"Time to Form Squares-Rules and Reality" Topic

In the interests of accurate representation on the tabletop- How long would it take the average battalion to form a square once the order was given? I'm sure it would vary by the original formation the unit was in, nationality, training, perhaps the size of the companies, fatigue, maybe more…Has anyone ever seen it done by modern troops/reinactors? How long do your rules systems allow for it to take under your preffered constructs? Any thoughts, information from all you out there more learned than I?
Thanks,
CGQG

How long would it take the average battalion to form a square once the order was given? I'm sure it would vary by the original formation the unit was in, nationality, training, perhaps the size of the companies, fatigue,

You've answered your own question, except that you didn't factor in terrain also.

How long is a piece of string?

30 seconds.

Anywhere from 30 seconds to 10 minutes, depending upon all the things you listed, plus the different national systems in place in whatever year you're thinking of.

If your game turns are supposed to represent anything over 5-10 minutes, then the safe answer is: "One Turn."

I'd like to see evidence of that 30 second formation change-especially in battle! Must be one of those famous, but largely mythological, "Emergency Squares."

Emergency square! The result of every ruleset struggling to balance cavalry vs. infantry and still let the gamer see a square formation on the table.

I'm of the opinion that "emergency squares" don't have a place on the table as actually being represented by a change in the miniature unit formation. I think the threatened units would have gone in and out of that formation far quicker than any game turn, and represents an unnecessary low level depiction of formation that isn't needed. Unless under an immediate threat, units wouldn't have been hanging around in a square formation.

Brent

Get a look at a copy of Nafziger's Imperial bayonets and look at his formation change times. This works for troops on reasonable ground with a high degree of training – your Marie Louise on a wet day may take longer. Note the importance of WHEN in these calculations, almost everyone improved their drill after being beaten once or twice by the French.

Re emergency squares, if we are talking about the Russian and Austrian column squares, they are perfectly reasonable, but I have always felt that the sides should get little or no firepower.

It was pretty fast. I don't have the numbers handy but the EE&L booklets got into this. Sorry, not more help today

I too would be pretty impressed with a unit that could form square in 30 seconds. It sounds very fast but even though I've done it re-enacting I'm no expert. Clearly it would depend on the size of the unit, their fatigue and their training as has already been pointed out, but other than badly trained troops I suepect there will be a median number that the rest orbit around within a reasonably close distance one way or the other.

Simply put, I think much of Imperial Bayonets is useless in terms of either understanding battlefield behavior, associated game design parameters, or as defensible data.

It is largely a reprint of period manuals (which were often ignored in whole and part in the field) and some suspect data from perfect case, non-battlefield, and uncorroborated data. Mix in theoretical writings by various authors-each with an axe to grind, and you have a book that gives, to some, an impression of hard fact and usable data when the reverse is just the case. To top that off there were, in earlier editions, some misquotes and typos that led to further misunderstandings.

You must be very clear that many of the conclusions expressed in that book are not from the record, but from the Author's "guesstimates" from that record. Guesstimates that I find decidedly questionable. The fact that so many Napoleonic gamers have used the apparent assuredness of these beliefs to make them reliable facts required of their rules-has probably done more harm to Napoleonic Wargames and their rules than any other single source.

The search for hard data where there is practically none, and the application and extrapolation of the little that does exist into a whole mythical universe filled with emergency squares, Prussian musketry tests against a sheet, and retired general's search for justification or a legacy will never replace some inventive and insightful deduction from the descriptions of what actually happened in battle.

No one will ever agree on this, of course, and several different appreciations will be in play-all changed and effected by the knowledge and sophistication of the gamer and designer. But hard data??? Damn Little!

Emergency Squares? How about a flying saucer? Unicorn? Ghosts? Take your pick.

Eh, the manuals written by the best experts of the time who actually did these things,, we must ignore?

The manuals used to train the troops,,,, we must ignore?

The evolutions described in the manuals, were not followed? So people whose lives depended on getting into a formation so as not to be cut to pieces by sabres… they ignored the manuals? Kings and royal families, whose thrones, wealth and heads depended on having successful armies… they Sponsored documents, paid for them, had their army schools teach them,,,, because they were going to be ignored? If so, why were they so stupid as to not teach what they actually did?

