"Do Rules Unreasonably Restrict use of Skirmish Order?" Topic

Davout actually says that it is unnecessary to send the instruction the 33rd Light.

Bill, I'm puzzled – the last sentence of your post indicates that Davout did think it was necessary to send the instruction to the 33rd Light (just not for Dessaix to do so – the other chap was going to)?

Regards

Major Snort and Whirlwind:

Yes, that is a good question, one I certainly didn't explain. So, let me ask some contextual questions:

1. Why single out the 33rd Legere, which is in Dessaix's division, for special attention? Why send a copy through general Barbanègre, commanding another division? Each of Davout's Five divisions had a Legere regiment in it.

Davout's I Corps was new to him, having been Bernadotte's and then Victor's Corps, though a number of his old regiments like the 13th Legere, 48th, 85th and 108th were included. The 33rd was the new Legere regiment--to Davout.

Davout's instructions state:

As it is important for the sake of uniformity that there is some method to adopt, I send you, my dear General, a summary of the manoeuvres that I invite you to train the regiments under your orders to do, whether of light infantry or of infantry of line. I want us to benefit from the present season for training the troops.

2. Why specifically note the light infantry in this way rather than assuming that they would all would receive a copy?

3. Why the instructions at all? His divisions were all veteran organizations with veteran officers?

He states his purpose "for the sake of uniformity."

4. Further on, Davout writes in his instructions:

The companies of the voltigeurs are already familiar with these manoeuvers, it will be proper to exercise the centre companies with the companies of voltigeurs for the first time, it means a mixing of the fusiliers with the voltigeurs.

The light regiments didn't have fusiliers. Why not include the 'Chasseurs' for the same reason he had mentioned both the light and line regiments above?

What conclusions can be drawn from this?

Bill

Maybe he wanted a uniformity of training?

Maybe it was for "information only" rather than as instruction?

Maybe he was being courteous, and didn't want them to find out later that he was instruction on light infantry/skirmish tactics, in case they got their nose out of joint? They might have thought that he was imposing on their "turf" or obliquely suggesting that the performance of the lights was bad and he needed to beef up the capabilities.

Maybe he was giving them an opportunity for feedback or constructive criticism or for commenting on how to co-ordinate the ligre battalion and voltigeur company in a common action?

Maybe he wanted to remind the other general of an overdue gambling debt?

Bill and Bill,

The conclusion that I would draw from this is that the only troops in Davout's corps trained to skirmish properly prior to the 1811 instructions were the voltigeur companies. The centre companies of both the ligne and leger regiments not being familiar with the manoeuvres used by the voltigeurs.

It would be very strange if prior to these instructions the chasseur companies in the leger regiments had a different skirmishing system to the voltigeurs within the same unit – the implication is that they had no system at all, although that wouldn't have prevented them from fighting en debandade.

Regarding the instruction to the 33rd leger, I must admit that my earlier post was from memory and I had not checked the actual wording. The only reason Dessaix was instructed not to send the order to them is that someone else was already doing it, as Whirlwind has pointed out. The implication is perhaps that the 33rd leger were not with Dessaix at the time and had been detached to another division for some reason, but this is just a guess. I don't think that it suggests that the only leger regiment to receive the instruction were the 33rd.

Major Snort:

Actually, there is every reason to believe that the Legere was not trained in similar fashion. For instance, the 10th Legere instructions [and not just their voltigeurs] are different than those outlined by Davout.

If there was already uniformity among the voltigeurs and the center companies were going to be trained to 'mix' with them, there would be no reason for Davout's efforts in 'uniformity', let alone such discussions as company deployment vs third rank.

Bill

Bill,

But within a single leger regiment, there would surely not be any difference between the skirmish training given to a company of voltigeurs and a company of chasseurs. Davout's wording implies that only the voltigeurs had been trained in the skirmishing manoeuvres, whether they were ligne or leger.

When do the 10th leger instructions date to? I was under the impression that they were post 1815.

Major S wrote:

But within a single leger regiment, there would surely not be any difference between the skirmish training given to a company of voltigeurs and a company of chasseurs. Davout's wording implies that only the voltigeurs had been trained in the skirmishing manoeuvres, whether they were ligne or leger.

Major Snort:

Before I answer that question, a little background:

1. Davout's instructions were first developed by Morand, which is why HIS division isn't mentioned among the division commanders addressed. In a letter dated Hambourg 16 October 1811. Davout wrote to Morand:

To the general Morand. Hambourg, 16th October 1811.
I have received, my dear general, your letter of 16th and the five copies of your project to teach the service of the skirmishers [tirailleurs] to all troops. It seems excellent to accomplish this task, and I will send it to all generals commanding a division of infantry, ordering them to use the rest of the season to exercise all companies in this. And, thanking you, my dear general, I ask you to send a copy of this project, of which you surely will have kept an original for yourself, to each of your generals and colonels, directing them to stick to it and exercise the troops in the future.

The companies of the voltigeurs are already familiar with these manoeuvers, it will be proper to exercise the centre companies with the companies of voltigeurs for the first time, it means a mixing of the fusiliers with the voltigeurs.

I will be obliged if you let me know of measures you have taken, and the progress of the troops in this training, made on different ground, which can only develop the understanding of the soldiers and the same of the officers.

On the same day, the following instructions were sent to the other division commanders of I army corps:

To the generals: Friant, Gudin, Dessaix, Compans and Barbanègre [the commander of the 33rd Legere]

It would appear that Morand had instructed all his infantry in procedures that had been trained during this time to all the voltigeurs--they were 'familiar' with them. Davout wanted a Corps-wide extension of the same procedures that Morand had trained his division in. Davout addressed it to Barbanègre too because the 33rd was new to the corps, though Barbanègre himself is not, having commanded the 84th Ligne.

2. There were no official light infantry regulations. Each Legere regiment and each Corps commander could and often did establish their own procedures. For instance, Ney's 1803 instructions called for the use of the third rank of the center companies instead of company deployment. Which right at the beginning, Davout states in HIS instructions has been considered, but deems company deployment better. And that is why Reille issues his instructions in 1815, which aren't identical to Davout's or Ney's. The instructions were to make sure that everyone was on the same page: uniformity. And because, like Davout's troops, units from different corps were mixed, each with their own Corps instructions, new 'uniformity' had to be created with new instructions.

2. If all the voltigeurs--across regiments--had been trained in the same manoeuvres, and those were the only methods used to skirmish, why the instructions?

All Davout could have done is have each voltigeur company officers show the others 'how to do it.' Something already had to be in practice for this particular company deployment of skirmishers to be instructed. The implication is that there were other ways to do it… and obviously Davout felt the Fusiliers and Voltigeurs hadn't worked together as skirmishers.

These are veteran regiments. If the methods found in Davout's instructions had already been in practice in the past [1805? when?], and been used for many years, and the voltigeurs were already 'familiar with them', why were the instructions necessary at all?

3. In both his letter and the instructions, Davout says:

The companies of the voltigeurs are already familiar with these manoeuvers, it will be proper to exercise the centre companies with the companies of voltigeurs for the first time, it means a mixing of the fusiliers with the voltigeurs.

In both cases the 'fusiliers' are mentioned. Not Grenadiers, not the Chasseurs or Carabiniers of the Legere regiments. Just the fusiliers. It is obvious from the comments that the only center companies that Davout is thinking of are the Fusiliers he identifies. I would think the implication is that the Chasseurs of the Legere regiments had been 'mixing' with the voltigeurs already.

In most battles of the Napoleonic wars, you see just that, Legere troops supporting, or more often being supported by line voltigeurs in skirmish operations.

So to answer your question.

What Davout says is "The companies of the voltigeurs are already familiar with these manoeuvers". That is all. He doesn't say they are the only methods being used, or that the Legere doesn't have their own maneuvers. Legere regiments certainly did over a long period of war. There are specific reasons why each of Davout's Divisions has a Legere regiment in it.

He issues the instructions for the sake of 'uniformity.' If the Voltigeurs were the only ones 'trained', and only in this one set of procedures, then any need for 'uniformity' would
have already been met.

That Davout specifically says for the divisional commanders to issue the instructions, 'whether light regiments or line regiments' is significant. It is obvious from the instructions and the mention of fusiliers that the line troops are to be included. Identifying the Light regiments too suggests that the divisional commanders might have assumed they didn't need the instructions--they were already practiced in their own methods.

If that were so, why issue the Legere the instructions?

Uniformity. Making sure that when voltigeurs, line and light troops skirmished together, that they all did it the same way.

