"Time to Form Squares-Rules and Reality" Topic
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| Femeng2 | 06 Aug 2011 4:27 a.m. PST |
1. Wellington's standard field orders REQUIRED all pennisular regiments to form 2 deep, as they were almost always understrength. THe 'Manual" required a two deep line whenever a regiment was at less than 2/3 strength in order to occupy the same frontage (otherwise parade evolution got messy).
2. DO not quote times from column to square, especially in British service. Use Line to Square, the typical battlefield formation. This gives, say 600 men in two lines at 2 feet per man (or so) or 200 yards of frontage. The standard is for the unit to march into its new position. How long would it take you to walk two football fields? In action you might run. All guides at the time give 10 minutes plus or minus for an organized evolution of any sort. |
| arthur1815 | 06 Aug 2011 4:37 a.m. PST |
The drill manuals were the basis on which – to varying degrees – troops were trained, and to which they attempted to conform in the field. Contemporary memoirs/letters sometime praise a unit for manoeuvring in battle as if on parade, suggesting both that this was sufficiently rare as to be remarkable, but also that it was the standard to which troops should aspire. Therefore, in the absence of specific timings &c. from participants' accounts, the drill manuals are a good place from which to start, but we must recognise that evolutions would be affected by terrain, training [of officers and men], morale, the tactical situation and a good helping of pure chance. So, we could start from the drill manual, and use the time calculated as the best possible by well-trained, crack, troops in an ideal situation, and then increase that time to allow for the combination of factors affecting the unit in battle, by adjusting the norm mathematically and modifying that by a random factor – the die. We might also consider whether such evolutions, when performed in drill, might not have been done at a steady pace so as not to confuse the men and practise the manoeuvres, and to look neat for parade purposes, but would be done with more urgency, albeit more raggedly, in action. After all, the idea behind all this drill was to enable troops to perform such evolutions without conscious thought in the confusion of battle. |
| Major Snort | 06 Aug 2011 4:57 a.m. PST |
Femeng 2 wrote: 1. Wellington's standard field orders REQUIRED all pennisular regiments to form 2 deep, as they were almost always understrength. THe 'Manual" required a two deep line whenever a regiment was at less than 2/3 strength in order to occupy the same frontage (otherwise parade evolution got messy). This is nonsense. Look up past threads on British 2 deep line.
Femeng 2 wrote:
2. DO not quote times from column to square, especially in British service. Use Line to Square, the typical battlefield formation. This gives, say 600 men in two lines at 2 feet per man (or so) or 200 yards of frontage. The standard is for the unit to march into its new position. How long would it take you to walk two football fields? In action you might run. All guides at the time give 10 minutes plus or minus for an organized evolution of any sort. This is also nonsense. When cavalry were a threat, the British normally used quarter distance columns, either the whole formation or on the flanks, as a standard precaution. There are examples of this happeneing in many battles, including Waterloo where most units deployed in such columns. |
| Repiqueone | 06 Aug 2011 6:05 a.m. PST |
I guess this boils down to the fact that, apart from the nonexistent or manufactured data, that time and motion studies have a very limited application to war-game design. It also explains why those rule sets that were the most wedded to that idea-namely the VLB rules-never really worked. Of course, some rough guide as to time elapsed has a comparative value, but any thought of basing movement, combat, maneuvering, etc. on time expenditures and judging events by elapsed time-especially combat events-is a true fool's errand. It's one of those ideas that seems so logical and full of promise, but soon reveals itself as a dead end. The wreckage of many a rule set may be found crumpled and overturned immediately in front of that dead end barrier. For a close up photo of one such wreck-check out the VLB forum on Yahoo! |
| spontoon | 06 Aug 2011 7:18 a.m. PST |
Having done the line to square thing before I became a 50+ year old gentleman with a condition, I can say that it runs much more quickly than the drill manuals make it seem. Takes longer to read it than do it. Say about two minutes. I love that remark, " Re-enacting is a Rotary Club picnic without showers!". Hits the nail on the head. S'why I don't do it anymore! |
| Trajanus | 06 Aug 2011 7:37 a.m. PST |
Forming square from line was a difficult and lengthy process, probably taking a couple of minutes if the methods in the drill book were followed. Also, the formed square would only have been 2 deep if the regulation manoeuvres were followed A interesting point would have to be the mechanics for forming said line, as there were no drills for forming from 2 ranks. Logic would suggest either they went to close column first, or someone made up a way of doing it and it never got written down. (Bit like the modern Spin Wheel for the Massed Bands of the Guards) All the manuals in use were still based on 3 ranks regardless of the acknowledgement that 2 might occur due to circumstances and its not as simple as saying 'OK, Form Square and for now we will just pretend there's a third rank' ! |
| 1968billsfan | 06 Aug 2011 8:39 a.m. PST |
Hmmmmm, Some posters say that the 2 rank line was the actually standard,,,, and then use Wellington's orders before battle, explicitly specifying that a 2 rank line should be used, as the proof. One of Wellington's strenghts was his ability to write and say exact, concise orders. then why would he be redundant and include the 2-rank specification, if it were already the standard? Think that the Brits did transition from the 3 rank to the 2 rank line during the Napoleonic wars. The changes between the 1806 and 1824 drill manuals are in concert with this. A question brought up by this thread to me, is what did a British square formed from a 2 rank line look like? If they did much of their marching in column as a 3 rank line, then a 3 rank square would be the norm to be formed from anything else than a line. From a 2 rank line, was it a doubled (4 rank) square as seen at Waterloo? I'm now searching for period pictures of British troops in square. |
| Repiqueone | 06 Aug 2011 9:10 a.m. PST |
Wasn't Wellington commanding an allied army? Was there still a need to be specific for either new troops and inexperienced officers with only book larnin'? The Waterloo Army was not the Peninsular Army other than in part. Or to make sure that certain allied troops-Brunswick, Nassau, and Dutch-were instructed carefully? One also needs to be sure which square is being discussed when debating the mechanics-Battalion or larger formations. I wouldn't be at all surprised to find out that the actual, functional, square retained 3 ranks-which must have required a bit of rigamarole when deploying from a 2 rank line. One wonders in an age of great "ownership" by Battalion and regimental officers in all armies of the units they led whether each commander didn't have a particular "style" he preferred to evolutions-ranging from sorta by the book to Col. Sander's Special order! This would be even more true when men were assigned for years to one discrete unit-which might very well have its own "touch" to the drill maneuvers. I think this is quite likely. |
| XV Brigada | 06 Aug 2011 10:22 a.m. PST |
I think it is a simpe truth that the time taken for any battalion to convert into square is one that really cannot be answered except in the most general terms. It depends on the starting formation, the number of soldiers in the battalion and the number of ranks. Although none of these alter the cadence, they can all alter the distance that individual sub-units have to march. A British square was usually formed from column. It was actually an oblong. The front two companies and rear two companies closed up while the others wheeled up left and right by sub-divisions. The whole as the regs say "formed at least four deep" which recognises that the battalion could be in two or three ranks. It did not change from two to three ranks for the purposes of forming square. Every conversion and evolution in the British regs could be conducted in either two or three ranks. Each sub-unit marches individually and will only move at all when they it is told to. It is not a matter of cavalry being seen by soldiers in the ranks but the decision being taken by the battalion commander and the order being issued and that is not instantaneous. Many years ago I saw some club house rules that used a matrix based on the relative ability of different nationalities to form a square. From this you could read off the distance that the cavalry had to move and it told you whether the square formed in time or not. I think it was based on Nafziger's calculations. It worked OK to determine this simple event and stopped arguments but as I remember but it was a compromise for all the reasons above. But aren't all wargames rules compromises anyway? Whatever the shortcoming of Nafziger's book might be I do recommend that people take a look at it. It will dispel many of the assumptions that have surfaced here. Bill |
