"Do Rules Unreasonably Restrict use of Skirmish Order?" Topic

I was reading vol. 2 of Jack Gill's book on the 1809 campaign yesterday where he talks about the Battle of Linz.
He tells a story about Marshal Bernadotte riding up to a Saxon infantry battalion and telling them to form skirmish order and assault some Austrians at the top of a hill. According to the story the Saxons looked at each other as they weren't trained to do this, but spread out into skirmish order and went forward.

This suggests to me that Marshal Bernadotte at least didn't think anything of asking a "line" infantry unit to skirmish.

There are other anecdotes of this in the 1809 campaign Teguen Hausen comes to mind where the 57th Ligne was thrown forward in skirmish formation. And if you read the reports from the French officers of the Teugen Hausen action (contained in Saski's book) the French officers describe the Austrian's have "a cloud" of skirmishers in front of their positions. Where did this cloud come from? I assume it must have been detailed from the regular infantry units.

Considering this, I wonder whether many rules' strict breakdown between light infantry that can skirmish and line infantry that can't is really correct.

What do you think?

On the first day of Leipzig, at least one Austrian line battalion is deployed in skirmish to advance through the woods on the approach to the outlying communities. There are many of examples all across the period.

So, I think you are right, that many are too restrictive. But I think they do it with the realization that you will need a lot more rules to address a relatively rare occurrence. So you will need varying grades of skirmishers, command control rules, etc. If you limit skirmishing to only the experts, then you can keep the rules simpler and still cover 90% of all the skirmishing of the era.

I think for rules where you are commanding divisions and corps, it is appropriate that only the trained skirmishers are represented. But for games where players are commanding brigades and lower, it might be worth the added complexity.

It's just one more thing that doesn't keep me awake at night. If the rules themselves have a believable rationale for how they handle skirmishers I'm a happy Connard. I'm playing a game, not rewriting history.

Just because troops can spread out doesn't mean it's skirmish order or that they're effective. There's a degree of training and leadership that made for effective skirmish order…a certain degree of control was still required. Otherwise troops would just go to ground or back off.

I've finished vol. 1of Jack Gill's trilogy, and I need to start vol. 2, so I don't know the answer….but does he tell you the RESULT of Bernadotte's order?

I've finished vol. 1of Jack Gill's trilogy, and I need to start vol. 2, so I don't know the answer….but does he tell you the RESULT of Bernadotte's order?

It's an excerpt from the memoirs of a Saxon officer. He says that they did it, but maintained their files and says wryly that there were a lot of shot launched off into the blue.

It's just one more thing that doesn't keep me awake at night. If the rules themselves have a believable rationale for how they handle skirmishers I'm a happy Connard. I'm playing a game, not rewriting history.

Yea, you're right. It's a pointless question. Why should I care? It's stupid to discuss ideas for their own sake. Sorry for bothering you.

It doesn't bother me, I was offering my opinion. It seems to bother you that it appears to bother me though.

Yes and no.

Skirmishers were shaken out a lot more than Napoleonic Rules allow, but many would have folded back into line duty by the time the business end of a battle happens. This is hard to do on the table, without players seeking an unhistorical advantage from it.

If you want a much higher level of skirmish portrayed might I suggest using ACW rules for the Napoleonic period to give the flavour you are after.

It doesn't bother me, I was offering my opinion. It seems to bother you that it appears to bother me though.

Oh, I thought the comment "It's just one more thing that doesn't keep me awake at night" was intended to indicate imply that the issue was not worthy of your consideration.

I think it's fundamentally an issue of basing. We choose base-sizes and scales based upon an assumption of close-order formations, and then we are further limited by needing those base sizes to conform to various other static game outcomes like flanks, fronts, falling-back, advancing after combat, contacting the enemy, and so on.

Skirmish order just doesn't behave within those constraints, so it's almost impossible to model it, using bases and game mechanics that presume close-order.

The best way to get round the objection Klingons makes is to substitute skirmish figures (I base them individually on pennies) for formed units. The better the unit can skirmish the lower the substitution ratio e.g. 95th Rifles 1:1, Austrian line 1809 perhaps 1:5. Course it means you have buy and paint more figures but I use 1/72 plastics so the cost is not high. You need rules covering reforming – I make it difficult for line stuff to reform whereas good lights can easily do so.

