"Napoleonic artillery ammunition supply at army level?" Topic

I'm trying to find some more info on how artillery ammunition was distributed at the army or corps level throughout a battle.

Information on the individual battery and gun ammo is pretty easy to come by but how the army artillery park was organised and how resupply of batteries was handled in the field is something that is only briefly handled in most of the Napoleonic books I have.

Any pointers would be much appreciated.

Has all this & more….
link

Dear Mark
This is a complex subject and depends upon the country.

In general terms using the French as the model. Each gun or pair of guns was accompanied by a caisson as the French artillery did not have ready ammunition on the limbers as most of the other countries.

The other caisson in the battery were held in the artillery park. When the caisson was running low in ammunition another caisson would move from the park to replace it. The French did not used ammunition boxes so resupply was an issue. Each round had to be placed into a separate nest.

The French artillerymen would move the ammunition in leather satchels from the caisson to the guns.

The British used a superior system where the ammunition boxes could be moved from the ammunition wagon to the limber. The Desaguliers ammunition limber was in effect a limber joined to an ammunition car with 5 foot wheels so could travel anywhere the guns could go unlike most other nations that used the four wheeled "Gribeuaval" caisson with the exception of the Russians who used the very mobile two wheeled carts. The only problems that the British had was the responsibility of ammunition was not under the control of the Royal Artillery but that is another can of worms.

Ammunition supply was essential to keep the guns in action and often overlooked. A gun would have about 200 rounds including those in the artillery park.
Stephen

Wha? French did indeed have a ready ammo box on the gun. Its that little box that comes on all model figures! An 8 pounder also had two caissons, a twelve pounder 3, with the battery. When one was emptied, it was sent back to the park to reload. It was not kept with the park, as this was often to take it too far away to be of any use (think Gettysburg movie) The British system was slightly different, using uniform sized boxes, removable from the ammo wagon (not a caisson) but the system worked exactly the same way.

Dear Andrea
I was referring to the limber and not the few rounds in the coffret on the gun carriage that was only used in an emergency. This was only used in emergency. The French had to manhandle each round rather that a box of ammunition. As you realise the resupply would be slower than that for the British.
Stephen

Thats all pretty helpful and the book has some useful info – I've just skimmed a copy, thanks.

I'm really looking for a way to model ammunition availability at the army or corps level and it seems that individual battery ammo isnt a factor as much as the supply and distribution from higher level.

This would suggest that rather than having individual batteries go 'out of ammo' it makes more sense to have an army ammo suppply that could be depleted.

Someone said during a recent game 'if there are no ammo rules you may as well just deploy and fire with every gun as much as you can' and this seemed to go against what I've read about artillery reserve and deployment.

Anyway, I'm now branching into the 'game design' board…

Thanks for the pointers – much appreciated.

Dear Mark
To see the reserve in action then you should read Borodino by Mikaberidze.

Consider setting up the supply depot and then move the caissons to the batteries. This I have done it is interesting how fast you run out of ammunition. Remember that only 20% at most was cannister. Also consider that a French caisson would be moving barely faster than a man walks and may be able to get to a trot.

Have a look at:
Dawson, Dawson and Summerfield (2007) Napoleonic Artillery, Crowood Press.
Smoothbore Ordnance Journal

Stephen

Little wonder the French Army was ground down with logistical systems like that wasting horses and manpower.

'if there are no ammo rules you may as well just deploy and fire with every gun as much as you can' and this seemed to go against what I've read about artillery reserve and deployment.

Yes, and it is dreary to keep track of in a large miniatures battle at the battery level-as ammo is not the only issue that relates to constant firing, but fatigue as well…

I would suggest computer rules such as Carnage & Glory, which keeps track of both at the battery level, and allows for a depleteable army level as calculated after battery re-supply. This makes the simulation model much more realistic, and requires a commander to husband artillery resources as his historical couterpart would have.

At least, use a set of rules that requires the record keeping, or you do end up with something quite unlike the historical use of guns.

Happy Gaming!

I use a "battery ammo supply rule" in my games for three reasons.

1) Prevents players from firing the "impossible shot". ie…at long range skirmisher target for example. Artillery commanders just wouldn't do it. Speeds up game play.

2) Artillery crew fatigue. You try firing, loading, pushing a 12 pdr back into position for just one hour. I moved a real 1812 12 pdr at Fort Nigara back in the 70's just 60 yards on grass with 6 other warm bodies. I twas a pain to say the least. Pushing that cannon back after every firing, loading with the carried heavy cannonball and being thirsty doesn't help. After 2-3 hours the crew is totally spent and must rest….same as being out of action for "lack of ammo" in my view point since no firing (or very limited) is taken place.

3) Forces players to disengage their artillery for a spell….while reloading, rest for artillerymen is given and their reserve ammo train can find their parent battery behind the lines. Unlike Infantry and cavalry….artillerymen are "wed" to their heavy burden and train company. Ammo resupply doesn't happen that quickly, try moving by hand a ton of shot someday plus the powder to go with it….and if the battery repositions itself….what do you think happens during a battle for the train to find their parent battery. Ask AAA for directions?

M

What he said.

'Little wonder the French Army was ground down with logistical systems like that wasting horses and manpower.'

Could you explain that statement a little more? I'm probably missing the gist of it, but I'm just a little confused by it.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Hmm – though the original post was about ammunition supply I guess it does make sense to combine this and fatigue if you are trying to model the use of batteries throughout a battle. Both having the same game effect but for different reasons.

The idea being that players have some incentive to hold a reserve so that fresh batteries can either reinforce the line or be massed to attack (or defend) a specific point.

The rules I'm working on are very large scale (multiple corps per side but with individual battalions, regiments or batteries) so detailed ammo and fatigue rules are out.

