"Do Rules Unreasonably Restrict use of Skirmish Order?" Topic

Back to the OP, I have been thinking – a hazardous process which can have unexpected results.

The Austrians were on the top of a hill;
The Saxons at the bottom were formed up so that shoulders overlapped;
Most hills at that time would not have been cleared of rocks and debris as were fertile valley flats;
Assaulting the hill in close order would have involved a lot of time wasted dressing the line as people stumbled over obstacles or went around them, this latter being rather harder in close order than many might imagine;
Going to what the Brits would call loose order gives the body the ability to bunch up left and right of an obstacle;
It will also reduce casulties.

The writer may not have felt that he needed to include the information about the hill being what boardgamers might call "rough" because it was as reasonable to assume as parked cars are in a modern street.

So, although wargames rules seem to represent skirmishing poorly, in this case I would say that the rules simply need to allow a charge across rough terrain with a movement penalty and some reduction of the impetus effect of a close order charge.

Which is a wordy way of writing what Mr Collins has already said.

By the way, I do hope Collins and MacLaddie continue this discussion, my reading list on skirm9ishing is getting longer.

By the way, I do hope Collins and MacLaddie continue this discussion, my reading list on skirmishing is getting longer.

So do I.

Bill

Have you found in the regulations other functions of the skirmishers besides those you mentioned in your former posts? The reason of my question is that in several after action reports I've read -from operations in Spain, in combats between Spanish and French- I have seen that skirmishers were also used, apparently, to find for weak spots in the enemy line. Actually, after reading several of those reports I've wondering if one of the main disadvantages of the French in Spain when fighting the British was that their skirmishers were unable to best the heavier British screens, and therefore the French attacks were forced to assault blind the British lines.

Thanks in advance.

basileus66:

Let's see. You ask several questions there. Obviously, what follows are my opinions, but I can provide support for it.

1. Yes, I have found several other combat missions, but generally secondary to the ones already mentioned. One weakness of the wargame table is the enemy sees too much, so one major purpose of skirmishers is missing: scouting.

I recently played a ACW game with hidden movement and lots of terrain. Our side, the Yankees, sent out small groups of skirmishers towards the enemy, to deny the enemy skirmishers certain terrain, and to keep the enemy from seeing behind the friendly screen to where our main body was. As neither side could tell where the enemy was going to land their blows, both sides deployed more skirmishers in an effort to 'see' what then enemy was up to behind the screens, woods and such. Each side kept deploying skirmishers in an effort to match the enemy where we/they didn't want the other side to see, and tried to drive back the enemy skirmishers to see on the other side. [to find that weak spot, as you say] We all found ourselves deploying far more skirmishers than we wanted too, but felt we had to because of the enemy escalation. Some formed units were so depleted by deploying skirmishers as to be useless in the fight between the main forces.

I thought the game gave a terrific sense of the skirmish dynamics in a battle, Napoleonic or ACW.

There were some surprises when the enemy main line finally appeared in different places forcing the our skirmishers back. There were times when that is what was going on with the French, Spanish and English too.

2. I think the idea that the British deployed heavier skirmish screens is often overblown, if not outright wrong, regardless of the fact that the French were surprised by the British lines.

First off, the British were on the defense during the first years of the war, which means they didn't have to deploy more skirmishers than the French, only enough to hold them.

Second, in any number of battles the French did deploy more skirmishers than the British--and gave them a good drubbing too. French writers don't often mention it, while British writers often gave/give the British POV as victors. [i.e. We beat the French, so we have better skirmishers and/or more of them.]

Third, Skirmishing, like other formations were tools to be used as needed. Skirmishers were used to hold terrain or to drive off enemy artillery. They could be used to outflank the formed troops of the enemy, or simply to harrass. And in a fluid battle situation, one set of intentions could flow into others.

I'll mention a small,[68 pages] but meaty book written by a Colonel Gawler of the 52nd Light, "The Essentials of Good Skirmishing", written in 1837. He uses a lot of Napoleonic incidents in his work. It's available for free on Google.

What is interesting is his lack of detail on the specific missions of skirmishers, rather stating that skirmishers should be trained and ready for any orders or objectives.

On the first page, he lists the eight essentials for 'good skirmishing', and then describes them all in detail with examples.

Bill

Well, let me add a couple of observations.

[1] Volleys exchanged between formed battalions and charges and melees, occupied a minor amount of time for a battle. I will make a WAG (wild asked guess) that in a 16 hour day, 8 hours were spent out of contact with the enemy, 2 hours in combat between battalions and 6 hours in skirmishing. (???) The rate of fire of former troops was 1-6 rounds per minute (3 being actually typical). The French giberne held 36 rounds, the British held 60 rounds, with extra ammo carried elsewhere maybe the sustained rate of fire might be 20 to 40 minutes before a unit would have to withdraw or be resupplied. (this time seems to remain constant down to our own era). Most of these would be fired into the air or ground. Most of the time one side or the other would run away if the other side looked like they were determined to close to contact.

Skirmishers might fire at a slower rate, but were firing aimed fire, over a much longer period of time, not through a cloud of smoke, and were often more highly skilled soliders than the fusiler line. …. The density of skirmishers might be 1/3 or 1/5 of that of a formed line. Is it unreasonable to expect that the kill rate (hits/minute) for skirmishers firing on a formed unit would be higher than that of from a formed line? Is it unreasonable that if they were firing for 3X as long, that they would be more deadly than the formed line's fire? Also, skirmishers could be readily relieved by the supports to replensh ammunition, get fresh men (sans sore shoulders) and clean muskets.

[2] Skirmishers were were instructed to shoot at the NCO's, officers, & artillery men. This would have a magnified impact on the morale and cohesion of a formed unit target. If they were allowed to do so over a long period of time, I would expect that the morale effect of taking casulties without being able to reply would rapidly increase.

[3] The point that battle for control of the middle ground often sucked away the strength of units, is valid. You had to feed men into this or be gradually shot up.

[4] Skirmishers often acted as a sort of "movable terrain" for sweeping surprises out of cover that was to be advanced on, and by preventing the enemy from close scrutany of you own dispositions, weak points and timing of advances or retreats. Leaving the skirmishers out of the wargame, ignores this. Alas too many gamers are absolute control freaks and cannot imagine playing a game without the 600 foot tall general with superman's vision.

Does anybody have any historical data on the rate of casulties on formed units from skirmishers? I believe some early Prussians were severely discomforted by French skirishers.

