"Napoleonic artillery ammunition supply at army level?" Topic

There is something of a parallel horse artillery discussion taking place on the Napoleon Series that is interesting, but somewhat redundant. Two of the forum members here, VW and Stephen Summerfield, are involved in the discussion and I thought it might be helpful if some of their comments are submitted here, and all of them are interesting and worthy of further discussion, although some of them have already been answered.

Much of the discussion appeared to revolve around Tousard's artillery manual for the United States in 1809, American Artillerist's Companion which is one of the excellent artillery manuals of the period consisting of two volumes of text (for about 1200 pages) and one volume of plates. This manual was reprinted by Greenwood Press in 1969.
1.There was a question about where Louis de Tousard found his information for his American Artillerist's Companion. The following is a list of the references used by Tousard in assembling the manual.

In French:

-General Victor-Antoine, Baron Andreossy, fortification theory lectures given to the Ecole Polytechnique.

-LtGen de Mouy, Unpublished treatise on the experiments at Strasbourg in 1764.

-Captain HO DeScheel, Memoires d'Artillerie Contenant l'Artillerie Nouvelle ou Les Changemens Faits Dans l'Artillerie Francaise en 1765.

-Colonel Edme-Jean-Antoine du Puget, Essai sur l'usage de l'artilleie dans la guerre de campagne et dans celles de sieges.

Recueil de quelques petits ouvrages quit peuvent servir de supplement a l'Essai sur l'usage de I'artilleie.

Procesverbal des epreuves faiues a douay sur les portees des pieces de 4 longues et de celles de 4 courtes de nouveau modele.

-Denis Diderot, JL d'Alembert, et al, Encyclopddie ou Dictionnaire Raisonne
Des Sciences des arts et des métiers.

-General Jean-Jacques-Basilien,Comte de Gassendi, Aide-Memoire a I'usage des officiers d'artillerie de France.

-General Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval, The Regulation of 1765.

Tables des Constructions des principaux attirails d'artillerie.

General Jean, Comte Fabre de Lamartilliere, Reflexions sur la fabrication des bouches a feu.

GeneralT heodore-Bernard-Simodn'U rtubie de Rogicourt, Manuel de I'artilleur.

Manuscript Volumes of Artillery: Five large volumes of memoires and treatises from knowledgeable French artillery officers used for instructional purposes in the French artillery schools.

In English:

-Captain Ralph Willett Adye, Bombardier and Pocket Gunner.

-Major-General Alessandro Vittoria Papacino D'Antoni, A Treatise on Gun-Powder: A Treatise on Fire-Arms; and A Treatise on the Service of Artillery in Time of War.

-James Glenie, The New History of Gunnery, with a New Method of Deriving the Theory of Projectiles in Vacuo from the Properties of the Square and the Rhombus.

-Major Charles James, Regimental Companion, containing a Relation of the Duties of every officer in the BritishArmy.

-John Muller, A Treatise of Artillery.

-Benjamin Robbins, New Principles of Gunnery.

-Captain William Stevens, A System of Discipline of the Artillery of the United States
of America, or, The Young Artillerist's Pocket Companion.

If anyone is unfamiliar with the source material for Tousard's artillery treatise/aide-memoire, I've listed most of them here for general reference. These are taken from Don Graves' excellent article ‘Louis Tousard and his ‘Artillerist's Companion': An Investigation of Source Material for Napoleonic Period Ordnance.' I have a copy of the article and it is excellent and very helpful.

2.There was a statement and a question about Austrian cavalry batteries (which Tousard identifies as horse artillery, which I would consider an error) as to their employment of a ‘wurst caisson' when it is apparent that they didn't use one, but used a wurst seat on modified and elongated gun carriages for the gun crew to sit on for movement.

3.There was a secondary question on this topic regarding the use of ‘light 3-pounder guns' at the beginning of the Austrian cavalry batteries and not the immediate employment of the modified 6-pounder gun and 7-pounder howitzer for cavalry battery service.

4. Regarding French horse artillery and its beginnings in 1791-1792, there were questions about ‘light ammunition carriages' in 1792; the French horse artillery conference in 1792; the employment of the wurst caissons by the French horse artillery; the employment of the 8-pounder gun with the French horse artillery in 1792 and the absence of a French 6-pounder until much later (ca 1805).

5.There is a question regarding the relatively late date that the French introduced ‘mobile artillery.' And a proposed answer to the question is included-‘Probably money.'