| LORDGHEE | 06 Aug 2011 10:38 a.m. PST |
Ripiquieone stated: Of course, some rough guide as to time elapsed has a comparative value, but any thought of basing movement, combat, maneuvering, etc. on time expenditures and judging events by elapsed time-especially combat events-is a true fool's errand" Funny, the first rule set Kreigspiel is exactly this, written and played by men who fought in the Napoleonic wars. It was consider so important as to remain a "secret" for 30 years. Intresting that the time of a turn is 2 minuntes to reach a desion. Lord Ghee |
| 1968billsfan | 06 Aug 2011 11:03 a.m. PST |
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| Repiqueone | 06 Aug 2011 11:49 a.m. PST |
A few notes, Bills Fan: Look at the graphic you posted! It shows three ranks not two! LordGhee: Kriegspiel was largely the work of one man-Von Reisswitz- not a group of Napoleonic Officers. It was the subject of much controversy-even within the German Army-leading to a counter-group led by such men as Verdy du Vernois that advocated a "Free-Kriegspiel" incorporating a judge or referee that told the group playing what the outcome of each of their actions were-using their experience and judgement. This was done because many-including highly thought of leaders-thtough the Kriegspiel was too "rigid" and gave misleading outcomes. It also was used for training usually of junior officers-in very specific "problems." Not battles per se-which accounts for its 2 minute intervals, which makes for a pretty slow moving game. |
| Mike the Analyst | 06 Aug 2011 2:53 p.m. PST |
I happened to be looking at the videos of the Trooping the Colour 2011 (youtube). The infantry are deployed in line two deep at the start of the parade. One of the companies is forward of the line and on the left flank. When the march past begins the companies on the main line turn about and form, essentially wheeling back to form an open column. The odd company converts from two ranks to three then turns to the right and marches in column of threes. Not shown is the point where this company moves back from three ranks to two but it does this as no company marches past in three ranks. As to forming square from column, there are descriptions of pairs of battalions forming double columns att Waterloo. Some battalions were sufficiently large so as to operate by wings. Now with the left battalion or wing "right in front" and the right battalion left in front you curiously have a column on the centre!! The front and rear faces can readily form 4 deep as has been described earlier. For the side faces you do not need to send half companies off in different directions as you have two separate companies side by side, one to wheel left by half company and double up, the other to go right etc. This is all going to be very quick. |
| Sparker | 06 Aug 2011 3:00 p.m. PST |
Mike's point about the 'Trooping the Colour' ceremony being a good place to start is a good one. But even here one should be cautious. Excellent at Foot Drill HM's Foot Guards undoubtly are, but I bet they spend a great deal more of their time on modern battle drills and fieldcraft, and other modern aspects of military life that their Napoleonic era predecessors didn't have to worry about – 'Elf n Saftety training, Equal Opportunities training, Memorising countless pages of ROE, etc etc. So that even they may not be as fast and instintive in carrying out a complex manoeuvre like forming square as their predecessors…. |
| XV Brigada | 06 Aug 2011 3:49 p.m. PST |
@1968billsfan, Elizabeth Southerden Thompson, Lady Butler (3 November 1846 – 2 October 1933). Nice picture but no help really. Not an authority and not contemporary. Bill |
| XV Brigada | 06 Aug 2011 4:07 p.m. PST |
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| Arteis | 06 Aug 2011 4:12 p.m. PST |
@1968billsfan: For what its worth, that pic clearly shows three ranks – one kneeling and two standing. ;-) |
| Grizzlymc | 06 Aug 2011 4:17 p.m. PST |
I do wish the commentators would confine themselves to explaining what is going on, rather than gracing us with their ill considered and bog ignorant opinion. Still, it is difficult to watch this magnificent parade without a tear in the eye. |
| Mike the Analyst | 07 Aug 2011 1:21 p.m. PST |
I have read a fair few memoirs over the year and I have yet to see one that says the colonel had no use for the drill manual, he made it up as he went along. There are local sets of instructions, Ney and Davout spring to mind but these are buildingg on the base given by the reglements. There are many cases where something will be described in terms that can be understood directly from the manuals. The reality may have fallen short in execution more often than not but that is the friction of war. There are occasional references to something improvised, the 28th in Egypt turing the rear rank to fight of cavalry from both sides is one, the Guards at Waterloo forming 4 deep line from square by simply unfolding the flanks and rear is another. The balance comes down in favour of doing things by the book. Finally if Instructions and Reglements were not followed why did the military establishments devote time to revising these and presumably training troops in these new drills. |
| 1968billsfan | 07 Aug 2011 3:30 p.m. PST |
Yes, the picture posted shows a third rank of dark heads. The other picture does show 2 ranks, which I find surprising, as I think the opinion at the time is 2 ranks couldn't withstand horse. Looking at the 1824 reg's, they are written for 2 ranks and it looks like it was quite acceptable to form square from 2-ranks. Another question that I have had for a time and never recieved/found a comfortable answer to is: What happened with a 3 rank formation, that received a lot [50%?] of losses in the 2rd rank? How did they then manevure and change formations after that? Did they readjust to a formation with all files being 2 ranks or do something else? I don't see anything in memoiors or regulations about this, so it must of been practical experiences or so obvious to someone familiar with troops that it wasn't worth mentioning. |
| Repiqueone | 07 Aug 2011 3:45 p.m. PST |
Mike, Several points: 1. I never said that the Colonel had no use for the Drill manual.
2. I never said he made it up as he went along.
3. I never said that instructions and regulations were never followed. All of the above are mis-statements and exaggerations of what I did say, which was: 1. That manuals were not slavishly followed and that field modifications, and experimentation by colonels with their regiments was likely, and equally likely that many regiments had some unique aspects to their drill. Especially true on the Battalion/ Regimental level. 2. That the "current" regulations were often dated, often partially superseded in practice by experience and field modifications, that were :LATER inserted in the official manuals. Often MUCH later. This means one should not look at the regulations as holy writ, but accepted "official" guidance that was constantly evolving. 3. Basing rules on the regulations is acceptable, only in the broadest sense, and they do not, in themselves, reflect the effects of combat and troops in extremis. Circumstance could often cause them to be morphed, and for truly strange formations and drill to be created. This doesn't even speak to monstrous application of the drill such as McDonald's infamous square at Wagram. 4. I also commented that reliance on drill books, paces per minute, and non-combat "data" as the core reality of a set of rules, and not just a few suspect pieces of evidence to be incorporated with narratives, physical laws, and other evidence to form basic premises, is not defensible. 5. I stated that military establishments were very inconsistent in their training, and that most troops( many illiterate-often not native speaking) of this era acquiring much more than basic drill was rare. It's tough enough to discuss historical matters on a forum, especially if offering a dissenting view, but nearly impossible if the statements are mis-stated. |
| XV Brigada | 07 Aug 2011 5:53 p.m. PST |
Every single reg I have seen starts with training the soldier, proceeds through company drills and then to battalion drills. The whole purpose of regulations is to provide a set of uniform battle drills. One of the reasons that the British Rules and Regs were introduced was precisely to do that. If regs were subject to evolution why do copies of the Rules and Regs published during the period not reflect any changes? Changes to doctrine take place after wars not during them. British doctrine was changed in the light of Napoleonic experience in 1824. Bill |
| McLaddie | 07 Aug 2011 5:57 p.m. PST |
Repiqueone wrote:
No one has ever proven any link between paces per minute and the performance of drill evolution as having any real consequence in the real world of napoleonic battle…EVER. In fact, the relationship between paces per minute affecting the time to change from one formation to another has never been demonstrated to have any significance-except to wargamers. Right. I would think that anyone who has read Napoleonic and 19th Century battle narratives would recognize that the military men themselves demonstrated an intense interest in the paces per minute. That is why all regulations dealt with it, why so many officers specifically mention the paces used in moving during battle, and paces are specifically mentioned in changing formation. For instance, the British regulations state 120 paces per minute in changing to square…and of course, that is practiced. One must ask the obvious (I would think) question if paces per minute were such a big deal why didn't all nationalities collapse on a golden mean? Or the fastest rate? They didn't. For the same reason they didn't all collapse on the same number of ranks, same column formations, same brigade formations, the same command structure etc. etc. etc. I would think that a much more obvious question would be why, if 'paces per minute and the performance of drill evolution had no real consequence in the real world of napoleonic battle…EVER' that the paces per minute is constantly mentioned in memoirs and regulations etc.? This is also compounded by the fact that the definition of paces varied widely-it wasn't a fixed value, but a variable! So were miles, leagues, inchs and many, many other measurements between nations. At the back of Scharnhorst's very popular text, Military Field Pocket Book, reprinted several times over the course of the Napoleonic wars, he lists the the difference pace lengths for various nations. So, why did he waste his time doing this? Bored, mislead, or did he actually believe such concerns about paces and paces per minute did have practical battlefield consequences? That's the question, multiplied by thousands of officers, is what needs to be answered. I stated that military establishments were very inconsistent in their training, and that most troops( many illiterate-often not native speaking) of this era acquiring much more than basic drill was rare. All the more reason to have very specific paces introduced rather than less--that is if troops were going to be able to maneuver together and officers were going to be able to control speed and coordination…at all. Bill |
| Repiqueone | 07 Aug 2011 7:27 p.m. PST |
Ah, Bill, I see that you and Napoleonic Wargamers (do you ever war-game?) are fixed stars in the universe of wargaming. Unchanging and sure in their course, and always ready to twinkle. Of course, the manuals state what they state and seem very authoritative. They are an OFFICIAL MILITARY DOCUMENT-very impressive, indeed! That isn't the question, and neither is it questioned that the military authorities thought they were quite important-especially those in administrative roles back in the hallowed halls of military officialdom. (any serving military wish to comment on official pubs from distant army staff and their treatment in wartime???) The question is did they reflect practice with few exceptions, especially in wartime, or were they generally helpful with experience and leadership modifying it to increase chances for success in the field? That they were generally amended to reflect actual practice well after the event, speaks more to military bureaucracy and the need for more active officers (read younger officers) with actual experience to return home and make the changes official. This is true of every army in every period. I won't even start with the ongoing failure to actually link the minutiae of specific nations drill with their success or failure in the field. For all the sputtering-no one seems to be up to that task. Surely, if it were important, someone would have commented on the great advantages or disadvantages of paces per minute and the battles won by either lengthening or speeding up the pace. On this subject silence reigns-except among the Napoleonic nit-pickers and their conviction that this minor, arcane, and banal knowledge must have some merit-or why did they pay good money for those old books and reprints containing the secret incantations of Napoleonic warfare? To be helpful, I can think of one case where antiquated drill and organization cost a Napoleonic Army victory-Prussia 1806. However, this was a case where an entire system was antique and of the previous century from its deployment of the army to command and control. Strangely though, the 1806 Prussian Army's pace length, paces per minute, and claimed rate of fire (i.e. its entire drill) was at a higher rate than the French armies that destroyed it. Perhaps the slowest moving troops should get a plus 1? (Kidding-just kidding) |
| McLaddie | 07 Aug 2011 8:08 p.m. PST |
One must ask the obvious (I would think) question if paces per minute were such a big deal why didn't all nationalities collapse on a golden mean? Or the fastest rate? They didn't. No? Just to follow up: All nations used a standard pace, British, Austrian, Prussian and Russian – 30", with the French and their closest allies using 2 metric feet (approximately 26.5"). Scharnhorst makes that observation: Different measurements but similar lengths. The various nations also had well regulated, and similar, march speeds for Ordinary Step, Quick Step etc. A summary of these with modern sources is as follows: Paces per Minute
Nationality Ordinary Step / Quick Step /Double Quick
British 75 / 108 / 120
French 76 / 100 / 120
Prussian 75 108 120
Austrian 1805 Regs 75 / 120
Austrian 1807 Regs 90 /105 / 120
Russian 75 / 110 /120 As it says in the British 1807 Rules and Regulations: We have already remarked the cadence or times of march, to be three in number; The proportions they stand relative to each other, vary somewhat in the different armies, but in general 75 to 80 paces in a minute, for ordinary time, from 100 to 120 for the quick movement; and 120 for the quickest. In those armies where the quick cadence is excelerated to 120, the quickest time is dispensed with. So, does that constitute a 'collapse'? Bill |
| McLaddie | 07 Aug 2011 8:55 p.m. PST |
Ah, Bill, I see that you and Napoleonic Wargamers (do you ever war-game?) are fixed stars in the universe of wargaming. Unchanging and sure in their course, and always ready to twinkle. Bob: I am sure that I game about as often as you do. And your star seems to be as fixed and twinkling as mine. Of course, the manuals state what they state and seem very authoritative. They are an OFFICIAL MILITARY DOCUMENT-very impressive, indeed! That isn't the question, and neither is it questioned that the military authorities thought they were quite important-especially those in administrative roles back in the hallowed halls of military officialdom. (any serving military wish to comment on official pubs from distant army staff and their treatment in wartime???) So the question isn't that the manuals train for it. Most all, from Dundas to Hardee state essentially the same statement below, found in ALL of national regulations from 1775 to 1876: "The uniformity of position, and the cadence and length of step, produce that equality and freedom ot march, on which every thing depends, and to which the soldier must be carefully trained, nor suffered to join the battalion, until he be thoroughly perfected in this most essential duty, …" In 1803, Lieutenant John Cooke joined the 43rd Regiment as ensign from the 1st West Yorkshire Militia as the 43rd began their conversion to light infantry. He made notes in his Memoirs regarding his drill and training. Getting to know the drill, In Sections of three, March!
"During the summer the troops in the numerous towns and camps in Kent were reviewed. Our brigade left Ashford and joined two battalions of the 95th Rifle Corps, (now the Rifle Brigade) at Brabourne Lees, and manoeuvred before the Duke of York. The 43rd and 52nd light infantry regiments were organised at Hythe and Shorncliffe Camp under the immediate superintendence of Sir John Moore, assisted by Major General McKenzie, in the most exemplary manner. Those corps were the admiration of all for their discipline and rapidity of their light movements, all of which were executed on the movable pivot by divisions or sections. They formed columns, squares, lines and echelons, without a halt, by merely marking time. The movable pivot preserved a regular cadence, handsome to the sight and of great utility. In time these evolutions extended throughout the army". So there is no question that marching at a particular cadence was seen as important, practiced and admired when achieved. The question is did they reflect practice with few exceptions, especially in wartime, or were they generally modified or ignored with experience and leadership to increase the chances for success in the field?That regulations were generally amended to reflect actual practice well after the event, speaks more to military bureaucracy and the need for more active officers (read younger officers) with actual experience to return home and make the changes official. This is true of every army in every period. [edited abit.] Terrific. IF that were true, we should see several things:
1. Different counts or cadences in practice as described by veteran soldiers.
2. Any changes should be markedly different, and from your position, paces should not only be changed, but maybe even ignored in writing those 'official' changes.