Sorry for not having researched enough to give exact numbers and references, but I think the points made are worthy of consideration.

I remain a bit unclear about something. At what range do people think that you can aim for an officer?

At 200 yards you could notice, by the position, movement and brighter plumage, where an officer was. Concentrating fire in that region gave a better chance of getting lucky.

@ Grizzlymc

Just to say I think you are coming in with some great posts here.

I have only fired a smoothbore once. The target looked like Michael Moore and I was at 100 yards. Now, my marksmanship might best be described as Marie Louise. I got one hit with 50 rounds.

It did occur to me that if I really wanted to kill a man with a musket I might be better off beating him to death with it.

Grizzlymc:

I have read more than one account where French skirmishers with smoothbores were firing at and hitting enemy officers. How common this was, I don't know. I am sure that it happened more often at shorter ranges. Rory Muir's book on the Napoleonic Experience and Tactics of Battle has several examples.

Billfan:

1. Skirmishers were notorious for burning through their ammo quickly. The 17th Legere ran through their ammo in about 1.5 to 2 hours at both Saalfield and again at Jena. And the 17th was a very experienced unit.

2. Read the last example of skirmish combat in Rory Muir's book, the Chapter on Light Infantry combat. At Quartre Bras, Even with British skirmishers defending the formed troops, officers and artilleryment were still being brought down by the more numerous French skirmishers, which forced Wellington to send out a regiment in close formation to charge and driven them back.

I don't know of any actual numbers being recorded for specific encounters, only general "ain't it awful" kinds of narratives. I have faint memories of reading some more specific descriptions, but I can't think of where at the moment.

Bill

At shorter ranges is interesting. Could close order infantry do enough damage to skirmishers at, say 75 paces to drive them away with a volley?

If not this feeds into an idea that has been bouncing around in my skull for a while.

Perhaps skirmish fire, rather than just putting some casulties on a unit before the real action starts, should have a small chance of creating disorder, shaking (pick your term depending on ruleset). This might be the opportunity for a column to charge or a line to advance and fire a devastating first volley versus a ragged reply, or something.

As you see, this is hardly a well thought out rule mechanic, but if this is a major battlefield role it needs to be represented somehow.

Maybe if skirmishers get to fire on a formed unit with a reasonable range and without significant opposing skirmishers (they not having been put out there or alternately have been shot up and sent packing), then the skirmishers might do more damage to the enemy then just the number of lead balls hitting flesh. If they concentrate on the leaders and controllers of the enemy battalion and put them out of action, the resulting effect would be equivalent to killing a greater number of "grunts". Wouldn't you use these guys, firing carefully, to target leaders?

Skirmishers could presumably pick their target to the extent that if they missed tne officer they hit the OR next to him, which is still an acceptable result.

Logically I would expect that being under skitrmisher fire would be bad for morale and bad for the effects of your own fire, both arguably in consequence of the loss of officers.

In a campaign context where I was tallying losses and the recovering wounded from one battle to another, I would deem skirmisher fire to cause more officer casualties than other kinds of fire.

"Does anybody have any historical data on the rate of casulties on formed units from skirmishers?"

I only have data from small actions from the Spanish theater of war. In almost all the cases, the casualties were very light. Usually, a couple of deaths, plus some injuries, many of them slight (the word in Spanish is "contuso", meaning lightly, probably walking wounded). At least in one ocassion, the skirmishers retreated after spending all their ammunition, with a result of 1 death (an officer), and 2 wounded, in the Spanish side, and more or less the same in the French side (in this case, the French were formed and the Spanish were sniping at them). The action lasted 4 hours.

Of course, I guess that in bigger actions, with a more dense skirmishers presence, casualties should have been higher.

Best regards

4th

I would suggest that the higher officer casulties should be at "short range" where a musket has some chance of hitting the man it is pointed at.

Skirmishers firing at over 100 paces are unlikely to be able to significantly increase the chance of hitting anyone over random.

I think an important morale effect, besides loss of file closers, is the nasty feeling people get when they cant fight back. This is somewhat like the effect of air superiority in WWII, casulties not so much, but making people hide anyway, yes.

Casualty rates on formed units from skirmishers can be found in several sources. Rory Muir quotes several eye-witnesses.

Here are some examples concerning casualties from skirmish actions, while giving a good feel for the events.

On the morning of Salamanca, Marmont ordered the voltigeurs of Foy's division

to push back the English pickets on the heights of Nuestra Señora de la Peña. These belonged to the 7th Division, which was occupying the wood behind. Not wishing his position to be too closely examined, Wellington sent out two whole battalions, the 68th and 2nd Caçadores, who formed a very powerful screen of light troops, and pushed back the French from the hill and ruined chapel on top of it. Marmont then strengthened his firing line, and brought up a battery which checked the further advance of the allied skirmishers. The two screens continued to exchange shots for several hours, half a mile in front of Wellington's position. The tiraillade had many episodes, in one of which General Victor Alten leading a squadron of his hussars to protect the flank of the British skirmishers received a ball in the knee, which put him out of action…after much bickering, and when noon had long passed, the 68th and Caçadores were relieved by some companies of the 95th from the Light Division, as Wellington wished to employ the 7th Division elsewhere. Oman vol. 5, page 422

This is an isolated skirmish, whose whole purpose to gain or deny information about friendly positions. According to Rory Muir in his Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon p. 58, the total losses for the 68th that day were one officer and three men killed, two officers and fourteen men wounded, twenty casualties from 338 officers and men. The Caçadores lost less, as the entire Portuguese Brigade suffered only seventeen casualties. Such light casualties out of a total of 700 combatants suggests that the skirmish was not pressed to any great degree.

As for ranges, Muir on page 59 quotes George Hennell's description of a skirmish with smoothbores:

I then had as fine a fire upon them as I possibly could have. We were upon a hill… [and] they were crowding into a narrow pass to get into a wood… I had this fire upon the men in the gateway for about ¾ of an hour at 300 yards. [!]

And of course, skirmishing could be costly too. At Vitoria, O'Callaghan's Brigade of Hill's Division captured the village of Subijana with little opposition and was then instructed to occupy the French troops facing it, without pressing home an attack. According to Edward Macarthur of the 39th:

The companies of the brigade were ordered independently to the front, to skirmish with the Enemy. The ground on which they stood was open, and exposed to the Artillery of the Enemy who had lined the opposite coverts with a swarm of light troops. In the short space of ten minutes my company lost in killed and wounded two officers, and twenty-nine men. Every Company maintained its ground till its ammunition was exhausted, when it was succeeded by another.