Plenty to think about and that book to read – thanks for all the suggestions.

crusaderminis- First, let me say that i am not the brightest bulb on the marquee, and because I can't do it doesn't mean it can't be done…but with the utmost humility, hat in hand, part tongue in cheek, and in a sincere desire to save you some time(if in fact you want to save time-it may not matter), I deferentially say that multi-corps battles can be done, with rules that work in terms of playability, that preserve the mechanics of what is unique and attractive to us about Napoleonic maneuver and combat, that have the level of detail which includes battery ammunition and fatigue,etc, and have a practical learning curve- but not without the computer. Without the computer, you will sacrifice not just one, but any two or more of the above when the troops you are representing reach more than 25,000 per side. I'm just saying that in almost 40 years of figure gaming and old school sensibility, I've never seen it done (maybe..close..) by much smarter folks than myself. I vote for Carnage & Glory computer rules for what I think you are attempting to replicate on the table.
-I have no afiliation to them at all: Just passing on what I consider a good thing.
Best,
lMdF

We play C&G a lot, pretty much every month for the past few years, in fact our club put on a demonstration game at Derby just last weekend.

Very nice rules but nothing like what I'm looking for I'm afraid. It doesnt really come close to being able to cope with the type of game I am after in the time frame that we have available to play.

I've had a bash at this before using my March Attack rules

link

The plan is to streamline these further, use some boardgame ideas and play it on hex based terrain – something I've been wanting to try out for a while.

So, thanks for the pointer – luckily I have time to waste :-)

Batteries seem to get used up. In the ACW – not all that far off – Union artillerist Hunt took used up batteries out of the line and replaced them with reserve batteries.

That says to me that a crew that fired off their ammo was pretty done for the day.

I am very interested in what you come up with next. I hope it will work on 4 or 5 inch hexes, like I already have. :^)

I hear you about the type of game and time frame. Way back when, it became apparent that for campaigns and large scale battles to be regularly accomplished I needed a dedicated space that could be revisited at convienence. Now after some years everything we need to game multi-corps/multi-army, or I to solo same, is in one room, belongs to one player(moi)and can be left set up in progress… I have never found a way to do bigger battles in less than about 16+ hours without overgeneralised rule mechanics, but those 16+ hours are detail rich and smooth with C & G, I think you'd agree :).

Summerfield – the small box was not for an emergenct – it was meant to get the gun into action quickly, with enough ammo to cover the time it took to set up and open the caisson and set the 'feed' to the guns into operation.

"Summerfield – the small box was not for an emergenct – it was meant to get the gun into action quickly, with enough ammo to cover the time it took to set up and open the caisson and set the 'feed' to the guns into operation.
"

Which is precisly an emergency, otherwise the guns could have waited till the cumbersome artillery amunition waggons came up – what is artillery without ammunition -nothing or null what the French did say.

Dear Femeng
The coffret ammunition if things went correctly to plan was not to be used but the ammunition from the caissons. When the caisson were not able to keep up then they would have to use this ammunition. This would only give the guns less than 5 minutes worth of ammunition. Coffret ammunition was mostly used during a withdrawal when the Caissons were already withdrawn. I thought that was made clear in my statement.

The coffret ammunition was not sufficient to fight the guns independent of the caissons. This was an antiquated system that was not suited to frequent movement unlike the British System and most of the other artillery systems in Europe. The Gribeauval guns and limbers were designed to fight the previous war and that was the Seven Years War. The French with such a system performed remarkably well.
Stephen

Femeng is correct and both VW and Stephen are wrong.

When the French emplaced, the coffret was placed on the gun limber and the bricole connected. Ammunition for firing was taken from the coffret and refilled then from the caisson, of which there was one per piece in the battery position, regardless of how many each piece by caliber rated.

The coffret for a 12-pounder held 9 rounds, the 8-pounder and 6-pounder 15 each (though the 6-pounder coffret could hold up to 18 rounds if I recall correctly), and the 4-pounders 18 rounds.

The idea that the French caisson, awkward though it might have been, especially in the hands of inexperienced drivers, could and did keep up with the guns in the company and they were emplaced either 50 yards behind the gunline or to the flanks.

As to the idea that the Gribeauval System was 'designed to fight the previous war and that was the Seven Years' War' is totally incorrect and that idea in itself demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of Gribeauval, his field artillery system, and French artillery doctrine developed between 1763 and 1789 during the French Army's reform period.

It is very clear from original documents, the French artillery doctrine of the period written by du Teil in 1778, and the work of Howard Rosen that Gribeauval designed his field artillery for a war of movement and maneuver. The design of the gun carriages themselves clearly demonstrate that, as does the system as a whole.

Sincerely,
Kevin

the coffret ammunition hampered a lot of potential exploits of French horse artillery and the French horse artillery officers were painfully aware of that.

Gribeauval was certainly not designed for horse artillery – for that you would have needed a complete different ammuniton supply other the old Gribeauval ammuniton caison.

Dr. Summerfield is of course right, Gribeauval had to bring the French artillery up tp standards of the rest of European main powers.

Il en résulte que dans ces terribles combats d'artillerie dont les dernières guerres offrent souvent l'exemple, nous combattions avec un nombre à peu près double de voitures et de chevaux pour produire un feu égal ; et que dans les circonstances critiques et difficiles qu'offrent les batailles, soit pour y arriver ou en sortir, l'encombrement énorme de voitures a souvent accru nos dangers et nos pertes ; et il est à remarquer que, sous ce rapport même, nos caissons, si peu maniables, incapables de tourner, prêts à verser dans toutes les irrégularités de terrain, et qu'on ne peut relever sans des travaux qu'on n'a pas toujours le temps d'effectuer, offrent encore bien plus de difficultés que les pièces, et sont un sujet d'inquiétude pour les officiers d'artillerie.

