"French En-Masse Tireureurs at Waterloo" Topic

It seems when elements of the D'Erlon's I corps returned to the fight later in the day they swarmed at the center of the Anglo-Allied line in mass Tireurur order. Jac Weller refers to this as an "Tireureurade" and it seems to have been used after the fall of Le Haye Sainte in the center. It nearly succeeded in crumbling the Allied line. Lord W had to bring up the Brunswickers to deal with it, and also formed some remaining British battalions into 4 rank lines to dual it out with the Tireureurs. One would assume that the morale of the French I Corps was so shaken that they only seemed able to fight in this loose formation, and I guess this was why the allied linear formations were able to best them because of their low morale. Comments?

Last futile gesture in the face of imminent defeat? The French command could only get relatively few men to advance so the formation looked as if it was in Tireurur order? An attempt to draw troops away from the area between Hougomont and la Haye Sainte to prepare for the Guard, and to prevent the Anglo-Allied joining up effectively with the closing Prussians?

I believe the French used this tactic at other times: en debande(?).

Clearly a swarm of tirailleurs could be effective & it does point the way from massed ranks to the more modern method of dispersing infantry.

I could not say if this was done because D'Erlons men were not capable of being rapidly re-formed or if it was intentional.

"Futile gesture"? Even Wellington admitted he was close to defeat. I'm not sure if victory would have benefittef the French much so, maybe "futile".

One would assume that the morale of the French I Corps was so shaken that they only seemed able to fight in this loose formation, and I guess this was why the allied linear formations were able to best them because of their low morale. Comments?

That is a common assumption, but the French never deployed large-scale skirmishing because their morale was low or they were incapable of any other formation because they are so shaken. During the first years of the Revolution 1792-94 maybe, but even that was not experienced, trained infantry.

Bill

Never say never:

link

Oliver:

Those troops weren't trained French troops, let alone trained troops who were shaken or suffering low morale.

They were the newly formed Legion du Nord. They were German and Polish infantry who didn't know the French drill. Coqueugniot threw them out as skirmishers because they couldn't do anything else.

It is a great example of untrained troops being used en masse to skrimsh, though.

Bill

If your goal is to tie up enemy troops without incurring large casualties, this sounds like the way to do it. The threat has to be serious enough to keep the enemy commanders focussed on their own front, and last long enough that they can't draw off their reserves to the real threat. Seems like a logical tactic to me.

The units that deployed in open or skirmish order (en tirailleur) at Waterloo after the failure of the French cavalry charges are substantial. They also achieved much success against the allied center in cooperation with artillery that was aggressively moved forward, sometimes to within 100 yards of the allied line. Generally speaking, the French not only won the skirmisher fight, but they were starting, together with the supporting close-range artillery fire, to shoot the allied line to pieces. It was during this period that Wellingtonn was running out of troops to patch his shattered line and supposedly made the comment 'night or the Prussians.' What he did order was to fight to the last man. That clearly demonstrates the success the French were achieving with large numbers of infantry, both line and light, deployed as skirmishers in large units, or 'en grandes bandes.'

Further, the skirmish swarms were supported by troops in formation as well as reformed cavalry, both light and heavy, who would force the allied infantry to remain in square or be ridden down, as Ompteda's brigade of the KGL was by French cuirassiers, losing a color and an entire battalion, the 8th, nearly annihilated.

As John Elting writes in Swords Around A Throne on page 535: 'French veterans used the same tactic [clouds of aggressive skirmishers] at Waterloo with mounting success, but unfortunately were able to do it only after Ney had wasted the French cavalry.'

In somewhat more detail, and in a summary of what was written on the subject by Siborne, Ropes, and Houssaye as noted below, Col Elting writes in A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars 'All along Wellington's left flank and center, clouds of French skirmishers, supported by aggressively handled guns, worked up onto the plateau in snarling, short-range fighting. A few cuirassier squadrons followed, forcing the Anglo-Dutch to stay massed in squares, or riding them down if they deployed. Kempt was battered; Ompteda was dead and his brigade shattered; Kruse wavering; French guns were demolishing Kielmansegge's ruined brigade at 100-yard range. Stalemated around Chateau Goumont, the French bypassed it to the west, driving in Clinton's right flank. Counterattacks by the Brunswickers and Kruse's Nassau contingent collapsed. Even English regiments faltered, having 'fed death' almost beyond endurance. The British and German cavalry sacrificed itself vainly; Dutch-Belgian cavalry refused to charge; a Hanoverian hussar regiment ran away…'

‘La Haye Sainte was in the hands of the enemy; also the knoll on the opposite side of the road; also the garden and ground on the Anglo-Allied side of it; Ompteda's brigade was nearly annihilated, and Kielmansegge's so thinned that those two brigades could not hold their position. That part of the field of battle, therefore, which was between Halkett's and Kempt's right, was unprotected; and being the very center of the Duke's line of battle, was consequently that point, above all others, that the enemy wished to gain. The danger was imminent; and at no other period of the action was the result so precarious as at this moment. Most fortunately Napoleon did not support the advantage his troops had gained at this point by bringing forward his reserve; proving that he did not exert that activity and personal energy in superintending and conforming to the progress of the action, which he ought to have done.'
-Sir James Shaw-Kennedy, staff officer of the 3d Division.

John C. Ropes, writing in his study of the Waterloo campaign, comments on the above quotation:

‘As to this last observation, we have just seen how the Emperor was employed during this critical period of the action. He was in truth fighting another battle with inferior forces against the Prussians, and this, too, at a distance of a mile and a half from the English line of battle. The criticism of Napoleon is therefore unfounded; it is simply die to the fact that his occupations during this period of the battle was not borne in mind by General Shaw-Kennedy. But the fact remains; if there had been no other battle to fight,-no desperate action at Plancenoit, requiring the presence and personal direction of the Emperor,-if the attack upon the allied lines could have been made under the eye and direct orders of Napoleon himself,-in the opinion of Kennedy, whose account of the battle is one of the best we have, it would have gone hard with Wellington's army. Add to this, that if there had been no other battle to fight, the Emperor could have brought 16,000 fresh men to bear upon this exhausted force of Wellington's. It should be added, also, that the English heavy cavalry of Somerset and Ponsonby, which had been well nigh exhausted by their charges at the beginning of the action, and had suffered more or less during the afternoon, were not able to render efficient service at the close of the day.'
Ropes, The Campaign of Waterloo, 313.