Muir p. 59

Here is an example of the French lights outnumbering the British. 31 men out of a single company is huge.

Moyle Sherer fo the 34th, which was in the same brigade, reports a similar experience and offers an alternative explanation for the heavy losses:

Not a soul …was in the village, but a wood a few hundred yards to its left, and the ravines above it, were filled with French light infantry. I, with my company, was soon engaged in smart skirmishing among the ravines, and lost about eleven men, killed and wounded, out of thirty-eight. The English do not skirmish as well as the Germans or the French; and it is really hard work to make them preserve their proper extended order, cover themselves, and no throw away their fire; and in the performance of this duty, an officer is, I think, far more exposed than in line fighting.

O'Callaghan's three battalions lost 48 killed and no fewer than 443 officers and men wounded in the battle, most of them from this episode. Muir p.59

This information is just from two pages of his book. There are lots more sources out there.

Bill

How important was skirmishing?

At the battle of Waterloo the total experience of the Wars of the Revolution and of the Napoleonic Wars, 25 year of warfare took the field. Forty seven French regiments took the field. Twelve were Guard, Thirty were Line and five were light.

Just counting the Regular army (as the Guard could all skirmish) that means that there were five light regiments of 2 battalions each of 6 companies for 60 companies that could skirmish. The thirty Line regiments of 2 battalions which one company per battalion could skirmish for a total of 60 companies. So out of the Regular army of 420 companies a total of 120 could skirmish or 29%.

Out of 40,000 infantry of which 11,600 where skirmishers. Not counting the Guard of 13,000.

So if this was not important why did 29% of the French Army's effort go into this special skill?

Now the British had 50,000 Infantry which 4000 had Rifles, interesting the 95th and the 52nd both light units fought in line all day, the 95th defending the sandpit and ridge and the 52nd next to the British Guard which flanked the French Middle Guard in the final attack. I went over the TOE quickly and they had 2000 men in Light battalions that did not fight in skirmisher order. Taking the KGL light (1000), the Dutch, Belgium and the Brunswicker Jagers (2000) and the 80 companies of about 60 men (4800) to skirmish or 7,800 men of which 3000 had rifles.

So the British had 15% to skirmish.

Wow now I see why the French tried after the coup de main (I Corp attack) to turn the battle into a skirmish fight and why you read that the British thought they where losing the fight.

Lord Ghee

In Cdt Colin's La Tactique there is a comment by a contemporary witness, I forget who, to the effect that skirmishers cancelled each other out. I think this is probably true most of the time. I think the problem is when the enemy has many more skirmishers than you do and overcomes your skirmishers or if you do not deploy any skirmishers at all and we are in an unopposed skirmishers scenario. Then the enemy skirmishers can approach your formed lines and do some damage.

The whole skirmishing business, and artillery preparation too, is not something wargames reproduce very well because both went on over a fairly long period and most gamers just want to get to grips I think.

Bill

XV

Many years ago there was much debate in wargaming circles about the "Variable lenght bound" The idea being to make things like artillery (and skirmishers, perhaps) both realistic and playable.

I suspect that many rules abstract the concept without introducing complex mechanisms to reproduce it.

Bill:
Actually, I think the Colin's comment was that both sides *let* the skirmishers cancel each other…in other words, they deploy enough skirmishers to deny the enemy any advantage, but not enough to achieve more--simply to avoid the escalation in skirmish activity that the Salamanca example I gave produced.

Wargame designers and wargamers often feel the same way. Let them cancel each out so we don't have to think about it and call it 'abstraction'. What they do is decide for the players that all skirmish activity will be one tactical choice, even though it wasn't the majority of the time, from the evidence I have seen.

Skirmishing was like any battle, ebb and flow, reserves introduced to achieve success or to keep the equilibrium, like Salamanca.

A lot of the ACW was done in open formations that resembled skirmishers to a minor degree. You needed odds of 3-1 to 5-1 to have an even chance in an attack. I'm expecting that something similiar might take place in skirmisher-to-skirisher actions.

If one side had 200 deployed skirmishers, you might need 100 to keep them at bay, but 500 to 600 to drive them backwards. Pushing back the enemy skirmishers meant becoming more disorganized, leaving your favored cover, running forward (during which you are not selecting targets, aiming, firing or reloading) and and then winding up in poorer cover. All this gives the advantage to the defender.

If an attacker tries to push matters, the defender can fill in from or retire on the supports and if driven back can win the reinforcement battle by virture of having to feed in fewer men than the attacker to stablize the situation and also being able to feed reinforcements in faster because the distances to the formed unit is a closer distance for new men to travel and orders have less distance. Couriers carrying orders have a quicker trip over better known paths to their destinations.

I can see that these skirmish fights might swing back and forth, usually without much consequences to affect things when the "big dogs got off the porch" (i.e. formed bodies of troops start moving thu). I recall a number of contemporary admonstrations, that brigade commanders should not get sucked into feeding too many skirmishers into these battles, so as to not undermine the core strength of the battaions.

I can see skirmish battles being supported and fought to deny or obtain tactically valuable woods or such that are odd fits to the obvious lines of defense for the main army. These areas might be used to hide artillery, stage line battalions prior to an assult, gain observation of the enemy or cover/control movement constriction points in the "no-man's land". Here, I think, is a arena which was ocassionally influential to a battle and would add a delicious course to a wargame.

Skirmishing and its role in a battle isn't well understood. Colin, the same one Bill mentioned said this:

"To study the procedures of combat with only the official documents or the combined accounts of battles, one risks falsifying their character. It is a general fact in history of wars, for example, that the skirmishers [tirailleurs] have played an often essential role, always/still important, and however one, in fact, little mentioned."
--J. Colin, L'Infanterie au XVIIIe siècle: la tactiques [16:1]

Scharnhorst insisted the main reason the French were successful on the battlefield was their Tirailleur tactics. [said in 1811.]

Keegan in his The Face of Battle said that Waterloo was a ten hour skirmish action punctuated by five attacks with formed troops lasting, collectively, three hours. Far more than 15% of the British were involved in skirmishing that day. [more like 20-25% depending on the point in time]

Personally, I don't believe that skirmishing was 'occasionally influential' anymore than cavalry charges or artillery fire were 'occasionally influential.' Certainly the influence that skirmishing had on a battle was often different from formed attacks, but no less influential. That's why Wellington AND Marmont personally directed the morning skirmish action at Salamanca, and why Colin said what he did.