Yes, the 10th Legere instructions are actually dated 1823, though they seem to be built on earlier instructions, very much a mix of Davout and Reille's instructions among others. I mentioned it because it is an example of individual regiments creating their own instructions, a practice that lasted long after the Napoleonic wars and not just in the French army.

One that created issues of 'uniformity.'

Bill

Bill,

Just to clarify what I was pointing out:

You claimed that Davout's instructions were for ligne troops only and not for leger. Reading Davout's instructions this is not the case at all.

Regarding the use of Leger troops primarily as the advanced skirmishers of a division; my main interest is the Peninsula, and while I have seen several secondary sources relating to other theatres that give the impression that this may have been the case there, in Spain it would seem that the leger functioned in the main as close order troops. I have read the memoirs of Lemonier-Delafosse of the 31st leger and cannot recall any instances of this regiment being used as skirmishers, although Lemonier-Delafosse mentions the voltigeurs of his regiment skirmishing on several occasions.

In more general terms, I agree with your view on skirmishing in the Napoleonic wars to a large degree, but I think that it is important to distinguish between troops fighting in an organised extended order and those fighting in something other than close order, or en debandade. You have claimed in this thread that 7,500 allied troops fought as skirmishers around Hougoumont. This is simply not true. Some of the units listed never entered the area and were formed in square or column for the entire day (Most of the Hanoverian Brigade of H Halkett and most of the KGL brigade of Du Plat). Reading accounts from those allied line troops that did fight within the Hougoumont enclosures, their actions were hardly those of a skirmish line, but rather those of troops disrupted by the environment. In wargames terms this would not be skirmishing, but would be covered by rules for disorder due to obstacles or rough ground in my opinion.

Major

This makes sense to me, would you say that the OP was a case of en debandade?

Whirlwind,

You are quite right. I should read the full sentence in future, it is a long time since I looked at this document. Senior moment. Sorry if I have confused people (and myself)!

As far as French light regiment training is concerned, I have seen a handful of instructions, from formation commanders and regimental instructions and Bill (Mc) is right, not one is exactly the same even if they are similar. As I remember 10th is post Napoleonic but not by much.

My view is that there was no single 'Standard Operating Procedure' for skirmishing in the French army.

Bill (XV)

"My view is that there was no single 'Standard Operating Procedure' for skirmishing in the French army."

I think you are right. One of the problems we have is our tendency to look into the past using the parameters we are familiar with. As in modern military everything is set into doctrine, we unconsciously try to find the 'doctrine' of the armies of the past, when probably it didn't exist. At least, it didn't in the formalized way it does at the present.

@basileus66,

The other thing is that the British, Prussians and Austrians did have standard instructions for skirmishing (I presume though don't know that the Russians did too).

We then take this knowledge and say 'the French must have had some too' and go looking for them. When they cannot be found we go a stage further and they 'this can't be right, are not the French famous for their skirmishers'.

People have been looking for these instructions for as long as I've been interested in wargaming and the period. There was a series of articles on the subject several years ago in First Empire magazine (which seems to have ceased publication). No single French SOP emerged, just several that were similar but all slightly different.

If we believe Marbot that these skirmishers "neutralised each other and decided nothing". In which case one could argue that rules representing the operational level (division and above) can probably ignore them unless there is a major disparity in number of skirmishers deployed. At tactical level perhaps more is needed.

What remain something of a mystery is what the OP described which appears to be the notorious grande bande, which seems to be something different. Very little I have seen describes how these functioned.

Bill XV

Major Snort wrote:

You claimed that Davout's instructions were for ligne troops only and not for leger. Reading Davout's instructions this is not the case at all.

Major:
That isn't quite what I was saying. Obviously the instructions were copied and sent to the Legere as well as the ligne. I was making a distinction as to why.

Davout specifically identifies the issue for the Ligne Fusiliers, not only in his letter to Morand, but also the instructions. The center companies of the Legere are not mentioned. The instructions were sent to the Legere as well as the Ligne for the sake of uniformity, not because the center companies were ignorant of skirmish methods or had never 'mixed' with their voltigeurs as was the case with the Fusiliers.

The voltigeurs were 'already familiar' with the methods outlined in the instructions. There is no suggestion that they were the only methods used or that they were 'familiar' with. The context here is Davout approving of a Division commander's independent "project to teach the service of the skirmishers [tirailleurs] to all troops." And in the insterests of uniformity, has the methods already familiar to the voltigeurs [not trained, familiar…interesting use of the word…in French 'to be aware of.'] sent to all commands. But what troops are identified as needing the training, as unfamiliar with skirmishing? The Fusiliers.

The Instructions Davout sent weren't newly invented, nor were they the 'only way to do it.' They were identified at that point in 1811 as the way the I Corps would do it across all troops for the sake of uniformity.

Regarding the use of Leger troops primarily as the advanced skirmishers of a division; my main interest is the Peninsula, and while I have seen several secondary sources relating to other theatres that give the impression that this may have been the case there, in Spain it would seem that the leger functioned in the main as close order troops. have read the memoirs of Lemonier-Delafosse of the 31st leger and cannot recall any instances of this regiment being used as skirmishers, although Lemonier-Delafosse mentions the voltigeurs of his regiment skirmishing on several occasions.

Well, the Legere battalions were certainly used as close-order troops, but there are plenty of instances where they were used as skirmishers. So were the Ligne troops. Was Lemoier-Delafoose at Bussaco when Massena ordered additional skirmishers to be deployed? How did the 31st accomplish that with only the voltigeurs?

There are any number of instances where both Legere and Ligne center companies were used as skirmishers. Here are a couple of examples.

1. I think you are aware of Pelet's discription of Ney's divisional assault at Bussaco where the entire division deployed as skirmishers, the Legere regiment leading. And if Pelet is to be believed, bemoaned what he says was the 'French approach to skirmishing' rather than some unique event.

2. Vimeiro: The battle began about 9:00 a.m. when General Junot sent Charlot's and Thomière's Brigades, along with seven guns, to attack the British on the ridgeline near Vimeiro. General Anstruther wrote later that:

The enemy came rapidly along the road, directly in front of the 50th, and when within about nine hundred yards deployed to their left, so as to bring their front parallel to ours; heavy cannonade from our guns, which caused the enemy much loss, but did not check his advance. Brigadier-General Fane sent out nearly all the 60th and some companies 95th, to skirmish with their sharpshooters; after a good deal of firing our people were driven in. Sent the light company 97th and three companies 52nd to cover their retreat; the latter made a gallant stand, but were at length driven in almost to the position, and the enemy advanced to the edge of the copse, about one hundred and fifty yards from us."

There were more than ten companies of British infantry sent to skirmish. The French had four battalions and 2 companies of Swill line. There is some question as to whether the voltigeurs companies were even with their battalions, but rather pulled away as part of the reserve. However, if they were there, the best they could have deployed were four companies. That isn't going to drive back six companies of the 60th and 95th, let alone the other five brought up to rescue them. So, Fusiliers in the center companies must have been used as there were no Legere battalions with the two brigades.

I can provide similar examples from Talavera, Salamanca and Vitoria. I am sure you have read where the British in the Peninsula report that French 'grenadiers' with their bearskins were skirmishing, which could have been either Ligne grenadiers or Legere carabiniers.

In more general terms, I agree with your view on skirmishing in the Napoleonic wars to a large degree, but I think that it is important to distinguish between troops fighting in an organised extended order and those fighting in something other than close order, or en debandade.

There were deployments particular to and exclusively associated with skirmishing actions. En debandage was one of those, grande bande another. I am not sure what distinction needs to be made here. Whether organized or en debandage, the combat category was termed skirmishing.

You have claimed in this thread that 7,500 allied troops fought as skirmishers around Hougoumont. This is simply not true. Some of the units listed never entered the area and were formed in square or column for the entire day.

Actually I said that Paget in his book Hougoumont claimed it.

Reading accounts from those allied line troops that did fight within the Hougoumont enclosures, their actions were hardly those of a skirmish line, but rather those of troops disrupted by the environment.

The traditional pervue of Light Infantry had always been woods and areas where close-order combat was difficult. That is why light infantry companies were the first to defend and attack the Hougoumont chateau, gardens, orchard and woods. The British referred to the engagement as a skirmish action. But no, they probably didn't form skirmish lines like they would in the open.

For instance. Here is Private Matthew Clay describing the situation, his Guard light company having retreated back to the Great Gate leaving him and a comrade, Private Gann behind.