LaSalle allows any unit with a SK value of 2 or greater to deploy into 'irregular order' or into skirmish bases to augment other units.

Since LaSalle is a small game only covering a small part of the battlefield and over a short time, that decision is made at deployment and cannot be changed during the game.

There are a few times that I can see deploying into irregular order would be beneficial, but not many and not often. I can see it being useful more often to only deploy half the battalion as extra skirmishers.

Generally its players that abuse the skirmishers getting them to do all kinds of things they could never do.

mjc

I agree with Klingons, basing is a prima facie contraint.

Any battalion level Napoleonics prescribe 4 figure stands ? How about 3 figure stands ?

Without having looked at a lot of Napoleonic rulesets, I would say, yes, there should be more flexibility in their deployment.

What were the advantages and disadvantages of deploying troops into skirmish order and how can those be recreated? A lackluster, not too well trained unit might say, "ah, good, yes, skirmish order it is" and then 1/2 the battalion mysteriously finds a way to drift off upon deployment to cook horse meat or maybe a local goose…

From a wargaming point of view, why not have movement trays with singly-based figures? Even multi-base plus 'change' can be made to work.

why not have movement trays with singly-based figures?

yeah, sure, what are those 28mm's ? We could spend even more time painting the detail on the facings.

Or you could simmply put a space between the bases, or have a firing figure on a single base to show that one or more bases were skirmishing.
XXXX____XXXX_____XXXX
doesnt look quite as good as
X X X X
but it does the job.

But the question is more how the rules handle it. I am less than clear on what skirmishers did. Given that, it is hard for me to understand whether rules handle that well.

One thing of which i am certain, there was less not more skirmishing in major battles in the ACW. Read Paddy Griffiths or Brent Noseworthy.

I am less than clear on what skirmishers did. Given that, it is hard for me to understand whether rules handle that well.

Yes, I'm also unsure about what they did. However, since those writing about the wars based on first hand observations mention it a lot, I assume they at least thought it was important.

I agree that most rules restrict skirmishing far, far more than is 'reasonable' visa vie history. There are several reasons for this:

1. Skirmishing isn't given a lot of attention by historians, and that includes military historians. They are interested in the 'decisive, dramatic events', personalities and politics, not necessarily how troops were moved or the small tactics:

"To study the procedures of combat with only the official documents or the combined accounts of battles, one risks falsifying their character. It is a general fact in history of wars, for example, that the skirmishers [tirailleurs] have played an often essential role, always/still important, however one, in fact, little mentioned."

--J. Colin, L'Infanterie au XVIIIe siècle: la tactiques [16:1]

2. Most historians, not being interested in skirmishing, don't understand how it worked.

3. Most wargame designers rely on those historians.

4. Wargame designers and wargamers find that skirmish actions are 'fiddly' and slowly attritional, rather than decisive, so they ignore it as 'not fun.' [Often using the same 'not decisive' arguments as SYW and Napoleonic generals.] In fact, most Napoleonic war game rules portray skirmish actions much more in line to SYW actions than Napoleonic.

5. Physically, it is awkward to portray skirmishing on the table top, either little groups of figures all over in 'screens', or with equally the laborious "SK factoring".
On top of that, neither work real well when the actual functioning of skirmishing isn't well understood.

It isn't surprising that many designers and gamers delegate skrimish to a side-show at best. Any number of wargame designers restrict the use of skirmishers to just specialists or either/or game choices [much like armies in the SYW] because "it is simpler", not because it is historically justified.

If anyone gets a chance to read a translation of the Krieg 1809 , they will find the Austrians deploying line troops all over the places, at times in large numbers, Regulars, Grenz, Freicorps and Grenadiers. Skirmishing was a far more flexible activity than most would believe. It's that flexibility that makes it hard to recreate easily on the tabletop. In fact, there is a direct relationship between the amount of skirmishing that occured on the battlefield and the lack of it portrayed on the table top.

Which game rules generally have more skirmish mechanics, Napoleonic war rules, or the ACW and Franco-Prussian? Yet, reading the tactical doctrine and battle narratives, and one sees far more skirmishing going on at later end of the 19th Century than the beginning.