Bill

Lord Ghee,

You don't compare like-with-like. You compare the Frenchmen who you think 'could' skirmish with the Allies who you think 'did'.

Regards

I was pointing out the effort each army had put into skirmishing. The British had offical 20% light troops. This was down from the action in Spain.

The French effort was really 100% as any troops could be order to skirmish.

The Prussian had the Thirid rank skirmish and had light troops also so 33% effort plus the light Troops.

skirmishing was very important

Lord Ghee

I was pointing out the effort each army had put into skirmishing. The British had offical 20% light troops. This was down from the action in Spain.

LG:

It is a mistake to assume that only the 'official' light troops were actually used in skirimish actions, at Waterloo or anywhere else for that matter.

For instance, at the Hougoumont, only the light companies of the 2 & 3 battalions of the 1st Guards were deployed. However, the entire 2nd battalion of the Coldstream Guards and 3rd Guards were deployed as skirmishers. The entire 1st battalion of the 2nd Nassau Regiment, and four battalions of the Kings German Legion were too. Four Hanoverian battalions, the Bremenvorde Landwehr, Osnakbruck Quackenbruck and Salzgitte were also committed as skirmishers in and around the Hougoumont. Add some Hanoverian light companies and the total is about 7,500 men just around the right end of the British line. If just the same number were deployed between the entire rest of the front, La Haye Sainte and the far left flank, you would have 15,000 men deployed as skirmishers at some point. That is 22% of the entire Allied Army. [From Julian Paget's little book Hougoumont:The Key to Victory at Waterloo

As the French II Corps had around 14,000 infantry, more than half would have to have been committed to skirmishing just to match the British, and they were on the attack. That is more than half the entire Corps.

The Prussian Brigades deployed their Fusiliers as light infantry, supported by the third rank from the Line battalions of each regiment. For instance, the I Corps brigades had nine battalions, one third of which were Fusiliers. So, if just the Fusiliers were deployed as skirmishers [which according to regulations was what they ere supposed to be], that is 1/3 of each brigade, not counting the third rank of the line regiments .

Simple counts of units committed to skirmishing in most battles finds @20 percent or more of ALL infantry being deployed as skirmishers, depending on the circumstances. Even the Prussians and Saxons at Jena, the battle that French skirmishers were supposed to have won, deployed about 25% of all their infantry as skirmishers. Just start adding up the numbers.

Imagine if the typical Napoleonic wargame found one in five or one in four infantry figures or stands being deployed as skirmishers. The table would look quite different.

skirmishing was very important.

Obviously important enough to commit quite a few troops to the effort, and the need so compelling that Allied commanders kept having to tell their subordinates all through the war not to commit so many line troops to skirmishing: Archduke Charles, General Mack, General Melas, Marshal Swartzenberg and the Russian General Staff as examples.

Bill

McLaddie

You have put your finger on one of my bugbears.

If all they did was sit there and shoot useless firearms at ranges where their chance of killing one person with their ammo was dubious, why did so many people do it?

WHY WAS IT SO IMPORTANT and HOW DID THEY DO THE IMPORTANT BITS? And what I read does not answer these questions (although I have some new reading to do from this thread).

Part of understanding might be made easier by going back to where the sole use of the firearm was as a skirmisher.
In the days when crossbows, short bows and firearms braced against the chest formed the 'enfant perdue' who skirmished around the mass of pikes,halberds, and axes. They were there to try and disrupt the enemy mass by knocking down leaders (next to the flag) and to protect their own mass against enemy skirmishers.
As artillery became more common they are also seen being sent separately from their own mass to form a battlewide screen to disrupt the enemy artillery but most normally that forced the enemy to screen their artillery with skirmishers and bring a halt to bombardment.
(Spanish wars in Belgium c1600)
You don't need to actually kill too many near and around officers to have that effect, just enough to unnerve them.

They also did small scale raiding, disrupting supplies, occupying broken terrain that got termed 'petite guerre'. (Many 30YW accounts)
Fast forward to where the musket replaced the pike in the mass and it seems people tend to forget or ignore this history of both unit and army skirmish support.
Looking at the OOB for the 7YW for example rapidly shows 33% of units with designations that indicate light troops.
So, I am afraid, I just dont buy any talking up of skirmishing somehow being 'invented' in the AWI.

There is an added page on skirmish duties of the grenadier platoon in the Portuguese translation of Dundas, the text by Bulow on 'modern warfare' from 1806-8 which talks of a near total light infantry battlefield is instructive too, I think that pops up as 'by an officer of the Prussian army' in translation.

I think a large part of it is that sometimes skirmishing gets treated as a 'freebie'. Send them out skirmishing, regroup, and voila still as ready as if they hadn't been physically and mentally shattered by 3 hours of combat.
I firmly believe there was no such thing as 'capable of skirmishing', I hold that was the natural order of things. Being able to skirmish effectively in an ordered way, and being able to manouver in close order effectively was what set the best apart from the rest.

The important bits – stopping the enemy light troops from occupying all the broken ground, stopping them disrupting your artillery and formed troops – trying to do the same to them – and yet preserving sufficient formed force to win the battle. The how – for petite guerre there is the handbooks of Grandmaison and Ewald, for battalion support there is the Austrian 1807 regs, for brigade support there is the Prussian 1812 regs. (the last are translated on Napoleon Series)

@ McLaddie

Imagine if the typical Napoleonic wargame found one in five or one in four infantry figures or stands being deployed as skirmishers. The table would look quite different.

Wel, it's been a while, but that was more or less exactly what my Quarrie-era Napoleonic battles did look like.

One wing of a tabletop force might be three line and one light battalions, the correct proportions.

The whole of the light battalion, plus the voltigeur companies from the line battalions, would be deployed in skirmish order. Battalions were 6 companies of 4 figures = 24 figures, so this meant 36 skirmisher figures (one battalion plus three companies) screening three formed battalions (60 figures after removal of the skirmisher company).

If attacking a similar Prussan force, say a Prussian 1815-era regiment, the Prussians would have the fusilier battalion of 20 figures deployed into skirmish order, with typically a jager company of 6 figures as well. This gave the Prussian screen 26 figures with 48 formed figures behind it (two 24-figure musketeer battalions), versus the previously-described French force of 36 and 60.

I know now, but did not know then, that another 16 figures could have been drawn from the musketeers, to reflect the use of their third rank as skirmishers.