We were earnestly engaged [by the enemy]…we were now left to ourselves and could see no one near us. The enemy skirmishers remained under cover and continued to fire at us, and we fired back and retired down the road up which we had advanced…On turning my eyes to the lower gates [Great Gate] I saw they were open…and we hurried towards them.

Clay and Gann were probably the last British to get in before the gates were closed. The French "skirmishers" pursued and rushed the gate led by Lt. Legros, known as L'Enfonceur" or 'The Smasher.' This group of 'skirmishers' just happened to be from a Legere Regiment, the 4th IIRC.

During the battle in the courtyard, a Hanoverian officer by the name of Lt. Wilder lost a hand. He was a member of one of the battalions that you feel were never there.

Whether this would be termed skirmishing in wargame rules isn't really the issue. The British termed it so, as did the French.

Bill

Bill McL,

In the quotation you provide from Gen Anstruther, you seem to be making the assumption that it was the French 'sharpshooters' that drove back all of those British infantryman, rather than French close-order supports? The text doesn't seem definitive.

Regards

de la debandage: This is when a unit is deployed without reserves, supports and possibly without regular pacing, all infantrymen being on the skirmish line.

Here is a Prussian officer using the term at Jena:

Lieutenant-Colonel von Hallmann, a battalion commander in the Infantry Regiment Winning No 23:

"The enemy line advanced and sent light troops after us, we formed front three or four times and fired, we had no Schuetzen, so Lieutenant-Colonel von Hallmann ordered 1st Lieutenant von Wobeser to cover the retreat with his company, and this he did as well as he could with musketeers operating 'a la debande' . . ."

Colonal Marbot in describing French combat methods divided Tirailleur actions into two categories:[Bressonet reviews this in his study]

1. Tirailleurs de marche et de combat or 'of march and combat' and

2. Tirailleurs en grande bande or 'in a large group.'

The actual deployment, use of supports, etc. were identical in both cases. The difference was one of combat mission.

In the first case, regardless of the numbers, the purpose of the Tirailleurs of march and combat was to protect and support close-order troops. As Bressonet says, they were "subordinate to the actions of the battalions."

The Tirailleurs in a large group or grande bande was an independent light infantry force with its own command and mission goals. As Bressonet says, they "form a corps principal whose goal is to take or defend a position or surround the enemy's flanks.

Like a number of French military terms, they signify combat use and intentions rather than different deployment or combat methods. [A column of maneuver compared to a column of attack is one example that confuses people because there is a formation called an attack column, but when the French identify an attack column they aren't always referring to the actual formation but the purpose of the column.]

Certainly Grande Bande often employed large numbers, sometimes many companies, whole battalions or more, but the actual skirmish methods were not different, but built on the foundation of the company deployment with supports etc.

Bill

Bill,

Regarding your interpretation of Davout's instructions; you rightly say that only fusilier centre companies are mentioned, but when he discusses the troops who were already familiar with the instructions he mentions only voltigeurs, not voltigeurs and chasseurs, just voltigeurs. Why were the chasseurs not familiar with them? Also, is it not possible that all centre companies, line or light, could have been referred to as fusiliers in a communication such as this?

Just as you claim the chasseurs are not identified as needing extra training, they are also not identified as being competent to use the new instructions or to skirmish. As previously stated, I cannot believe that the voltigeur companies of light regiments would have previously received different skirmish training than the chasseurs.

Whirlwind:

Who were the British skirmishing with? The 'sharpshooters'. Who were sent out to rescue them: Skirmishers. There is no suggestion that the formed battalions were the ones involved in "after a good deal of firing our people were driven in."

I find it hard to believe that 400 voltigeurs [tops] drove in seven companies of riflemen [600-700] after a good deal of firing because of the formed battalions behind them…They were driven in, not simply pushed back by the advance of formed troops. However, if it was true, that the Formed troops advancing was the reason the British light companies were 'driven in', why would another five companies of skirmishers have been sent to rescue them? How?

Oman's description of the combat: Vol I, p. 354

The French came on in their usual style, a thick line of Tirailleurs, supported by battalion columns close in their rear….[Fane and Anstruther were on the slope of a hill partially hidden.] Fane had got most of the riflemen of the 60th and 95th out in front, at the foot of the hill in a very thick skirmishing line; only a few companies of them were in reserve alone with the 50th at the head of the slope. [visible, and the regiment which sends out companies to rescue the riflemen] In each quarter the course of the fight was much the same: the French tirailleurs pushed up the slope among the brushwood and vienyards, slowly diving the riflemen before them. [Who was driving?] Then, as they drew near the crest, the two English Brigadiers suddenly let loose their formed battalions upon the assailants.

The question is how four companies of voltigeurs could have done that without more skirmishers…. Of course, I am assuming skill parity between the British rifles and the French tirailleurs.

Bill

Bill,

Regarding skirmishing and the use of leger regiments in the Peninsula, I am not claiming that French line troops were never used in the skirmish line ot that leger units never skirmished. I am saying that leger units do not normally seem to have been used as a skirmish line to cover the rest of the division, rather this task was normally initially fulfilled by the voltigeurs.

I don't see anything in Massena's orders for Busaco that required the deployment of additional skirmishers. His instruction to Ney is merely that he should be "preceded by his tirailleurs". Whether the second corps received instructions to deploy additional skirmishers is not clear, but I have certainly never seen an order to this effect. Lemonier-Delafosse was at Busaco with the 31st leger and attacked the ridge. The only skirmishers he mentions from his regiment are the voltigeurs, the rest of the unit struggling to form line on the summit.

In a different part of the field, Pelet doesn't describe the troops "deploying" into skirmish order, instead, a brigade "attacked on the flank by artillery, was thrown to the left of the road. After fighting for some time, it found itself almost entirely dispersed into groups of skirmishers, and in the end it became necessary to support this unit with the second brigade." I am presuming that Horward's translation is accurate and if so this incident would best be covered in wargames rules by a disorganisation result being applied to the brigade, rather than being a clever decision to extend into skirmish order on the part of a commander.

I am saying that leger units do not normally seem to have been used as a skirmish line to cover the rest of the division, rather this task was normally initially fulfilled by the voltigeurs.

I agree. The SOP was to deploy the voltigeurs for screening the parent battalion.

And if it is the SOP, why would Massena,not once, but twice specifically mention skirmishers preceding the columns in an army-wide order as if they wouldn't normally?

I don't think the orders to the II corps area all that unclear. And of course, the British at Bussaco report 'thick' and 'heavy' French skirmish forces, as Anstruther reported a 'thick British skirmish line' at Vimeiro when seven companies covered the two brigade front…in line. If half or so of a voltigeur company screen with the rest in support is covering their battalion, that is at most 50 men.

As for Pelet, is wasn't disorder. He specifically says, contrasting the British skirmish practices during that particular engagement, "Our system permitted French regiments to be dispersed during a battle…" Howard's translation again on the very same page. That dispersal is part of the French 'system' not some result of disorder and Pelet didn't think it was all that 'clever'.

I think there are some semantic issues. For instance, at Jena the Hohenloe regiment reinforced their Schuzten 'several times' with volunteers from the center companies, but the colonel of the regiment only references the Schutzen's activities for the entire battle, even though by his count, they were probably outnumbered by the line infantry volunteers sent to support them.

You see the British do this also, referring to their light company's actions when it is supported by other line companies. It makes sense as the officer of the light troops would be the one in charge of any added supports. That *could* be the same process with the French voltigeurs. Any center companies sent to support them would still be under the command of the voltigeur command and so possibly referred to as voltigeurs in general.

I think one of the biggest problems for us is that Napoleonic officers did not have the same relationship to terminology that we and our current military do for a variety of reasons.

Bill

Bill McL,

It is no particular thing, I'm perfectly happy with the idea of French centre companies skirmishing. In this instance though – and I'm happy with the text of both quotations – I'm not neccessarily convinced that the French were using lots of skirmishers. Perhaps as the shielded French columns advanced the British skirmishers were forced to retreat upon their supports – the text does not imply cause, it only says after a deal of firing the Brit skirmishers were driven in (no subject) . After all, the sentences immediately following your quotation go:

There was one fierce volley from the six guns on the hill top, and then the 97th charged Charlot's men in front, while the 52nd swerved round and took them in flank. One smashing discharge at ten paces blew to pieces the heads of the columns of the 32nd and 82nd, which crumpled up in hopeless disorder and rolled down to the foot of the hill, pursued by their assailants…

It seems clear that in this case the French supports were pushing close behind their skirmish screen as the British were able to defeat them (both) in short order. I'm not saying that there weren't lots of French centre company' skirmishers deployed, just saying not necessarily.