3. We should see the officers themselves pay scant attention to those three particular speeds, ordinary, quick and double quick during battle. Now, the question is whether we see that in history. I won't even start with the ongoing failure to actually link the minutiae of specific nations drill with their success or failure in the field. Good, we aren't talking about minutiae of the specific drills, but of the place cadence and the pace held for all nations in all maneuvering. For all the sputtering-no one seems to be up to that task. Surely, if it were important, someone would have commented on the great advantages or disadvantages of paces per minute and the battles won by either lengthening or speeding up the pace. I think you might be lost in the minutiae. First of all, certainly, you would agree that speed, both slow and fast, was very important on the battlefield. And such ability to move was critical to winning battles. And how did officers control that speed? There will be a quiz later. On this subject silence reigns-except among the Napoleonic nit-pickers and their conviction that this minor, arcane, and banal knowledge must have some merit-or why did they pay good money for those old books and reprints containing the secret incantations of Napoleonic warfare? Wow. You sound rather bitter. It isn't all silence. However, forget those nit-pickers. The only folks we really need to listen to are the men who fought the battles. If THEY are nit-pickers and feel that such banal knowledge has merit, it might be significant to Napoleonic warfare. To be helpful, I can think of one case where antiquated drill and organization cost a Napoleonic Army victory-Prussia 1806. However, this was a case where an entire system was antique and of the previous century from its deployment of the army to command and control. Actually boyo, the atiquated drill they followed was the basis for the French 1791 regulations. And you really don't know much about the battle if you think antiquated drill lost Jena or Auerstadt… Strangely though, the 1806 Prussian Army's pace length, paces per minute, and claimed rate of fire (i.e. its entire drill) was at a higher rate than the French armies that destroyed it. Really? If you believe that is their entire drill, you haven't read their regulations. You missed some significant minutiae. [As if a few paces per minute made any difference when officers controlled which pace to use.] And then again, Napoleon thought the Prussian drill, discipline and maneuvers at Jena impressive--He placed the entire blame for their loss on the Prussian commanders--said so to the Prussian King. Perhaps the slowest moving troops should get a plus 1? (Kidding-just kidding) No, but perhaps the best trained and most experienced should…
Is that nit-picking? Bob, if you can lay asside your obvious dissatisfaction with some perceived group of wargamers and their insistance on minutiae, perhaps we can actually look at what officers did in battle and see whether or not adhering to set paces was actually some bureaucratic exercise that had nothing to do with real battle. Remember that a soldier wasn't even allowed to join a British battlaion until he could master a regulation pace marching at those three speeds. Obviously it was very important, and tens of pages of most regulations and tactical treatises were given over to mastering the pace. The question is whether that translated to the battlefield. I can think of several ways to test that. IF the pace is important to the Napoleonic and later officers in the field, we should see in the various memiors and narratives:
1. The speeds mentioned inbedded in a description of tactical operations. 2. The speeds should relate to different tactical situations…as each had its strengths and weaknesses. 3. Officers should order specific speeds, like Lee did for Pickett's Charge. [He specified quicktime, 110 paces per minutea according to Hardee.] 4. We should be able to generally match speeds to actual distances traversed where known, such as Pickett's Charge crossing the expected quicktime distance in twenty minutes. 5. As you say, the speeds at which troops move should be seen as influencing successful engagements, or help explain failures.
Now, we have had this discussion before, where you have categorically stated that "No one has ever proven any link between paces per minute and the performance of drill evolution as having any real consequence in the real world of napoleonic battle…" I have yet to see you offer any evidence for this belief. I am offering to provide those links, giving examples of the five points above from the Napoleonic wars to ACW. In the past, this is where you exit stage left in the discussion. Bill H. |
| Repiqueone | 08 Aug 2011 3:37 a.m. PST |
Bill,
In my experience, this is where everyone leaves the discussion! Getz and I have always marveled at how it always seems to be more and more about less and less. I've made my points- to paraphrase Lee, " it's good to realize that Napoleonic discussions are so terribly endless lest we come to post to them too much." |
| Trajanus | 08 Aug 2011 4:32 a.m. PST |
Which is of course, as good a way of avoiding someones point of view as any other. |
| basileus66 | 08 Aug 2011 5:43 a.m. PST |
Bob You are avoiding the discussion. Bill has given enough evidence to the contrary to yours statements as to merit you either disprove them or accept that perhaps you have been too vocal against drill manuals. |
| XV Brigada | 08 Aug 2011 5:57 a.m. PST |
On one hand we have a view which questions the importance of the various regs and maintains that something else was probably done on actual service. Challenging stuff is a good thing but in this case unfortunately nothing seems to exist to support it. On the other hand we have a view that the documented regulations and intructions that exist were actually produced for a purpose and represent the battle drills soldiers were trained to use. This tends to be confirmed by other primary sources. In 1806 it was Prussian tactics not their battle drills that were the problem – compare the Prussian 1788 Reglement with the British Rules and Regulations 1792. There is not much to choose between them and they were no more 'antiquated' than the British regs were. When statements are made to one effect or another and with a fair degree of emphasis, that such and such was the case and it whatever such and such was, was a universal truth that affected all armies, it would be helpful if something was provided to back them up. |
| Repiqueone | 08 Aug 2011 7:27 a.m. PST |
Just when I thought I was out-they sucked me back in… The worst part of this is that it is a colossal waste of time, and I have some rules to finish writing. HOWEVER, see: 1, Rory Muir-Tactics and the Experience of battle in the Age of Napoleon- page 63-last para. 2, Ibid, page 73, 2nd Para. 3. Ibid, Page 74, Para 3 through para 7 (including an example of a colonel's modifications). 4. Ibid. page 75 1st para. including the astonishing statement that "few of the complex drills of the Ordannace were ever executed in war." 5. Ibid, Page 75 2nd para. An interesting discussion of pace and rate. 6. Nosworthy , Battle tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies, page 105, 3rd para.ff. 7. Ibid, page 173 last para note that one unit, besides using the regs was "Experimenting with innovative procedures as well.." 8. Chapter 8 of that book discusses the evolution of small tactics during the period-outside of the "official" regs. 9. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare, page 320 last para where St. Cyr states in retrospectto the Orddinance of 1791 " The ordinance made troops shine in maneuvers, but it could not be applied in war." It goes on to cast doubt on the accuracy in the details of execution on following pages. See page 323, para 3, "drills cannot resemble the actions of the battlefield." One could go on-but I think I have better things to do. Please note I NEVER said the regs were ignored or free lance substitutions were made-please read carefully what I said. And now, as this is at the Napoleonic ego impasse stage, a goodnight to all. |
| Rudysnelson | 08 Aug 2011 8:29 a.m. PST |
Conrad's simple comment on terrain as a determanant. I have read of several attempts to form square delayed due to rough terrain or high vegatation. Another factor was weather. Several cases of formed squares not faring well in rainy weather. |
| Trajanus | 08 Aug 2011 8:44 a.m. PST |
compare the Prussian 1788 Reglement with the British Rules and Regulations 1792. There is not much to choose between them and they were no more 'antiquated' than the British regs were. Hardly surprising as Dundas nicked most of the 1788 Regs to write the 1792 ones but fair point none the less. |
| Trajanus | 08 Aug 2011 9:27 a.m. PST |
1, Rory Muir-Tactics and the Experience of battle in the Age of Napoleon- page 63-last para. A not particularly earth shattering reference to Gen Hill getting hacked off with his Light Companies retreating too slowly while doing things by The Book. 2, Ibid, page 73, 2nd Para. I have no idea as to how that supports Bob's point of view. 3. Ibid, Page 74, Para 3 through para 7 (including an example of a colonel's modifications)
4. Ibid. page 75 1st para. including the astonishing statement that "few of the complex drills of the Ordannace were ever executed in war." The two above have explanations to the effect that some Colonels preferred to select a few manoeuvres and drill their men to the point of insensibility on them, as they held these to be the key points of survival in the field – What's wrong with that? 5. Ibid, Page 75 2nd para. An interesting discussion of pace and rate. No not really a discussion, more of a comment that its not clear that pace rates were maintained. Strangely Bob omits to quote: "Yet although armies might not always follow their drill book to the letter, there is no doubt that proficiency at drill was immensely important on the battlefield in giving battalions the confidence and tactical flexibility which distinguished good troops."
