"D'Erlon's dispositions at Waterloo" Topic

John, does this mean you have uncovered some interesting information on this subject?

Mike,

I have been collecting lots of French material which will, when published, call for a reappraisal of various aspects of Waterloo. The forthcoming Smoothbore Ordnance Journal, published by Ken Trotman books, and edited by Dr. Stephen Summerfield, has a whole feature on the artillery at Waterloo, a preview copy of which I have seen and highly recommend.

I should probably leave this response to John – but I believe his point is that the three maps illustrated in this thread, all represent the grand battery as being located on the ridgeline occupied by D'Erlon's corps. In reality the grand battery was advanced and arrayed on the spur to the southeast of La Haie Sainte. This placed the guns much closer to the Allied lines, and somewhat remote from D'Erlon's ridge. The intervening valley would would have been occupied by the limbers and caissons of the grand battery. This is very clearly represented in Mark Adkin's Waterloo companion.

npm

Ligniere,

No need to leave anything for me. You are absolutely correct in relation to the illustrated maps. However, I think the key element that has come to light in relation to the French artillery, and not just during the crisis of the battle after La Haie Sainte fell, is just how close they moved to the Allied line following the British cavalry charge.

John

John,
This must be reference to the forward movement of various battery's that came within a few hundred paces of the British center. Almost within musket range effectively. If these were horse batteries, it would be logical to assume they were batteries attached to III and IV Cavalry corps, who perhaps advanced, following the cavalry attacks of the earlier afternoon. The only other horse batteries, were located on the flanks, to the west of Hougoumont, or confronting the Prussians between Papelotte and Plancenoit, or in reserve with the Imperial Guard.

npm

Correct. I've got a couple of very interesting French accounts, one of which I've almost finished translating. I'll post an extract here as soon as it's complete. It should make interesting reading!

On the Napoleon Series forum there is now also a lengthy thread going on about the latest views on D'Erlon's attack.

1815fieldarmy.nl

My understanding of the position of the deployed grand battery is, that it was indeed deployed on the forward slope of the road running from La Belle Alliance towards Papelotte, and once the infantry had advanced a number of batteries on their own initiative moved forward to re-deploy on the small ridge immediately on the eastern side of the Brussels-Charleroi road and close to La Haye Sainte.
But the majority remained in their initial position.
This can also be retrieved through numerous Allied and Prussian accounts on the end of the battle, where they did indeed find numerous guns, caissons and equipment abandoned along the road from La Belle Alliance towards Papelotte; i.e. IMHO the position of the grand battery.

I never understood the loss of central gravity, brought upon by D'Erlon's attack. Irregardless of the minute formations his troops may have been in, it was his strategic attack that upsets me most. His attack should never have been frontal; it should have been at the right obligue and remained so until he could position at least one division outside the Allied line. In simpler terms, he should have outstretched the opposing force. Why the VI Corps had to totally repositioned to face Blucher is such a waste of time, when it could have easily moved forward to fill the hole left by D'Erlon. And who better than the Young Guard to engage La Haye Sainte? Just throwing my two cents worth in, realizing that opinions are like s; everyone has one…

I never understood the loss of central gravity, brought upon by D'Erlon's attack. Irregardless of the minute formations his troops may have been in, it was his strategic attack that upsets me most. His attack should never have been frontal; it should have been at the right obligue and remained so until he could position at least one division outside the Allied line. In simpler terms, he should have outstretched the opposing force.

Wellington held Papelotte and secured the Eastern edge of the battlefield.

In addition, if you spread too thin, it weakens your centre and that is an even bigger failing that committing a frontal attack.

n the Napoleon Series forum there is now also a lengthy thread going on about the latest views on D'Erlon's attack.

Do you have a link? That sounds like a fun discussion.

No sir, I don't have that link. Rememeber the center was held by the VI Corps and behind them was the Guard. Bypassing Papelotte with Durette's division was more along the lines of what I was thinking. Sliding the VI Corps alongside the I Corps provides quite a wide frontage. Remember, this battle started out traditionally, but quickly changed to a "do or die" situation with the arrival of the first Prussians, off in the distance. Napoleon's reserves were concentrated on the main road and I thought could have been better used moving forward.

I think the problem would be that Papelotte would function as another La Haye Sainte to impede the advance and the countryside to the east of Papelotte was broken and wooded and therefore difficult for formations to traverse.