Anyway, back to the main debate, much more interesting!

Regards

The answer to the topic question is "Yes"
Now lets move more to the topic as we all have enough information about skirmishing and take a look at rule sets.

This pertains to skermishing and not anything else, Here in El Paso we play home grown rules and our game look like this"

Waterloo

every regiment has it skirmisher out in front.

Whirlwind:

Well, 'drive', drove and 'driven' was a commonly used verb for forceful eviction and skirmishers doing more than 'pushing' others back.

As an example:

Action at Grijon, 11 May 1809, the British advance on Oporto:

"While the light troops of the legion were thus engaged, two companies of the first line battalion, under the command of captains Detmering and von Marshalk, and one company of the second line battalion under captain Langrehr, which had been sent to support the skirmishers, became also engaged with the French light infantry, whom they in like manner drove back, but not without some sacrifice; for captain Detmering was killed, captain Langrehr received a shot through the arm, and eight men were wounded."

Beamish, King's German Legion, vol. i, p.193

Questions keep coming up. How did seven British rifle companies become 'driven' back by four voltigeur companies?

Why would Massena say in his orders, not once, but twice to place skirmishers preceding the columns? I mean, wouldn't they normally? Were his veteran officers really that clueless? They saw the terrain as well as Massena. It meant something else.

Skirmish screens could be heavy or thick, skirmish screens could involve thousands of men, and be advanced and advancing ahead of the main line nearly a mile at times [Hill's division at Vittoria]

Skirmish deployments wer far more flexible in size, participating units, and distances from the main body than most wargame rules would have you believe.

Bill

Lord G:

Ghee, that's an inspiring tabletop.

Bill

McLaddie has expressed it better than I could – inspiring

It is Retired Maj. Norris Waterloo board

The Major created this board in 1981 and I have been luckly able to game on it since. It is of 9 pieces and you can rotate it 27 different ways.

:)

Lord Ghee

Whirlwind:

Your conclusion is that the formed French troops at Vimeiro 'drove' the British skirmishers back and that more British skirmishers were then used to rescue them from these formed troops.

You don't see that kind of dynamics on the battlefield. For instance, at Bussaco, Craufurd deploys 1500 men as skirmishers in front of his Light Division…that is half of the entire division. Loison's Division, preceded by skirmishers advances up the slope towards Craufurd. The Division stops, three more battalions are deployed as skirmishers and the rest of the division, at least five battalions in close formation continue to advance up the slope.

In your Vimeiro scenario, the British lights should be 'driven in' by the formed troops advancing behind the French skirmishers. They don't. The British skirmishers simply let the French columns pass through and on up the slope while continuing to hold back the skirmishers.

So, why didn't the formed troops push back the British. There were at least the same number of French skirmishers as the British at Bussaco? Obviously the Bussaco skirmishers didn't have to be rescued from the close-order troops.

I know the 'pushing back' of skirmishers by formed troops is a wargame dynamic. The question is whether it is a common or required one on the battlefield, rather than a choice made by the skirmishers. Paddy Griffith's Volume IX of Oman's The History of the Peninsular War</a> has a pertinent discussion of this dynamic on pages 287-289.

Bill

Bill

Bill McL,

Craufurd deploys 1500 men as skirmishers in front of his Light Division

Where were all these men? Let's assume that half were in a skirmish chain in advance of their supports, the chain being at 5 pace intervals. That's 375 individual pairs of men, covering a frontage of 1,562 yards. Whereas, at the point of attack the frontage was about 650 yards wide. This lesser width could have been covered by about 300 men in a skirmish chain [600 including supports].

By comparison, if the 1500 men were in close order and in two-ranks, they would have occupied a frontage of 460 yards [without intervals].

It is possible that those men extended slightly to open their files presenting something like a two-rank open order – and that this became the first line of defense, neither a skirmish screen/chain, nor a close order formation. A traditional two-rank open order would have occupied a frontage of 1000 yards – perhaps that's the formation that Craufurd's men adopted. Which in comparison to a typical French skirmish chain would have been excessively dense.

npm

There is surprisingly little detail available for how Craufurd's skirmishers were deployed at Busaco, possibly because several of the 95th diarists had been wounded at the Coa and were not present, but I would rule out the open 2 deep line option from what I have read.

The skirmish line and supports seem to have been deployed in some depth and fought with the French for some time prior to them reaching the crest. Jonathan Leach writes that the 95th were engaged with the enemy skirmishers for 3 days, so I believe that a large portion of the 1,500 men would have been either supports or reserves. The French officer Pelet wrote of this part of the field:

[The Anglo-Portuguese] had withdrawn all the advance posts from the foot of the mountain, but halfway up the slope a line of skirmishers was established, sustained by small posts and strong reserves. The various vulnerable points such as rocks, groups of trees, hedges etc, had been carefully reinforced

If the Allies were following standard procedure for light battalions deployed far in advance of the main line, then possibly only one quarter of the whole would have been in the firing line at any one time. (one quarter skirmishing, one quarter in close order support, one half in close order reserve)

A letter written by Jonathan Leach offers a bit more info about the deployment:

…the hills occupied by the Light Division were extremely high and the approach to them near the summit full of craggy rocks. Amongst these and some fir trees our companies lay scattered and had such excellent cover that I am puzzled to conceive how we contrived to lose 41 men…All the prisoners who were taken agreed in the report that even the General who led on the attack did not conceive that the hill was defended by anything more than a few skirmishers…

This all suggests that the firing line was extended, and not particularly densely formed.

MajS.

This all suggests that the firing line was extended, and not particularly densely formed.

Based on the quotes you provide, that would be my conclusion too – and it makes it all the more reasonable to be cautious when considering what was actually meant when '1500' men were deployed as skirmishers.
In the example you offer,

one quarter skirmishing, one quarter in close order support, one half in close order reserve

we can calculate that of the 1500 men only 375 men would have been in the actual skirmish chain line, or about 180 pairs. If covering a frontage of approximately 650 yards, these would have been spaced at a little over 4 pace intervals – which sounds about right.

npm

Bill wrote,

In your Vimeiro scenario, the British lights should be 'driven in' by the formed troops advancing behind the French skirmishers. They don't. The British skirmishers simply let the French columns pass through and on up the slope while continuing to hold back the skirmishers.

Bill,

I would say that the idea of the British skirmishers letting the French columns pass through while continuing to fight the French skirmishers would be unusual. With the British linear deployment, it was essential that the front of the line was clear before engaging the French columns and several examples of this can be found happening in various battles. The skirmishers would be expected to withdraw to the rear before the close order troops engaged, whether they had been succesful or not.

A good description of this dynamic in action comes from the battle of Barrosa. Despite Oman claiming that the French deployed no skirmishers in front of Laval's Division, British accounts note that the clash of the formed battalions was preceded by a spirited skirmish engagement which lasted up to an hour. There is a good description of this written soon after the action by Major Duncan of the artillery. Surtees of the 95th participated in this fight and doesn't claim to have either driven in the enemy skirmishers, or to have been driven in by them. He wrote:

Our people extended as we went up the hill, the Portuguese [flank companies of the 20th regiment] supporting us in the rear; and in a very short time we were hotly engaged with the fellows with the beautiful green feathers…at this time the grenadier battalion of the 8th, with their waving red plumes, began to advance in close column, the drums beating all the time the pas de charge [probably a column of companies formed right in front with the grenadiers leading]. They were supported by other columns in their rear…The 8th advanced, notwithstanding the galling fire kept up by our people and the Portuguese, every shot must have told, as they were in a solid body, not more than 100 to 150 yards distance. Our people were of course compelled to give way to this imposing column…

This is very similar to the scenario proposed by Whirlwind, so it isn't an impossible suggestion.

Major Snort:

No not an impossible suggestion--not at all. Not suggesting the Vimeiro skirmish action was unusual, I was suggesting that it was some SOP that was always followed, and shouldn't be assumed because of that.

Note the French came within in similar distance 150yards to 190 yards as noted at Vimeiro, but Major Duncan doesn't say that nearly the same number of skirmish companies had to be sent out to cover their retreat…

I am not sure how 'unusual' that would be. There should be some comparisons of examples here. If the French columns were let through--made way for--then the British line would have a clear short at them just as they did at Bussaco.