6. Nosworthy , Battle tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies, page 105, 3rd para.ff. This refers to the French Revolutionary army at Jamappes having an assault column fall to bits while trying to form line under heavy fire. Quell Surprise on that one Bob ! 7. Ibid, page 173 last para note that one unit, besides using the regs was "Experimenting with innovative procedures as well.." Assuming that "Experimenting with innovative procedures as well.." is a direct quote from somewhere in this thread (I haven't looked) This passage refers to the use of massed columns at a divisional level. Divisional manoeuvres' were not covered as standard drill to my knowledge. Which, as I recall, is where this thread started out. 8. Chapter 8 of that book discusses the evolution of small tactics during the period-outside of the "official" regs Chapter 8 is entirely about tactics. Perhaps Bob doesn't know the difference between Drill and Tactics ? Thankfully I don't have Quimby so I won't have to waste my time looking that up, even though I don't have rules to write! |
| XV Brigada | 08 Aug 2011 11:11 a.m. PST |
A quick look at 'Tactics and Experience' only highlights the importance of battle drills. Most of Muir's comments casting doubts on whether they were used as per the regs, or not, are largely his own speculation without much substance, or Muir simply asking the question. Lots of people don't understand the difference between drill regs and tactics. Quimby is not very good and is responsible for most of the rubbish written about Oman's anaysis, though he doesn't seem to have used any of Oman's key works. Bill |
| Delbruck | 08 Aug 2011 11:24 a.m. PST |
There has been a lot of talk about drill manuals, certainly a very important consideration. But let's look at real world experience. A good portion of the Anglo-Allied army spent the afternoon in square because of fear of more French cavalry attacks. Because of this, between charges the French artllery did a good deal of damage to these squares. Undoubtedly far more casualties were caused by the artillery than the actual cavalry charges. If forming square under BATTLEFIELD conditions was as quick as drll manuals implies, I doubt if the Anglo-Allied infantry would have stayed in these vulnerable formations (to artillery) for so long. |
Ligniere  | 08 Aug 2011 11:54 a.m. PST |
The British squares were on the reverse slope, and therefore not directly visible to the French artillery opposed to them – being hit was probably inevitable but more the result of chance than being targeted. The threat of a sudden cavalry attack, although diminished was still possible. And the morale effect of being in square was much better than standing in line, and perhaps column, where more casualties might result if hit [twenty ranks deep opposed to eight in square] – When in square the lads had to fight their way out to run to the rear, and the opportunity to skulk was reduced as the wounded were typically pulled into the middle, and not removed or assisted to the rear, so the unity and cohesion of the unit was probably easier to maintain. npm |
| Trajanus | 08 Aug 2011 11:59 a.m. PST |
. And the morale effect of being in square was much better than standing in line Well yes and no. Some at the time commented on how terrible it was at the back face of a Square looking into space waiting to be hit from behind at any moment. Personally, I'd just rather have been in Brussels! |
| (religious bigot) | 08 Aug 2011 2:49 p.m. PST |
Good point, though – and forming and reforming throughout the afternoon for a threat invisible to the bulk of troops might have been a tad nervewracking, and tiring. |
| McLaddie | 09 Aug 2011 2:32 p.m. PST |
Just when I thought I was out-they sucked me back in…The worst part of this is that it is a colossal waste of time, and I have some rules to finish writing. Bob:
Well, I appreciate your colossal waste of time, particularly when it directly influences the rules you are off to write. I tend to follow Voltaire's dictum: "I don't much care what you believe, I want to know why you believe it." The information one chooses to note as important tells a lot about what they are thinking and I have, for a long time, wondered how you came to your very unconditional beliefs. HOWEVER, see:1, Rory Muir-Tactics and the Experience of battle in the Age of Napoleon- page 63-last para. It's important to see what exactly is being said: Page 63, last Paragraph:
However occasional anecdotes give glimpses of a reality far removed from the orderly world of regulations and drill manuals. At Talavera, on the morning of 28 July, 1809, the light companies of Hill's division were retreating before Victor's second attack. They fell back slowly and reluctantly, often turning to fire at the French and keeping their order ‘with the regularity of a field day.' But far from inspiring official praise, their coolness drove Hill—normally the mildest of generals—to furious impatience. He wanted to get his front clear and sounded the bugles to hasten the retreat, swearing (on onl one of two recorded occasions during the whole war], ‘D—n their filing, let them come in anyhow." I had to wonder at this ‘reality far removed from the orderly world of regulations and drill manuals.' I am not sure what Rory Muir was thinking because:
1. The light infantry was retreating with the regularity of a field day.
2. Hill's solution was according to regulations: He had the bugles sound the increase in the pace to hasten the retreat. I can only assume that the ‘far removed' was that Hill wanted them to move faster than ‘normal' practice, which he accomplished according to drill. [See Rottemberg's Rifle and Light Infantry Regulations 1798] 2, Ibid, page 73, 2nd Para.
Underlying all these formations and manouveres was drill, which enabled soldiers to operate effectively in close order…Details of drill make extremely dry reading, but a single example should convey the complexity of the movements involved and the need for automatic and unhesitating obedience here a single mistake could sow confusion and reduce a unit to chaos. I am not sure how this supports Bob's thesis. For those interested in the thread question, the next several paragraphs on pages 73-74 detail how a battalion of eight companies would form square from line.
3. Ibid, Page 74, Para 3 through para 7 (including an example of a colonel's modifications). This is a great set of quotes, all from William Grattan's memoirs with the Connaught Rangers, the 88th Foot. The regiment's Colonel Wallace explains to his men the critical issues in forming square—and remember this is on the parade ground training: Mind the square; you know I often told you that if you ever had to form it from line, in the face of an enemy, you'd be in a d—d ugly way, and have plenty of noise about you; mind the tellings off, and don't give the false touch to your right or left man; for by G—d, if you are once broken, you'll be running her and there like a parcel of frightened pullets. Muir then says: Dirll manuals survive in abundance, but there is only fragmentary evidence of how closely they were followed in the field. Actually, there is more than just fragmentary evidence, which I'll give some evidence of: The examples of ‘modifications' that Bob alludes to are in the following two paragraphs, the first Grattan's observations, and the second Muir's: But he also says, in praising Wallace, that ‘by a good commanding officers, I do not mean one too fond of quackery—quite the contrary. Too much training is as bad as too little; we had no fuss with our men.' And ‘at drill our manoeuvres were chiefly confined to line marching, echelon [sic] movements and formations of the square in every possible way; and in all these we excelled. Now, every regiment was required to master eighteen manoeuvres, but many officers didn't feel all eighteen were necessary: page 74 When Sir Ralph Abercromby was preparing for his campaign in Egypt in 1801 he decided that Dundas's Regulations with its eighteen manoeuvres, the official drill of the British army—was too complicated for ruse in the field. He therefore introduced a simplified version which concentrated on a few basic manoeuvres, while adding several new types of square to counter the anticipated French predominance of cavalry. Now, several points. 1. The ‘simplified version' that Abercromby is the same process that Wallace carried out. They focused on ten of the eighteen manoeuvres, finding all eighteen unnecessary. More is ‘complicated' and less is simplified.
