"Hof's Prussian Napoleonic Tactics" Topic

As expected perhaps, in this title, PH does his best to praise the Prussians and explain how good they were.

He suggests that the Revolutionary French did not introduce large-scale effecive skirmishing tactics-page 7

He hints that the reason the Prussians signed a peace treaty with France in 1795 was because funding from the British ran out-page 26

He later explains that the Prussians had been modernising during the peace period and in 1806 did well at times using 'non-Frederickian tactics' – page 40

He suggests that, at Jena, the Prussians did really well, considering they were outnumbered, although such praise seems to clash with the fact that they didn't do so well at Auerstadt when they outnumbered the French 2-1.

Overall, the book is the best visually of the three available in the series covering Napoleonic tactics, French and British being the other two.

Some of the images offered are really good, examples being Plate D depicting a Prussian battalion in column of attack, 1812, Plate E depicting Prussian Cavalry formations at Liebertwolkwitz, 1813 and Plate H depicting the Prussians attacking towards Plancenoit, 1815.

The book is not very detailed, probably due to the lack of space and, by expressing how good the Prussians were from the Revolutionary period onwards, it does have the, perhaps unintended side effect of expressing how good the French must have been to defeat them.

It is, overall, a welcome addition to the series and hopefully, it will be followed by titles covering the Russians and Austrians.

.not a very detailed book

I did learn some useful things about the Prussian army of 1812-1815 (which I have figures for) which contradicts some rulesets I've played. That the Prussians used assult columns, line battalions had skirmish elements and the "solid square" against cavalry, that was entirely new to me. I would've liked if he had spent less time arguing the point that the 1806 Prussians weren't as bad as historians say (continuing his arguement from his earlier Osprey books) – okay, I'm convinced – and more on detail. Such as, did landwher infantry regiments have fusilier battalions? When? There are hints in the text, but I don't recall reading if they had them from the beginning or they were formed later.

I purchased a copy at Fall-In and have been reading through it pretty thoroughly and feel that it has some great informational research. It does however have the PH slant that everything the Prussians ever did during the Napoleonic Wars was great no matter what and even though they lost initially. I agree with his premise that the Prussians were better than they're given credit for, but they were not as super human as he indicates. After hearing it over and over again in the text it actually detracts a bit from his overall research. My two cents worth.

link

I find this topic very interesting, because it was reading about the dramatic events at Jena-Auerstadt that got me back into Napoleonic gaming.

I have come to the conclusion that like any other period, there was not a great deal separating the different soldiers from the different armies of the time, when you look at tactical competency at the battalion level. There are degrees of difference of course, but not so much as to explain the dramatic outcomes of the big battles.

On the gaming table, this equates to a +1 here, and a -2 there on a D10, if at all.

So your average Prussian soldier is just as competent as your average French soldier, all things being equal.

The only thing I can find that really explains how the French were able to win time and time again, against huge odds … was the clever employment of the Corps d'Armee system, which stands out in all those battles where the opposition were still lagging behind in the top level command and control area.

As the wars dragged on, the other guys slowly caught on, and started adopting Corps systems of their own. Not surprisingly, the battles became bigger, bloodier, and more evenly matched over time.

The only way to appreciate this on a gaming table is to play Napoleonic big battles with several 'Corps' per side.

If you are playing evenly matched brigade scale games, there should be little difference between the actual battalions I reckon – just a few % here and there, and a little more skirmish capability on the French side.

My 2c

@ Steve64,

A balanced post, if I may say so.

Hofschroer has always struck me as somebody who knows what he is talking about where the Prussians are concerned.

If only he were able to comment on TMP ;-)

If only he were able to comment on TMP ;-)

Well, he has only himself to blame…

We still need Osprey's on Prussian Artillery (NV) and Prussian Commanders of the Napoleonic Wars! (E)!

Too true Bill,

though I'm getting nostalgic for Gribeauval and bricole 'discussions'.

Yes Hoffie is very good on German sources, its only when he allows his axe grinding to start that he wears a bit..

He hints that the reason the Prussians signed a peace treaty with France in 1795 was because funding from the British ran out-page 26

Fancy the British stopping paying for the Prussian Army's victorious advance on Paris – the tight bastards!

@Steve64 your points are great and reflect one reason I'm such a fan of Empire for rules. The French and Prussian infantry and cavalry are a dead heat and it is only the corps/division combination vs. the column/brigade aspect that allows for results like we saw historically. Yes the French commanders are across the board superior but I doubt anyone would argue that point. Wait, this is TMP. <grin> Anyway, the games I've played in 1806 were all very close.

I also agree with Steve64 points. For what I have read about Auerstadt (mostly French sources, mind you) the Prussian defeat was more at the command and control level, than tactically, even though Davout's soldiers showed a remarkable tactical ability that allowed them to exploit the advantages they had on the higher levels of command.

@Sparker:

British subsidies were fundamental in the forming of anti-French coalitions, and funding the wars against the Republic and Napoleon. That's not in question, even by the most anti-French historians. And if you remember what was said in the times -"War demands three things: money, money and more money!"- you will concur with me that, perhaps, Mr H's reasoning it is not so off the mark as you seem to think.

He suggests that the Revolutionary French did not introduce large-scale effecive skirmishing tactics-page 7

Ok, I'm not sure where that started, but the French of the early Revolution were NOT using large-scale effective skirmishing tactics. Voltegeurs were NOT part of the regular infantry until later. Prussian infantry of the same period were using their third rank as well as inherent Schutzen as skirmishers. In small scale actions, the Prussians made a habit of slapping the French during the first few years of the Revolution. This is not something that Hofschroer made up, or even recently discovered.

He hints that the reason the Prussians signed a peace treaty with France in 1795 was because funding from the British ran out-page 26

Why's that so difficult to believe? Other than British funds, what reason does Prussia have for fighting the French? France, along with Austria, is the traditional opponent of Prussia for influence in the German states. Where does restoring the French Monarchy benefit Prussia? Letting Austria and France bleed one another makes far better sense.

