"Hof's Prussian Napoleonic Tactics" Topic

"As the saying goes – history doesn't repeat itself, but historians repeat each other."

good saying.

One thing is certain, PH has looked longer and harder at this subject than anyone posting on this thread.

Perhaps historians become repetitive because they have come to the same conclusions after seeing and evaluating primary evidence individually.

Schlieffen and Hopfner certainly were of one mind as to the reasons for the Prussian defeat in 1806.

Roche-Aymon, Prince August, Frederick William III, and Generals Witzleben, Wachholtz,and Schmidt came to similar conclusions about the problems the Prussian army had and was faced with.

And of course Scharnhorst firmly believed that the Prussian army had to be reformed before 1806 if it was to stand a chance against the French.

There is plenty of evidence available to look at and evaluate, and it seems to me that some very eminent historians of the period, such as Paret, White, Col Elting, and Craig came to the same conclusions, not in agreement with each other, but by evaluating the evidence that they found in their research.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Wir haben hier einen Fall des beliebten "Beweises durch ständige Wiederholung" = Here we have a case of the popular "proof by repetition"?

Whirlwind

The problem is that PH is not doing what you and some others try to make out he is doing. His main aim appears to be using any chance he can put down anyone with a negative viewpoint on the Prussians.

I can accept his passion for the Prussians but not his 'desire' to pull everyone down that disagrees with him. You can't go around saying 'everyone is wrong but me' without offering evidence to support it. And, in my opinion, he does not offer enough evidence to support his biased viewpoint

And we must remember that the negative viewpoints have not just come from fresh air, like PH's research seems to have done. The people have done their homework. It is no use PH and others trying to 'persuade' us that they have just repeated the same stuff. Evidence is what will persuade us, not hot air! And sadly, there is just not enough evidence in his book, but plenty of Hoffie hot air.

If he has the evidence and positive quotes, he should have included them. The main positive thing he has done is not to contradict himself, as he did in his failed Prussian Victory attempt. But I suppose, on the positive side, he does get us talking about the Prussians, so that is a little victory for him, since no one else seems to be talking about them.

@ Whirlwind,

The point about repetition is well enough made. Some Post-war historians made their reputations copying each other.

I await Hofschroer's book with interest though I doubt it will have very much new to say.

Gazzola,

The guys always been a clown and I dare say he always will be he has is group of followers who have their opinion and look upon him as some devine being.

If however you look at his record he is banned from various forums for his attitude to people who disagree with him his insults and tantrums.

The editor should have by knowrealised that when ever his name or works are mentioned suddenly a new name apears on the forum this time it's Hansi Depp who will probably be non other than Hofschroer.

The problem is that PH is not doing what you and some others try to make out he is doing. His main aim appears to be using any chance he can put down anyone with a negative viewpoint on the Prussians.

Well it seems odd if that is his primary aim. I took it from your review that his main aim was to say that the reason the Prussians were so heavily defeated was not because of any outmoded regimental tactical doctrine but because of poor high-level strategy and leadership? Since this viewpoint is opposed to that of most previous histories of the conflict it isn't surprising that he is critical of those historians?

To put it in more familiar terms, I don't think Kevin's main aim is to put down anyone with a negative viewpoint on the French, but he genuinely believes that a deep understanding of Napoleonic warfare leads inexorably to a wide admiration of most facets of the French military of the period. Similarly PH seems to genuinely believe that the Prussian Army of the period has been slighted and misunderstood by authors writing about the period and so it isn't unsurprising that he is critical of them?

Regards

I took it from your review that his main aim was to say that the reason the Prussians were so heavily defeated was not because of any outmoded regimental tactical doctrine but because of poor high-level strategy and leadership

As opposed to others who have blamed both, obviously.

Gazzola – a question for you:

Has your opinion of the effectiveness of Prussian Infantry in the 1806-07 campaign changed since reading PH's book?

Regards

Whirlwind

I was hoping PH's book would enlighten me. It didn't. And, although it is interesting in some places, I felt it contained nothing really new and he was doing what he accuses others of, repetition, albeit condensed into one short title.