Bypassing Papelotte would have been difficult; the terrain around it would have been difficult to manoeuvre in and then there is the problem of Frischermont, which is slightly east of Papelotte and would also have to be outflanked, pushing Durutte's attack even further off track.

If you stick VI corps alongside I corps, what do you do when the Prussians arrive? If you have not defeated the Allied army by that time and have had time and space to redeploy to face them, you are stuffed. Also, you have very little reserve if anything goes wrong, which was the situation anyway once the Prussians arrived.

But that is exactly what I was basing my arguement on. Time. The whole campaign was a roll of the dice from the beginning. Maybe had Waterloo been successful for the French, this would have given the Russians and Austrians time to rethink their plans.

As it was, the campaign required timing and audacity. Having been to Waterloo several times and walked the fields in the 80's and 90's, I do realize how unfavouable the terrain was for movement east of Papelotte for Durette. Still, an inclined march to the right with D'Erlon's Corps would give the appearance to the Allied troops on the ridge that the French were attempting to turn their flank. As VI Corps pulled up alongside I Corps, I envisoned D'Erlon then inclining left (much like the move made famous by Fredrick the Great). Head in one direction, then attack back in another.

In my mind 6 divisions on line rolling forward is one heck of an advantage. And when the first Prussians start arriving on the field, the battle becomes telescoped into one area and one area only: the occupation of the ridgeline at Mont St. Jean. This is not time to husband your reserves; rather, it is the final moment to strike before "Old Vorwarts" arrives in force. The moment that defines the campaign is when the VI Corps is pulled and shifted to fight the Prussians, and conduct a battle on two fronts. That is hardly audacious. Breaking the Allied line on D'Erlon's front would place a French force between Wellington and Blucher.

With a sense of urgency enhanced by the dark Prussian columns off in the distance, I think it was possible to roll Wellington's flank. Couldn't Napoleon then turn to deal with the Prussians?

Huevans011, I would appreciate the link you offered, if it is still available? Thank you in advance.

The moment that defined the campaign was when the Prussians decided to head for Wavre. After that, it was over. the idea of fighting a battle to destroy the Allied army and then turning to fight the Prussians just does not work. Napoleon would have had to destroy the Allies as he could not have turned to fight the Prussians leaving even a battered Allied army in his rear. The odds on destroying them in the time available were very poor indeed.

I also think that you are massively overestimating the ability of Napoleonic infantry to manouvre on a mud soaked field like Waterloo. The idea of I Corps dodging around the field is not really viable; If you have seen how small the area is, you should know how easily the Allies could see what the French were doing and you should also be aware of how slow movement was on the day.

You seem to assume that the best defensive commander in Europe would have fallen for such a scheme.

You should realy read the book by Bernard Coppens, called Waterloo les mensonges, there you will find plenty of food for thoughts.
Napoleon did not think that Wellington would offer battle at the 18th of Junne.
Napoleon did not think that the beaten Prussians would be ready to interfere before the 20th of June again.
The Prussians did surprise Napoleon when they attacked his right flank at about 16:30.
Wellington accepted only the battle because of the promised Prussian commitment, without the Prussians Napoleon would have won the battle.
The French did manoeuvre in the past well on mud soaked fields, as on Dresden 1813.

VW, if the Prussians surprised Napoleon by attacking his flank at 16:30, he must have been sufferning from amnesia or Alzheimers given that he knew of their presence at 13:00 and ordered Lobau to move to block them shortly after.

The French may have manouvered well at Dresden (although there is a lack of evidence for them perfoming the sort of manouvres proposed above) but that was on a far bigger field and the army of 1815 seems to have been a far more sluggish organisation that even that of 1813.

The problem with fighting the Allies and the Prussians consecutively on the Waterloo battlefield is that you have to either:

1. Defeat Wellington so thoroughly that there is no chance of him popping up behind you as you take on Blucher

or

2. Send a sizeable force to keep a defeated but not broken Wellington away while you deal with Blucher.

The former would seem to have been beyond the ability of the French command team given the resources and time available, while the latter would have reduced the force available to take on Blucher to a level that was non-viable.

Given the huge mistakes made by the French command at Waterloo, I suspect that they would not have won even if the Prussians had not turned up. If Wellington had still been clinging to his ridge at nightfall, Napoleon had lost as his campaign was built on speed and thoroughly defeating his enemies. Failure to do that would have ruined his plans and the morale of the army.

