"New scenario book: The Death of Glory - France 1914" Topic

Robert, a month ago a friend of mine said he wanted to buy your book.

The manuscript is progressing well. The time consuming part relates to sourcing and translating the German texts. The goal is to get the book out before the 100th anniversary.

With respect to the Battle of Le Cateau, it is worth reviewing Jack Sheldon's analysis from 'Battleground Europe: Le Cateau':

'In any examination of the battle of Le Cateau, the question always arises as to why it was not possible for the considerable forces of First Army at von Kluck's disposal to deal the BEF a mortal blow during the retreat from Mons. The short answer and the most important reason is that the commander was let down by his intelligence organisation. There were inherent systemic deficiencies in the way information was collected, communicated, collated and processed by the German army at the time and these problems, coupled with failures on the ground, meant that for much of the campaign von Kluck was forced to take decisions based on incomplete and misleading intelligence appreciations.

Command and control, already glossed over in pre-war training, which never succeeded in thoroughly exercising the cavalry chain of command required to support mobile operations efficiently, suffered further from poor communications.

By the very early morning of 26 August, II Cavalry Corps was already in the saddle and, supported by its Jäger battalions, was advancing south to the west of Solesmes in three great columns. Within a very short time battle was joined and the cavalry, instead of spending the day ranging out wide to the west and threatening to cut off the British retreat, became bogged down in minor battles for the possession of unimportant villages. It could be argued that, in so doing, it engaged the attention of the British defenders long enough to enable the leading infantry regiments to close up. Be that as it may, the end result was that the German cavalry was drawn progressively into a dismounted battle in unfavourable circumstances, was fixed in position by the British II Corps and effectively prevented from acting decisively and cohesively.

German errors had let their chance of dealing a crushing blow slip through their fingers. The opportunity never arose again.'

Robert

Howdy,

So why do you believe the BEF to be well-trained, well-drilled? Why is not the high percentage of reservists a factor?

When were Corps level exercises held, and what was their scope? When was II Corps formed?

When were Divisional execises held, and what was their scope?

Brigade ditto?

Regimental (i.e., Battalion)?

Zuber notes that British command was not flexible in the defense, you did not address this in your post.

When will your book be out, will it be available in the US?

Ponder on,

JAS

Zuber is quite wrong about the flexibility of the BEF defense. I have already given some examples but will provide further details. The issue of training will be discussed in further posts.

Robert

On the question of the BEF being well-trained and well-drilled, I would pose the question back to you of why you think the BEF was not well-trained and well-trained? If your interpretation is based on Zuber's work then you need to read much more widely. It is embarrassing to read his interpretation of the BEF situation. Zuber is quite good on the German perspective (but he either deliberately or unknowingly leaves out some key pieces of information). He is not good, indeed is woeful at times, when reviewing German enemies.

The BEF followed a series of training processes at different levels. These processes were very similar to the German processes, with some interesting exceptions that I will come on to. I will turn your questions in reverse, if I may, starting from the lowest tactical levels first. As with the German system, a new recruit was provided with basic training. This included markmanship, ie the ability to hit a target accurately. British infantry and cavalrymen received increased pay to reward high levels of markmanship, based on the standard of 15 aimed rounds per minute. Many men could significantly exceed this standard, whereas German Mauser rifles could not deliver even 15 aimed rounds per minute (as was also the case with the Lebel rifle).

As a trainee became more proficient in all aspects of basic training, further exercises were added at the unit level. Thus there was squad, platoon, company and battalion level training within the various regiments (or the equivalent levels for the cavalry regiments). This training took place irrespective of the whether the regiments were based in England or India. Regiments were divided into the training battalions and the active battalions, which were often serving overseas. The latter would be fed by the regular soldiers who had completed their training.