And the front of the skirmishers would naturally go well beyond the flanks of the British line, which would also 'aid' in giving way to the columns by gathering behind the flank skirmishers--obviously what was done from the descriptions. The British seem to be very good at rotating skirmishers through the skirmish line, as Pelet notes.

Bill

To follow up on my comments, I don't think that the French restricted themselves to just the voltigeurs in most instances though they did start with them, and couldn't have to have achieved the results they actually did a number of times. And the behavior of skirmishers before the advance of formed troops was not a one note response, or being ‘driven in'.

Skirmish combat was much more fluid than that, and not anywhere as 'johnny one note' as many historians, starting with Oman have suggested.

At Bussaco, Jonathan Leach, a light infantry and then Rifle officer comments [p. 165] Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier

"General Loison's divisions, which led the attack, was allowed by General Crawford [sic] to reach nearly the summit of the ridge, when he ordered a volley from his division, and a charge with the bayonet."

"…was allowed…" The word suggests that Craufurd could have stopped Loison, if he had chosen, probably because he had once before. Lower down the slope Loison had been forced to stop his columns of close-order infantry and deploy three battalions as tirailleurs to deal with the British skirmishers. Craufurd made a tactical choice… rather than being ‘driven in.'

Napier of the 52nd at Bussaco:

We were retired a few yards from the brow of the hill, so that our line was concealed from the view of the enemy as they advanced up the hights, and our skirmishers retires, keeping up a constant and well directed running fire upon them;…General Craufurd himself stood on the brow of the hill watching every movement of the attacking column, and when all of our skirmishers had passed by and joined their respective corps, and the head of the enemy's column was within a very few yards of him, he ordered the 52nd to charge."

[pp. 123-124] The early Military Life of General Sir George Napier KCB

As the ‘respective corps', the Rifles and Caçadores , remained to the flanks and lower down the slope the entire time, the relatively few troops in front of the French columns passed by the formed troops and moved down the slope again.

Here is another example of a skirmish line letting formed troops pass through, friendly troops in attacking at Sabugal:

Our four companies had led up in skirmishing order, driving in [there's that word again] the enemy's light troops; but the summit was defended by a strong compact body, against which we could make no head; but opening out, and allowing the 43rd to advance, with a tearing volley and a charge, sent the enemy rolling into the valley below, when the rifles again went to work in front, sticking to them like leeches.

PP. 8-9 Adventures in the Rifle Brigade

Bill

Bill,

Where is the evidence that "the Rifles and Caçadores remained to the flanks and lower down the slope the entire time" in the action at Busaco? Every account I have seen, both primary and secondary, indicates that the rifles and cacadores were all forced back up the slope and behind the supporting line of light infantry.

Kincaid's account of Sabugal is not really supported by other accounts. His "opening out" to allow the 43rd to pass is described by Leach in more believable terms as:

"Reynier's corps, after a sharp fire, forced back, with overwhelming numbers, the four companies of the 95th on the 43rd regiment….But the 43rd, on which the riflemen were driven back for support, was a corps not to be meddled with free of expense…"

So far from being some voluntary action with the 95th performing fleet-footed sideways manoeuvres to avoid the advancing columns, it seems that it could have been a rather hasty retreat born out of necessity, with the retreating rifles passing around the flanks of the supporting line before rallying, identical to that experienced by Surtees at Barossa.

MS wrote:
Kincaid's account of Sabugal is not really supported by other accounts. His "opening out" to allow the 43rd to pass is described by Leach in more believable terms as:

"Reynier's corps, after a sharp fire, forced back, with overwhelming numbers, the four companies of the 95th on the 43rd regiment….But the 43rd, on which the riflemen were driven back for support, was a corps not to be meddled with free of expense…"

Hey MS:

I am not sure why Leach is more reliable or why you see his account as counterdicting all of Kincaid's.

Our four companies had led up in skirmishing order, driving in [there's that word again] the enemy's light troops; but the summit was defended by a strong compact body, against which we could make no head; but opening out, and allowing the 43rd to advance, with a tearing volley and a charge, sent the enemy rolling into the valley below, when the rifles again went to work in front, sticking to them like leeches.

In both accounts there is a sharp fight and apart from the different in the Rifle companies' response [make no headway vs forced back by overwhelming numbers]. In both cases, the 43rd does take on the French,obviously without the British skirmishers in the way. They had to get out of the way--whether they were driven back 'involuntarily' or 'fleet-footed. 'Opening up' as the method of getting out of the way, moving to one or both flanks, is not all that strange.

MS wrote:

it seems that it could have been a rather hasty retreat born out of necessity, with the retreating rifles passing around the flanks of the supporting line before rallying, identical to that experienced by Surtees at Barossa.

That retreating around the flanks is not something only born of 'necessity.'

For instance, in The Regulations for the Exercise of British Rifle and Light Infantry it references units withdrawing to the left and right as well as 'on their supports' which are normally to be positioned on the flanks--obviously for good reasons. Later, on page 28 is says:

The commanding officer of the advanced guard will of course have been previously directed, whether in case of falling in with an enemy, he is to attack or merely to amuse him with his skirmishers [love that 'amuse'], or whether he is to fall back. In the last instance, he must not retire with the main body, but, by withdrawing in an oblique direction, leave a clear stage for the operations of that corps against the enemy.

Even Leach himself describes a similar maneuver early in his account [pp. 50-1]

As soon as we[the 95th] had got clear of the front of the 97th, and passed around its right flank, that it staggered the resolution of the hostile column, which declined to close and measure its strength against them.

That isn't a maneuver born of 'necessity' or out of the ordinary. At Talavera, where Roland Hill was concerned that his infantry line could not deliver a volley without hitting their own skirmishers:

The light companies of Hill's division came in so slowly and unwillingly, turning back often to fire, and keeping their order with the regularity of a field-day [the distances between pairs, I am assuming]. The general, wishing to get his front clear, bade the bugles sound to bring them in more guickly, and as they filed to the rear in a leisurely way was heard to shout…'D--n their filing, let them come in anyhow.

According to the Regulations, that 'filing' was the skirmish line/chain moving files together to the left or the right flank in preparation for moving off behind the battleline and returning to close order. Doing it leisurely would mean they were still in front of at least part of the battleline as they did the filing.

All of which is to say, that Kincaid's 'opening out' is just another way of describing how light troops could and did withdraw from the front of a battleline. And as the light troops would be on the flanks of a much narrower enemy column, it is quite possible that they simply stayed there with their supports rather than retreating behind the formed troops…thus opening out rather than filing left and right to then withdraw behind the rest of the light brigade…particularly when a relatively small number [what 300 to 600] of that 1500 skirmishers would have actually been covering the front of the formed line's 700 yards of front.

Arthur Harryman discusses this in his Chapter 11 on the British Rifles and Light Infantry in the Peninsular War as part of editor Paddy Griffith's IX volume of Oman's A History of the Peninsular War. pp.287-289

In any case, I don't think I am pushing some strange view of British or French skirmish operations here.

Bill

Just another British description of recalling skirmishers:

A Practical Guide for the Light Infantry Officer

Capt. T. H. Cooper 56th Foot 1806

He References
Baron Gross, <b.Duties for an Officer in the Field and Particularly Light Infantry 1801
General Jarry Instructions concerning the Duties of Light Infantry in the Field 1803 English translation
Otway's Turpin's Art of War
Ehwald on the Duties of Light Troops 1799
and the British Regulations of Riflemen and Light Infantry 1798

This publication was very popular with British officers.

In Cooper's book:
Page 38
LINE HALTED OR ADVANCING WHEN LIGHT INFANTRY ARE CALLED IN.

When the Light Companies are called in, the line may either be halted or advancing.

In the first case they will retire towards the line, closing to their outer flanks by degrees, so as when they come near their battalions they many be in two divisions, ready to file round the flanks fo the battalion to their places.

If the line is advancing, they will only close to their outer flanks, so as to be in two divisions by the time the line comes up to them, when they will instantly face outwards, and file to the rear.

The italized description fits Kincaid's 'opening out' to let the battleline pass. If they didn't file to the rear, but remained on the flanks, that would fit the entire description.

Cooper's book is available for free from Google:

link

Jarry, Ehwald and Gross are also available.

Bill

Bill,

I am aware of the methods used by the British to recall skirmishers, but the point that I was questioning is this from one of your previous posts:

I know the 'pushing back' of skirmishers by formed troops is a wargame dynamic. The question is whether it is a common or required one on the battlefield, rather than a choice made by the skirmishers.