Telle fut, en effet, la funeste issue de plusieurs batailles où l'on fit des pertes énormes d'artillerie 4), par exemple celle de Dennewitz et de la Katzbach ; cette dernière, surtout, s'étant livrée dans un terrain coupé de ravins et de défilés où les communications étaient très-difficiles, tout fut encombré de voitures ; l'artillerie ne put s'en tirer : on perdit cent cinq pièces de canon et plus de trois cents caissons ; au combat de Mockern, lors des journées de Leipzig, soixante-quatre ; à Dennewitz, soixante, etc.

Les inconvénients que nous signalons se font encore bien plus sentir dans l'artillerie à cheval, destinée essentiellement à agir avec vitesse et à réunir subitement une masse de feux sur un point décisif. Quels que soient ses efforts 5), les caissons sont un obstacle continuel à ce qu'elle puisse avoir aucune rapidité ; les moindres irrégularités de terrain l'arrêtent à chaque pas : les pièces, à la vérité, les franchiraient ( et en effet on peut les faire passer presque partout ); mais sans leurs caissons que feraient-elles ? Cette artillerie est paralysée ou retardée, le moment manqué, et l'artillerie à cheval la mieux instruite, la plus exercée et la plus hardie, peut se trouver ainsi arrêtée dans le moment le plus important par les obstacles que lui oppose la nature de son matériel.

Dans tous les cas, les caissons ne permettront jamais d'aller plus vite qu'au trot, tandis que toutes les artilleries à cheval étrangères peuvent aller au grand galop, quand les circonstances l'exigent, et suivre tous les mouvements de la cavalerie ;

Pendant ce temps, il se fit par la gauche de l'armée française, un grand mouvement de cavalerie accompagnée d'artillerie à cheval, pour gagner les derrières de l'armée prussienne. Cette cavalerie y arriva en effet, mais sans artillerie ; le terrain trop difficile par cette saison, la retarda ; il est probable que quelques places auraient pu suivre ; mais les caissons ne pouvaient s'en tirer. Qu'arriva-t-il? C'est quelle ce mouvement de cavalerie qui devait causer, peut-être, la ruine de l'ennemi, déjà partout entamé et vivement poursuivi, ne produisit aucun effet. La cavalerie arriva bien sur les derrières, et enveloppant circulairement les troupes prussiennes, d'après leur propre récit, leur coupait toute retraite ; elle tenta plusieurs charges elle furent infructueuses, malgré le désordre de l'infanterie ennemie. Quelques pièces d'artillerie auraient suffi pour entamer ces masses compactes, dans lesquelles la cavalerie aurait facilement pénétré ; au lieu de cela, l'ennemi parvint à réunir quelques pièces d'artillerie à cheval russes 7), et repoussant notre cavalerie, acheva sa retraite. Ce grand mouvement, quoique bien exécuté, n'eut pas le moindre résultat.

etc. etc. for full please visit the home page of Geert van Uythoven and read

OBSERVATIONS
SUR LES CHANGEMENTS QU'IL PARAITRAIT UTILE D'APPORTER AU MATERIEL ET AU PERSONNEL DE L'ARTILLERIE 1).
Edited and composed by Geert van Uythoven

'Gribeauval was certainly not designed for horse artillery – for that you would have needed a complete different ammuniton supply other the old Gribeauval ammuniton caison.'

Funny, that-with all the faults that you and Stephen point out, the French horse artillery was not only the best in Europe, it was recognized as such as the time. Even the RHA remarked on it.

And the French horse artillery arm definitely preferred the Gribeauval 8-pounder and were loath to give it up when the newer AN XI 6-pounder was put into service.

And Tousard remarked that the Gribeauval 12-pounder was suitable for use as a horse artillery weapon.

Sincerely,
Kevin

for wargaming rules, in case one is bothering, due to the fact that the French Horse Artillery had to wait for their cumbersome artillery waggons to catch up, they should be 25 % slower than British, Russian and Prussian horse artillery.

Or perhaps they empty their coffrets in the interim?

well that is what the French artillery officer had to say on this:

Le trait caractéristique de ce système d'artillerie, est, principalement, de transporter séparément, dans des caissons, à la su ite de chaque bouche à feu, les munitions nécessaires à son approvisionnement. Sans son caisson la pièce est nulle et ne peut combattre ( car nous devons compter pour rien quelques coups renfermés dans les coffrets ) : de-là la nécessité de ne jamais s'en séparer et de le traîner partout à sa suite ; et sur un champ de bataille, le nombre de bouches à feu qui combattent entraîne immédiatement, sur le même terrain, au moins un égal nombre de caissons ; par conséquent une double ligne de voitures et de chevaux ; et celles-ci offrent par leur construction le plus d'embarras.

@ von W,

That more or less sums it up. So, the small number of rounds in the coffret were insufficient and Gribeauval guns could not be separated from their caissons.

This means that Gribeauval equipped batteries could only move at the speed of their caisson, which we already know had a very poor cross country capability.

It sounds more suited to an 18th century battlefield than a Napoleonic one.

Dear Von Winterfeldt
The French introduced the Wurst Wagon in about 1793 for the Legere Artillerie [vehicle mounted horse artillery] equiped with 8-pdrs. This seems to have been a useful addition. The vehicles had been designed by Jacob Manson in the late 1780s. Gribeauval turned down his proposal for mobile artillery. This was mainly an issue of cost it seems.

Gribeauval died in 1789 so was not tainted with supporting the royalists. Manson joined the Army of Conde before choosing to join Bavaria rather than go into exile in Russia.

It is unclear when exactly the wurst wagons were abamdomed by the French Horse Artillery. They may still have been in use part 1805. I have found nothing to confirm or deny this. Certainly the wonderful scale drawings I have of these wagons date from this period.