I think we have an example of a lack of sense here. If they ignored the manuals in the field and did something else, might you think in your modern arrogence that somebody somewhere might have written what they did instead?

I don't think Imperial Bayonets is going to be that far off. I think that the officers of the time knew the drill for changing formations and were very familiar with what the well-defined paces were, how quickly the sequence of moves would take to execute with different sized units in different terrain and with different quality troops.

Thanks for taking the discussion to a realm where facts aren't allowed to interfer with the free flow of ideas.

Great Repiqueone.

Now we know what you think of Nafziger and why – how long do you think it took to form square?

Shouldn't the real question be; How much ground can a Cavalry unit cover in the time an infantry unit takes to form a square?
From my observations at re-enactments over the years; an infantry unit have best be able to form a square in under 3 minutes. That is from the time the Colonel realizes he needs to, until the last man is in place. I don't see 30 seconds as unreasonable if that time is from start to finish of moving and not including the issuing of the orders.
I would think that most time is spent in deciding that a square is called for.

If you look at any drill manual-say for instance the British Drill manuals of the early 1800s- you will find that there were several drills incorporating three line formations that simply were not used in lieu of the more common practice of two lines. The two line formation preference preceded the official drill manuals "approval" by several years. The use of many skirmish tactics by the British arose in answer to the AWI experience in America, and was not introduced into the formal manuals for many years-though it was used in the field.

It is not uncommon for armies in wartime to functionally operate quite differently than the official manuals-including field modifications of equipment. The Official manuals are often past their sell-by date when published!

Basic drill was, of course, taught to all involved-but it was often imperfectly introduced to troops, and the Napoleonic period had a huge range of accomplishment in that regard-ranging from pretty good to non-existent. Training in musketry was woeful-with very few rounds fired in training.
And all of this was done in a non-combat environment!

The French camp at Boulogne and its concentrated training was VERY exceptional, and also ephemeral-and, even there, musketry training was minimal. Some have even conjectured it was more a diplomatic/strategic move by Napoleon than any idea of improvement by instruction.

Much of drill was meant to forge a functioning unit in concept as well as practice, and well-trained and veteran troops might be reasonably proficient, but few units were going to win the marching band contest, and being under fire can lead to some very strange accommodations that aren't found in a manual.

My point was that the way Imperial Bayonets presents its information has led to many gamers making unwarranted assumptions about its validity-not that troops ignored the manuals. Though, in many ways, they did.

You have heard the terms "Lies like a Bulletin" and "An Army is always prepared to fight the last war." That has application to literal readings of drill manuals as well. Manuals are interesting and provide insights into the thinking of military establishments and the general capability of units, but other than in the broadest and simplest applications is not always a very good guide to actual practice and combat environment actions.

It is unlikely that most troops had mastered more than the basic movements-and whole sections of manuals were never used. This is especially true of much of the Napoleonic period and the ACW.

The idea that Imperial Bayonets is anything more than a collection of best practices with suspect actual application is a triumph of belief over reason.
It is also not something that many Napoleonic buffs want to believe as they comb through reams of drill rates, formational charts, and Prussian musketry tests to find the absolute, undeniable, unassailable, truth about events imperfectly known, often recorded by eye-witnesses with limited views, wrapped in smoke, crashing volleys, and horribly maimed and screaming men.

Sure, there's history to be studied, it's the joy of the hobby, but don't get too carried away with the associated shards of hard data that, upon examination, are often VERY soft.

The realm I'm suggesting is the realm of the historian-not the realm of the ever credulous war gamer. Facts are very important-it's just that there are historical facts and war-game facts. It has always been thus.

I have no idea what the "average" time was for forming square in the midst of battle, when threatened by cavalry.

I do know there were two possible results: 1. Soon enough to thwart the attack or even the attempt. and 2. Too late!

"Soon Enough" seems to be the general outcome-given that cavalry often took a bit to get itself shook out, and infantry could form squares in that length of time-unless terrain or blockage of vision prevented it.