Once Blucher had escaped from what can laughingly be called the French "pursuit" after Ligny, it was all over for Napoleon. His force was split, neither wing was under the command of anyone who was showing any ability or flair and the Prussians had moved into the central position between the two wings, delaying one with a small force while marching on the main threat with the bulk of their army.

No amount of fancy manouvres against Wellington, even if they were possible, would have saved Napoleon.

By the way, whay assume that people have not read a certain book?

@Colinjallen

It was not assuming people having not read a certain book, just a recommendation.

It discusses for example why Napoleon lied to claim to have dedected the Prussians already at 13:00 – but he was surprised by them when Lobau was just starting to crush Wellington's center.

To finish off Wellingtons Army the unimaginative fighting of Napoleon ( I agree with that) would still have done it unless of course the Prussians would come up.

It was not only the escape of Blücher after Ligny, but to rally his army and bring it back already at the 18th to fight again – that was the miracle.

As written above, Napoleon claimed at the morning of the 18th of June that the Prussians wouldn't be ready to act before the 20th (and for that he just ignored them).

There could be some speculations for wargaming. Like Napoleon has really detected the Prussians at 13:00 and he movers Lobau in a good definsive position occupying the defiles at Lasne and the bois de Paris.

According to Prussian opinions a small force could have blocked their deployment for a very long time if those key positions would have been occupied by the French.

The Prussians would be blocked, in front of them Lobau, in the back Grouchy.

vW, it is known from several sources, not just Napoleon, that he was aware of the Prussians by about 13:00, hence the movement of Lobau. However, it is arguable if Lobau could have reached the Lasne in time given the location of the Prussians.

I am not sure on what basis you assume that Napoleon could have "finished off" Wellington given the performance of the French command. Finishing him off implies more than just causing him to withdraw from the ridge after nighfall and it is hard to see how Napoleon had the resources and the command ability, even with Lobau, to do that.

@Colinjallen
I have to disagree with you on that point, I am convinced that Napoleon wasn't aware of the Prussians at 13:00 – one of his big lies about the battle.

I looked into the subject – neither could he see from his point of view the Prussians at 13:00 at St. Lambert, neither was a black Prussian hussar captured (at least the 2nd Silesian hussars in the vanguard had a different uniform), neither there were any outposts to encounter the Prussians, not even in the bois de Paris.
The Prussians had time to deploy and they were afraid to be detected in their "vulnerable" approach.
In case Napoleon would have detected the Prussians at 13:00 why did he fail to do anything about it, the alledged cavalry sent forward, wasn't either, and Lobau according to himself and 2 of his staff officers was surprised at 16:00 by the Prussians. I would have at least suspected that Lobau would have been informed as soon as Napoleon was aware that the Prussians were arriving, but also Napoleon was surprised and did not believe at first that Prussian troops threatened his flank.

My basis to assume that Napoleon would have won – at 15:00 Napoleon comments very positivly how the battle is going and a French officer – talking to out posts at the right flank (who did not so far see the Prussians) remarks at 16:00 that the battle is won.

vW,
We will have to agree to disagree on what Napoleon knew when; my only questions for you on that topic are these:

1. Why did Napoleon deploy Lobau to face the Prussians before he was aware of their existence?

2. Why do others who were present also independently claim that the Prussian advance was known at about 13:00?

As for believing that Napoleon was winning at 15:00 because he said that he was, I cannot really formulate a sensible reply to that which will not sound utterly disrespectful.

I'm sorry gentlemen, but I have to also agree to disagree. Colinjallen, I agree with you that Napoleon was aware of the Prussians moving against him, early in the battle. There is no way thousands of Prussians could cross the plain undetected, for several hours. You are willing to accept the fact that the VI Corps could be redeployed in the mud, and move to face the Prussians, yet you say they were unable to maneuver half of that distance against Wellington's flank? And by flank, I don't mean the traditional definition. I meant an oblique march to the right to give the "impression" of moving to the flank. Expected to be seen by all, on the ridge. Only when VI Corps came on line with the Ist, would D'Erlon then order an "oblique left" attack. You are correct about the terrain, being undulated with woods, ravines, sunken roads and such, that would negate a traditional flank attack. I agree with that theory. All I am saying is that instead of just blindly throwing the Ist Corps into a frontal assualt, why not maneuver slightly to give the impression of moving to the flank, but then attack back into the center, now reinforced with VI Corps?