So, to answer your question, the answer is no, my opinion on the Prussians has not changed after reading his Osprey title. But my opinion, despite what Hansi Depp (whoever he is) probably wants to believe, has not been a negative one.

I've always felt that they fought well in all the campaigns they were involved in. However, I also feel that victories are gained by a mixture of factors, which includes one of the opponents doing the right thing, and the other not doing the right thing, plus the quality and actions of the commanders and leadership at the time and the fighting qualities of the troops at the time. Then there are the terrain, weather and supply situation factors to take into consideration.

If the French beat the Prussians, then the French had most of the factors in their favour and if the Prussians beat the French, then most of the factors were probably in their favour. I feel that goes for all battles and campaigns. And how did I come to this conclusion – a lot of it by reading the material of those that PH vainly tries to persuade us are incorrect in their views on the Prussians. Funny that isn't it. Perhaps, like Dicky Depp he can't read English very well?

'On the other hand I don't think many people are fooled that the OP was anything other than mendacious, disguised as an innocent post. Gazolla did the same thing when Mr Hollin's last book appeared.'

Nonsense.

John is commenting on new Napoleonic books that are coming out and what he likes or dislikes about them. To accuse him of something else is not only wrong, but not able to be proven.

I believe that John's comments are not only welcome but it can lead to a worthwhile discussion.

Unfortunately, when the discussion degenerates to the level of making pejorative remarks about different members then the discussion is no longer enjoyable either to participate in or to read.

Perhaps we can get back to the Prussians in 1806 and leave out the personal remarks?

It would be nice for a change.

Sincerely,
Kevin

XV Brigada

The DESIRED RULE OF XV BRIGADA

If a new book appears on the scene members must NOT make any negative comments about it. And they must certainly not dare do a negative review, no matter what faults they may find within the text. Anyone doing so will be considered as having a grudge against the author.

Ho hum, sadly some people's views never change.

10th Marines

Thanks for the supporting post. It did, for a moment, look like it was going to become an interesting discussion. But it seems that for some people, it is much easier to insult those who may challenge or disagree with their views, rather than debate or discuss anything with them, unless, of course, you agree with everything they say right from the start.

But sadly, I think it is time to stop talkiing about PH's latest piece of work and the Prussians. I think that'll hurt Hansi Depp (whoever he is ) more than any further negative comments or questions. And also sadly, XV Brigada will always prefer to believe the worst of people and that those making negative comments, do so because they have it in for the author.

John,

You are correct. The discussion is usually over when the insults begin. It is also an indicator that those who start throwing the insults have lost the argument/discussion.

Sincerely,
Kevin

As it looks like the discussion is over, let me ask a question: in your informed opinion, which was the major cause of Prussian defeat in 1806? Was it a tactical advantage possessed by the French at battalion level? Or was it strategical, and a by-product of a better command and control skills and organization in the part of the French?

By the way, I wouldn't put too much weight on Scharnhorst's remarks regarding the Prussian army. He had, after all, an invested interest in making it look worst than it really was. He was a reformer, and most probably overstated his case in order to strength his arguments.

'…I wouldn't put too much weight on Scharnhorst's remarks regarding the Prussian army. He had, after all, an invested interest in making it look worst than it really was. He was a reformer, and most probably overstated his case in order to strength his arguments.'

Bas,

I don't agree with this assessment of Scharnhorst and his work and motives at all. First, his 'assessments' before 1806 were certainly on the money, and, second, unless there is something that actually proves this about Scharnhorst's motives for reform and his assessments, then it is merely conjecture.

You're not the first person, though, to say this about Scharnhorst. We'll have to agree to disagree on this one.