He later explains that the Prussians had been modernising during the peace period and in 1806 did well at times using 'non-Frederickian tactics' – page 40

The Prussian Army of the Revolution wasn't the Prussian Army of Frederick, and the reforms just before 1806 were definitely a move toward 'modernization.' Part of the problem in 1806 was how new those reforms were. The Prussian performance at Eylau is a fair indication of where the Prussian Army was headed. I've long held the opinion that historians that hold up the Prussian Fredrickian tactics as a reason for their defeat to be a sign of supreme laziness. That army was continuously evolving.

He suggests that, at Jena, the Prussians did really well, considering they were outnumbered, although such praise seems to clash with the fact that they didn't do so well at Auerstadt when they outnumbered the French 2-1.

They did do very well at Jena considering numbers and the ground they fought on. The Prussian defeat at Jena was more to do with Hohenlohe not breaking off as he should have. As for Auerstadt, I'd be curious just how well you think the French would have done at Jena if Napoleon had been killed at the onset? I'll be the first to sing the praises of Davout (I consider him the best general of the Napoleonic Wars), but dropping Braunschweig at the onset was a huge stroke of luck.

Auerstedt is an interesting one. As far as the infantry were concerned the numbers engaged at any one time were about the same.

The ground, going, and terrain generally, also prevented Prussians using their numerical advantage and was a force multiplier for the French.

Only the first twelve line battalions after 1806 had a fusilier battalion. I see it as a sort of experiment with light infantry along the French lines. It apparently did not work out for the Prussians, as they reverted to the use of the third rank of all battalions being trained and called off as skirmishers, giving each battalion its own organic skirmish capability. This included the Landwehr.

Armies never perform well when they are in the midst of a major reorganizational change. The Prussian problem was that they waited too long to start modernization.

@Femeng 2

Interesting, from where do you draw your conclusions?

I am waiting for the opinion of Oliver Schmidt on this subject.

Bertlichtingen

I've not explored the Prussian side to the Napoleonic wars, which is why I was attracted to PH's book, so I can't really argue too much concerning their army and how good or bad they were.

I find it odd that you think it okay for the Prussians to drop out of the war, just because the funding ran out? That suggests the Prussians were nothing more than a bunch of mercenaries in the employment of Britain?

You say 'Where does restoring the French monarchy benefit Prussia?- Then where does destroying the French Revoution benefit Prussia? If they weren't acting out of politcal reasoning, then they were acting as mercenaries.

It is also interesting how you come up with an excuse for losing at Jena, even though you say they did so well and an excuse for losing at Auerstadt. Could it be more the truth that, as well as the Prussians did at both battles, the French did better, otherwise the Prussians would not have lost both battles?

Sparker

Or it could be a good excuse by PH to explain why the Prussians dropped out of the war. Blame someone else, in this case the British. It basically paints the early Prussians as nothing more than a bunch of mercenaries. No money, no war. If only the French could have paid them off, topped the British payments. It would have saved all those men dying, since the Prussians were obviously not fighting for political reasons, if we are to believe PH.

Grognard1798

It is a very interesting book. However, i was disappointed to see the author waste two whole pages in a book of only 64 pages, on negative quotes on the Prussian Army by other historians and authors, such as Elting, Chandler, Fuller,Delbruck, Kitchen, Petre, Maude, Gates.

Yet he only offers one positive quote in contrast? (Sebastian Haffner) It makes one wonder if there were German historians and authors who perhaps agreed with the overwhelming negative viewpoint, which the author might not want us to be aware of?

You say 'Where does restoring the French monarchy benefit Prussia?- Then where does destroying the French Revoution benefit Prussia? If they weren't acting out of politcal reasoning, then they were acting as mercenaries.

And the Prussian king hiring out his army as mercenaries is a bad thing how? In hindsight it's obvious that Prussia's interests are best served by ending the Revolution. However, there's no way anyone at the time would have foreseen the rise of Napoleon. Given that, there is no political reason for Prussia to do more than let France and Austria blunt themselves on each other.

It is also interesting how you come up with an excuse for losing at Jena, even though you say they did so well and an excuse for losing at Auerstadt. Could it be more the truth that, as well as the Prussians did at both battles, the French did better, otherwise the Prussians would not have lost both battles?

my point was that tactically, at battalion level) the Prussians were good, well trained troops. This is the level that the book is covering. The Prussians weren't defeated because their troops sucked, which is what the original post seemed to suggest. There are a host of reasons why the Prussians were beaten, all at levels higher than the book covers.

Berlichtingen

My original post was not intended to suggest that the Prussians 'sucked', as you put it, during the Revolutionary period. So you are incorrect there. I'm just saying what PH has written. But it does seem a convenient excuse to blame others for the Prussians deserting their allies – in this case, blaming the British, due to a lack of 'funding'.

And if it was to Prussia's benefit to let Austria and France fight each other, why did they get involved in the first place – just for cash payments off Britain? It does not tie up somehow. I can't see the Prussians being that greedy or commited to war, just for cash payments.

And I can't believe you really think it is okay for a Monarch of one nation to allow his armed forces to be used as Mercenaries by another nation! Of course, you may be correct and the Prussian monarch might be happy to put money before politics, but I doubt the Prussians citizens would be happy about it. If they kept winning battles perhaps, but they would surely wonder why they suddenly left the war, had they been winning all the time.

Put into today's terms, that's like saying it is okay for the Iranians to pay the Russians or British to fight for them. After all, politics does not come into it.

And I can't believe you really think it is okay for a Monarch of one nation to allow his armed forces to be used as Mercenaries by another nation!

Huh?! Monarchs selling their armies as mercenaries was a fairly common practice

On the subsidy issue Hofschroer is basically correct, except that it didn't run out, Britain stopped paying it.

In simple terms Prussia, as far as Britain was concerned, had not met her part of the bargain. London suspected Prussian duplicity. Britain probably expected too much of Prussia but subsidy installments were not paid by their due date. This infuriated Berlin.

But comparative inactivity during 1794 was not really good value for money. The Prussians did not unite with the Austrians as anticipated. London eventually lost patience and suspended the subsidy after paying up more than a million and Prussia withdrew from the coalition.

Berlichtingen & XV Brigada

Well, if PH is correct, it looks as though the Prussians were not going to war to restore a monarchy, or to elevate any kind of threat from Revolutionary France, but were, in fact, attempting to become another Switzerland.

