"Time to Form Squares-Rules and Reality" Topic

XV Brigada – jinx (in a manner of speaking) ;-)

@Colinjallen,

Yes indeed. A pace is roughly 26 inches which makes 1500 of them approximately 1100 yards. So which was it? 1500 paces or 600 yards?

@PM,

You will need to explain that to me.

Bill

So the early to mid revolutionary French armies and the French of 1813-14 won engagements through better order and execution? I seem to remember that those armies were notorious for their lack of order and execution. Many factors other than order and execution contribute to the winning of engagements.

I don't remember suggesting that order was everything, only that it was significant. There are few all-powerful elements to battle. It's that complexity that makes it interesting. And yes, the Revolutionary and 1813-14 troops were often raw, so they were trained well in a few formations like attack column and not in others. As wargamers, we often have to get beyond the historians' neat generalizations to what exactly they meant. The Marie-Louis infantry were often very orderly as long as they were in formation…changing formation was another issue altogether.

In the case of the French attack on the fusiliers at Salamanca, what made the difference was order, numbers and the determination of the French, the latter being evidenced by the speed of their advance and their willingness to press home the attack without firing.

The speed of their advance was the pas de charge, the determination was evidenced by how steady and orderly their advance was. That orderly advance at a steady cadence is what communicated the French willingness to press home the attack. The Fusiliers' disorder just the opposite. The narrative suggests the normal expectation is that order will to win over disorder every time.

Order was only one factor.

Never said differently, but obviously from the descriptions, it was significant.

Bill H.

forwardmarchstudios:

Well, yeah, you have noted one of the real ground scale issues with miniatures. The issue of frontage vs depth is pretty much a moot point when the size of each figure footprint is considered.

The distances are certainly an issue at the scale you are working. Games generally reduce the time per turn with smaller ground scales, say 2 minutes [Kriegspeil] to 5 minutes for rules with single figure skirmish games or lower level scales like Chef de Battalion or Grand Manuever.

It is a real problem. When infantry in a 50 yards per inch/30 minute turn game has the historical ability to move at least 24-30 inches a turn, you can have units zooming all over the place. Most rules solve the problem by simply reducing the speed, thus avoid asking why units didn't move like that all the time. Or the artifical limitations are rationalized by 'averaging' movement and claiming the friction of war keeps them from moving that fast…

Either choice leaves game battalions incapable of movement evidenced on the actual battlefields.

Bill H.

The time for cavalry to cover set distances in a charge was very quick, even when French and other heavy cavalry never galloped in a charge, but trotted to keep that order.

You see commanders forming square as soon as cavalry is in the area because cavalry did move fast and it did take between 1 to 3 minutes to form square from line. At Salamanca, Causel sees British cavalry quite a distance away, but orders two battalions to go to square because he isn't sure they can see the cavalry.

And infantry did get caught in the middle of forming square. It happened at Quartre Bras, for instance.

The real relationship that seems to be in play is the distance from the cavalry when the square is formed, and whether through terrain, smoke or intervening troops, cavalry can get close, get inside the decision-making cycle of an infantry unit, thus catching them before they can form square.

Bill H.

Bill H: "And as Grattan points out, and the Fusiliers' experience at Salamanca demonstrates, the side with the better order and execution won the engagement--and that includes cadence and forming square."

That clearly states that order and execution were the key factors, in your own words.

I think that the problem with this discussion is that it has become overly polarised; drill, regulations and marching in step were very important in battle, but not as important as some would believe. Commanders at all levels did things that worked when the rigours of combat showed the problems and failings of drill.

On the other hand, to argue that drillbooks were routinely and generally ignored is obvious nonsense.

Bill H hits on a key point about forming square; battlefield conditions were not the same as those on our wargames tables or our interpretation of descriptions of battles. Smoke, crops (many of which were taller then than now), folds in the ground etc all combined to make the judgment of when to form square far more difficult than we generally imagine.

Quick question that I was thinking about last night, slightly OT.
Does any one know what the regulations were for the time it would take to coordinate an attack at different levels of command? So for instance a division level attack could be organized and sent off in x amount of time. I would imagine that this would vary wildly by the quality of the general and his staff. But, like with drill and such, was there a gold standard in the regulations of various countries?