The cause of the Prussian defeat in 1806, and I've said this before, was a combination of factors-not just one. The Prussian doctrine and tactical system was outmoded and not effective against a modern system. The artillery arm was inefficient, largely the fault of Frederick the Great, and the continued use, for example, of battalion guns was a waste of effort. The Prussian staff organization and functioning was both outmoded and inefficient and that affected the command and control of the army. The generals were too old and there was, in effect, no unity of command in the Prussian army in the field. The Prussian cavalry was not the effective battlefield force that it had been under Frederick and overall Prussian training was not much more than parade ground maneuvers and there was little, if any, training for the three combat arms to coordinate on the battlefield.

Some reforms were attempted before the war started in 1806, but at best they were partial (such as some infantry battalions being trained 'in the French manner') and the adoption of the division organization, though it was the all-arms division that the French had abandoned in 1800.

I don't believe that a complete military failure and collapse, such as happened to Prussia in 1806-especially in so short a time-can ever be blamed on one area only. The Prussian senior leaderships refusal to completely reform the army, as was urged by the group of reformers prior to 1806, affected the entire army, its training, doctrine, organizatin, and tactics.

Sincerley,
Kevin

10th Marines

A shame really that people ruined everything by turning to personal abuse because, in some ways, it is still a good book. I know I was pleased with it when I first read it. But when you examine it carefully you realise it does not really contain anything new. Most of the information is already available elsewhere.

For example, someone posted that they were unaware of the Prussians using solid squares against cavalry, but that information has been available for some time. And it can be found quite quickly on the net, such as on sites like napoleonistka.atspace.com

I guess the positive thing about the book is that it manages to condense the information into one small volume, which was one of the reasons I felt the author should not have wasted two whole pages on having a dig at well known historians.

So, overall, still a title worth owning. And I do hope it sells well because, if anything, it might just lead to Osprey producing titles covering the Russian and Austrian Napoleonic tactics in the not too distant future.

John,

Agree. I have the book and have found it to be useful also. We have just seen another tempest in a teapot, which is unfortunate.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Maxshadow

Your comment on PH using obsolete jargon makes you wonder if he also uses obsolete research, since most of what he offered had already been available on websites for some time!

But more importantly, let's hope Turner can laugh him off like the rest of us and he sticks around.

@ Maxshadow,

There are several strands to this.

First there is Hofschroer the writer, who is well informed, whose writing has always been useful and who, at one time, was the only person writing authoritatively on the Prussians in English.

Second there is Hofschroer the writer whose ego seems to be such that he is unable to respond sensibly to any kind of challenge, who cannot admit to the possibility that he is mistaken about anything, and whose reaction to criticism has always been either defensive, aggressive or entirely negative.

On the other hand, he is not the only writer, to have a pretty well developed ego such that they believe themselves the founts of all knowledge and wisdom, so he is not unique by any means.

I also have some sympathy with his irritation when he is challenged by people who know next to nothing about the subject and who seem to rely on some third rate book which has seen better days, and who are not really interested in debate or dialogue anyway. Why bother with these people?

The answer is not to bother with them, but the third Hofschroer, is the fool who cannot resist the bait dangled in front of him and who, rather than ignore uninformed them, reacts with childish abuse that, in the end, harms only himself. I expect a lot more people read TMP than actually post on it.

So Gazzy, who cannot read German, explains why Hoffie, who can read German, (has) not interpreted German sources correctly.

Sigh.

The problem is that the French primary and secondary sources don't agree with some of the German primary and secondary sources and both sides were equally eye-witnesses to the events.

I don't remember anyone, whatever they think of PH personally, denying that he can translate German or that he knows more about the Prussian Army than nearly everyone else on the planet.

"The problem is that the French primary and secondary sources don't agree with some of the German primary and secondary sources and both sides were equally eye-witnesses to the events. "

In what way? Bressonnet and Jany are pretty similiar in their view about the Prussian army of 1806 – one is French the other German.