And, I suppose, as suspect at PH's latest title is, he does get us talking about the Prussians.

A couple of things…

First, the book is another ‘arrow in the quiver' and should be of interest and use to anyone who studies the period, especially the armies of the period.

Second, Prussian artillery has already been partially covered in the Osprey Men-at-Arms book, Prussian Staff and Specialist Troops by the same author.

Third, a few comments from the posters on this thread…

‘I have come to the conclusion that like any other period, there was not a great deal separating the different soldiers from the different armies of the time, when you look at tactical competency at the battalion level. There are degrees of difference of course, but not so much as to explain the dramatic outcomes of the big battles.'

There was a very large difference between the French soldiers of the Grande Armee and the Prussian. The national conscription brought in people from across the spectrum of French life and, generally speaking, was a great leveler. That was not the case with the Prussians. About half of the Prussian army personnel were not native Prussians and there were large groups of Prussians who were kept from military service on purpose by the Prussian government.

‘So your average Prussian soldier is just as competent as your average French soldier, all things being equal.'

However, all things were not equal. French training, doctrine, and tactics were very different from that of the Prussians, and the Prussian service had large numbers of troops on furlough for ten months of the year. The Prussian tactical system was still formal and their numbers of light troops who could fight in open order was not large compared to the French infantry arm, most of whom could. The French trained to coordinate artillery and infantry, the Prussians did not. The Prussians diluted their artillery strength and still used battalion guns. The French massed their artillery and had abolished battalion guns since at least 1800.

‘The only thing I can find that really explains how the French were able to win time and time again, against huge odds … was the clever employment of the Corps d'Armee system, which stands out in all those battles where the opposition were still lagging behind in the top level command and control area. As the wars dragged on, the other guys slowly caught on, and started adopting Corps systems of their own. Not surprisingly, the battles became bigger, bloodier, and more evenly matched over time.'

The corps d'armee system only began in 1800 and the French were winning before that. The French tactical system, a solid artillery system, the French staff organization from army level down, the development of the division, all had an impact on the French ability to win.

‘…a little more skirmish capability on the French side.'

A little?

The French began experiments in the field in the mid-1770s with their maneuvers in Normandy commanded by Marshal de Broglie and other officers.

Columns were employed against units deployed in lines and what resulted was the 1791 Reglement which barely mentioned skirmishers, and not at all how the French employment of large numbers of troops in open order during the wars of the Revolution.

When the shooting started and the need to get troops, many of which were untrained to the 1791 Reglement, large numbers of troops in open order were pushed forward to engage the enemy.

What developed was a tactical system that employed whole battalions and regiments deployed in open order on the attack as the fire support element of units attacking behind them in lines of battalion columns. No other army fought that way, least of all the Prussian army of 1806.

‘The French and Prussian infantry and cavalry are a dead heat and it is only the corps/division combination vs. the column/brigade aspect that allows for results like we saw historically.'

I would disagree with that statement. The French tactical and operational system as a whole has to be looked at and not just one aspect of the army. The Prussians were in a transition sparked by young officers trying to bring the Prussian army up to date organizationally, tactically, and having an up-to-date staff organization on the French model. French infantry were trained differently than the Prussians, whose training largely consisted of close order drill, and both French light and line infantry could fight in open order, whereas the Prussians could and did not.

‘…the Prussian defeat was more at the command and control level, than tactically, even though Davout's soldiers showed a remarkable tactical ability that allowed them to exploit the advantages they had on the higher levels of command.'

The Prussian defeat was at all levels, from tactics at the battalion level, to staff organization and planning at the other end of the spectrum. The tactical systems of the two armies were very different, and while the Prussians had some units trained ‘in the French manner' it had not been adopted army-wide.

‘Ok, I'm not sure where that started, but the French of the early Revolution were NOT using large-scale effective skirmishing tactics. Voltegeurs were NOT part of the regular infantry until later. Prussian infantry of the same period were using their third rank as well as inherent Schutzen as skirmishers. In small scale actions, the Prussians made a habit of slapping the French during the first few years of the Revolution.'

As stated, the French development of combining troops in open order with troops in formed units was tried and experimented with during the French reform period from 1763-1789. When the shooting started in 1792, the French tactical system was developed through trial and error and by the mid-1790s French infantry was becoming more proficient and could fight according to the 1791 Reglement combined with the new skirmishing tactics. The skirmishing tactics did not do away with the 1791 Reglement but supplemented it. And while the official voltigeur companies were not authorized and formed until 1805-1806, some infantry regiments had scout companies (eclaireurs) as early as 1796.

‘Other than British funds, what reason does Prussia have for fighting the French? France, along with Austria, is the traditional opponent of Prussia for influence in the German states. Where does restoring the French Monarchy benefit Prussia? Letting Austria and France bleed one another makes far better sense.'

Restoring the French monarchy might have curtailed the aggressiveness of the French under the republic. The Prussian army had not performed well overall after 1763. The cream of the Prussian officer corps had been killed during the Seven Years War.

One of the main reasons the Prussians withdrew from the coalition was there was a fatter, easier target in the east where Poland was being dismembered. The Prussians wanted territory and Poland was ‘easy pickin's.'

‘The Prussian Army of the Revolution wasn't the Prussian Army of Frederick, and the reforms just before 1806 were definitely a move toward 'modernization.' Part of the problem in 1806 was how new those reforms were. The Prussian performance at Eylau is a fair indication of where the Prussian Army was headed. I've long held the opinion that historians that hold up the Prussian Fredrickian tactics as a reason for their defeat to be a sign of supreme laziness. That army was continuously evolving.'

The main problem with reforms in the Prussian army was the Prussian senior officer conservatism. This is covered very well in Charles White's The Enlightened Soldier, and Peter Paret's Clausewitz and the State and Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform. The adoption of the all-arms division by the Prussians in early 1806 was an improvement for the Prussians, but it was already an obsolete formation as the French had abandoned it in 1800 in favor of the better homogenous infantry and cavalry divisions.

‘They did do very well at Jena considering numbers and the ground they fought on. The Prussian defeat at Jena was more to do with Hohenlohe not breaking off as he should have.