Quarrie rules stipulated that, if attacked by a skirmisher-screened formation, formed units had to use half their firepower against the skirmishers, unless they had a screen of their own.

In the above example, both sides have such a screen, so both players wanted to resolve the skirmisher action first as it had a major bearing on the formed action.

Typically the stronger screen would have half its force use its move to advance, while the other half fired.

These encounters tended to be inconclusive unless one side seriously pressed in on the other and had a substantial numbers edge. At other times they could be automated to some extent, eg "skirmishers versus skirmishers inflict 1 figure casualties per 20 figures firing per 4 moves (3 for riflemen)", or whatever.

You were very wary of engaging skirmish screens on forward slopes, in case of ambush by light cavalry positioned behind it.

If doing this now, I would nowadays know that only about a third of the light battalions would actually be in the skirmish line at any point. A routed French legere screen would not quit the battlefield but would rejoin its formed main formed body.

This error probably had little net effect on play balance because it applied to both sides. It had a major effect on choice of army. We all thought that Austrian or early Prussian armies had insufficient light infantry, and thus would be pwn3d every time against the French. So nobody had one. We had British, French, Russian and late Prussian.

But essentially, they were skirmish battles. The company stands would be dispersed rather than blocked together to represent open order. If you achieved a position where your screen was able to fire unopposed at formed units, ideally units pinned in square by cavalry, then the other guy was in a very bad place.

(borrowing shamelss from many above posts and repeating some of my stuff) I'm guessing that they skirmished, because if they didn't and the other side did, then they would:

[1] take a lot of casulties to formed troops

[2] let skirmishes get close enough to artillery to hurt them

[3] give up the information/intellegence battle- be unsure of the enemy's position, strength, their initiation of movement,

[4] ocassional unhappy surprises when advancing.

[5] surrender worthwhile terrain between the main battle lines.

[6] make communications risky (couriers might be snatched or have a longer path

with the disadvantage of
{1} tiring some of you own troops
{2} weakening your core units.

I don't disagree that skirmishing was important, and both sides did it, and usually there was a standoff. But,look at your favorate rule set. How many items in the above lists could possibly be "in play" in your wargame?

I think [1] and [2] are there (maybe not well but there) in all rulesets.

[3] [4] and [5] are probably not there unless you use blinds and hidden markers/deployment. Few games do.

[6] might be in effect due to affecting zones of control, but ignore adventuresome Cossacks and other light troublemakers (which preduces the game against some nationalities)

{1} and {2} are ignored, so the value of light troops is downgraded. Two battalions of line would be at a distantage versus a battalion of line and one of lights. I don't know any rules that factor in the fatigue of skirmishers (especially, just the 3rd rank!)

Unless your rules, cover these items, (and maybe some more that I haven't thought of), the skirmishers aren't important.(to your game). But armies almost always spent more time skirmishing than charging/firing in line/galloping with swords waving in the air…..

Bill,

Just seen your post of 12 June. Thanks for that. No I don't have Bowden's translation. I have a copy of an original Bressonnet in French.

Bill

I think one factor that's being overlooked in these discussions is the idea of frontage. We should also distinguish between the use of an open/extended order, and the skirmish chain.

Let's consider Waterloo as an example, the distance from Hougoumont to Papelotte was probably about 6,000 paces. If the light troops in the skirmish chain were spaced in pairs at 7.5 paces distance, that amounts to 800 pairs of men, or 1,600 total. Let's assume that these men are supported directly by that number again [it could have been more, but never more than twice the number]. That amounts to 3,200 men [4,800 maximum] for each side total. If any more men are committed to the skirmish chain then it begins to get very crowded, and defeats the purpose somewhat. I believe the idea that every unit would simply send out it's light troops regardless is erroneous. If there was a mission to perform, then they would be sent forward, If not, why wouldn't they remain with the parent unit. As the first skirmish chain gets used up [fatigued, or exhausted ammunition], then more could be sent out to replace them. The French practically had 1/6 of their number available as voltigeurs available for the skirmish chain, that amounts to about 6,500 men. But the reality was that they only needed to deploy half that number to cover the three miles of frontage along the initial allied position – that's half the battalions voltigeur companies. In 1815 there was very little, if any difference apart from uniform, between light and line regiments.

npm

The French practically had 1/6 of their number available as voltigeurs available for the skirmish chain, that amounts to about 6,500 men. But the reality was that they only needed to deploy half that number to cover the three miles of frontage along the initial allied position – that's half the battalions voltigeur companies.

NPM:
True. That's what I would assume. What I meant is just as you say, @ half of an entire unit committed to skirmishing would be on the line at one time, generally speaking. It all depended on the spacing, which was flexible, and what the skirmishers were supposed to accomplish. The rest would be formed up in support.

In 1815 there was very little, if any difference apart from uniform, between light and line regiments.

I disagree with this. Throughout the period, and in 1815, the French Legere regiments were treated differently in the following ways:

1. They deployed in 2 ranks when in close formation--this was the norm, though I am sure they did form up in 3 ranks at times. The 1792 Provisional Instructions, the National Guard instructions and the various Legere regimental manuals, such as the 10th's, all stipulated this.

2. They were almost always the first deployed as skirmishers, with the Line infantry then supporting them if necessary.

3. In most attacks, the Legere regiments would lead in their brigade when committed in multiple lines, which was true from Jena to Waterloo. The first troops to attack the Hougoument, La Haye Saint and the farms on the British left were Legere battalions, even though the I Corps only had three battalions of Legere.

4. The Legere regiments had precedence over line troops, which means in brigade battle line, they would be stationed on the right. If you have Goetz's book on Austerlitz, his maps of the battle show this.

Whether the Line voltigeurs and center companies skirmished as well as the Legere is another question altogether--but there was a distinct difference, even in 1815.

Bill

Bill,
My proposition was that during the late Empire, typically, only the voltigeur company would be used to form the skirmish chain. And that in order to effectively cover the 6000 pace frontage, you would only need every other company of voltigeurs. Simply because there wasn't adequate space to accommodate more.

The deployment of the light infantry in open/extended order in two ranks was something different to forming the same troops in skirmish chain – which again was essentially formed in two ranks. The first thing the voltigeur company would do was change from three ranks to two, and then extend laterally to present the ordered spacing. Reille's instructions during the Waterloo campaign called for 10 pace intervals, if memory serves me well.