There certainly were good and poor skirmishers among the national armies. Often designers use this as a reason to negate the use of poor or even regular skirmishers and only allow specialists or elites to skirmish.

Imagine doing that kind of 'negation' with other infantry formations like column and line simply because some troops were well-trained and others not.

Bill

Mine don't.

@Bede,

Almost all infantry could skirmish. We know that Davout had his line regiments in 1 Corps trained to skirmish in 1811. I have also seen examples of 92nd Foot, a highland regiment, skirmishing in Egypt in 1800, Prussian line infantry in 1806, Russian grenadiers in 1812, Prussian Landwehr in 1815. Austrians in 1809 have already been mentioned. Where line battalions didn't have specialist light companies, such as Austrians, the third rank was usually the source of trained skirmishers.

The only caveat one might place on universal skirmishing is some kind of penalty for non-specialist infantry but I'm not even sure about that.

I'd take the view that any Napoleonic rules that deliberately under-emphasise skirmishing or prevent line infantry from skirmishing at all, are not very good. It is the same as giving the British ‘magical' musketry. I can't understand why on one hand people go to great lengths to have their miniatures painted correctly yet on the other are unconcerned about unreflective rules.

Wargame rules should treat Skirmishing like other formations: Troop quality influences performance, but it doesn't restrict the use of such formations.

There certainly were SOPs and individual officers who had specific inclinations concerning skirmishing, like Davout, but in general, if an officer wanted to risk it, any unit could skirmish. How well was another issue entirely.

Bill

Bede – I agree that it must have been important but before you can fit it into some sort of rule system you need to know what they did and how, and why it couldnt be done in close order.

Perhaps in my post above I only addressed half my problem with skirmishing. Not only do I not understand what they did, I cannot fathom exactly how they went about it. Glib arm waving using the word screening does not help – screening whom from what? And yet, the only consistent thing about first person accounts and those of historians on what skirmishers did and how is that they drop into a vague mumble early in the piece.

Take the OP. Bernadotte, who had been around the block a few times, seems to have believed that it was better to assault the Austrians on the hill. I have yet to see a set of wargames rules in which a charge in open order has a better chance than one in close order, not until the gatling gun came into action. Clearly Bernadotte knew something that day which has escaped my 40 years of Napoleonic reading.

I (still) play the 'old' WRG ruleset, where I have several light infantry battalions based per 7 strips of 16 figures total; so 6 bases with 2 figs can skirmish, leaving the command base intact to retreat upon or fall back when charged.
I have the line battalions on 3 strips of each 4 figs to use as proper line infantry, with the 4th divided into 2 bases of 2 figs, as if these were the 2 flanking companies.

I maainly made the restriction for not every battalion to be deployed entirely as skirmishers, because it does cost points for every figure to be converted into being able to skirmish (+1 point); so that adds up quite quickly if you have 16 battalions (only 2 are light).
So in a way WRG has some restrictions, but you could choose to pay the points and have every one skirmish.
I do not do that because of 'historical' reasons when playing.

Cartman's approach is a half way house between my two diagrammes and is one I have used with the same set of rules. These solutions are so much easier today with steel and magnetic bases.

If you have time, try to replicate the OP with WRG. Note well that if you have equal points, the Saxons will be outnumbered because the Austrians dont need to skirmish.

So, if the whole Saxon battalion in Bede`s original post "spread out" and went forward, they`d be in "loose files" or "open order"; this isn`t quite the same thing as detaching skirmishing sub-units, or even having the whole unit skirmishing.

In my rules I treat loose order and open order troops as formed units but extended order as skirmishers in fights with formed close order units… all these adaptations have negative artillery fire effects modifiers though and infantry in these formation variants fight with their own particular unit class modifiers.

Mr Collins – NOW we are getting about one third of the way to the nitty gritty, consider the following:

The French reckoned skirmish order was 6 paces per two men, or roughly 3-4 files per file, giving a frontage of 5-6 times the original 3 rank company frontage (makes sense as the bn is about this frontage);
The brits reckoned 2 paces per pair, giving a VERY dense open order formation – about as close as heterosexual men would choose to be;
The brits had one light company of 10, implying a 9X spacing, approx 50% thinner than the french;
The continentals with a third rank, assuming pairs of men, are going to have a british style density unless they are only using a subset.