Regarding French skirmishers and what they accomplished after the French cavalry charges:

‘Nevertheless, the English, Hanoverian, Nassau, and Brunswick troops had suffered severely; obliged to remain in squares for fear of the repeated irruptions of the French cavalry, they presented an easy mark to the French infantry skirmishers of Donzelot's division, which with a portion of Quiot's was finally brought over from the east side of the turnpike, as well as to the artillery from the French main position, which, necessarily silent while the cavalry were on the plateau, constantly recommenced it fire as soon as the cavalry retired down the slope, as was done many times during those two hours. In fact, this part of the allied line was finally weakened so much that it was very near giving way, as we shall shortly see. At one time, all the troops for nearly a mile and a half to the west of the Brussels pike had retired from exhaustion, and in disorder, and the Duke himself had to lead up fresh troops to take their places.'
Ropes, 310.

The following excerpts are from William Siborne's History of the Waterloo Campaign:

‘Exposed as Alten's division had been to the most furious assaults of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, the British and German brigades of which it was composed had become awfully diminished; and the facility which the possession of La Haye Sainte now afforded the French for continuing their desperate endeavors to force that part of the allied line, rendered the situation of these troops extremely critical.'
Siborne, 313.

‘When…the Duke beheld his line so fearfully reduced in numbers, which he had no means of replacing, and which the indomitable courage of his British and German troops alone had hitherto been able to supply, it is not surprising that he should have manifested some little impatience for the arrival of that portion of the Prussian forces which was to cooperate more immediately with his own army. The latter…presented but a mere wreck of that proud array which it had displayed in the morning….Exposed, however, as they had been for so many hours to a tremendous cannonade, which only ceased at times but to give place to attacks of cavalry and musketry, their exemplary passive forbearance seemed, in some instances, to be approaching its utmost limits. Frequent messages reached the Duke from commanding officers, soliciting reinforcements and support, since their corps were reduced to skeletons; but the only reply they received was, that no reinforcements could be granted, and that they must hold their ground to the last man.'
Siborne, 326-327

‘In all three arms of the service the losses had been awfully severe. Battalions dwindled to mere handfuls of men, were commanded either by captains or subalterns. A vast number of guns along the whole extent of the line had been disabled. The British and German cavalry brigades, with the exception of Vivian's and Vandeleur's on the left, were reduced to less than the ordinary strength of regiments-Somerset's and Ponsonby's brigades united did not comprise two squadrons.'
Ropes, 327.

‘Whilst the Imperial Guard was forming for attack, the French troops in possession of La Haye Sainte and its inclosures, now consisting of the entire of Donzelot's division, from the left of d'Erlon's corps, renewed, with redoubtable vigour, their assault upon the center of the allied line; the object being evidently either to force that point previously to the arrival of the Guard on its left, and thus facilitate the assault to be made by the latter, or to harass it in such a manner that, should the effort of the Guard prove successful, they would be enabled completely to overthrow the allied center. The fire from the skirmishers that had located themselves between the farm and the position, and from those on the knoll by the sandpit, on the opposite side of the high road, had been incessant since the capture of that post. Ompteda's brigade of the King's German Legion, which had hitherto occupied the hollow-way that descends into the chaussee, was reduced to a mere handful of men: the two squares in which Kielmansegge's Hanoverian brigade, the next on the (allied) right, had stood its ground so many hours, were fearfully diminished; Kruse's Nassau brigade, still further to the right, formed in three contiguous columns, (two in front and one in rear) began to evince symptoms of hesitation; and the interval between this and Halkett's British brigade had become much greater than was consistent with the due security of this part of the line. So weakened indeed was the latter at this period, that, to remedy the evil in some degree, it had been deemed advisable, with a view rather of giving it the appearance of greater strength than of affording any very active support, to draw close up in its rear, the skeleton remains of the Scots Greys and the 3d Hussars of the KGL. On the allied left of the high road, an unremitting fire was maintained against their opponents by the 95th and 4th British regiments in extended order along the front hedge of the Wavre road, commencing from the Charleroi chaussee, as also from the 40th, 79th, 1st, and 28th British regiments, deployed behind the embanked hedge on the rear side of that road. The 27th British regiment had been brought up by Lambert, and posted in square, in the angle formed by the junction of the above roads, having one face parallel with, and close to, the chaussee, for the purpose either of throwing a flank fire upon the French troops on the opposite side, should these succeed, as appeared very probable, in compelling Ompteda's and Kielmansegge's brigades to retire, or, of pouring a close, deadly volley upon any column endeavoring to penetrate along the high road itself. The artillery on the allied right of the high road, in front of these brigades, was at this moment completely disabled. Two British artillerymen were observed vainly endeavoring to serve a couple of guns, but were compelled to desist from the want of all materials for loading.'
Siborne331-332