You seem to be suggesting here and in other posts that the withdrawal of allied skirmishers in the face of French attacks at Busaco and Sabugal was a choice made by the skirmishers and if they had the mind to do so, they could have withstood the advancing columns and tirailleurs. I disagree. I also disagree with the suggestion that the only part of a skirmish line that would withdraw when facing an advancing column would be the section directly in its front and that the rest would carry on merrily skirmishing with a large enemy force past their flank threatening to cut them off :-)

Major Snort:

I appreciate the clarification. For me, it's a question of what actions explain the narratives and the results. I can see I need to clarify too. You disagree on two points. Let me address them in two separate posts. Your first statement:

You seem to be suggesting here and in other posts that the withdrawal of allied skirmishers in the face of French attacks at Busaco and Sabugal was a choice made by the skirmishers and if they had the mind to do so, they could have withstood the advancing columns and tirailleurs. I disagree.

So, you feel that stopping the French Advance…even for a while, or stripping the French columns of their tirailleur support were not tactical options?

Your alternative seems to be that the British skirmishers had no other options and no other result was possible—retreating. Given the narratives and dynamics described at Bussaco and Sabugal, and many others during the Peninsular Wars, that doesn't fit. The British lights retreating, recalled and ending up back behind the main line isn't the only option possible for the British lights. It certainly doesn't explain the accounts of Bussaco.

Arthur Harryman, in The Modern Studies, the IX Volume of Oman's History of the Peninsular History p. 287 noted:

At Bussaco, Leach comments that "General Loison's division, which led the attack, was allowed by General Crawford [sic] to reach nearly the summit of the ridge."… The use of the word ‘allowed' is surely intended to convey the author's belief that Craufurd, could, if he had so desired, prevented the column from reaching the crest of the ridge; which could only have been achieved by ordering the Riflemen and Caçadores lower down the slope not to fall back before the French advance, and , if necessary, deploying more troops as skirmishers to halt the enemy tirailleurs and force the French column to reinforce its own skirmish line. …resulting in a prolonged exchange of fire for no appreciable result.

If that ability to stop the French columns sounds unlikely, remember it had already happened lower down the slope where the British lights, without support from Craufurd's battleline, had been so numerous and put up such a fight that Loison stopped his advance to deploy three whole battalions as skirmishers [and this is after all his voltigeurs were out, between 600-800 men].

If the British skirmishers'only response to tirailleurs and columns advancing on them was to withdraw, to be ‘driven in', what dynamic occurred at Bussaco to ‘force' Loison to deploy another 1500 tirailleurs?

David Gates describes what he believes is the general dynamic in British skirmish actions in his book British Light Infantry Arm p. 165 -167:

The Allied skirmishers, having halted the progress of the French voltigeurs and driven them back, would also turn their attention increasingly to the enemy's columns. "Our Rifles," Captain Kincaid recalled in writing of the first French infantry assault at Waterloo,

…opened such a fire on the advancing skirmishers as quickly brought them to a standstill; but their columns advanced steadily through them, although our incessant tiralade was telling in their centre with fearful exactness.

…The worst case of this occurred at the Battle of Bussaco in 1810, where having fought their way through hundreds of Allied light troops up an extraordinarily steep slope, Loison's division of Ney' corps d'armée had all but reached the crest of Wellington's ridge… Their voltigeurs screen having long since been driven in by the Allied skirmishers, Loison's battalions had no opportunity to deploy into a more suitable formation for a mustketry duel.

Now, I believe that Gates' conclusion is certainly one of the results caused by British lights, but it all depended on the tactical circumstances, enemy decisions and numbers.

So the questions are:

Exactly where at Bussaco are Craufurd's skirmishers in relation to the British lines and French columns, considering Kincaid's Waterloo description and Gate's generalization? Where are the French columns and tirailleurs throughout Loison's advance at Bussaco?

If, at Bussaco, the British lights had retreated in the face of Loison's advance, why didn't the French tirailleurs follow too? What tactical decisions did each side make?

Where were the French lights when Loison reached the crest? Where were the British lights?

If the combination of columns and light infantry was so irresistible, how did the British at Bussaco contain the French light infantry, but not the advancing columns?

The other question is where did they contain them?
Obviously not in front of Loison's columns, if
a. the French didn't stop and
b. there were no lights reported between Loison and Craufurd's formed troops.

If the British skirmishers were still holding the French lights at bay, then they weren't doing it in front of Loison's columns or Craufurd's line—or were they recalled behind it.

Either the British lights continued hold the French tirailleurs back somewhere, or 2,000+ tirailleurs simply ‘decided' to let Loison's columns go it alone while the British skirmish line retreated back behind Craufurd's line.

I don't think so, and it certainly doesn't explain what actually happened.

Gates and Harryman concluded that the British lights had driven in the French lights, stripped Loison's columns of their support…and were continuing to do so--and not in front of Loison--when Craufurd struck.

Physically, how do you see the British skirmishers operating on the ground at Bussaco to produce the descriptions and results we both have read?

Bill

Major Snort wrote:

I also disagree with the suggestion that the only part of a skirmish line that would withdraw when facing an advancing column would be the section directly in its front and that the rest would carry on merrily skirmishing with a large enemy force past their flank threatening to cut them off :-)

Major:

If I understand correctly, you believe, regardless of the front occupied by the skirmish line compared to the enemy columns, the entire skirmish line would always withdraw and retire behind the main line in the face of such an enemy advance? Is that what you see happening at Sabugal?

Can we agree that British skirmishers were routinely deployed past the flanks of their own battle line, that the light supports were routinely deployed on the flanks and that the skirmishers were routinely recalled by the flanks? I provided quotes from two treatises that describe just such a maneuver for light troops, to clear the front of formed troops.

In the case of French columns vs a British line at Sabugal, a ‘recall' move to the flanks by the skirmishers would end up some distance—more than one hundred yards--from the French columns before retreating behind the battleline. [@800 yard front of Beckwith's British Brigade in line, @ 600 yard front of French columns, leaves 100 yards clear to each flank of the British line.] So, the moving to the flanks maneuver was SOP. Why couldn't they simply stay on the flanks and continue firing on the enemy?

However, you feel, contrary to Kincaid's description, there could never be an ‘opening out' of the skirmish line to allow either the enemy columns through or friendly troops a clear front by moving to the flanks?

You also believe the British skirmishers would be retreat rather than have the formed columns on their flank. I take it those columns wouldn't be bothered by the enemy skirmishers ontheir flanks at Bussaco and Sabugal?

You wrote:

Kincaid's account of Sabugal is not really supported by other accounts. His "opening out" to allow the 43rd to pass is described by Leach in more believable terms as:

"Reynier's corps, after a sharp fire, forced back, with overwhelming numbers, the four companies of the 95th on the 43rd regiment….But the 43rd, on which the riflemen were driven back for support, was a corps not to be meddled with free of expense…"

Again, I read this as an acknowledgement of tactical decisions. The riflemen were driven back for support.[?] So the French, wanting the British Riflemen to have support, drove them back, or was it a decision by the British to retreat back to gain the 43rd Light's support? I think the latter interpretation of the wording more reasonable, particularly in conjunction with Kincaid's description.

Leach doesn't say the Lights were recalled [retreating behind the 43rd], and neither does Kincaid. That certainly isn't the definition of ‘support' in light warfare.

It is quite possible that both men's accounts agree, as the actual fighting ranged back and forth, it is a question of who was describing what. Here is
Oman Vol. IV pp. 192-193

The combat of Sabugal. Beckwith's advance.

Merle…had just got the four battalions of the extreme flank regiment drawn out. [4th Léger]. They were, as usual, in column of divisions, (double companies), with a weak skirmishing line in front, which was at once driven in by the Rifles and Caçadores. Merle then led down his four columns against the screen of light troops which covered Beckwith's line, and drove them back with considerable loss to himself, and little to his opponents, since he had only skirmishers to shoot at, while his own combat battalion columns were very vulnerable. The light troops fell back to each flank of the line presented by the 43rd and formed companies of the Caçadores, and then halted and turned upon the enemy.