So, what do we consider to be frontages per pair, or per man if doctrine is different, for loose files, open order and extended order?

And what is skirmishing?

Rules like CLS and their derivatives use skirmishing as an important form of combat. For a set of rules that originated almost 50 years ago they seem to cover the subject pretty well.

The mechanic, depending on the variant, for indicating skirmishing units is to place a card equal in size to the base of the half company stand used for units that have skirmishing capabilities (A French Line battalion in 1809 has four 5 figure (Gren. and center) stands and two 3 figure stands (half company stands).

You can see some Austrian Lights (Jagers and Grenzers) thus indicated in this picture . Will

If you have a formed, close order body of troops on the one hand and a loose order, unformed body of troops on the other, if both sides have equal numbers the skirmishers will have the advantage at 100 yards. Musket accuracy was very poor. Therefore, the skirmishers are in a formation which requires individual accuracy out to 100 yards to suppress or hurt them. While, the close order body of troops are in a formation which only demands relative accuracy, not against an individual, but against a group, to suppress or hurt them.

Isn't that what the French Revolutionary forces mastered ?

In my limited reading I've also seen examples of skirmishers successfully conducting assaults against close order troops. Specifically the 17th Light… the Ukra River 1807, also Pultusk same year. In either case, I would think the training and experience of both the skirmishers and the troops in close order or loose order opposing them would be important factors in determing outcomes.

British infantry probably skirmished better than anyone else and their close order lines were less vulnerable to opposing skirmishers.

In short, allow anyone to be thrown into skirmish order, but then have deductions or additions for training, expereince, weapons, etc… How would standard Russian infantry skirmish ? Well, or not well ? Their muskets weren't very accurate or reliable, so putting a battalion of line Russians on the skirmish line ? But perhaps they charge well and though in skirmish firefighting they were probably terrible, perhaps they would prefer charging enemy skirmish lines and driving/suppressing/hurting them that way ?

I would think that men with pointy sticks told to assault that hill in open order would do as well as the Saxons.

The answer to the OP is that, assuming that the Saxons had a reasonable chance of success, YES.

But there is a broader issue. What were loose, open and extended order? What was skirmishing? How was it done?

As to the example at 100 yards – the length of a football pitch, I would either ignore them or: fire a volley, charge out of the smoke, and use my X more bayonet frontage to kill them. See how the light bobs like a foot of cold steel in their guts.

And popping off muskets at 150 paces, with 1/6 of my numbers, just what are they trying to do to me?

What were loose, open and extended order? What was skirmishing? How was it done?

Spread out men and take advantage of terrain to cover yourselves. Minimize the risk of the individual against enemy close order fire.

And popping off muskets at 150 paces, with 1/6 of my numbers, just what are they trying to do to me?

To hit as many of you as they can, so that they might cause disorder and perhaps fear in the "you's" they don't hit .

I really think the vast majority of troops during the Napoleonic Wars wouldn't have needed extensive training to grasp these basic concepts. How effective they may have been as a whole unit, is where training , experience, weapons would've played a deciding role in outcomes.

Bottom

Are you saying that there was no difference between loose – extended order, and that they were only used where there was cover?

Are you also saying that the only characteristic skirmishing had was to spread out and take cover?

Sit down with a copy of Hughe's firepower, unless one of our experts here has a better analysis of the percentage chance of hitting with a musket at 100 yards. Modify his percentage by the Prussian tests to allow for the fact that your skirmishers are aiming.

Bear in mind you are outnumbered 6:1 and I repeat what exactly do you think you are doing and how do you think that a unit which is trained to swap volleys at 80 paces is going to be frightened of you?

Grizzly and others who asked. In general terms a skirmish company detached from a battalion was normally divided into three elements. The skirmish element, consisting of a two rank line in open order, a support element in close order and a reserve element in close order. The distance between each of the three elements was typically 50 to 100 paces, the reserve being a similar ditance in front of the parent battalion. Distance between files on the skirmish line was typically 10-15 paces. No two instructions or regulation I have seen are exactly the same but all follow the same general pattern.

So no more than a third of the skirmish company, be it a light company or the third rank in the case of the Prussians and Austrians, was actually on the skirmish line at any one time.