A Wurst wagon was built upon a Gribeauval Caisson chassis but the ammunition box had leather springs so that it could be moved at more than a slow trot across country. Gunners sat astride. It was in emulation of the Austrian Cavalry Artillery who rode on the trails of the specially designed guns. [See SOJ-3 53-54 and SOJ-1(01) for more details.]

I have heard so much about how wonderful the French Horse Artillery was but this seems to be despite the equipment they used.

Certainly it would be useful to have someone collect together and translate extracts as you have posted to show the thinking at the time. So much rumour and speculation about this subject. This was the reason for the inception of the Smoothbore Ordnance Journal to have translations of the material and be able to compare to the original.
Stephen

While information on the make up of various artillery batteries is good background the topic is, "Napoleonic artillery ammunition supply at army level?," which has precious little to do with wargame design.

Resupplying batteries was a task which occurred without reference to the army commander who would be busy with the battle and it certainly is not in the ken of corps or division generals.

In any event, batteries rarely ran out of ammunition, mostly because the artillery guys knew their jobs and did them. So why should wargame rules simulate a rare event when they have enough problems simulating other things? Unless, of course the rules are designed to simulate the logistics of ammunition resupply rather than fighting.

Bob Coggins

"Someone said during a recent game 'if there are no ammo rules you may as well just deploy and fire with every gun as much as you can' and this seemed to go against what I've read about artillery reserve and deployment"

I think this is why, Bob-a way of simulating the factors that require a gamer to think like a period commander. One may control as many forces as a marshall on the table, but must make tactical decisions at a much lower command level as well.

it is not running out of ammunition, it is getting ammunition to the guns, and here – accrding to the experience of French artillery officers, the French horse artillery encountered problems – and couldn't always exploit opportunities, see in the statements above.

Le Marechal de Fer,

You are, of course free to play the rules you like, but I couldn't disagree more. You are creating a design problem where none exists. Army, corps and division generals never interfered with their artillery because they didn't have the knowledge to do so (okay but for Napoleon) and even then he had subordinates to control the artillery. Obviously gamers have to move their artilley on the table but that's the limit and to be frank if you are playing an army game, only reserve and horse artillery should be represented on the table. At the division level only the battery commanders determine where and how their guns are deployed based on what the infantry is doing. Guns assigned to the direct support of infantry should be built into the firepower of the infantry.

von Winterfeldt,

I have no doubt that the jottings of a number of artillery officers support resupply problems for the horse artillery. Nor do I doubt there were ammunition problems at the Katzbach, Dennewitz or Mockern. All three were French disasters and supplying a few batteries with ammunition would not have prevented any of them. In any event the logistics support at all three battles collapsed as the majority of combat units retreated or rounted through the trains.

Over the years, at large battles on the continent, 10s to 100s of thousands of artillery rounds were fired by hundreds if not thousands of batteries from dozens of different nations, yet I have found very few instances of batteries running out of ammunition. Had there have been a real problem of ammunition resupply it would have been publically addressed with a commission or panel. In the absence of one and given the great number of rounds expended during battles I have to conclude ammunition supply is not a problem worthy of simulating.

Bob Coggins

I don't think it is about batteries running out of ammunition. It appears to be about limiting the the mobility of French horse artillery, specifically moving faster than their ammunition caissons, or penalising them if they do until their caissons catch up. The object, it seems to me, is to reflect the limitations of Gribeauval equipment.

Supply of ammunition was and still is a real problem. It was the major limit upon the number of rounds fired. It was not commented about often because it was a matter of the common day that you fired no more than the ammunition that you had.

The failure of the Allied offensives of 1914-16 were caused by the British not having enough ammunition let alone of the correct type. Shrapnel ammunition was not suitable for cutting the German Wire.

Wellington forbade counter battery fire and long range fire as he considered it a waste of ammunition. This type of restriction was not uncommon. I have heard of examples of Prussian, Saxon, Russian and French.

Could the failure of the Grand Battery at Waterloo be an issue of the supply of ammunition. Research of 1815 Ltd and Erwin in particular may suggest this. The artillery gun line was not advanced. Why was La Haye Saint not flattened and taken until about 4pm. The times as ever differ.

The Russians at Borodino effectively rotated their batteries but they had to give ground due to running short of ammunition.

The Austrian-Bavarian at Hanau lost the battle due to the Bavarian guns running out of ammunition. The Bavarian and Austrian Calibres were different. So the Bavarian 6-pdrs and Howitzers were soon out of ammunition. This is clear when looking at the ammunition returns. Wrede was not fighting stragglers as he was lead to believe and where were the Allied forces. He had delayed the French for two days.

Logistics is a very boring area for historians and often neglected.

Certainly a very interesting subject.
Stephen

I've read that the Prussian artillery tended to fire until they had exhausted their immediate ammunition supply, then retire. This practice led to the batteries firing as rapidly as possible simply in an effort to exhaust their supplies and give them the opportunity to retire, having done their bit. This practice was much criticized by the reformers, including Scharnhorst and Gneisnau. The point here is that they weren't exhausting all of their ammunition, just that immediately available, perhaps the equivalent of one caisson.

But the idea that batteries couldn't or wouldn't run out of ammunition at some point is over simplistic. During an active campaign the ammunition carried in the field would be, realistically, finite. Eventually, particularly in a drawn out campaign with multiple engagements, even the supplies maintained in the army artillery park would be consumed, with rare opportunity for those to be readily replenished.