The light battalions when used to precede the attacking formations would always maintain a close order support, so might only send forward one, two or perhaps three companies into the skirmish chain. The battalion adopting a formation, I suspect, akin to the individual company formation mentioned in Morand or Reille's orders from the later empire period.

Foy, a division commander with Reille at Waterloo, in his history of the Peninsular war clearly stated that the voltigeurs formed the light infantry of the army – a role they gradually acquired following their introduction during the late Consulate.

npm

Lord Ghee,

You assume that only British and German (and presumably Dutch and Belgians as well) troops designated 'Light' could skirmish but every French infantryman could skirmish. There does not appear to be any compelling evidence to assume this difference.

Regards

the only examples of line skirmishering are French that I am aware of. Now the Dutch and the Brunswickers both were trained by the French so my guess is they could. I have not read of any examples of Prussian and British line skermishering other than the Prussian use of the Third Rank.

Lord Ghee

I think the Russians had it about right. They usually had 2 line brigades and 1 jager brigade per division. Contrary, to what I think is the average view, they had a lot of experience in fighting in loose formations- at least as much as anybody else. While the English, French, Austrians and Prussians were at peace, the Russians were fighting wars in the Caucasinas, against the Ottoman Empire and agaist the Swedes in Finland. Cossacks in the eastern regions were light calvary and foot soldiers who were sort of "American wild west" types who were expanding a simplified western europeon farming/trade/stock raising culture against the previaling remaints of Gengas Khan horsemen hordes. All these theaters were predominately open order and skirmish-rich. From their experience they expected that spread light troops were an essential part of the battlefield. Note that the prevailing opinion of the origin of light troops comes from the Austrian fighting with Grenze, Pandours etc. from the 7YW. The Russians had a wide range of experiences of this type of warfare from the north, NE, E, S, and SW of the empire. They didn't have to learn it from the French.

(by the way, how well did the French & allies do in the 1812 invasion? They were defeated mostly by the action of light troops, backed up strategically by line troops. The Russian line troops were targeted by seldom forced into a conclusive battle, while the Russian light troops killed a couple of hundred thousand of the Grande Armie.}

Lord Ghee wrote:

I have not read of any examples of Prussian and British line skermishering other than the Prussian use of the Third Rank

There are dozens of examples of British line infantry centre companies skirmishing, both in the Peninsula and at Waterloo.

Bill,
My proposition was that during the late Empire, typically, only the voltigeur company would be used to form the skirmish chain. And that in order to effectively cover the 6000 pace frontage, you would only need every other company of voltigeurs. Simply because there wasn't adequate space to accommodate more.

NPM:

I am certain that is was SOP to deploy the voltigeur companis first IF there wasn't a Legere battalion or two handy. The number of skirmishers occupying a front depended on how far apart they were deployed, and their combat mission.

The deployment of the light infantry in open/extended order in two ranks was something different to forming the same troops in skirmish chain – which again was essentially formed in two ranks. The first thing the voltigeur company would do was change from three ranks to two, and then extend laterally to present the ordered spacing. Reille's instructions during the Waterloo campaign called for 10 pace intervals, if memory serves me well.

It does. However, the question is why Reille felt it necessary to give those instructions. There were plenty of veterans in his Corps, with several Legere regiments. So why the instructions? The most likely reason is because they were different from previous practices. The 10th Legere manual created about 1805 has a different spacing. The British and the French light would extend or open files when skirmishing as well as form chains of various distances. Reille's instructions were for the voltigeurs and line companies, not the Legere, and they pertained to the company's initial deployment, not necessarily the only distances they would maintain throughout an entire engagement.

The light battalions when used to precede the attacking formations would always maintain a close order support, so might only send forward one, two or perhaps three companies into the skirmish chain. The battalion adopting a formation, I suspect, akin to the individual company formation mentioned in Morand or Reille's orders from the later empire period.

I think, from my reading, that light battalions preceding the attacking formations often were the attacking formation. The individual company skirmish line would have supports and a reserve, usually half of the entire force, and were used regardless of how many companies were deployed.

And how many companies were sent forward initially depended on the battle plan, the terrain and enemy. For instance, Massena at Bussaco specifically instructed his corps commanders to send out additional skirmishers on the advance, that is, more than Standard Operating Procedure. During the battle, Loison began his advance with "a strong chain of skirmishers", When checked by the 1500 skirmishers deployed by Craufurd, Loison deployed another two whole battalions as skirmishers, the Legion du Midi and the 32nd Legere. [Which was on the right of it's brigade.]

Now, if Massena issued specific instructions to deploy more skirmishers, they had to be closer than 10 paces, if that were the norm. Or closer than 5 paces if that were the norm. When two whole battalions were deployed on a single division front, maybe 800 to 1000 yards, you have some fairly crowded skirmishing on both sides. When Loison's division was defeated, Mermet sent out the battalions of the 25th Legere to cover their retreat…in skirmish order.

Foy, a division commander with Reille at Waterloo, in his history of the Peninsular war clearly stated that the voltigeurs formed the light infantry of the army – a role they gradually acquired following their introduction during the late Consulate.

Was he speaking of the Legere voltigeurs too? The voltigeurs were usually the first to be deployed as skirmishers, however, I still have found that the Legere was used first if any light infantry work was to be done beyond a simple battalion screen, which the voltigeurs certainly could provide. And Foy, at Waterloo, facing the Hougoumont orchard, sent in the 4th Legere first to skirmish, with the formed attacks carried out by his line troops.

Bill

Thanks Snort not familiar with that information.

Lord Ghee

Bill,
How can you be sure that Reille was only the addressing the line voltigeur and fusilier companies – a voltigeur was a voltigeur, whether he was from a line or a light battalion. It's not as if they used the term tirailleur for light regiment light companies – they were voltigeurs. Morand/Davout's instructions, issued prior to the Russian campaign, for the deployment and use of 'tirailleurs' was equally addressed to veterans. I think the reason they were written was because there were no official regulations, and the commanding generals wanted uniformity of action, at least within the confines of their command. A general needed to know that if he gave a certain command it would be carried out in an appropriate manner, one that he understood and had essentially dictated.

Foy's text was as follows:

Napoleon subsequently added a picked company called voltigeurs, composed of men of small stature, but intelligent and active.
These voltigeurs constituted the light infantry of the French armies, and habitually performed the service of tirailleurs. An action always commenced with swarms of tirailleurs on foot and on horseback: this species of fighting favoured the development of individual faculties, and was eminently suited to the restless spirit and courage in attack peculiar to the French.