The support element was usually rotated through the skirmish element. Actual skirmishing was done in pairs (files) the two men taking it in turns to fire or load in such a way that ideally one musket would always be loaded.

The purpose of skirmishing is more or less the same in all regulations that discuss it.

1. To protect formed troops against the fire of enemy skirmishers by keeping enemy skirmishers at a distance.

2. To fight in all kinds of terrain where formed lines can only move with difficulty.

3. To disguise an attack by deploying a swarm of skirmishers to prevent discovery of friendly movements.

4. To throw back enemy skirmishers, divert the enemy's attention and threaten the enemy's flanks, when moving forwards with close-order troops.

5. To hold enemy skirmishers during a retreat so that formed troops are able to make an undisturbed withdrawal.

6. To protect the flanks of a column against enemy skirmishers during flank and column marches.

Hope this helps.

XV

That is an excellent example of what skirmishers are supposed to do and how they are supposed to operate.

However

Distance between files on the skirmish line was typically 10-15 paces.

Except that the brits considered extended order to be two paces between men (so 3 paces per man) and open order about 2 paces per man. Why the difference?

The Austrian 1807 regulation estimates 60-80 men as sufficient to screen a battallion of about 10 times this No, suggesting a frontage of 4-5 paces per man, or 8-10 per pair.

Now as to what they were for – section 1 seems fine, although one wonders what the French must have thought when faced with a brit skirmish line of 5X or 8X their firepower.

Point 2 makes sense, although why fight where your main effort is not being made?

3. Just how are a bunch of guys 10 paces apart going to hide anything bigger than a basketball?

4a Ok, a bit like 1 then;
4b Divert the enemy's attention from what?
4c How are a few blokes 10 paces aprt going to threaten my flanks, and how often is it that I wont have another unit on those flanks?

5. So, 1 again
6 Likewise

So, these innefective 30 or 40 odd men are so going to inconvenience my formed battallion, trained to swap shots at 80 paces, that I need to mess about with skirmishers to protect mysel – despite the credibility gap, taking that to be so, why the big deal?

Point 3 sounds great, but how?
Threatning flanks is great, but you are threatning like a mosquito threatens an elephant – what is the threat, be frightened or I will yell boo? be frightened or I will fire my pathetically inadequate fire arm, be frightened or I will plunge into a mass of troops who outnumber me umpteen to one?

The only credible part of this is that if you wish to dominate rough terrain, open order is the way to go – Seven years war Pandours. But the point of deciision will be elsewhere.

There is a disconnect between the what and the how which suggests that too much folk lore is being recycled. There must have been a battle winning what and there must have been a how to achieve that what.

As I said no two regs are the same. I will see if I can provide you with more precise info on distances between files. The points 1 to 6 are an amalgamation of the Prussian 1812 and Austrian 1807 regs.

Divert from what? Whatever you want to divert the enemy's attention from what you are doing I suppose.

If you multiply your 30-40 men by the number of battalions to your front and bear in mind the they are making use of any cover available, then over time they are going to seriously inconvenience your nicely formed close order battalion that are the sizes of a barn doors and whose return fire is not effective.

If they can keep you from doing the same to their formed troops they have won the skirmish I think. Also the smoke -which is usually ignored in most rules – will obscure what is going on behind them. One of the roles of skirmishers was also as a 'trip wire' to prevent you being surprised.

Having said all that, skirmishers tended I think, to cancel each other out quite often but if one side had them out and the other didn't – well that was probably a problem. Take Graewert at Auerstedt, although artillery was just as much an issue, the French skirmishers were unopposed and that was clearly an additional problem.

On the whole though I don't think skirmishers were ever decisive.

Bill

Divert their attention, these are musket balls, not s!

Graewurt shows that with a musket they could target officers and NCO's, from memory the range they were doing that from isn't given. But how many rules give you a chance to shake or disorder, or what have you a unit under skirmish fiore for X turns, irrespective of mass casulties?

12 paces per man, a battalion is going to be faced by about 40 or so max – this isnt a wargame were skirmishers are huddled up like a bunch of old women.

If battalions are like barn doors, how do you explain how many rounds it took to kill a man?

See what I mean, the what and the how dont make much sense. And the little bit that does, isn't reflected in any rules that I have read let alone any which I have played.

