"Luftwaffe Maritime operations" Topic

Or the HS 293. Robert

After seeing a couple of pics of two captured British Swordfish by the Italians I was thinking of maybe running a deception "What if" raid ;) Robert

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"This British Fleet Air Arm 820 Squadron's Fairey Swordfish, tail code 4F, aircraft number P4127, of aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, during a bombing raid on Cagliari, on 2 August 1940, was hit by AA fire and forced to land on Italian Cagliari-Elmas Airfield. The crew (two men) was taken prisoner and the aircraft, captured nearly intact, was repaired by Elmas Caproni plant and fitted with an Alfa Romeo 125 radial engine. Transferred on Italian mainland, at Guidonia's Flight Test Center, on 27 February 1941, the Swordfish P4127 was still listed as being there 6 April 1942. After this date was likely phased out and scrapped"

Robert

"This photograph show HMS Valiant (nearest to the camera) and HMS Resolution and is most likely taken during an Italian air attack (by SM 79 bombers) against Force H on 9 July 1940. The photograph is taken from HMS Enterprise."
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Robert

"On 29/9/39 a Do.18, K6+RK, of 2./Ku.Fl.Gr.506 was engaged in a fight with a Hudson, N7250 of 224 Squadron, over the North Sea. The Hudson crew believed that they had killed the front gunner of the Dornier during the fight, but in fact no-one was injured and the flying boat made good its escape with only minor damage from five bullets.

29/11/39 was a bad day for Ku.Fl.Gr.406 (the new designation of the amalgamated Ku.Fl.Gr.506), when five of the unit's Do.18s were lost on mining sorties. There was also an inconclusive engagement between a Saro London of 240 Squadron with a Do.18, possibly 6K+FH of 1./Ku.Fl.Gr.406, where both aircraft returned safely to base.

On 11/4/40, two days after the invasion of Norway, two Blenheim fighters of 254 Squadron on a strafing attack over the Hardangerfjord, met a Do.18, K6+AH, of 1./406 in the air at 17.40. The Dornier managed to inflict damage on both Blenheims, forcing them to break off the attack – the flying boat receiving just 6% damage.

25/7/40: The only unusual event that has been found for this date concerning Do 18s was a night-time collision at Stavanger between two aircraft of 2./406 which resulted in the destruction of both machines, but only one crew member being injured."

Source: 'Aufklarer – Luftwaffe Reconnaissance Aircraft and Units 1935-1945' by David Wadman, John Bradley, Barry Ketley, Hikoki Publication, 1997, ISBN 095189987

More on Operation Wikinger. This is beginning to look like a really fun operation to game. Robert

Luftwaffe attack their own Destroyers on February 22nd. 1940
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There was also Fl 282s helicopters being used for convoy protection duty in the Aegean. Something different for a gaming scenario. Robert

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RE.200 Catapult

JU-290

"On 26 May 1944, shortly after daybreak, a Sea Hurricane piloted by Sub Lieutenant Burgham from the escort carrier HMS Nairana shot down Ju 290 9K+FK of FAGr 5 over the Bay of Biscay. The afternoon of the same day, Sub Lieutenants Mearns and Wallis attacked two more Ju 290s, Mearns shooting down 9V+GK piloted by Kurt Nonneberg, which ditched in the sea. The other Ju 290 disappeared on fire into cloud and was assumed to have crashed.

As the Battle of the Atlantic swung irrevocably in favour of the Allies with the loss by the Germans of French bases in August 1944, maritime reconnaissance unit FAGr 5 was withdrawn eastwards and the remaining Ju 290s were reassigned to transport duties, including service with KG 200, where they were used to drop agents behind enemy lines and other special missions."

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From Wiki so take with a grain of salt. But funny that more were made then could be used during the war. Robert

"In April 1942, Adolf Hitler made the production of aerial torpedoes a German priority, and the Luftwaffe took the task over from the Kriegsmarine.[18] The quantity of available aerial torpedoes outstripped usage within a year, and an excess of aerial torpedoes were on hand at the end of the war. From 1942 to late 1944, about 4,000 aerial torpedoes were used, but some 10,000 were manufactured during the whole war.[18] Torpedo bombers were modified Heinkel He 111 and Junkers Ju 88 aircraft, but the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighter aircraft was successfully tested as a delivery system.[18]"

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"A period of convoy escort duties followed. On 1 December the Fencer was escorting Convoy OS.60 200 miles to the south-west of Ireland when a Fw 200 was spotted and shot down by two Wildcats."

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I hve seen a Aviation print of a Focke-Wulf 200 Condor from III/KG40 and three Ju88Ds from KGr 106 escorting U-552 "Red Devil". Does anyone know how common this was and if there were any encounters with Allid aircraft ? Robert

Hopefully someone knows the answer about the Condor and JU-88s escort. Robert

Now this one I didn't for sure. The 2 Ar-196s operated out of Penang in the Far East for U-boat escort. Robert

Profile based on the description. Robert

"1942

Kommando Philipp

During the summer and autumn 1942 German Luftwaffe naval detachment Einsatzstab Fähre Ost (Commander Oberstleutnant F. Siebel) equipped with about 20 armed "Siebel artillery barges" and supported by four light German mine layer boats under the command of Luftflotte 1 operated on Lake Ladoga for interfering Soviet supply shipping to Leningrad together with a rather weak Finnish naval detachment and a squadron of four Italian motor MAS torpedo boats. Their bases were at Sortanlahti and near Käkisalmi.