@colinjallen

Lobau was initially not deployed against the Prussians before he was surprised by their onslaught at about 16:00 – why should his staff officers claim so – if they weren't??

The Prussian advance was certainly known by Wellington but not by Napoleon.

All Prussian eye witnesses, being present on the spot agree that they were not observed by the French, that they could observe their rear, that no action before about 16:30 was happening.

Of course there were others present who did claim that they knew about the Prussians at about 13:00 – the intention is to cover up the huge mistake by Napoleon completly ignoring the Prussians as well as guarding his right flank very badly.
In case one is looking hard into those persons, their testimony will crumble and show that they lie.

„On la vue par ses réflexions au déjeuner du Caillou, Napoléon ne s'attendait pas du tout à la venue des Prussiens, qu'il jugeait impossible, ou, pour mieux dire, qu'il n'envisageait même pas. » Coppens p. 185
« Le général Müfling rapporte les paroles suivantes qui aurait été prononcées par Napoléon : « (…) l'armée prussienne est complétement battue ; elle ne peut se rallier en trois jours ; j'ai 75 000 hommes ; les Anglais en 50 000. ( 9, C.de W. Histoire de la Campagne 1815, Stuttgart et Tubingue 1817) » – Coppens p. 129
« Seul Jérôme Bonaparte ose hasarder l'hypothèse d'une jonction des alliés. Mais il n'est pas pris au sérieux : « la jonction des Prussiens avec les Anglais est impossible avant deux jours, après une bataille celle de Fleurus (Fußnote 11 – la bataille de Ligny) », répond l'Empereur, « suivis comme ils le sont pour un corps de troupes considérable ( 12, Foy dans Girod de l'Ain page 278). « – Coppens p. 129

Bülow : » l'ennemie se montrait d'une négligence incompréhensible et semblait ne faire aucune attention à notre existence. » – Coppens p. 237

« Le major prussien von Damitz , qui a écrit en 1837 d'après les souvenirs et papiers de général Grollmann, quartier-maître de Blücher, écrit : « Là, ou apercevait clairement les dispositions prises par les Français et les Anglais. Il ne parut pas un homme pour empêcher cette reconnaissance. » – Coppens p. 187

Un chef d'escadron du 7e hussards, Dupuy, placé à l'aile droite de l'armée raconte avoir vu Domon l'après-midi. Il n'était donc par partis reconnaître des troupes ennemies menaçant le flanc droit : « Jusque vers quatre heures, nous restâmes paisibles spectateurs de la bataille. Dans ce moment le général Domon vint à moi ; le feu des Anglais était à peu près cessé ; il me dit que l'affaire était gagnée, que l'armée ennemie était en retraite, que nous étions là pour faire jonction avec les corps de maréchal Grouchy et que nous serions le soir à Bruxelles, il partit. ( 9, Dupuy (Victoir) Souvenirs militaires, Paris 1892, page 290) » Coppens – p. 190

Le capitaine Coignet, attaché à l'état major général, écrit : « Il arrive un officier près de l'Empereur qui arrivait de notre aile droite disant que nos soldats battaient en retraite : « Vous vous trompez, lui dit l'Empereur, c'est Grouchy qui arrive. « Il ne croyait pas à un pareil contretemps. Il fit partir de suite dans cette direction pour s'assurer de la vérité. L'officier, de retour, confirma la nouvelle qu'il avait vu une colonne prussienne s'avancer rapidement sur nous et que nous soldats battaient en retraite. ( 1, Les cahiers du capitaine Coignet, Ed. Jean Mistler, Hachette, 1968) » Coppens – p. 237

Even Marbot – before paid by Napoleon

Laon, 26 juin 1815.
Je ne reviens pas de notre défaite!… On nous a fait manœuvrer comme des citrouilles. J'ai été, avec mon régiment, flanquer de droite de l'armée pendant presque toute la bataille. On m'assurait que le maréchal Grouchy allait arriver sur ce point, qui n'était gardé que par mon régiment, trois pièces de canon et un bataillon d'infanterie légère, ce qui était trop faible. Au lieu du maréchal Grouchy, c'est le corps de Blücher qui a débouché!… Jugez de la manière dont nous avons été arrangés!… Nous avons été enfoncés, et l'ennemi a été sur-le-champ sur nos derrières!… …
link