The reason I ask is that it seems like the ability to control troops probably had more of an impact on the time it took for a unit to conduct an offensive action, vice the time it actually took to coordinate it. Pickett's Charge took all night and part of the next day to set up, for example, and only 20 minuets to come off. It seems like once you get past the battalion level of representation that this is probably more important, no?

I appreciate this discussion and agree that the regulation speeds were basically followed in practice (today as then, you practices what you would follow as the basics in combat, so that training would override fear, doubt and confusion and be the glue and control to keep units functioning. If you doubt this, you have never been there).

When we write wargame rules, we try to keep things playable. Often, I think, we take one characteristic of "battle" and use it to shape it and some other feature, which is not really related. One example is the "zone of control" of an officer. One set of rules, that I just played, had a divisional officers ZoC limited to 3", which was 300 yards, (with about a 15 minute turn). An aide could gallop (25mph) ~11,000 yards in that time with an order, but the unit acted as if it were 38X farther away for getting orders. ?? Any sub-unit that strayed outside this distance would automatically STOP. (How did they know? Is there a Dr.Spock manual, which is undiscovered in the US Library of Congress?). No chance to wander away and wind up in an odd spot. This would have been a wonderful capabilty in the ACW Wilderness battle! ?? A poor divisional general was a poor general whether his units were 300 yards or 700 yards away from his location. His poor decisions, should find some other way to be expressed on the wargame table, than to force him to keep his units in a compact formation, which is a bit unwieldy to move about. Opps, it is expressed in a historically wrong way, and while pentalizing those units, it does it in a different way than what was. I think that method is the start of a road in a wrong direction in getting our game mechanics to better replicate what was and give us more satisfaction and fun in playing Napoleionic general.

So, let me say that the "time to form square" discussion is also intimately related to the "distance on the wargame table" versus "did they really try to march to a timed march or were those drums really just for post-bivouac jive-music sessions?".

<<<SORRY, for this aside, but I can't really believe some of the doubters I read from above. For them, PLEASE go to something like U-tube and pull up and play some of the rousing marches of the period. Notice that there is a strong beat???? Notice that you heart-rate and foot starts to time itself to the beats-per-minute played?? Okay, your point is that they played these things and drummed them, and the soldiers marched at a different pace than that. (sic) It is so painfully obvious. Get a clue. sorry about that rant.
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Simply stated, I think that a problem in wargaming is that the players have TOO MUCH NEW INFORMATION at the start of each turn and can change orders an actions at a frequency that is ? 5X, 10X ? greater than a field officer of the time could receive, order, react to, or get his troops to respond to. The way that the game designers, (author included- but I'm questioning), "solved" this is by shortening the march distanes, to be fair to the other side, so THE OTHER side would have ITS fair chance to respond.

WHY NOT, have players write(or other wise indicate) movement, including movement into the enemy two turns in advance (or for 2 turn seqments), and allow rates which we think were practical. This could be done in a variety of ways (I don't want to lock in the discussion):

o maybe you could write a petite movement for this coming turn, but have an option of also writing a gross movement for a following turn (which might revert to a stand type order if you so chose), or

o write 2 turns of orders every other turn and live with the results, but allow "historical" movement rates,

o with any of the above allow an emergency stop to a defensive or stand order at the players option

o other ideas (I haven't tried to be comprehensive here)

o

Forward, I have never encountered any regulations for that; as you say, it all depended on the circumstances.

billsfan, an interesting post. I completely agree that the vast majority of rules allow players to micro-manage to a degree that is almost nonsensical; that, combined with the usual wargames problem of being able to see far more than a real commander could, causes real problems for game design.

I also agree with your comment on how some sets of rules attempt to model the quality of commanders. Uusually, I try to let the players do their thing with command; the poor players are usually pretty good at replicating poor commanders:).

One of my main grumbles with most sets of rules is the generally unsolved problem of time and distance. One set that I used to play regularly stated that a move represented 20 minutes of real time. In that timespan, the rules allowed an infantry unit to travel about 400m in line and 600m in column.

Colin

colinjallen:

I think that the problem with this discussion is that it has become overly polarised; drill, regulations and marching in step were very important in battle, but not as important as some would believe. Commanders at all levels did things that worked when the rigours of combat showed the problems and failings of drill.
On the other hand, to argue that drillbooks were routinely and generally ignored is obvious nonsense.