To protect these vessels German flying detachment called Kommando Philipp or Kommando 1./JG 54 (1.Staffel / Jagdgeschwader 54, also planes from III./JG 54) (Staffelkapitän Oberleutnant Götz) was moved to Petäjärvi airbase. In September detachment was reinforced with two Heinkel He 60 and one Heinkel He 59 maritime rescue planes located at river Vuoksi near Käkisalmi. About 15 Messerschmitt Bf 109F-4 fighters operated from Petäjärvi and Mensuvaara airbases between 28.6. – 29.10.1942."

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A Staffelkapitän of 1./S.A.Gr.128 in mid-1943 was Oblt. Heinz Wurm claimed a number of aerial victories in his Ar 196 in late 1942. Does anyone know what they were? Robert

Looks like Oblt. Heinz Wurm at least shot down a Liberator on 30 May 1943.

"30.05.43 Oblt. Heinz Wurm Jagdkdo West Liberator 􀂅 15 West/9076 20.54 Reference: AA MSS f. 4"

Pg. 31
PDF link

According to the records another of his was a Beaufort, Robert

Does anyone know of any combined operations with the Luftwaffe Maritime units and The Regia Marina units? Robert

Looks like they shared bases. Robert

From "Luftwaffe Aerial Torpedo Aircraft and Operations in WWII", by Harold Thiele.

9 October 1939 – North Sea
Eight He 59's from either Ku.Fl.Gr 706 or 406 attempted an attack on Royal Navy vessels with airborne torpedoes, but the enemy was not located.

5 November 1939
A scramble by 3./Ku.Fl.Gr 106 with airborne torpedoes against reported Britush destroyers had no result.

7 November 1939
At dawn three He 59's were sent against two British destroyers to the eat of Lowestoft and for the first time in WWII made contact with the enemy. The result however, was disappointing as apparently only one aircraft released its torpedo which missed its target.

18 December 1939
North north-west of Rattray Head, the British fishing steamer Active (185 GRT) was sunk by an airborne torpedo launched by 3./706. Robert

For the photo above I found this,
"Italian float plane CRDA Cant-Z-506B "Airone" of 147th Squadriglia Autonoma Ricognizione Marittima (Autonomous Squadron Maritime Reconnaissance) on the slipway of the air harbor of Leros Island, Greece, 1942, during engine overhaul. Note, behind the Italian aircraft, the large crane of slipway and a German flying boat Dornier Do.24T-1 employed mainly in search-and-rescue missions. The 147th Squadriglia was an unit of Comando Militare Marittimo "Grecia" (Military Maritime Command "Greece") in turn under the authority of Comando Aviazione Ausiliaria Regia Marina (Auxiliary Aviation for Royal Navy Command) with HQ at Rome"

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Nice shots. Robert

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Is it my imagination or does the MG in the He-III nose look kinda puny? LOL. Robert

Those a great photos gents.

Especially love the German heli pics, Kaos. Thanks for sharing them, since I hadn't seen any before.

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"A Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Kondor sinking in the Atlantic Ocean west of Ireland, after being shot down by a Lockheed Hudson Mark V of No. 233 Squadron RAF based at Aldergrove, County Antrim, while trying to attack a convoy. This oblique aerial photograph was taken from the victorious Hudson (AM536) and shows the crew of the Kondor swimming for their liferaft which is inflating to the right of the tailplane."

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Luftwaffe units in Norway

I August 1940, the following units in Luftflotte 5 were equipped with He 115s:

1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 506 Sola-See
2./Kü.Fl.Gr. 506 Sola-See
3./Kü.Fl.Gr. 506 Sola-See
1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 906 Aalborg

These units flew offensive sorties against maritime targets (Hafsten et al., 1991). In April 1940, 1./706 converted from the He 60s to He 115s, and was transferred to Ålborg in Denmark. This unit then performed several missions from Denmark and Norway, until its withdraw to Germany in August 1941 (Green, 1970). Hafsten et al. (1991) , on the other hand, claims that 1./706 in August 1940 was equipped with the obsolete He 59. Furthermore, Hafsten (pers.com., 1996) adds that this unit formed on He 59 from mid April 1940 in Kiel-Holtenau, and shortly afterwards was transferred to Copenhagen and then Aalborg-See. A few He 115s were assigned to the unit in late 1940 (approximately ´ staffel).
The entire Küstenfliegergruppe 506 but the 1. staffel was withdrawn to its homebase at the island Norderney in October 1940. The 1. staffel, which was left behind in Norway, flew several sorties on the cost of Scotland and England, primarly attacking convoy shipping. This staffel continued to performed such missons until it was withdrawn as well, on April 1th 1941 (Hafsten et al., 1991).
The lightly armed Heinkel 115 proved to be too slow and vunerable for succsessful operations in areas patrolled by RAF fighters and, as a consequence, its operations were to be confined largely to the Arctic. However, 1./906 performed reconnaissance sorties from Brest between June and December 1941, when it was finally transferred to Norway under Luftflottte 5 in early 1942 (Green, 1970; AirInt, 1987b). This year Luftwaffe reached its climax in terms of aerial attacks on the famous Murmansk-convoys (Haftsten et al., 1991).
In early 1942, the He 115 equipped units operating from Norway consisted of just three staffels; 1./906 (He 115C), 1./406 and 3./906. These units were completly or partly equipped with Heinkel floatplanes (Green, 1970; AirInt, 1987b). According to Hafsten et al. (1991), the units operating this aircraft in 1942 included:

1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 906 Sola-See
1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406 Sorreisa/Kirkenes

During June and July, these two units participated in the attacks on the ill-fated convoy PQ 17. In addition, other maritime units like 2./406, 3./406, 3./906 and 1./125 were available for the reconnaissance role, but these were primarly equipped with Bv 138s.
In August 1942, 1./906 recieved its order to leave Norway, and was to reorganise and convert to the He 111 as part of 8./K.G. 26. By now, 1./406 was the single unit which still flew the He 115 (Green, 1970; AirInt, 1987).
According to official records regarding operational aircraft in service with Luftflotte 5 in November 1943, just one Küstenfliegerstaffel and one Seenotstaffel were still solely equipped with the He 115. These units consisted of 1./406 and Seenotstaffel 10. The last mentioned unit also operated the Do 24, in the sea-rescue role (Hafsten et al., 1991).
In late 1944, the He 115 disappear from Luftwaffe records regarding aircraft in service with Luftflotte 5, and the last unit exclusively formed with this aircraft (1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406) was disbanded in October and its personnel transferred to other units (Hafsten et al., 1991). In the final months of the war, allied air superiority made it difficult to operate the aged He 115 in an efficient way and this aircraft was subsequently abandoned by the Luftwaffe.
When hostilities ended in 1945, no units were officially operating the He 115, but photographic evidence shows a few examples of the aircraft left behind at Skattora. However, all He 115s captured from the Germans were eventually destroyed by the Norwegians (probably with assistance of a disarmament group) shortly after the cease-fire in 1945.
Aeroplane Monthly (1987) published in the January issue an interesting photo of a He 115 belonging to K.G. 200, Luftwaffe's famous special operations unit. The picture shows a modified He 115 with the code A3+DE, and according to this magazine, K.G. 200 had three such aircraft on strength as late as January 1945! This particular aircraft has the blanked-off centre section in the canopy and a non-standard hole in the belly. Since K.G. 200 also operated from bases in Norway (Hafsten et al., 1991), speculation as to whether or not this particular unit performed agent dropping missions from Norway has emerged. According to Hafsten (pers.com., 1996), K.G. 200 had two or three such aircraft on strength on a detachment in Finland from 1943 but, when the German-Finnish alliance broke down in 1944, all He 115s were captured by the Finnish airforce. No evidence suggesting that these particular aircrafts were operated by K.G. 200 in Norway exists."

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It also appears that Luftwaffe HE-114s were used to interdict Soviet convoys in the Black Sea area. Robert

Ex-Estonian PTO-4 were used also,
"Four examples surviving from the Soviet occupation of Estonia (1940-41) were operated by the German Luftwaffe, being operated by a unit manned by Estonian volunteers (initially called Sonderstaffel Buschmann and later 1./SAGr.127) based at Reval-Ülemiste airfield. They were operated as training and liaison aircraft as well for coastal patrol over the shores of the Baltic"

Source: Luftwaffe Codes, Markings and Units 1939-1945 by B C Rosch
0 88740 796 X

Aufkl.Gr 127 aircraft code 6R

1 formed ? post number 46107, disbanded 10/41

1. reformed from Sd. Staffel Buschmann 4/43 post number 53141

1. later 1/SAGr 127 6/43 disbanded 10/44

Ar65, Ar 95, He 50, He 60, Hs 126, Ju 160, Stampe SV 5

NSGr11

Aircraft code 3W

stab formed 10/43 from stab/SAGr 127 disbanded 10/44

1. formed 10/43 from 2/SAGr 127, post number 54423 disbanded 10/44

2. formed 10/43 from 3/SAGr 127, post number 55956 disbanded 10/44

3. formed 12/43 post number 63105 disbanded 10/44

aircraft used Ar 66, Fokker CV, Fw58, He 50, Hs126

Sonderstaffel Buschmann aircraft used
Ar 66, Ar 95, Bu 131, D H 89A, Go 145, He 50, He60, Miles Magister, PTO-4, RWD-8, Stampe SV-5

Code no standard code but used SB as unit code.