‘Such was the state of things in the center of the Anglo-allied army, when the continued popping fire from the French skirmishers quickened into a fierce tiraillade, which threatened to bear down everything opposed to it. The bank along the high road, beyond the garden of La Haye Sainte, and the mound adjoining it, which latter was quite close to the allied position, became all at once thickly crowded with skirmishers. Those that lined the banks seemed intent upon keeping down the fire from the British regiments of Kempt's and Lambert's brigades, along the Wavre road, while those under cover of the little mound in advance, as if aware of the object of the formation of the 27th British regiment, and sensible of the necessity of securing their right flank in their meditated forcing of the position, opened such a close, sharp, fire upon that regiment, that, within the brief space of a few minutes, it lost more than half its numbers. At the same time, taking advantage of the crippled state of the allied artillery in this quarter, the French brought up two guns in advance of the north-western angle of the garden of La Hay Sainte, in which position they were covered from any fire from the opposite side of the high road, by the skirmishers occupying the bank and the mound. From these guns a smart fire of grape was opened, and maintained without intermission, upon the left square of Kielmansegge's brigade, (consisting of the field battalions of Grubenhagen and York) at the short distance of 150, and afterwards of scarcely 100, paces. The square manifested the most exemplary submission and forbearance in its ranks; not venturing to reply to the fire, by the apprehension of cavalry being under the brow of that position, prepared to take instant advantage of any favorable opportunity for a charge. The right square (consisting of the field battalions Bremen and Verden) also suffered most severely. Some other guns, which had accompanied the columns in rear of the French skirmishers, were suddenly brought forward, and opened so destructive a discharge of grape upon this latter square, that one of its sides was literally completely blown away; the remainder being left standing in the form of a triangle. The commander, and many other officers, were wounded. The ammunition was failing rapidly. The combined fire of grape and musketry continued to increase in violence; and the square finally dwindled into a mere clump of men. The French tirailleurs continued pressing forward in a very compact line, whilst the sound of drums beating the pas de charge announced the advance of the columns immediately to their rear. The Prince of Orange, perceiving the probability of the center of the allied line being forced, unless some great effort were made to check the enemy's advance, ordered the 1st and 2d Nassau battalions of Kruse's brigade to charge, gallantly placing himself at their head. His Royal Highness was soon struck by a bullet in the left shoulder; the attack failed; and the Nassauers were falling back, when the reinforcement which Wellington provided for this part of the line, consisting of five battalions of Brunswick infantry, moved rapidly into the interval between Kruse's Nassau, and Halkett's British, brigade. But so unexpectedly did the Brunswickers find themselves placed under a most destructive fire, and so suddenly were the heads of their columns assailed, that they were unable, in the midst of the thick smoke in which they became involved, to recover from the partial irregularities by which, under such circumstances, their advance was accompanied, and to form up in sufficient order, before they came in close contact with the enemy, whose vigorous attack compelled them, as also Kruse's Kielmansegge's, and Ompteda's brigades, to fall back about a hundred paces.'
Siborne, 332-333.

The following is from Henry Houssaye's Napoleon and the Campaign of 1815 Waterloo:

‘Ney immediately posted a mounted battery upon a mound near La Haye Sainte and pushed forward a regiment to the sandpit, which was once more abandoned by the English 95th. In these two positions the gunners fired at a distance of less than 300 yards, the tirailleurs at less than 80, upon the very center of the enemy's line. Supported by this fire, which made a breach for them, the remainder of the divisions of Allix, Donzelot, and Marcognet ascended on either side of the farm as far as the Ohain road. The enemies shot at each other through the hedges, from the banks, and attacked with their bayonets. Ompteda meanwhile, with the 5th and 8th battalions of the KGL on the main road delivered a counterattack which at first was crowned with success. A bullet brought him to the ground under his horse, mortally wounded. The 5th battalion fell back. The 8th, which was in advance of it, was exterminated by a squadron of cuirassiers. Its flag was taken; its chief, Colonel Shrader, killed; thirty men alone escaped from the sabers.'
Houssaye 216-217

‘The enemy's left center (brigades Kempt, Pack, Lambert, Best, and Winke) still held firm; but on the extreme left, the Nassau troops of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar were for the second time driven out of Papelotte by the division of Durutte, and on the right center, the Anglo-allies were wavering and their strength almost spent. The ammunition gave out, the guns were dismounted, others were left without a gunner. The Prince of Orange and General Alten, both of them wounded, quitted the battlefield; Colonels Gordon and De Lancy-Evans, aides-de-camp to Wellington, were killed. The cavalry brigades under Somerset and Ponsonby, were reduced together to two squadrons; the Ompteda brigade had now only a mere handful of men; the Kielmansegge brigade fell back behind Mont St Jean; the Kruse brigade gave way…Everywhere the ranks were thinning, the wounded were numerous, and numerous also were the men who went off with them under the pretext of carrying them to the ambulances. Disorder appeared even in the dauntless brigade of Colin Halkett, where a battalion found itself under the command of a mere lieutenant. The standards of the 30th and 73d were prudently sent to the rear.'
Houssaye, 217.

‘'The center of the line was left open' said an aide-de-camp of General Alten. ‘We were in peril. At each moment the issue of the battle was more than doubtful.' In spite of his accustomed confidence, Wellington became uneasy. He could see plainly the black masses of Blucher's troops assaulting the flank of the French army, but he himself was without any support. He was heard to murmur: ‘Night or the Prussians must arrive.'…But his resolution was in nowise daunted. Officers arrived to him from every side, describing the situation as desperate, and asking for fresh orders. There was no other order but to stand firm to the last man.'
Houssaye, 217-218

‘On the left, the struggle continued around Hougoumont, in flames; the position was stomed by one of Jerome's brigades; the French sharpshooters, supported by Pire's lancers, had passed beyond the Nivelles road. In the center, above La Haye Sainte, from which the enemy was at last expelled, the soldiers of Donzelot, Allix, and Marcognet crowned the ridges and vigorously drove the English along the Ohain road. In the valley the six regiments of Bachelo and Foy had rallied, with the debris of the cavalry.'
Houssaye, 221.

All of this evidence from creditable secondary sources, based on primary source material and well-documented as such, clearly demonstrates that at the period of the battle noted, the French infantry fought in large skirmisher swarms, supported by artillery and cavalry and put the issue of the battle in doubt.

Using skirmishers did not usually mean one company in front of a battalion, especially for the French. The French deployed whole battalions, regiments, and in this case large portions of infantry divisions in open order to fight as skirmish swarms, which in this form is a primary maneuver unit, the skirmishers in the attack as whole units supported by artillery and cavalry, as well as other infantry units in formation, probably battalion columns.

Sincerely,
Kevin

What a great read that was. Thanks Kevin.

I was waiting for you to turn up, Kevin.
I know this is a particular area of interest for you & your reply did not disappoint.