‘Mobile artillery' by definition if field artillery which during the period concerned was defined as horse, foot, and mountain artillery. So, to answer the query logically, Gribeauval introduced his new field artillery system ca 1764-1765. And the reason it took so long is that the Vallieres, father and son, dominated French artillery thinking from at least 1732 on, and wanted to keep their artillery system in service, even though it had failed during the Seven Years' War.

What is probably meant by the question, however, is horse artillery which the French introduced into their service in 1791-1792. And one of the reasons could very well have been funding, as horse artillery companies are much more expensive to organize and maintain than a foot artillery company, and that extra expense has much to do with the extra horses needed, especially as the French meant, from at least 1792, to mount all the gunners in the horse artillery gun companies.

Gribeauval's reason, however, in answer to a question by M. de Vregilles, another French artillery officer who had distinguished himself in the Seven Years' War, who proposed to Gribeauval a plan to organize a French horse artillery arm: ‘You witness the difficulties and enemies which my endeavors to destroy ancient prejudices have raised against me; at a future period we may execute your plan; digest and improve upon it; for the present it would be asking too much.'

Apparently, then, the French were at least thinking about establishing a horse artillery arm during the reform period (1763-1789) before the shooting started in 1792. Unfortunately I don't have an exact date for the incident.

6. There was a statement made in the thread about ‘rumor' that ‘surrounds' the subject of horse artillery and much of that problem should be ‘laid at the door of Tousard.' I find that idea somewhat disingenuous and completely inaccurate. Are there historical mistakes in Tousard's manual? I have found a few so the answer is ‘yes.' As has been mentioned here many times, every book has errors. But to make an assumption or accusation such as was made against Tousard, and I hope not if the manual was actually read and understood, seems an attempt to discredit one of the best of the artillery manuals of the period and an excellent resource.

7. There was a statement that Tousard was ‘considered to be identical to DeScheel.' That is an incorrect assumption as Tousard is much longer than DeScheel's treatise, though DeScheel was one of the references used by Tousard. There was also a comment made that Tousard was being regarded as a ‘main source on artillery' which it is, but that ‘as such…all conclusions' made by Tousard ‘were taken as fact value.' Yes, and no. Tousard is an artillery reference that should, to my mind, be used in conjunction with other period references, such as Gassendi and d'Urtubie. These are technical manuals, and form the basis for any study of French artillery of the period.

8. There was also a comment that Tousard wrote ‘fiction.' Seems to me there is a tendency among some of our colleagues to consign mistakes in a text as either ‘fiction' as is done here, or as ‘lies' as has been done from time to time (though that wasn't done in the thread I'm referring to on the Napoleon Series). The horse artillery section in Tousard is excellent, and although the historical part of the section, which is short compared to the technical part, may have errors in it, I've seen historical errors in other works of this type, so that is an author error, done in good faith, and not a deliberate ‘fiction' as was intimated in the thread.

9. There was a very interesting comment, stating that ‘British Experimental Horse Artillery dates to the American War of Independence'-I'd like to see evidence for that. There certainly wasn't anything of that type employed in combat in North America. If the reference is to galloper guns, I would submit that isn't horse artillery.

10. The last comment made was again a reference to Tousard, in that his manual ‘is so light weight and so blatantly biased in favor of the French.' The author of this statement also said that he hadn't read Tousard. Seems to me that before making so definitive and sweeping a statement, the manual should be at least read first. Just a though, though. As the manual was written by the US Army, by a school-trained French artillery officer because the US Army was in the process of adopting the Gribeauval System, much French information would necessarily be in there. As the author of this is not here, I will not name him (as he is also a friend of mine) but he and I have discussed much Napoleonic material and seldom agreed over the last twelve years. He's a good man, with much good work to his credit.

Sincerely,
Kevin

‘not poorly documented but the documents poorly exploited.'

Could you explain this statement, please?

‘The short sight apporach – to look only on the guns. One has to see train – ammunition carriage – gun – gunners.'

I would agree completely. Could you please explain where this has been done?

‘All 4 parts will form a team and a team is only so strong as its weakest link.'

In actuality, there are more than four parts to an artillery system. Command and control, tactics, doctrine, and education also are a part of any good artillery system.

‘Gribeauval had certainly no horse artillery in mind – when he designed his guns and his ammunition system.'