As the year progressed, higher level exercises were used. This schedule was similar to the German schedule. The similarity was not accidental. British Staff Officers frequently attended German training exercises, even after von Moltke the Younger took over as Chief of the General Staff. One cavalry officer, who later received a VC and was killed quite early in the war, was arrested by the German police for example when he continued to attend a German training exercise in late 1913. As an aside, British familiarity with German training and strategic thought played an important role in determining the BEF's defensive set up for Mons. British I Corps, for example, took up a position along the Malplaquet road so as the BEF right flank was refused. This was based on Haig's understanding, as I Corps Commander, that the approaching German forces would attempt to encircle the BEF right flank. Likewise, the British cavalry was sent to the left flank to protect it from envelopment.

I could quote a ton of information about British training techniques at all levels but I won't. Much of this information will appear in the book, which is due not later than August 1914 (hopefully sooner – and yes it will be available in the US). Here are some interesting snippets taken from Haig's diaries. The material was published by Haig's grandson, Douglas Scott, who died recently. The book is 'The Preparatory Prologue: Douglas Haig Diaries and Letters 1861-1914' (ISBN 1844154041).

"28th July (1908) Press Cutting about the Autumn Manoeuvres – entitled 'The Manoeuvres Scheme':

I understand that this year the army manoeuvres will be on a much larger scale than for many years past. An enormous tract of country, having roughly, Salisbury Plain for its centre, and extending from Middlesex to Gloucestershire, is being acquired for this purpose. Of the Expeditionary force of six divisions, four are being permanently quartered in the South of England, the other two being in Ireland, and it is expected that the former will all take part in the proposed operations. There will in addition be a cavalry division of twelve regiments and four batteries of horse artillery so that the number of troops that will take part in manoeuvres will be between 40,000 and 50,000 men. In addition, each of above five divisions will carry out their preliminary training [as divisions] on the some spot of the ground that has been acquired, that of the cavalry being probably on Salisbury Plain. The latter will this year be commanded by Major-General Douglas Haig… He may be expected to employ this arm in a very different way than was the case last year. Spectacular charges will give place to a more modern concept of a horse soldier's role, and a large scheme of tactical reconnaissance will be undertaken.

16 October 1908 – Go to War Office early. Great Conference and War Game held under C.G.S. [Chief of the General Staff]. About 50 or 60 officers present representing all branches of the Army."

The following examples come from Haig's diary of 1913, five years on. At this time, Haig was Commander-in-Chief of the Aldershot Command:

"16 May [1913] – Cold blustery morning. Start at 10 am. 3 Cavalry Regiments (Bays, 11th Hussars and 19th Hussars) carry out evolutions under Kavanagh. Then R.H.A. [Royal Horse Artillery] under Haney take up a series of positions and fire upon flagged enemy. K.R.R. [Kings Royal Rifle (Regiment) – a regular infantry regiment] attack Miles Hill from North, crossing canal by extemporized bridges.

17 May – 7th Fusiliers [a battalion from an infantry regiment] and section of Fd. [Field] Artillery operate southwards. The Howitzer Brigade (Furse) shows how guns directed, means of observation from balloon. See wirelesss and at 4 pm go to Flying Corps…

18 May – See Somerset L.I. [Light Infantry – another infantry regiment] attack position, etc.

9 September – Division v. Division Manoeuvres begin today at 1.15 but mounted reconnaissances start 3 hours earlier.

11 September – Command Training [equivalent of a German corps] begins today.

14 September – Have conference in servants' hall at 11 am on scheme for Army Manoeuvres. General Allenby commanding Cavalry Div. and Colonel Vaughan [Chief General Staff Officer] come over from Newmarket after night operations and return after lunch. Issue instructions to Cavalry and orders to Red force [the British named their respective corps by colours. Haig commanded Red force, which became I Corps in August 1914. Grierson commanded Blue force, which became II Corps in August 1914. Grierson died on the way to Maubeuge after war broke out, with Smith-Dorrien taking his place. Allenby commanded the British cavalry division when war broke out, and Vaughan was still his CGSO].

16 September – [the annual] Army Manoeuvres began today. Advance in 3 columns. Blue force is evidently entrained on line Hitchen-Gamlingay and is digging position near the Gogmagog hills.