Having said this during a battle, it is probably less likely that a battery would exhaust its total 'available' ammunition supply, but rather that the crews themselves would become exhausted through the effort of keeping the guns in action for an extended period of time. A battery might be capable of maintaining a brisk rate of fire for a certain period of time [perhaps 30 minutes or so], but at some point they would need to either slow down or stop entirely. At that point it would make sense to send the immediate caisson back to the artillery park to replenish, or pull out of the line themselves, to be replaced by a fresh battery.

npm

Hi,
Quite right Bob Coggins- I use a set of rules that requires decision making for units at the (in the case of artillery) battery level. No abstractions that generalize the representation on the tabletop- and my rules need to reflect in a workable manner the factors that required contemporary commanders to handle their guns as they did, including national differences.

npm- I didn't know that about the Prussians-might make an interesting scenaro specific optional rule sometime.
Of course, you are right about fatigue being a factor that colored a commanders decision making and battery activity during a battle- quite necessary to model it in the rules, as you do.
LMdF

ratisbon,

Do I understand you saying that division-level artillery was not under the control of the division commander? If not him, who?

rich

The division commander could be overruled by the corps commander in the French army as to the employment of and who controlled the corps artillery. The corps artillery commander, usually a general officer, also had control over the corps artillery reserve and could get control over the division artillery by going through the corps commander. This is what Senarmont did at Friedland to get control over the entire corps complement of artillery (36 field pieces) and then act on his own in the action that followed.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Regarding ammunition resupply in the French army during the period:

The normal issue for the French during the period was approximately 350 rounds per gun. Napoleon wanted a 'double issue' for each field piece in the army on wheels to support the firing batteries and gun companies.
Whatever the mobility problems the French had with the Gribeauval caisson, they undoubtedly overcame them because the Grande Armee only came close to running out of artillery ammunition once-at Leipzig in 1813. And that wasn't because of problems with the caissons, but because the French ammunition trains were cut off north of Leipzig at Eilenberg.
The French resupply system was very efficient for ammunition, with each gun company's caissons, except for one that stayed with each piece, was shuttling ammunition forward from the parcs.
The artillery ammunition supply/resupply system worked this way. First, there was a series of parcs and depots which held the army's ammunition supply, both for artillery and small arms. There were division parcs, corps parcs, the army parc (the grand parc general), and the forward depot.
The gun companies' caissons would be distributed between the companies and the parcs-only one caisson per piece would actually accompany the gun companies into action. The others would be employed to shuttle ammunition forward to the companies on the firing line, and the empty caissons would travel back to the parcs to be refilled.
Between the gun companies and the division parcs 170 rounds of ammunition would be alloted per piece; the corps parcs would have 85 rounds per piece, and the mobile section of the army parc another 85 rounds per piece. The forward depot would have an additional 250 rounds per piece with the army in the field. That totaled 590 rounds per piece of which 340 rounds were mobile or 'on wheels' for use and issue to the gun companies..
4-pounders had two caissons assigned; 6- and 8-pounders had three, 12-pounders had five. Howitzers usually had three each.

Sincerely,
Kevin

‘The French introduced the Wurst Wagon in about 1793 for the Legere Artillerie [vehicle mounted horse artillery] equiped with 8-pdrs. This seems to have been a useful addition. The vehicles had been designed by Jacob Manson in the late 1780s. Gribeauval turned down his proposal for mobile artillery. This was mainly an issue of cost it seems.'

The wurst was probably introduced in 1791, not as late as 1793. It should also be noted that if the wurst was used to transport gunners, the ammunition load would be reduced by the aggregate weight of the gunners mounted on the caisson.

Gribeauval did not introduce horse artillery because of the ongoing arguments with Valliere over the introduction of the new field artillery system, which Valliere opposed. When asked by Vregilles after recommending to Gribeauval that a French horse artillery arm should be organized, was told by Gribeauval: ‘You witness the difficulties and enemies which my endeavors to destroy ancient prejudices have raised against me; at a future period we may execute your plan; digest and improve upon it; for the present it would be asking too much.' So, Gribeauval didn't shut the door on horse artillery, but advised its advocate(s) to be patient and it would come later. I do believe that this information was supplied to you before

‘It is unclear when exactly the wurst wagons were abamdomed by the French Horse Artillery. They may still have been in use part 1805. I have found nothing to confirm or deny this. Certainly the wonderful scale drawings I have of these wagons date from this period.'

I'm not sure that the wurst caisson was abandoned by the French horse artillery at all. It was usually not used by the horse artillery arm to transport gunners after 1800 but was in all probability used for ammunition because it was lighter, and easier to employ than the standard caisson, which at best was an awkward vehicle and front heavy. Keeping the wurst caisson would also have the advantage of mounting gunners whose horses had been lost in combat until they were replaced.

‘A Wurst wagon was built upon a Gribeauval Caisson chassis but the ammunition box had leather springs so that it could be moved at more than a slow trot across country. Gunners sat astride. It was in emulation of the Austrian Cavalry Artillery who rode on the trails of the specially designed guns.

Do you have evidence that the standard caisson could not be moved across country at more than a ‘slow trot?'
‘I have heard so much about how wonderful the French Horse Artillery was but this seems to be despite the equipment they used.'

It was superior to the Austrian cavalry batteries in equipment and guns. And the cavalry batteries still used the Austrian four-wheeled caissons in addition to the pack horses. I would have liked to see the Austrian limber with long-carriage field piece with the gunners astride move at any pace faster than a trot.

The Prussians also employed a four-wheeled caisson during the period, as did, I believe, the Russians.

The only nation that employed a more modern caisson was the British and that was fielded after the shooting started in 1792, the British have immense artillery problems of standardization and design until at least 1800.

‘While information on the make up of various artillery batteries is good background the topic is, "Napoleonic artillery ammunition supply at army level?," which has precious little to do with wargame design. Resupplying batteries was a task which occurred without reference to the army commander who would be busy with the battle and it certainly is not in the ken of corps or division generals.'

Correct-it was the job of the division and corps artillery chiefs as well as the army artillery commander and those artillery officers in charge of the artillery parcs at division, corps, and army.