What do you mean by an ‘ammunition system'? As far as I know the French ammunition system was developed during the early wars of the Revolution and finalized by Napoleon. The French ammunition supply/resupply (logistics) system has been shown already.

I would suggest that Gribeauval definitely had horse artillery in mind, but chose to delay it until there was a better time to introduce and develop it. The field pieces of Gribeauval's ‘three calibers' were more than adequate for any horse artillery arm-definitely proven when French horse artillery was introduced in 1791.

‘It was pure 18th century warfare, hauling guns with ropes to catch up with the infantry.'

Field pieces were ‘hauled with ropes' when necessary and the prolonge was in use at least through the American Civil War. And the ‘ropes' weren't used to ‘catch up with infantry' at least not in the French service, but to maneuver with the infantry if necessary.

‘The tactical use of guns, as well as the infantry – was however discussed in military circles, like field artillery forming not only an aid to infantry but to emerge as an independent branch of arms – as can be seen in the writings of du Teil – for example.'

Yes, and infantry/artillery cooperation in combat was taught in the French artillery schools from 1765 on. These points have been discussed and documented on the forum many times already.

‘The shortcomings were very well realized by the artillery committee led by Marmount and better solutions were proposed.'

What 'better solutions' were proposed by the Artillery Committee?

They were also opposed by certain members of the artillery committee, such as Gassendi. And it should be noted that only two field pieces of Systeme AN XI were actually produced in any numbers: the 6-pounder and the 5.5-inch howitzer, also known as the 2-pounder. Gribeauval field pieces and ancillary vehicles were in use through and past 1815 until the introduction and implementation of the Vallee System in 1829. French horse artillerymen much preferred the Gribeauval 8-pounder to the new 6-pounder, the robustness of the 8-pounder being one of the reasons.

When the new Vallee System went into effect, the two cannons employed were the 8-pounder and the 12-pounder.
Because of opposition to the Systeme AN XI and the time and tooling that had to be considered for full production of the new system, what was actually produced merely supplemented the existing Gribeauval System, but it never replaced it.

‘Yes because I want to know the technical details, equipment and capability of them. This side interests the wargamer as he can then model this.'

The manuals will provide all the information on technical details, et al, that anyone needs. I have quite a few artillery manuals of the period and they are full of technical data and what the equipment could do and couldn't do isn't hard to figure out.

‘The Russians employed two wheeled ammunition carts from 1803 onwards as part of the M1805 system. The experimentation with them under Tsar Paul was a failure. They were not suited to the poor roades in Poland and Russia. The M1805 system was a development of the Tsar Paul rather than a new system if you study the plans as we have had to do for my new book on the subject.'

Agree on the two-wheeled Russian caissons. The Russian 1805 System undoubtedly came out of the reforms that Paul I was trying to do before Alexander and his nobles got rid of him. The Russian 1805 Artillery System brought the Russian material somewhat up to the standard of the Austrian Lichtenstein System.

‘Valliere Junior died in 1774'

Valliere fils died in 1776.

‘So why does his objections stop Gribeauval to introduce horse artillery in 1780.'

Do you understand the scope of the artillery system that Gribeauval actually introduced? The new education system alone was a completely revamped system on its own. There was also a major ruckus and debate between the adherents of the two systems (Valliere v Gribeauval) which was long and bitter and actually divided the French artillery officer corps. When Gribeauval finally triumphed, he was probably satisfied with the major and sweeping reforms that he did achieve and counseled Vregilles to be patient and to wait.
What date do you have for your quote?

‘Gribeauval died in 1789. The design for the Manson Wurst Wagons were about 1780.'

And?

I would think that Gribeaval's answer on horse artillery development was self-explanatory. I don't have a date for the quotation by year. I haven't been able to find that yet.

Sincerely,
Kevin

‘It was pure 18th century warfare, hauling guns with ropes to catch up with the infantry.'

There is a recurring theme on the artillery threads that states that the Gribeauval System was designed to fight the last war and not the next. That idea is completely incorrect. The following might help to correct that mistaken theory. There is also an excellent definition given for what an artillery system actually is:

The following excerpts are taken from Howard Rosen, ‘The Systeme Gribeauval: A Study of Technological Development and Institutional Change in Eighteenth Century France', August 1981.