17 September – Send on [Brigadier General] Morland with line Bde. [of four infantry battalions], a Bde of FIeld Artillery and a Batt. of howitzers via Newmarket to report to General Allenby commanding Cavalry Division near Dullingham. Remainder march via Dulham to line Cowlinge-Huldon. Blue occupies his position River Hill Worsted Lodge. His mounted troops attack Haking in command of Advanced Guard of 2nd Division near Little Thurlow in afternoon.

18 September – Send off Cavalry at 5 am from Little Thurlow to seize and hold the high ground between Burtlow and Haverhill till relieved by Infantry. 2nd Division to march on Camp's Green and drive back whatever met. 1st Division to high ground near West Wickham as reserve under my orders. Cavalry get high ground at Wigmore Pond without opposition. Relieved by Bde of 2nd Division. Heard enemy advancing to attack from Bartlow and Saffron Waldon. Order Lomax 1st Div. to occupy position West Wickham to 'Park' Slundy Camps with Bde. in reserve in rear of his left. Intend to take offensive with 2nd Divn and Cav. Divn. Enemy's 4th Division come on so fast [thanks to Grierson's expert use of aerial reconnaissance and night infantry marches] that have to hold the position with 2nd Division. Enemy attack me in position instead of me attacking him and Cavalry Division comes upon rear of his 4th Divn, when all engaged with my 2nd Divn. The Blue 3rd Divn have formed 'front to flank' on [line of] communications in Bedford to Birmingham. Cease fire about 6 pm."

Every year, and 1913 was no exception, the Army Manoeuvres were followed by a detailed debriefing. Lessons learned were published.

"Diary 21 September – At 9 am give the Smith-Dorrien Cup for Companies attack exercise to 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards. 7 squadrons and 120 companies had entered for the Competition."

Hopefully these quotes give some idea of the range and complexity of training that existed in the BEF before the war. As to the question about II Corps, I presume you are referring to the late formation of II Corps as an official entity only just before war broke out. Zuber suggests that this was an example of the ad hoc last minute way in which the BEF came together after war was declared. This suggestion betrays his complete ignorance of the pre-war BEF. II Corps may not have existed but its Staff had trained together as Blue force on many occasions, along with the infantry divisions that came under its command when war broke out.

Robert

Howdy,

You provide great anecdotes, but very little analysis.

From your prior post, you conclude British command was flexible because Allenby stopped for tea on the way to the left flank. You don't cite local counterattacks organized to stem German canal crossings at Mons.

Haig's diary entries are persuasive. Again, no analysis. Was there a system to the training, had the British developed a doctrine (a common way of tactical/operational problem solving)? I found Martin Samuel's book quite pursuasive in that they had not. It would be a good idea to analyize the training and identify the mission-types that were trained for. Then compare what was trained with what happened in the war.

You still have not answered the question of why the Allies took so many more casualties than the Germans.

Nor why the high percentage of reservists was not a significant factor.

Nor why the Germans were able to cross the canal at multiple locations at Mons. Why didn't the BEF crush the German hasty attacks with their prepared defense? Where were the counter attacks on local penetrations?

I look forward to hearing more.

Kind regards,

JAS

Robert,

One more item to address: Samuels documents that the British Official History was specifically written as patriotic propaganda. Writing of the "real" history was interupted by WW2. To wit, as mentioned above, systematic analysis is needed beyond anecdotes from memoirs.

When do you plan to publish your book and what is its scope?

Ponder on,

JAS

The British Official History is flawed, as is the German equivalent. Both were marred by post hoc interpretations and both must be read with caution. With respect to Mons, it is hard to study the German perspective with anything other than memoirs. The German regimental histories were mostly written after the war. The good ones (and they vary considerably in quality) have good maps and several anecdotal accounts from various members of the regiment. Von Kluck wrote his memoirs during the war IIRC. Die Schlacht bei Mons was definitely published during the war by the Great General Staff. It is probably the most contemporaneous of the official accounts.