I do note that troops seems to take such formations for extended periods of time and not switch back and forth too much. This idea of units being the Ohio State Marching Band spelling "O-H-I-O" ( Or "B-R-I-T") with great fluidity and frequency seems a bit over the mark.

I imagine that most units in the Napoleonic Period or the Civil War-tended to form up in a formation suited to their role and the terrain and stayed there for the duration of the battle. Certainly more than a few evolutions would not be a common action.

Have you seen the last version of "The Four Feathers"?
I thought that was a very good representation of forming square. Granted they had Egyptian allies in with British regulars, so cut the time a bit if you only have regulars.

All of these literal scale questions are usually best severed at the outset. You can make your rules activity-driven, rather than time-driven.

How long does it take to form a square? One Turn. Or one movement phase. Or one movement increment. Or one… Whatever.

Did the Flargnubian Grenadiers form square faster than everybody else? Then adjust the rule for them. Otherwise, aim for a reasonable middle-point that will cover most people.

You can also use the sequence of play to answer the question. Does your game feature a predictable and/or linear sequence in which I always move, and then we fight, before you (always) shoot, or rally, etc.? If so, then changes of formation should probably be fit into the movement phase, so that they're not a pain in the ass, interrupting somewhere else. (What's the point of having a simple, clean sequence, if it keeps getting interrupted.)

If your game features a more flexible or asymmetrical sequence, then the players can decide when they want to form square, but doing so will be one "step" or "round" or whatever increment you choose. (That way you won't have to worry about whether or not there's an "emergency square" – the sequence will build that unpredictability and urgency into the player's menu of options.)

The key point is how easily will a unit get caught not in square an ripped to pieces in the rules.

Jaz
6sided.net – Wargaming Blogs

@Repiqueone,

>It is largely a reprint of period manuals (which were often ignored in whole and part in the field)<

What is your evidence that period manuals were "ignored in whole and part in the field". More importantly, having ignored them, what were troops actually trained to do and where can description of this training be found.

Bill

And the dead hand of pedantry falls onto an otherwise interesting thread.

XV Brigada,

British manuals of the Napoleonic wars required infantry to deploy three deep. They actually deployed two deep. That is evidence of a manual being ignored in part.

In the middle of a war not all modifications are written down.

Colin

I am not so sure that field manuals were that useless as Bob affirms. In Spain, war manuals became during the war much looked after. Of course, many of the officers, especially in the newly recruited regiments of volunteers, had not formal training at all and didn't know how to deploy their soldiers in battle, or maneuver with them. They pestered the government and the HQs for sending manuals to them. I remember one case in particular: in 1810 Longa had reunited under his command a band of partisans in excess of 1,000 men; he was trying to train them as soldiers, in order to improve their fighting ability in open combat against French columns. Hence he asked general Mahy, in Corunna at the time, to send to him several manuals for him and his officers (by this time Longa's guerrilla had been formally recognized as a volunteer regiment of the line). Mahy, however, replied that he had not enough manuals to cover the needs of his own army; he sent in their place some books in the tactics of light troops, while apologizing Longa for not being able to be of more help. In a letter attached to the original document, the British resident in Corunna offered to Longa to translate the British field manual into Spanish and send it to him.

From this little story we can conclude that: a) Field manuals were actually used by the armies; b) it was thought as a valuable tool. Of course, as Bob says, we can't be sure how much of the manual was actually used in combat. Still my guess is that when subjected to the stresses of battle most officers would resort to well known maneuvers and formations, rather than to improvise anything fancy. If the evolutions and formations recomended by manuals were what they were familiar with, it's probable that those were what they used in combat.

In other words, they were not just only cultural constructs ('only' being the relevant word) but also tools to be used in battle.

Best regards

Actually, the key seems to be training and options. Well drilled troops can delay forming square and perform evolutions which less well trained troops would not dare to risk.