‘In any event, batteries rarely ran out of ammunition, mostly because the artillery guys knew their jobs and did them.'

Generally, that is correct. Problems did arise, especially in the Russian Army, because senior artillerymen were not in command of the artillery at different levels. It took the Russians some time to correct this, and it really didn't begin until after 1807. By 1815 it was better, but it still had a long way to go.

With the Prussians it was just as bad, if not infinitely worse. Prussian artillery in 1806 as an arm was a mess and was not employed properly and most of it was lost. The biggest problem they had after that was command and control and their corps artillery chiefs were only senior field grade officers, not general officers as in the French service. That was a disadvantage for the Prussians.

‘it is not running out of ammunition, it is getting ammunition to the guns, and here – accrding to the experience of French artillery officers, the French horse artillery encountered problems – and couldn't always exploit opportunities, see in the statements above.'

It is too bad that either the rest of the quotations from the above situations were not shown or the situations described were not put into context. No arm is perfection in any army. There are situations where the standard system doesn't work, but the two quotations are isolated events and I would suggest not the norm for the French artillery arm.

The French resupply system for ammunition was well-thought-out and functioned efficiently. Leipzig is a horrible example to use and is an outlier, as the French trains, including the reserve ammunition, were cut off north of Leipzig in Eilenberg and the artillery consumption by the French was unusually heavy-267 rounds per piece. That was one of the main reasons that Napoleon decided to withdraw.

‘ Army, corps and division generals never interfered with their artillery because they didn't have the knowledge to do so (okay but for Napoleon) and even then he had subordinates to control the artillery.'

That isn't correct for the Russians, especially before 1807, and not for the Prussians before 1806. Wellington certainly was involved with artillery employment and probably with the logistical functions that went along with it.

‘I have no doubt that the jottings of a number of artillery officers support resupply problems for the horse artillery. Nor do I doubt there were ammunition problems at the Katzbach, Dennewitz or Mockern. All three were French disasters and supplying a few batteries with ammunition would not have prevented any of them.'

Agree.

‘In any event the logistics support at all three battles collapsed as the majority of combat units retreated or rounted through the trains.'

That didn't happen at Leipzig as the ammunition trains were not present at the army level.

‘Over the years, at large battles on the continent, 10s to 100s of thousands of artillery rounds were fired by hundreds if not thousands of batteries from dozens of different nations, yet I have found very few instances of batteries running out of ammunition. Had there have been a real problem of ammunition resupply it would have been publically addressed with a commission or panel.'

Agree. Ammunition resupply was pushed forward by the French and Austrians so that the artillery companies did not have to leave if ammunition ran short. The French replaced an empty or nearly empty caisson with a full one from the trains so the gun companies could continue in action. It was a highly developed system that worked well, awkward caissons or not. Infantry ammunition was replenished in the same way. Artillery companies that were in support of infantry divisions also had four caissons of infantry ammunition assigned to them. At Eylau's ending in February 1807 the infantry ammunition caissons in Davout's III Corps were at the front line of the French infantry replenishing cartridges in the snow and gathering darkness. I guess they had little or no trouble maneuvering and moving through the snow.

‘Supply of ammunition was and still is a real problem. It was the major limit upon the number of rounds fired. It was not commented about often because it was a matter of the common day that you fired no more than the ammunition that you had.'

How could you fire ‘more ammunition than you had'? That isn't the same thing as deficit spending.

'Wellington forbade counter battery fire and long range fire as he considered it a waste of ammunition. This type of restriction was not uncommon. I have heard of examples of Prussian, Saxon, Russian and French.'

French, British, and Austrian artillery doctrine generally stated that the main target of friendly artillery was against the enemy's infantry and their artillery was only to engage enemy artillery if the enemy's artillery was hurting friendly infantry more than your artillery was hurting the enemy's infantry.

Counterbattery fire took a long time and used up a lot of ammunition which is why it was frowned upon. The Russians didn't get past counterbattery fire until well after 1807.

'Could the failure of the Grand Battery at Waterloo be an issue of the supply of ammunition. Research of 1815 Ltd and Erwin in particular may suggest this. The artillery gun line was not advanced. Why was La Haye Saint not flattened and taken until about 4pm. The times as ever differ.'

What would be the point of 'flattening' La Haye Sainte? That would take an inordinate amount of time and ammunition. It was taken by a well-coordinated combined arms assault after Ney pulled his head out of his fourth point of contact.

And French artillery did advance into point-blank range of the allied line after the failure of the French cavalry charges in combination with infantry in grandes bandes. See Siborne, Houssaye, and Ropes.

'The Russians at Borodino effectively rotated their batteries but they had to give ground due to running short of ammunition.'

Rotating batteries out of the line in order to get resupplied with ammunition was not an efficient way of ammunition resupply. The French and Austrian method of pushing the ammunition forward to the firing line was much more efficient and had the added benefit of letting the gun companies know they wouldn't be sent to the rear if they ran out of ammunition. It taught them ammunition conservation.

‘The Austrian-Bavarian at Hanau lost the battle due to the Bavarian guns running out of ammunition.'

Wrede lost at Hanau because he wasn't expecting the Imperial Guard and Napoleon to show up. He had his ass handed to him as a consequence. If the Bavarians ran out of artillery ammunition, that was because someone wasn't paying attention on the allied side of the action. The only thing that Wrede actually accomplished was to enable the French to leave Germany as victors.

‘The Bavarian and Austrian Calibres were different.'

If both armies were using 6-pounders, then the calibers were not different-they were the same. What was different was the measurement of the round as the ‘pounds' being used were different. 'Gun caliber' then could be calculated in different ways because of the designation of cannon being by the weight of the round and not necessarily the diameter of the bore. Further, the French calculated by the diameter of the round, not the bore. Almost everyone was on a different sheet of music, something that is overlooked when discussing period artillery.