Le Prince von Thurn und Taxis, attaché militaire bavarois au quartier général du maréchal Blücher, écrit : « Le chemin descendait de façon abrupte d'une hauteur dans la vallée du ruisseau de la Lasne, puis immédiatement après avoir passé celui-ci, il remontait de façon aussi abrupte, il faut ajouter à cela que le chemin était très étroit et en mauvais état. Ce défilé nous retint de façon extraordinaire et nous eûmes une peine incroyable à faire monter l'artillerie sur la hauteur en question.
Un pétit détachement ennemie aurait pu nous disputer ici le passage toute la journée. ( 15, Thurn und Taxis (Prinz August von) Aus den Feldzügen 1812 bis 1815, Leipzig 1912) « Coppens p. 245

« Un peu plus tard, le comte de Lobau, commandant la droite à Waterloo, fit dire à l'Empereur qu'il était attaqué par les Prussiens. Napoléon ne voulait pas d'abord admettre que la chose fût possible. Lobau dit à M. de Caronne, un de ses officiers : « Faites un prisonnier et portez-le-lui, peut-être sera-t-il convaincu (…) ( 2, Bourdon de Vatry, cité dans les Mémoires du maréchal Grouchy, tome 4, 1874, page 108) » Coppens – p. 238

« Le colonel Jamin, sous – chef d'état-major du 6e corps écrit : « Le 6e corps se porte en avant pour soutenir l'attaque du centre à peine est-il arrivé sur la crête de ravin qui sépare les deux armées que son chef d'état-major, le général Durieux, qui l'avait devancé, revient blessé et annonce que de tirailleurs ennemies s'étendant sur notre flanc droit. Le comte de Lobau s'avance avec le général Jacquinot et moi pour le reconnaître, et bientôt nous voyons déboucher deux colonnes d'environ dix milles hommes chacune : c`´était le corps prussiens de Bulow. La destination du 6e corps se trouve changé par cet incident : il ne s'agissait plus de continuer l'attaque contre les Anglais, mais bien de repousser celle des Prussiens : en un mot par la force de choses nous étions réduits à la défensive la plus défavorable et dont le résultat n'était plus douteux. ( …) ( 8, Janin, Campagne de Waterloo ou Remarques critiques et historiques sur l'ouvrage du général Gourgaud, Paris 18120, page 35.) » Coppens – p. 242

Quant au Colonel Combes-Brassard, l'autre sous-chef d'état-major du 6e corps, il écrit : « Le 6e corps, formant la réserve, marcha pour soutenir l'attaque à droite. Ce corps était composé entièrement d'infanterie. Il était trois heures et demie, un feu infernal s'étendait sur toute la ligne des deux armées. Le 6e corps achevait de se déployer en réserve sur toute la droite de l'armée, lorsque, me rendant à la extrémité de notre droite, je reconnus des têtes de colonnes qui débouchaient du côté de Vavres, par Ohain et Saint-Lambert.
Ces colonnes étaient prussiennes. Leur arrivée se produisait sans que l'Empereur eût donné aucun ordre. Nous étions tournes. ( 9, Combes-Brassard. Notices sur la bataille de Mont-Saint-Jean (récit rédigé le 22 juin 1815, dans Souvenirs et Correspondance sur la bataille de Waterloo, Librairie historique Teissèdre, Paris 2000. ) » Coppens, p. 242

And again Thurn und Taxis

Thurn und Taxis zitiert aus :
Archivalische Beiträge zur Geschichte des Feldzugs 1815.
(16. bis 24. Juni 1815)
Von
Julius von Pflugk – Harttung
s. 608 bis 624

„Wenn man die Höhe erreicht hat, so befindet man sich am Eingang des Waldes von Frichermont, von dem Dorfe dieses Namens so genannt, das etwas weiter schon wieder abseits liegt, dessen Turm man durch ein Echappée de vue ganz deutlich sah, und welches wohl bemerkt, von feindlicher Infanterie besetzt war.
(maybe an error of thurn und taxis, I always assumed that some companies of Orange Nassau and not the French occupied this?
quellques compagnies de régiment Oranien Nassau occupaient le château de Fichermont, Waterloo 1815, Les Carnets de la Campagne No. 4, La Papelotte, p. 32)
Zu unserem Glücke war es der Wald aber nicht. Ja, es stand nicht einmal eine Vedette hier, und der Feldmarschall ließ denselben durch die zwei zuerst herangekommenen Bataillone ohne Schuß besetzen, so daß wir nun auch schon Meister der jenseitigen Débouchés waren. Allein auch mußten wir trachten in unserer verdeckten Aufstellung zu bleiben, da wir zu wenig Truppen hatten, um etwas zu unternehmen. Unsere ersten Plänkler fanden jenseits des Waldes eine Patrouille von 16 bis 20 Mann, die sich aber gleich nach dem Dorfe zurückzug, und unerklärlich genug, zeigte sich keine zweite." S. 618