Hansi Depp – whoever he is – has some very good analysations and there is nothing wrong with :

Wir haben hier einen Fall des beliebten "Beweises durch ständige Wiederholung"

"The problem is that the French primary and secondary sources don't agree with some of the German primary and secondary sources and both sides were equally eye-witnesses to the events. "

Well someone help me out here. There is a tradition, crudely put, that the Prussian Army was barely out of the SYW, that (controversially) their infantry couldn't skirmish and was shot down in rows etc and needed an age to manoeuvre etc, that (less controversially) its much vaunted cavalry didn't quite live up to expectations and its brigade/divisional wasn't all it coud have been, and that (uncontroversially) the Prussian direction of the war at Army level and higher was a recipe for disaster, with a reaasonable mount of bad fortune – is that an unfair summary of the disagreements?

Now PH has previously shown that in fact there were plenty of Prussian skirmishers – Bill H was on about it last year sometime IIRC. However, Kevin's postings have show that not only do French apologists hink that there were severe problems with the tactical performance of the Prussian infantry , but a reasonaby wide selection of voices from the period. The tactical reforms post 1807 are also suggestive, if not conclusive, that the Prussians thought that their infantry tactics were not all they could have been.

Wir haben hier einen Fall des beliebten "Beweises durch ständige Wiederholung" – it might be so, it depends on what precisely you think is being repeated. If it is meant that "the Prussian Infantry was no different from that of their fathers in 1763" then it is demonstrably false (and PH has already done so convincingly). If it is referring to "Prussian infantry were not the tactical equals of their French opponents", then that is a much more difficult proposition to refute, and what the French thought of their opponents then becomes much more important, is that not so?

Regards

'However, Kevin's postings have show that not only do French apologists hink that there were severe problems with the tactical performance of the Prussian infantry , but a reasonaby wide selection of voices from the period.'

And who, exactly, are these 'French apologists'?

If I recall correctly, the French won in 1806 and quite convincingly.

So what do the French have to apologize for?

Sincerely,
Kevin

"If it is referring to "Prussian infantry were not the tactical equals of their French opponents", then that is a much more difficult proposition to refute, and what the French thought of their opponents then becomes much more important, is that not so?"

I would not say that they were equals to the French but that they had all necessary tactical options to beat the French.
Why don't those who are interested in a more balanced view just read Napoleon's Apogee, the translation of Bressonnet, or at least page 337??
and then read Jany's Gefechtsformen to get an idea how the Prussians fought in 1806 (Bressonnet is not that strong on Prussian tactics there he seemingly relied on Höpfner only)

Im my view you must at least read Jany : Gefechtsformen der Infanterie (and not volume III about the history of the Prussian army) as well as Bressonnet – to be able to form a good opinion.

"When we think that the vanquished of 1806 were the same who inflicted upon us the setbacks in 1813, 1814, and 1815, and when we see at Jena and Auerstädt the energetic attitude of old survivors of the true Frederician era, like Field-Marshal von Möllendorf, we cannot help but think that the same army commanded by similar men would have ment with a totally different fortune."
Napoleon's Apogee, page 337.

Otherwise I am not reading any mails of 10th M – there – like Napoleon – I am not inclined to waste my time.

Kevin,

"French apologists" referring to those who typically favour the French: say Houssaye, Elting and Lachoque et al and typically prefer/believe French sources rather than those from the coalition. But, in this instance, as you have pointed out, the criticism of the Prussian infantry's tactical abilities has been quite wide.

If I recall correctly, the French won in 1806 and quite convincingly.

A fact which no-one has doubted. The subject being discussed was whether faulty Prussian infantry tactics contributed substantially to that defeat or whether they did not. French sources thinking they did is suggestive but hardly conclusive, especially if they have mischaracterised the nature of those tactics.

So what do the French have to apologize for?

Nothing. I was on about "apologists for the French" rather than "French apologizing".

Regards

On further reflection, I withdraw and apologize for my remark about "French apologists" – it has the wrong tone. I merely mean those authors who have either focussed most heavily upon the French Army, and/or those who have generally considered it superior to most or all of their allied opponents during most of the wars. I do not mean to imply that they are invariably incorrect or biased.

Regards

Someone who 'favors' the French is not an apologist for them.

Col Elting definitely is not-he was an accomplished historian who knew his business and studied the period for a very long time.