‘Logistics is a very boring area for historians and often neglected.'

I agree with you that the study of logistics is very neglected by military historians, at least the greater majority of them. I don't agree with you that it is a boring subject. It can be considered a difficult subject and less colorful one, but I have found it fascinating possible because I was an artillery officer and was intimately involved in logistics both theoretically and practically.

‘I've read that the Prussian artillery tended to fire until they had exhausted their immediate ammunition supply, then retire. This practice led to the batteries firing as rapidly as possible simply in an effort to exhaust their supplies and give them the opportunity to retire, having done their bit. This practice was much criticized by the reformers, including Scharnhorst and Gneisnau. The point here is that they weren't exhausting all of their ammunition, just that immediately available, perhaps the equivalent of one caisson.'

The Russians were guilty of the same thing, at least before the end of the Friedland campaign in 1807.

‘But the idea that batteries couldn't or wouldn't run out of ammunition at some point is over simplistic. During an active campaign the ammunition carried in the field would be, realistically, finite. Eventually, particularly in a drawn out campaign with multiple engagements, even the supplies maintained in the army artillery park would be consumed, with rare opportunity for those to be readily replenished.'

That also depends how much ammunition was provided per piece in the various parcs. Ammunition should have been continued to be manufactured and then forwarded to the forward depot by shuttle service and then to the parcs, etc.

'Having said this during a battle, it is probably less likely that a battery would exhaust its total 'available' ammunition supply, but rather that the crews themselves would become exhausted through the effort of keeping the guns in action for an extended period of time. A battery might be capable of maintaining a brisk rate of fire for a certain period of time [perhaps 30 minutes or so], but at some point they would need to either slow down or stop entirely. At that point it would make sense to send the immediate caisson back to the artillery park to replenish, or pull out of the line themselves, to be replaced by a fresh battery.'

Both the French and the Austrians had ammunition shuttled forward to the gun companies in the line so that they would not have to retire because of ammunition problems. Apparently not all of the armies did that.

Each caliber of field piece would also have a sustained rate of fire-usually one round per minute for a 12-pounder and two rounds per minute for anything smaller in caliber. I would say that a ‘brisk rate' would be one that the gun crew would load and fire as fast as they could and that would happen in an emergency. You cannot, as you have noted, keep that up for long. Crew fatigue would take over.

Sincerely,
Kevin

As the subject of the French horse artillery arm has come up again, maybe the following will be helpful.

‘But no European power has hitherto derived such important advantages from this new artillery as the French. The adoption of it was for a long time proposed in vain; but in 1791 M. Duportail, then minister of war, authorized the commanding officer of the division of Metz to form two companies of horse artillery; and, finally, in the year 1792, it was adopted generally, and soon carried to great perfection. In order to give it the advantage of a superior fire, the French flying or horse artillery consists of 8-pounders, and 6-inch howitzers; the ammunition is carried in light caissons, and most of the artillerists are on horseback, while others ride on the wursts. By this arrangement, in addition to the known abilities of French cannoniers, the republican horse artillery soon acquired a decided superiority over that of the Austrian, and other powers, which the imperial horse artillery has maintained, and even surpassed, during a series of victories in the glorious wars of 1805 and 1806.'

‘The success of the experiment in 1791, the extraordinary skill in the choice of officers and artillerymen, who were employed, and who, in a few weeks, were able to maneuver with light troops, dispelled every doubt on the subject, and showed how fit the French were for this kind of service.'

‘In 1792, a short time before the declaration of war, M. de Narbonne, who had succeeded M. Duportail in the department of war, formed at his office a committee, composed of very intelligent and well informed officers: thither he summoned the generals of the three great divisions of the army, and the principal generals and field officers of the artillery and engineers. He ordered them to inquire into and decide upon the means of perfecting and extending to the French army the use of horse artillery. The result of this conference will be seen in the following section.'

Result of the Conference in 1792

‘We cannot give a more correct idea of the organization and importance of the horse artillery than by relating the result of this famous conference. The officers who concurred in the following results were unquestionably the best informed in the French army. They resolved as fundamental points:

‘1. That a numerous horse artillery, well served, and always kept complete in men and horses, is the surest method of protecting the evolutions of a corps but tolerably trained, by supporting its attack by the bayonet, and of rendering almost nugatory, by positions taken opportunely nad with celerity, the advantage that troops, better disciplined, might promise themselves from their superiority in maneuvering.'

‘2. That for the effective employment of this horse artillery, and for the regulation of its service, training, etc., it is necessary to provide it with better horses than field artillery usually has, so that it may be transported with the greatest swiftness to whatever place it may be required at; and that the artillerists may be able to follow their pieces, and begin fire as soon as they are placed.'

‘3. That, to accomplish this object, it is better that the artillerymen should be all on horseback, than if they even partly rode upon wursts or stuffed caissons, because accidents are less frequent, movements more easy, retreat more certain, and horses more easily placed.'

‘4. That, without excluding pieces of any caliber, it appears most advantageous to make use of 8- and 12-pounders, and 6-inch howitzers.'

‘5. That it is useless to train the horse-cannonier like a dragoon, intended for cavalry maneuvers; that this would be diverting him, to no purpose, from his principal object; that it is sufficient if he be well seated on horseback, accustomed to mound and dismount nimbly, to guide his horse freely, without confining him to any particular rank in following the pieces, and leaving to his judgment the task of learning to know, and to execute, if required, the cavalry maneuvers, in which he may happen to be engaged.'

‘6. That the maneuver a la prolonge should be employed whenever the impossibility of maneuvering with traces [bricoles] would force the artillerymen to renounce them, because the horses remaining harnessed while the pieces are firing, all the time that is lost in taking off or putting to the limbers, is gained for profiting by the position taken, and because ditches and rivers can, in this manner, be crossed with the greatest celerity.'