2. The ‘new' types of squares are simply larger squares based on multiple battalions.
3. In every case, the regulations weren't changed, just fewer of them used, OR as in the case of the squares, the same regulations and drill were used to build different sized formations. And instead of giving a list of examples and evidence, I think I'll provide one example that applies to forming squares from Grattan's memoirs: page 86 At drill our manoeuvres were chiefly confined to line marching, echelon movements, and the formation of the square in every possible way; [my italics]and in all these we excelled. Colonel Wallace was very unlike an old Major who, having once got his battalion into square, totally forgot how to get it out of it. Having tried several ways, each time more effectually clubbing the sections, he thus addressed his officers and soldiers:"Gentlemen! I can clearly discern that there is a something wanting, and I strongly recommend you, when you reach your barracks, to peruse Dundas! –Men, you may go home," and he thus dismissed them. Even an ‘experimenter' like Wallace relied on Dundas. Drill provided the building blocks for all formations and maneuovres. No matter many ways Wallace formed square, the regulations and drill found in Dundas were the methods for doing it. It is also interesting that it appears to be harder to get out of square than it is to get into it. And FYI, for those who might not know, ‘clubbing' was the slang for units being out of order, usually facing backwards or the left-hand flank of the unit ending up on the right. 4. Ibid. page 75 1st para. including the astonishing statement that "few of the complex drills of the Ordannace were ever executed in war." The French did the very same thing. They didn't throw out the Ordannace, they simply ignored the complex drills that they felt were unnecessary. And the ordannaces and regulations that were ignored were done army-wide for the most part. Why? Because, like a band that has the horn section decide to march at a different pace or perform a different maneuver from those practiced by the rest of the band, battalions operating in close formation that didn't use the same drill and methods ended up creating nothing but a mess. Bob, you seem to feel the quotes provided prove that troops didn't adhere to drill and regulations on the battlefield. They don't, and I am not sure you know the place drill held in battlefield operations, if you feel that Chapter Eight on Nosworthy's book is evidence of that. The various formations and experimental maneuvers cited in the chapter ALL depend on the effective use of drill rather than evidence of any changes in it. I'll respond to the rest of the quotes in another post getting down to the pace and what that has to do with troop movement on the battlefield. Bill |
| Lion in the Stars | 10 Aug 2011 3:20 p.m. PST |
(any serving military wish to comment on official pubs from distant army staff and their treatment in wartime???) You follow them, or you stand in front of a green tablecloth or a full Courts-Martial (if you're still alive). The only excuse for not following the regulations when you're standing in front of the Old Man is success, and the deaths of your troops that would have been prevented by following the regulations is NOT considered success. |
| McLaddie | 11 Aug 2011 2:36 p.m. PST |
Bob:
The real question concerns your statements about the use and benefits of pace and cadence on the battlefield. The question is did they reflect practice with few exceptions, especially in wartime, or were they generally modified or ignored with experience and leadership to increase the chances for success in the field? I am not sure that this is referring to the regulations or just the use of the pace, but I will assume the latter. You are very clear when you say: "No one has ever proven any link between paces per minute and the performance of drill evolution as having any real consequence in the real world of napoleonic battle…" I'd like to show you through soldiers' own comments, the references you gave and some simple observations of historical events that paces/cadance had "real consequences in the real world of Napoleonic battle." And I think we can agree that the only 'real' experts on that question were the participants on the field. 5. Ibid, Page 75 2nd para. An interesting discussion of pace and rate. Yes, interesting. Rory says this at the beginning of the paragraph: Nor is it clear whether soldiers always maintained their stately marching rate of about 90 (ordinary), 105 (quick step) or 120 (double quick) steps per minute, though obviously confusion could arise if a battalion's advance became ragged, especially if it was in line. Why that is not clear is never discussed, but Rory gives several examples of this confusion: According to a Prussian officer at Ligny, ‘About two o'clock we started; double time soon became a run, which at the order of Major General von Trippelskirchen, grew faster minute by minute.' And then a French account: ‘We advance, carry arms, in readiness for a charge, at a quick step and in good order, but it always ends in double quick, because the shot makes you impatient… the men become excited, called out to one another and hastened their march; the column began to become a little confused…the column began to double, the ranks got into confusion an, the agitation produced a tumult.' Both incidents are given by the two quoted authors as examples of troops losing cohesion because they fail to keep to the drill and pace, even though they begin with quick and double quick in the advance… on the battlefield. In both cases, the examples of attacks are noted because they failed as a consequence of the confusion. Note that the French start their advance at quick pace [pas de charge] which is beaten on the drum, [as noted by many British diarists] and then they move to double quick [pas de course], which is so standard that the officer says ‘it always ends in double quick. He also says ‘because the shot makes you impatient'…But that sequence was also per regulations and conventional practice in an advance/attack. Dundas suggests quick pace and then double quick for the last fifty yards before striking the enemy. It is obvious in the example above that the Prussians were going to be very tired running for several minutes, as well as being disordered. Drill and the regulations were specifically written to avoid both consequences. Most all Regulations explicitly state as much. Muir says right after the above excerpt: Yet although armies might not always follow their drill book to the letter, there is no doubt that proficiency at drill was immensely important on the battlefield… So, it would seem that in battle officers did pay attention to paces, followed them in an attempt to keep control and order, even though that order could be lost… in fact that was the intent of armies on the battlefield…to create disorder in the enemy. And the army that held on to that order the longest, won. Captain C. Clery of the 32nd Light Infantry and a professor at Sandhurst, wrote a very succinct description of what the pace and regulations were all about… in 1875 in a book entitled Minor Tactics Marches being the immediate prelude to fighting, the influence they can thereby exercise over the latter renders their study of importance [i.e. minor tactics, which meant drill]. The object and requirements in all marches are to bring troops to the right place, at the right time, in the most efficient manner. Celerity in performing a march and efficiency at the end of it must therefore go hand in hand. To ensure efficiency the condition of the men should be such that the ordinary rate of marching does not produce undue fatigue. This is arrived at by previous training… Dundas and other authors say the same thing, just not as succinctly. Drill and the regulations were practiced and followed "to bring troops to the right place, at the right time, in the most efficient manner." Ignoring them created confusion and fatigue. The Prussian and French examples only prove his point. Bob, the paragraphs you cite do indicate that ‘paces per minute and the performance of drill evolution [as well as ignoring them] DO have real consequence in the real world of Napoleonic battle…' Your next examples only prove the point from another angle: 6. Nosworthy , Battle tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies, page 105, 3rd para.ff. It is important to also quote the second paragraph: The advance in columns slowed down as the attackers neared the enemy. [a much more natural response than running faster at them, even though that is convention.] Auguste Marquis de Dampierre, who commanded a portion of this advance, recalled:We marched in … column up to one-quarter of cannon range [about 200-225 paces]. Then, since we were losing men, General Dumouriez and Beruonville ordered me to deploy the columns… The movement was made like a peacetime manoeuvre…As soon as the eight battalions had finished deploying, I commanded them to march forward and to beat the charge [quick time, again specifically mentioned.] Third paragraph: But such clock-like precision appears to have obtained only in a minority of cases. [I am assuming he is speaking of this particular engagement.] Most battalions in the assault found themselves unable to re-deploy into line under a severe fire. Leclaire, another high-level officers at Jemappes, reports that only three of his companies managed to regain line. A ‘diabolical fire' from the Hungarian grenadiers in front of them forced many of the men in his command to seek refuge at the back of the columns. How this proves that drill had no effect on performance or that paces weren't seen as significant escapes me. Obviously, the failure of Leclaire's troops stems from their inability to perform those drills under severe fire when Dampierre's men could. One lost control of his troops, the other didn't. This would appear significant to me. Read ANY narrative of battle and almost invariably the pace is mentioned, 'steady pace', 'charge pace', 'quick time','double quick'. For instance, William Grattan feels the issue is so important that in all his battle descriptions throughout his memoirs, the pace is always mentioned. I certainly agree that enemy actions can disrupt friendly units' ability to carry out the drills, rendering them unable to function properly [That is, carry out movements and formations they have been drilled in. ] That is why troops practiced the drills, so that in the confusion of battle that Wallace describes in practicing forming squares, they could continue to function… that is perform the evolutions at command, retaining a commander's control of them—including their speed--as Dampeirre's troops demonstrated positively and Leclaire's negatively. 