. If you 'know exactly what staff officers do' then you will acknowledge that someone with Fuller's staff record, as a GSO1 would have found that his background, training and experience entirely relevant to his military historical writing.

He says that this is "received wisdom" and that there is a "counter argument for a much more careful analysis of the sources".

You claim that this statement is not 'mealy mouthed' – really?

Hofschroer makes no comment at all about limited language skills of any of the writers he mentions and the inference you draw in that respect is just silly

Yes, of course it was silly…Just an obviously too heavy handed attempt at humour….

I think your apparent dislike of Hofschroer is getting the better of you.

I have never met the gentleman, I'm sure he is perfectly charming. However, I do find the way he consigns any and all critics to the lunatic asylum annoying, and his forensic 20/20 hindsight criticism of long dead heroes, from the comfort and safety of his armchair, without making the least allowance for the stress and responsibility they were operating under, rather grating.

I do not refer to his latest book in this, but rather to his attacks on the Duke of Wellington in his 'Waterloo the German Victory'. He is of course perfectly entitled, after leisurely forensic analysis of the sources, to point out that the Duke, if he had remembered this message and calculated that position course and speed, could have made this appreciation and therefore have been in Paris before breakfast, but he should put it into the appropriate 'field' context.

Which he would have done had he of had any such experience…

@ Sparker,

I really think you ought to stop digging the hole you are in.

First of all, I am not really interested in people's military record and I do not normally parade mine at all. I don't think it is relevant to anything here.

I do need to correct you on a couple of points.

In the first place as I didn't mention military operations I don't know how I could "demonstrate a shallow understanding". I also didn't "write off" Fuller at all.

May I remind you that your initial premise was that the majority of historians cited by Hofschroer "have had military experience". This does not seem to be true. I acknowleged Fuller's military experience clearly enough I thought.

You also wrote about the "experience they (the historians cited by Hofschroer) will of had at military command". I am not sure whether Fuller commanded at battalion level in South Africa but staff officers do not command anything. I did note that he commanded a brigade post-war.

I did not deny that Fuller's experience as a whole might well have been relevant to his historical writing although Elting didn't seem to think so, but some people do not rate Elting very highly either.

So, of the eight named, only three have any significant military experience, of any kind.

We will have to draw a line under our respective understandings of ‘mealy mouthed' and I see no purpose is pursuing it. I think Hofschroer was as frank as he could reasonably be. You, evidently, do not.

I too have never met Hofschroer. He seems to have a ‘split personality'. His books are always worth reading, in my view, but his childish public behaviour is very foolish indeed.

@ Maxshadow,

Oh yes! It is very easy indeed but we must try to remain as objective as humanly possible :-)

I don't remember the specific thread – 2006 is too long ago. Try something last week perhaps.

I do remember his many outbursts while he was still a ‘trusted' member of TMP and subsequent ones under a variety of pseudonyms.

His inability to accept criticism, even simple questions, did him no favours at all.

He seems self-destructive and gives the impression that he is not quite "the full shilling".

Eventually his reputation will get beyond forums. Publishers may not want to be associated with him and he may find himself reduced to the kind of status as the notorious Hamilton-Williams. Unemployable.

That will be a shame.

@Sparker
At least your are honest enough to admit that you cannot give a quote.

About Haffner's military back-ground -

Seiner Auffassung nach erledige jeder Mensch, der in Deutschland lebe, die Arbeit des Regimes, selbst wenn er unpolitisch beschäftigt sei. So begründete Haffner seinen Entschluss zur Emigration. Um Deutschland leichter verlassen und in Großbritannien – das aufgrund der anhaltenden Weltwirtschaftskrise eine verhältnismäßig restriktive Emigranten- und Flüchtlingspolitik vertrat – leichter einreisen zu können, ließ er sich im August 1938 mit einem Auftrag der Ullstein-Presse nach England schicken. Dort erklärte er mit Verweis auf seine Verlobung mit Erika Landry, die in Deutschland als Jüdin galt (nach Haffners Auffassung zu Unrecht, nur aufgrund eines bürokratischen Versehens), dass er nicht nach Deutschland zurückkehren könne, und erbat das Asylrecht. Er erhielt zunächst eine vorläufige Aufenthaltserlaubnis für ein Jahr. Haffner befürchtete die Ausweisung, aber innerhalb jenes Jahres brach der Zweite Weltkrieg aus.

so – NONE

and Martin Kitchen

Martin Kitchen (December 21, 1936, Nottingham, England) is a British-Canadian historian, specialized in modern European history, with an emphasis on Germany. Professor Emeritus of history at Simon Fraser University, he started teaching in 1966. He also taught at the Cambridge Group for Population Studies (Cambridge University).

He was educated at Magdalen College, Oxford and the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at the University of London. Throughout his career, Kitchen has served in several editorial boards such as the International History Review, the Canadian Journal of History / Annales canadiennes d'histoire and International Affairs. Kitchen's work has been translated into German, Polish, Portuguese, Spanish, Korean and Chinese. He is internationally regarded as a key author for the study of contemporary history.

so most likley no military experience either.

So your attack against Peter Horschröer's alledged attack – is based on immagination.

Otherwise I agree with XV Brigada

The list of historian PH implicitly criticises on pages 4-5 of Elite 182 are, in order of appearance:

Elting, Col. US Army;
David Chandler, Lt RAEC and long time lecturer at RMAS;
Maj Gen JFC Fuller, British Army General Staff Officer;
Delbruck;
Kitchen;
Col FN Maude, British Army;
Petre;
Gates;
and Haffner.