He drew conclusions from his research and though he admired the Grande Armee and Napoleon, he was not above criticizing both when they deserved it.

And Col Elting didn't 'prefer/believe French sources rather than those from the coaltion.'

I would suggest you actually take a look at his work and his source material and figure out what Col Elting actually said and talked about.

Sincerely,
Kevin

WW,

Well said and well done.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Von Winterfeld,

Who translated the work Napoleon's Apogee ?

John,

It seems to me that established historians and scholars such as Gordon Craig, William Shanahan, Charles White, and Peter Paret-all of whom are German-speakers, have done milestone work on the Prussian Army, and know what they are talking about.

Charles White was given access to East German-held material in the 1980s and Shanahan and Craig both worked in Germany before War II and had access to the German/Prussian archival material.

And as none of them apparently had an axe to grind for the Napoleonic period because they are all American historians, they perhaps give an unbiased viewpoint and are valuable historians and their published material is very valuable in studying the Prussians in 1806 as well as through 1815.

Further, Chris Bassford, Greg Pedlow, Gary Cousins and John Hussey have done excellent work on Waterloo, Clausewitz, and the controversies surrounding the Waterloo campaign between the British and the Prussians and who did what to whom regarding credit for the allied victory.

So, excellent historical inquiry has been done for quite some time with logical conclusions being made. And instead of criticizing the people, if one doesn't agree with their conclusions, then post something to support an opposite point of view.

All personal attacks do is minimize the value or opinions of the attacker and tends to irritate the rest of the forum to no purpose. Historical inquiry and criticism of opinions and stances are what should be conducted, not personal attacks of other forum members.

Sincerely,
Kevin

'He suggests that the Revolutionary French did not introduce large-scale effecive skirmishing tactics-page 7'

John,

I missed this comment on page 7 of the subject book the first time through and find it as interesting as you do.

The first mention of employing light infantry with line infantry that I have found originates with de Saxe in the 1740s.

Christopher Duffy mentions in his The Military Experience in the Age of Reason that the French were thinking about it at the end of the Seven Years' War and that the infantry experiments that Marshal de Broglie conducted in Normandy in the 1770s definitely employed columns supported by regular light infantry in skirmish order.

So, it appears that the French were both talking about the practice before the end of the Seven Years' War and experimenting with it in the field by the mid- to late-1770s.

Also noteworthy, I think, is when the Prussians actually implemented use of light infantry as regular troops, they had to have a written regulation for the process. The French, on the other hand, developed their use of skirmishers in large numbers, much larger than the Prussians did and as an offensive weapon supporting attacks by infantry in closed column without written regulations or instructions and didn't have one army-wide for the entire period 1792-1815.

Sincerely,
M

Scott Bowden was the translator

Thanks Kevin.

Von Winterfld
Intersting normally Scott Bowden an author who has writen some excellent books is insulted for his work by many yet in this case he seems to have got it right, do you happen to have a copy of Bressonnets original work? or are you relying on the translation.

'He suggests that, at Jena, the Prussians did really well, considering they were outnumbered, although such praise seems to clash with the fact that they didn't do so well at Auerstadt when they outnumbered the French 2-1.'

French strength at Jena was approximately 96,000 to 48,000 Prussians and Saxons. However, about 40,000 French were not committed to the action.

French casualties were 'slightly over 5,000'; Prussian casualties were about 11,000 killed and wounded plus 15,000 prisoners and the loss of 200 guns and 30 colors.

Ruchel didn't arrive on the field until 1400, having left Weimar at 1000-a distance of six miles. While initially doing well against the French upon arrival, his force was broken up and routed.

At Auerstadt, where Davout was outnumbered more than two-to-one, the French incurred almost 8,000 casualties, 3500 of them being in Gudin's division. The Prussians lost about 12,000 killed and wounded, 3,000 prisoners, and 115 guns.

At the end of the campaign, which lasted for three weeks, the Prussians had lost 140,000 men as prisoners, 800 field pieces, and 250 flags.