GrizzlyMC, uncork your headgear bro. I said what I said. If you can't handle it, then keep counting "paces" and let me know when you find the evidence that your technocrat BS made a difference on a real Napoleonic battlefield.

XV Brigada:

Yep, those were seen as major roles for skirmish infantry. they are very much the role of le petite guerre during the SYW, but early in the Napoleonic wars, it was understood that skirmishing had additional mission objectives on the battlefield: [Just some examples]

1."When a regiment or a battalion", says the the Prussian Schutzen Instructions of 1789, "moves forward to take a position, the tirailleurs [the Schützen and their supports] can deploy ahead of their unit, then move forward of their battalions to cause by their fire a certain damage in the enemy's ranks and to disorder it before the arrival of the battalion. But when one or more battalions come within musket range of the enemy, the tirailleurs must fall back on each side and follow the battalion or regiment and hence can protect the flanks.

2.French Provisional Instructions of 1792:

"The light troops are placed in small thickets, behind hedges, ditches, or small rises, according to the nature of the ground. They are commanded to fire at the enemy batteries, and to try and kill the gunners. These men do not form troops, so as not to draw artillery fire, …"

Of course, this itself had been drawn word for word from the French Reglément of 1778.

3. Sharnhorst's Officers' Field Pocket Book, published in 1796 provides instructions for skirmishers to not only distrupt formed enemy infantry, but to target enemy artillery and to sieze forward terrain "in preparation for the advance of the main battleline."

Whether troops deployed in loose files or extended line, or deployed at 6 yards apart, or even 20 yards, it all depended on the training of the troops, the tactical needs of the moment and of course, enemy actions. For instance, we see the British deploying 'skirmishers' in extended line as well as 'chains' of pairs or files at much greater distances from each other.

Training made a difference, just as it did in all other military endeavors, but the lack of training didn't preclude a unit from deploying as skirmishers.

A light company would provide a screen for their battalion which covered not only the battalion's front but also out past the flanks as well as a reserve.

However, light companies were often deployed in groups. Most French divisions had 'legere' officers among their staff to command these multi-company forces. The Union and Confederates often used the same method, a company captain being designated by the colonel to command multi-company skirmish forces. The same method was used at the brigade level with entire regiments.

The British formed combined light battalions which had designated commanders. The post-Jena Prussians had a Fusilier officer of a brigade designated as the commander of a skirmish force of multiple companies, fusilier and third rank.

And apart from the really raw French conscripts of 1792-94, most troops could dispurse as skirmishers and be recalled in relatively short order in most game time scales. [recall was one of the first calls light and line infantry learned in skirmish training.]

There was much more going on with skirmish combat during the Napoleonic wars than most would have us believe.

Bill

Take Graewert at Auerstedt, although artillery was just as much an issue, the French skirmishers were unopposed and that was clearly an additional problem.

XV Brigada:

I think you are referring to Grawert at Jena. His division was not at Auerstadt. The French skirmishers were far from unopposed. 25% of all the Prussian and Saxon infantry at Jena were deployed as skirmishers, light and line: Here are some examples:

1. Zweifel regiment deployed their entire third rank at the beginning of the battle. [@400 men out of 1200]

2. Stanitz's grenadier Brigade with Holtzendorf deployed the entire third rank of his command, driving the French 10th Legere Tirailleurs back before then were reinforced. [@850 men out of 2600]

3. The Grenadier Battalions Hahn and Sack each deployed an entire company as skirmishers [@290 men out of 1160]

4. According to their colonel, the Hohenloe Regiment deployed 'several' waves of volunteers which with the Schutzen held back the French skirmishers. [At least 3 X 80 plus the 80 Schutzen from the two battalions, or 320 men]

5. Ney's elite battalions of light and grenadiers were driven out of the Altenburg Woods situated the middle of the Prussian line, between Vierzehenheiligen and Isserstadt.
This is a body of nearly 1000 men, so the Prussian must have had at least that many deployed as skirmishers to drive them out of the woods.

All these incidents [and more] are noted in Bressonet's 1898 study of the battles.

That doesn't mean the French skirmishers weren't a problem for the Prussians. They were, if only because the French were far better at skirmishing and outnumbered the Prussians 2-1 at each juncture of the battle. However, they were most definitely opposed by Prussian skirmishers.