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Here is a fun one to try and game. On 2 Jul while attacking Convoy PQ.17 The Luftwaffe squadron commander In a He-115 flew between two columns of merchant ships and was shot down by AA fire crashing in front of the convoy. Another He-115 landed next to the shot down He-115 to rescue the crew and took off again successfully Before two Escorts could get to them. Robert

And another,
"First alerted by shore-based radar, the escort screen went to general quarters at 13:16 on 11 May, beginning the first of five successive alerts. In Campbell, Commander Sowell warned the escorts to be alert to the possibility of a dusk attack. At 20:25, radar noted the approach of enemy aircraft, and Sowell formed the convoy into eight columns 1,000 yards (910 m) apart for maneuvering room. When the enemy was reported 70 miles (110 km) north of Cape Corbelin, UGS-40 steered due east, past Cape Bengut. Shortly after sunset, escort ships commenced laying smokescreens, as the German aircraft, a mixed force of Junkers (Ju.) 88's, Heinkel He. 111's, and Dornier Do. 217's, approached from the stern of the convoy and broke into groups to attack from different points of the compass. The destroyer escorts and friendly fighter craft downed an estimated 17 of the enemy torpedo planes, and drove away all the remainder, and the Allied convoy emerged unscathed."
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Robert

Gen.d.Lw.b.Ob.d.M
Kü.Fl.gr 706
2/406 Do 18 Sola See
5/196 Ar 196 Hommelvik
Kü.Fl.Gr 506
1/506 He 115 Sola See
2/506 He 115 Sola See
3/506 He 115 Sola See
*
Fl.Führer Ost
1/906 He 115 Aalborg, Denmark

General der Luftwaffe fur
Norwegen
Moen in Maalselv
Stab/Ku.Fl.Gr.706
Tromsoe
3/906 Do 18 D/G
Tromsoe
1/406 He 115 B/C
Tromsoe
*
Stab/Ku.Fl.Gr.706
Tromsoe
3/906 Do 18 D/G
Tromsoe
1/406 He 115 B/C
Tromsoe

Luftgaukdo.Norwegen
Oslo
Stab I / JG 77
2/JG 77 Me 109 T
Lista
3/JG 77 Me 109 T
Herdla
13/JG 77 Me 109 T
Sola
Einsatzst.J.Gr.Dronth. Me 109 E/T
Vaernes, Oerlandet
Erg.St.IV (St)/LG 1 Ju 87 B/R
*
Stab/K.Gr.z.b.V.108
Fornebu
1/108 Ju 52 see
Trondheim-Hommelvik
2/108 Ju 52
Fornebu
3/108 Ju 52 / Fi 156 / He111
Fornebu
Verbindungsstaffel 2 Fi 156 / FW 58
Fornebu
5. Seenotstaffel He 59 Sola See, detatchments at Bergen, Trondheim, Tromsoe, Hammerfest and Kirkenes

1/706 He 59 Thisted, Denmark
3/Fl.Erg.St Ar 196 Aalborg, Denmark
*
Lg.Kdo Norwegen
1/KG z.b.V 108 Ju 52 see/He 59 + 60 Hommelvik
2/KG z.b.V 108 Ju 52 / Ju 90 Fornebu
*
Seenotdienst He 59 Sola, Bergen, Trondheim

nuav.net/ooblw.html

The Golden Comb

"The Golden Comb (Ger. die Goldene Zange) was an anti-ship tactic developed by the German air force (Luftwaffe) during World War II for use against Allied convoys taking supplies to the Soviet Union by the Arctic route. It was first employed against convoy PQ 18 in September 1942.

Before 1942 the German armed forces (Wehrmacht) lacked a means to attack ships at sea due to the inter-service rivalry between the Luftwaffe, which regarded all air operations as it's domain, and the Kriegsmarine, which saw the development, production and use of torpedoes as its own. Consequently Germany had no torpedo bomber force, in contrast to the forces of other world powers.

In early 1942, when the Allied Arctic convoy cycle was becoming well established, the Luftwaffe was ordered to form a torpedo bomber force, and was allotted the resources to do so. In response, two groups (Gruppe), III/KG 26 and III/KG 30, were assigned to train and equip as anti-ship /anti-convoy units. These units were equipped with He 111 and Ju 88 aircraft, modified to carry two air-dropped torpedoes externally under the wings.

In order to attack a target like a convoy, a formation of 20 to 30 ships sailing in close formation at relatively slow speed, KG 26 commander Generalmajor Harlinghausen and his men developed the Goldene Zange ( the "Golden Comb"), a new anti-ship (specifically an anti- convoy) tactic.

The Golden Comb involved the full group, which, having found its target, would form into a line abreast, some 40 aircraft flying approximately 30 metres apart. These would approach the convoy, from a forward quarter, and simultaneously launch their torpedoes at a distance of 1000 metres. The line would then overfly the convoy and escape.

The resulting pattern of up to 80 torpedoes, all travelling in parallel towards the target, was likened to the teeth of a comb; hence the name.