Colin J:
I do agree that the discussion has been polarized…it is tough not to seem that way when such 'it never happened' statements are made--take the other side and automatically you are arguing for 'it always happened.'

I tried to make the point before: Drill is the practice and discipline applied in learning the regulations. The regulations are how to maneuver and create formations. They reguired practice, particularly experience in battle to do well. I know folks say commanders did things that worked when the rigours of combat showed the problems and failings of drill. There was creativity, but almost always using the building blocks and tools provided by the regulations and practiced. Here's an example, Grattan describing Wallace's Brigade in its approach and attack at Salamanca:

p. 56
Wallace's three regiments advanced in open column until within two hundred and fifty yards of the ridge held by the French infantry. Thomiers' column, five thousand strong, had by this time reached their ground, while in their front, the face of the hill had been hastily garnished with riflemen. All were impatient to engage, and the calm but stern advance of Wallace's brigade was received with beating of drums and loud cheers from the French, whose light troops hoping to take advantage of the time which the deploying from column into line would take, ran down the face of the hill in a state of great excitement; but Packenham, who was naturally of a boiling spirit and hasty temper, was on this day perfectly cool.

He told Wallace to form line from open column without halting, and thus the different companies, by throwing forward their right shoulders were in line without the slow manoeuvre of a deployment. Astonished at the rapidity of the movement, the French riflemen commenced an irregular and hurried fire, and even at this early stage of the battle a looker-on could, from the difference in the demeanour of the troops of the two nations, form a tolerably correct opinion of what would be the result.

[That belief in order again.]

Regardless of the fire of the riflemen, and the showers of grape and canister, Packenham, at the head of Wallace's brigade, continued to press onward; his centre suffered, but still advanced; his left and right being less oppressed by the weight of the fire, continued to advance at a more rapid pace, and as his wings inclined forward and outstripped the centre, his right brigade assumed the form of a crescent. The manoeuvre was a bold, as well as a novel one, and the appearance of the brigade imposing and unique, because it so happened that all the British officers were in front of their men—a rare occurrence.

Here Grattan calls Wallace/Packenham's maneuver 'bold' and 'novel'. Yet wheeling into line from open columns is in the regulations, it's just that deploying, where the column faces the enemy and 'unfolds' into line was more common. And the wheeling without halting is also not a common move, but again is in Dundas' regulations. So, while Packenham is being bold and novel, he isn't reinventing the regulations. He is just using them in an uncommon form. And the fire from the French slow the pace of the brigade in the middle, forming a crecent…but the British don't stop to align, but press on.

Astounded by the unshaken determination of Wallace's soldiers, Thomier's division wavered: nevertheless they opened a heavy discharge of musketry, but it was unlike the former,—it was irregular and ill-directed, the men acted without concert or method, and many fired in the air. At length their fire ceased altogether, and the three regiments, for the first time, cheered! The effect was electric; Thomier's troops were seized with a panic, and as Wallace closed upon them, his men could distinctly remark their bearing. Their mustachioed faces, one and all, presented the same ghastly hue, a horrid family likeness throughout: and as they stood to receive the shock they were about to be assailed with, they reeled to and fro like men intoxicated.

The brigade, which till this time cheerfully bore up against the heavy fire they had been exposed to without returning a shot, were now impatient, and the 88th greatly excited: for Murphy, dead and bleeding, with one foot hanging in the stirrup-iron, was dragged by his affrighted horse along the front of his regiment. The soldiers became exasperated, and asked to be let forward.

Here is that order in place, while the soldiers are impatient to be led forward.

Packenham, seeing that the proper moment had arrived, called out to Wallace "to let them loose." The three regiments ran onward, and the mighty phalanx, which but a moment before was so formidable, loosened and fell in pieces before fifteen hundred invincible British soldiers fighting in a line of only two deep.

I think the example gives a good feel for the battlefield use of the regulations, maintaining order and commanders' use of novel approaches to gain an advantage. The British discomforted the French by doing the unexpected, wheeling into line rather than deploying. And of course, when things are falling apart, you will find commanders 'jerry-rigging' whatever they can.