Observations on the character and composition of the French, British and Spanish Armies by General Foy.

Foy clearly doesn't distinguish between the light or line voltigeurs, they were both voltigeurs in his mind, and meant to 'commence' the attack – he doesn't suggest that they were the attack – they were merely a part of the whole, just as artillery was.

Massena's directions at Bussaco were obviously an attempt to deal with the extremely difficult terrain that the French were about to traverse – the position was completely unsuitable to regular close order column movement – better to advance 'a la debande' – in an attempt simply to get from point A to point B. Close order columns could follow this heavy protective screen with less fear of being disturbed.

The use and deployment of light troops within difficult terrain was axiomatic to the period. Hence the deployment of Jerome within the Bois du Bossu at Quatre Bras, and in the assault against Hougoumont at Waterloo. I don't believe it is any coincidence that D'Erlon's sole light regiment [13e Leger] would ultimately be instrumental in taking La Haie Sainte. These terrain types/objectives were perfectly suited to the experience of the leger units within these divisions and it would be natural that they would be employed there. The troops would necessarily fight in open/extended order to assault through woods, orchards or buildings, and I'm sure they would have been preceded by swarms of voltigeurs in skirmish chain order. The French line troops could perform the same duties, but the espirit de corps of the light regiments probably gave them an edge in such fighting – that was certainly true during the Revolution, Consulate and early Empire, but I'm not convinced it was as relevant from 1813 onwards.

npm

How can you be sure that Reille was only the addressing the line voltigeur and fusilier companies – a voltigeur was a voltigeur, whether he was from a line or a light battalion.

NPM: I'm not sure. I was asking. Reille's instructions refer to 'when a company is selected to skirmish', so I am assuming it was a generic set of instructions, not directed at just the voltigeur companies.

I wasn't questioning what Foy said, I was suggesting that it wasn't necessarily as exclusive as you think. His actual use of Legere battalions in battle suggests that it wasn't. As for the Legere being part of the attack, I meant that most all divisional attacks find the Legere in the front, particularly when the terrain required it, including the Hougoumont.

Massena's directions at Bussaco were obviously an attempt to deal with the extremely difficult terrain that the French were about to traverse – the position was completely unsuitable to regular close order column movement – better to advance 'a la debande' – in an attempt simply to get from point A to point B. Close order columns could follow this heavy protective screen with less fear of being disturbed.

He suggested heavy skirmish screens, not 'a la debande' which is deploying without supports or reserves. Obviously it was in response to the terrain and the enemy skirmishers. My point is that a 'heavier' skirmish screen would require less space between skirmisher files than 10 paces.

The use and deployment of light troops within difficult terrain was axiomatic to the period.

Yep, so when light infantry actions are required, the Legere were called upon to provide the troops, not just the voltigeur companies of each infantry battalion. That's my point.

that was certainly true during the Revolution, Consulate and early Empire, but I'm not convinced it was as relevant from 1813 onwards.

Really? The ratio of Ligne to Legere regiments in 1800 was 3:1, in 1809 3:1 , in 1813 3:1 and guess what it was in 1815… Napoleon made a point of raising new Legere regiments to keep that ratio, even in 1813. If it was not 'relevant', why would the French bother?

The line troops were expected to perform skirmish duty. That is true of all the Napoleonic armies, throughout the wars, 1792-1815, and they did. However, the universal practice when light infantry/skirmish actions were required because of terrain, combat mission etc. was to deploy the light specialists first whenever possible. That was what the Legere were for. Lots of battle examples of this practice.

Bill

Oh, and do you know what the argument was for creating voltigeur companies in each line regiment in 1803-4?--considering that all French infantry were supposedly able to skirmish?

Because the Legere regiments weren't always available.

Bill

Bill,
I think your numbers are a little off. The number of regiments in 1803 was 89 line and 23 light – that's 80% line and 20% light. The number of regiments in 1813 was 133 line and 35 light – again 80% line and 20% light.

The need for voltigeur companies throughout the army, was because the light regiments would be performing advance guard duties, or employed to fight in difficult terrain, unsuitable for the close order formations. This would denude the line regiments of the ability to provide a skirmish screen of whatever source. As a consequence the French either employed men from the third rank, or employed one company [typically the 3rd] as a voltigeur company. This was formalized during the Consulate, and effectively eliminated the need for the use of the 3rd rank as skirmishers within the French army.

There was a recurring use of combined [reunis] voltigeur battalions in both Spain and Italy during the Empire. These units would form advance guard and other duties commonly associated with the light regiments – and this was the case even when light regiments were present in the order of battle. This would account for Foy's suggestion that the "voltigeurs constituted the light infantry of the French armies".

npm

I think your numbers are a little off. The number of regiments in 1803 was 89 line and 23 light – that's 80% line and 20% light. The number of regiments in 1813 was 133 line and 35 light – again 80% line and 20% light.

Could well be, I was doing from memory. Point being, the ratios held throughout the period… even if my memory didn't.

There was a recurring use of combined [reunis] voltigeur battalions in both Spain and Italy during the Empire. These units would form advance guard and other duties commonly associated with the light regiments – and this was the case even when light regiments were present in the order of battle. This would account for Foy's suggestion that the "voltigeurs constituted the light infantry of the French armies".

We are talking about the battlefield. When you had 'elite battalions created, they almost envariably constituted the grenadiers and voltigeurs of the line. For instance, when Ney created his advanced Guard for Jena, it was made up of the Grenadiers and voltigeurs of the line AND the Legere battalions.

I am not saying that the Voltigeurs of the line didn't share the duties of light infantry specialists--because they were and did. I am saying that the first in when skirmishing [other than simply screening the parent battalions], were the Legere. I am more than happy to start listing examples.

Do you know where in Foy's memiors he says that about the voltigeurs and whether he is including the legere companies?

Bill

Bill,
The Foy piece was reprinted, and is available on line, in Maxwells, The victories of the British armies – see page 386 of the following:

link

Thank you for the offer, but no need to share examples – as there will be an equal number, of examples where light regiments weren't available to lead the attack. Davout's III Corps at Auerstadt only had the 13e Leger, and they clearly couldn't be everywhere at once.

Your opinion is that light regiments maintained a specialist character throughout the Revolution, Consulate and Empire, my opinion is that the specialist role [amongst the French army] diminished after 1803, and that by 1813, both line and light were performing the same routine duties, whether they were close or open order duties.

npm

Your opinion is that light regiments maintained a specialist character throughout the Revolution, Consulate and Empire, my opinion is that the specialist role [amongst the French army] diminished after 1803, and that by 1813, both line and light were performing the same routine duties, whether they were close or open order duties.