No, they didn't. At Jena, the numbers of Prussians and French in the actual fighting were nearly equal, as about 40,000 French were not committed. The Prussians were outmaneuvered and outfought by their opponents, the French infantry fighting in whatever formation was deemed appropriate by their commanders and with close support by their own artillery and cavalry. The same cannot be said about the Prussians.

‘As for Auerstadt, I'd be curious just how well you think the French would have done at Jena if Napoleon had been killed at the onset? I'll be the first to sing the praises of Davout (I consider him the best general of the Napoleonic Wars), but dropping Braunschweig at the onset was a huge stroke of luck.'

Coulda, woulda, shoulda. I don't see the problem with Brunswick getting himself shot (which was the beginning of a family tradition as he son was killed in action fighting the French at Quatre Bras). The problem was no one assumed command after he fell. And Davout did outfight his opponents-the same basic reason for defeating the Prussians on both fields.

‘And the Prussian king hiring out his army as mercenaries is a bad thing how? In hindsight it's obvious that Prussia's interests are best served by ending the Revolution. However, there's no way anyone at the time would have foreseen the rise of Napoleon. Given that, there is no political reason for Prussia to do more than let France and Austria blunt themselves on each other.'

The Prussians also pulled out of the coalition in order to take part in the partition of Poland which would not cost as much, and the immediate benefit was more territory, than fighting in France.

‘…my point was that tactically, at battalion level) the Prussians were good, well trained troops. This is the level that the book is covering. The Prussians weren't defeated because their troops sucked, which is what the original post seemed to suggest. There are a host of reasons why the Prussians were beaten, all at levels higher than the book covers.'

Some of the reasons the Prussians were beaten and routed was at the tactical level.

The Prussian artillery, which outnumbered the French artillery at Jena, was badly handled and outfought. This stems because the Prussian artillery arm (along with the engineers) were neglected by Frederick (and the officers mistreated) and at this point the Prussian artillery was largely ineffective on the battlefield.

And while there were limited reforms to the Prussian artillery from 1807-1813, it never caught up with the artillery of the other four main belligerents until after the wars concluded.

The Prussians did not teach their infantry and artillery to cooperate/coordinate on the battlefield. Prussian infantry battalions were beginning to train differently, based on the French model, but they were not trained to deploy in open order as battalions and regiments to skirmish or fight in that type of order and terrain.

And the Prussian cavalry did not act en masse when attacking, so their actions were not coordinated on the battlefield in any type of coherent manner.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Kevin,

So given all that, where does the balance between "generalship" and "tactical efficiency" lie in the two battles as a cause of the French victories, in your opinion?

Regards

Waiting for "Valmy:The Prusian victory" to come out and set the record straight.

And, I suppose, as suspect as PH's latest title is, he does get us talking about the Prussians.

Although it will be as nothing compared to when Dave H writes "Austrian Napoleonic Tactics 1792-1815".

Regards

Berlichtingen did write already a good analysation about the situation and defeats of the Prussian Army – otherwise one just has to read recently published books, in English, like Napoleon's Apogee to form a balanced opinion.

I think Kevin hit the nail on the end on some points. It starts with leadership on the Prussian side but it extends to the inflexibility of the Prussian Corps system and how well it coordinated within the corps and other corps with it. The French system evolved into each corps being a full army. The Prussian system of reserve forces hindered them to a great extent.

One point regarding the French in the Revolutionary era revolves around the column approach. The column was NOT developed as a preferred formation for combat because it was superior but rather it was the most efficient in homogenizing the forces available. The French improved training later on with more time but the call to defend France brought in many volunteers and the column was found to be effective as a fighting formation for those that lacked training and experience in rapid reloading (this is relative to the times regarding 'rapid' lol!) The British in the Peninsula certainly proved that highly trained infantry in line could not only withstand a column attack but repulse it as well.

Battalion guns were abandoned by the French as being less flexible and less telling when dispersed rather than combined into larger batteries. The practice came back for at least a year when Napoleon captured so many guns and had so many men of foreign nationality under his command. It was never as effective to have battalion guns but if you had enough of them, why not use them? I dare say if Napoleon had come up through the cavalry, we might have seen cavalry be emphasized even more than he did (to be sure, cavalry was not neglected at all by him!)

Prussia did not have the ability to field the same amount of men with domestic recruits. As a percentage of its populace, it did have more men; as a raw number, it was way less as France had the largest population within its borders of any European nation at the time. At least 3X the amount that Prussia had (I believe 30MM vs. 9MM for Prussia or thereabouts) But make no mistake about it, the French used foreign troops to a larger percentage than other nations eventually.

As is usual, the truth is somewhere in between on actuality vs. opinions. Leadership, organization, flexibility and maneuver has to be to the advantage of the French. On a battalion level, I will disagree and say that the Prussian army actually had well trained men and in some aspects better trained than their French counterparts. But it would be erroneous to believe that they were the French equal with all the other factors taken into account.

As stated by others, reform was on the way and was having its effect but if your general staff and organizational synergy is not in place, it all falls apart rapidly. Say what you want about the French, but they certainly adapted and changed with changing circumstances. The often repeated negatives about the Prussians and clinging to 7YW battalion training as being its downfall is BS. The British proved that linear tactics still worked with the right training as long as it was combined with skirmish and light infantry tactics as well. Frederick was right in training his men to rapidly reload and shoot as the musket was no more accurate in Napoleon's day than in the 7YW. Napoleon himself was a student of Frederick's and admired him immensely.

Unfortunately for the Prussians, they did not have the same level of training that they had in the 7YW and they had an enemy that was well versed in the tactics and strategy that the Prussians clung to as well. There were reasons that the general staff was almost 100% cashiered as a result of losing to the French. The army itself was not as flexible to the changing times nor were the general staff creative or flexible enough to adapt to the new battlefield.

As mentioned in a previous post, I did wonder why PH did not offer more than one positive viewpoint of the Prussian Army, considering he felt the need to use 2 pages out of 64 on negative viewpoints from historians/authors who studied and researched the period and were well known for their works on the Napoleonic Wars? It seems very strange that he did not take the opportunity to do so?

Unfortunately for the Prussians, they did not have the same level of training that they had in the 7YW and they had an enemy that was well versed in the tactics and strategy that the Prussians clung to as well. There were reasons that the general staff was almost 100% cashiered as a result of losing to the French. The army itself was not as flexible to the changing times nor were the general staff creative or flexible enough to adapt to the new battlefield.