Endlich, es war ungefähr ½ 5 Uhr, entschloss sich der Feldmarschall und General Bülow, die durch den ungefähr eine habe Stunde tiefen Wald
vorgegangen waren, von wo aus man die ganze Linie beobachten konnte, und denen es schien (wie es denn auch der Fall war),
dass der Feind einiges Terrain gewonnen, den Angriff zu unternehmen, obschon nur zwei Brigaden heran waren. – Ich glaube, es war Zeit.
Man fing sogleich an, eine Batterie durchfeuern zu lassen, damit der Herzog avisiert sein könnne, und unmittelbar darauf wurde vorgerückt.
Das Terrain steigt jenseits des Waldes wieder terrassenförmig in das Tal hinab, in welchem das Dorf Planchenoit liegt.
Eine feindliche Kavallerieabteilung von ca. 150 Pferden kam aus demselben gerade in diesem Moment die Höhe herauf,
wahrscheinlich um, (wozu es freilich nun etwas spät war) eine Rekognoszierung zu machen.
Selber mochte es etwas unerwartet sein, daß schon so viel Truppen von uns debouchiert hatten.
Sie stutzte und kehrte um, wir folgten, und bald öffnete sich die Gegend noch mehr für uns, im Verhältnis, als wir vom Plateau herabstiegen.
Wir hatten dicht vor uns Planchenoit, jenseits dieses Ortes erhebt sich das Terrain wieder bis zu der großen Strasse,
die von Quatre-Bras nach Brüssel führt und deren Direktionslinie uns jetztschon ganz deutlich bemerkbar war.
An dieser Chaussee befand sich ein fanalartiges Gerüst nahe bei einer Meierei, Belle Alliance genannt.
Hier konnten wir die feindliche Reserve in dichten Massen aufgestellt erblicken, nämlich sämtliche Garden und das 6.Korps.
Hier war es auch, von wo Napoleon bis dahin (und noch später, bis gegen 7 Uhr) die Schlacht beobachtet und geleitet hatte.
Wir waren so nahe, daß wir den Moment bezeichnen konnten, in welchem das 6.Korps rechtsum machte und,
um unserem Vorrücken Einhalt zu tun, sich auf Planchenoit in Bewegung setzte.
Wir befanden uns also in der rechten Flanke der feindlichen Reserven und folglich im Rücken seiner engagierten Truppen,
deren Feuerlinie zu unserer Rechten, freilich etwas weit, gut sichtbar war.
Ich glaube, daß in diesem Augenblick noch keine feindliche Infanterie in Planchenoit war,
und daß man die zunächststehenden 2 Bataillone hätte hineinwerfen können.
Allein selbe würden wahrscheinlich wieder vom Feinde herausgedrängt worden sein, da wir sie noch nicht gehörig hätten soutenieren können.
Man begnügte sich also für den Moment, ein starkes Geschützfeuer in das eben vom Feinde besetzt werdende Dorf zu etablieren.
Kurz hierauf, es mochte nahe an 6 Uhr sein, als unsere Kolonnen eben anfingen, endlich in größerer Anzahl aus dem Walde hervorzukommen,
traf eine wenig erfreuliche Meldung von General Thielmann ein, daß er im Moment, wo er sich angeschickt, unserer Direktion zu folgen,
von einem bedeutenden feindlichen Korps heftig angegriffen worden, so zwar, daß man sich schon um den Besitz von Wavre schlage,
und er demnach um Sukkurs bitte."

"One sees by his reflections at the lunch of Caillou, Napoleon did not expect at all the arrival of the Prussians, he thought it impossible, or, rather, he did not even consider it."

General Müfling reports the following words which were spoken by Napoleon: "(…) the Prussian army was completely defeated, and cannot rally in three days: I have 75,000 men, the English 50,000.