The attack was planned for use in the half light period of dawn or dusk, and would be in conjunction with a simultaneous dive bombing attack to divide the opposing AA fire.
The first use of the tactics occurred on 13 September 1942 against the Allied convoy PQ 18, a collection of 35 merchant ships, with a strong escort of 18 warships including the escort carrier Avenger.

After a dive-bombing attack by I/KG 30, the convoy was approached by I/KG 26, the torpedo-bombers, in a formation of 42 aircraft. The sight was described by one observer as "a huge flight of nightmare locusts".[1]

Despite anti aircraft fire from the ships and their escorts, the group continued on course, dropping their torpedoes as planned. In response the convoy commodore ordered a turn to starboard in order to sail parallel to the torpedo tracks. In the confusion the signal was misread by the ships of the starboard columns, which continued ahead. The torpedoes struck and eight ships, six in the outermost starboard column, and two further in, were sunk.

This occasion was the most successful use of the Golden Comb. The German aircraft made repeated attacks on PQ 18 thereafter, and two more ships were sunk by them, but no successes similar to the first day were achieved. Conversely, aircraft losses mounted after the first attack, and by the end of the air offensive against PQ 18, 40 aircraft from the two groups had been lost.

Following PQ 18 the Allied convoy cycle was paused until December 1942 when the next series of convoys was able to travel under cover of the Arctic night. Thus the Luftwaffe had no further opportunity to use the Golden Comb.
Impressive as it was, and devastating as its first use had been, the Golden Comb was, in the end, an ineffective tactic. The Allies quickly found counter-measures which reduced its effectiveness and inflicted crippling losses on the attackers.

The approaching formation was unable to take any evasive action on its approach, and was vulnerable to AA fire from the ships and escorts. The formation was also vulnerable to attacks by fighter aircraft from the carrier, and the combination of gun and fighter attack, aided by the bold and aggressive handling of the carrier, Avenger, and the AA ship, Ulster Queen, caused the bombers to release and break formation earlier and earlier in their approach runs as the battle progressed.

Finally the standard response to torpedo attack, to turn into the track to present a smaller target ( coincidentally referred to as "combing the tracks") was made more effective against torpedoes running on the same vector. The confusion over signals that contributed to PQ 18's first day losses was not repeated.

Other air forces had found torpedo attacks were more effective against ships when delivered from different directions simultaneously. Whist hitting 8 ships in one attack was a huge success, the bombers had launched over 80 torpedoes in that one attack; a ratio of 10 torpedoes to one ship hit. This was a less successful ratio than other occasions by other air forces, such as the RN's attack on Bismarck (May 1941), the IJN's attack on Prince of Wales and Repulse, (December 1941) and the USN's attack on Yamato, (April 1945)."

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"This sentence from Reichsmarschall Göring is more or less the explanation for the missing of any substantial support from the Luftwaffe for the U-boats. "Everything that flies is mine" meens the total concentration of the Luftwaffe supporting the Army in their operations.
The main tasks of maritime units of the Luftwaffe were coastal and sea reconnaisance, air-sea rescue, coastal patrol, and sea-mining and sea-minesweeping.

After the fall of France and the occupation of Norway some Kampfgeschwader (Bomber units) took part in anti shipping attacks. The most known units were the famous KG 40 with its Focke-Wulf 200 Condor, called as the scourge of the Atlantik and the KG 26 and KG 30 with their convoy attacks on the north cape lane.

What was left for the U-boats? Aufklärergruppen (reconnaissance-units), Küstenfliegerverbände (Coastal-flyer-units), Seeaufklärungsgruppen (See-reconnaissance-units) did their duty in controlling the the coastal waters and were searching for convoys. Seenotstaffeln could be sent out for rescue-purposes. Concentrated co-operation between the german navy and the Luftwaffe or support was never achieved. All attempts were more or less patchwork to keep the OKM silent.

The assignement of FW 200 Condor from KG 40 for reconnaissance purposes (instead of attacking purposes) found a fast end, when the British sheltered their convoys with escort carriers and CAM-ships.
Ju-88 sent out to sweep the Biskay from british anti U-boats groups were defeated by long range fighter.
The building of the Fernaufklärungsgruppe 5 with Ju 290 in November 1943 was too late and to little to show any impact on the already lost battle of the Atlantic.
Only the Luftwaffe units in Norway fighting against the North-cape convoys showed some use for the U-boats. But this was only a side theater on the batlle of the Atlantic."
9thflottilla.de/9lstart.htm

Interesting about the bad case of communications between the Kreigsmarine and the Luftwaffe, Robert

"Signals are an important element of seafaring and naval warfare. Ships must communicate with each other and Captains must communicate with their superiors ashore. For the S-Boats, which often operated at night in formations, communication was especially vital to navigation, formation keeping, target location and attack coordination. Signalling methods utilized by the S-boats ranged from the ancient practice of flags, semaphores and lanterns to the most modern radio and radar technologies of that era.