Am I right in thinking that the Prussians also disbanded nearly all the individual regiments as well? That woud seem to indicate that the dissatisfaction with their performance went down at least to battalion-level?

Regards

I agree with a lot of what Berlichtingen wrote above.

I think there are a number of misconceptions in this thread which result from badly informed post-WW2 writing on the subject.

Those who talk about the Prussian army of 1806 as if it was still that of the SYW are wrong. It is likely that the Prussian army of 1806 was actually better trained than some of Frederick the Great's, the quality of which was not always the same.

Prussia in 1806 had problems though, not least of which was that the country was impoverished and the last war had been fought 12 years before. The French, on the other, had been at war as recently as the previous year. Their Corps system had been tested, together with its command and control, while the Prussians were still experimenting with Divisions and command was by ‘committee' in comparison. The principal Prussian failings were at the operational level.

But the point about the British in the Peninsula is well made. The British 1792 Rules and Regulations were not a million miles from the Prussian 1788 Reglement für die Königlich Preußische Infanterie. The British document was Prussian in all but name yet the British infantry beat the French on a more or less regular basis from Maida onwards. On the other hand, one need only look at the British in the Low Countries at the end of the 18th Century to see what Wellington called ‘learning what not ought to be done', or words to that effect. But a ‘Prussian' or ‘linear' army, call it what you like was perfectly capable of beating a French one if handled well. That was the problem, the Prussian army in 1806 was not handled well at either battle.

All this stuff about Prussian mercenaries is misleading. Hiring foreigners was common enough throughout Europe but as far as the Prussians are concerned I think I'm right in saying that if one was not from Bandenburg-Prussia you were considered a foreigner, even if living in ‘greater' Prussia and a subject of the Prussian state.

The individual human rank and file material in the opposing armies was hardly any different. French and Prussians soldiers were conscripts both and the claim that the egalitarian nature of the French army gave it an advantage is also so much tosh. The alleged different relationship between ranks didn't help very much when fighting the British in the Peninsula, an army recruited from ‘volunteers', who often had little alternative as far a career choice, and in which the gulf between officers and ‘scum' was vast. As unequal as it is probably possible to get.

The nature of the post-1806 Prussian army was dictated in part by treaty limitations though a number of senior officers from 1806 did serve in the latter wars.

There isn't much difference between the British and Prussian Regulations and the French 1791 Reglement either. The difference in tactical systems is that the French supplemented theirs with their developments of the use of combining troops in formation with those in loose, open, or skirmish order and the coordination between the two was the key to the successes that they achieved.

The French infantry in 1806 could fight in line, column, a combination of both, and also fight in open order. And the operations were coordinated.

The Prussians couldn't do that.

And until the reforms the British came up with at Shorncliffe the British suffered reverses on the continent at the hands of the French in the 1790s. Further, Moore's army was driven into the sea by the French in Spain.

Wellington's adaptation of the linear system, by covering his main line of resistance with a heavy skirmisher screen was different to what the British had done before. Further, French errors tactically compounded the problem the French faced fighting Wellington.

Back to the Prussians, the endemic problems the Prussians had in 1806, and a lack of reform when urged to do so contributed mightily to their disaster in 1806.

If the Prussians were actually equal to the French, battalion by battalion, then they should have won at Auerstadt. The issue is that they were not.

The Prussian training was not as thorough as that of the French of the period-they were limited in what they were trained to do. That they adopted columns and skirmishers from 1807-1813 is proof that they paid attention in 1806 and figured out what they had to do.

Simply blaming the Prussian failures on either command and control problems and at the operational level is overlooking what actually happened on the battlefield in October 1806.

Sincerely,
Kevin

I was merely jesting about Prussian wanting to become another Switzerland and making its army into mercenaries.

It arose out of the fact that I don't believe Prussia went to war with Revoutionary France, as PH's books suggest, purely because Britain paid them to do so. They had other reasons, as 'The Declaration of Pilnitz, 27th August, 1791' and 'The Duke of Brunswick's Proclamation, 25th July, 1792' suggest.

Indeed, in the The Duke of Brunswick's Proclamation you will find the line '…to restore the King to his legitimate power…'. The fact that Prussia went to war for reasons other than being funded by Britain, suggests that PH has got it wrong in his book.

Although I still think PH's book is suspect in areas, it is still one worth having, which is why I have it. But, as with most of PH's work, you have to read it with care and don't necessarily accept that everything he says is gospel truth. It is usually just hos point of view. But visually, his book is still the best of the three Osprey titles on Napoleonic tactics.

Whirlwind, the elimination of regiments was due to the surrender agreement with Napoleon but to be frank, they did lose quite a few men and were not in a position to reconstitute every single regiment in the army anyway.

Others have added to my point about the Prussians being well trained but not as flexible as the French. Certainly in line they fought quite well. But if we compare the zenith of French training to the zenith of Prussian training, there can be no comparison. Also, we mustn't forget that the French were almost constantly at war, which lends quite a bit of real life training too :-)

The British in the Peninsula certainly had the experience and the training too. They adapted to French tactics but again, flexibility wasn't deemed as important as a good stout line that was capable of devastating and repeated volley fire.

So, were the Prussians good? Yes, but not as experienced and flexible. And the flexibility of the French extended beyond individual battalion training and methods. Attrition played the most significant role in the eventual defeat of France. But I also think reliance on allies and client states did as well. Similar to how the Roman Empire's reliance on 'foreign' troops and allies led to its eventual downfall.

Without having read the book at hand, I am sure that praise goes a bit overboard for the Prussians. But let's not forget that he is trying to sell a book on the Prussians, not the French. There is merit to saying the Prussians were good. And a lot of merit to saying that they weren't mired in 7YW tactics and training as well.

'Attrition played the most significant role in the eventual defeat of France.'

The two front war that Spain became didn't help much either.
And the fact that almost every year the French had to fight somebody, and although Napoleon is usually portrayed, especially by English-speaking authors, as the aggressor, that isn't quite accurate.

'But I also think reliance on allies and client states did as well.'