Thank you for those excellent accounts, Kevin. But the question I would raise is whether those French infantry units would have been better deployed in formation and used to drive back Wellington's line.

When the final attack by the Garde was made, the French had only 5 bns (IIRC) available for a formed attack and this was not sufficient to break the Allied line.

I do believe that the French reverting to the older and tried system of combinations of formed units and those deployed as skirmishers, integrally supported by artillery well forward was working. With these methods Wellington's line was being shot to pieces and he was running out of reserves.

I found one comment by an allied officer that if the Guard had attacked a half hour earlier than it did, it would have punched through and broken the allied line.

Two things about the Guard attack. First, the attack was not coordinated properly and instead of hitting the allied line together, there were actually four separate attacks with the five battalions that did attack (two of them had linked up during their advance). The 3,000 Guardsmen faced about 8,000 allies, and the issue was in doubt. The fighting was nothing like it was shown in the movie Waterloo. The fighting was quite savage and Maitland was actually driven back during the action.

Second, Ney led the attack along the same track he had led the cavalry, and not where the allied line was weakest because of the heavy fighting with the French using swarms of skirmishers. If the Guard battalions had acted en masse and hit a little earlier and in the weakest place, which I believe was the intent, the outcome could have been different.

During this period in the battle the French tactics being employed were correct and were working. And it was usual practice for French commanders to have their first line deployed as a heavy skirmish line backed up by formed units, just as the French attacks with skirmisher swarms were doing. It was both effective and deadly. The mention more than once of the allied artillery being out of action is also noteworthy.

Sincerely,
Kevin

Max and Ochoin,

Glad to help and hopefully contribute. And many thanks for the gracious compliments-they are most appreciated.

Sincerely,
Kevin

I'm sorry Kevin, I couldn't disagree more. The story of Waterloo is one of consistent French failure – nothing they did worked.

Regards

@Waterloo7171

Yes to your suggestion, passages preceding the one quoted by Kevin in Siborne make clear that Ney was adopting a tirailleur 'line' to overcome his lack of unbroken/surviving infantry, as a way to try and attrit the Allies. Reading the whole of Siborne on this is well worth it, to show that the idea of the French simply adopting skirmisher formation and shooting the whole allied line to bits is an over-simplification.

IIRC Major Snort has previously posted some interesting stuff on this topic. I'll try and find the thread.

Regards

Here it is, from this thread TMP link :

Just to illustrate how Siborne saw swarms of skirmishers everywhere, whilst those who were there sometimes thought they saw something quite different, the advance of Adam's brigade against what was perhaps Foy and Bachelu is a good example.

Siborne's account of Adam's attack can be found on p301-302. It is clearly based on the accounts of Adam himself and Captain Eeles. Adam simply states that the attack was directed on a body of French infantry, but Eeles is far more specific:

"The brigade continued to advance through the smoke until it passed beyond the crest of the British position; on the smoke clearing away, the 71st Regiment, with whom my company was acting, found itself in column very close to and in front of a large body of the enemy's infantry, formed in line and dressed in grey greatcoats. The 71st immediately formed line, and I placed my company of rifles on the right of that regiment. I can only observe here that the French and 71st were closer than I ever before saw any regular formed adverse bodies, and much closer than troops normally engage. The French opened a heavy fire on the 71st, who, neverthless, completed their formation in the most regular and gallant style."

Siborne junior notes in the margin: "Most probably a dense line of skirmishers".

I'll leave you to make up your own mind here.

Regards

Same as a "Death*w*a*n*k*e*r", only spelled funny.

LT

The above posting is not mine.

Sincerely,
Kevin

WW,

This describes fighting during the French cavalry attacks and addresses actions around Hougoumont, not on the allied left and center, which the other accounts do and those are after the French cavalry attacks.

So, the action that you're describing is not the same one that is being addressed both by the opening question on the thread and what is being described in Siborne, Ropes, Houssaye and Col Elting in the material already presented.

Your conclusion is therefore based on an entirely different episode in the battle, not the one in which the French were successful after the failure of the cavalry attacks and which nearly broke the allied center, driving back counterattacks by the Nassauers and Brunswickers, as well as citing Wellington as ordering his men to fight to the last man-definitely an admission of if not defeat, but near-defeat.

What the section of Adams' brigades attack/advance is that the French were fighting in swarms of skirmishers and they were not remnants, but formed units deployed in open formation that were still capable of fighting in line or column.

Further, in the passage you quote, there is no conclusion to the action, merely the recognition of how close and desperate the fighting was. It does confirm that the French fought in a heavy skirmish line, however.

Do you have any of the books to hand?

Sincerely,
Kevin

I think that the issue revolves too much about a discussion between the morale of the whole 1st Corps commanded by Comte d'Erlon and the effective contribution of the large skirmisher swarms. Durutte's division wasn't involved in the intial setback and kept on fighting around the farms of La Haye and Papelotte all day, and was quite effective in contesting the ground here with Sachsen-Weimar's brigade of Nassau soldiers, until eventually the matter was solved by the arrival of Zieten's Prussian troops.
Likewise Marcognet's 3rd French Division kept active against the left flank all day.
So the skirmisher swarms were most likely only those from the 1st and 2nd French Divisions, and these were indeed very effective when the farm of La Haye Sainte was captured and these troops were able to dislodge the defenses on the ridge top with effective fire, supported by close range artillery. The threat was so large that Vincke's Hannoverians were moved from the left to the center and positioned in the rear at about the position aligning with the Mont St. Jean farm, to bolster the line and make every soldier making his way to the rear, return back to his ranks.
My main conclusion is that d'Erlons 1st Corps was not put out of action after its initial assault and able to form an operational unit to have engaged during the next hours of the battle.

Kevin,

My conclusions are not based on the quotation originally provided by Maj S in the thread I posted to – that was merely an indication that it isn't safe to assume that the French were always actually in skirmish order when Siborne says they were as the eye-witness cleary states that the French were in line. I'd hoped that was clear – my mistake.
But Siborne clearly states that the French infantry had adopted the 'tirailleur' tactic as a result of early loss and disorganization.