7. Ibid, page 173 last para note that one unit, besides using the regs was "Experimenting with innovative procedures as well.." The experiments in large columns, whether by regiment, division or McDonald's large column at Wagram ALL depended on the regulations and drill. Those ‘experiments wouldn't have been possible if the troops hadn't been proficient in the ordannaces. 8. Chapter 8 of that book discusses the evolution of small tactics during the period-outside of the "official" regs. The same situation. The assumption that the evolution of tactics described in the chapter changed either the drill, regulations or their importance simply isn't true. 9. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare, page 320 last para where St. Cyr states in retrospectto the Orddinance of 1791 "The ordinance made troops shine in maneuvers, but it could not be applied in war." It goes on to cast doubt on the accuracy in the details of execution on following pages. Again, Quimby is speaking of 1. the complicated ordinances found to be unnecessary in battle, just as Colonel Wallace and General Abercrombie concluded the same about the 18 maneuovres. Quimby simply details those fancy maneuvers deemed unsuited for war. St. Cyr was critical of the "Prussian style" of the 1791 regulations as early as the French Revolution. Again, the ordinances weren't changed/amended or thrown out in mass. Only specific parts that all French troops followed… or they would have had a hard time of it on the battlefield. There was a great deal of effort to make such drill uniform, which is one reason so many Corps officers wrote instructions and treatises for their commands. See page 323, para 3, "drills cannot resemble the actions of the battlefield." This quote is taken way out of context to suggest that drills are not followed on the battlefield or actions on the battlefield don't resemble drills. The section is again talking about specific, complex drills rather than drills in general AND how football practice doesn't resemble an actual game--different purposes, same skills. Just FYI concerning what drill and tactics meant to the British miliatary: James' New Military Dictionary 1805 Drill: To teach young recruits the first principles of military movement and positions etc. Wallace, for instance has his regiment stand at attention for four hours and that is referred to as 'drill.' To be Sent to Drill: To be placed under the command of a drill officer or non-commissioned officer and made to join the recruits in performing manual and platoon exercises etc. This is sometimes ordered as a punishment to those who are perfect in their exercise when a battalion, company, or individual has done something to merit exposure. TACTICS: A word derived from the Greek,signifying order. Tactics consist of a knowlege of order, disposition, and formation, according to the exigency of circumstances in warlike operations. These dispositions are severally made, or
one disposition follows another by means of manoeuvres and evolutions. Hence the necessity of paying the greatest attention to the first principles of military art; and hence the absurdity and ignorance of some men, who would pass for great and able tacticians, without having grounded themselves in the elements of their professions. As well might a person assume the character of a complete arithmetician uhder a total ignorance of the first rules. I think that is clear enough concerning their significance. One could go on-but I think I have better things to do. Please note I NEVER said the regs were ignored or free lance substitutions were made-please read carefully what I said. No, what you said was: The question is did they reflect practice with few exceptions, especially in wartime, or were they generally helpful with experience and leadership modifying it to increase chances for success in the field? How do you determine whether the regulations reflect practice with few exceptions or whether they were just generally helpful with leadership modifying them to increase success in the field? Well, we have to note how often actions based on the regulations are noted versus actions that constitute modifications. Simply some of the tools provided in a set of regulations is very different from modifying their contents. For instance, if you look at Torrens 1824 British Regulations compared to the 1798/1807 regulations, there are really very few changes or modifications…perhaps 10%, and this is after twenty years of war, so I would think that constitutes ‘few exceptions.' Overall, Bob, I think you might have confused drill and ‘tactics' during the period with the wide variety of formations that drill was used to build on the battlefield. {De Saxe was so enamored with the ‘new' cadence and pace in the early 1700s, that he wanted to reserve the word ‘tactics' to just that innovation.] And while I agree that officers in the field used what they found useful in regulations, they did not ‘amend' them to any great degree. They chose to use drill and maneuvers that they found practical in Dundas or the ordinances etc., while relegating others to the parade ground, but they did not amend the drill or regulations. Officers, even corps commanders, couldn't change drill and regulation maneuvers whenever they wanted because they had to work with other units in unison. That is why St. Cyr and others were so adamant about changing them—that is truly amending them—because they had to have everyone accept the same changes, not just fail to use some. Nearly all the formations drill you read officers using on the battlefield are found in the drill manuals. If there were lots of ‘modifications', that would have been commented on too. Whether we are talking about Wellington's choosing to form his infantry in two ranks, or the strange formation of the French I Corps at Waterloo, the ability to carry those actions out are based in their respective regulations. And about70-80% of the maneuvers and drill found in the British and French regulations of the 1790s remained the same for better than 60 years of regulations, well beyond the ACW. But unfortunately, little of Bob's quotes addressed the issue of paces and their impact in battle. Next Post. Bill |
| McLaddie | 13 Aug 2011 6:23 p.m. PST |
To provide the evidence that Bob says doesn't exist and to follow up on the time to form square, I'll just finish with the following. I am responding to Bob's statement: No one has ever proven any link between paces per minute and the performance of drill evolution as having any real consequence in the real world of napoleonic battle…EVER. Actually, the evidence is easily found. For instance, Grattan says of the British at Salamanca: p. 69 of his Adventures but it was a parade battle in the fullest acceptation of the word.[!] It was unlike those that had preceded it, where the bravery, and the bravery only, of the British soldier was to be called into the scale, and nothing else left to him but to defend the ground he occupied "to the death." But on this day the British soldier proved that he was as quick in movement as the redoubtable Imperial Veteran, and that he was able to foil him with his own weapon—rapidity of motion. Of course, Rory Muir provides evidence too: John Burgoyne, an engineer officer with the Fusilier Brigade at Salamanca wrote to his sister on July 25, 1812: Muir p.149 Our troops had but just gained [the height], and had not had time to form again in order, but even then they did not give it up, although ours was a much smaller regiment, until the enemy's column was close to them. The French regiment came up the hill with a quick and regular step, and their drums beating the pas de charge [Quick Time]; our men fired wildly and at random among them; the French never returned a shot, but continued their steady advance. The English fired again, but still without return; They stood their ground however with great courage. But men in such confusion had no chance against the perfect order of the enemy, and when the French were close upon them, they wavered and gave way. I would think the French regiment's "perfect order" was significant, at least to John Burgoyne, and the "quick and regular" step had a lot to do with that impression. If anyone needs more evidence than that, Muir's book has several more quotes with obvious examples of the link between paces per minute and the performance of drill evolution as having any real consequence in the real world. A square formed by a battalion was practiced as the double quick, or 120 paces per minute in all armies. That means it could be formed from column in 30 seconds and from line in a minute, while the British had to go from a 2 rank line to 4 rank line to square which took longer, about 1.5 to 2 minutes. It was a problem as Colonel Wallace notes: Mind the square; you know I often told you that if you ever had to form it from line, in the face of an enemy, you'd be in a d—d ugly way,… Here is the problem on the battlefield at Salamanca: Muir Page 94
Private William Brown of the 1/5th writes of Salamanca:
As our brigade was marching up to attack a strongly posted column of infantry, a furious charge was made by a body of cavalry upon our Regiment, and not having time to form square, we suffered severely. Some of the things that *could* slow the formation of a square are:
1. the battalion already in confusion
2. the terrain
3. the need to form in conjunction with other battalions,
as they had to at Waterloo.