That 'reliance' didn't begin to change the Grande Armee until 1807. However, the French had usually, if not always, employed some type of mercenary units, as did the Spanish and British, just to mention two other nations.

And in 1809 specifically the Confederation of the Rhine troops in the Army of Germany fought excellently against the Austrians and most, if not all, did very well in Russia, the Swiss and Wurttembergers being considered equal to veteran French units.

Since you brought the Romans up, that is both an accurate and an inaccurate statement and the explanation would take a few pages. The Romans, both east and west, relied on foreign troops as auxiliaries, both infantry and cavalry, especially cavalry. But both empires, like the French empire, had the backbone of their armies being native soldiery. Interestingly, Caesar's famous X Legion was organized and recruited in Spain.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Similar to how the Roman Empire's reliance on 'foreign' troops and allies led to its eventual downfall.'

@ ancientsgamer,

Yes, I think so, and I have never seen anything to suggest that the post-1806 inclusion of a fusilier battalion in the infantry regiment had anything to do with copying the French voltigeur company. Why would you? The idea of separate specialist light and grenadier companies was outdated already and the use of the third ranks for skirmishers had been around for a long time.

By the early 19th century the grenadiers were a throwback to an earlier era and these 'elite' companies were at least in part a bit of military BS; more pay, flash uniforms etc. Napoleon, if nothing else, understood human nature. There is nothing like a bit of bling to motivate soldiers:-)

If you used the third rank it also didn't derange the organisation of the battalion when it was deployed as skirmishers and wherever an element of the battalion went it always took its skirmishers with it.

The Reserve infantry regiments and (I think?) the Landwehr infantry regiments has their third battalions designated as fusiliers.

I agree, battalion for battalion there was probably not a lot to choose between them, except that, even with the influx of any replacement conscripts following the 1805 campaign, the French were more experienced. It doesn't mean that the Prussians were bad soldiers.

I'm not entirely sure about the British adapting to French tactics in the Peninsula, to be honest. I also think the firepower thing is overstated but the ‘stout line' was a feature of the British and Prussians. The key was always how you best used that ‘line' and where you put it. Look at the initial Prussian dispositions at Jena, they are all over the place.

The following comments are taken from Peter Paret's The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806. Perhaps this information will add to the discussion:

‘Conditions on the other side were more complex. The Prussian army was no longer that of Frederick the Great. But despite many changes, its organization and doctrine remained basically those of his last years. Some officers serving against republican armies in the early 1790s recognized the need for adjustments. In 1795 a Military Reorganization Commission was established. But it dealt principally with the increase in territory and population resulting from the Third Partition of Poland, and the changes it instituted did little to improve the army's performance in 1806. Another change, this one certainly significant, was a step backward: the strategic and operational thinking of the men now in charge was less imaginative, more cautious, than it had been under Frederick, who tried to impart to his senior generals some of his own uncompromising understanding of the use of force. Under his very different heirs, the Prussian military was ill prepared to learn from, let alone accept, the republican armies' innovations in organization, command, and execution.'-page 6.

‘Considering only the size of the opposing forces in October, a Prussian victory remained possible and might have blunted the French threat until Russian help arrived. But already at an early stage weaknesses became apparent, ranging from the strategic conceptions of the senior commanders to the army's organization and tactical methods, which were to hinder Prussian operations throughout the campaign.'-page 10.

‘The organization of the Prussian army acted as a further brake. Above the regiment, its executive and administrative structure was adequate for maneuvers; in war it was stretched to the limit. Despite some last-minute reshuffling of the table of organization, regiments were not grouped in permanent brigades, in which they learned to act together. The senior staff officers of the field commanders had limited authority and differed in their operational concepts. The commander-in-chief's staff, small and further handicapped by a scarcity of maps, found it difficult to coordinate the various parts of the army. Disciplinary concerns and the prevailing moral code precluded soldiers from living off the land, which tied the army to a ponderous network of depots and supply trains and reduced mobility, the more so since, in contrast to the highly drilled rank and file, the wagoners and drovers were civilians. Nor was it helpful to burden the supply service with grooms and hay wagons for the horses infantry officers kept to ride or use as carriage horses on the march-one of several ways the privilege of rank slowed the army. In these matters the French were more consequential. When Napoleon issued operational orders to his marshals, he did not feel it beneath his dignity to warn against the presence of unauthorized horses. Like their opponents, the French never had sufficient maps and suffered from the difficulty of coordinating widely separated units by means of messengers. Napoleon's constant demand that his generals keep him informed of their location did not prevent an entire corps from slipping out of his control during the campaign. But his strategic sense, operational intelligence, and energy made up for these and other flaws.'

‘Prussian weaknesses in organization were amplified by a tactical system less versatile than that of the French. In itself that need not have been fatal. The high casualties the French were to suffer in 1806 suggest that Prussian tactics , however, old-fashioned, might yet have succeeded had the army been organized in larger units, with a strong central command and better means of control and communication. But deficient tactics made success even less likely and turned defeat to disaster.'

‘French and Prussian tactics remained similar in some respects, yet in recent years they had developed significant differences. In both armies the infantry fought in linear formations. It required intense drill and discipline to open marching columns into the extended lines of two or three ranks that enabled large numbers of men to fire simultaneously or to deliver the irregulat but continuous fire to which volleys degenerated in combat. Endless training was needed to change the direction of the line, or convert firing lines to bayonet charges or into battalion squares to repel cavalry. In the French army marching columns could also thicken into so-called battalion or attack columns, wider than deep, which brought large numbers of men quickly to the enemy-a formation Prussia still rejected in favor of the more difficult method of advancing in line. Columns and lines could detach groups of skirmishers to cover their movement and to fight in woods, broken terrain, or villages. That was also done in Prussia, but rarely since it went against the assumption that only absolute trust in the linear system could fuse large numbers of men into the mobile cohesion that was its greatest strength. How was the same soldier to be taught the automatic responses demanded by linear tactics and the initiative required in skirmishing?'

‘By 1800 the French had gone far to develop tactics that responded to the new possibilities the revolution created. Line and column were made more versatile by attaching a company of light infantry to each infantry regiment for skirmishing and scouting. But whether soldiers wore the uniforms of grenadiers, line infantry, or voltigeurs, all were expected to fight with reasonable competence in column, line, and open order. At the time some observers regarded French infantry tactics, especially skirmishing, as the decisive innovation of the new wars.'-pages 11-14.