It is artful to suggest that Wellington ordered his men to fight to the last man – what his orders did was prevent tactical retreat, not at all the same thing.

I've got the Siborne to hand and the Ropes' book on e-format somewhere (I think – it has been a while since I looked at it). I haven't read the 'Atlas…' or the Houssaye.

Regards

I found one comment by an allied officer that if the Guard had attacked a half hour earlier than it did, it would have punched through and broken the allied line.

Something that deserves further discussion, I think. Given the cumulative attrition of the Allied line, would not a further half-hour's delay have increased the chances of a breakthrough by the Garde?

The object of the exercise is to strike at the best time when the enemy is in the most disarray or weakest. Apparently the allied officer that commented on the situation believed that the best or most opportune time for the French had passed and that the Anglo-dutch were recovering somewhat.

Napoleon had led the Guard battalions up himself undoubtedly planning to launch them properly and massed himself. He was interrupted by a crisis on the right flank, and by the time he returned to the main battle Ney had taken charge and launched the Guard battalions as they had come up, not waiting to mass them before attacking. Ney also launched the attack at the same target he used for the cavalry attacks and not the portion of the allied line that had been seriously, if not fatally damaged by the fighting after the cavalry charges. The impact on the weakened portion of the allied line by five Guard battalions might have been decisive.

One British junior officer that was in the objective area and observed the Guard's attack was quite impressed with their advance and made the comment that all he expected to received was a bayonet in the body.

Sincerely,
Kevin

I know there are 19th century books that provide detailed casualty lists for the Anglo-Allied army. Does any one have title(s) or a link? Perhaps an analysis of these losses can make it clearer on the effectiveness of the French attacks.

v/r

Joe

"All of this evidence from creditable secondary sources, based on primary source material and well-documented as such, clearly demonstrates that at the period of the battle noted, the French infantry fought in large skirmisher swarms, supported by artillery and cavalry and put the issue of the battle in doubt."

Of such secondary claims is mythology born. Let us hear the primary material – it has often been shown to be the case here that claims about primary material and how the selection by secondary authors (often known as data mining) compared with what the actual primary material says can be quite illuminating, especially in showing that the secondary author is "creditable", "reliable" etc.

'I know there are 19th century books that provide detailed casualty lists for the Anglo-Allied army. Does any one have title(s) or a link? Perhaps an analysis of these losses can make it clearer on the effectiveness of the French attacks.'

I have never seen a casualty list for Waterloo, or any other period battle for that matter, that breaks down the total casualties for particular periods of the battle.

I have seen at least one that does give an eyewitness account of how many were killed in a particular area, however (by Senarmont at Friedland the day after the battle).

Sincerely,
Kevin

@ dave hollins

Nice to see you back, dave.
Your call for primary sources is of course correct.

What sources should we look for?
I do know Wellington by the late afternoon thought his army was just about beaten because of continuing French pressure.

Is there any source that contradicts the eficacy of the French skirmishing at this stage?

@Ochoin Deach,

It all depends upon what you mean. The British eye-witnesses who wrote to Siborne mention four units in particular as suffering from French fire at this period in the day: the 27th, 2/95th, 1/95th and a battalion of the 1st Guards. There is no particular mention of the formation the French opposing the Guards was in at the time, but the witness records the Guards defeating their opponents in short order.

The witnesses who mention it all agree on the particular damage inflicted on the 27th, deployed in square within range of the French occupying the La Haye Sainte position to stop further French close-order advance through the middle of the position. The witnesses from the 1/95 and 2/95 tell a roughly equivalent story – after the fall of La Haye Sainte, musketry fire forced both units back from their advanced positions to defensive positions nearer the road. It is interesting to note that Leach of the 95th reports both sides fighting in exactly the same way at this time, with French Officers attempting to induce their men to advance but being defeated by British "en grandes bandes" (my phrase).

One or two of the witnesses record British skirmishers to the (French) left of LHS suffering heavy casualties from combined artillery fire and infantry fire from that place, while another witness (from Adam's Brigade IIRC) reporting a unit being moved back to avoid fire from the woods at Hougoumont (as a precaution).

It should be noted that all of the witnesses in the 'Letters' were British (although including a couple serving in German Corps). There is no mention of this phase at all from the eyewitnesses quoted in Peter Hofschroer's Waterloo book. It should be noted that in the quotation provided by Kevin in his first post regarding the German/Brunswick troops, the story ends with the Brunswickers rallying and defeating the French in turn by their fire.

The whole story suggests to me the similarity between the French and the Allied armies rather than the differences. The interplay between skirmishing infantry, formed infntry (in every battlefield formation), cavalry and artillery is noteworthy on both sides, as is the tremendous courage (check out the losses). The key difference at this phase in the battle is that the French have gained some cover in the areas of La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont that make their 'skirmishing tactics' more worthwhile than trying to batter through the Allied line.

I do know Wellington by the late afternoon thought his army was just about beaten because of continuing French pressure.

Well the pressure seems to have been high on both sides, but rather more on the French.

Regards

And if you want to have a look yourself:

link

Regards

When I heared a student talking about "creditable secondary sources" or something similar the first question I asked is "how do you know that they are creditable?"

The major problem with secondary sources is that the author has processed a number of other sources in order to provide the reader with an account of an event, but the reader only gets the secondary source's interpretation of the information which might consist of only a selection of primary and other secondary material. The reader simply does not know.

Sometimes we find that only secondary source A has actually looked at primary material at all and over the years sources B, C and D have copied source A so that to the untutored it appears that there are four independent sources when there is in fact only one.

Of course good secondary sources do have their uses in pointing the interested reader to primary sources or by quoting primary sources verbatim. But if we are to be serious about answering questions such as posed by the OP, it is not to the interpretations of secondary sources that one should turn.

I cannot contribute to the specific subject here. Waterloo has no interest for me. All I know is that Wellington only fought the battle on the expectation of Prussian support and that the French were decisively beaten such that Napoleon never bothered anybody again and Europe entered a period of several decades of peace.