Sincerely,
Kevin

'He later explains that the Prussians had been modernising during the peace period and in 1806 did well at times using 'non-Frederickian tactics' – page 40'

The Prussians were reforming their army during the period 1789-1806, but slowly and somewhat reluctantly. Some Prussian battalions, including the gredadier battalion that Clausewitz was assigned to had trained 'in the French manner' and also did well in combat, as Clausewitz's battalion did.

However, the artillery was not reformed and performed poorly overall in 1806. Battalion guns were still being used and there was little coordination between the infantry and artillery on the battlefield.

The general staff had been changed from Frederick's day, thanks to Massenbach, but staff operations during the three-week Jena campaign were poor.

There is a case to be made that reforms were both attempted and accomplished-such as the decision to reorganize the army into divisions, but not enough was done and in many respects the Prussian army of 1806 was the 'ghost' of Frederick's Prussian army of 1756-1763 which, by the way, won only about half of its battles and the main reason Prussia and Frederick survived was because of Russian withdrawal from the war because of the death of Tsarina Elizabeth.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin

Great posts as usual. I think some people just want to pull down some historians and authors by suggesting they have their facts wrong or did not do their research properly. This is basically an insult, especially if the person doing the attacking does not offer anything to support their disguised insult.

Sadly, I think there are those who do it, in an attempt to suggest they are the only ones who undertake proper research and readers should believe everything they write. It might fool some people, but it won't fool those who look past their disguised insults and are aware that people like PH have not really produced anything new at all.

If only people like PH would spend their time trying to offer something new to our knowledge about the Prussians. That would be very welcome I'm sure by everyone. And in terms of Napoleonic enthusiasts and wargamers I've not come across anyone that has a really negative view about them. But again, as I said before, at least Hansi Depp or PH, despite the personal attacks, has got us talking about the Prussians.

@ Turner,

Pascal Bressonnet's ‘Études Tactiques' is a very interesting work produced by the French General Staff. It was published posthumously by Historical Section in 1909. I think it is one of the most convincing tactical studies on the Napoleonic period ever written. It has an air of authority being written, by a serving French officer, at a time when armies still moved by foot and horse.

He used French sources, of course, as well a number of Prussian/German staff publications, including Höpfner's and Lettow-Vorbeck's which are footnoted where they are used. He also alludes to the anonymous "L'historien allemande" who is thought to be Jany.

What you will not find in Bressonnet are any of the disparaging, throw-away, remarks of the kind made by popular English language modern writers such as Elting and Chandler, and others. It is very unfortunate that the inexpert and inaccurate remarks of these people have coloured our views today.

Bressonnet said many things about the Prussians but as far as their infantry was concerned he thought there was not much to choose between them and the French; "Ainsi que nous l'avons dit déjà, nous pouvons affirmer dès maintenant que la tactique élémentaire de l'infanterie prussienne ne la plaçait pas, a priori, dans une situation d'inferiorité très prononcée vis-à-vis de l'armée francaise."

I only have an original French edition of Bressonnet and if you are asking about the accuracy of Mr Bowden's translation, I'm afraid I cannot comment. Perhaps von W can.

I would not characterise criticism as an insult necessarily. If you write and publish, I would say that criticism comes with the job. I have only ever read Bowden's stuff on the ACW, which is always interesting but is a war about which I am inexpert.

I'm still waiting for a copy of Hofschroer's Osprey and will reserve judgement but I fear that, for several reasons, dialogue and discussion about it here is always going to be a waste of time.

Bill

When your mot hits a brain
And goes straight down the drain
That's T-M-P
When they want to shine
But instead they just whine
That's T-M-P

sorry Dean…

Bill,

Many thanks for the information, I only have Bowdens work on Waterloo which I find useful.

Turner

'What you will not find in Bressonnet are any of the disparaging, throw-away, remarks of the kind made by popular English language modern writers such as Elting and Chandler, and others. It is very unfortunate that the inexpert and inaccurate remarks of these people have coloured our views today.'

I don't suppose that you could expound and expand on that remark?