A Reciever/Transmitter type FuG/V aU provided ship to shore communication, as well as general reception and long range communication. It was mounted in the radio room forward and below the wheelhouse. This was the same type used in larger Luftwaffe seaplanes This provided a simple means for air/sea cooperation. In actual practice this was often hindered by the Luftwaffe High Command's lack of interest in maritime operations and the general scarcity of resources. "

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"By late August, 1941, it became clear to the Soviet military command that Tallinn and Estonia would also fall into German hands within a matter of days. The Soviet navy ships located in Tallinn had to be evacuated. On 26 August 1941, Moscow gave Admiral Vladimir Tributs permission to evacuate Tallinn with all available naval forces. But the Germans did their best to prevent just that from happening. The Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe attacks conducted against the Tallinn naval exodus can arguably be said do be the Germany's greatest naval success of 1941 and the Soviet Red Banner Baltic Fleet's worst moment."

feldgrau.com/baltsea.html

Maritime aircraft in action Sep 1943. Robert

YouTube link

Luftwaffe attacks and sinks a Soviet ship during Operation Barbarossa 1941

youtu.be/DFU0oznOIi4

Can't doubt their audacity. Robert

21 March 1940
"At dusk on 16 March an attack was made on Scapa by 15 enemy bombers operating in small groups, and continued from 7:45pm until 9pm

It is reported that only the first wave of five aircraft attacked ships in the harbour, dropping about 20 bombs. This attack came in low and climbed on reaching Scapa Flow to make dive bombing attacks on the fleet. H.M.S. Norfolk was hit in the quarter deck and holed by a near miss aft, 4 officers being killed, and 4 officers and 3 ratings wounded. The damage to the ship necessitates docking, but she was capable of steaming at 10 knots, and has since arrived at the Clyde. H.M.S. Iron Duke (depot ship) was also damaged by two near misses, and one other capital ship was attacked but not hit.

The remaining aircraft dropped a large number of high explosive and incendiary bombs near Hatston Aerodrome and Bridge of Wraith on the road between Kirkwall and Stromness. About 120 high explosives and over 500 incendiary bombs were dropped in all. Eight craters were made in the airfield at Hatston, some 800 yards from the hangers, and one bomb fell near a bomb store. No other damage was done to air force objectives, but two cottages were damaged at Bridge of Wraith, one civilian being killed and seven injured."
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10 Jan 41

HMS Illustrious bombed by the Luftwaffe

HMS Illustrious under attack on the 10th January 1941. Courtesy MaritimeQuest.

The Luftwaffe announced their arrival in the Mediterranean with a vengeance. The new aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, whose planes had so successfully attacked the Italian fleet at Taranto, was the subject of a sustained attack by Ju 87 dive-bombers as it escorted a convoy to Malta. MaritimeQuest has a series of images of the attack and the damage to the ship.

The main forces of the Mediterranean Fleet, consisting of H.M. Ships Warspite and Valiant with H.M.S. Illustrious and 7 destroyers, were operating in support in the Eastern Basin and covering the passage from Alexandria to Malta of a convoy which was escorted by H.M. Ships Perth, Orion, York and Ajax. On the 10th January the Fleet was attacked several times by various types of aircraft.

The first attack was by torpedo bombers on the Battle Fleet, in which torpedoes missed after avoiding action had been taken. The second, which occurred at about 1235, was carried out by 25 or more Ju 87 and 88 dive-bombers which attacked with great determination and skill, thus confirming the arrival in the Mediterranean of units of the German Air Force.

In this attack H.M.S Illustrious was severely damaged as a result of 6-direct bomb hits and several near misses, which caused fires and disabled her steering gear. Her casualties were 83 killed, 60 seriously and 40 slightly wounded, including several officers. H.M.S. Warspiie also sustained slight damage from a near miss. During this attack one Fulmar and one Swordfish were shot down, their crews being saved, and two enemy aircraft were shot down by gunfire.

At 1330 an unsuccessful attack was made on Illustrious by high level bombers and between 1600 and 1700 a second dive-bombing attack by about 30 aircraft was made on her and the Battle Fleet in which another hit was believed to have been made on Illustrious, and H.M.S. Valiant had one killed and 3 wounded from near misses.

During this attack Fulmars from Illustrious, which had refuelled at Malta, shot down 6 or 7 Ju 87 or 88′s and damaged several others. Heavy bombs of about 1,000 lb. were used in all these attacks. Illustrious, covered by the Battle Fleet, arrived at Malta at about 2100 after a final, but unsuccessful, attack had been made oh her by torpedo bombers outside the entrance to Grand Harbour. Eleven of her Swordfish and 5 Fulmars were destroyed by fire.

From the weekly Naval Situation report see TNA CAB/66/14/33

Air Mechanic Rayburn was on board HMS Illustrious and somehow lived to tell his story:

My action station as with all maintenance crews, was in the hanger with the aircraft, which by the way were all heavily armed, and loaded with torpedoes ready for an attack on the Italian Fleet.

Illustrious was armed with 16 4.5 dual purpose guns, and 8 6 barrelled 2lb quick firing AA weapons. The ship kept jumping and shaking. Several large bombs hit the shop aft, and the after hanger was on fire. The noise was indescribable. In my baptism of fire, all that sticks in my mind are impressions. 
I was standing more or less in the centre of the hanger. A chap came down from the flight deck; his rubber suit was full of holes with blood leaking from all of them. I helped carry him down to the casualty station in the washroom flats.