Bill

And this material by Elting and the well-known Bonapartist Houssaye is not even secondary. Elting is tertiary and Houssaye is rather fond of adding in claims.

Creditable is like reliable – it means "I like what it says, I have ignored anything to the contrary and have not looked at the primary material myself".

10th Marines wrote:

The units that deployed in open or skirmish order (en tirailleur) at Waterloo after the failure of the French cavalry charges are substantial.

Do you know which units were deployed en tirailleur? Are we talking about companies, battalions or entire brigades? The field of Waterloo is very small and the area in question in front of Alten's and Picton's divisions is even smaller – perhaps 6 or 700 yards frontage. How many infantry deployed en tirailleur could fit into this area?

Historians and eyewitnesses are fond of the term "cloud of tirailleurs", but what does it mean? George Cathcart who fought in Germany in 1813 offered an explanation:

Every line of tirailleurs was invariably sustained by adequate small supports formed in rear, and, as far as might be, sheltered; but ready at hand to reinforce or relieve their comrades who were actually engaged. But, besides this, a sufficient and concentrated reserve was invariably stationed not far off, to sustain the whole of these advanced combatants. Thus, when people talk of a cloud of light troops, although the appearance may have warranted that figure of speech, the duty was nevertheless conducted with method, and in accordance with these principals. The author has dwelt on this particular feature more in detail than he otherwise would have done HAD NOT THE SAME SYSTEM APPLIED TO ALL OTHER NATIONS ENGAGED

Back to Waterloo, undoubtably the French deployed tirailleurs and they seem to have been reasonably effective, but were they really shooting the allied line down left right and centre?

Kielmansegge was in the thick of it in the middle of the area in question. He noted the "swarm" of French tirailleurs appearing after the cavalry attacks but only mentions that they "wounded several persons in the squares". Of far more consequence was the artillery and the appearance of "a very strong column of infantry". The retreat seems to have been caused by "the violent canister and musket fire from the advancing column."

Stretton of the 40th regiment in Lambert's brigade, just to the left of the crossroads, claimed that the French in front of his position consisted of "a double line of tirailleurs, supported by a heavy column of infantry". He even drew a map to illustrate his account, showing the heavy column passing through the skirmishers (whom he shows not in a mob, cloud or grande bande, whatever one is, but in a straight, dispersed, line) and then forming line, noting that some of these troops were "bayoneted close to our front rank".

Leach of the 95th was in the same area and wrote that the French established "a strong and numerous line of infantry, extending along the front of Kempt's brigade". Whether this was a close order line or not is not clear, but its subsequent actions don't sound like the actions of tirailleurs. The combat, according to Leach, was an "uninterrupted fire of musketry" between the two lines and on several occasions the French attempted to charge , but the British fire "was so very hot and deadly that they almost instantly ran back behind the crest of the hill, always leaving a great many killed or disabled behind them."

Further to the left, an officer of the 1st regiment noted that all the captains of his regiment, and presumably all the companies, were successively employed to oppose the French skirmishers.

The major success of the French tirailleurs seems to have been the destruction of the 27th regiment who were formed in square on an emminence and were shot down without being able to reply, but this seems to have been the exception rather than the rule and the combat in other areas seems to have been more evenly matched, and not the one-sided slaughter portrayed in some posts above.

Interesting that Wellington did not commit the Guards or Adam's troops to support the centre but left these troops in their positions on the right.

The light cavalry of Vivian and Vandeleur was called in to support the centre. They report hot action between the infantry to their front. Interestingly there was not a need to commit these cavalry to an attack at this point.

General Bonaparte also did not send in his Guards directly against this section of the line but whether by accident of resign these Guards advanced more to the left (West) and straight into Maitland and Adam.

The organization that Cathcart describes, quoted by Major S. is one, three lines, skirmish line, supports and a reserve, that the French, including Davout describe too.

I think, from the evidence, the French were more successful in the center after the cavalry attacks because they began using combined arms tactics, which included a liberal use of tirailleurs, instead of employing one arm a time, first artillery[grand battery], then infantry [I Corps attack] and finally cavalry.

The skirmishers were part of a coordinated effort rather than The Form of Attack.

Bill

If ifs and buts were milk and nuts, we'd all be cows and squirrels.

write about it all you like, the little pleb still lost.

John

Unfortunately, that is correct, but that isn't either the point or the object of the thread.

Sincerely,
Kevin

'Of such secondary claims is mythology born. Let us hear the primary material – it has often been shown to be the case here that claims about primary material and how the selection by secondary authors (often known as data mining) compared with what the actual primary material says can be quite illuminating, especially in showing that the secondary author is "creditable", "reliable" etc.'

Have you read the sources listed? I have and have them to hand if you care to discuss them. And I do believe the sourcing is quite evident in the books listed and as the bibliographies list the source material it is easy to figure out where the authors found their material. With Siborne it is very easy to figure out. If you disagree with any of it, perhaps you can state what you disagree with and why.

'And this material by Elting and the well-known Bonapartist Houssaye is not even secondary. Elting is tertiary and Houssaye is rather fond of adding in claims.'

Horse pucky.

Neither is considered a tertiary source, a term that is usually used to denigrate an author's work. Both Col Elting's and Houssaye's works are secondary by definition.

If you have read Col Elting as well as Houssaye you'll find the source material is listed and referred to. Houssaye's footnotes in particular are quite extensive.

'When I heared a student talking about "creditable secondary sources" or something similar the first question I asked is "how do you know that they are creditable?"'

Generally speaking, checking the bibliography and footnotes, as well as the authors' methodology and conclusions is a good start.

If you have a particular or general problem with Ropes, Siborne, or Houssaye why don't you state what your particular problems are with the books so it can be discussed and add to the discussion instead of 'painting with a broad brush' in an attempt to denigrate their works. Have you read the works in question?

K

'It should be noted that in the quotation provided by Kevin in his first post regarding the German/Brunswick troops, the story ends with the Brunswickers rallying and defeating the French in turn by their fire.'