I have found throught the years of study that some people would rather be verbose than blunt, especially when blunt is called for.

I also find it very interesting that you made such a remark about both John Elting and Chandler when you engage in what you are criticizing. That's hypocritical.

'I would not characterise criticism as an insult necessarily. If you write and publish, I would say that criticism comes with the job.'

I completely agree and I don't believe that criticism is insult at all-as long as no insult is intended. And you are exactly correct that if you write, you should expect criticism.

By the way, what have you published?

Sincerely,
K

'In the end, he disagrees with a 'traditional' view of the Prussian Army 1806 – other writers like Kevin will maintain that traditional stance.'

And what, exactly, is that 'traditional stance?' That the Prussians lost badly and why?

I don't have a 'traditional' view of military history. I do my own research and come to my own conclusions.

Sincerely,
Kevin

There was some discussion of this topic on this thread:

TMP link

It starts off with more focus on the Russians and the Austrians, the Prussians are discussed from the middle onwards.

Regards

Some discussion of it also at the Napoleon Series

link

Regards

What I hate of threads like this is that after a few messages the discussion degenerates in a "you said-I said" catfight, while the original point -i.e. the reasons after the Prussian defeat of 1806- is left aside as unimportant.

I wonder if it wouldn't be easier just to stick to the known facts and discuss after them, instead repeating ad nauseam that Mr. Whatever behaves like a moron -which, by the way, is so evident that not further comment should be needed!-.

What I hate of threads like this is that after a few messages the discussion degenerates in a "you said-I said" catfight, while the original point -i.e. the reasons after the Prussian defeat of 1806- is left aside as unimportant.

I wonder if it wouldn't be easier just to stick to the known facts and discuss after them, instead repeating ad nauseam that Mr. Whatever behaves like a moron -which, by the way, is so evident that not further comment should be needed!-.

While I agree with you in principle, I'm just not sure it works like that in practice…

Especially as the author of the book being reviewed is assumed to be the one that people are demanding to be banned. Some of the posters can't see each other because of the stifles. Some of the posters here "have history".

And, as far as I can tell, each side thinks the other is utterly unreasonable.

Regards

I wonder if it wouldn't be easier just to stick to the known facts and discuss after them

I'm not sure that the facts are that much in dispute, really. PH and others have shown that if anyone did think that the Prussians didn't use skirmishers and fought exactly in the manner of the Prussians at Rossbach, that is simply not true. However, this does not by itself answer the question of whether the reform of the Prussian Army was part of a continuous process (as proposed by PH and others following him) or if the Prussians themselves decided that their infantry's tactical performance as a whole in 1806-07 wasn't as it should have been and instituted wide-ranging reforms as a result.

The only "key facts" that I know of to be disputed are:

1. The nature of the defeat of Grawert's Division at Jena. PH has shown that the Prussians used skirmishers throughout the combat, however at least one regiment appears to have been defeated by Lannes' infantrymen firing from a thick, disorganised "skirmish" line. Some of the Prussians there seemed to believe that this was a localized defeat resulting from specific indecision on the part of the commander, some others have seemd to believe it to be indicative of the difference between the two armies.

2. The casualty figures and when they were suffered. If the casualty figures during the "fighting phases" of the battles are roughly equivalent, then that argues a measure of tactical equivalence. If the differences in casualties inflicted are wider, then that argues a tactical disparity too (no-one is trying to say that the Prussians didn't suffer lots of casualties overall). Needless to say really, that it then becomes a case of distinguishing whether one side was doing something fundamentally different giving it an advantage, or was doing the much the same things rather better, giving it an advantage that way instead. One might make a comparison with the Russian and Waterloo campaigns. Although overall the French casualties were much higher, they were not suffered on the battlefield, so they do not suggest a tactical inferiority to their opponents.

Regards

One thing to bear in mind is that PH does not write that the Prussians were "better" than the French, or lost simply due to misfortune. He points to the failures in Prussian leadership from the co-ordination of all arms to the strategic direction of the campaign and this, in essence, explains the result of the conflict.

Regards