‘In 1806 the French were the better integrated and mobile force, against which the less flexible and slower Prussians with their uncertain strategic concepts, would not necessarily lose, but were at a disadvantage…What mattered was to recognize that the enemy had adopted important new ways of fighting, and to respond to them in organization, training, tactics, and strategy, even if this required changes elsewhere as well.'

‘After 1806 it was as important to eliminate the formalism that ruled the Prussian army as it was to alter the army's organization, strategic outlook, and operational and tactical doctrine. Too often the army was run like a platoon. Senior commanders and subordinates alike tended to obey orders literally. At the same time individual and institutional rigidity coexisted with the acceptance of social prerogatives in appointments, promotions, and discipline, which might further diminish proficiency.'

‘To improve organization and tactics, privileges had to be reduced and behavior changed. Discipline and treatment of the rank and file, laws that exempted segments of the population from military service, the status of the technical services-all needed to be dealt with…Even before 1806 some officers recognized these links, and many more were to see them afterwards…A very different conclusion was developed by officers of the historical section of the Prussian, and, after 1871, the German General Staff. Their usually very competent publications largely ignored or even denied the significance of the French amalgamation of close and open order. The main cause of the Prussian defeat, they declared in formulations that continued to be used in official histories down to the Third Reich, was poor leadership. Flaws in organization, doctrine, and training contributed to the outcome, but meant little compared to the shortcomings of the senior generals. The most prominent representative of this view was Count Schlieffen, who as chief of the General Staff and after his retirement in 1906 wrote a number of intellectually and stylistically brilliant historical studies. His analysis of Hannibal's generalship had, as we know, a bearing on his strategic plans against France in a new war. In his essays on the war of 1806, which take up some eighty pages in his collected works, he concluded firmly that ‘it was not the officers'…lack of bravery, nor antiquated tactics that defeated the Prussians at Jena, but Napoleon's determination and energy, his vast numerical superiority, and the endless mistakes of the senior Prussian commanders.'
‘Schlieffen and the many who agreed with him seem not to have realized that their views placed them in opposition to their predecessors who after the defeats of 1806 rebuilt the army. Schlieffen's conclusion is particularly interesting when we compare it to his analysis of the battles in earlier pages of the same essays. To take only Hohenlohe's men facing skirmishers at Jena, Schlieffen writes: ‘The French infantry hidden in the fields and behind hedges and walls [of the village], directed…accurate fire at the Prussian and Saxon battalions, lined up like practice targets that couldn't be missed [and] that by the numbers, from left to right, fired one ineffective volley after another.' We might almost be reading Major-General Maude.'-pages 28-31.

Material from Peter Paret's Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform is equally interesting and illuminating, especially his comments on the Prussian staff histories/historians:

‘Frederick's recognition, in his last years, of the advantages to be gained from a permanent body of light infantry was not accompanied by new ideas on the employment of such troops in the field. His instructions for the Freiregimenter mark no advance over his earliest writings on the subject, though even then the Prussian army was falling behind others in the organization and use of the light service.'-page 34.

‘The decisive innovation in infantry fighting that was to occur at the end of the eighteenth century consisted in the acceptance of open order tactics by the line infantry. Close order methods-the line, the attack column, fire by volley-were now combined with skirmish groups and individual aimed fire. Furthermore, these methods were employed not by separate specialist units that mutually supported each other, but by the same men, or at least by subunits of the same tactical command.'-page 37.

‘In an attack the light infantry are dispersed a hundred, one hundred and fifty, or if desired two hundred paces ahead of the line. They should open fire when they are within three hundred paces of the enemy, without order or command, and at will. The light infantry captain must not signal retreat nor withdraw with his ensign until he is fifty paces from the enemy, then he slowly falls back on the regiment, keeping up his fire from time to time, until he has reached the intervals between the line battalions, which are already moving forward.'-Maurice de Saxe, cited on page 41.

‘General von Hopfner writes that before 1806 ‘the fusiliers trained for duty in the field much like the heavy infantry; in one case as in the other, hilly terrain was avoided as far as possible.' Elsewhere he writes that ‘the riflemen lacked any training in extended order.' General von Witzleben, the intimate friend of Frederick William III, and a member of the footguards since 1799, is quoted as saying that during his early years as a subaltern ‘the tirailleur system was little known in our army'-a statement repeated in nearly the same words in General von Roeder's memoirs. General von Wachholtz, in the Prussian service from 1798-1807, recalled that ‘musketry training consisted of shooting off a considerable number of dummy bullets,' and that there was no target practice in the line battalions except for the riflemen. In his memoirs, the fusilier officer and later General Friedrich Karl von Schmidt describes how difficult it was to procure real bullets even for the fusiliers' training. Gumtau, the historian of the jager and schutzen, who served with the light infantry for over thirty years, claims that before 1806 each jager annually received powder sufficient for only nine shots at the target, and had to provide the lead himself.'-pages 60-61.

From the experiences of a Prussian jager officer against the French in the 1790s: ‘'In detached operations: surprise attacks, ambushes, and all actions where the various arms-particularly the cavalry-could participate, in outposts, and in everything that can be counted among the task of raiders, the superiority of the allies was apparent…But our frequently successful little war did not lead to decisions, exactly because it lacked [the French] system, which subordinated individual actions to a higher general purpose.' The allies' employment of combined operations rarely broke the bounds of the little war, while tactical cooperation on the largest scale between heavy and light units came to be standard procedure in the French armies. Even on conventional missions, the allied heavy infantry too often lacked the protective screen of light troops, which their official doctrine now called for, since these specially trained men were constantly detached for reconnaissance or raids. But few French close formations moved without their scouts and skirmishers. If the battalion tirailleurs went on patrol, an equivalent number of other soldiers took their places in the skirmish line. Eventually, most of the French line regiments could fight in some kind of open order-awkward and confused though it might be. It was this fundamental change that Duhesme…tried to express when he wrote, ‘One can truthfully say that by the end of 1793 the French armies had only light infantry.' -page 72.