WW,

Could you cite the page number in Siborne's history for that, or if you cannot, can you cite the page number or the letter from Siborne's letter collection?

Sincerely,
Kevin

Whatever "reliability" means, you cannot assess it from a bibliography – as several authors have recently been found out listing lots of books (esp in German and Russian), which they have not read (usually because they lack the linguistic skills) in order to puff themselves up and give the reader a false sense of their "reliability".

However, I am not aware that the late Colonel Elting indulged in that and indeed, his bibliography in Swords would not suggest that he has done anything other than list books he has read.

If we look at Swords, Chap XXXII, we find in his notes that in 25 notes, just one is from a primary source (Coignet). It does not stop him writing in n.21: "English history has it that not one square was broken. Closely studied, theor own reports suggest that several must have been ridden through and badly cut up, even if the survivors were able to reform". There is no source or even example given for this.

If we turn to the bibliography, we can see Houssaye and Ropes and indeed, Elting's own Atlas, but no Siborne or primary source. I gather Ropes is highly regarded as a secondary source, albeit of "English history", but this line-up makes it clear that Elting ahs done no primary research and failed to consult Siborne, while using Houssaye, (whose claims for Bonapartism clearly impresssed Hamilton-Williams so much that he copied quite a lot!). So, Elting is only seeing what Houssaye and Ropes selected, while missing a key work. That makes it tertiary – meaning the author did not do primary work and has been selective in his use of secondary material. It is not denigration – many perfectly good works are like this, but they cannot be quoted as some kind of reflection of the primary material.

If you read Swords carefully and check the notes, there is plenty of primary source material used in the book, and quite a bit of it (from the listed primary material in La Sabretache which is now in my possession, thanks to Col Elting) not used in English before.

In that material you can find the letters of Brigadier Pilloy who stated that in the cavalry charges the French cavalry he was charging with, a cuirassier regiment, rode over and through the square they were attacking.

And I stated if you check the bibliography and the footnotes (or substituting endnotes or just notes) is one way of assessing a book's reliability. You left out the footnotes part of the sentence and I guess you missed the point.

So, again, Col Elting's work is not tertiary at all-but a secondary work of great importance and the only one of its kind in English. His material is from primary and reliable secondary works, and that makes his work secondary, not tertiary.

K

Whoa guys. Kevin gave some very pertinent quotes from some historians and if someone has a question about their accuracy or detail, then they should note where.

It has been my experience that military historians will, at times, make generalizations and state facts that are not footnoted, but are diametrically opposed to some of the very sources they list in their Bibliography—and of course, why they made the statements they did remains a mystery. However, I don't assume that means it's wrong—nor do I assume that the statements are correct simply because it is an author I respect.

There are issues here, some noteworthy and some that are simply the result of current circumstances vs. when Etling Houssaye were working.

Sir James Shaw-Kennedy is a primary source in large part because he was at Waterloo. However, a great deal of his work is secondary because it is dependent on other's experiences/testimony, not his.

Siborne's work is also secondary, as it too is dependent on first hand accounts. Like Kennedy, he was able to correspond with many of the officers and men who were at Waterloo--even though Siborne was not.

John C. Ropes was born in the 1830s, so he may have talked with Waterloo participants who lived into the 1850s and after, but his work is decidedly tertiary where he depends on secondary sources/historians for his information. He was not as close to the events chronologically as Kennedy and Siborne and didn't have ths same access to the Waterloo participants.

Houssaye and Etling's work is both secondary and tertiary, Like Kevin's series of quotes, because some of the history is based on primary sources like Kennedy's, some on secondary sources like Ropes, and third hand conclusions like Etling and Houssaye. So, in that sense, Kevin, Col. Etling's work is tertiary where he narrates his conclusions about primary and secondary sources, but certainly not completely. You provided primary, secondary and tertiary evidence in your long post depending on who you quoted. That doesn't make Etling, Houssaye or you wrong, just that the construction of history is two levels removed from the event, tertiary, let alone 1501-200 years after the fact.

But so what? None of this makes one author more reliable or producing better history, primary, secondary or tertiary. Each must be vetted equally. However it does throw light on the relationship between the various authors' work.

Houssaye and Etling's conclusions quoted above are entirely dependent on primary and secondary sources such as Siborne and Kennedy. Quoting them side-by-side as though they are all equal authorities on Waterloo can be misleading.

Any conclusions that Houssaye and Etling have come to are based on someone else's work and experiences. That doesn't make them wrong, or less rigoreous in their research, it just places them in a different relationship to Napoleonic history and the sources for that history. And we all today share that same relationship to that history--secondary if we are referencing primary works, or tertiary, if we are referencing someone else's conclusions on their study of primary sources, like Elting and Houssaye.

However, the study of history has changed dramatically since Houssaye and Elting wrote. The only sources they had access to were in libraries or an individual's possession. They had to travel to read any number of books, if they couldn't receive them from interlibrary loan. In any case, they only had them for a limited amount of time. Travel, the telephone or writing letters were the only ways to reach others doing research. A slow process.

Because of that, the lists of sources are often limited to our eyes. Before computers and the internet, historians often had no access to the books and were left with isolated quoted somewhere else instead. Often a source was listed when only a limited amount of the book had been studied.

Today, those primary sources are available for free on line. I can pull up most all the primary sources in full on my computer than Etling ever listed in his combinedworks. I can email researchers, native speakers, and historians in every European country on the map just as easily.

What this means is that everyone on the TMP page has potential access to more sources, in both numbers and quality, than Etling and Houssaye could ever hope to put their hands on.

It means our relationship to historical sources, past historians, and authors have changed. Any presumptive historical authority can be checked as easily as typing in 'Google' on our computer. We have moved from making conclusions on secondary sources [tiertiary conclusions] and can go directly to the primary sources and make conclusions [secondary conclusions], placing us on the same research level as Etling and Houssaye. Whether we are equal scholars and researchers is another question altogether.