The surgeons were busy. Blood washed from side to side with the sway of the ship. 
I returned to my action station in the hangar. The ship continued to rock and sway.

I looked up with fear and apprehension. Then there was an almighty flash as a 1,000 lb bomb pierced the 4 inch armoured deck and exploded. I was only aware of a great wind, and bits of aircraft, debris, all blowing out to the forward lift shaft of 300 tons, which was also blown out. 
There were dead and wounded all around. My overalls were blown off and I had small wounds to the back of my head and shoulder.
I was probably 10-15 feet away from the bomb when it exploded. Luck I survived? I prefer the thought of someone looking out for me. 
The hanger by then was burning all over. The ships commander came and said, ‘come on lads close the armoured doors.' The overhead sprays then flooded the hanger.

The ship started to sink by the stern, and everyone had to blow up lifebelts. Then came a spot of humour in all that chaos. Poor old Corporal Gater came through a side door white as a sheet saying ‘I wish I hadn't bloody joined.' 
The battering carried on for six to seven hours. 
There were many wounded piled up. The aft surgeons station had been destroyed, and the forward station was unable to cope quickly with so many casualties. 
Captain Boyd finally steered with the engines into Malta. The ship was quiet at last.

See Acepilots for his full story and much more on HMS Illustrious.

A hole in the armoured flight deck of HMS Illustrious where a 1,250 pound bomb penetrated. Courtesy MaritimeQuest.

Some repairs were carried out at Malta (where there were further air attacks) before HMS Illustrious returned to Alexandria. There she was sufficiently patched up to make the journey, via the Suez Canal and round Africa, to U.S. shipyards in Norfolk, Virginia. She was out of the war for the remainder of the year."

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Royal Navy Vessels Lost To Aircraft during Weserübung

09/04/40 Destroyer GURKHA (1,870t) Sunk by aircraft bombs, off Stavanger, Norway

20/04/40 Trawler RUTLANDSHIRE (458t) Attacked by aircraft and grounded, Namsos, Norway

25/04/40 Trawler BRADMAN (452t) Sunk by aircraft, West Coast of Norway.

25/04/40 Trawler HAMMOND (452t) Sunk by aircraft, Aandalsnes. Norway.

25/04/40 Trawler LARWOOD (453t) Sunk by aircraft, West Coast of Norway

28/04/40 Trawler CAPE SIRETOKO (590t) Sunk by aircraft, West Coast of Norway

29/04/40 Trawler CAPE CHELYUSKIN (550t) Sunk by aircraft bombs, off Norway

30/04/40 Sloop BITTERN (1,190t) German bombers off Namsos, Norway

30/04/40 Trawler JARDINE (452t) Sunk by own forces after damage by aircraft, West Coast of Norway.

30/04/40 Trawler WARWICKSHIRE (466t) Sunk by aircraft, Trondheim area, Norway.

3/05/40 Destroyer AFRIDI (1,870t) Sunk by aircraft bombs, off Norway

3/05/40 Trawler ASTON VILLA (546t) Sunk by aircraft off Norway.

3/05/40 Trawler GAUL (550t) Sunk by aircraft off Norway.

3/05/40 Trawler ST. GORAN (565t) Sunk by aircraft, Namsos, Norway

21/05/40 Trawler CAPE PASSARO (590t) Sunk by aircraft, Narvik area, Norway

22/05/40 Trawler MELBOURNE (466t) Sunk by aircraft, Narvik area, Norway

25/05/40 Special service vessel MASHOBRA (8,324t) Damaged by aircraft, and beached at Narvik

26/05/40 Boom defence vessel LOCH SHIN (255t) Capsized at Harstad, Norway, after being damaged by aircraft and beached.

26/05/40 Cruiser CURLEW (4,290t) Sunk by aircraft, bombs, off Ofotfiord, Norway

10/06/40 Armed boarding vessel VAN DYCK (13,241t) Lost in convoy probably by German air attack, Narvik area, Norway

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And there was this success later in the war ,

"On 10 February 1944, German Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor from the I./KG 40, stationed in Norway, sank the British tanker SS El Grillo at Seyðisfjörður."

Robert

"1942

April 26. The trawler Surprise from Hafnarfjörður was attacked by a German aircraft 160 nm out of Westman Islands. 2 bombs were dropped at it but while they fell extremely close to its side and shook it up no damages resulted from this encounter.

Aug. 19. Icelandic boat, Skaftfellingur , while on its way to Fleetwood, UK, saved 52 men from a sinking German U-boat. The boat, according to one of the survivors, had participated in a fight between a German and a British aircraft. Both the planes had crashed into the sea and the boat itself was badly damaged. The U-boat saved the crew from the German plane but ignored the British. [ This is taken from a 1971 book, based on local WWII data which was censored by the allied authorities in Iceland, so details are lacking. I cannot find ANY U-boat in my sources that matches this. ] The boat then moved on to Fleetwood but was stopped by two destroyers near port and the destroyers took the Germans. The British were extremely sceptical that only 7 Icelanders had dared to rescue 52 Germans but let the boat go anyway.