However, that isn't the way it is told by far too many history books.

Bill

Dear Grizzlymc

Skirmishing isn`t just "spreading out", adopting a looser order… and inspite of each nation`s light infantry regulations stated intervals, each nation`s commanding officers could vary them according to the circumstances.

But the original poster gave example of line infantry simply advancing and assaulting an enemy position… it would be nice to see more of the context here… but i`d guess that Marshal Bernadotte really wanted the battalion to advance in loose files to minimize casualties and in doing so, speed up their assault.
I`m not surprised that the Saxon officers looked a little confused (and something might have been lost and/or found in the translation) if they were being asked to both skirmish and assualt with the battalion in the same order!

If we`re about "spreading out" here, it is a part of light infantry drill. Now, a light battalion if told to adopt a loose order (being in two ranks – which many nation`s were) could easily skirmish in the pairs that that order would produce… but obviously a light battalion skirmishing in this manner would not have any supports or reserves; and this, properly speaking, is what I mean by "skirmishing".

How would you show this in a wargame? I mean this sort of spreading out into double or triple the normal frontage of a battalion, if that is what we're talking about? Would you sort of break up the bases of the battalion an inch or two to show that the men are fanning out? To my knowledge there are no rulesets that allow for this. I think Piquet might have, but that might also just be my imagination…

To my knowledge there are no rulesets that allow for this.

The old WRG 1685-1845 rules did. Units that could skirmish were mounted on two half-sized bases that were moved apart.

It worked quite well. In the rules units are typically 3 or 4 bases large, so one or two bases could be split up to throw out a skirmish screen in front of the parent unit.

I`ve posted a diagram to my blog for how I represent this `22.

link

Bill,

Yes of course I did mean Jena. It was late! I was alluding to Graewert specifically and I have not seen any descriptions of Pussian skirmishers deployed to screen his division. As far as I know the French skirmishers in front of Vierzehnheilgen were unopposed.

I totally agree with you about Prussian skirmishers in 1806 generally. You will also find at least one example of a Prussian centre company deploying as skirmishers in 1806, in Jany I think.

As far as Etude Tactiques is concerned it is possibly one of the most useful books to the wargamer.

Bill

Michael,

Bressonet's Etudes Tactiques sur la Campagne de 1806 has quite a lot to say about French skirmishers. What I described above is what the French called Tirailleurs de Route et de Combat. These skirmish companies remained tied to their parent battalion.

The other kind were Tirailleurs en Grande Bande. As the name implies they were bigger and are described as a "corps principale". They consisted of an an entire battalion or more used for an open order assault usually where terrain prevented the used of formed close order.

Bill

Sorry Bill,

I missed your earlier points and was replying to Grizzlymc and the OP.
In my rules I have used the example loosely on Desmichel`s essay on Light Infantry. In which he describes a formation with the first and second ranks of the centre companies "en tirailleur", the elite companies formed on the wings and the third ranks of the centre companies formed in column on the centre.
In my rules I have represented the supports and reserves with the elite company bases in column at the rear.
I have arranged it in this way so as not to be confused with a unit in line which may simply open its order.

mike.

XV Brigada:

I agree that Bressonet's study is extremely valuable. He is however, still Focused on the French and at times does not detail or perhaps recognize what the Prussians did, leaving several Prussian skirmish successes unexplained, like that at the Altenburg Woods.

As for the five battalions of Grawert's division [the regiments Grawert, Zastrow and one from Stanitz] facing Vierzehnheiligen--

the first thing that Grawert did upon reaching the front of Vierzehnheilgen was to throw out skirmishers. This is in both Marwitz's official report and Colonel von Kalckreuth narrative, the commander of infantry Regiment Prince of Hohenlohe (No. 32) [both reported in Jany and quoted in Bressonet:

"Our infantry attack, before which the enemy skirmishers fell back, now came up to the village Vierzehn Heiligen where a line was formed again and the left flank was taken slightly around the village . . . The village was occupied by the enemy in strength, and behind it, out of our line of sight, he had squeezed together strong columns or was bringing them up. During this time the infantry of Grawert's division continued its offensive march on Vierzehnheiligen …

"The French, posted in the hedges and enclosures, put up a lively fire. Their action, like that of the skirmishers spread out over the plain, along with the cannon of the grand battery and the artillery of V Corps inflicted significant losses on the Prussian line for which there was no proper reserve to replace them.