All of which doesn't make any of those folks' quoted by Kevin and others wrong, only far more easily checked, and because of that, they can more easily frustrate researchers today when references and sources can't be referenced, can't be because they weren't footnoted or mentioned…

And why would past authors footnote and reference sources when most every reader could never take advantage of them, even if they did? You see this very argument put forth by a variety of historians in the mid-19th Century and first half of the 20th, particularly when writing popular history or anything not meant for internal consumption in acadamia?

Bill

@ Kevin,

No problems, should be bottom of this page and beginning of the next (514-15 for the pages of the 'book', 468-469 for the pages on Google Books).

link

The paragraph beginning after "…as also Kruse's Kielmansegge's, and Ompteda's brigades, to fall back about a hundred paces.'" So it might be 332-333 in the edition you are using.

Reegards

Kevin,

Dave H wrote:

If we look at Swords, Chap XXXII, we find in his notes that in 25 notes, just one is from a primary source (Coignet). It does not stop him writing in n.21: "English history has it that not one square was broken. Closely studied, their own reports suggest that several must have been ridden through and badly cut up, even if the survivors were able to reform". There is no source or even example given for this.

Now in your reply, you mention the letters of Brigadier Pilloy as saying that he (with a Cuirassier regiment) cut up a British square. However, this is a French (unpublished?) source. Elting specifically states that a close reading of English sources would lead you to this conclusion. Surely Dave is merely pointing out that unless Elting either mentions which specific English reports or Allied squares he (Elting) is referring to, that statement doesn't get us very far, because we can't test it against the testimony of the British eye-witnesses?

Regards

Sounds like they failed. Very interesting quotes to read in this thread. And while the allies may have been sorely pressed though, the attack failed. No near success if they succeeded they would have won. They failed wether this was due to poor formation choice or already shattered morale I still can't decide.

Just my tuppence on the precedings so far. Keep firing away though lads

I won't believe any British square was broken until someone can proove exactly which square. Other units in other battles that broke always had the truth admitted and it's been documented. I can't see the logic in in trying to cover it up. While sources emain vague and imprecise I'll put it done to flights of fancy name a regiment and I'll give it more consideration.

Sergeant Morris of the 73rd's account points to the temporary breaking into of the combined square of the 33rd and 69th. Morris said they retired in confusion followed by the Cuirassiers. Intervention by the Life Guards chased off the French before the infantry were too badly cut up. The combined square did reform.

Also, Morris' account also mentions the French turning capturned guns against them and being under infantry attack as well. He says that they went into action with 29 officers and 550 men and were left with 2 officers and 70 men.

v/r

Joe

'Surely Dave is merely pointing out that unless Elting either mentions which specific English reports or Allied squares he (Elting) is referring to, that statement doesn't get us very far, because we can't test it against the testimony of the British eye-witnesses?'

The source, Pilloy's letters, are published in La Sabretache, but the books that were done in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, so you have to look. In the volumes I have in my library there are over 5,000 pages of Napoleonic material (and that is probably a low estimate) with the letters not only of Pilloy, but Ameil, Teste, Drouot and many others. There are also after-action reports and other material that wasn't seen in English until Swords was published. In short, the volume of original, or primary material in the 25 volumes is immense. And these are books, some of the 700-800 pages long. They are not magazines as such as are published by La Sabretache today.

Further, if material is mentioned and not footnoted, and it doesn't have to be by the way, and you want to find the source material, look up the references from which the material came. It isn't hard, but it can be time consuming. Col Elting conveniently lists the references by chapter in Swords which makes it very helpful. He also published errata in Napoleon Magazine (I believe) years ago for the few errors he did make in Swords.

It does amaze me from time to time that excellent historians and scholars such as Col Elting are criticized for not footnoting enough, but material in Ospreys, which until recently was not footnoted at all and references weren't listed, are not commented on and are taken as semi-gospel. Just an observation on my part.

Sgt Morris' account does verify a square being broken at Waterloo, even though it later reformed. Broken is broken to my mind. So there is an English source that can be considered 'closely studied' can it not?

Why do French comments have to be verified by English eye-witnesses? Do English eyewitness accounts have to be verified by French accounts? I've never seen that one presented as a prerequisite. And I don't believe that Siborne had any letters from the French participants, did he?

Delort mentioned that he saw three allied squares being broken during the cavalry attacks. This is mentioned in Houssaye.

Sincerely,
Kevin

>Any conclusions that Houssaye and Etling have come to are based on someone else's work and experiences.<

Yes they are which means that other than identifying the primary sources from which they derived their interpretation, which may be a synthesis of many, they are not very pertinent at all in my view if one is serious about the question, particularly if Elting is merely repeating Houssaye.

I also disagree about the alleged secondary nature of Siborne's letters which are not Siborne's interpretation of them rather the actual letters themselves written by eyewitnesses. What one can say about the letters is that they are written from the recollections of people many years after the events they described. This does not make them secondary but it is a factor to be taken into account by a diligent historian when assessing their accuracy and reliability.

Hollins is far too generous where Elting is concerned. Swords is a turgid book if ever there was one and if I am to be frank, no historian worthy of the name would use Swords as evidence for any historical conclusions in 2011.

It is written from sources selected to support the author's bias and contains conclusions the origins of which are unclear, all of which make Swords almost useless as a source.

Bill

Sgt Morris talking about the other regiments' square is here (p109-110):

link

Regards

Why do French comments have to be verified by English eye-witnesses? Do English eyewitness accounts have to be verified by French accounts? I've never seen that one presented as a prerequisite. And I don't believe that Siborne had any letters from the French participants, did he?

Kevin, I'd thought that history was about using different sources to better evaluate the same events. The more eye-witnesses verify an event the better, no? So, in the case of the 33/69 square, we have a witness from a different regiment saying that the square was broken by French Cavalry which was then defeated in its turn by British Cavalry and the square reformed in short order. The witnesses from the Life Guards and from the regiments involved in the square who I am aware of do not mention it at all. Surely hearing about an event from the widest variety of sources, British, Dutch, German, French or whoever, is what enables us to unlock what exactly happened?

Siborne asked for French responses but didn't get any, IIRC.

Regards