In short 4 of the 9 have actual military experience of the chain of command, of the role and responsibilities of comanders, and the way things get snafud in the field.

So if my belief that these 4 have relevant military experience which will have informed their history is my imagination, I see no point in continuing this thread.

At least we seem to agree on something!

Sparker

I found PH offering the late Sebastian Haffner as the single 'positive' viewpoint on the Prussian Army, as a very odd choice? But he was probably the only one PH could find that wrote something that he felt could support his viewpoint.

Haffner was more known for his nonacademic history books for a general audience and mainly covered Prussian history 1870 onwards and the later World Wars. From what I can see, he was not known for anything particular on the Napoleonic period.

Haffner's (real name Raimund Pretzel) background was journalism and his outlook on history had a journalistic bent. One source states that he believed that a journalist's job was to 'dramatise' routine political events. That ties in well with PH's tendency to dramatise everything.

In Haffner's book The Rise and Fall of Prussia there is very little on the Napoleonic period, which seems even more odd, since we are led to believe, according to PH, that the Prussians were an important, if not vital part of the Napoleonic period. The Chronological Table in Haffner's book actually jumps from 1802 to 1819, which suggests that the author believes there wasn't much to say about the Prussians during the Napoleonic period. As I say, a very odd choice but perhaps not unexpected.

John,

Great post-very informative and well done.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Hi Kevin

Thanks for that. It is just so annoying when people, in order to sell their titles, come out claiming to offer Napoleonic enthusiasts new or updated information, when most of what they offer is already available. It is just a selling ploy employed by the worse of writers at the expense of the customer.

Most of what PH offers can be found on Napoleonic websites and books like Schmidt's Osprey on Prussian Regular Infantry, and that was out 7 years ago! It is a shame he didn't write the Osprey Prussian Tactics title. And to attempt to pull down other Napoleonic authors, probably out of spite and jealousy, is plain stupidity and arrogance.

But I suppose we've seen it all before and will see it again and sadly, people who can't cope with those who have different viewpoints, will keep banging their heads against the wall. Well, it's their headache and we can only offer them pity, which is all they deserve really.

Anyway, enough of the clowns. I wish a happy and healthy Christmas to all true Napoleonic enthusiasts, wherever and whoever you are.

Hi Gazzola,

Thanks for the info about Haffner – from what little I know of Prussian history I would certainly agree that skipping the Napoleonic wars, particularly the period from 1806-7, the military and social reforms and so on, is odd.

I don't know if you have read 'The Iron Kingdom', by Christopher Clark, I found it a very readable history of Prussia, and he certainly sees this period as something of a watershed….

Perhaps an example of a modern historian who doesn't have to resort to revisionist melodrama to peddle his books?

Thanks for your seasons greetings and may I also echo them to fellow Napoleonic enthusiasts!

So far I encountered only three auhtors who published in English worthwile publications about the Prussian Army :

Hofschröer
Schmidt
Summerfeld

Sparker in case you are genuinly interested in that topic you cannot avoid German sources or stick to the above authors.

'The Iron Kingdom' is essentially a social history.

von Winderfeldt,

Thank you for the recommendations; for reasons I have covered ad infinitum on TMP I believe anything written by PH to be seriously flawed, and the poor spelling and tortuous English that seems to dog anything published by Summerfield is bad for my blood pressure!

I will certainly see if there is anything by Schmidt in English available….

'The Iron Kingdom' is essentially a social history

XV Brigada, along with your dismissal of JFC Fuller as 'only a staff officer' you seem to be something of a dab hand at glib but hilariously inaccurate put downs…

I must assume you haven't read 'The Iron Kingdom', except perhaps to see how well it accorded with your cherished shibboleths, perhaps this recommendation can convince you to reassess this political, military and social history:

'The history of Prussia is one that has been told many times, but seldom as intelligently, elegantly and interestingly as it is here…a monumental history'

That was by Richard Overy, who is of course required reading both at RMAS and BRNC…

In particular, see p373 for a pithy but convincing assessment of the effectiveness of the post reform army…

Now you are just being rude.

How is Sparker being rude?

I believe his contributions are always logical and well-presented.

Just because one poster disagrees with another does not make him rude.

Sincerely,
Kevin

I completely agree that Oliver Schmidt's work on the Prussians is not only excellent, but it is invaluable.

Others who have greatly contributed to understanding of the Prussian army of the period are Peter Paret, William Shanahan, Gordon Craig, and Charles White. Further, Chris Bassford and Greg Pedlow have also contributed valued material on the Prussians of the period.

Together, these seven historians have contributed an immense amount of material on the Prussians that greatly helps to understand the Prussian army and the Prussian state.

And thanks to the recommendation of The Iron Kingdom by Sparker I've just ordered it.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Hi Kevin,

Thanks for the 'time on target' – 'Mission complete, Tgt neutralised'!

I hope you enjoy 'The Iron Kingdom' as much as I did.

Kind Regards,

Sparker

How is Sparker being rude?

Sparker is rude when he states you seem to be something of a dab hand at glib but hilariously inaccurate put downs….
Whether he is just being rude is something intelligent, honest people can disagree.

Which is another way of saying I'm disappointed
in Sparker.

I honestly don't see how being ex-modern military (and by modern here I mean experience of WW2 and after) necessarily gives anyone a better understanding of Napoleonic warfare. It might just as easily skew it, assuming continuties which don't in fact exist.

Regards