I recall, I think, Beresford marching the Light Division accross the front of French cavalry looking at them and saying "No, they aren't serious", dont think he would have tried that with Portugese militia

Until my German improves markedly and my Russian and French come into existence, I would run with Nafziger as a lowerbound figure. He is assuming that:
a) The regiment is at full strength;
b) The square is formed as per the drill manual;
c) Each company "knows" where it is going.

So it won't be much less, but it could be more.

Basileus,

The case that you use is a particular one of a newly raised unit with inexperienced and unschooled officers. In this situation, the need for something to work from is obvious.

Under the stress of battle, most armies develop new operating procedures as the weaknesses of the official systems are shown up. The adoption of two rank line by the British is an example of this, as are the French skirmishing tactics, which are lacking from official manuals.

Colin

If manuals were not used because armies evolve during a war, then presumably a manual is best seen as a reflection of practice in the LAST war (which may or may not have been continued).

So would this mean post-Napoleonic manuals are the best place to see Napoleonic practise written down? Who updated their manuals after the Napoleonic wars? Do they tell us anything?

I suspect manuals are not either/or – they were not entirely used or not entirely used. I guess the question is whether the bits about squares are likely to relevant.

Eagle,

I think your post just about sums it up; some parts of manuals remained in use while others were ignored or superceded. As you say, the question here is whether the parts about squares were used, which is probably pretty well unanswerable in an absolute sense.

Sometimes it is just not possible to say what actually happened on Napoleonic battlefields with an acceptable degree of certainty.

Colin

Napoleonics not being my speciality I've been reading this with intrest. The ACW is my speciality so I can comment on this:

"It is unlikely that most troops had mastered more than the basic movements-and whole sections of manuals were never used. This is especially true of much of the Napoleonic period and the ACW."

While this was true of 1st Bull Run/Manassas, (the Marine Battalion performed the manuel of arms everytime they stopped on the march from Washington), it certainly was not true for any period after this.

The thing to remember about war, especially prior to the modern age, is that there very little actual fighting. While campaigns might last a couple of months, actual battle is usually only a few days, out of an entire year, And when the troops weren't activly on campaign, (and sometimes while on campaign), they spent a part of each and every day drilling. By the spring of 1862 both armies knew the drill manuel by heart and could go through the evolutions without thinking about them.

"I imagine that most units in the Napoleonic Period or the Civil War-tended to form up in a formation suited to their role and the terrain and stayed there for the duration of the battle. Certainly more than a few evolutions would not be a common action."

Actually they went through a ton of evolutions on a regular basis. Changing from march column, to line of battle, to column of companies, to skirmish, to whatever was very common during action. Remeber, just because you're in a battle doesn't mean you're getting shot at.

With the greatest respect to reenactors, I don't think their drills should be used to time complex drill movements when undertaken by professional troops.

During my time in the TA we spent a good deal of our available time pracising 'skirmishing' – the art of alternately firing and moving by half sections and buddies, so that 6 blokes are firing when 2 are moving forward or retiring. We thought we were pretty good, until we saw Regular soldiers demonstrating it – they covered the same ground in less than half the time we did it in…

So my point is with Reenactors, no matter how dedicated they are, they simply can't replicate the amount of time, discipline and small unit cohesion of regular troops…

I have no idea how long it would take a unit to change into square, but this is how we do it for our rules. Our turns are 15 minutes. If a unit is ordere dto do a formation change and nothing else happens they can do it in one turn. If charged by cavalry you roll on a chart.

Troops are rated for morale/training on a a scale of A-E with A being the best. Once you lay out the cavalry charge, (there's a bonus for charging units which is variable based on the terrain and a die throw), you roll on the chart which tells you how long it takes to change formation and you find out if the unit made it or not. You get a plus on the roll if you were ordered to change formation.

The end result is that cavalry in open terrain is going to move faster than in poor terrain, and French Old Guard are going to change formation must faster than Spanish regulars. So you've got a much better chance of catching the Spanish mid-change than the guard. It works well for us.

and the dead hand of pedantry falls onto an otherwise interesting thread.

How is this helpful?

"So my point is with Reenactors, no matter how dedicated they are, they simply can't replicate the amount of time, discipline and small unit cohesion of regular troops…"

Fully agreed, however, it does give you a greta idea of how difficult it can be just to keep order marching across an open field. And I've seen how manuvers were at least supposed to be made with real men as opposed to toy soldiers whcih provides some useful insight.