George Simmons gives this account of the action in his A British Rifleman: The Journals and Correspondence of Major George Simmons: pp.161-162

ACTION OF SABUGAL
Colonel Beckwith's Brigade crossed the river Coa ; 3rd the sides steep; the 95th led. It was deep and came up to my arm-pits. The officer commanding the French piquet ordered his men to fire a few shots and retire. On getting footing, we moved up in skirmishing order and followed in the track of the piquet. We were met by a [French} regiment, and kept skirmishing until the rest of the Brigade came up, when we pushed the enemy through some fine groves of large chestnut-trees upon the main body (Regnier's Corps or 2nd). Two guns opened on us and fired several discharges of round and grape. The guns were repeatedly charged, but the enemy were so strong that we were obliged to retire a little. Three columns of the enemy moved forward with drums beating and the officers dancing like madmen with their hats frequently hoisted upon their swords. Our men kept up a terrible fire. They went back a little, and we followed. This was done several times, when we were reinforced by the other Brigades, and the guns were taken. But from the enemy's numbers being very much superior, the combat was kept up very warmly until General Picton's (3rd) Division came up and pushed out its Light companies on their flank, the 5 th Regiment forming a line in support. The 5th Division, under General Dunlop, soon crossed at this bridge and passed through Sabugal. The enemy gave way and went off in confusion;…

Now, I italicized the different advances and retreats Simmons notes. Both Kincaid and Leach only comment on one advance and retreat.
It is quite possible that both men's accounts agree, as the actual fighting ranged back and forth, and they were commenting on different points in the battle. It is a question of who was describing what. Here is Oman Vol. IV pp. 192-193

The combat of Sabugal. Beckwith's advance.

Merle…had just got the four battalions of the extreme flank regiment drawn out. [4th Léger]. They were, as usual, in column of divisions, (double companies), with a weak skirmishing line in front, which was at once driven in by the Rifles and Caçadores. Merle then led down his four columns against the screen of light troops which covered Beckwith's line, and drove them back with considerable loss to himself, and little to his opponents, since he had only skirmishers to shoot at, while his own combat battalion columns were very vulnerable. The light troops fell back to each flank of the line presented by the 43rd and formed companies of the Caçadores, and then halted and turned upon the enemy.

That would seem to support Kincaid's description. Attacking the flanks of attacking French columns is nothing new. Merle could have thrown out 4 voltigeur companies against Beckwith's five, which I doubt would have been described as weak, nor could the British have driven them in so quickly. Merle doesn't seem to have deployed all four with a ‘weak skirmishing line' being described The skirmish dynamic is very much the description that Gates gives.

The question is why you feel, given Bussaco and Sabugal, the British light troops couldn't ‘open out', or at least would never ‘chose' that option.

I think Skirmish formations had many tactical options including:

1. Forcing the enemy to deploy more skirmishers.
2. Stripping the formed troops of protection, but allowing them through the skirmish line.
3. Overwhelming the enemy skirmishers with more numbers.
4. Using formed troops as ‘supports' in the same way skirmish lined deployed supports. As Cooper notes:
5. Simply ‘neutralizing' the opposition, in the hopes that the skirmishing won't escalate.

P. 75 SKIRMISHING:

"The Company being sufficiently instructed in the firings and manoeuvring, will proceed to skirmishing, when one general principal will be observed, namely, that seldom more than one half must be sent forward to skirmish, the other half is to remain formed in the rear, and ready to give support. If a battalion is in reserve, then a whole Company maybe sent forward to skirmish as in the advanced guard.

I guess the question would be why you feel the British wouldn't carry out the maneuver Kincaid says.

Bill

Major Snort quoted:

Stretton of the 40th regiment in Lambert's brigade, just to the left of the crossroads, claimed that the French in front of his position consisted of "a double line of tirailleurs, supported by a heavy column of infantry". He even drew a map to illustrate his account, showing the heavy column passing through the skirmishers (whom he shows not in a mob, cloud or grande bande, whatever one is, but in a straight, dispersed, line) and then forming line, noting that some of these troops were "bayoneted close to our front rank".

MS:

Sorry about the duplication of Oman's quote in the last passage. Completely missed that somehow. Ignore the first quote.

I read this on the Waterloo skirmishers thread and thought it applicable. I can ony imagine that the French skirmishers got out of the way of the columns by 'opening up' when the French columns 'passed through'.

Bill

Bill,

You have made some interesting points, but I don't have time to respond in any detail at the moment. I'll have a think about it tomorrow.

Regards

MS

Major S:

I understand. It took me two days to respond. As usual, I'll be interested in what you say, as they are always grounded in solid history and primary sources…

Bill

Bill,

Regarding your first post about the action in front of the Light Division at Busaco, as stated previously, there are surprisingly few eyewitness accounts, but I am not sure how Gates concludes that the French skirmishers had been "long since driven in".

Although I am sure you have seen all the following accounts, it may be worth posting them to illustrate why I think that it was the allied screen that was driven in:

Jean Jacques Pelet who witnessed the attack from the French position wrote:

Loison's division ascended fighting on one abutment after another. Stopping for an instant before each enemy post, Loison captured it immediately. Some areas were weakly defended by the English skirmishers, others had to be stormed with vigour. A few detached companies on the left had carried upper and lower Moura. This division broke through and pushed the last line of reserves; soon it was about to reach the crest.

Napier was with the 43rd Regiment and claimed:

The enemy's shot came singing up in a sharper key and the skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the edge of the ascent [in retreat] when the artillery drew back and the victorious cries of the French were heard within a few yards of the summit.

The Historical Record of the 52nd Regiment, which featured the contribution of Peninsula veterans, (the pre-1815 section was apparently compiled by the veteran officer John Cross) describes the action:

A multitude of light troops covered this [French] advance, and drove back the allied skirmishers till the bayonets of Simon's column appeared within a few yards of the plateau, and two companies had begun to deploy.

To illustrate that the 52nd were not attempting to claim an undue amount of credit, the "History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade" seems to confirm that this is actually what happened:

Our Riflemen and Cacadores could not hold back the dense advancing mass of tirailleurs and gradually retired up the hill, the bulk of them it is said forming up behind the 43rd since the ground on the flank of the 52nd was at places almost impractical

I haven't read the Modern Studies addition to Oman's history, but I would say that Arthur Harryman's (do you mean Arthur Harman's?) conclusion that Craufurd "allowed" the French advance to continue by purposely withdrawing his own skirmish line is completely unsubstantiated. Is this linked to the "aversion to skirmishing" quote? Leach could, more believably in my opinion, have been referring to the fact that Craufurd kept his strike force under cover until the last minute, rather than sending it down the slope to halt the French advance earlier.

You mention that Gates quotes Kincaid saying that the 95th at Waterloo: "opened such a fire on the advancing skirmishers as quickly brought them to a standstill; but their columns advanced steadily through them, although our incessant tiralade was telling in their centre with fearful exactness". This is interesting, because both Barnard and Kincaid note this episode, explaining that although they may have stopped their immediate opponents and also forced the main column to change direction, once the column was past their flank, they had to run for it:

Barnard, the battalion commander, wrote:

When the enemy made their first attack, this company [Leach's in the gravel pit] was soon obliged to join the others, and although they maintained their ground sufficiently to change the direction of the enemy's column, they were obliged to retire as it passed their left flank, and to join the companies at the hedge.

Kincaid had been with the other companies near the hedge and says:

We had held the knoll longer than prudence warranted with the enemy already round both flanks, and we were consequently obliged to make the best use of our heels to get into the position.

So although the rifles, who were part of a continuous skirmish screen, had held their immediate opponents, they had not driven them in and when the columns continued their advance past their flank, they were obliged to withdraw and presumably their halted opponents were able to follow up alongside the column.

This seems to have been one of the advantages of the French columnar approach, in that it allowed the tirailleurs to continue in action in the intervals until the last moments of an assault and if the tirailleurs were checked, a combined advance of columns and skirmishers provided the numbers required to force the British skirmish line to retire.

Regarding the question of where the French skirmishers were at the moment of contact with the 43rd and 52nd at Busaco, that remains a mystery, but there are plenty of other accounts that describe only the clash of formed troops when it is clear that French tirailleurs were present as well. At Vimeiro, John Patterson of the 50th describes his regiment's opponents as being covered by "a legion of tirailleurs" but when the column is tackled, only the close order troops are mentioned, as though the tirailleurs have disappeared. Luckily in this case Patterson summarises the action claiming that most of the regiment's losses had been caused by the tirailleurs "while covering their column". If the French skirmishers at Busaco had been retarded, rather than driven in, it is possible that they were either parallel with the head of the columns, rather than being in advance as a covering force, or even slightly further back, as in the examples of the 95th at Waterloo.

As a last thought, although some secondary sources claim that Loison had to commit several additional battalions to the skirmish fight, where is the primary evidence? Is it from Fririon, and if so do you have a copy?

Major S:

As usual, you don't disappoint. Let me put together my thoughts and such. I'll post soon. I do see I will have to revise my thinking on some points though.