From the British perspective, I have read a wide range of personal and regimental accounts. The main focus, however, has been on the detailed war diaries. Most specifically, it is the myriad of hand-written messages that are most informative. These were written and sent during the battle. Quite apart from the interest in seeing signatures from the likes of Smith-Dorrien, Vaughan, Murray, Sordet, etc, the messages provide as near a real time view of the battle as it is possible to get. There is nothing equivalent from the German perspective. Furthermore, it has been possible to photograph the actual sketches drawn by British aerial reconnaissance pilots, cavalry patrols, etc. My comments are drawn from an in depth study of these sources, in addition to some of the rarer books that I have managed to acquire.

Robert

With respect to Martin Samuels, are you referring to his book 'Command or Control'?

In the Haig quotes earlier, I specifically included the reference to the 1908 manoeuvres. The "50 or 60 officers" mentioned were gathered to help create the Field Service Regulations, which encapsulated the "…common way of tactical/operational problem solving". From the FSR flowed a range of more detailed publications, dealing with musketry, signalling, etc. In addition, there were manuals that described how training would advance from the individual through squad, platoon, battalion, brigade, etc levels, and their cavalry counterparts. I have a large number of these, as well as their German, French and Belgian equivalents. There are few differences between them.

All of the various manuals, etc describe how the training should be done. I have been gathering books and diaries that describe the actual process, ie how it was delivered on the ground and what impact it had. Some of the most interesting books that I have are very very rare handwritten diaries from German and French officers and men from before the war. There are books that have been published by other authors that have been very helpful too, but these books are not available in English. Two of the most impressive are 'Le jour de deuil de l'armée française', recently published by Jean-Claude Delhez, and Dimitry Queloz's book "De la manoeuvre napoléonienne à l'offensive à outrance. La tactique générale de l'armée française 1871-1914".

I mention all of this to illustrate that I am not commenting based on a read of Zuber's books and the British Official History.

Robert

Howdy Robert,

I just signed up as a supporting member, thinking I could send you private messages. You used to, but apparently you cannot currently.

I have the impression that we are talking past each other even though we are using a common language.

Yes, "Command or Control"

My email is jescarbo@yahoo.com. Please drop me a line.

Thanks,

JAS

Howdy,

I found the PM button, and just sent you a message.

JAS

Thanks, JAS. I have picked up the PM and will reply later.

Just to prevent the question about casualties from cropping up again, I am not going to address the reasons for the differential casualty count. The issue is more complex, not least because of the huge problems with the French medical services. I don't know the details and am just reflecting back information from French colleagues. Leaving this confounding issue aside, the casualty counts can only be regarded as a pointer. As I mentioned before, I would not base a wargame's mechanic on this very high level information FWIIW. This is just a personal preference. Rather, such information has acted as a driver to understand in more detail what actually happened at the operational and tactical levels.

Samuels' book made for compelling reading when I first came across it. He portrayed the contrasting styles of British and German command and control. I am much less convinced now. Samuels drew heavily on the work of Captain Wynne, whose analyses of German tactics were designed to jolt the pre-WW2 British command into getting ready for impending war. Wynne was very selective in his case studies, picking out the best examples to illustrate a very important point. Samuels' focused on some of the worst examples of British 'control'. The book is very unbalanced, having been superseded in many respects by more recent scholarly works on Haig's command style, British corps command (Simpson's excellent book), Sheldon's excellent books on the German army, etc.

Turning now to the issue of British tactics at Mons. From a British perspective, the battle was not about the bridges primarily. Had this been the case, then the Field Service Regulations supported the notion of immediate counter-attacks to secure lost ground. The battle, however, cannot be seen in this light. While the bridges were to be denied to the Germans if possible (hence the preparation to blow many of them), this was not the overall mission of the BEF. It is vital that we look beyond these minor tactical issues.