"Only Jerome Bonaparte dared venture the hypothesis of a junction of the allies. But it was not taken seriously: "the junction of the Prussians with the English is not possible two after days after such a battle as Fleurus (fussnote 11 – the battle of Ligny)," replied the Emperor, "pursued as they are by a considerable body of troops" (I'm not 100% certain on this last bit).

Bülow: "the enemy showed incomprehensible negligence and seemed to pay no attention to our existence.

Prussian Major von Damitz, who wrote in 1837 based on the memories (memoirs?) and papers of General Grollmann, Quarter Master for Blücher, writes: "There, they clearly perceived the dispositions of the French and the English. Not a single man appeared to prevent this reconnaissance. "

A squadron commander of the 7th Hussars, Dupuy, placed on the right wing of the army tells of seeing Domon in the afternoon. (Il n'était donc par partis reconnaître des troupes ennemies menaçant le flanc droit – I don't get the first bit of this sentence – but might mean (Enemy reconnaissance parties were not menacing the right flank): "For about four hours we remained quiet spectators of the battle. At this moment General Domon came to me, the fire of English was almost stopped, and he told me that the thing was won, that the enemy was retreating, we would link up with the corps of Grouchy and that we would be in Brussels in the evening, then he departed."

Captain Coignet, attached to the General Staff, wrote: "It happened that an officer near the Emperor had arrived from our right, saying that our soldiers are retreating:" You are mistaken, 'said the Emperor, it is Grouchy arriving. "He did not believe in such a setback. He sent him away in that direction to ensure the truth. The officer returned, confirmed the news that he had seen a Prussian column move quickly on us and that our soldiers were retreating."

I can not get over our defeat! … We manoeuvred like pumpkins. I was with my regiment, on the right flank of the army for most of the battle. I was assured that Marshal Grouchy would come to this point, which was guarded by my regiment, three guns and a battalion of light infantry, which was too few. Instead of Grouchy, Blucher's was the Corps which came! … Judge the manner in which we had been arranged! … We were broken, and the enemy was on the spot in our rear!

Prince von Thurn und Taxis, Bavarian military attaché at the headquarters of Marshal Blücher, wrote: "The path descended steeply to a height in the valley of the Lasne stream, then immediately after it this, it rose abruptly; it must be added that the road was very narrow and in poor condition. The defile kept us in an extraordinary way and we had incredible difficuty getting artillery onto the heights in question.
A small detachment enemy sent here could have disputed our passage with us all day.

A little later, Count Lobau, commanding the right to Waterloo, sent word to the Emperor that he had been attacked by the Prussians. Napoleon did not want to admit that this thing was possible at first. Said M. de Lobau Caronne, one of his officers: "Take a prisoner and bring him to him, maybe he will be convinced then(…)

Colonel Jamin – Chief of Staff of the 6th Corps wrote: "The Sixth Corps went forward to support the attack in the centre and had just reached the crest of the ravine which separated the two armies when the Chief of Staff, General Durieux, who had preceded him, returned wounded and announced that enemy skirmishers were extending (enveloping?) our right flank. Count Lobau went forward with me and Jacquinot to reconnoitre, and soon we saw two columns of about ten thousand men each: it was the Prussian Corps of Bulow. The destination (mission?) of the Sixth Corps was changed by this incident: it was no longer to continue the attack against the English, but to repel the Prussians – in a word by the force of circumstance we were reduced to the east favourable defence and the result was no longer in doubt(…)

As Colonel Combes-Brassard, another Deputy Chief of Staff of the 6th Corps, wrote: "The 6th Corps, forming the reserve, marched to support the attack on the right. This body was composed entirely of infantry. It was half past three, a hellish fire extended across the line of the two armies. The 6th Corps achieved its redeployment from reserve to deploy onto the right of the army, when, I rode to the end of our right flank, I recognized the heads of columns emerging from the side of Vavres by Ohain and Saint-Lambert.
These columns were Prussian. The Emperor had given no orders concerning their arrival. We had been outflanked.

My German is even more awful than my French, so the last bit is beyond me.

I have to stop at this point and offer a little insight. Much has been made of what we were all taught in school, however accurate. When I attended junior high in the North, the American Civil war was taught. When I attended junior high in the South, however, the American Civil war was skipped as a "moment of inconvience" in our history.