Fully agreed, however, it does give you a greta idea of how difficult it can be just to keep order marching across an open field. And I've seen how manuvers were at least supposed to be made with real men as opposed to toy soldiers whcih provides some useful insight.

Sure, but it is only the challenges that you are getting a feel for – the other side of the equation is the sheer speed and cohesion possible by a highly drilled and disciplined group of men performing an action with adrenaline that they have rehearsed countless times with only the butt of a Serjeant's pike to fear….

I agree Dn, I would guess that re enactors span the range from dodgy militia to snappy movers, and maybe the 95th could beat them all, but it is still some datum points on the curve.

There is a fundamental limit to how you can manouver men shoulder to shoulder and re enactors must overcome the same problems as their historical counterparts.

I take Sparker's point. The reason crack troops seem like supermen is that this is their job. Try to do something with a potters wheel some day, then sit down and watch the potter do it. Try to outbox a pro, or … whatever.

BTW Connard is not always helpful, but he is usually cogent; this redeems him.

Sparker is of course right about re-enacting. I think the only real value I got from re-enacting when it comes to things is relative. For example, the slightest change in terrain has a huge effect on all three arms (and I've done all three). I can vividly remember falling over a very small molehill in my eagerness to deploy from column to line and manhandling a light cannon with four other crew up what looked like a virtually non-existant incline only to nearly pass out after about 50 metres!

I would reckon that the biggest drawback would be the smoke though, assuming a unit had been engaged. It's all well and good being able to form a square but unless you can see the enemy it's not much use.

Using re-enactors to prove a point about drill or combat practice 150 years ago, is rather like using the cast of "The Natural" as a measure of the 1927 Yankees baseball team.

The uniforms are pretty close, the diamond looks the same, and with careful editing and selective photography the players might look proficient-but I wouldn't like their chances at winning against a women's softball team, and I doubt that the actors would have much insight into playing championship baseball.

Oh, one other point that makes it moot is that 50+ year old overweight men, often very much out of condition (or having a condition), might not give a meaningful impression of underfed 19 year olds, scared to death, and literally running for their lives, except, of course, in their own imagination.

War is hell. Reenactment is a Rotary Club picnic without showers.

I did take another look at my copy of Imperial Bayonets. I confess I would take G's inf and cav movement speeds as a good general guideline, but am not sure of their utility when determining what happened in a battle. Overall, I find it very informative, and accessable -besides,one has to have something other than a time machine and a stopwatch!

So, for rules design, the variables that need to be accounted for seem to be:

-how far away the cavalry is when the threat is spotted,it's formation,evoloutions,the intervening ground, and speed.(distance, cohesion & time)
-How effective and timely the order to form is at the point the threat is recognized.(experience & leadership)
-How quickly the troops can execute the order(training, original formation, numbers, fatigue and disorder, terrain)
-'Random'events that happen in war ('chance'like "the colonel got a ball in the throat as he was about to give the order")

Generally, given the above, it seems the consensus is that it could happen pretty quickly on a parade ground-like a minute or less, and under most conditions,most of the time it did happen ("soon enough") fairly quickly in battle.

The rules have to consider all the above,using basic movement speed foundations to start, in order to have a good construct. Wow.

I spoke to a computer rules designer who explained how his rules factor in all of the above, and I'm convinced it's the way for me to go on this, practically, and for the sake of more 'realistic' simulation.

(mostly) very helpful and observant posts above, and I can see again the observational and research skills and real depth of knowledge we all have to posess to have fun on the table at a mastery level. Hats off to all.

Somewhat related- Can anyone clarify a bit for me what happened between the infantry of St. Hilare's division and the Austrian cavalry at Aspern-Essling? Marbot leaves me with the impression that the cavalry either broke French Squares, or the infantry was perhaps to disordered to protect themselves when the Austrians charged, and were pursued as fugitives?

Sorry, I think I meant at Wagram.