"Grawert's infantry replied to this terrible fire by first throwing out to the fore their isolated skirmishers, then by employing battalion volleys and platoon fire, mostly without result despite the skirmish fire of the French being so effective that Regiment Sanitz fell back for a moment. it was however reformed in line by Prince Hohenlohe.

So, Grawert's first action was to throw out skirmishers. What Marwitz means by 'isolated' is not clear. It could have been lonly the Schutzen deployed, 40 men per battalion, so no more than 200 against Vierzehnheilgen, which would have been a chain of men, 2 for every 5 yards. So 'isolated' could have meant few in number. It could also mean that Grawert didn't reinforce them, but supported them by volley fire instead. There is some suggestion that there was Pelet's Fusilier battalion with Grawert, but that is just a narrative from a line officer in Grawert's division.

Marwitz morbidly jokes at this point in the report:

"It seemed as if we wanted to take the village by fire. We were standing only a few hundred paces from his batteries and the hail of canister wrought an incredible devastation in our battalions which we could not replace with anything.

The Prussians deployed skirmishers, recalled them when it was obvious they were not doing any good against the French in the village, and while volley-firing on the village at an appreciable distance,[200 paces] brought up artillery.

Once the French were driven into the village by the artillery fire, and the fires started by the incendiary shells, Hohenlohe ordered the advance to begin again.

Lannes, in his official report, calls this the crucial threat of the day. Ney had been repulsed and most of the Prussian line stabilized to the point that Hohenlohe felt confident in attempting to restart the advance. This is where Lannes commits the 100th and 103rd to a spoiling attack on the Prussian left flank. It stops the advance, though the French battalions are finally driven back.

So, the Prussians attempted to oppose the French skirmishers in Vierzehnheilgen. There just wasn't enough of them, and standing in the open against superior numbers in the village was quickly seen as a failing proposition. What we see is the Prussians attempting to 'solve' the problem of French skirmishers in the Village first with skirmishers, and then with artillery, which is successful in driving them in. One the French fire has slackened, Hohenlohe again attempted to take the village. During the battle he would attempt it three times.

The first time he stopped because the Stanitz regiment recoiled and had to be brought back into line and the village fire had to be surpressed. The second time, the advance was stopped by Lannes spoiling attack. The third time, Grawert first congratulates Hohenlohe on winning the battle and then talks him out of attacking the village until Rachel's reinforcements arrive. Because of these three stalls, the Prussians stand around for over an hour under artillery and skirmish fire. As Colonel von Kalckreuth says:

Despite that, [enemy fire] the courage of the men was unshaken and if circumstances had allowed us to attack the enemy instead of waiting for his attack, then this courage would never have dissipated. In the meantime, the former did not occur, there merely came the order not to advance any further. This lack of movement gave everybody the opportunity to see the unfavorable turn of events and the disorder tearing the beaten left flank apart everywhere[Sanitz's regiment facing the French grand battery of 30 guns].

Bill

Bill,

Thanks for that. I think it is reasonable enough for a French officer from the Historical Section of the General Staff to be focused on the French. A problem with Bressonnet is that Etudes Tactiques was completed posthumously and towards the end it is sometimes a bit contradictory.

I will re-read it but I am looking now at Chapter XX "La Division Grawert Entre en Ligne" on p158 and I can't see your quote. What page should I be looking at?

Bill

Bill:

I believe it is in the appendices where several battle reports, including Lannes are printed up. Marwitz's offical report is there. A friend barrowed my copy, so I don't have it handy at the moment.

I will have it back on Monday and can look up the particulars there. I have the quotes pulled out and stored in a different place, which is why I could come up with them now.

Bill

Bill:

My friend looked it up in my copy of Bressonet. Marwitz's report isn't there [I thought it was], only French reports.

However, Bressonet uses Marwitz's report in several places in describing Prussian actions.

If you look on page 165 of the Bowden translation [which I assume is the one you have], middle paraphraphs, you will find the mention of Grawart responding to the fire from the village by first sending out skirmishers. Massenbach also has an account that supports that action.

Sorry for the confusion. I simply didn't have the book at hand.

Bill