I recommend reading an excellent book titled Waterloo by Alfred A. Knopf. It first explores what all three nationalities teach children about Waterloo. To the French, Napoleon lost because he was betrayed. To the English, it was the steadiness of the "thin red line" that held the French back, and won the day. To the Germans, it was "thank Goodness we showed up, or the English would have lost the day". The last chapter deals with the battle as clearly told as possible.

There is no possible way that Blucher's arrival surprised Napoleon; only the timing. It's just not physically possible to march 40,000 men over an open plain and not be discovered, in the middle of the day.

@Davout 1792

Yes it is possible, visit the battle field, go to the spot where Napoleon was – then you realize that it is topographically impossible to see the Prussians. All Prussian reports agree that there were no outposts nothing – confirmed by French reports as well.
Napoleon was not aware of the Prussians till they attacked, the rest is a cover up story.
Napoleon as most officers of the French army even confused buildings on the battle field, when they talk of Mont St. Jean, they mean La Haye Sainte, they did not realize the chateau of Hougoment etc..
Bülow entered the fight with only two brigades – about the equivalent of 2 divisions, no way near to 40.000 soldiers, the march was concealed, as Blücher has ordered it – and in fact success – a total surprise.
Otherway how can it be explained that Lobau was surprised at 16:30 by the Prussians – when Napoleon supposedly knew about it??

@Whirlwind
Thank you for your translation efforts, seemingly in vain, when reading Davout1792

Napoleon as most officers of the French army even confused buildings on the battle field, when they talk of Mont St. Jean, they mean La Haye Sainte, they did not realize the chateau of Hougoment etc..

It was my understanding that the French Imperial Headquarters were using the Ferraris maps during the campaign. Those clearly indicate, and name, Chateau d'Hougoumont, Ferme de la Haye Sainte and Ferme de Mont St.Jean, locating them accurately in relation to one another. So I would be surprised if IHQ were confused at the time of the battle – maybe memory failed them in subsequent years, or it served their purpose to misidentify the properties. The maps are fairly accurate as to the road networks and arable land, not so much when it comes to the wooded areas on the physical battlefield.

npm

@ Ligniere

It is pretty evident in the battle reports that they confused the names, when attacking La Haye Saint they thought they would attack Mont St. Jean, all clearly and convinvingly layed out in the lovley mensonges or the Carnets de 1815

To backtrack a bit after reading this thread, I find D'Erlon's deployment odd in some respects according to his battle array.

He had his corps arrayed on the left, with the divisions 1, 2, 3, and 4 facing the British. But the brigades of the first division were arrayed on the right, the first two brigades were arranged so, first brigade on the right:

55 105
54 28

That array would necessarily fold out into a line of battalions:

54 55 105 28

with the first brigade on the right, the columns folding out on the center like a typical attack column, leaving the expected array. However, typically, a line of divisions would deploy [unfold] in the direction away from the lead/1st division, with the line lengthening towards the high numbered division… which would make sense as the I Corps would have the First Division on the left up against the road and the II Corps deploying in the direction of the Army's flank right of the 4th Division.

The problem that I can see from the maps is that the Divisions didn't have the space to deploy between them, at least not the First Division, so was what did D'Erlon see his divisions doing in that formation and array?

Bill

I had always assumed D'Erlon deployed left in front because Durutte's 4th Division was several hours behind the remainder of I Corps and to have deployed in the traditional right in front manner would have left a gap between the left flank of Marcognet's 3rd Division and the Brussels-Charleroi road.

As for the internal array, what's your source for this? Apart from Adkin (who I don't think did any original research on this) I am only aware of the map in de Bas & de Wommerson that shows this and no sources are stated here either (unless I have missed them).

Allan

Allan:

;-7 My source was a previous post by Michael W. early on.

De Bas has the most detail. He has Charlet's Brigade attacking La Haye Sainte with the 55e in front and the 54e behind (with Bourgeois' brigade on the right, with the 105e in front and the 28e behind it). I think Margerit, who was in Durutte's division I believe, has one battalion of the 54e held back in reserve, and the brigade rallied on that battalion.

IF that is accurate, it says something about D'Erlon's plans for his attack. Having the the Corps deploy with the First Division on the right wouldn't have been all that much of a problem. The entire French army was around the center… not much of a gap, and of course, the 4th Division was there for the battle.

No, I have found that the array tells you something about what was planned because it tells you what the formations allowed the divisions to do in deploying. The mixture of fromations is different in comparison to most French arrays.

Bill