Colinjallen,

That is not quite right. The British Rules and Regulations allow for two and three ranks. There was also no rewrite of the 1792 regs until 1824 and although two ranks were now the norm, three ranks were still allowed.

Bill

George Nafziger's book was more or less a time and motion study based on paces per minute and distance marched.

It was also an exercise in relativity in that is showed which nationalities conducted their respective evolutions more quickly, or slowly, than others.

I think he got a couple of his calculations wrong but it is as good a place as any to start.

I also agree that the utility of re-enactors as a model is not good. Units are too small to extrapolate results to a battalion with half a dozen sub-units, let alone something bigger.

If you could get 800 re-enactors together, form them into a battalion, with supernumeraries and all the bells and whistles, and thorougly train them with delivery being by competent instructors then one might have something.

Bill

Bill, THe 1806 regs still recommended three ranks, and stated that as the norm. They were not, and hadn't been for years.

No one has ever proven any link between paces per minute and the performance of drill evolution as having any real consequence in the real world of napoleonic battle…EVER. In fact, the relationship between paces per minute affecting the time to change from one formation to another has never been demonstrated to have any significance-except to wargamers.

One must ask the obvious (I would think) question if paces per minute were such a big deal why didn't all nationalities collapse on a golden mean? Or the fastest rate? They didn't.

This is also compounded by the fact that the definition of paces varied widely-it wasn't a fixed value, but a variable!

George's book, for all its great appeal to nitpicking Napoleonic gamers, is mostly a work of speculation based on fact. About as useful as the modern time and motion studies you mentioned that often get the time right and the motion right, but forget to demonstrate any business advantage stemming from the cost of the study.

Bill,

The Napoleonic era British regulations require the use of 3 ranks except in very particular circumstances. However, throughout the period, British infantry normally deployed in 2 ranks. Therefore, the regulations were being ignored in the field, so it is an example of a regulation or manual being partly ignored. However, this is off-topic and a digression from the discussion about squares.

Colin

Returning to part of the original question, we allow for some randomness in the time taken to form square when the unit is being attacked. For us, this represents factors such as:

When the cavalry were spotted
Terrain problems
Difficulties caused by lost officers and NCOs

Each class of unit requires a different dice roll to form square in time when charged. Really good units are very unlikely to fail while the worst units (usually my Neapolitans) have a slightly higher probability of failure, although they are still likely to succeed.

Forming square when not being attacked takes a move for everyone.

Colin

From my observations at re-enactments over the years; an infantry unit have best be able to form a square in under 3 minutes.

From my observations of re-enactments over the years, most Napoleonic infantry battalions are about 100 strong at best. And never under fire from artillery and/or muskets.

Can we please get away from using re-enactors as a paradigm for any real world military manoeuvres? Please?

How is this helpful?

It wasn't intended to be. It was an observation on how many otherwise interesting threads, on the Napoleonics boards in particular, get subverted by some tool trying to flog their own agenda. Personally I have no axe to grind with Nafziger.

From my observations of re-enactments over the years, most Napoleonic infantry battalions are about 100 strong at best. And never under fire from artillery and/or muskets.

And more often than not more like 20, or an ad hoc 'unit' put together from several disparate groups who most certainly will have done very little drill together.

Can we please get away from using re-enactors as a paradigm for any real world military manoeuvres? Please?

Without doubt. As I said, the only value from re-enacting is relative, other than perhaps learning what the eye can very often not see.

At the risk of addressing the OP ;-) I offer two examples.

(1) British battalion at full strength in single platoon column at quarter distance forming square. Assume for the purposes of this exercise that the platoons are numbered 1 to 10 front to rear:
. Platoon 1 falls back on platoon 2. Platoons 1 and 2 are now formed as a four rank face.
. Platoon 10 advances/closes up to platoon 9. Platoons 9 and 10 about face and are now formed as a four rank face.
. Platoons 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 divide into half platoons – a left hand half platoon and a right hand half platoon. Each left hand half platoon breaks into two sections (left section and right section) and wheels left, the right section forming behind the left section. The right hand half platoon does the same but wheels to the right. The left hand and right hand half platoons are now formed as a four rank face to left and right respectively.
. The battalion is now in square.
. The maximum distance moved by any single file is the two innermost files for platoons 3 to 8, which is no more than 22 paces. Even at 76 paces per minutes that is less than 20 seconds.
. Time to form square is therefore less than 20 seconds.