Do you have any examples of commanders doing novel maneuvers etc.? I'll lay odds that while novel, whatever is created, McDonald's Square at Wagram or the 4 rank British lines at Waterloo, they will be found in and created with the regulations.

Bill H.

Folks,

I find all this really interesting (yes I do) and I agree that circumstances could make a difference but in 'wargaming world' we have to find an acceptable compromise to rfepresent all this stuff.

Can we not answer the OP in general terms? We know, after all, the pace troops marched at, how far the most distant sub-unit had to march to close the square.

That was what Nafziger was attempting and he makes it very clear that there were influences he did not take into account. His was at least an exercise in relativity.

Bill

I find all this really interesting (yes I do) and I agree that circumstances could make a difference but in 'wargaming world' we have to find an acceptable compromise to represent all this stuff.

Bill:

Well, 'general terms'. Most generalizations are based on lots of specifics AND how they are going to be represented. In general terms you have:

1. How fast a square can be made from various formations in practice.
2. What things can hinder that effort [beside cavalry itself]
3. How close do cavalry have to be before they can reach the unit before it can form square?
4. What time, space and other scale issues confine the information?

THEN you generalize.

I can only suggest the way I have seen it done[and I have done] when simulating behaviors that have been practiced. And this sounds far more complicated than it is…but that is technical work for you.

You start with the practiced behaviors [forming square] and the time etc. required to do it. [Consider this the 'perfect' event, such as Nafziger's descriptions.] Then you do the following:

1. Find all the examples of 'real world' efforts you can to average as well as determine what things can hinder the perfect event.

2. List all the things that can hinder the perfect event

3. Compare the events that were hindered timewise to the perfect event. Obviously, most Napoleonic battle events weren't timed, so other indicators will need to be found. This is a pretty common problem with simulations of all kinds--not enough data exact for our liking.

4. What you get is a range of times/successes coorelated with various things that get in the way. In other words, a continuum of performances related to things that hinder performance…in this case, forming square.

Next you determine scale, time increments, and simulation purposes. For instance, if the purpose of the simulation doesn't include representing actions in one minute increments, then that will have an impact on how forming squares are represented… If cavalry isn't a major focus of the simulation, that will dictate how you 'generalize.'

Bill H.

In general, besides things that can hinder forming squares in practiced time, how close the cavalry is when the square is formed will have to be a real trigger regarding when and how successful a unit will be in forming square.

Once you have all that information you can scale it however you want, and find the mechanics that represent those relationships to your satisfaction…as well as testing them against historical events.

SORRY, for this aside, but I can't really believe some of the doubters I read from above. For them, PLEASE go to something like U-tube and pull up and play some of the rousing marches of the period. Notice that there is a strong beat???? Notice that you heart-rate and foot starts to time itself to the beats-per-minute played?? Okay, your point is that they played these things and drummed them, and the soldiers marched at a different pace than that. (sic) It is so painfully obvious. Get a clue. sorry about that rant.

To add to the rant: Listen to the bass drum. Boom, Boom, Boom-Boom-Boom. Boom, Boom, Boom-boom-boom. Left, Left, Left-right-left. Left, Left, Left-right-left.

That's the pace you keep. It's the drummer's job to keep that cadence perfectly on time, everyone else in the band follows the bass drum. All the marchers follow the beat of the bass drum. I don't care to remember how many times we got mashed because someone couldn't march with the music.

As a really nasty follow-on point, the modern military has increased the pace a bit: the standard US military marching cadence is 120 30" steps per minute, and double-time is 180 36" steps per minute, but you don't do any fancy stuff at double time.

McLaddie: So the 'better' answer would likely be to have some kind of quality roll to see if the unit under cavalry attack saw the threat in time to form square. After all, a 10' rise can hide an awful lot of cavalry behind it!

Lion, not necessarily a quality roll; the ability to see through rises and crops and to "feel" the enemy is not linked to quality per se. In one set of rules we wrote and used, each unit had a "commander rating", which was an expression of the ability, experience and knowledge of the unit commander. Better commanders were more likely to realise the need to form square.

It wasn't perfect but what is in wargaming?

I suppose that one could follow the "realisation" roll with a unit quality roll to see if the sub-units are capable of manouvering in time.

Sirs,
I am humbled by the depth, breadth and effort of the discussion.
Best,
CGQG