Bill

This seems to have been one of the advantages of the French columnar approach, in that it allowed the tirailleurs to continue in action in the intervals until the last moments of an assault and if the tirailleurs were checked, a combined advance of columns and skirmishers provided the numbers required to force the British skirmish line to retire.

That is an excellent point. I'm going to add that to your definitive refutation of Nafziger's theories on the British 2-deep line as major contributions to my understanding of Napoleonic warfare, at least.

Best Regards

Thinking about it, have I read that somewhere before? Gates or Muir perhaps? Still an excellent point, mind.

Regards

Bill,

I have found confirmation of the position of French skirmishers at Busaco at the moment of the charge of the 43rd and 52nd regiments, which seems to be as I had assumed.

This letter written by Lt. Charles Booth of the 43rd appears in the Historical Record of that regiment:

In the part of the line occupied by the Light Division and about 200 yards immediately to its front two columns of the enemy – supposed about 5,000 each – were met by the two left hand companies of the 43rd, and the right two of the 52nd. The front of their columns only – chiefly composed of officers – stood the charge; the rest took to their heels… The flanks of the 43rd and 52nd in their charge met only the enemy's skirmishers who had, by superior numbers driven in the 95th Rifles but a few seconds before the charge of the division. These poor fellows were all glad enough to give themselves up as prisoners, our men not being allowed to fire a shot at them…

Major Snort:

You beat me to it. I was going to quote him more fully. I think Lt. Booth's description is one of the most technically detailed accounts I have read. More later, but you did still my thunder. One thing I was going to point out was his statement that the French deployed superior numbers of skirmishers… But I will reponse in full tomorrow.

Bill

Major:

Well, it took me a while to get back to this, but Bussaco certainly illuminates the uses of light infantry.

I agree that the evidence does indicate that the Rifles and the two Caçadore battalions did retreat up the slope before superior numbers of French skirmishers.

I still maintain that the French columns and skirmishers, in combination were not something that the British lights automatically gave way to in every case, nor were the French assume that they could push them back without driving them all in front of them. Loison did deploy battalions as skirmishers. And while the accounts of some British officers do say that the Rifles and Portuguese lights retreated around the flanks and rallied behind the 43rd and 52nd, I have found the accounts that made me believe, Harman and Gates' errors not withstanding, that the lights didn't all retreat behind the formed troops… So, the information:

I have looked at Booth, Napier and Leach's accounts as well as Verner's Hisory of the Rifle Brigade Vol. 2, the chapter on Bussaco, and William Cope's later history. I'm going to use Oman's unit strengths, though it really doesn't matter whose are used… the basic numerical relationships hold.

So, without using up too much space repeating what has been established or any lengthy quotes, let's reprise what the accounts tell us:

Loison's Division was made up of two Brigades, Simon's and Ferey's. Simons had six battalions:
26th Ligne 3 btns 1,625
Légion du Midi 1 btn 564
Légion Hanovrienne 2 btns 1,158

Ferey also had six battalions:
32nd Leger 2nd btn 393
66th Ligne 3 btns 1,830
82nd Ligne 2 btns 1,236

On the morning of the battle, eight companies of the the 95th [766 men] and the 3rd Caçadores [656 men] were positioned around Sula at the base of the slope. According to Verner, there were also 6o K.G.L. sharpshooters there too, for a total of 1,422 to 1,482 men. The rest of the Light Division was deployed about 200 yards east of the Convent, the 43rd and 52nd in line [1820 men] with the 1st Caçadores in the second line, [546 men] There were artillery positioned on both flanks and Ross's three guns between the regiments in the center.

Now, in the morning, all accounts agree that Loison had to deploy more men to push the British out of Sula, Oman, Fortescue, Muir, Verner etc. etc. This isn't surprising considering the numbers alone. With all 12 Voltigeur companies deployed, around 90 men each, that is only about 1100 men. As Booth says "The flanks of the 43rd and 52nd in their charge met only the enemy's skirmishers who had, by superior numbers driven in the 95th Rifles but a few seconds before the charge of the division."

So, Loison deploys more skirmishers to push the British out of Sula and up the slopes.

Verner, p. 144

Before the British light troops would relinquish their hold of Sula, Loison had to bring up several battalions to reinforce his skirmish line. Footnote on the 26th Ligne. p. 152: …apparently the bulk of this regiment had been extended as skirmishers. Chambers in his Bussaco p. 115 has gone into this matter fully….

Loison deploys some battalions as skirmishers and evicts them from Sula. Craufurd then sends down the 1st Caçadores, another 546 men. So, the British, we know now had 2000 skirmishers covering a front of some 800 to 1000 yards. To simply match that many British lights would require another 1000 French skirmishers, but the reports are of superior numbers. So at least three battalions, or 1600 men were deployed. Verner believes that this was the entire 26th Ligne because the French report, Fririon in his Journal Historique de la Campagne de Portugal states that Simon was leading the 26th Ligne Tirailleurs when he was wounded and captured, at Ross's guns.

The small 32nd Leger battalion moved off to the left and was repulsed by Pack's troops. When Leach goes down and identifies units that attacked them by the bodies' uniform buttons, he doesn't find any from the 32nd. Verner notes that of the battalions in Simon's Brigade, the 26th lost significantly fewer men than the rest of the brigade, so he concludes that the 26th couldn't have been leading the column. The Legions were in column and the 26th en tirailleur. So, the French column or columns that attacked were made up of eight battalions without their voltigeurs, or less than 4,000 men

Booth, Napier and others state that the French advanced in columns of sections, which makes sense. With only five companies left in each battalion, the SOP was to form an attack column on company sections. With two battalions advancing with columns abreast, which seems to have been the case from the reports. This is indirectly supported because the British in a fascinating move, formed mini-columns from four companies folded back on a sections front on each side of Ross's guns to charge the French columns, while the rest of the British line volleys against the column and charges the skirmishers to their front.

This makes the front of the French columns between 120 and 200 yards. This matches Booth's description of how many muskets were able to fire on the Column from the flanks and that most of the two British battalions charged skirmishers.

Verner, in describing the retreat of the Rifles before the Light Division's charge says that:

Our Riflemen and the Caçadores could not hold back the dense advancing mass of tirailleurs and gradually retired up the hill, the bulk of them forming up behind the 43rd since the ground on the flank of the 52nd was at places almost impracticable.

Cope, p. 61 describes it this way:

Among the rocks and broken ground on the sides of this hill were disposed the Riflemen of this Battalion; while in the hollow behind it Craufurd had concealed the 43rd and 52nd. Scarcely had day dawned on the 27th, when the enemy made his advance. Loison's division climbed the road leading up the face of the projecting hill, though galled by the fire of the Riflemen and Ross' guns. Yet they came on, the Riflemen, as the French pressed up the hill, running in on their supports and forming in the hollow between the spur and the mountain.

The two hollows are different, which is why the second one is described. There is one hollow behind the hill, the Riflemen at least on the 52nd flank formed in a different hollow, between the spur and the mountain. That places them below and in front of the hill rather than behind it. Maps show this spur and the hollow between it and the crest.

I imagine that at least on the 52nd side of the line, the Rifles weren't able to get up behind the British line. However, it did place them well to do what Leach says they did, which was to fire into the flanks of the columns as the French retreated. I am not sure how, once the British Line had charged and the French had so precipicely run down the hill, that the Light troops from behind the main line could have then moved out, caught up with the rout to then fire on their flanks.

Not as purposeful as I imagined, but I hope you can see why I thought Gates and Harman's accounts were believable.

The two points here for me are:

1. Loison didn't see the combination of French columns and skirmishers capable of pushing back the British lights on the lower slopes. He didn't push his columns forward, but instead deployed more skirmishers.

2. Nearly half of the French division was in skirmish order. Even so, the rear of the French columns, according to Napier, were still near Sula when the head reached the crest of the slope.

For this thread, it is obvious that most all wargame rules would not allow such large deployments of skirmishers, and even if they did, the tactical reasons both sides would deploy nearly half their infantry are not supported by most game mechanics.

Bill

I don't want to break up or deflect the posts above (I enjoy them and learn from them. Nice to sea a civilized conversation that doesn't degrade into criticisms of spelling errors!)

Question: what do you think the "leakage" was of skirmishers that were driven in. My experience from similiar situations is that there was a large minority who would disappear to reappear later with excellent stories, when the opportunity to be fatigued or discomforted was over. One "figure" out of four? Half? A tenth?

Nice posts Bill and the Major… thank you !