Aug. 24. German Focke Wulf FW-200 Condor recon bomber attacked the trawler Vörður 20 nm out of Icelandic shores. The trawler was machine gunned at 9:30 AM just when the ship was about to leave the fishing grounds for port. 3 men were on deck when the plane fired and one was hit in the chest and died shortly thereafter. The plane came over the trawler twice and dropped a bomb which fell into the sea just aft of the ship and shook at badly causing some internal damages. The plane then flew eastwards.

Sept. 10. German bomber attacked 5 small fishing boats just east of Iceland. The boats were machine gunned but only one was hit causing minor damages but no men were hurt. The aircraft then dropped a bomb towards one of the boats but missed and then flew away.

Sept. 29. German bomber attacked Icelandic ship east of Iceland, both using machine guns and bombs. No casualties were inflicted on board and the crew fired 83 rounds from a machine gun but apparently missed the plane.

Oct. 8. German bomber attacked 2 motor boats east of Iceland using bombs but missed.

Oct. 18. German FW-200 Condor attacked the large boat Eldborg north-east of Iceland and made 15-16 attempts against it. At one time the plane was so low that the crew of the boat could even see the Germans open up the bomb hatch. No bombs were dropped as the boat was constantly changing course, finally the Germans gave up on trying to bomb it and machine gunned the boat but missed.
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Really interesting to see how many Icelandic boats and ships were attacked during the war. Robert

"8 Aug 1941

Karl Marx Izyaslav-class destroyer was bombed and sunk in Loksa Bay by Luftwaffe aircraft".

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SS TUNISIA

On August 4, 1941, in position 53.53N, 18.10W (west of Ireland) Tunisia was bombed by an FW200 Kondor aircraft. She sank in position 53.53N, 18.10W. There were only five survivors from a complement of forty-three.

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"First Happy Time"

The period, August 1940 to May 1941, was known by the Germans as the First Happy Time, because of the considerable amount of Allied ships sunk for light losses. Even before the formation of Fliegerführer Atlantik, the success of air attack on convoys during this time was almost immediate. Under the command of Donitz, in August 1940 – February 1941, Fw 200s sank 52 ships for only four losses.[29] By Christmas 1940, KG 40 had sunk 19 ships of 100,000 tons and damaged 37 of 180,000 tons. In January, 17 ships were sunk (65,000 tons) and five damaged.[30] February was worse for the British, losing 21 ships to Fw 200s, totalling 84,301 tons.[31]

In January 1941 HX 90, OB 274, HG 50 and SL 61 were successfully attacked. The later raid, on 19 January, sank seven ships from HG 50 and SL 61. [30] On 8 February, U-37 discovered convoy HG.53. The U-Boat reported its presence to Fliegerführer Atlantik. I./KG 40 was dispatched and sank five ships (9,201 grt), although 29,000 grt was claimed. The role was reversed a few days later when Convoy OB.288 was discovered by Fw 200s, and U-Boats sank a number of ships. However, inadequate navigation training, exacerbated by out-of-date meteorological data, created errors in location of reports of up to 450 kilometres (280 mi), while 19 per cent of all reports gave errors in course of up to 90 degrees.[20]

It was not always easy, communicating and coordinating with air and sea forces. U-Boats were unable to make accurate navigation using sun or star sightings and even when convoys were located they had trouble homing in bombers because their short-range transmitters were too weak to reach the aircraft. However, they were strong enough to alter British defences. Harlinghausen was irritated when his aircraft communicated accurate locations and the U-Boats failed to respond. Only when he complained to the BdU did he learn from Donitz that the navy failed to inform the Luftwaffe that there were no U-Boats in the area to respond. By the end of March, 1941, attempts at close cooperation were abandoned in favour of more flexible approached. Donitz noted in his war diary that enemy signals about German air attacks would allow his intelligence (B-Dienst) to locate the convoy – he supposed that this would offer a better chance of interception.[20]

During the first quarter of 1941, the Condors sank 171,000 grt, the vast majority being lone ships. In one case, a sustained attack upon Convoy OB.290 on 26 February 1941 accounted for seven to nine vessels (49,865 grt), all sunk by KG 40 Fw 200s. However, with never more than eight aircraft operational, this was an exception. Soon, British CAM ship (catapult aircraft merchantmen) appeared, and the time of light Condor losses ended.[20][31]

Donitz envisaged a cooperation of air and sea forces in mass attacks against convoys. The wolfpack tactics were proving successful, and he sought to supplement them with the Luftwaffe. The Condors were to break up the convoys, and scatter them so the Wolf packs could move in and dispatch the ships while they were unprotected. In March, the Luftwaffe won back control of KG 40 had placed under Harlinghausen's control, and success dried up. KG 40 was forced to suspend operations for two weeks (probably due to insufficient support)."

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