For the British, Mons was perceived as a meeting engagement in a broader context. The BEF's role was two-fold: to extend the French army's left wing in anticipation of getting around the German army, ie cooperating in Joffre's plan; and to preserve the BEF as a fighting force. As mentioned before, the BEF had detected massed German forces bearing down on it and on Lanrezac's Fifth Army (I have photographed the original British aerial reconnaissance sketches that show some of German Second Army's forces as well as First Army). The intelligence about the German forces was good but not complete. It was good enough for the BEF to recognise that it could not expect to overwhelm the German forces in a meeting engagement. Coupled with this was the knowledge that contact had not been gained fully with the French Fifth Army on the right. There was a gap of several miles. In addition, there were no covering forces on the BEF's left flank. True, there were French territorial units further off to the left but there was no possibility of securing contact with them. Taking all of these factors into account, the BEF prepared to meet a large German force on ground of the BEF's choosing. The plan was to assume a defensive posture that would preserve operational choice, either to advance or to retreat after absorbing the impact of the German forces. In all of this and the relatively isolated position, it was vital that the BEF prevented itself from being enveloped and annihilated in accordance with what the BEF believed the mission of First Army would be.

This belief was based on the BEF's detailed understanding of German tactics. Many British commanders, including Haig, spoke and read German. Many had visited the German Great General Staff on several occasions. One officer in particular, General Maurice, had spent some time at Potsdam and had discussed the German war plans with one of the Staff Officers. Most British officers had read the various German publications; many were translated into English before the war.

As mentioned before, the possession of canal bridges was of minimal importance, by comparison, in the British plan. In accordance with the general principles of the FSR, a flexible defensive plan was put in place. This was based on a defense in depth, which maintained operational flexibility. An 'outpost line' was established along the canal. Forward of this line, smaller advanced outposts were established. These consisted of cyclists, divisional cavalry and other elements that were designed to give early warning of the German approach and to cause the German forces to deploy. These units were posted north of the canal, which is why the bridges could not be blown in advance. British reserves were posted behind the outpost line. Their role was not to recapture bridges. Given that the main point of German attack was not known precisely, the British reinforcements were far enough back to ensure that breakthroughs could be localised, maintaining the ability for the BEF to withdraw if necessary. Further defensive measures were taken to the rear, with positions being created along the high ground south of the canal. These positions were to serve the BEF well when the outpost line was abandoned.

As noted before, steps were taken to protect the BEF flanks. I Corps refused the right flank and the British Cavalry Division was moved across to the left.

At this point, it should be made clear that I do not think that the BEF's performance was perfect. Mention has already been made of the command failure that left 4/Middlesex Regiment in the lurch at Obourg. This opened up the Nimy/Obourg salient. That the German 18th Division could not capitalise on this was down to the flexible British defence as well as command failures in the German First Army.

Just to reiterate, I do not think that the BEF's command performance was perfect. It was not, however, worse than the German command performance IMHO. Martin Samuels, for example, made much of the German concept of Auftragstaktik, ie mission-based command. German commanders did not, allegedly, set out detailed instructions for their subordinates to follow. Rather they explained the overall mission and left their subordinates to fulfil the mission in whatever way was appropriate.

What then was German First Army's mission? Its mission was to get around the Allied armies' left flank and enable the German army to destroy the Allied armies' ability to fight on. How was this mission translated to von Kluck's commanders and their subordinates? The night before Mons, they were given specific objective lines that did not represent the envelopment of the BEF. Opposite the BEF's vulnerable left flank, von Kluck ordered II Corps and IV Reserve Corps to hold back in case the BEF was coming from Lille. He stopped the remaining corps (IV, III and IX, from the German right to left) to stop preparing for the wheel to the West. These corps then received a besonderen Befehl – special order – not to move beyond the line of the Leuze[-en-Hainaut] – Mons – Binche road. In other words, these corps were given a specific objective line not a general mission. This objective line was, for the most part, just across the canal. Thus the bridge crossings were vital to the German corps' objectives. Just because this was the case, it should not be assumed that the same importance could be applied to the BEF. It should be noted that the Germans did not capture all of the canal crossings required by the order. Furthermore, having discovered next day that the intelligence about Lille was wrong, there wasn't enough time to get around the BEF's left flank. On the BEF's right flank, the German IX Corp's objective line did not come close to outflanking the British I Corps refused right flank. German IX Corp persisted in attacks towards the west from St Symphorien (which is on the Mons – Binche road) and did not attempt to outflank British I Corps.

Robert

Excellent post so far.