‘As a result of its adoption in 1765, the French were in possession of the best artillery force on the continent at the very moment that artillery was coming to play a crucial role in combat. This extensive and modern artillery system, staffed by highly professional and loyal officers, provided the French armies of the Revolution with their most valuable military inheritance from the Old Regime…As products of the systeme Gribeauval, they were trained in the foremost technical schools of Europe for a warfare of complex and decisive movement. They were members of an organization, composed entirely of Frenchmen, which had been thoroughly reformed before the Revolution of 1789.'-1

Jean du Teil, himself one of the key military theorists before Napoleon, was an ardent admirer of Gribeauval and his new artillery system.'-13

‘According to du Teil, Gribeauval ‘rendered the artillery more scientific.'-13

‘Judged by his work, taken as a whole, Gribeauval was the greatest reformer, certainly in the material, probably in the personnel, the artillery world has ever seen…the systeme Gribeauval was as perfect a work as is humanly possible.'-14

‘Gribeauval was more important than anyone else, including Jacques-Antoine Hippolyte, comte de Guibert, or Chevalier Jean Charles de Folard.'-14

‘…only Sebastien le pretre de Vauban ‘has left a work comparable to that of Gribeauval.''-15

[The systeme Gribeauval] ‘was the key technical-military development in the period immediately following the Seven Years' War.'-16

‘Often obscured by the large number of changes it introduced, was the fact that the systeme Gribeauval was a genuine system, a thoroughly integrated blend of organizational principles, tactical ideas, and technology. Gribeauval conceived of the artillery as a system in which each part was designed in functional relation to the whole. Men and material were both viewed instrumentally, as elements of the system. From the details of equipoment to its social organization, every aspect of the systeme Gribeauval was designed to achieve a specific purpose: to create an artillery force with sufficient mobility to participate actively in offensive field operations.-30-31

‘Artillerists now had to be familiar with infantry maneuvers and tactics, as well as knowledgeable about artillery. The equipment had been designed to follow infantry movements closely. The officers had to be able to react and plan accordingly. This required a higher level of individual skill and initiative, especially among the junior grades. Infantry tactics were made an integral part of the artillery curriculum for the first time, and every officer was given at least some experience of command during peacetime maneuvers. Every regiment had its own school at which officers took formal instruction.'-46

‘The most significant innovation one sees in the systeme Gribeauval was that it was indeed a system: a thorough synthesis of organization, technology, material, and tactics. Every aspect of the system, from the harnessing of the horses to the selection and organization of personnel, embodied a single functional concept. Utility was its principle, mobility was its goal. Every element of the systeme Gribeauval was designed to function in a particular way, in a particular circumstance. Men and technology were considered functional elements of the total system. The date, 1776, of the final official acceptance of the systeme Gribeauval, marked an important stage in the development of modern military institutions.'-48.

‘Developments in organization and material had a tactical purpose as well. All of these efforts were intended to provide mobility. It was only with the developments in technology and organization incorporated into the systeme Gribeauval that true mobility in a tactical sense was achieved. Mobility was a new military concept. Beyond mere movement, it required the ability to activate military force in a variety of circumstances, and at a particular moment. This orchestration of forces placed great demands upon the people, the equipment, and the conductors of combat operations. Time, as well as timing, were now more crucial than ever before. Greater precision and skill were now required in both the human and technological elements. Understood in these broader terms, the cost and rationale of all the hchanges in the systeme Gribeauval was justified by ‘…mobility, the true end, the essential end of all these important changes.'-50-51

So, according to Rosen, whose research on his paper was quite extensive with much primary material from Gribeauval himself and others, mobility was a prime motivator for the design of the Gribeauval System of field artillery. Gribeauval was neither planning nor designing for the last war, but the next one.

And just for fun, here's Ralph Willett Adye's remark on the Gribeauval System ca 1800:

‘The French system of artillery was established as far back as the year 1765, and has been rigidly adhered to through a convulsion in the country which overturned everything like order, and which even the government itself has not been able to withstand. We should therefore, conclude that it has merit, and, though in an enemy, ought to avail ourselves of its advantages. At the formation of their system, they saw the necessity of the most exact correspondence in the most minute particulars, and so rigidly have they adhered to this principle that, though they have several arsenals, where carriages and other military machines are constructed, the different parts of a carriage may be collected from these several arsenals, in the opposite extremities of the country, and will as well unite and form a carriage as if they were all made and fitted in the same workshop. As long as every man who fancies he ahs made an improvement is permitted to introduce it into our service, this cannot be the case with us.'-Ralph Willett Adye, ca 1800.

Sincerely,
Kevin