Ligniere, I thought Bill was maintaining that although the 'Line' and 'Light' could and did perform the same duties throughout the period, when there was a choice the 'Light' would be used, which isn't quite the same thing?

Regards

Your opinion is that light regiments maintained a specialist character throughout the Revolution, Consulate and Empire, my opinion is that the specialist role [amongst the French army] diminished after 1803, and that by 1813, both line and light were performing the same routine duties, whether they were close or open order duties.

NPM:
I think I understand your position, but Whirlwind has articulated the difference.

If the specialist role had diminshed after 1803, then that would have been beyond the original rationale for having voltigeur companies. I agree that line and light could and did perform the same routine duties. My points have been:

1. The Legere retained several unique characteristics or roles in battle.

2. Their specialist role did not diminsh enough to keep the French from maintaining the line/legere ratio throughout the period, which required some effort. [and completely unnecessary if there was no difference.]

3. You will notice that both Davout's and Reille's instructions are directed at LINE companies and not Legere. Any concern in providing instructions in training light infantry methods would be directed at those needing it and previously unacustomed/not knowledgable about such basic operations. Davout's instructions also include a discussion of company deployment of skirmishers versus third rank, which also indicates line troops…that and the fact that thre was some expectation of the line center companies skirmishing.

4. The actual battlefield performance, how the Legere were used is also a major indicator of whether there was any perceived difference. In battle they were treated differently from line. Davout's Corps always had fewer legere regiments than the rest of the Grande Armee. I think that speaks to how well trained his troops were. For instance, in 1806 all the corps had one legere brigade in each division, except Davout's four divisions.

So, yes, I do believe that the Legere retained their specialist character throughout, though certainly the line voltigeurs were treated as light specialists too. And there were often more of them, one company for every line battalion compared to 6-9 companies in a Legere battalion.

If the differences between line and legere had disminished, what I think you would have to show is that the organizational and precedence differences, let alone the title 'legere' did not indicate any difference in the battlefield use of Legere regiments, that they were generally identical to line regiments.

I haven't found that to be true.

Bill

NPM:

Thanks for the link to Foy's work. I think it is important to put the quote in context on page 386-7:

"The battalion of infantry consisted of nine companies, including one of grenadiers. Napoleon subsequently added a picked company called votigeurs, composed of men of small stature, but intelligent and active.

These voltigeurs consitituted the light infantry of the French armies, and habitually performed the service of tirailleurs. An action always commenced with swarms of tirailleurs on foot and horseback; this species of fighting favoured the developement of individual faculties, and was eminently suited to the restless spirit and courage in attack perculiar to the French. This mode of combat was an innovation upon the old system of tactics, and foreigners ascribed the first successes of the French armies to the prodigal use of light troops.

So, some points:

1. The criteria he gives for votigeurs "composed of men of small stature, but intelligent and active" is exactly the same criteria given for legere infantry given by the French.

2. The second point is that he says "an action always commenced with swarms of tirailleurs on foot." What we *should* see is only voltigeur companies [line and legere]being used in these swarms as time progresses 1804-1815, and not other Legere companies. Right?

We don't. What we almost always see are voltigeurs AND center companies of legere battalions constituting those swarms, 1794-1815. If line center companies were used, it was only after Legere infantry had been committed or weren't available.

3. And of course, Legere regiments were present at the beginning when "foreigners ascribed the first successes of the French armies to the prodigal use of light troops."

John Lynn, in his Bayonets of the Republic notes that even in the days of mass skirmish actions, the Legere and Chasseur battalions, the specialists, were always deployed first.

So the question for Foy is why the Legere regiments aren't even mentioned in his description of tirailleur actions and history, particularly when the voltigeurs were originally added to suppliment the scarcity of legere troops, no replace them or completely 'constitute' the only light infantry in the army.

I am not sure what Foy was thinking, but his description of things misses some very key points regarding skirmishing and the organization of the French Army, regardless of whether you agree with his assessment or not.

Bill

Bill,

Davout's 1811 skirmish instructions seem to have been aimed at the centre companies of all troops under his command, not specifically the centre companies of line regiments.

The only troops that he deemed to be already familiar with these instructions were the voltigeur companies. There is even a specific instruction to Desaix to forward these instructions to the 33rd light regiment, so how can you conclude that the instructions were not aimed at both line and light regiments?

@ Maj S

While I certainly agree that all companies of line regiments could skirmish to one degree or another (and this probably depends on the year we are talking about), and that Davout refers to both light and line regiments in his instruction for skirmish training, Davout actually says that it is unnecessary to send the instruction the 33rd Light.

I don't have an OB for Davout's command in 1811 but by 1812 1 Corps has four light regiments that I can see so I am not sure why 33rd Light was singled out in his instruction. Perhaps it was the only regiment present in 1811. Perhaps Davout was satisfied with its skill levels already. I don't really know.

Is the absence of any mention of Greandier/Carabinier companies relevant or would any conclusion be reading too much into that I wonder?

Here is the introduction to Davouts instruction.

To the generals: Friant, Gudin, Dessaix, Compans and Barbanègre. Hambourg, 16th October.

We recognized that it was generally harmful to take a certain number of men by company, for flankers and skirmishers, and that it was preferable to take entire companies.

The companies of voltigeurs who are elite companies, cannot always perform this role without serious inconvenience, it has, therefore, appeared appropriate to me that in the case of the companies who could be used for the role, are trained for it.

As it is important for the sake of uniformity that there is some method to adopt, I send you, my dear General, a summary of the manoeuvres that I invite you to train the regiments under your orders to do, whether of light infantry or of infantry of line. I want us to benefit from the present season for training the troops.

Forward this instruction to each of the Colonels of the regiments under your orders and one for each general of brigade; recommend that more copies are not made of it by the rest.

The companies of the voltigeurs are already familiar with these manoeuvers, it will be proper to exercise the centre companies with the companies of voltigeurs for the first time, it means a mixing of the fusiliers with the voltigeurs.

I will be obliged if you let me know of measures you have taken, and the progress of the troops in this training, made on different ground, which can only develop the understanding of the soldiers and the same of the officers.

(To the general Dessaix) It will be needless (inutile), my dear General, that you send a copy of this instruction to the 33rd light, as I send a copy to the general Barbanègre, so that he forwards a copy to it.

Bill