'7.That, in order to form at once a sufficient number of companies of horse artillery, without weakening the artillery regiments, it would answer at first to attach to each piece two intelligent artillerymen, and to take the remainder from other corps, and chiefly from the light troops.'

‘Upon these principles this establishment was organized in the French armies, which have reaped such great advantages from it in all their campaigns.'

‘From a consideration of the principles on which this artillery is founded, and in order to reap the greatest possible advantage from it, it is of great consequence that those to whom its direction is entrusted should be well acquainted with military tactics, and have a thorough knowledge of artillery; not that common-place knowledge of a few particular motions, but a general and extensive acquaintance in the art of war. They should be able to dispose of it so as to annoy the enemy in every direction, and to protect the movements of the troops which are either attacked or attacking; and as circumstances may require different positions to be assumed, they should know how to avoid becoming a sacrifice to the enemy's fire; or at least to afford him few means of succeeding: on the contrary, they should throw in his way endless obstacles to overcome. They should remember that the wurst caissons employed for the horse artillery, contain less ammunition than the common caissons, that, therefore, greater economy is necessary, and they should consequently employ it only on the most efficacious occasions. It is also requisite that the subaltern officers and cannoniers should be acquainted with maneuvering; they should likewise know that the science does not merely consist in firing rapidly a numerous succession of balls, but, on the contrary, in firing with success at proper distances. Their own knowledge should enable them to judge of those distances, that they may not consume their ammunition in absolute uselessness, and, by such faulty conduct, find themselves desititute at the moment when the action is in its hottest part, and most perilous.'

‘The cannoniers should also be well instructed in the use of their ordnance, and thoroughly practiced in the maneuvering of it.'

-American Artillerist's Companion by Louis de Tousard, Volume II, 39-43.

Horse Artillery Definition

‘…What is flying or horse artillery?'

‘…Flying or horse artillery is the method of marching the common field artillery with a sufficient number of horses to enable the men and pieces to reach, much more speedily, such positions as theh general may think it necessary they should occupy.'

‘On what occasions is this dispatch required, and when is it necessary horse artillery should be used?'

‘With a vanguard, to occupy a position, a passage, or defile…with a reserve, to reinforce some part of the line, or to strike a decisive blow; and, near the seacoast, to reach speedily any part which may be threatened by the enemy.'

‘These are the occasions in which dispatch is required, and when horse artillery should be used; and we may say, evince the true measure of its quantity and importance, as has been fully proved in the glorious events of the last campaigns.'

-Tousard, II, 30-31.

The Object of the Horse Artillery

‘The principal object of the horse or flying artillery is to possess such a peculiar organization as to execute with facility not only the most rapid, but, at the same time, the most unexpected movements; to be enabled quickly to bear either upon a point that is attacked, on any part of a seacoast which is threatened with invasion, or on a post which it is requisite to carry by a decisive attempt; to be constantly attendant on the cavalry, if it be required; to confound and embarrass the enemy by every mode of attack and defense, which the theory and practice of the military art, and of artillery, can possible suggest; and, lastly, to effect these various operations, by the knowledge of displaying, positions, et.'

Tousard, II, 35.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Dear Kevin
Valliere Junior died in 1774

So why does his objections stop Gribeauval to introduce horse artillery in 1780.

What date do you have for your quote?

Gribeauval died in 1789. The design for the Manson Wurst Wagons were about 1780.
Stephen

Dear Kevin
The Russians employed two wheeled ammunition carts from 1803 onwards as part of the M1805 system. The experimentation with them under Tsar Paul was a failure. They were not suited to the poor roades in Poland and Russia.

The M1805 system was a development of the Tsar Paul rather than a new system if you study the plans as we have had to do for my new book on the subject.
Stephen

Dear Kevin
Certainly you have shown how poorly documented French Horse Artillery has been. We are not sure what material they were using and when Wurst Wagons were used.

We can say that 8-pdrs were used but were these true horse artillery or vehicle mounted artillery. From OOBs the 8-pdr was phased out by 1809 with the horse artillery.

Everything is very vague as nobody seems to want to put a date upon it.
Stephen

@10th Marines. Thank you very much – the information you gave a few posts up about the Division, Corps and Army supply is exactly what I was after.

8-pounders were replaced in the main army after the 1809 campaign. That information is in Saski.

8-pounders, however, were still used in Spain through 1814.

I do believe that you are making divisions in artillery types and usage with horse artillery and 'vehicle mounted' artillery. The French made no such distinction, as evidence the conclusions of the 1792 horse artillery conference. To the French it was all horse artillery.

If you want to make a distinction of the type you're alluding to, you have to go to the US in the period before and during the Civil War when foot artillery became the heavy artillery (siege and garrison). Horse artillery in the US Army had the gunners individually mounted. 'Mounted' artillery had the gunners seated on the limbers and caissons.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Crusaderminis,

You're very welcome.

Sincerely,
Kevin

not poorly documented but the documents poorly exploited.

The short sight apporach – to look only on the guns.

One has to see train – ammunition carriage – gun – gunners.

All 4 parts will form a team and a team is only so strong as its weakest link.

Gribeauval had certainly no horse artillery in mind – when he designed his guns and his ammunition system.
It was pure 18th century warfare, hauling guns with ropes to catch up with the infantry.

The tactical use of guns, as well as the infantry – was however discussed in militray circles, like field artillery forming not only an aid to infantry but to emerge as an independent branch of arms – as can be seen in the writings of du Teil – for example.

The shortcomings were very well realized by the artillery committee led by Marmount and better solutions were proposed.

Dear Kevin
Yes because I want to know the technical details, equipment and capability of them. This side interests the wargamer as he can then model this.
Stephen