(2) French battalion post 1808 at full strength in column of divisions at full distance forming square.
. First division stands fast and forms a three rank face.
. Second division wheels the left hand peleton left and the right hand peleton right. These peletons now form three rank faces to the left and right respectively.
. Third division advances/closes up to the rear of the previous position occupied by the second division and about faces forming a three rank rear face to the square.
. The battalion is now in square.
. The maximum distance moved by any single file is the two innermost file for the second division, which is no more than 47 paces. Even at 76 paces per minutes that is less than 40 seconds.
. Time to form square is therefore less than 40 seconds.

- Allan

About the British being in two ranks… there are some statements above that the regulations are all written for 3 ranks but the British "normally deploy in two ranks"

The booklet: ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE 1 Jan. 1807
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE MANUAL and PLATOON EXERCISES,
FORMATIONS, FIELD-EXERCISE,AND MOVEMENTS OF HIS MAJESTY'S FORCES. FOR THE USE OF THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE
BRITISH ARMY.
cf: PDF link

has the following section

S.64. From three Ranks forming in two Ranks.
FORM TWO
DEEP.
LEFT FACE
QUICK MARCH.
Fig. 9.
Halt, front, Dress up
The platoon halted, is ordered, FORM TWO DEEP; the rear rank men of the left sub-division instantly step back one pace; on the word LEFT FACE, the rear rank of both bdivisions face: the word QUICK MARCH is then given, on ich the men of the rear rank of the left sub-division step short, until those of the right get up to them; they then move on with them in file; as their rear is clearing the left flank of the platoon, the commander ( who has shifted to this flank during the movement ) gives the words Halt, front, dress up, he instantly dresses them on the standing part of his platoon, and resumes his post on the right. -One third, or one more sub-division is added to the front of the company. If a battalion is standing in open column, it may thus increase the front of its; companies, before it
forms in line: -But if it is already in line, and is thus to increase its front, its companies must take sufficient intervals from each other, before their respective rear ranks can come up. If a battalion in line is posted, and without deranging its front is to lengthen out a flank by the aid of its rear rank, it would order that rank to wheel backwards by subdivisions: The last sub-division of each company would close up to its first one: All the sub-divisions ( on the head one ) would move forward to open
column: An officer would be named to command those of each two companies. The open column would move on, and wheel into line on the flank of the battalion. -In this manner also would a line of several battalions lengthen itself out by the rear ranks of each.

S.65. From two Ranks forming into three Ranks.
Fig. 9.
FORM THREE
DEEP.
RIGHT FACE.
QUICK MARCH.
Halt, front
The platoon being halted and told off into three sections, it receives the word FORM THREE DEEP; on which the third section instantly steps back one pace: the word RIGHT FACE is then given; and the man on the right of its front rank, on facing, disengages a little to his right; on the word QUICK MARCH, the front rank men of the third section step off, those of the other rank mark the time till they have passed, and then follow. -When the leading man has got to the right of the platoon, the commander gives the word, Halt, front, on which each man halts, faces to the left, and instantly covers his proper file leader.
A rear rank which has lengthened out and formed on the flank of its battalion, would return to its place by wheeling back into open column of sub-divisions; marching till each arrived at its flank

Also note that in the section noting the liste of exercises for the company there is:

"22. From 3 deep, form 2 deep.
23. From 2 deep, form 3 deep."

Note also about the battalion:

"FORMATION OF THE COMPANY.

The company as always to be sized from flanks to center.
The company is formed three deep.
……
Close order is the chief and primary order, in which the battalion and its parts at all times assemble and form. Open order is only regarded as an exception from it, and occasionally used in situations of parade and show……
…"

These regulations were first written in 1807 but were still in force in 1816 for sure and I don't know when they were superceded by a later edition. There is definite instructions on changing from 2 to 3 ranks and backwards and this was practiced and done at the company level.