4. Poor training or inexperience, having the problems that
Wallace and the 88th suffered in practicing forming
square as quoted earlier. The Parade Ground and field days are where the Napoleonic armies practiced for the reality of the battlefield, unlike today's armies. And as Grattan points out, and the Fusiliers' experience at Salamanca demonstrates, the side with the better order and execution won the engagement--and that includes cadence and forming square. Bill H. |
| McLaddie | 13 Aug 2011 6:42 p.m. PST |
Bob wrote:
Of course, some rough guide as to time elapsed has a comparative value, but any thought of basing movement, combat, maneuvering, etc. on time expenditures and judging events by elapsed time-especially combat events-is a true fool's errand." As pointed out, Napoleonic military men did just that. But lets talk about the battlefield. There are a number 19th Century battles where the time, distance and pace are known. So, what do we find? One of the best documented events is Pickett's Charge. All accounts agree that the Confederates moved at quick pace, 110 paces per minute. The advance was 20 minutes. Now, with each pace being 30", how much terrain should they have covered? Simple: 91.5 yards per minute for 20 minutes equals 1830 yards. The Rebel divisions dressed line twice, crossed a fence and different brigades moved at the oblique twice during the advance. the distance covered was at least 1600 yards. How many ACW rules allow units to travel that far in twenty minutes under fire and over obstacles? I can't think of one, including Bob Jones' designs, past and present. Most don't allow more than half that movement. The same tests can be done with a number of Napoleonic engagements and movement on the battlefield. Perhaps "any thought of basing movement, combat, maneuvering, etc. on time expenditures and judging events by elapsed time-especially combat events-isn't a true fool's errand." Not if the goal is to actually allow players to move their units as far as they actually did under battlefield conditions… Not if the actual military men, one's who risked life and reputation on such things,thought Bob's fool's errand was so critical to battlefield success. And yes, Bill [XV Brigada] all simulations, games and historical narratives are compromises. The question is what is being compromised and why… rather than being justified as impossible to determine. Bill H. |
| forwardmarchstudios | 13 Aug 2011 9:49 p.m. PST |
Bill (H.)-
Interesting point on Pickett's Charge. I just took some of my 1:1 3-4mm DIY bases I've been working on and set them out to measure some distances, since as these guys are 1:1 fig representation I have the ability to see where every guy actually is… if you see what I mean. My battalions each have 420 troops, three ranks deep (these are French battalions). Each company is on a 60mm x 20mm and has about 70 figs. So, in line the battalion is 360mm in frontage. That's about 120 yards of real world space on the ground. So it's about 14 inches across, give or take. So a 1200 yard field like the one at Gettysburg would require a table that is 140 inches across- not counting the Yankee back-court. Cutting that in half, you would need to have arms 70 inches or so long in order to reach across the table to move troops through that space. Not going to happen at that scale. So let's cut it in half, so that each battalion is only 3 bases. Now each battalion is 7 inches wide in line, give or take, and the table would be 70 inches across, or about 6 feet. At this distance one could possibly reach across it from both sides. However this is also larger than most gaming tables that aren't at the cons or at clubs, so it might be limiting. I could drop the representation ratio lower, so that only 2 bases are used, and in that case a 120mm frontage, or about 5 inches, would equal 120 yards. The only problem I have with this is some slight abstraction by way of the unit frontage/depth when in column, although it could be argued away by means of the spacing between battalions on the battle field (a slightly treacherous solution I feel). But, if you got that route, where a battalion is 5 inches across, then Pickets charge would only be 50 inches wide- 5"= 120 yards X 10.
50" is about 4 feet across. Where am I going with this? Honestly, I'm not sure. I've become much more interested in seeing how battles actually progressed since making up these small-scale 1:1 figs. One point that I think is obvious is that if you're playing with battalions that have a frontage of more than about 7 inches across you won't even be able to make a move of 1200 yards, so it's a moot point. because it will become physically impossible.. baring some midgets in swing-harnesses. Plus, without cutting down on frontage you end up with artillery having a range that extends right off the back side of your opponents deployment zone… if he's not in canister range, that is. This is less of a problem for smaller scales than for 28mm, and maybe even 15mm for some people. If you're giving your 28mm figs a 20mm square base then you might want to restrict them to 18 figure battalions in two ranks! Otherwise, one could always slip to the brigade level of representation, but then a lot of this square v line v column issue becomes moot anyway, and other factors of time and rank dressing would come into play… The only issue I have with games allowing or not allowing a 1200 yard advance in 20 minutes is simple playability. Sure, a lot happened during that particular 20 minutes, but then again no one wants to play a 3 hour lull in fighting at 5 minutes per turn either. I'm not sure that there is any ruleset outside an outright kreigspiel that could represent that, and you would probably need a ref at that. |
| 12345678 | 13 Aug 2011 10:20 p.m. PST |
"The Parade Ground and field days are where the Napoleonic armies practiced for the reality of the battlefield, unlike today's armies. And as Grattan points out, and the Fusiliers' experience at Salamanca demonstrates, the side with the better order and execution won the engagement--and that includes cadence and forming square." So the early to mid revolutionary French armies and the French of 1813-14 won engagements through better order and execution? I seem to remember that those armies were notorious for their lack of order and execution. Many factors other than order and execution contribute to the winning of engagements. In the case of the French attack on the fusiliers at Salamanca, what made the difference was order, numbers and the determination of the French, the latter being evidenced by the speed of their advance and their willingness to press home the attack without firing. Order was only one factor. |
| bgbboogie | 14 Aug 2011 4:59 a.m. PST |
I found a reference a month or so ago, the statement was roughly (I didn't note the book),
"if enemy cavalry were within 1500 paces (600 yards) there would not be time to form a proper square and gaps may well be present and thus the square destroyed before it had chance to defend its self". It is though always a bowl of contention especially when an opponenet wants you in square to destroy you with artillery fire at close range. |
| 12345678 | 14 Aug 2011 5:17 a.m. PST |
1500 paces is a lot more than 600 yards! |
| Private Matter | 14 Aug 2011 5:56 a.m. PST |
Apart from some of the sniping going back and forth, I find this topic to be interesting. One of the earlier posters said a comment which to me is the crux of the matter. The poster said something along the lines that there were two speeds 1) in time and 2) too late. Only being a casual reader and not an expert on the period I don't remember finding any instances where infantry got caught in the middle of a changing to a square by cavalry. I have read where infantry was caught in a line by cavalry as they were also facing cannon but not being caught in the middle of a change. If there are any cases of this that have been documents I would love to read about them. I think that by looking at those details were infantry being caught out is documented, we may be able to extrapolate the answer to the original question. Its fairly easy to gauge a rough guess of how fast cavalry moves at the trot, then cantor and finally gallop, so if we could determine what the line of sight was to the cavalry, take into account any hesitations by the Infantry commanders, and determine how far along the infantry was to forming their square before they were hit we could make a decent determination. Taking bgboogie's post about if the enemy is within 600 yards, then supposing the Cavalry trots the first 300 yards, cantors the next 200 and then lets loose for the last 100, you are looking at roughly (and assuming flat even ground) that from the time the charge commences to the time it hits home about 121 seconds. If you use the modern conversion of paces to yard of 1500 paces equals 1250 yards and cavalry trots the first 50% and only gallops the last 100 yards then the time is almost 2.5 minutes. As my only experience with large formation drill was the on parade deck at Parris Island, I can't even begin to comment on if 3 minutes is enough time for 800 men trained in these formations do go from line to square. Although I must admit the motivation seems there for them to do it. |
| XV Brigada | 14 Aug 2011 5:58 a.m. PST |
@ bgbb, Interesting. I have a book Jack Coggins called Arms and Equipment of the Civil War which dates from 1962 and was one of the books that sparked my interest in wargaming. Its subject is the ACW but for what it is worth it has a diagram showing an attack by cavalry on a battery of smoothbores. This starts from 1500 yards and its purpose is to show the fire the cavalry would receive from the guns during the charge. The first 620 yards at the trot takes 2 minutes and 48 seconds, the next 440 yards at the manoeuvring gallop takes 1 minute and 24 seconds (which I calculate at .19 second per yard) and the final 440 yards at the gallop and charge takes 42 seconds (.095 second per yard) to complete. I don't know where the figures come from or if they 'translate' to Napoleonic cavalry but based on them we are talking about 160 yards being covered at manoeuvring gallop at .19 seconds per yard or 30.4 seconds, call it 30 seconds, in total. Add the final 440 yards at gallop and charge of 42 seconds and I get approximately 1 minute and 12 seconds to cover 600 yards. Lots of caveats here. 1. Where these figures came from is unclear.
2. They are for ACW cavalry which I suppose we would categorise as light.
3. Early 19th century heavy cavalry might move much more slowly.
4. Mid 19th century American doctrine and early 19th century European doctrine might be quite different.
5. A charge against infantry might take place over a different/shorter distance at different speeds.
6. My mathematics might be badly flawed (not a personal strong point). Anyway, it is something and even if an approximation, it seems that the infantry need to get a shift on. A club I belonged to many years ago had a matrix in its house rules from which you could read off the distance the cavalry had to cover against the time taken for a unit to form square from various starting formations and determine immediately whether the square had closed in time or not. It was a compromise and didn't take different sizes of unit or numbers of sub-unit into account but it was a rule on which all were agreed and it stopped all argument! Bill |
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gets started with Flintloque.