‘That we have too little genuine light infantry can hardly be doubted. But how could such a force be created? One might-and this appears to me most feasible and suitable-add a light battalion to each infantry regiment…Or one could do away completely with the so-called light infantry, and the entire infantry would be trained to perform this duty as well, as is the case in the French army.'-Frederick William III, 1807, as cited on page 123.

‘Tactics also needed improving, in particular the cooperation between light troops and the line. Theorists of the preceding century, the Prince wrote, had already ‘recognized the advantages offered by an intellignent combination of line with light infantry…The French were the first to carry out this excellent idea on a large scale…from which arrangement they derive…important advantages.'-Prince August of Prussia, 1807, as cited on page 126.

‘At the start of the Revolutionary wars, the French government decided to introduce new tactics…which would give hidden talents scope for development. Instead of the line it chose the column, since this provided appropriate means to direct an enflamed people; regular fire was exchanged for the tirailleur system, and thus the basic elements of the French victories were formed. Since skirmishing isolated the soldier in combat, left his to his own judgment, and strongly aroused the ambition of each individual, it necessarily gave the French an advantage over troops drilled to fight only in close formations…The present French emperor improved on this new system of war. The idea, already sensed by the famous Marshal de Saxe, that the art of war lay solely in the legs, was expanded and realized by Napoleon in his audacious marches; his army achieves a speed of movement so far unequaled by others, and since it is solely designed for fighting it knows neither baggage nor supply depots, and its operations are not dependent on the calculations of a quartermaster. But without the organization of French armies into divisions, legions, and corps, the success of these daring marches would nevertheless often be most doubtful. Apart from other factors, this arrangement is so advantageous because through it the efficient combination of infantry and artillery, the two fundamental branches of the service, effectively supports the rather inferior French cavalry. Now the corps and divisional commanders no longer recognize the existence of terrain dangerous to them; they only know more or less favorable ground on which they are able to fight at any time.'-Roche-Aymon, as cited on pages 143-144.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Great post Kevin. But I have the feeling PH may not have come across them, or perhaps, if he did, he simply ignored them when doing his research. I wonder why?

I wouldn't wonder for too long Gazzola, PH has a history of ignoring primary evidence that doesn't suit the 'competitive advantage' of his latest book…

And he also appears to have something of a 'prophet in the wilderness' self image, hence lining up all the historians in this book that he disagrees with, the more to point up his 'ground breaking' credentials.

But all that aside, I'm looking forward to getting my copy, and, as has been said, read with care I'm sure it will be a useful addition to the body of work for this period…

@Sparker:

British subsidies were fundamental in the forming of anti-French coalitions, and funding the wars against the Republic and Napoleon. That's not in question, even by the most anti-French historians. And if you remember what was said in the times -"War demands three things: money, money and more money!"- you will concur with me that, perhaps, Mr H's reasoning it is not so off the mark as you seem to think.

@ Basileus – I don't fault his 'reasoning', I ruefully chuckle at his priorities and motives in getting in a dig at British strategic foreign and diplomatic policy in a short work about Prussian Tactics….

I shall wait until I actually read it before rushing to judgement.

There aren't many people out there who have as good a grasp of the Prussian army as Hofschroer, and other than Oliver Schmidt and Dr Summerfield, none of them post here.

In the meantime, Hofschroer probably has a point in that too many modern authors have repeated each other where the Prussians of 1806 are concerned.

I ruefully chuckle at the posts by the usual suspects on this thread and wonder at their priorities and motives in getting in a dig.

Great read thanks Kevin.

I ruefully chuckle at the posts by the usual suspects on this thread and wonder at their priorities and motives in getting in a dig.

Said the man who clearly couldn't resist getting a dig in…

Great post Kevin. But I have the feeling PH may not have come across them, or perhaps, if he did, he simply ignored them when doing his research. I wonder why?

PH does know this stuff – he wrote about it nearly 30 years ago. Presumably he doesn't reference it because he either disagrees with some of it, thinks some it generally supports his position but because he is a modern writer does not feel that he needs to quote another modern writer, or that he is better referencing primary material. In the end, he disagrees with a 'traditional' view of the Prussian Army 1806 – other writers like Kevin will maintain that traditional stance. The rest of us will try and read their books with an open mind and then come to a view about who has persuaded us.

Regards

Sparker

It is a good book in some respects, like his other titles, which I also own. But yes, you need to read with care and with good humour.

For a start, as I've already mentioned, you will puzzle as to his reasoning for wasting two whole pages out of a book of only 64, quoting historians who offer negative views on the Prussian Army, while only offering one positive quote in reply. And I'm not sure that the late Haffner was known for his Napoleonic studies, but more for his work on Prussia 1870 onwards and the two World wars, so why use him and not others, if they exist?

You will also chuckle at his convienent excuses for the Prussians losing both battles in 1806. But inbetween those two bits of biased Hoffi if does contain some decent stuff and the pictures are good.

Whirlwind

It is difficult to read PH's book with an open mind, as much as you might want to, especially when he felt he needed to fill two pages of negative quotes from well known Napoleonic historians but only one questionable positive quote. Surely, if more positive quotes or views exist, then here was an opportunity to educate all those following the negative view?

I tried to view it with an open mind, and, on first reading, I was quite pleased with it. But then I started to really look at what he wrote and realised that his own unconvincing Hoffie viewpoints in certain areas, basically turned a very good book into an almost good book. Still worth buying though.

XV Brigada

If anyone was trying to get a 'dig' in, it was sad Hoffie mentioning all those historians with negative viewpoints on the Prussian Army. He obviously believes they were 'all' wrong and God know where they got their information from? Just a shame he couldn't back up his argument against their viewpoints with any 'positive' viewpoints. Strange that, isn't it?

Gazzola,

If the man wants to write a book with a different viewpoint to everyone else, that is not a problem in and of itself? He thinks from reading the accounts that the Prussian Army's defeat can be explained one way, others have generally taken a contrary view so naturally the majority of viewpoints are negative, right?

When anyone writes a book analyzing anything, it will stand or fall on the strength of the analysis, not on whether others analyzing it have come to a similar conclusion previously, surely? Especially when PH (presumably) thinks he has looked longer and harder at this subject than anyone else, ever.

Regards