My take on this is that most of the maneauvering was done with 3 ranks, because that is what is mainly described. When the small size of the unit or large size of ground to be covered in line, came up, there was an additional evolution in going from column to line ( this is well described in the regulations above ) , which shook out the third rank into an extension of the line. That is all is necessary to agree with the observation that "British troops fought in a 2-deep line". Everything then fits. The other movements were done with 3 ranks.

I cannot believe that there was a seperate, secret, never-documented procedure actually practiced where all the evolutions were done in the field with 2 ranks but were done with 3 ranks all other times. If so, then they must have had to practice for several weeks before taking to the field, so as to do this. Imagine the confusion!!! ( "Psssh are we doing the 2 rank or the 3 rank stuff right now? ) " I have never heard of these practice sessions. I will also have to wonder how British columns ( division wide, company( platoon ) -wide, or section wide ) could have traveled cross-country if they were 50% wider than then contemporaires….

Billsfan wrote:

My take on this is that most of the maneauvering was done with 3 ranks, because that is what is mainly described. When the small size of the unit or large size of ground to be covered in line, came up, there was an additional evolution in going from column to line (this is well described in the regulations above), which shook out the third rank into an extension of the line. That is all is necessary to agree with the observation that "British troops fought in a 2-deep line". Everything then fits. The other movements were done with 3 ranks.

The overwhelming body of evidence that is available shows that the British infantry in the Peninsula and at Waterloo were formed 2 deep (some doubling to 4 deep in the latter stages of Waterloo). They did not manoeuvre 3 deep and then form 2 deep. This is off topic, and much has been written about this is past threads on British 2 deep line if you search through the archives.

The time taken to form square would have greatly depended on the formation – not just whether the infantry were in line or column, but the type of column, either closed, quarter, half or full distance, would have made a huge difference.

Most wargames rules do not differential between the types of columns used on the battlefield. This is hardly surprising as playability would be greatly compromised by introducing such details, so a good compromise in a tactical set of rules would be half a move to form square from column and a full move to form square from line.

In reality, the British used the following methods to form square, both in drill and in action:

The quickest manoeuvre would have been from a close column to a closed square. This would have taken less than 10 seconds but resulted in a solid formation with little firepower on the flanks and presented a very dense
target for artillery. There are only a few examples of this formation being used in action.

The British preferred to manoeuvre in quarter distance columns when in the presence of enemy cavalry. Hollow square could be formed from this column in much less than 30 seconds. There are dozens of examples of this formation being used in action.

Half and full distance columns would have taken extra time to close the intervals to quarter distance before forming square, which could have doubled the time given above for the quarter distance column.

Forming square from line was a difficult and lengthy process, probably taking a couple of minutes if the methods in the drill book were followed. Also, the formed square would only have been 2 deep if the regulation manoeuvres were followed.

I have not found any references to British squares being formed from line in this manner in action and this is one area where it is perhaps better to look at the 1824 regulations, which proposed a more rapid means of forming a 4 deep square from a 2 deep line. The 1824 regulations also described how to form the emergency rallying square. There are a couple of examples of this formation being used by the British lines against cavalry in the Napoleonic era.

link

By 1824 it appears that the regulations were written with the default being a 2 rank formation, but still having references with how to form 3 ranks.

@CJA,

Not really.

Regulations are first a menu of battle drills that may be used in any particular tactical circumstance. Second they are a training manual containing a description of how these were done.

Using two ranks is an exception that became the norm for reasons that are still unclear as far as the Napoleonic Wars are concerned – for under strength units to cover a practical frontage is one, to make use of the muskets of the third rank is another – but it is wrong to say that its use is an example of ignoring the regulations.

If there was some kind of evolution in British regulations and instructions during the period it is not evident in any I have which cover the period 1792 to 1810. So the opportunity was there but not taken.

Two ranks was an option described in the regulations and is not off topic because the number of ranks may affect the speed at which evolutions are performed.

Like 1968billsfan I too cannot believe that undocumented alternatives exist for use in the field only.

Bill